instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* WebContents::Create(const WebContents::CreateParams& params) {
FrameTreeNode* opener_node = nullptr;
if (params.opener_render_frame_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* opener_rfh = RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(
params.opener_render_process_id, params.opener_render_frame_id);
if (opener_rfh)
opener_node = opener_rfh->frame_tree_node();
}
return WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener(params, opener_node);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct kvm_io_device *kvm_io_bus_get_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
gpa_t addr)
{
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
int dev_idx, srcu_idx;
struct kvm_io_device *iodev = NULL;
srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
bus = srcu_dereference(kvm->buses[bus_idx], &kvm->srcu);
dev_idx = kvm_io_bus_get_first_dev(bus, addr, 1);
if (dev_idx < 0)
goto out_unlock;
iodev = bus->range[dev_idx].dev;
out_unlock:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
return iodev;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CSPSourceList::parsePort(const UChar* begin, const UChar* end, int& port, CSPSource::WildcardDisposition& portWildcard)
{
ASSERT(begin <= end);
ASSERT(!port);
ASSERT(portWildcard == CSPSource::NoWildcard);
if (!skipExactly<UChar>(begin, end, ':'))
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
if (begin == end)
return false;
if (end - begin == 1 && *begin == '*') {
port = 0;
portWildcard = CSPSource::HasWildcard;
return true;
}
const UChar* position = begin;
skipWhile<UChar, isASCIIDigit>(position, end);
if (position != end)
return false;
bool ok;
port = charactersToIntStrict(begin, end - begin, &ok);
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: off_t HFSForkReadStream::Seek(off_t offset, int whence) {
DCHECK_EQ(SEEK_SET, whence);
DCHECK_GE(offset, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<uint64_t>(offset), fork_.logicalSize);
size_t target_block = offset / hfs_->block_size();
size_t block_count = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(fork_.extents); ++i) {
const HFSPlusExtentDescriptor* extent = &fork_.extents[i];
if (extent->startBlock == 0 && extent->blockCount == 0)
break;
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> new_block_count(block_count);
new_block_count += extent->blockCount;
if (!new_block_count.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek offset block count overflows";
return false;
}
if (target_block < new_block_count.ValueOrDie()) {
if (current_extent_ != i) {
read_current_extent_ = false;
current_extent_ = i;
}
auto iterator_block_offset =
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t>(block_count) * hfs_->block_size();
if (!iterator_block_offset.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek block offset overflows";
return false;
}
fork_logical_offset_ = offset;
return offset;
}
block_count = new_block_count.ValueOrDie();
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 16,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<NetworkHandler*> NetworkHandler::ForAgentHost(
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* host) {
return DevToolsSession::HandlersForAgentHost<NetworkHandler>(
host, Network::Metainfo::domainName);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LimitCache(size_t cache_size) {
download_manager.set_max_form_cache_size(cache_size);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: register_address_increment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long *reg, int inc)
{
ulong mask;
if (ctxt->ad_bytes == sizeof(unsigned long))
mask = ~0UL;
else
mask = ad_mask(ctxt);
masked_increment(reg, mask, inc);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hidp_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p", sock);
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_BLUETOOTH, GFP_ATOMIC, &hidp_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sock->ops = &hidp_sock_ops;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
bt_sock_link(&hidp_sk_list, sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 9,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: initializeEncoding(XML_Parser parser)
{
const char *s;
#ifdef XML_UNICODE
char encodingBuf[128];
/* See comments abount `protoclEncodingName` in parserInit() */
if (!parser->m_protocolEncodingName)
s = NULL;
else {
int i;
for (i = 0; parser->m_protocolEncodingName[i]; i++) {
if (i == sizeof(encodingBuf) - 1
|| (parser->m_protocolEncodingName[i] & ~0x7f) != 0) {
encodingBuf[0] = '\0';
break;
}
encodingBuf[i] = (char)parser->m_protocolEncodingName[i];
}
encodingBuf[i] = '\0';
s = encodingBuf;
}
#else
s = parser->m_protocolEncodingName;
#endif
if ((parser->m_ns ? XmlInitEncodingNS : XmlInitEncoding)(&parser->m_initEncoding, &parser->m_encoding, s))
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
return handleUnknownEncoding(parser, parser->m_protocolEncodingName);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 1,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
{
int mxsize, cmd_size, k;
int input_size, blocking;
unsigned char opcode;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
struct sg_header old_hdr;
sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];
if (unlikely(uaccess_kernel()))
return -EINVAL;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_write: count=%d\n", (int) count));
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (!((filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ||
scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device)))
return -ENXIO;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
return -EFAULT; /* protects following copy_from_user()s + get_user()s */
if (count < SZ_SG_HEADER)
return -EIO;
if (__copy_from_user(&old_hdr, buf, SZ_SG_HEADER))
return -EFAULT;
blocking = !(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (old_hdr.reply_len < 0)
return sg_new_write(sfp, filp, buf, count,
blocking, 0, 0, NULL);
if (count < (SZ_SG_HEADER + 6))
return -EIO; /* The minimum scsi command length is 6 bytes. */
if (!(srp = sg_add_request(sfp))) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(1, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_write: queue full\n"));
return -EDOM;
}
buf += SZ_SG_HEADER;
__get_user(opcode, buf);
mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
if (sfp->next_cmd_len > 0) {
cmd_size = sfp->next_cmd_len;
sfp->next_cmd_len = 0; /* reset so only this write() effected */
} else {
cmd_size = COMMAND_SIZE(opcode); /* based on SCSI command group */
if ((opcode >= 0xc0) && old_hdr.twelve_byte)
cmd_size = 12;
}
mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n", (int) opcode, cmd_size));
/* Determine buffer size. */
input_size = count - cmd_size;
mxsize = (input_size > old_hdr.reply_len) ? input_size : old_hdr.reply_len;
mxsize -= SZ_SG_HEADER;
input_size -= SZ_SG_HEADER;
if (input_size < 0) {
sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -EIO; /* User did not pass enough bytes for this command. */
}
hp = &srp->header;
hp->interface_id = '\0'; /* indicator of old interface tunnelled */
hp->cmd_len = (unsigned char) cmd_size;
hp->iovec_count = 0;
hp->mx_sb_len = 0;
if (input_size > 0)
hp->dxfer_direction = (old_hdr.reply_len > SZ_SG_HEADER) ?
SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV : SG_DXFER_TO_DEV;
else
hp->dxfer_direction = (mxsize > 0) ? SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV : SG_DXFER_NONE;
hp->dxfer_len = mxsize;
if ((hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_DEV) ||
(hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV))
hp->dxferp = (char __user *)buf + cmd_size;
else
hp->dxferp = NULL;
hp->sbp = NULL;
hp->timeout = old_hdr.reply_len; /* structure abuse ... */
hp->flags = input_size; /* structure abuse ... */
hp->pack_id = old_hdr.pack_id;
hp->usr_ptr = NULL;
if (__copy_from_user(cmnd, buf, cmd_size))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV is functionally equivalent to SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV,
* but is is possible that the app intended SG_DXFER_TO_DEV, because there
* is a non-zero input_size, so emit a warning.
*/
if (hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_WARNING
"sg_write: data in/out %d/%d bytes "
"for SCSI command 0x%x-- guessing "
"data in;\n program %s not setting "
"count and/or reply_len properly\n",
old_hdr.reply_len - (int)SZ_SG_HEADER,
input_size, (unsigned int) cmnd[0],
current->comm);
}
k = sg_common_write(sfp, srp, cmnd, sfp->timeout, blocking);
return (k < 0) ? k : count;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 17,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Editor::PasteAsFragment(DocumentFragment* pasting_fragment,
bool smart_replace,
bool match_style) {
Element* target = FindEventTargetFromSelection();
if (!target)
return;
target->DispatchEvent(TextEvent::CreateForFragmentPaste(
GetFrame().DomWindow(), pasting_fragment, smart_replace, match_style));
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NotificationView(const DialogNotification& data,
AutofillDialogViewDelegate* delegate)
: data_(data),
delegate_(delegate),
checkbox_(NULL) {
scoped_ptr<views::View> label_view;
if (data.HasCheckbox()) {
scoped_ptr<views::Checkbox> checkbox(
new views::Checkbox(base::string16()));
checkbox->SetText(data.display_text());
checkbox->SetTextMultiLine(true);
checkbox->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
checkbox->SetTextColor(views::Button::STATE_NORMAL,
data.GetTextColor());
checkbox->SetTextColor(views::Button::STATE_HOVERED,
data.GetTextColor());
checkbox->SetChecked(data.checked());
checkbox->set_listener(this);
checkbox_ = checkbox.get();
label_view.reset(checkbox.release());
} else {
scoped_ptr<views::StyledLabel> label(new views::StyledLabel(
data.display_text(), this));
label->set_auto_color_readability_enabled(false);
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo text_style;
text_style.color = data.GetTextColor();
if (data.link_range().is_empty()) {
label->AddStyleRange(gfx::Range(0, data.display_text().size()),
text_style);
} else {
gfx::Range prefix_range(0, data.link_range().start());
if (!prefix_range.is_empty())
label->AddStyleRange(prefix_range, text_style);
label->AddStyleRange(
data.link_range(),
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo::CreateForLink());
gfx::Range suffix_range(data.link_range().end(),
data.display_text().size());
if (!suffix_range.is_empty())
label->AddStyleRange(suffix_range, text_style);
}
label_view.reset(label.release());
}
AddChildView(label_view.release());
if (!data.tooltip_text().empty())
AddChildView(new TooltipIcon(data.tooltip_text()));
set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(data.GetBackgroundColor()));
SetBorder(views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(
1, 0, 1, 0, data.GetBorderColor()));
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void atl2_clear_phy_int(struct atl2_adapter *adapter)
{
u16 phy_data;
spin_lock(&adapter->stats_lock);
atl2_read_phy_reg(&adapter->hw, 19, &phy_data);
spin_unlock(&adapter->stats_lock);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltFreeTransformContext(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
/*
* Shutdown the extension modules associated to the stylesheet
* used if needed.
*/
xsltShutdownCtxtExts(ctxt);
if (ctxt->xpathCtxt != NULL) {
ctxt->xpathCtxt->nsHash = NULL;
xmlXPathFreeContext(ctxt->xpathCtxt);
}
if (ctxt->templTab != NULL)
xmlFree(ctxt->templTab);
if (ctxt->varsTab != NULL)
xmlFree(ctxt->varsTab);
if (ctxt->profTab != NULL)
xmlFree(ctxt->profTab);
if ((ctxt->extrasNr > 0) && (ctxt->extras != NULL)) {
int i;
for (i = 0;i < ctxt->extrasNr;i++) {
if ((ctxt->extras[i].deallocate != NULL) &&
(ctxt->extras[i].info != NULL))
ctxt->extras[i].deallocate(ctxt->extras[i].info);
}
xmlFree(ctxt->extras);
}
xsltFreeGlobalVariables(ctxt);
xsltFreeDocuments(ctxt);
xsltFreeCtxtExts(ctxt);
xsltFreeRVTs(ctxt);
xsltTransformCacheFree(ctxt->cache);
xmlDictFree(ctxt->dict);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"freeing transformation dictionary\n");
#endif
memset(ctxt, -1, sizeof(xsltTransformContext));
xmlFree(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcInstallColormap(ClientPtr client)
{
ColormapPtr pcmp;
int rc;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pcmp, stuff->id, RT_COLORMAP,
client, DixInstallAccess);
if (rc != Success)
goto out;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_SCREEN_ACCESS, client, pcmp->pScreen, DixSetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success) {
if (rc == BadValue)
rc = BadColor;
goto out;
}
(*(pcmp->pScreen->InstallColormap)) (pcmp);
return Success;
out:
client->errorValue = stuff->id;
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 21,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *p,*buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
goto err;
}
inl=i2d(data,NULL);
buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p=buf_in;
i2d(data,&p);
ret=
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)
&& EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (!ret)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = -1;
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: use correct function name
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 5,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _warc_bid(struct archive_read *a, int best_bid)
{
const char *hdr;
ssize_t nrd;
unsigned int ver;
(void)best_bid; /* UNUSED */
/* check first line of file, it should be a record already */
if ((hdr = __archive_read_ahead(a, 12U, &nrd)) == NULL) {
/* no idea what to do */
return -1;
} else if (nrd < 12) {
/* nah, not for us, our magic cookie is at least 12 bytes */
return -1;
}
/* otherwise snarf the record's version number */
ver = _warc_rdver(hdr, nrd);
if (ver < 1200U || ver > 10000U) {
/* we only support WARC 0.12 to 1.0 */
return -1;
}
/* otherwise be confident */
return (64);
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 26,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<gfx::Transform>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
const char* column_major_data;
if (!iter->ReadBytes(&column_major_data, sizeof(SkMScalar) * 16))
return false;
r->matrix().setColMajor(
reinterpret_cast<const SkMScalar*>(column_major_data));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sas_ata_internal_abort(struct sas_task *task)
{
struct sas_internal *si = dev_to_sas_internal(task->dev);
unsigned long flags;
int res;
spin_lock_irqsave(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
if (task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_ABORTED ||
task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: Task %p already finished.\n", __func__,
task);
goto out;
}
task->task_state_flags |= SAS_TASK_STATE_ABORTED;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
res = si->dft->lldd_abort_task(task);
spin_lock_irqsave(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
if (task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE ||
res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
goto out;
}
/* XXX we are not prepared to deal with ->lldd_abort_task()
* failures. TODO: lldds need to unconditionally forget about
* aborted ata tasks, otherwise we (likely) leak the sas task
* here
*/
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: Task %p leaked.\n", __func__, task);
if (!(task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE))
task->task_state_flags &= ~SAS_TASK_STATE_ABORTED;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
return;
out:
sas_free_task(task);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ctr_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return ctr_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->enc, sctx, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void readpng2_warning_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg)
{
fprintf(stderr, "readpng2 libpng warning: %s\n", msg);
fflush(stderr);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 24,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int complete_emulated_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
BUG_ON(!vcpu->arch.pio.count);
return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init isolated_cpu_setup(char *str)
{
int ret;
alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_isolated_map);
ret = cpulist_parse(str, cpu_isolated_map);
if (ret) {
pr_err("sched: Error, all isolcpus= values must be between 0 and %d\n", nr_cpu_ids);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OobeUI::ShowOobeUI(bool show) {
core_handler_->ShowOobeUI(show);
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFlexibleBox::needToStretchChildLogicalHeight(RenderBox* child) const
{
if (alignmentForChild(child) != ItemPositionStretch)
return false;
return isHorizontalFlow() && child->style()->height().isAuto();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arm_vcpu_arch_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
{
int ret;
switch (attr->group) {
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_CTRL:
ret = kvm_arm_pmu_v3_set_attr(vcpu, attr);
break;
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_CTRL:
ret = kvm_arm_timer_set_attr(vcpu, attr);
break;
default:
ret = -ENXIO;
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandlePostSubBufferCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::PostSubBufferCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::PostSubBufferCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandlePostSubBufferCHROMIUM");
if (!supports_post_sub_buffer_) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glPostSubBufferCHROMIUM", "command not supported by surface");
return error::kNoError;
}
bool is_tracing;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("gpu.debug"),
&is_tracing);
if (is_tracing) {
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
ScopedFramebufferBinder binder(this, GetBoundDrawFramebufferServiceId());
gpu_state_tracer_->TakeSnapshotWithCurrentFramebuffer(
is_offscreen ? offscreen_size_ : surface_->GetSize());
}
ClearScheduleCALayerState();
if (supports_async_swap_) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN0("gpu", "AsyncSwapBuffers", c.swap_id());
client()->OnSwapBuffers(c.swap_id(), c.flags);
surface_->PostSubBufferAsync(
c.x, c.y, c.width, c.height,
base::BindOnce(&GLES2DecoderImpl::FinishAsyncSwapBuffers,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), c.swap_id()),
base::DoNothing());
} else {
client()->OnSwapBuffers(c.swap_id(), c.flags);
FinishSwapBuffers(surface_->PostSubBuffer(c.x, c.y, c.width, c.height,
base::DoNothing()));
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int alloc_debug_processing(struct kmem_cache *s,
struct page *page, void *object, void *addr) { return 0; }
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 2,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CopySmiToDoubleElements(FixedArrayBase* from_base,
uint32_t from_start,
FixedArrayBase* to_base, uint32_t to_start,
int raw_copy_size) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_allocation;
int copy_size = raw_copy_size;
if (raw_copy_size < 0) {
DCHECK(raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEnd ||
raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole);
copy_size = from_base->length() - from_start;
if (raw_copy_size == ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole) {
for (int i = to_start + copy_size; i < to_base->length(); ++i) {
FixedDoubleArray::cast(to_base)->set_the_hole(i);
}
}
}
DCHECK((copy_size + static_cast<int>(to_start)) <= to_base->length() &&
(copy_size + static_cast<int>(from_start)) <= from_base->length());
if (copy_size == 0) return;
FixedArray* from = FixedArray::cast(from_base);
FixedDoubleArray* to = FixedDoubleArray::cast(to_base);
Object* the_hole = from->GetHeap()->the_hole_value();
for (uint32_t from_end = from_start + static_cast<uint32_t>(copy_size);
from_start < from_end; from_start++, to_start++) {
Object* hole_or_smi = from->get(from_start);
if (hole_or_smi == the_hole) {
to->set_the_hole(to_start);
} else {
to->set(to_start, Smi::cast(hole_or_smi)->value());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 18,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t sc_right_trim(u8 *buf, size_t len) {
size_t i;
if (!buf)
return 0;
if (len > 0) {
for(i = len-1; i > 0; i--) {
if(!isprint(buf[i])) {
buf[i] = '\0';
len--;
continue;
}
break;
}
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 26,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int filemap_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
int error;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct file_ra_state *ra = &file->f_ra;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct page *page;
unsigned long size;
int did_readaround = 0;
int ret = 0;
size = (i_size_read(inode) + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (vmf->pgoff >= size)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
/* If we don't want any read-ahead, don't bother */
if (VM_RandomReadHint(vma))
goto no_cached_page;
/*
* Do we have something in the page cache already?
*/
retry_find:
page = find_lock_page(mapping, vmf->pgoff);
/*
* For sequential accesses, we use the generic readahead logic.
*/
if (VM_SequentialReadHint(vma)) {
if (!page) {
page_cache_sync_readahead(mapping, ra, file,
vmf->pgoff, 1);
page = find_lock_page(mapping, vmf->pgoff);
if (!page)
goto no_cached_page;
}
if (PageReadahead(page)) {
page_cache_async_readahead(mapping, ra, file, page,
vmf->pgoff, 1);
}
}
if (!page) {
unsigned long ra_pages;
ra->mmap_miss++;
/*
* Do we miss much more than hit in this file? If so,
* stop bothering with read-ahead. It will only hurt.
*/
if (ra->mmap_miss > MMAP_LOTSAMISS)
goto no_cached_page;
/*
* To keep the pgmajfault counter straight, we need to
* check did_readaround, as this is an inner loop.
*/
if (!did_readaround) {
ret = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
count_vm_event(PGMAJFAULT);
}
did_readaround = 1;
ra_pages = max_sane_readahead(file->f_ra.ra_pages);
if (ra_pages) {
pgoff_t start = 0;
if (vmf->pgoff > ra_pages / 2)
start = vmf->pgoff - ra_pages / 2;
do_page_cache_readahead(mapping, file, start, ra_pages);
}
page = find_lock_page(mapping, vmf->pgoff);
if (!page)
goto no_cached_page;
}
if (!did_readaround)
ra->mmap_miss--;
/*
* We have a locked page in the page cache, now we need to check
* that it's up-to-date. If not, it is going to be due to an error.
*/
if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page)))
goto page_not_uptodate;
/* Must recheck i_size under page lock */
size = (i_size_read(inode) + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (unlikely(vmf->pgoff >= size)) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
/*
* Found the page and have a reference on it.
*/
mark_page_accessed(page);
ra->prev_pos = (loff_t)page->index << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
vmf->page = page;
return ret | VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
no_cached_page:
/*
* We're only likely to ever get here if MADV_RANDOM is in
* effect.
*/
error = page_cache_read(file, vmf->pgoff);
/*
* The page we want has now been added to the page cache.
* In the unlikely event that someone removed it in the
* meantime, we'll just come back here and read it again.
*/
if (error >= 0)
goto retry_find;
/*
* An error return from page_cache_read can result if the
* system is low on memory, or a problem occurs while trying
* to schedule I/O.
*/
if (error == -ENOMEM)
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
page_not_uptodate:
/* IO error path */
if (!did_readaround) {
ret = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
count_vm_event(PGMAJFAULT);
}
/*
* Umm, take care of errors if the page isn't up-to-date.
* Try to re-read it _once_. We do this synchronously,
* because there really aren't any performance issues here
* and we need to check for errors.
*/
ClearPageError(page);
error = mapping->a_ops->readpage(file, page);
page_cache_release(page);
if (!error || error == AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE)
goto retry_find;
/* Things didn't work out. Return zero to tell the mm layer so. */
shrink_readahead_size_eio(file, ra);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BrowserTabStripController::HasAvailableDragActions() const {
return model_->delegate()->GetDragActions();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_to_shortform(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args,
int forkoff)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_local *name_loc;
struct xfs_da_args nargs;
struct xfs_inode *dp = args->dp;
char *tmpbuffer;
int error;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_to_sf(args);
tmpbuffer = kmem_alloc(args->geo->blksize, KM_SLEEP);
if (!tmpbuffer)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(tmpbuffer, bp->b_addr, args->geo->blksize);
leaf = (xfs_attr_leafblock_t *)tmpbuffer;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(args->geo, &ichdr, leaf);
entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
/* XXX (dgc): buffer is about to be marked stale - why zero it? */
memset(bp->b_addr, 0, args->geo->blksize);
/*
* Clean out the prior contents of the attribute list.
*/
error = xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp);
if (error)
goto out;
if (forkoff == -1) {
ASSERT(dp->i_mount->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_ATTR2);
ASSERT(dp->i_d.di_format != XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE);
xfs_attr_fork_remove(dp, args->trans);
goto out;
}
xfs_attr_shortform_create(args);
/*
* Copy the attributes
*/
memset((char *)&nargs, 0, sizeof(nargs));
nargs.geo = args->geo;
nargs.dp = dp;
nargs.firstblock = args->firstblock;
nargs.dfops = args->dfops;
nargs.total = args->total;
nargs.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
nargs.trans = args->trans;
nargs.op_flags = XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT;
for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)
continue; /* don't copy partial entries */
if (!entry->nameidx)
continue;
ASSERT(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL);
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, i);
nargs.name = name_loc->nameval;
nargs.namelen = name_loc->namelen;
nargs.value = &name_loc->nameval[nargs.namelen];
nargs.valuelen = be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen);
nargs.hashval = be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval);
nargs.flags = XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_TO_ARGS(entry->flags);
xfs_attr_shortform_add(&nargs, forkoff);
}
error = 0;
out:
kmem_free(tmpbuffer);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xstrtokenize(const char *str, const char *separators)
{
char **list, **nlist;
char *tok, *tmp;
unsigned num = 0, n;
if (!str)
return NULL;
list = calloc(1, sizeof(*list));
if (!list)
return NULL;
tmp = strdup(str);
if (!tmp)
goto error;
for (tok = strtok(tmp, separators); tok; tok = strtok(NULL, separators)) {
nlist = realloc(list, (num + 2) * sizeof(*list));
if (!nlist)
goto error;
list = nlist;
list[num] = strdup(tok);
if (!list[num])
goto error;
list[++num] = NULL;
}
free(tmp);
return list;
error:
free(tmp);
for (n = 0; n < num; n++)
free(list[n]);
free(list);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err elst_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 entries;
s32 tr;
u32 nb_entries;
GF_EdtsEntry *p;
GF_EditListBox *ptr = (GF_EditListBox *)s;
nb_entries = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
if (ptr->version == 1) {
if (nb_entries > ptr->size / 20) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid number of entries %d in ctts\n", nb_entries));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
} else {
if (nb_entries > ptr->size / 12) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid number of entries %d in ctts\n", nb_entries));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
}
for (entries = 0; entries < nb_entries; entries++) {
p = (GF_EdtsEntry *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_EdtsEntry));
if (!p) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
if (ptr->version == 1) {
p->segmentDuration = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
p->mediaTime = (s64) gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
} else {
p->segmentDuration = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
tr = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p->mediaTime = (s64) tr;
}
p->mediaRate = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_list_add(ptr->entryList, p);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoResult Core::ReadData(MojoHandle data_pipe_consumer_handle,
void* elements,
uint32_t* num_bytes,
MojoReadDataFlags flags) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher(
GetDispatcher(data_pipe_consumer_handle));
if (!dispatcher)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return dispatcher->ReadData(elements, num_bytes, flags);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 19,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_mov(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
memcpy(ctxt->dst.valptr, ctxt->src.valptr, sizeof(ctxt->src.valptr));
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setReadyState(ReadyState readyState)
{
if (readyState == m_readyState)
return;
switch (readyState) {
case Loading:
if (!m_documentTiming.domLoading)
m_documentTiming.domLoading = monotonicallyIncreasingTime();
break;
case Interactive:
if (!m_documentTiming.domInteractive)
m_documentTiming.domInteractive = monotonicallyIncreasingTime();
break;
case Complete:
if (!m_documentTiming.domComplete)
m_documentTiming.domComplete = monotonicallyIncreasingTime();
break;
}
m_readyState = readyState;
dispatchEvent(Event::create(eventNames().readystatechangeEvent, false, false));
if (settings() && settings()->suppressesIncrementalRendering())
setVisualUpdatesAllowed(readyState);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static boolean ReadProfile(j_decompress_ptr jpeg_info)
{
char
name[MaxTextExtent];
const StringInfo
*previous_profile;
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
int
marker;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*profile;
/*
Read generic profile.
*/
length=(size_t) ((size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info) << 8);
length+=(size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (length <= 2)
return(TRUE);
length-=2;
marker=jpeg_info->unread_marker-JPEG_APP0;
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"APP%d",marker);
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
error_manager->profile=profile;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
error_manager->profile=NULL;
if (marker == 1)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if ((length > 4) && (LocaleNCompare((char *) p,"exif",4) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"exif",MaxTextExtent);
if ((length > 5) && (LocaleNCompare((char *) p,"http:",5) == 0))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Extract namespace from XMP profile.
*/
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); j++)
{
if (*p == '\0')
break;
p++;
}
if (j < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile))
(void) DestroyStringInfo(SplitStringInfo(profile,(size_t) (j+1)));
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"xmp",MaxTextExtent);
}
}
previous_profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (previous_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
{
size_t
length;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
SetStringInfoLength(profile,GetStringInfoLength(profile)+
GetStringInfoLength(previous_profile));
(void) memmove(GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+
GetStringInfoLength(previous_profile),GetStringInfoDatum(profile),
length);
(void) memcpy(GetStringInfoDatum(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(previous_profile),
GetStringInfoLength(previous_profile));
}
status=SetImageProfile(image,name,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Profile: %s, %.20g bytes",name,(double) length);
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *lookup_hash(struct nameidata *nd)
{
return __lookup_hash(&nd->last, nd->path.dentry, nd->flags);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 28,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jpeg_encap_unwind(TIFF* tif)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
LONGJMP(sp->exit_jmpbuf,1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 10,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DestroyWebContents(JNIEnv* env,
jclass clazz,
jlong jweb_contents_android_ptr) {
WebContentsAndroid* web_contents_android =
reinterpret_cast<WebContentsAndroid*>(jweb_contents_android_ptr);
if (!web_contents_android)
return;
content::WebContents* web_contents = web_contents_android->web_contents();
if (!web_contents)
return;
delete web_contents;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pcm_sanity_check(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream))
return -ENXIO;
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!substream->ops->copy && !runtime->dma_area))
return -EINVAL;
if (runtime->status->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN)
return -EBADFD;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoHandle Core::AddDispatcher(scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher) {
base::AutoLock lock(handles_->GetLock());
return handles_->AddDispatcher(dispatcher);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 25,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct nr_sock *nr;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET || protocol != 0)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_NETROM, GFP_ATOMIC, &nr_proto);
if (sk == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nr = nr_sk(sk);
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sock->ops = &nr_proto_ops;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
skb_queue_head_init(&nr->ack_queue);
skb_queue_head_init(&nr->reseq_queue);
skb_queue_head_init(&nr->frag_queue);
nr_init_timers(sk);
nr->t1 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_timeout);
nr->t2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay);
nr->n2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries);
nr->t4 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay);
nr->idle =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout);
nr->window = sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size;
nr->bpqext = 1;
nr->state = NR_STATE_0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jas_iccprof_puttagtab(jas_stream_t *out, jas_icctagtab_t *tagtab)
{
int i;
jas_icctagtabent_t *tagtabent;
if (jas_iccputuint32(out, tagtab->numents))
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(int, tagtab->numents); ++i) {
tagtabent = &tagtab->ents[i];
if (jas_iccputuint32(out, tagtabent->tag) ||
jas_iccputuint32(out, tagtabent->off) ||
jas_iccputuint32(out, tagtabent->len))
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 7,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_rockridge_ZF1(struct file_info *file, const unsigned char *data,
int data_length)
{
if (data[0] == 0x70 && data[1] == 0x7a && data_length == 12) {
/* paged zlib */
file->pz = 1;
file->pz_log2_bs = data[3];
file->pz_uncompressed_size = archive_le32dec(&data[4]);
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 22,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string ContextualSearchDelegate::GetDiscourseContext(
const ContextualSearchContext& context) {
discourse_context::ClientDiscourseContext proto;
discourse_context::Display* display = proto.add_display();
display->set_uri(context.page_url.spec());
discourse_context::Media* media = display->mutable_media();
media->set_mime_type(context.encoding);
discourse_context::Selection* selection = display->mutable_selection();
selection->set_content(UTF16ToUTF8(context.surrounding_text));
selection->set_start(context.start_offset);
selection->set_end(context.end_offset);
selection->set_is_uri_encoded(false);
std::string serialized;
proto.SerializeToString(&serialized);
std::string encoded_context;
base::Base64Encode(serialized, &encoded_context);
std::replace(encoded_context.begin(), encoded_context.end(), '+', '-');
std::replace(encoded_context.begin(), encoded_context.end(), '/', '_');
return kDiscourseContextHeaderPrefix + encoded_context;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_write_zTXt(png_structp png_ptr, png_charp key, png_charp text,
png_size_t text_len, int compression)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_zTXt;
#endif
png_size_t key_len;
char buf[1];
png_charp new_key;
compression_state comp;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_zTXt");
comp.num_output_ptr = 0;
comp.max_output_ptr = 0;
comp.output_ptr = NULL;
comp.input = NULL;
comp.input_len = 0;
if ((key_len = png_check_keyword(png_ptr, key, &new_key))==0)
{
png_free(png_ptr, new_key);
return;
}
if (text == NULL || *text == '\0' || compression==PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE)
{
png_write_tEXt(png_ptr, new_key, text, (png_size_t)0);
png_free(png_ptr, new_key);
return;
}
text_len = png_strlen(text);
/* Compute the compressed data; do it now for the length */
text_len = png_text_compress(png_ptr, text, text_len, compression,
&comp);
/* Write start of chunk */
png_write_chunk_start(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_zTXt,
(png_uint_32)(key_len+text_len + 2));
/* Write key */
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, (png_bytep)new_key,
(png_size_t)(key_len + 1));
png_free(png_ptr, new_key);
buf[0] = (png_byte)compression;
/* Write compression */
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, (png_bytep)buf, (png_size_t)1);
/* Write the compressed data */
png_write_compressed_data_out(png_ptr, &comp);
/* Close the chunk */
png_write_chunk_end(png_ptr);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_field_base(int match, int field)
{
return match < 3 ? 2 - field : 1 + field;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iasecc_parse_ef_atr(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct iasecc_private_data *pdata = (struct iasecc_private_data *) card->drv_data;
struct iasecc_version *version = &pdata->version;
struct iasecc_io_buffer_sizes *sizes = &pdata->max_sizes;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
rv = sc_parse_ef_atr(card);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "MF selection error");
if (card->ef_atr->pre_issuing_len < 4)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid pre-issuing data");
version->ic_manufacturer = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[0];
version->ic_type = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[1];
version->os_version = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[2];
version->iasecc_version = card->ef_atr->pre_issuing[3];
sc_log(ctx, "EF.ATR: IC manufacturer/type %X/%X, OS/IasEcc versions %X/%X",
version->ic_manufacturer, version->ic_type, version->os_version, version->iasecc_version);
if (card->ef_atr->issuer_data_len < 16)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Invalid issuer data");
sizes->send = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[2] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[3];
sizes->send_sc = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[6] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[7];
sizes->recv = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[10] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[11];
sizes->recv_sc = card->ef_atr->issuer_data[14] * 0x100 + card->ef_atr->issuer_data[15];
card->max_send_size = sizes->send;
card->max_recv_size = sizes->recv;
/* Most of the card producers interpret 'send' values as "maximum APDU data size".
* Oberthur strictly follows specification and interpret these values as "maximum APDU command size".
* Here we need 'data size'.
*/
if (card->max_send_size > 0xFF)
card->max_send_size -= 5;
sc_log(ctx,
"EF.ATR: max send/recv sizes %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"X/%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"X",
card->max_send_size, card->max_recv_size);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InspectedContext* ensureInspectedContext()
{
if (m_inspectedContext)
return m_inspectedContext;
v8::Local<v8::Object> console = ensureConsole();
v8::Local<v8::Private> key = inspectedContextPrivateKey(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> inspectedContextValue;
if (!console->GetPrivate(m_context, key).ToLocal(&inspectedContextValue))
return nullptr;
DCHECK(inspectedContextValue->IsExternal());
m_inspectedContext = static_cast<InspectedContext*>(inspectedContextValue.As<v8::External>()->Value());
return m_inspectedContext;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 23,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DiscardPages(Address begin, Address end) {
uintptr_t begin_address =
WTF::RoundUpToSystemPage(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(begin));
uintptr_t end_address =
WTF::RoundDownToSystemPage(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(end));
if (begin_address < end_address)
WTF::DiscardSystemPages(reinterpret_cast<void*>(begin_address),
end_address - begin_address);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return(((image->columns+7)/8)*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 23,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void testInterfaceEmptyMethodOptionalLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfaceEmptyMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_dsack_set(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, u32 end_seq)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tcp_is_sack(tp) && sysctl_tcp_dsack) {
int mib_idx;
if (before(seq, tp->rcv_nxt))
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKOLDSENT;
else
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKOFOSENT;
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), mib_idx);
tp->rx_opt.dsack = 1;
tp->duplicate_sack[0].start_seq = seq;
tp->duplicate_sack[0].end_seq = end_seq;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX];
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
unsigned uninitialized_var(in), log;
struct vhost_log *vq_log;
struct msghdr msg = {
.msg_name = NULL,
.msg_namelen = 0,
.msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */
.msg_controllen = 0,
.msg_iov = vq->iov,
.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
};
struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf hdr = {
.hdr.flags = 0,
.hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
};
size_t total_len = 0;
int err, mergeable;
s16 headcount;
size_t vhost_hlen, sock_hlen;
size_t vhost_len, sock_len;
/* TODO: check that we are running from vhost_worker? */
struct socket *sock = rcu_dereference_check(vq->private_data, 1);
if (!sock)
return;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
vhost_hlen = nvq->vhost_hlen;
sock_hlen = nvq->sock_hlen;
vq_log = unlikely(vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) ?
vq->log : NULL;
mergeable = vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF);
while ((sock_len = peek_head_len(sock->sk))) {
sock_len += sock_hlen;
vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen;
headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads, vhost_len,
&in, vq_log, &log,
likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1);
/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
if (unlikely(headcount < 0))
break;
/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
if (!headcount) {
if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
/* They have slipped one in as we were
* doing that: check again. */
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
continue;
}
/* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us
* they refilled. */
break;
}
/* We don't need to be notified again. */
if (unlikely((vhost_hlen)))
/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, vhost_hlen, in);
else
/* Copy the header for use in VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF:
* needed because recvmsg can modify msg_iov. */
copy_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, sock_hlen, in);
msg.msg_iovlen = in;
err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
sock_len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
/* Userspace might have consumed the packet meanwhile:
* it's not supposed to do this usually, but might be hard
* to prevent. Discard data we got (if any) and keep going. */
if (unlikely(err != sock_len)) {
pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: "
" len %d, expected %zd\n", err, sock_len);
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
continue;
}
if (unlikely(vhost_hlen) &&
memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&hdr, 0,
vhost_hlen)) {
vq_err(vq, "Unable to write vnet_hdr at addr %p\n",
vq->iov->iov_base);
break;
}
/* TODO: Should check and handle checksum. */
if (likely(mergeable) &&
memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&headcount,
offsetof(typeof(hdr), num_buffers),
sizeof hdr.num_buffers)) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed num_buffers write");
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
break;
}
vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads,
headcount);
if (unlikely(vq_log))
vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len);
total_len += vhost_len;
if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PassOwnPtr<WorkerThreadTask> create(WorkerThread& workerThread, PassOwnPtr<ExecutionContextTask> task, bool isInstrumented)
{
return adoptPtr(new WorkerThreadTask(workerThread, task, isInstrumented));
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 16,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::ShallowFinishCHROMIUM() {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::ShallowFinishCHROMIUM");
flush_id_ = GenerateNextFlushId();
helper_->CommandBufferHelper::Finish();
if (aggressively_free_resources_)
FreeEverything();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 28,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void calc_timer_values(struct perf_event *event,
u64 *now,
u64 *enabled,
u64 *running)
{
u64 ctx_time;
*now = perf_clock();
ctx_time = event->shadow_ctx_time + *now;
*enabled = ctx_time - event->tstamp_enabled;
*running = ctx_time - event->tstamp_running;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_drop_colorspace_imp(fz_context *ctx, fz_storable *cs_)
{
fz_colorspace *cs = (fz_colorspace *)cs_;
int i;
if (cs->free_data && cs->data)
cs->free_data(ctx, cs);
for (i = 0; i < FZ_MAX_COLORS; i++)
fz_free(ctx, cs->colorant[i]);
fz_free(ctx, cs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadAllowed(
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& web_contents_getter,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& request_method,
CheckDownloadAllowedCallback check_download_allowed_cb) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(std::move(check_download_allowed_cb), true));
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DocumentLoader::DocumentLoader(const ResourceRequest& req, const SubstituteData& substituteData)
: m_deferMainResourceDataLoad(true)
, m_frame(0)
, m_cachedResourceLoader(CachedResourceLoader::create(this))
, m_writer(m_frame)
, m_originalRequest(req)
, m_substituteData(substituteData)
, m_originalRequestCopy(req)
, m_request(req)
, m_originalSubstituteDataWasValid(substituteData.isValid())
, m_committed(false)
, m_isStopping(false)
, m_gotFirstByte(false)
, m_isClientRedirect(false)
, m_isLoadingMultipartContent(false)
, m_wasOnloadHandled(false)
, m_stopRecordingResponses(false)
, m_substituteResourceDeliveryTimer(this, &DocumentLoader::substituteResourceDeliveryTimerFired)
, m_didCreateGlobalHistoryEntry(false)
, m_loadingMainResource(false)
, m_timeOfLastDataReceived(0.0)
, m_identifierForLoadWithoutResourceLoader(0)
, m_dataLoadTimer(this, &DocumentLoader::handleSubstituteDataLoadNow)
, m_waitingForContentPolicy(false)
, m_applicationCacheHost(adoptPtr(new ApplicationCacheHost(this)))
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BookmarkEventRouter::BookmarkEventRouter(BookmarkModel* model) : model_(model) {
model_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ipip6_tunnel_del_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t, struct ip_tunnel_prl *a)
{
struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry *x;
struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry __rcu **p;
int err = 0;
ASSERT_RTNL();
if (a && a->addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) {
for (p = &t->prl;
(x = rtnl_dereference(*p)) != NULL;
p = &x->next) {
if (x->addr == a->addr) {
*p = x->next;
kfree_rcu(x, rcu_head);
t->prl_count--;
goto out;
}
}
err = -ENXIO;
} else {
x = rtnl_dereference(t->prl);
if (x) {
t->prl_count = 0;
call_rcu(&x->rcu_head, prl_list_destroy_rcu);
t->prl = NULL;
}
}
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 28,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void toggle_interruptibility(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mask)
{
u32 int_shadow = kvm_x86_ops->get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, mask);
/*
* an sti; sti; sequence only disable interrupts for the first
* instruction. So, if the last instruction, be it emulated or
* not, left the system with the INT_STI flag enabled, it
* means that the last instruction is an sti. We should not
* leave the flag on in this case. The same goes for mov ss
*/
if (!(int_shadow & mask))
kvm_x86_ops->set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, mask);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* Make sure legacy kernel users don't send in bad values
* (normal paths check this in check_kill_permission).
*/
if (!valid_signal(sig))
return -EINVAL;
return do_send_sig_info(sig, info, p, false);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *assigned_dev)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int r;
bool noncoherent;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
pdev = assigned_dev->dev;
if (pdev == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
r = iommu_attach_device(domain, &pdev->dev);
if (r) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "kvm assign device failed ret %d", r);
return r;
}
noncoherent = !iommu_capable(&pci_bus_type, IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY);
/* Check if need to update IOMMU page table for guest memory */
if (noncoherent != kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent) {
kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(kvm);
kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent = noncoherent;
r = kvm_iommu_map_memslots(kvm);
if (r)
goto out_unmap;
}
pci_set_dev_assigned(pdev);
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "kvm assign device\n");
return 0;
out_unmap:
kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(kvm);
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_pages() takes a number of pages, so fix the problem
by matching the two.
This was introduced by commit 350b8bd ("kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter
of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)"), which fixes the lack of
un-pinning for pages intended to be un-pinned (i.e. memory leak) but
unfortunately potentially aggravated the number of pages we un-pin that
should have stayed pinned. As far as I understand though, the same
practical mitigations apply.
This issue was found during review of Red Hat 6.6 patches to prepare
Ksplice rebootless updates.
Thanks to Vegard for his time on a late Friday evening to help me in
understanding this code.
Fixes: 350b8bd ("kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of... (CVE-2014-3601)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool PSOutputDev::axialShadedFill(GfxState *state, GfxAxialShading *shading) {
double xMin, yMin, xMax, yMax;
double x0, y0, x1, y1, dx, dy, mul;
double tMin, tMax, t, t0, t1;
int i;
if (level == psLevel2Sep || level == psLevel3Sep) {
if (shading->getColorSpace()->getMode() != csDeviceCMYK) {
return gFalse;
}
processColors |= psProcessCMYK;
}
state->getUserClipBBox(&xMin, &yMin, &xMax, &yMax);
shading->getCoords(&x0, &y0, &x1, &y1);
dx = x1 - x0;
dy = y1 - y0;
if (fabs(dx) < 0.01 && fabs(dy) < 0.01) {
return gTrue;
} else {
mul = 1 / (dx * dx + dy * dy);
tMin = tMax = ((xMin - x0) * dx + (yMin - y0) * dy) * mul;
t = ((xMin - x0) * dx + (yMax - y0) * dy) * mul;
if (t < tMin) {
tMin = t;
} else if (t > tMax) {
tMax = t;
}
t = ((xMax - x0) * dx + (yMin - y0) * dy) * mul;
if (t < tMin) {
tMin = t;
} else if (t > tMax) {
tMax = t;
}
t = ((xMax - x0) * dx + (yMax - y0) * dy) * mul;
if (t < tMin) {
tMin = t;
} else if (t > tMax) {
tMax = t;
}
if (tMin < 0 && !shading->getExtend0()) {
tMin = 0;
}
if (tMax > 1 && !shading->getExtend1()) {
tMax = 1;
}
}
t0 = shading->getDomain0();
t1 = shading->getDomain1();
writePSFmt("/t0 {0:.4g} def\n", t0);
writePSFmt("/t1 {0:.4g} def\n", t1);
writePSFmt("/dt {0:.4g} def\n", t1 - t0);
writePSFmt("/x0 {0:.4g} def\n", x0);
writePSFmt("/y0 {0:.4g} def\n", y0);
writePSFmt("/dx {0:.4g} def\n", x1 - x0);
writePSFmt("/x1 {0:.4g} def\n", x1);
writePSFmt("/y1 {0:.4g} def\n", y1);
writePSFmt("/dy {0:.4g} def\n", y1 - y0);
writePSFmt("/xMin {0:.4g} def\n", xMin);
writePSFmt("/yMin {0:.4g} def\n", yMin);
writePSFmt("/xMax {0:.4g} def\n", xMax);
writePSFmt("/yMax {0:.4g} def\n", yMax);
writePSFmt("/n {0:d} def\n", shading->getColorSpace()->getNComps());
if (shading->getNFuncs() == 1) {
writePS("/func ");
cvtFunction(shading->getFunc(0));
writePS("def\n");
} else {
writePS("/func {\n");
for (i = 0; i < shading->getNFuncs(); ++i) {
if (i < shading->getNFuncs() - 1) {
writePS("dup\n");
}
cvtFunction(shading->getFunc(i));
writePS("exec\n");
if (i < shading->getNFuncs() - 1) {
writePS("exch\n");
}
}
writePS("} def\n");
}
writePSFmt("{0:.4g} {1:.4g} 0 axialSH\n", tMin, tMax);
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset,
int len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
r = __copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::TasksNeedPause() {
Page* page = GetPage();
return page && page->Paused();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::AbortClientNavigation() {
browser_side_navigation_pending_ = false;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Com_Filter( char *filter, char *name, int casesensitive ) {
char buf[MAX_TOKEN_CHARS];
char *ptr;
int i, found;
while ( *filter ) {
if ( *filter == '*' ) {
filter++;
for ( i = 0; *filter; i++ ) {
if ( *filter == '*' || *filter == '?' ) {
break;
}
buf[i] = *filter;
filter++;
}
buf[i] = '\0';
if ( strlen( buf ) ) {
ptr = Com_StringContains( name, buf, casesensitive );
if ( !ptr ) {
return qfalse;
}
name = ptr + strlen( buf );
}
} else if ( *filter == '?' ) {
filter++;
name++;
} else if ( *filter == '[' && *( filter + 1 ) == '[' ) {
filter++;
} else if ( *filter == '[' ) {
filter++;
found = qfalse;
while ( *filter && !found ) {
if ( *filter == ']' && *( filter + 1 ) != ']' ) {
break;
}
if ( *( filter + 1 ) == '-' && *( filter + 2 ) && ( *( filter + 2 ) != ']' || *( filter + 3 ) == ']' ) ) {
if ( casesensitive ) {
if ( *name >= *filter && *name <= *( filter + 2 ) ) {
found = qtrue;
}
} else {
if ( toupper( *name ) >= toupper( *filter ) &&
toupper( *name ) <= toupper( *( filter + 2 ) ) ) {
found = qtrue;
}
}
filter += 3;
} else {
if ( casesensitive ) {
if ( *filter == *name ) {
found = qtrue;
}
} else {
if ( toupper( *filter ) == toupper( *name ) ) {
found = qtrue;
}
}
filter++;
}
}
if ( !found ) {
return qfalse;
}
while ( *filter ) {
if ( *filter == ']' && *( filter + 1 ) != ']' ) {
break;
}
filter++;
}
filter++;
name++;
} else {
if ( casesensitive ) {
if ( *filter != *name ) {
return qfalse;
}
} else {
if ( toupper( *filter ) != toupper( *name ) ) {
return qfalse;
}
}
filter++;
name++;
}
}
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 6,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 count, int c)
{
__u32 *tmp;
net_get_random_once(syncookie6_secret, sizeof(syncookie6_secret));
tmp = this_cpu_ptr(ipv6_cookie_scratch);
/*
* we have 320 bits of information to hash, copy in the remaining
* 192 bits required for sha_transform, from the syncookie6_secret
* and overwrite the digest with the secret
*/
memcpy(tmp + 10, syncookie6_secret[c], 44);
memcpy(tmp, saddr, 16);
memcpy(tmp + 4, daddr, 16);
tmp[8] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
tmp[9] = count;
sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
return tmp[17];
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 3,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INT CALLBACK BrowseInfoCallback(HWND hDlg, UINT message, LPARAM lParam, LPARAM pData)
{
char dir[MAX_PATH];
wchar_t* wpath;
LPITEMIDLIST pidl;
switch(message) {
case BFFM_INITIALIZED:
pOrgBrowseWndproc = (WNDPROC)SetWindowLongPtr(hDlg, GWLP_WNDPROC, (LONG_PTR)BrowseDlgCallback);
hBrowseEdit = FindWindowExA(hDlg, NULL, "Edit", NULL);
SetWindowTextU(hBrowseEdit, szFolderPath);
SetDialogFocus(hDlg, hBrowseEdit);
if (nWindowsVersion <= WINDOWS_XP) {
SendMessageLU(hDlg, BFFM_SETSELECTION, (WPARAM)TRUE, szFolderPath);
} else {
wpath = utf8_to_wchar(szFolderPath);
pidl = (*pfSHSimpleIDListFromPath)(wpath);
safe_free(wpath);
SendMessageW(hDlg, BFFM_SETSELECTION, (WPARAM)FALSE, (LPARAM)pidl);
Sleep(100);
PostMessageW(hDlg, BFFM_SETSELECTION, (WPARAM)FALSE, (LPARAM)pidl);
}
break;
case BFFM_SELCHANGED:
if (SHGetPathFromIDListU((LPITEMIDLIST)lParam, dir)) {
SendMessageLU(hDlg, BFFM_SETSTATUSTEXT, 0, dir);
SetWindowTextU(hBrowseEdit, dir);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494
| 0
| 15,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vnc_display_pw_expire(DisplayState *ds, time_t expires)
{
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
if (!vs) {
return -EINVAL;
}
vs->expires = expires;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void json_delete_integer(json_integer_t *integer)
{
jsonp_free(integer);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 9,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int intel_pmu_save_and_restart(struct perf_event *event)
{
x86_perf_event_update(event);
return x86_perf_event_set_period(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BrotliResult ReadContextModes(BrotliState* s) {
BrotliBitReader* br = &s->br;
int i = s->loop_counter;
while (i < (int)s->num_block_types[0]) {
uint32_t bits;
if (!BrotliSafeReadBits(br, 2, &bits)) {
s->loop_counter = i;
return BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
}
s->context_modes[i] = (uint8_t)(bits << 1);
BROTLI_LOG_ARRAY_INDEX(s->context_modes, i);
i++;
}
return BROTLI_RESULT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_check_private_key)
{
zval ** zcert, **zkey;
X509 * cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY * key = NULL;
long certresource = -1, keyresource = -1;
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ZZ", &zcert, &zkey) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zkey, 0, "", 1, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (key) {
RETVAL_BOOL(X509_check_private_key(cert, key));
}
if (keyresource == -1 && key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
if (certresource == -1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 11,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::absoluteQuads(Vector<FloatQuad>& quads, bool* wasFixed) const
{
quads.append(localToAbsoluteQuad(FloatRect(0, 0, width().toFloat(), height().toFloat()), 0 /* mode */, wasFixed));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BookmarksGetTreeFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<bookmarks::Get::Params> params(
bookmarks::Get::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
std::vector<linked_ptr<BookmarkTreeNode> > nodes;
BookmarkModel* model = BookmarkModelFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (params->id_or_id_list.as_array) {
std::vector<std::string>* ids = params->id_or_id_list.as_array.get();
size_t count = ids->size();
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(count > 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
int64 id;
if (!GetBookmarkIdAsInt64(ids->at(i), &id))
return false;
const BookmarkNode* node = model->GetNodeByID(id);
if (!node) {
error_ = keys::kNoNodeError;
return false;
} else {
bookmark_api_helpers::AddNode(node, &nodes, false);
}
}
} else {
int64 id;
if (!GetBookmarkIdAsInt64(*params->id_or_id_list.as_string, &id))
return false;
const BookmarkNode* node = model->GetNodeByID(id);
if (!node) {
error_ = keys::kNoNodeError;
return false;
}
bookmark_api_helpers::AddNode(node, &nodes, false);
}
results_ = bookmarks::Get::Results::Create(nodes);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t ndp_msg_opt_rdnss_lifetime(struct ndp_msg *msg, int offset)
{
struct __nd_opt_rdnss *rdnss =
ndp_msg_payload_opts_offset(msg, offset);
return ntohl(rdnss->nd_opt_rdnss_lifetime);
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 26,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static std::string error_data() {
return std::string("ohhh nooooo mr. bill!");
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockInputMethod::OnWillChangeFocusedClient(
ui::TextInputClient* focused_before,
ui::TextInputClient* focused) {
ui::TextInputClient* client = GetTextInputClient();
if (client && client->HasCompositionText())
client->ConfirmCompositionText();
ClearComposition();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::WebContentsTreeNode::OnFrameTreeNodeDestroyed(
FrameTreeNode* node) {
DCHECK_EQ(outer_contents_frame_tree_node_id_, node->frame_tree_node_id())
<< "WebContentsTreeNode should only receive notifications for the "
"FrameTreeNode in its outer WebContents that hosts it.";
delete current_web_contents_; // deletes |this| too.
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 16,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init init_f2fs_fs(void)
{
int err;
f2fs_build_trace_ios();
err = init_inodecache();
if (err)
goto fail;
err = create_node_manager_caches();
if (err)
goto free_inodecache;
err = create_segment_manager_caches();
if (err)
goto free_node_manager_caches;
err = create_checkpoint_caches();
if (err)
goto free_segment_manager_caches;
err = create_extent_cache();
if (err)
goto free_checkpoint_caches;
err = f2fs_init_sysfs();
if (err)
goto free_extent_cache;
err = register_shrinker(&f2fs_shrinker_info);
if (err)
goto free_sysfs;
err = register_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type);
if (err)
goto free_shrinker;
err = f2fs_create_root_stats();
if (err)
goto free_filesystem;
return 0;
free_filesystem:
unregister_filesystem(&f2fs_fs_type);
free_shrinker:
unregister_shrinker(&f2fs_shrinker_info);
free_sysfs:
f2fs_exit_sysfs();
free_extent_cache:
destroy_extent_cache();
free_checkpoint_caches:
destroy_checkpoint_caches();
free_segment_manager_caches:
destroy_segment_manager_caches();
free_node_manager_caches:
destroy_node_manager_caches();
free_inodecache:
destroy_inodecache();
fail:
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const URI_TYPE(Uri) * source, UriMemoryManager * memory) {
if (source->pathHead == NULL) {
/* No path component */
dest->pathHead = NULL;
dest->pathTail = NULL;
} else {
/* Copy list but not the text contained */
URI_TYPE(PathSegment) * sourceWalker = source->pathHead;
URI_TYPE(PathSegment) * destPrev = NULL;
do {
URI_TYPE(PathSegment) * cur = memory->malloc(memory, sizeof(URI_TYPE(PathSegment)));
if (cur == NULL) {
/* Fix broken list */
if (destPrev != NULL) {
destPrev->next = NULL;
}
return URI_FALSE; /* Raises malloc error */
}
/* From this functions usage we know that *
* the dest URI cannot be uri->owner */
cur->text = sourceWalker->text;
if (destPrev == NULL) {
/* First segment ever */
dest->pathHead = cur;
} else {
destPrev->next = cur;
}
destPrev = cur;
sourceWalker = sourceWalker->next;
} while (sourceWalker != NULL);
dest->pathTail = destPrev;
dest->pathTail->next = NULL;
}
dest->absolutePath = source->absolutePath;
return URI_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: ResetUri: Protect against NULL
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 2,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::processDidCrash()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
QUrl url(KURL(WebCore::ParsedURLString, webPageProxy->urlAtProcessExit()));
qWarning("WARNING: The web process experienced a crash on '%s'.", qPrintable(url.toString(QUrl::RemoveUserInfo)));
pageView->eventHandler()->resetGestureRecognizers();
if (m_loadProgress > 0 && m_loadProgress < 100) {
QWebLoadRequest loadRequest(url, QQuickWebView::LoadFailedStatus, QLatin1String("The web process crashed."), QQuickWebView::InternalErrorDomain, 0);
loadProgressDidChange(100);
emit q->loadingChanged(&loadRequest);
}
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Document::createAttribute(const String& name, ExceptionState& es)
{
return createAttributeNS(String(), name, es, true);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Segment::ParseCues(long long off, long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pCues)
return 0; // success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadID(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) // weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; // done
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues =
new (std::nothrow) Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pCues == NULL)
return -1;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::LogInitiatorSchemeBypassingDocumentBlocking(
const url::Origin& initiator_origin,
int render_process_id,
content::ResourceType resource_type) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::
LogInitiatorSchemeBypassingDocumentBlocking(
initiator_origin, render_process_id, resource_type);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int process_metadata(AVFormatContext *s, const uint8_t *name, uint16_t name_len,
uint16_t val_len, uint16_t type, AVDictionary **met)
{
int ret;
ff_asf_guid guid;
if (val_len) {
switch (type) {
case ASF_UNICODE:
asf_read_value(s, name, val_len, type, met);
break;
case ASF_BYTE_ARRAY:
if (!strcmp(name, "WM/Picture")) // handle cover art
asf_read_picture(s, val_len);
else if (!strcmp(name, "ID3")) // handle ID3 tag
get_id3_tag(s, val_len);
else
asf_read_value(s, name, val_len, type, met);
break;
case ASF_GUID:
ff_get_guid(s->pb, &guid);
break;
default:
if ((ret = asf_set_metadata(s, name, type, met)) < 0)
return ret;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local void grow_space(struct space *space)
{
size_t more;
/* compute next size up */
more = grow(space->size);
if (more == space->size)
bail("not enough memory", "");
/* reallocate the buffer */
space->buf = REALLOC(space->buf, more);
if (space->buf == NULL)
bail("not enough memory", "");
space->size = more;
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void fpm_children_bury() /* {{{ */
{
int status;
pid_t pid;
struct fpm_child_s *child;
while ( (pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG | WUNTRACED)) > 0) {
char buf[128];
int severity = ZLOG_NOTICE;
int restart_child = 1;
child = fpm_child_find(pid);
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "with code %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
/* if it's been killed because of dynamic process management
* don't restart it automaticaly
*/
if (child && child->idle_kill) {
restart_child = 0;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != FPM_EXIT_OK) {
severity = ZLOG_WARNING;
}
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
const char *signame = fpm_signal_names[WTERMSIG(status)];
const char *have_core = WCOREDUMP(status) ? " - core dumped" : "";
if (signame == NULL) {
signame = "";
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "on signal %d (%s%s)", WTERMSIG(status), signame, have_core);
/* if it's been killed because of dynamic process management
* don't restart it automaticaly
*/
if (child && child->idle_kill && WTERMSIG(status) == SIGQUIT) {
restart_child = 0;
}
if (WTERMSIG(status) != SIGQUIT) { /* possible request loss */
severity = ZLOG_WARNING;
}
} else if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
zlog(ZLOG_NOTICE, "child %d stopped for tracing", (int) pid);
if (child && child->tracer) {
child->tracer(child);
}
continue;
}
if (child) {
struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp = child->wp;
struct timeval tv1, tv2;
fpm_child_unlink(child);
fpm_scoreboard_proc_free(wp->scoreboard, child->scoreboard_i);
fpm_clock_get(&tv1);
timersub(&tv1, &child->started, &tv2);
if (restart_child) {
if (!fpm_pctl_can_spawn_children()) {
severity = ZLOG_DEBUG;
}
zlog(severity, "[pool %s] child %d exited %s after %ld.%06d seconds from start", child->wp->config->name, (int) pid, buf, tv2.tv_sec, (int) tv2.tv_usec);
} else {
zlog(ZLOG_DEBUG, "[pool %s] child %d has been killed by the process management after %ld.%06d seconds from start", child->wp->config->name, (int) pid, tv2.tv_sec, (int) tv2.tv_usec);
}
fpm_child_close(child, 1 /* in event_loop */);
fpm_pctl_child_exited();
if (last_faults && (WTERMSIG(status) == SIGSEGV || WTERMSIG(status) == SIGBUS)) {
time_t now = tv1.tv_sec;
int restart_condition = 1;
int i;
last_faults[fault++] = now;
if (fault == fpm_global_config.emergency_restart_threshold) {
fault = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < fpm_global_config.emergency_restart_threshold; i++) {
if (now - last_faults[i] > fpm_global_config.emergency_restart_interval) {
restart_condition = 0;
break;
}
}
if (restart_condition) {
zlog(ZLOG_WARNING, "failed processes threshold (%d in %d sec) is reached, initiating reload", fpm_global_config.emergency_restart_threshold, fpm_global_config.emergency_restart_interval);
fpm_pctl(FPM_PCTL_STATE_RELOADING, FPM_PCTL_ACTION_SET);
}
}
if (restart_child) {
fpm_children_make(wp, 1 /* in event loop */, 1, 0);
if (fpm_globals.is_child) {
break;
}
}
} else {
zlog(ZLOG_ALERT, "oops, unknown child (%d) exited %s. Please open a bug report (https://bugs.php.net).", pid, buf);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 21,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
pitem *item = NULL;
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
pqueue *processed_rcds;
pqueue *buffered_app_data;
d = rl->d;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void opj_get_all_encoding_parameters( const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res,
OPJ_UINT32 ** p_resolutions )
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers*/
const opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* to store l_dx, l_dy, w and h for each resolution and component.*/
OPJ_UINT32 * lResolutionPtr;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* non-corrected (in regard to image offset) tile offset */
OPJ_UINT32 l_tx0, l_ty0;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &p_cp->tcps [tileno];
l_tccp = tcp->tccps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
p = tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, l_dx and l_dy */
l_tx0 = p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx; /* can't be greater than p_image->x1 so won't overflow */
*p_tx0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(l_tx0, p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(opj_uint_adds(l_tx0, p_cp->tdx), p_image->x1);
l_ty0 = p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy; /* can't be greater than p_image->y1 so won't overflow */
*p_ty0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(l_ty0, p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(opj_uint_adds(l_ty0, p_cp->tdy), p_image->y1);
/* max precision and resolution is 0 (can only grow)*/
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min*/
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* aritmetic variables to calculate*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy , l_pw , l_ph;
lResolutionPtr = p_resolutions[compno];
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts*/
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions;
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
--l_level_no;
/* precinct width and height*/
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdx;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdy;
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_level_no));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_level_no));
/* take the minimum size for l_dx for each comp and resolution*/
*p_dx_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dx_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dx);
*p_dy_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dy_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents*/
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0==l_rx1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0==l_ry1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pw;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_ph;
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision*/
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_tccp;
++l_img_comp;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix an integer overflow issue (#809)
Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of
pi.c.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 mcg_cap)
{
int r;
unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff, bank;
r = -EINVAL;
if (!bank_num || bank_num >= KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS)
goto out;
if (mcg_cap & ~(KVM_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED | 0xff | 0xff0000))
goto out;
r = 0;
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = mcg_cap;
/* Init IA32_MCG_CTL to all 1s */
if (mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P)
vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl = ~(u64)0;
/* Init IA32_MCi_CTL to all 1s */
for (bank = 0; bank < bank_num; bank++)
vcpu->arch.mce_banks[bank*4] = ~(u64)0;
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int entersafe_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int r;
assert(file);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
r = iso_ops->process_fci(card,file,buf,buflen);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Process fci failed");
if(file->namelen)
{
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_UNKNOWN;
}
else
{
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT;
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,545
|
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