instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MODRET auth_post_host(cmd_rec *cmd) {
/* If the HOST command changed the main_server pointer, reinitialize
* ourselves.
*/
if (session.prev_server != NULL) {
int res;
/* Remove the TimeoutLogin timer. */
pr_timer_remove(PR_TIMER_LOGIN, &auth_module);
pr_event_unregister(&auth_module, "core.exit", auth_exit_ev);
/* Reset the CreateHome setting. */
mkhome = FALSE;
#ifdef PR_USE_LASTLOG
/* Reset the UseLastLog setting. */
lastlog = FALSE;
#endif /* PR_USE_LASTLOG */
res = auth_sess_init();
if (res < 0) {
pr_session_disconnect(&auth_module,
PR_SESS_DISCONNECT_SESSION_INIT_FAILED, NULL);
}
}
return PR_DECLINED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 3,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void curl_free_post(void **post)
{
curl_formfree((struct HttpPost *)*post);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ttwu_post_activation(struct task_struct *p, struct rq *rq,
int wake_flags, bool success)
{
trace_sched_wakeup(p, success);
check_preempt_curr(rq, p, wake_flags);
p->state = TASK_RUNNING;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (p->sched_class->task_woken)
p->sched_class->task_woken(rq, p);
if (unlikely(rq->idle_stamp)) {
u64 delta = rq->clock - rq->idle_stamp;
u64 max = 2*sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
if (delta > max)
rq->avg_idle = max;
else
update_avg(&rq->avg_idle, delta);
rq->idle_stamp = 0;
}
#endif
/* if a worker is waking up, notify workqueue */
if ((p->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER) && success)
wq_worker_waking_up(p, cpu_of(rq));
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: box_send(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
StringInfoData buf;
pq_begintypsend(&buf);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->high.x);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->high.y);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->low.x);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->low.y);
PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(pq_endtypsend(&buf));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaymentRequestState::~PaymentRequestState() {}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p\n", __func__, sk);
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
/* Initialize the SCTP per socket area. */
switch (sk->sk_type) {
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
sp->type = SCTP_SOCKET_UDP;
break;
case SOCK_STREAM:
sp->type = SCTP_SOCKET_TCP;
break;
default:
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
}
/* Initialize default send parameters. These parameters can be
* modified with the SCTP_DEFAULT_SEND_PARAM socket option.
*/
sp->default_stream = 0;
sp->default_ppid = 0;
sp->default_flags = 0;
sp->default_context = 0;
sp->default_timetolive = 0;
sp->default_rcv_context = 0;
sp->max_burst = net->sctp.max_burst;
sp->sctp_hmac_alg = net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg;
/* Initialize default setup parameters. These parameters
* can be modified with the SCTP_INITMSG socket option or
* overridden by the SCTP_INIT CMSG.
*/
sp->initmsg.sinit_num_ostreams = sctp_max_outstreams;
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_instreams = sctp_max_instreams;
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_attempts = net->sctp.max_retrans_init;
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_init_timeo = net->sctp.rto_max;
/* Initialize default RTO related parameters. These parameters can
* be modified for with the SCTP_RTOINFO socket option.
*/
sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial = net->sctp.rto_initial;
sp->rtoinfo.srto_max = net->sctp.rto_max;
sp->rtoinfo.srto_min = net->sctp.rto_min;
/* Initialize default association related parameters. These parameters
* can be modified with the SCTP_ASSOCINFO socket option.
*/
sp->assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt = net->sctp.max_retrans_association;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_number_peer_destinations = 0;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_peer_rwnd = 0;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_local_rwnd = 0;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life = net->sctp.valid_cookie_life;
/* Initialize default event subscriptions. By default, all the
* options are off.
*/
memset(&sp->subscribe, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
/* Default Peer Address Parameters. These defaults can
* be modified via SCTP_PEER_ADDR_PARAMS
*/
sp->hbinterval = net->sctp.hb_interval;
sp->pathmaxrxt = net->sctp.max_retrans_path;
sp->pathmtu = 0; /* allow default discovery */
sp->sackdelay = net->sctp.sack_timeout;
sp->sackfreq = 2;
sp->param_flags = SPP_HB_ENABLE |
SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE |
SPP_SACKDELAY_ENABLE;
/* If enabled no SCTP message fragmentation will be performed.
* Configure through SCTP_DISABLE_FRAGMENTS socket option.
*/
sp->disable_fragments = 0;
/* Enable Nagle algorithm by default. */
sp->nodelay = 0;
sp->recvrcvinfo = 0;
sp->recvnxtinfo = 0;
/* Enable by default. */
sp->v4mapped = 1;
/* Auto-close idle associations after the configured
* number of seconds. A value of 0 disables this
* feature. Configure through the SCTP_AUTOCLOSE socket option,
* for UDP-style sockets only.
*/
sp->autoclose = 0;
/* User specified fragmentation limit. */
sp->user_frag = 0;
sp->adaptation_ind = 0;
sp->pf = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family);
/* Control variables for partial data delivery. */
atomic_set(&sp->pd_mode, 0);
skb_queue_head_init(&sp->pd_lobby);
sp->frag_interleave = 0;
/* Create a per socket endpoint structure. Even if we
* change the data structure relationships, this may still
* be useful for storing pre-connect address information.
*/
sp->ep = sctp_endpoint_new(sk, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sp->ep)
return -ENOMEM;
sp->hmac = NULL;
sk->sk_destruct = sctp_destruct_sock;
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_INC(sock);
local_bh_disable();
percpu_counter_inc(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, 1);
if (net->sctp.default_auto_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&net->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
} else
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
local_bh_enable();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 24,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *isofs_fh_to_parent(struct super_block *sb,
struct fid *fid, int fh_len, int fh_type)
{
struct isofs_fid *ifid = (struct isofs_fid *)fid;
if (fh_type != 2)
return NULL;
return isofs_export_iget(sb,
fh_len > 2 ? ifid->parent_block : 0,
ifid->parent_offset,
fh_len > 4 ? ifid->parent_generation : 0);
}
Commit Message: isofs: avoid info leak on export
For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 12,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutofillPopupControllerBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::Paint1pxHorizontalLine(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
SkColor color,
const gfx::Rect& bounds,
bool at_bottom) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
const float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
gfx::RectF rect(gfx::ScaleRect(gfx::RectF(bounds), scale));
const float inset = rect.height() - 1;
rect.Inset(0, at_bottom ? inset : 0, 0, at_bottom ? 0 : inset);
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setColor(color);
canvas->sk_canvas()->drawRect(gfx::RectFToSkRect(rect), flags);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ObserveNavEntryCommitted(const GURL& expected_url,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
return content::Details<content::LoadCommittedDetails>(details)
->entry->GetURL() == expected_url;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int32_t out_blocks;
/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
if (!state->after_authentication)
return 0;
/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
return 0;
/* Peer can't rekey */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
/*
* Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
* make progress when rekey limits are very small.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
return 0;
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
return 1;
/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */
out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
return (state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 21,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void staticVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::staticVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smp_link_encrypted(const RawAddress& bda, uint8_t encr_enable) {
tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable);
if (smp_cb.pairing_bda == bda) {
/* encryption completed with STK, remember the key size now, could be
* overwritten when key exchange happens */
if (p_cb->loc_enc_size != 0 && encr_enable) {
/* update the link encryption key size if a SMP pairing just performed */
btm_ble_update_sec_key_size(bda, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
}
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENCRYPTED_EVT, &encr_enable);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 15,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DoubleOrNullStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "doubleOrNullStringAttribute");
DoubleOrString cpp_value;
V8DoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, cpp_value, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setDoubleOrNullStringAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t unix_stream_sendpage(struct socket *socket, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags)
{
int err;
bool send_sigpipe = false;
bool init_scm = true;
struct scm_cookie scm;
struct sock *other, *sk = socket->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb, *newskb = NULL, *tail = NULL;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
other = unix_peer(sk);
if (!other || sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (false) {
alloc_skb:
unix_state_unlock(other);
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
newskb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, 0, 0, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
&err, 0);
if (!newskb)
goto err;
}
/* we must acquire readlock as we modify already present
* skbs in the sk_receive_queue and mess with skb->len
*/
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
if (err) {
err = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT ? -EAGAIN : -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
send_sigpipe = true;
goto err_unlock;
}
unix_state_lock(other);
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) ||
other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
send_sigpipe = true;
goto err_state_unlock;
}
if (init_scm) {
err = maybe_init_creds(&scm, socket, other);
if (err)
goto err_state_unlock;
init_scm = false;
}
skb = skb_peek_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue);
if (tail && tail == skb) {
skb = newskb;
} else if (!skb || !unix_skb_scm_eq(skb, &scm)) {
if (newskb) {
skb = newskb;
} else {
tail = skb;
goto alloc_skb;
}
} else if (newskb) {
/* this is fast path, we don't necessarily need to
* call to kfree_skb even though with newskb == NULL
* this - does no harm
*/
consume_skb(newskb);
newskb = NULL;
}
if (skb_append_pagefrags(skb, page, offset, size)) {
tail = skb;
goto alloc_skb;
}
skb->len += size;
skb->data_len += size;
skb->truesize += size;
atomic_add(size, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
if (newskb) {
err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, false);
if (err)
goto err_state_unlock;
spin_lock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
__skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, newskb);
spin_unlock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
}
unix_state_unlock(other);
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
other->sk_data_ready(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return size;
err_state_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
err:
kfree_skb(newskb);
if (send_sigpipe && !(flags & MSG_NOSIGNAL))
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!init_scm)
scm_destroy(&scm);
return err;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_error(struct sock *sk, int flags, int err)
{
if (err == -EPIPE)
err = sock_error(sk) ? : -EPIPE;
if (err == -EPIPE && !(flags & MSG_NOSIGNAL))
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FPDF_BOOL PDFiumEngine::Form_PostRequestURL(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_WIDESTRING url,
FPDF_WIDESTRING data,
FPDF_WIDESTRING content_type,
FPDF_WIDESTRING encode,
FPDF_WIDESTRING header,
FPDF_BSTR* response) {
std::string url_str = WideStringToString(url);
std::string data_str = WideStringToString(data);
std::string content_type_str = WideStringToString(content_type);
std::string encode_str = WideStringToString(encode);
std::string header_str = WideStringToString(header);
std::string javascript = "alert(\"Post:" + url_str + "," + data_str + "," +
content_type_str + "," + encode_str + "," +
header_str + "\")";
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Compositor::OnFirstSurfaceActivation(
const viz::SurfaceInfo& surface_info) {
}
Commit Message: Don't report OnFirstSurfaceActivation for ui::Compositor
Bug: 893850
Change-Id: Iee754cefbd083d0a21a2b672fb8e837eaab81c43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1293712
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Saman Sami <samans@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601629}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 2,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void irda_flow_indication(void *instance, void *sap, LOCAL_FLOW flow)
{
struct irda_sock *self;
struct sock *sk;
self = instance;
sk = instance;
BUG_ON(sk == NULL);
switch (flow) {
case FLOW_STOP:
pr_debug("%s(), IrTTP wants us to slow down\n",
__func__);
self->tx_flow = flow;
break;
case FLOW_START:
self->tx_flow = flow;
pr_debug("%s(), IrTTP wants us to start again\n",
__func__);
wake_up_interruptible(sk_sleep(sk));
break;
default:
pr_debug("%s(), Unknown flow command!\n", __func__);
/* Unknown flow command, better stop */
self->tx_flow = flow;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_enable_service(tBTA_SERVICE_ID service_id)
{
tBTA_SERVICE_ID *p_id = &service_id;
/* If BT is enabled, we need to switch to BTIF context and trigger the
* enable for that profile
*
* Otherwise, we just set the flag. On BT_Enable, the DM will trigger
* enable for the profiles that have been enabled */
btif_enabled_services |= (1 << service_id);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: current services:0x%x", __FUNCTION__, btif_enabled_services);
if (btif_is_enabled())
{
btif_transfer_context(btif_dm_execute_service_request,
BTIF_DM_ENABLE_SERVICE,
(char*)p_id, sizeof(tBTA_SERVICE_ID), NULL);
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 15,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport DrawInfo *CloneDrawInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,
const DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
clone_info=(DrawInfo *) AcquireCriticalMemory(sizeof(*clone_info));
GetDrawInfo(image_info,clone_info);
if (draw_info == (DrawInfo *) NULL)
return(clone_info);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
if (draw_info->primitive != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->primitive,draw_info->primitive);
if (draw_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->geometry,draw_info->geometry);
clone_info->compliance=draw_info->compliance;
clone_info->viewbox=draw_info->viewbox;
clone_info->affine=draw_info->affine;
clone_info->gravity=draw_info->gravity;
clone_info->fill=draw_info->fill;
clone_info->stroke=draw_info->stroke;
clone_info->stroke_width=draw_info->stroke_width;
if (draw_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=CloneImage(draw_info->fill_pattern,0,0,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->stroke_pattern=CloneImage(draw_info->stroke_pattern,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
clone_info->stroke_antialias=draw_info->stroke_antialias;
clone_info->text_antialias=draw_info->text_antialias;
clone_info->fill_rule=draw_info->fill_rule;
clone_info->linecap=draw_info->linecap;
clone_info->linejoin=draw_info->linejoin;
clone_info->miterlimit=draw_info->miterlimit;
clone_info->dash_offset=draw_info->dash_offset;
clone_info->decorate=draw_info->decorate;
clone_info->compose=draw_info->compose;
if (draw_info->text != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->text,draw_info->text);
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->font,draw_info->font);
if (draw_info->metrics != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->metrics,draw_info->metrics);
if (draw_info->family != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->family,draw_info->family);
clone_info->style=draw_info->style;
clone_info->stretch=draw_info->stretch;
clone_info->weight=draw_info->weight;
if (draw_info->encoding != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->encoding,draw_info->encoding);
clone_info->pointsize=draw_info->pointsize;
clone_info->kerning=draw_info->kerning;
clone_info->interline_spacing=draw_info->interline_spacing;
clone_info->interword_spacing=draw_info->interword_spacing;
clone_info->direction=draw_info->direction;
if (draw_info->density != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->density,draw_info->density);
clone_info->align=draw_info->align;
clone_info->undercolor=draw_info->undercolor;
clone_info->border_color=draw_info->border_color;
if (draw_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->server_name,draw_info->server_name);
if (draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL)
{
register ssize_t
x;
for (x=0; fabs(draw_info->dash_pattern[x]) >= MagickEpsilon; x++) ;
clone_info->dash_pattern=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (2*x+2),
sizeof(*clone_info->dash_pattern));
if (clone_info->dash_pattern == (double *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"UnableToAllocateDashPattern");
(void) memset(clone_info->dash_pattern,0,(size_t) (2*x+2)*
sizeof(*clone_info->dash_pattern));
(void) memcpy(clone_info->dash_pattern,draw_info->dash_pattern,(size_t)
(x+1)*sizeof(*clone_info->dash_pattern));
}
clone_info->gradient=draw_info->gradient;
if (draw_info->gradient.stops != (StopInfo *) NULL)
{
size_t
number_stops;
number_stops=clone_info->gradient.number_stops;
clone_info->gradient.stops=(StopInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
number_stops,sizeof(*clone_info->gradient.stops));
if (clone_info->gradient.stops == (StopInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"UnableToAllocateDashPattern");
(void) memcpy(clone_info->gradient.stops,draw_info->gradient.stops,
(size_t) number_stops*sizeof(*clone_info->gradient.stops));
}
clone_info->bounds=draw_info->bounds;
clone_info->fill_alpha=draw_info->fill_alpha;
clone_info->stroke_alpha=draw_info->stroke_alpha;
clone_info->element_reference=draw_info->element_reference;
clone_info->clip_path=draw_info->clip_path;
clone_info->clip_units=draw_info->clip_units;
if (draw_info->clip_mask != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->clip_mask,draw_info->clip_mask);
if (draw_info->clipping_mask != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->clipping_mask=CloneImage(draw_info->clipping_mask,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
if (draw_info->composite_mask != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->composite_mask=CloneImage(draw_info->composite_mask,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
clone_info->render=draw_info->render;
clone_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
return(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ActivatePassiveGrab(DeviceIntPtr device, GrabPtr grab, InternalEvent *event,
InternalEvent *real_event)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = device->spriteInfo->sprite;
GrabInfoPtr grabinfo = &device->deviceGrab;
xEvent *xE = NULL;
int count;
int rc;
/* The only consumers of corestate are Xi 1.x and core events, which
* are guaranteed to come from DeviceEvents. */
if (grab->grabtype == XI || grab->grabtype == CORE) {
DeviceIntPtr gdev;
event->device_event.corestate &= 0x1f00;
if (grab->grabtype == CORE)
gdev = GetMaster(device, KEYBOARD_OR_FLOAT);
else
gdev = grab->modifierDevice;
if (gdev && gdev->key && gdev->key->xkbInfo)
event->device_event.corestate |=
gdev->key->xkbInfo->state.grab_mods & (~0x1f00);
}
if (grab->grabtype == CORE) {
rc = EventToCore(event, &xE, &count);
if (rc != Success) {
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch, "[dix] %s: core conversion failed"
"(%d, %d).\n", device->name, event->any.type, rc);
return FALSE;
}
}
else if (grab->grabtype == XI2) {
rc = EventToXI2(event, &xE);
if (rc != Success) {
if (rc != BadMatch)
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch, "[dix] %s: XI2 conversion failed"
"(%d, %d).\n", device->name, event->any.type, rc);
return FALSE;
}
count = 1;
}
else {
rc = EventToXI(event, &xE, &count);
if (rc != Success) {
if (rc != BadMatch)
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch, "[dix] %s: XI conversion failed"
"(%d, %d).\n", device->name, event->any.type, rc);
return FALSE;
}
}
(*grabinfo->ActivateGrab) (device, grab,
ClientTimeToServerTime(event->any.time), TRUE);
if (xE) {
FixUpEventFromWindow(pSprite, xE, grab->window, None, TRUE);
/* XXX: XACE? */
TryClientEvents(rClient(grab), device, xE, count,
GetEventFilter(device, xE),
GetEventFilter(device, xE), grab);
}
if (grabinfo->sync.state == FROZEN_NO_EVENT)
grabinfo->sync.state = FROZEN_WITH_EVENT;
*grabinfo->sync.event = real_event->device_event;
free(xE);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hashtable_del(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
size_t hash = hash_str(key);
return hashtable_do_del(hashtable, key, hash);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 29,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
int ret;
if (!data->rpc_done) {
state = nfs4_try_open_cached(data);
goto out;
}
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (!(data->f_attr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR))
goto err;
inode = nfs_fhget(data->dir->d_sb, &data->o_res.fh, &data->f_attr);
ret = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
state = nfs4_get_open_state(inode, data->owner);
if (state == NULL)
goto err_put_inode;
if (data->o_res.delegation_type != 0)
nfs4_opendata_check_deleg(data, state);
update_open_stateid(state, &data->o_res.stateid, NULL,
data->o_arg.fmode);
iput(inode);
out:
return state;
err_put_inode:
iput(inode);
err:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qib_set_part_key(struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd, u16 key)
{
struct qib_pportdata *ppd = rcd->ppd;
int i, any = 0, pidx = -1;
u16 lkey = key & 0x7FFF;
int ret;
if (lkey == (QIB_DEFAULT_P_KEY & 0x7FFF)) {
/* nothing to do; this key always valid */
ret = 0;
goto bail;
}
if (!lkey) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
/*
* Set the full membership bit, because it has to be
* set in the register or the packet, and it seems
* cleaner to set in the register than to force all
* callers to set it.
*/
key |= 0x8000;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rcd->pkeys); i++) {
if (!rcd->pkeys[i] && pidx == -1)
pidx = i;
if (rcd->pkeys[i] == key) {
ret = -EEXIST;
goto bail;
}
}
if (pidx == -1) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto bail;
}
for (any = i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ppd->pkeys); i++) {
if (!ppd->pkeys[i]) {
any++;
continue;
}
if (ppd->pkeys[i] == key) {
atomic_t *pkrefs = &ppd->pkeyrefs[i];
if (atomic_inc_return(pkrefs) > 1) {
rcd->pkeys[pidx] = key;
ret = 0;
goto bail;
} else {
/*
* lost race, decrement count, catch below
*/
atomic_dec(pkrefs);
any++;
}
}
if ((ppd->pkeys[i] & 0x7FFF) == lkey) {
/*
* It makes no sense to have both the limited and
* full membership PKEY set at the same time since
* the unlimited one will disable the limited one.
*/
ret = -EEXIST;
goto bail;
}
}
if (!any) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto bail;
}
for (any = i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ppd->pkeys); i++) {
if (!ppd->pkeys[i] &&
atomic_inc_return(&ppd->pkeyrefs[i]) == 1) {
rcd->pkeys[pidx] = key;
ppd->pkeys[i] = key;
(void) ppd->dd->f_set_ib_cfg(ppd, QIB_IB_CFG_PKEYS, 0);
ret = 0;
goto bail;
}
}
ret = -EBUSY;
bail:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_encode_bundle_ctrl_reply(const struct ofp_header *oh,
struct ofputil_bundle_ctrl_msg *msg)
{
struct ofpbuf *buf;
struct ofp14_bundle_ctrl_msg *m;
buf = ofpraw_alloc_reply(oh->version == OFP13_VERSION
? OFPRAW_ONFT13_BUNDLE_CONTROL
: OFPRAW_OFPT14_BUNDLE_CONTROL, oh, 0);
m = ofpbuf_put_zeros(buf, sizeof *m);
m->bundle_id = htonl(msg->bundle_id);
m->type = htons(msg->type);
m->flags = htons(msg->flags);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 16,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int control_ops_alloc(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
int __percpu *disabled;
disabled = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!disabled)
return -ENOMEM;
ops->disabled = disabled;
control_ops_disable_all(ops);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* evt)
{
if (evt->isMouseEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().clickEvent && static_cast<MouseEvent*>(evt)->button() == LeftButton) {
m_inputType->handleClickEvent(static_cast<MouseEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isTouchEvent()) {
m_inputType->handleTouchEvent(static_cast<TouchEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isKeyboardEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().keydownEvent) {
m_inputType->handleKeydownEvent(static_cast<KeyboardEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
bool callBaseClassEarly = isTextField() && (evt->type() == eventNames().keydownEvent || evt->type() == eventNames().keypressEvent);
if (callBaseClassEarly) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::defaultEventHandler(evt);
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->type() == eventNames().DOMActivateEvent) {
m_inputType->handleDOMActivateEvent(evt);
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isKeyboardEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().keypressEvent) {
m_inputType->handleKeypressEvent(static_cast<KeyboardEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isKeyboardEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().keyupEvent) {
m_inputType->handleKeyupEvent(static_cast<KeyboardEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (m_inputType->shouldSubmitImplicitly(evt)) {
if (isSearchField())
onSearch();
if (wasChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent())
dispatchFormControlChangeEvent();
RefPtr<HTMLFormElement> formForSubmission = m_inputType->formForSubmission();
if (formForSubmission)
formForSubmission->submitImplicitly(evt, canTriggerImplicitSubmission());
evt->setDefaultHandled();
return;
}
if (evt->isBeforeTextInsertedEvent())
m_inputType->handleBeforeTextInsertedEvent(static_cast<BeforeTextInsertedEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->isMouseEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().mousedownEvent) {
m_inputType->handleMouseDownEvent(static_cast<MouseEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
m_inputType->forwardEvent(evt);
if (!callBaseClassEarly && !evt->defaultHandled())
HTMLTextFormControlElement::defaultEventHandler(evt);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2cap_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 reason)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p reason %d", hcon, reason);
if (hcon->type != ACL_LINK)
return 0;
l2cap_conn_del(hcon, bt_err(reason));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cf2_setGlyphWidth( CF2_Outline outline,
CF2_Fixed width )
{
CFF_Decoder* decoder = outline->decoder;
FT_ASSERT( decoder );
decoder->glyph_width = cf2_fixedToInt( width );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: confirm_delete_directly (CommonJob *job,
GList *files)
{
char *prompt;
int file_count;
int response;
/* Just Say Yes if the preference says not to confirm. */
if (!should_confirm_trash ())
{
return TRUE;
}
file_count = g_list_length (files);
g_assert (file_count > 0);
if (can_delete_files_without_confirm (files))
{
return TRUE;
}
if (file_count == 1)
{
prompt = f (_("Are you sure you want to permanently delete “%B”?"),
files->data);
}
else
{
prompt = f (ngettext ("Are you sure you want to permanently delete "
"the %'d selected item?",
"Are you sure you want to permanently delete "
"the %'d selected items?", file_count),
file_count);
}
response = run_warning (job,
prompt,
f (_("If you delete an item, it will be permanently lost.")),
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, DELETE,
NULL);
return response == 1;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int srpt_get_u64_x(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
return sprintf(buffer, "0x%016llx", *(u64 *)kp->arg);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 14,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct rpc_task *rpc_run_bc_task(struct rpc_rqst *req,
const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops)
{
struct rpc_task *task;
struct xdr_buf *xbufp = &req->rq_snd_buf;
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.callback_ops = tk_ops,
};
dprintk("RPC: rpc_run_bc_task req= %p\n", req);
/*
* Create an rpc_task to send the data
*/
task = rpc_new_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
xprt_free_bc_request(req);
goto out;
}
task->tk_rqstp = req;
/*
* Set up the xdr_buf length.
* This also indicates that the buffer is XDR encoded already.
*/
xbufp->len = xbufp->head[0].iov_len + xbufp->page_len +
xbufp->tail[0].iov_len;
task->tk_action = call_bc_transmit;
atomic_inc(&task->tk_count);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->tk_count) != 2);
rpc_execute(task);
out:
dprintk("RPC: rpc_run_bc_task: task= %p\n", task);
return task;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NTPResourceCache::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED == type ||
chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED == type) {
new_tab_incognito_html_ = NULL;
new_tab_html_ = NULL;
new_tab_incognito_css_ = NULL;
new_tab_css_ = NULL;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::didCancelCompositionOnSelectionChange() {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ImeCancelComposition(routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_access_checker_harness_first(request_rec *r)
{
return lua_request_rec_hook_harness(r, "access_checker", AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int init_wifi_hal_func_table(wifi_hal_fn *hal_fn) {
if (hal_fn == NULL) {
return -1;
}
hal_fn->wifi_initialize = wifi_initialize_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_cleanup = wifi_cleanup_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_event_loop = wifi_event_loop_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_error_info = wifi_get_error_info_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_supported_feature_set = wifi_get_supported_feature_set_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_concurrency_matrix = wifi_get_concurrency_matrix_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_scanning_mac_oui = wifi_set_scanning_mac_oui_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_supported_channels = wifi_get_supported_channels_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_is_epr_supported = wifi_is_epr_supported_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_ifaces = wifi_get_ifaces_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_iface_name = wifi_get_iface_name_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_reset_iface_event_handler = wifi_reset_iface_event_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_start_gscan = wifi_start_gscan_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_stop_gscan = wifi_stop_gscan_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_cached_gscan_results = wifi_get_cached_gscan_results_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_bssid_hotlist = wifi_set_bssid_hotlist_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_reset_bssid_hotlist = wifi_reset_bssid_hotlist_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_significant_change_handler = wifi_set_significant_change_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_reset_significant_change_handler = wifi_reset_significant_change_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_gscan_capabilities = wifi_get_gscan_capabilities_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_link_stats = wifi_set_link_stats_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_link_stats = wifi_get_link_stats_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_clear_link_stats = wifi_clear_link_stats_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_valid_channels = wifi_get_valid_channels_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_rtt_range_request = wifi_rtt_range_request_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_rtt_range_cancel = wifi_rtt_range_cancel_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_rtt_capabilities = wifi_get_rtt_capabilities_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_start_logging = wifi_start_logging_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_epno_list = wifi_set_epno_list_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_country_code = wifi_set_country_code_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_enable_tdls = wifi_enable_tdls_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_disable_tdls = wifi_disable_tdls_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_tdls_status = wifi_get_tdls_status_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_tdls_capabilities = wifi_get_tdls_capabilities_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_nodfs_flag = wifi_set_nodfs_flag_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_firmware_memory_dump = wifi_get_firmware_memory_dump_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_log_handler = wifi_set_log_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_reset_log_handler = wifi_reset_log_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_alert_handler = wifi_set_alert_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_reset_alert_handler = wifi_reset_alert_handler_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_firmware_version = wifi_get_firmware_version_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_ring_buffers_status = wifi_get_ring_buffers_status_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_logger_supported_feature_set = wifi_get_logger_supported_feature_set_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_ring_data = wifi_get_ring_data_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_get_driver_version = wifi_get_driver_version_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_ssid_white_list = wifi_set_ssid_white_list_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_gscan_roam_params = wifi_set_gscan_roam_params_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_bssid_preference = wifi_set_bssid_preference_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_enable_lazy_roam = wifi_enable_lazy_roam_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_set_bssid_blacklist = wifi_set_bssid_blacklist_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_start_sending_offloaded_packet = wifi_start_sending_offloaded_packet_stub;
hal_fn->wifi_stop_sending_offloaded_packet = wifi_stop_sending_offloaded_packet_stub;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp,
unsigned char *cmnd, int timeout, int blocking)
{
int k, at_head;
Sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
sg_io_hdr_t *hp = &srp->header;
srp->data.cmd_opcode = cmnd[0]; /* hold opcode of command */
hp->status = 0;
hp->masked_status = 0;
hp->msg_status = 0;
hp->info = 0;
hp->host_status = 0;
hp->driver_status = 0;
hp->resid = 0;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_common_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n",
(int) cmnd[0], (int) hp->cmd_len));
if (hp->dxfer_len >= SZ_256M)
return -EINVAL;
k = sg_start_req(srp, cmnd);
if (k) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(1, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_common_write: start_req err=%d\n", k));
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return k; /* probably out of space --> ENOMEM */
}
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
if (srp->bio) {
scsi_req_free_cmd(scsi_req(srp->rq));
blk_end_request_all(srp->rq, BLK_STS_IOERR);
srp->rq = NULL;
}
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -ENODEV;
}
hp->duration = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
if (hp->interface_id != '\0' && /* v3 (or later) interface */
(SG_FLAG_Q_AT_TAIL & hp->flags))
at_head = 0;
else
at_head = 1;
srp->rq->timeout = timeout;
kref_get(&sfp->f_ref); /* sg_rq_end_io() does kref_put(). */
blk_execute_rq_nowait(sdp->device->request_queue, sdp->disk,
srp->rq, at_head, sg_rq_end_io);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void crypto_rfc4106_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_setattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_setattrres *res)
{
__be32 *p;
uint32_t bmlen;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_SETATTR);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(bmlen);
READ_BUF(bmlen << 2);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bpf_jit_compile(struct sk_filter *fp)
{
u8 temp[64];
u8 *prog;
unsigned int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
int ilen, i;
int t_offset, f_offset;
u8 t_op, f_op, seen = 0, pass;
u8 *image = NULL;
u8 *func;
int pc_ret0 = -1; /* bpf index of first RET #0 instruction (if any) */
unsigned int cleanup_addr; /* epilogue code offset */
unsigned int *addrs;
const struct sock_filter *filter = fp->insns;
int flen = fp->len;
if (!bpf_jit_enable)
return;
addrs = kmalloc(flen * sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (addrs == NULL)
return;
/* Before first pass, make a rough estimation of addrs[]
* each bpf instruction is translated to less than 64 bytes
*/
for (proglen = 0, i = 0; i < flen; i++) {
proglen += 64;
addrs[i] = proglen;
}
cleanup_addr = proglen; /* epilogue address */
for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) {
/* no prologue/epilogue for trivial filters (RET something) */
proglen = 0;
prog = temp;
if (seen) {
EMIT4(0x55, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe5); /* push %rbp; mov %rsp,%rbp */
EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 96); /* subq $96,%rsp */
/* note : must save %rbx in case bpf_error is hit */
if (seen & (SEEN_XREG | SEEN_DATAREF))
EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x5d, 0xf8); /* mov %rbx, -8(%rbp) */
if (seen & SEEN_XREG)
CLEAR_X(); /* make sure we dont leek kernel memory */
/*
* If this filter needs to access skb data,
* loads r9 and r8 with :
* r9 = skb->len - skb->data_len
* r8 = skb->data
*/
if (seen & SEEN_DATAREF) {
if (offsetof(struct sk_buff, len) <= 127)
/* mov off8(%rdi),%r9d */
EMIT4(0x44, 0x8b, 0x4f, offsetof(struct sk_buff, len));
else {
/* mov off32(%rdi),%r9d */
EMIT3(0x44, 0x8b, 0x8f);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, len), 4);
}
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, data_len)))
/* sub off8(%rdi),%r9d */
EMIT4(0x44, 0x2b, 0x4f, offsetof(struct sk_buff, data_len));
else {
EMIT3(0x44, 0x2b, 0x8f);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, data_len), 4);
}
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, data)))
/* mov off8(%rdi),%r8 */
EMIT4(0x4c, 0x8b, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, data));
else {
/* mov off32(%rdi),%r8 */
EMIT3(0x4c, 0x8b, 0x87);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, data), 4);
}
}
}
switch (filter[0].code) {
case BPF_S_RET_K:
case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
case BPF_S_ANC_PROTOCOL:
case BPF_S_ANC_IFINDEX:
case BPF_S_ANC_MARK:
case BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH:
case BPF_S_ANC_CPU:
case BPF_S_ANC_QUEUE:
case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS:
case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS:
/* first instruction sets A register (or is RET 'constant') */
break;
default:
/* make sure we dont leak kernel information to user */
CLEAR_A(); /* A = 0 */
}
for (i = 0; i < flen; i++) {
unsigned int K = filter[i].k;
switch (filter[i].code) {
case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X: /* A += X; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x01, 0xd8); /* add %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K: /* A += K; */
if (!K)
break;
if (is_imm8(K))
EMIT3(0x83, 0xc0, K); /* add imm8,%eax */
else
EMIT1_off32(0x05, K); /* add imm32,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X: /* A -= X; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x29, 0xd8); /* sub %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K: /* A -= K */
if (!K)
break;
if (is_imm8(K))
EMIT3(0x83, 0xe8, K); /* sub imm8,%eax */
else
EMIT1_off32(0x2d, K); /* sub imm32,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X: /* A *= X; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT3(0x0f, 0xaf, 0xc3); /* imul %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K: /* A *= K */
if (is_imm8(K))
EMIT3(0x6b, 0xc0, K); /* imul imm8,%eax,%eax */
else {
EMIT2(0x69, 0xc0); /* imul imm32,%eax */
EMIT(K, 4);
}
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X: /* A /= X; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x85, 0xdb); /* test %ebx,%ebx */
if (pc_ret0 != -1)
EMIT_COND_JMP(X86_JE, addrs[pc_ret0] - (addrs[i] - 4));
else {
EMIT_COND_JMP(X86_JNE, 2 + 5);
CLEAR_A();
EMIT1_off32(0xe9, cleanup_addr - (addrs[i] - 4)); /* jmp .+off32 */
}
EMIT4(0x31, 0xd2, 0xf7, 0xf3); /* xor %edx,%edx; div %ebx */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K: /* A = reciprocal_divide(A, K); */
EMIT3(0x48, 0x69, 0xc0); /* imul imm32,%rax,%rax */
EMIT(K, 4);
EMIT4(0x48, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0x20); /* shr $0x20,%rax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X:
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x21, 0xd8); /* and %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K:
if (K >= 0xFFFFFF00) {
EMIT2(0x24, K & 0xFF); /* and imm8,%al */
} else if (K >= 0xFFFF0000) {
EMIT2(0x66, 0x25); /* and imm16,%ax */
EMIT2(K, 2);
} else {
EMIT1_off32(0x25, K); /* and imm32,%eax */
}
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X:
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x09, 0xd8); /* or %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K:
if (is_imm8(K))
EMIT3(0x83, 0xc8, K); /* or imm8,%eax */
else
EMIT1_off32(0x0d, K); /* or imm32,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X: /* A <<= X; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT4(0x89, 0xd9, 0xd3, 0xe0); /* mov %ebx,%ecx; shl %cl,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K:
if (K == 0)
break;
else if (K == 1)
EMIT2(0xd1, 0xe0); /* shl %eax */
else
EMIT3(0xc1, 0xe0, K);
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X: /* A >>= X; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT4(0x89, 0xd9, 0xd3, 0xe8); /* mov %ebx,%ecx; shr %cl,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K: /* A >>= K; */
if (K == 0)
break;
else if (K == 1)
EMIT2(0xd1, 0xe8); /* shr %eax */
else
EMIT3(0xc1, 0xe8, K);
break;
case BPF_S_ALU_NEG:
EMIT2(0xf7, 0xd8); /* neg %eax */
break;
case BPF_S_RET_K:
if (!K) {
if (pc_ret0 == -1)
pc_ret0 = i;
CLEAR_A();
} else {
EMIT1_off32(0xb8, K); /* mov $imm32,%eax */
}
/* fallinto */
case BPF_S_RET_A:
if (seen) {
if (i != flen - 1) {
EMIT_JMP(cleanup_addr - addrs[i]);
break;
}
if (seen & SEEN_XREG)
EMIT4(0x48, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xf8); /* mov -8(%rbp),%rbx */
EMIT1(0xc9); /* leaveq */
}
EMIT1(0xc3); /* ret */
break;
case BPF_S_MISC_TAX: /* X = A */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x89, 0xc3); /* mov %eax,%ebx */
break;
case BPF_S_MISC_TXA: /* A = X */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x89, 0xd8); /* mov %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_LD_IMM: /* A = K */
if (!K)
CLEAR_A();
else
EMIT1_off32(0xb8, K); /* mov $imm32,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_LDX_IMM: /* X = K */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
if (!K)
CLEAR_X();
else
EMIT1_off32(0xbb, K); /* mov $imm32,%ebx */
break;
case BPF_S_LD_MEM: /* A = mem[K] : mov off8(%rbp),%eax */
seen |= SEEN_MEM;
EMIT3(0x8b, 0x45, 0xf0 - K*4);
break;
case BPF_S_LDX_MEM: /* X = mem[K] : mov off8(%rbp),%ebx */
seen |= SEEN_XREG | SEEN_MEM;
EMIT3(0x8b, 0x5d, 0xf0 - K*4);
break;
case BPF_S_ST: /* mem[K] = A : mov %eax,off8(%rbp) */
seen |= SEEN_MEM;
EMIT3(0x89, 0x45, 0xf0 - K*4);
break;
case BPF_S_STX: /* mem[K] = X : mov %ebx,off8(%rbp) */
seen |= SEEN_XREG | SEEN_MEM;
EMIT3(0x89, 0x5d, 0xf0 - K*4);
break;
case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN: /* A = skb->len; */
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, len) != 4);
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, len)))
/* mov off8(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT3(0x8b, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, len));
else {
EMIT2(0x8b, 0x87);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, len), 4);
}
break;
case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN: /* X = skb->len; */
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, len)))
/* mov off8(%rdi),%ebx */
EMIT3(0x8b, 0x5f, offsetof(struct sk_buff, len));
else {
EMIT2(0x8b, 0x9f);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, len), 4);
}
break;
case BPF_S_ANC_PROTOCOL: /* A = ntohs(skb->protocol); */
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, protocol) != 2);
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, protocol))) {
/* movzwl off8(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT4(0x0f, 0xb7, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, protocol));
} else {
EMIT3(0x0f, 0xb7, 0x87); /* movzwl off32(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, protocol), 4);
}
EMIT2(0x86, 0xc4); /* ntohs() : xchg %al,%ah */
break;
case BPF_S_ANC_IFINDEX:
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, dev))) {
/* movq off8(%rdi),%rax */
EMIT4(0x48, 0x8b, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, dev));
} else {
EMIT3(0x48, 0x8b, 0x87); /* movq off32(%rdi),%rax */
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, dev), 4);
}
EMIT3(0x48, 0x85, 0xc0); /* test %rax,%rax */
EMIT_COND_JMP(X86_JE, cleanup_addr - (addrs[i] - 6));
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct net_device, ifindex) != 4);
EMIT2(0x8b, 0x80); /* mov off32(%rax),%eax */
EMIT(offsetof(struct net_device, ifindex), 4);
break;
case BPF_S_ANC_MARK:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, mark) != 4);
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, mark))) {
/* mov off8(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT3(0x8b, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, mark));
} else {
EMIT2(0x8b, 0x87);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, mark), 4);
}
break;
case BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, rxhash) != 4);
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, rxhash))) {
/* mov off8(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT3(0x8b, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, rxhash));
} else {
EMIT2(0x8b, 0x87);
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, rxhash), 4);
}
break;
case BPF_S_ANC_QUEUE:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, queue_mapping) != 2);
if (is_imm8(offsetof(struct sk_buff, queue_mapping))) {
/* movzwl off8(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT4(0x0f, 0xb7, 0x47, offsetof(struct sk_buff, queue_mapping));
} else {
EMIT3(0x0f, 0xb7, 0x87); /* movzwl off32(%rdi),%eax */
EMIT(offsetof(struct sk_buff, queue_mapping), 4);
}
break;
case BPF_S_ANC_CPU:
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
EMIT4(0x65, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x25); /* mov %gs:off32,%eax */
EMIT((u32)(unsigned long)&cpu_number, 4); /* A = smp_processor_id(); */
#else
CLEAR_A();
#endif
break;
case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
func = sk_load_word;
common_load: seen |= SEEN_DATAREF;
if ((int)K < 0)
goto out;
t_offset = func - (image + addrs[i]);
EMIT1_off32(0xbe, K); /* mov imm32,%esi */
EMIT1_off32(0xe8, t_offset); /* call */
break;
case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS:
func = sk_load_half;
goto common_load;
case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS:
func = sk_load_byte;
goto common_load;
case BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH:
if ((int)K < 0) {
if (pc_ret0 != -1) {
EMIT_JMP(addrs[pc_ret0] - addrs[i]);
break;
}
CLEAR_A();
EMIT_JMP(cleanup_addr - addrs[i]);
break;
}
seen |= SEEN_DATAREF | SEEN_XREG;
t_offset = sk_load_byte_msh - (image + addrs[i]);
EMIT1_off32(0xbe, K); /* mov imm32,%esi */
EMIT1_off32(0xe8, t_offset); /* call sk_load_byte_msh */
break;
case BPF_S_LD_W_IND:
func = sk_load_word_ind;
common_load_ind: seen |= SEEN_DATAREF | SEEN_XREG;
t_offset = func - (image + addrs[i]);
EMIT1_off32(0xbe, K); /* mov imm32,%esi */
EMIT1_off32(0xe8, t_offset); /* call sk_load_xxx_ind */
break;
case BPF_S_LD_H_IND:
func = sk_load_half_ind;
goto common_load_ind;
case BPF_S_LD_B_IND:
func = sk_load_byte_ind;
goto common_load_ind;
case BPF_S_JMP_JA:
t_offset = addrs[i + K] - addrs[i];
EMIT_JMP(t_offset);
break;
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K, X86_JA, X86_JBE);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K, X86_JAE, X86_JB);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K, X86_JE, X86_JNE);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K,X86_JNE, X86_JE);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X, X86_JA, X86_JBE);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X, X86_JAE, X86_JB);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X, X86_JE, X86_JNE);
COND_SEL(BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X,X86_JNE, X86_JE);
cond_branch: f_offset = addrs[i + filter[i].jf] - addrs[i];
t_offset = addrs[i + filter[i].jt] - addrs[i];
/* same targets, can avoid doing the test :) */
if (filter[i].jt == filter[i].jf) {
EMIT_JMP(t_offset);
break;
}
switch (filter[i].code) {
case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X:
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x39, 0xd8); /* cmp %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X:
seen |= SEEN_XREG;
EMIT2(0x85, 0xd8); /* test %ebx,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K:
if (K == 0) {
EMIT2(0x85, 0xc0); /* test %eax,%eax */
break;
}
case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K:
if (K <= 127)
EMIT3(0x83, 0xf8, K); /* cmp imm8,%eax */
else
EMIT1_off32(0x3d, K); /* cmp imm32,%eax */
break;
case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K:
if (K <= 0xFF)
EMIT2(0xa8, K); /* test imm8,%al */
else if (!(K & 0xFFFF00FF))
EMIT3(0xf6, 0xc4, K >> 8); /* test imm8,%ah */
else if (K <= 0xFFFF) {
EMIT2(0x66, 0xa9); /* test imm16,%ax */
EMIT(K, 2);
} else {
EMIT1_off32(0xa9, K); /* test imm32,%eax */
}
break;
}
if (filter[i].jt != 0) {
if (filter[i].jf)
t_offset += is_near(f_offset) ? 2 : 6;
EMIT_COND_JMP(t_op, t_offset);
if (filter[i].jf)
EMIT_JMP(f_offset);
break;
}
EMIT_COND_JMP(f_op, f_offset);
break;
default:
/* hmm, too complex filter, give up with jit compiler */
goto out;
}
ilen = prog - temp;
if (image) {
if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen)) {
pr_err("bpb_jit_compile fatal error\n");
kfree(addrs);
module_free(NULL, image);
return;
}
memcpy(image + proglen, temp, ilen);
}
proglen += ilen;
addrs[i] = proglen;
prog = temp;
}
/* last bpf instruction is always a RET :
* use it to give the cleanup instruction(s) addr
*/
cleanup_addr = proglen - 1; /* ret */
if (seen)
cleanup_addr -= 1; /* leaveq */
if (seen & SEEN_XREG)
cleanup_addr -= 4; /* mov -8(%rbp),%rbx */
if (image) {
WARN_ON(proglen != oldproglen);
break;
}
if (proglen == oldproglen) {
image = module_alloc(max_t(unsigned int,
proglen,
sizeof(struct work_struct)));
if (!image)
goto out;
}
oldproglen = proglen;
}
if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
pr_err("flen=%d proglen=%u pass=%d image=%p\n",
flen, proglen, pass, image);
if (image) {
if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "JIT code: ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS,
16, 1, image, proglen, false);
bpf_flush_icache(image, image + proglen);
fp->bpf_func = (void *)image;
}
out:
kfree(addrs);
return;
}
Commit Message: net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump target
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6
bytes.
In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump
target is one byte past the start of target instruction.
Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <nepenthesdev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 23,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp,
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *info,
int send_ack)
{
int err = 0;
if (! grp->count)
return -EINVAL;
grp->count--;
if (grp->close && grp->count == 0)
err = grp->close(port->private_data, info);
if (send_ack && client->type == USER_CLIENT)
snd_seq_client_notify_subscription(port->addr.client, port->addr.port,
info, SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_PORT_UNSUBSCRIBED);
module_put(port->owner);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 8,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
{
int hashlen;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
return 0;
hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
if (hashlen == 0)
return 0;
if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH))
return 0;
OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_edit_list_entry(MOVContext *mov,
const MOVStreamContext *msc,
unsigned int edit_list_index,
int64_t *edit_list_media_time,
int64_t *edit_list_duration,
int64_t global_timescale)
{
if (edit_list_index == msc->elst_count) {
return 0;
}
*edit_list_media_time = msc->elst_data[edit_list_index].time;
*edit_list_duration = msc->elst_data[edit_list_index].duration;
/* duration is in global timescale units;convert to msc timescale */
if (global_timescale == 0) {
avpriv_request_sample(mov->fc, "Support for mvhd.timescale = 0 with editlists");
return 0;
}
*edit_list_duration = av_rescale(*edit_list_duration, msc->time_scale,
global_timescale);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 17,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 29,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hugetlbfs_read_actor(struct page *page, unsigned long offset,
char __user *buf, unsigned long count,
unsigned long size)
{
char *kaddr;
unsigned long left, copied = 0;
int i, chunksize;
if (size > count)
size = count;
/* Find which 4k chunk and offset with in that chunk */
i = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
offset = offset & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
while (size) {
chunksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
if (offset)
chunksize -= offset;
if (chunksize > size)
chunksize = size;
kaddr = kmap(&page[i]);
left = __copy_to_user(buf, kaddr + offset, chunksize);
kunmap(&page[i]);
if (left) {
copied += (chunksize - left);
break;
}
offset = 0;
size -= chunksize;
buf += chunksize;
copied += chunksize;
i++;
}
return copied ? copied : -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int json_array_extend(json_t *json, json_t *other_json)
{
json_array_t *array, *other;
size_t i;
if(!json_is_array(json) || !json_is_array(other_json))
return -1;
array = json_to_array(json);
other = json_to_array(other_json);
if(!json_array_grow(array, other->entries, 1))
return -1;
for(i = 0; i < other->entries; i++)
json_incref(other->table[i]);
array_copy(array->table, array->entries, other->table, 0, other->entries);
array->entries += other->entries;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 21,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void atalk_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock_bh(&atalk_sockets_lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&atalk_sockets_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseFetchContext::AddCSPHeaderIfNecessary(Resource::Type type,
ResourceRequest& request) {
const ContentSecurityPolicy* csp = GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (!csp)
return;
if (csp->ShouldSendCSPHeader(type))
request.AddHTTPHeaderField("CSP", "active");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dump_msg_test(char *code,FILE* fd,char header,char segregationLevel)
{
unsigned short int i,j,l,m,msglen;
int k;
char r,*msg;
unsigned char *payload;
payload=(unsigned char*)code;
memcpy(&i,code,2);/*the CODE of the request/response*/
memcpy(&j,&code[MSG_START_IDX],2);/*where the MSG starts*/
memcpy(&msglen,&code[MSG_LEN_IDX],2);/*how long the MSG is*/
i=ntohs(i);
j=ntohs(j);
msglen=ntohs(msglen);
if(header==0){
fwrite(code,1,j+msglen,fd);
fwrite(&theSignal,1,4,fd);
return 0;
}
msg=(char*)&payload[j];
r=(i<100)?1:0;
if(r){
if(segregationLevel & ALSO_RURI){
if(!(segregationLevel & JUNIT)){
k=htonl(payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+1]+payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+2]);
fwrite(&k,1,4,fd);
fwrite(msg,1,ntohl(k),fd);
k=htonl((long)payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX]);
fwrite(&k,1,4,fd);
fwrite(&payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+1],1,payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX],fd);
fwrite(&theSignal,1,4,fd);
}else
print_uri_junit_tests(msg,payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+1]+payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+2]
,&payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+1],payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX],fd,1,"");
}
i=REQUEST_URI_IDX+1+payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX];
}else{
i=REQUEST_URI_IDX;
}
j=payload[i];
i++;
for(k=i;k<i+(j*3);k+=3){
memcpy(&l,&payload[k+1],2);
memcpy(&m,&payload[k+4],2);
l=ntohs(l);
m=ntohs(m);
if(header==(char)payload[k] ||
(header=='U' &&
(payload[k]=='f' ||
payload[k]=='t' ||
payload[k]=='m' ||
payload[k]=='o' ||
payload[k]=='p')))
dump_headers_test(msg,msglen,&payload[i+(j*3)+l+3],m-l,payload[k],fd,segregationLevel);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: seas: safety check for target buffer size before copying message in encode_msg()
- avoid buffer overflow for large SIP messages
- reported by Stelios Tsampas
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int br_multicast_ipv4_rcv(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb;
struct iphdr *iph;
struct igmphdr *ih;
unsigned len;
unsigned offset;
int err;
/* We treat OOM as packet loss for now. */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph)))
return -EINVAL;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
if (iph->ihl < 5 || iph->version != 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ip_hdrlen(skb)))
return -EINVAL;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
if (unlikely(ip_fast_csum((u8 *)iph, iph->ihl)))
return -EINVAL;
if (iph->protocol != IPPROTO_IGMP)
return 0;
len = ntohs(iph->tot_len);
if (skb->len < len || len < ip_hdrlen(skb))
return -EINVAL;
if (skb->len > len) {
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb2)
return -ENOMEM;
err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb2, len);
if (err)
goto err_out;
}
len -= ip_hdrlen(skb2);
offset = skb_network_offset(skb2) + ip_hdrlen(skb2);
__skb_pull(skb2, offset);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb2);
err = -EINVAL;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb2, sizeof(*ih)))
goto out;
switch (skb2->ip_summed) {
case CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:
if (!csum_fold(skb2->csum))
break;
/* fall through */
case CHECKSUM_NONE:
skb2->csum = 0;
if (skb_checksum_complete(skb2))
goto out;
}
err = 0;
BR_INPUT_SKB_CB(skb)->igmp = 1;
ih = igmp_hdr(skb2);
switch (ih->type) {
case IGMP_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
case IGMPV2_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
BR_INPUT_SKB_CB(skb2)->mrouters_only = 1;
err = br_ip4_multicast_add_group(br, port, ih->group);
break;
case IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
err = br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report(br, port, skb2);
break;
case IGMP_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY:
err = br_ip4_multicast_query(br, port, skb2);
break;
case IGMP_HOST_LEAVE_MESSAGE:
br_ip4_multicast_leave_group(br, port, ih->group);
break;
}
out:
__skb_push(skb2, offset);
err_out:
if (skb2 != skb)
kfree_skb(skb2);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TemplateURLRef::ParseIfNecessary(
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data) const {
if (!parsed_) {
InvalidateCachedValues();
parsed_ = true;
parsed_url_ = ParseURL(GetURL(), &replacements_, &post_params_, &valid_);
supports_replacements_ = false;
if (valid_) {
bool has_only_one_search_term = false;
for (Replacements::const_iterator i = replacements_.begin();
i != replacements_.end(); ++i) {
if ((i->type == SEARCH_TERMS) ||
(i->type == GOOGLE_UNESCAPED_SEARCH_TERMS)) {
if (has_only_one_search_term) {
has_only_one_search_term = false;
break;
}
has_only_one_search_term = true;
supports_replacements_ = true;
}
}
if (has_only_one_search_term)
ParseHostAndSearchTermKey(search_terms_data);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __cond_resched(void)
{
__preempt_count_add(PREEMPT_ACTIVE);
__schedule();
__preempt_count_sub(PREEMPT_ACTIVE);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
if (tp->rcv_rtt_est.time == 0)
goto new_measure;
if (before(tp->rcv_nxt, tp->rcv_rtt_est.seq))
return;
tcp_rcv_rtt_update(tp, jiffies - tp->rcv_rtt_est.time, 1);
new_measure:
tp->rcv_rtt_est.seq = tp->rcv_nxt + tp->rcv_wnd;
tp->rcv_rtt_est.time = tcp_time_stamp;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
struct timespec __user *, utime, u32 __user *, uaddr2,
u32, val3)
{
struct timespec ts;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
u32 val2 = 0;
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
if (utime && (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT || cmd == FUTEX_LOCK_PI ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI)) {
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ts, utime, sizeof(ts)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec_valid(&ts))
return -EINVAL;
t = timespec_to_ktime(ts);
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
t = ktime_add_safe(ktime_get(), t);
tp = &t;
}
/*
* requeue parameter in 'utime' if cmd == FUTEX_*_REQUEUE_*.
* number of waiters to wake in 'utime' if cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP.
*/
if (cmd == FUTEX_REQUEUE || cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE ||
cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI || cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP)
val2 = (u32) (unsigned long) utime;
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, val2, val3);
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 7,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sock *dn_socket_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *n)
{
struct dn_iter_state *state = seq->private;
n = sk_next(n);
try_again:
if (n)
goto out;
if (++state->bucket >= DN_SK_HASH_SIZE)
goto out;
n = sk_head(&dn_sk_hash[state->bucket]);
goto try_again;
out:
return n;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int core_cmd0_wrapper(void *core, const char *cmd) {
return r_core_cmd0 ((RCore *)core, cmd);
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 13,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DGAAvailable(int index)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen;
assert(index < MAXSCREENS);
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[index];
return DGAScreenAvailable(pScreen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct tevent_req *smb1cli_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
uint8_t smb_command,
uint8_t additional_flags,
uint8_t clear_flags,
uint16_t additional_flags2,
uint16_t clear_flags2,
uint32_t timeout_msec,
uint32_t pid,
struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon,
struct smbXcli_session *session,
uint8_t wct, uint16_t *vwv,
uint32_t num_bytes,
const uint8_t *bytes)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct iovec iov;
NTSTATUS status;
iov.iov_base = discard_const_p(void, bytes);
iov.iov_len = num_bytes;
req = smb1cli_req_create(mem_ctx, ev, conn, smb_command,
additional_flags, clear_flags,
additional_flags2, clear_flags2,
timeout_msec,
pid, tcon, session,
wct, vwv, 1, &iov);
if (req == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(req)) {
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
status = smb1cli_req_chain_submit(&req, 1);
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
return req;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigatorImpl::NavigateToEntry(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
const FrameNavigationEntry& frame_entry,
const NavigationEntryImpl& entry,
ReloadType reload_type,
bool is_same_document_history_load,
bool is_history_navigation_in_new_child,
bool is_pending_entry,
const scoped_refptr<ResourceRequestBodyImpl>& post_body) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser,navigation", "NavigatorImpl::NavigateToEntry");
GURL dest_url = frame_entry.url();
Referrer dest_referrer = frame_entry.referrer();
if (reload_type == ReloadType::ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL &&
entry.GetOriginalRequestURL().is_valid() && !entry.GetHasPostData()) {
dest_url = entry.GetOriginalRequestURL();
dest_referrer = Referrer();
}
if (frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame()) {
const GURL& virtual_url = entry.GetVirtualURL();
if (!virtual_url.is_valid() && !virtual_url.is_empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Refusing to load for invalid virtual URL: "
<< virtual_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return false;
}
}
if (!dest_url.is_valid() && !dest_url.is_empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Refusing to load invalid URL: "
<< dest_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return false;
}
if (dest_url.spec().size() > url::kMaxURLChars) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Refusing to load URL as it exceeds " << url::kMaxURLChars
<< " characters.";
return false;
}
base::TimeTicks navigation_start = base::TimeTicks::Now();
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT_WITH_TIMESTAMP0(
"navigation,rail", "NavigationTiming navigationStart",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL, navigation_start);
PreviewsState previews_state = PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame()) {
previews_state = frame_tree_node->frame_tree()
->root()
->current_frame_host()
->last_navigation_previews_state();
} else if (reload_type == ReloadType::DISABLE_LOFI_MODE) {
previews_state = PREVIEWS_NO_TRANSFORM;
}
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
navigation_data_.reset(new NavigationMetricsData(navigation_start, dest_url,
entry.restore_type()));
RequestNavigation(frame_tree_node, dest_url, dest_referrer, frame_entry,
entry, reload_type, previews_state,
is_same_document_history_load,
is_history_navigation_in_new_child, navigation_start);
if (frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame() &&
frame_tree_node->navigation_request()) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN_WITH_TIMESTAMP1(
"navigation", "Navigation timeToNetworkStack",
frame_tree_node->navigation_request()->navigation_handle(),
navigation_start,
"FrameTreeNode id", frame_tree_node->frame_tree_node_id());
}
} else {
RenderFrameHostImpl* dest_render_frame_host =
frame_tree_node->render_manager()->Navigate(
dest_url, frame_entry, entry, reload_type != ReloadType::NONE);
if (!dest_render_frame_host)
return false; // Unable to create the desired RenderFrameHost.
if (is_pending_entry)
CHECK_EQ(controller_->GetPendingEntry(), &entry);
CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(dest_render_frame_host, dest_url);
bool is_transfer = entry.transferred_global_request_id().child_id != -1;
if (is_transfer)
dest_render_frame_host->set_is_loading(true);
if (is_pending_entry && controller_->GetPendingEntryIndex() != -1)
DCHECK(frame_entry.page_state().IsValid());
bool is_transfer_to_same =
is_transfer &&
entry.transferred_global_request_id().child_id ==
dest_render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID();
if (!is_transfer_to_same) {
navigation_data_.reset(new NavigationMetricsData(
navigation_start, dest_url, entry.restore_type()));
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::Value navigation_type = GetNavigationType(
frame_tree_node->current_url(), // old_url
dest_url, // new_url
reload_type, // reload_type
entry, // entry
frame_entry, // frame_entry
is_same_document_history_load); // is_same_document_history_load
dest_render_frame_host->Navigate(
entry.ConstructCommonNavigationParams(
frame_entry, post_body, dest_url, dest_referrer, navigation_type,
previews_state, navigation_start),
entry.ConstructStartNavigationParams(),
entry.ConstructRequestNavigationParams(
frame_entry, GURL(), std::string(),
is_history_navigation_in_new_child,
entry.GetSubframeUniqueNames(frame_tree_node),
frame_tree_node->has_committed_real_load(),
controller_->GetPendingEntryIndex() == -1,
controller_->GetIndexOfEntry(&entry),
controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex(),
controller_->GetEntryCount()));
} else {
dest_render_frame_host->navigation_handle()->set_is_transferring(false);
}
}
if (is_pending_entry)
CHECK_EQ(controller_->GetPendingEntry(), &entry);
if (controller_->GetPendingEntryIndex() == -1 &&
dest_url.SchemeIs(url::kJavaScriptScheme)) {
return false;
}
if (delegate_ && is_pending_entry)
delegate_->DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(dest_url, reload_type);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 4,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info,
struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity)
{
struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = {
.style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH,
};
struct nfs4_secinfo_res res = {
.flavors = flavors,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SECINFO_NO_NAME],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client;
struct rpc_cred *cred = NULL;
int status;
if (use_integrity) {
clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient;
cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client);
msg.rpc_cred = cred;
}
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args,
&res.seq_res, 0);
dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
if (cred)
put_rpccred(cred);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCommitURL(int child_id,
const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false; // Can't commit invalid URLs.
if (IsPseudoScheme(url.scheme()))
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(url.spec(), url::kAboutBlankURL);
if (IsWebSafeScheme(url.scheme()))
return true; // The scheme has been white-listed for every child process.
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return false;
return state->second->CanCommitURL(url);
}
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
{
long n;
unsigned char *p;
int i;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/* We've already read everything in */
*len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
return 1;
}
p = s->init_msg;
n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
&p[s->init_num], n, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
s->init_num += i;
n -= i;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
* Finished verification.
*/
if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
ssl3_take_mac(s);
#endif
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
} else {
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
/*
* init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
* unsigned
*/
if (s->init_num < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
*len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StringPiece16::const_iterator findNonAlphaNumericAndNotInSet(const StringPiece16& str,
const StringPiece16& allowedChars) {
const auto endIter = str.end();
for (auto iter = str.begin(); iter != endIter; ++iter) {
char16_t c = *iter;
if ((c >= u'a' && c <= u'z') ||
(c >= u'A' && c <= u'Z') ||
(c >= u'0' && c <= u'9')) {
continue;
}
bool match = false;
for (char16_t i : allowedChars) {
if (c == i) {
match = true;
break;
}
}
if (!match) {
return iter;
}
}
return endIter;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageconvolution)
{
zval *SIM, *hash_matrix;
zval **var = NULL, **var2 = NULL;
gdImagePtr im_src = NULL;
double div, offset;
int nelem, i, j, res;
float matrix[3][3] = {{0,0,0}, {0,0,0}, {0,0,0}};
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "radd", &SIM, &hash_matrix, &div, &offset) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(hash_matrix));
if (nelem != 3) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have 3x3 array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i<3; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(hash_matrix), (i), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(var) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(var) != IS_ARRAY || zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(var)) != 3 ) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have 3x3 array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (j=0; j<3; j++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(var), (j), (void **) &var2) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(var2);
convert_to_double(*var2);
matrix[i][j] = Z_DVAL_PP(var2);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have a 3x3 matrix");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
res = gdImageConvolution(im_src, matrix, div, offset);
if (res) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 21,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(frame_);
visitor->Trace(progress_tracker_);
visitor->Trace(document_loader_);
visitor->Trace(provisional_document_loader_);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 20,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm;
/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
if (old_mm) {
sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
/*
* Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
* for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going
* through with the exec. We must hold mmap_sem around
* checking core_state and changing tsk->mm.
*/
down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(old_mm->core_state)) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
return -EINTR;
}
}
task_lock(tsk);
active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
tsk->mm->vmacache_seqnum = 0;
vmacache_flush(tsk);
task_unlock(tsk);
if (old_mm) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm);
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm);
mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
mmput(old_mm);
return 0;
}
mmdrop(active_mm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: box_overbelow(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPle(box1->high.y, box2->high.y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 13,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeBlob(size_t len, WritableBlob* outBlob)
{
status_t status;
if (!mAllowFds || len <= IN_PLACE_BLOB_LIMIT) {
ALOGV("writeBlob: write in place");
status = writeInt32(0);
if (status) return status;
void* ptr = writeInplace(len);
if (!ptr) return NO_MEMORY;
outBlob->init(false /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
ALOGV("writeBlob: write to ashmem");
int fd = ashmem_create_region("Parcel Blob", len);
if (fd < 0) return NO_MEMORY;
int result = ashmem_set_prot_region(fd, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
if (result < 0) {
status = result;
} else {
void* ptr = ::mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
status = -errno;
} else {
result = ashmem_set_prot_region(fd, PROT_READ);
if (result < 0) {
status = result;
} else {
status = writeInt32(1);
if (!status) {
status = writeFileDescriptor(fd, true /*takeOwnership*/);
if (!status) {
outBlob->init(true /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
::munmap(ptr, len);
}
::close(fd);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sock *mroute6_socket(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct mr6_table *mrt;
struct flowi6 fl6 = {
.flowi6_iif = skb->skb_iif ? : LOOPBACK_IFINDEX,
.flowi6_oif = skb->dev->ifindex,
.flowi6_mark = skb->mark,
};
if (ip6mr_fib_lookup(net, &fl6, &mrt) < 0)
return NULL;
return mrt->mroute6_sk;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void phar_postprocess_ru_web(char *fname, int fname_len, char **entry, int *entry_len, char **ru, int *ru_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *e = *entry + 1, *u = NULL, *u1 = NULL, *saveu = NULL;
int e_len = *entry_len - 1, u_len = 0;
phar_archive_data **pphar = NULL;
/* we already know we can retrieve the phar if we reach here */
zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), fname, fname_len, (void **) &pphar);
if (!pphar && PHAR_G(manifest_cached)) {
zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, fname, fname_len, (void **) &pphar);
}
do {
if (zend_hash_exists(&((*pphar)->manifest), e, e_len)) {
if (u) {
u[0] = '/';
*ru = estrndup(u, u_len+1);
++u_len;
u[0] = '\0';
} else {
*ru = NULL;
}
*ru_len = u_len;
*entry_len = e_len + 1;
return;
}
if (u) {
u1 = strrchr(e, '/');
u[0] = '/';
saveu = u;
e_len += u_len + 1;
u = u1;
if (!u) {
return;
}
} else {
u = strrchr(e, '/');
if (!u) {
if (saveu) {
saveu[0] = '/';
}
return;
}
}
u[0] = '\0';
u_len = strlen(u + 1);
e_len -= u_len + 1;
if (e_len < 0) {
if (saveu) {
saveu[0] = '/';
}
return;
}
} while (1);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_rng_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_rng *rng = __crypto_rng_cast(tfm);
struct rng_alg *alg = crypto_rng_alg(rng);
struct old_rng_alg *oalg = crypto_old_rng_alg(rng);
if (oalg->rng_make_random) {
rng->generate = generate;
rng->seed = rngapi_reset;
rng->seedsize = oalg->seedsize;
return 0;
}
rng->generate = alg->generate;
rng->seed = alg->seed;
rng->seedsize = alg->seedsize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 5,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __page_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *symname, int len, int nofs)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct page *page;
void *fsdata;
int err;
char *kaddr;
unsigned int flags = AOP_FLAG_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
if (nofs)
flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
retry:
err = pagecache_write_begin(NULL, mapping, 0, len-1,
flags, &page, &fsdata);
if (err)
goto fail;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
memcpy(kaddr, symname, len-1);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
err = pagecache_write_end(NULL, mapping, 0, len-1, len-1,
page, fsdata);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
if (err < len-1)
goto retry;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return 0;
fail:
return err;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_LSTAT)
/* Platform doesn't have lstat, so we can't look for symlinks. */
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#else
char *pn;
char c;
int r;
struct stat st;
/*
* Guard against symlink tricks. Reject any archive entry whose
* destination would be altered by a symlink.
*/
/* Whatever we checked last time doesn't need to be re-checked. */
pn = a->name;
if (archive_strlen(&(a->path_safe)) > 0) {
char *p = a->path_safe.s;
while ((*pn != '\0') && (*p == *pn))
++p, ++pn;
}
c = pn[0];
/* Keep going until we've checked the entire name. */
while (pn[0] != '\0' && (pn[0] != '/' || pn[1] != '\0')) {
/* Skip the next path element. */
while (*pn != '\0' && *pn != '/')
++pn;
c = pn[0];
pn[0] = '\0';
/* Check that we haven't hit a symlink. */
r = lstat(a->name, &st);
if (r != 0) {
/* We've hit a dir that doesn't exist; stop now. */
if (errno == ENOENT)
break;
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* Last element is symlink; remove it
* so we can overwrite it with the
* item being extracted.
*/
if (unlink(a->name)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Could not remove symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
/*
* Even if we did remove it, a warning
* is in order. The warning is silly,
* though, if we're just replacing one
* symlink with another symlink.
*/
if (!S_ISLNK(a->mode)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Removing symlink %s",
a->name);
}
/* Symlink gone. No more problem! */
pn[0] = c;
return (0);
} else if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
/* User asked us to remove problems. */
if (unlink(a->name) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Cannot extract through symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
}
pn[0] = c;
/* We've checked and/or cleaned the whole path, so remember it. */
archive_strcpy(&a->path_safe, a->name);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 13,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tracer_tracing_off(struct trace_array *tr)
{
if (tr->trace_buffer.buffer)
ring_buffer_record_off(tr->trace_buffer.buffer);
/*
* This flag is looked at when buffers haven't been allocated
* yet, or by some tracers (like irqsoff), that just want to
* know if the ring buffer has been disabled, but it can handle
* races of where it gets disabled but we still do a record.
* As the check is in the fast path of the tracers, it is more
* important to be fast than accurate.
*/
tr->buffer_disabled = 1;
/* Make the flag seen by readers */
smp_wmb();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 3,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::UpdateTargetURL(const GURL& url,
const GURL& fallback_url) {
GURL latest_url = url.is_empty() ? fallback_url : url;
if (latest_url == target_url_)
return;
if (target_url_status_ == TARGET_INFLIGHT ||
target_url_status_ == TARGET_PENDING) {
pending_target_url_ = latest_url;
target_url_status_ = TARGET_PENDING;
} else {
if (latest_url.possibly_invalid_spec().size() > url::kMaxURLChars)
latest_url = GURL();
Send(new ViewHostMsg_UpdateTargetURL(GetRoutingID(), latest_url));
target_url_ = latest_url;
target_url_status_ = TARGET_INFLIGHT;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedAttrGetter2AttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedAttrGetter2", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedAttrGetter2(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntries() {
bool transient = transient_entry_index_ != -1;
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
if (transient) {
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(kInvalidateAll);
}
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void huge_pagevec_release(struct pagevec *pvec)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(pvec); ++i)
put_page(pvec->pages[i]);
pagevec_reinit(pvec);
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rend_service_dump_stats(int severity)
{
int i,j;
rend_service_t *service;
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
const char *safe_name;
origin_circuit_t *circ;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Service configured in %s:",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
safe_name = safe_str_client(intro->extend_info->nickname);
circ = find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
if (!circ) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: no circuit",
j, safe_name);
continue;
}
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: circuit is %s",
j, safe_name, circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 24,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Editor::TryDHTMLPaste(PasteMode paste_mode) {
return !DispatchCPPEvent(EventTypeNames::paste, kDataTransferReadable,
paste_mode);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlinkTestRunner::UseUnfortunateSynchronousResizeMode(bool enable) {
UseSynchronousResizeModeVisitor visitor(enable);
RenderView::ForEach(&visitor);
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ThreadHeapStats::ThreadHeapStats()
: allocated_space_(0),
allocated_object_size_(0),
object_size_at_last_gc_(0),
marked_object_size_(0),
marked_object_size_at_last_complete_sweep_(0),
wrapper_count_(0),
wrapper_count_at_last_gc_(0),
collected_wrapper_count_(0),
partition_alloc_size_at_last_gc_(
WTF::Partitions::TotalSizeOfCommittedPages()),
estimated_marking_time_per_byte_(0.0) {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void svc_rdma_send_wc_common(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct ib_wc *wc,
const char *opname)
{
if (wc->status != IB_WC_SUCCESS)
goto err;
out:
atomic_inc(&xprt->sc_sq_avail);
wake_up(&xprt->sc_send_wait);
return;
err:
set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
if (wc->status != IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR)
pr_err("svcrdma: %s: %s (%u/0x%x)\n",
opname, ib_wc_status_msg(wc->status),
wc->status, wc->vendor_err);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 14,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::synchronizeAllAttributes() const
{
if (!elementData())
return;
if (elementData()->m_styleAttributeIsDirty) {
ASSERT(isStyledElement());
static_cast<const StyledElement*>(this)->synchronizeStyleAttributeInternal();
}
if (elementData()->m_animatedSVGAttributesAreDirty) {
ASSERT(isSVGElement());
toSVGElement(this)->synchronizeAnimatedSVGAttribute(anyQName());
}
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void start_auth_request(PgSocket *client, const char *username)
{
int res;
PktBuf *buf;
client->auth_user = client->db->auth_user;
/* have to fetch user info from db */
client->pool = get_pool(client->db, client->db->auth_user);
if (!find_server(client)) {
client->wait_for_user_conn = true;
return;
}
slog_noise(client, "Doing auth_conn query");
client->wait_for_user_conn = false;
client->wait_for_user = true;
if (!sbuf_pause(&client->sbuf)) {
release_server(client->link);
disconnect_client(client, true, "pause failed");
return;
}
client->link->ready = 0;
res = 0;
buf = pktbuf_dynamic(512);
if (buf) {
pktbuf_write_ExtQuery(buf, cf_auth_query, 1, username);
res = pktbuf_send_immediate(buf, client->link);
pktbuf_free(buf);
/*
* Should do instead:
* res = pktbuf_send_queued(buf, client->link);
* but that needs better integration with SBuf.
*/
}
if (!res)
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "unable to send login query");
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 1
| 29,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int write_pipe_buf(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
int ret;
void *data;
loff_t tmp = sd->pos;
data = kmap(buf->page);
ret = __kernel_write(sd->u.file, data + buf->offset, sd->len, &tmp);
kunmap(buf->page);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec_old(struct iovec *dst, void *src,
size_t transferred, unsigned count,
bool is_compat)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (count * sizeof(struct compat_iovec) == transferred) {
struct compat_iovec *ciov = src;
unsigned i;
/*
* With this interface a 32bit server cannot support
* non-compat (i.e. ones coming from 64bit apps) ioctl
* requests
*/
if (!is_compat)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
dst[i].iov_base = compat_ptr(ciov[i].iov_base);
dst[i].iov_len = ciov[i].iov_len;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
if (count * sizeof(struct iovec) != transferred)
return -EIO;
memcpy(dst, src, transferred);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
}
kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void nfs4_init_once(struct nfs_inode *nfsi)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NFS_V4
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nfsi->open_states);
nfsi->delegation = NULL;
nfsi->delegation_state = 0;
init_rwsem(&nfsi->rwsem);
#endif
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static pgprot_t phys_mem_access_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
unsigned long size, pgprot_t vma_prot)
{
#ifdef pgprot_noncached
phys_addr_t offset = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (uncached_access(file, offset))
return pgprot_noncached(vma_prot);
#endif
return vma_prot;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 5,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendImpl::SyncEndEnumeration(
std::unique_ptr<Rankings::Iterator> iterator) {
iterator->Reset();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbStore_g1 (FbBits *bits, const CARD32 *values, int x, int width, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 *pixel = ((CARD32 *) bits) + ((i+x) >> 5);
CARD32 mask = FbStipMask((i+x) & 0x1f, 1);
CARD32 v = miIndexToEntY24(indexed,READ(values + i)) ? mask : 0;
WRITE(pixel, (READ(pixel) & ~mask) | v);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lha_replace_path_separator(struct lha *lha, struct archive_entry *entry)
{
const wchar_t *wp;
size_t i;
if ((wp = archive_entry_pathname_w(entry)) != NULL) {
archive_wstrcpy(&(lha->ws), wp);
for (i = 0; i < archive_strlen(&(lha->ws)); i++) {
if (lha->ws.s[i] == L'\\')
lha->ws.s[i] = L'/';
}
archive_entry_copy_pathname_w(entry, lha->ws.s);
}
if ((wp = archive_entry_symlink_w(entry)) != NULL) {
archive_wstrcpy(&(lha->ws), wp);
for (i = 0; i < archive_strlen(&(lha->ws)); i++) {
if (lha->ws.s[i] == L'\\')
lha->ws.s[i] = L'/';
}
archive_entry_copy_symlink_w(entry, lha->ws.s);
}
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::RectF RenderViewImpl::ElementBoundsInWindow(
const blink::WebElement& element) {
blink::WebRect bounding_box_in_window = element.BoundsInViewport();
ConvertViewportToWindowViaWidget(&bounding_box_in_window);
return gfx::RectF(bounding_box_in_window);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Com_Quit_f( void ) {
char *p = Cmd_Args( );
if ( !com_errorEntered ) {
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
SV_Shutdown(p[0] ? p : "Server quit");
CL_Shutdown(p[0] ? p : "Client quit", qtrue, qtrue);
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
Com_Shutdown ();
FS_Shutdown(qtrue);
}
Sys_Quit ();
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 15,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RegisterForAllNavNotifications(TestNotificationTracker* tracker,
NavigationController* controller) {
tracker->ListenFor(NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(controller));
tracker->ListenFor(NotificationType::NAV_LIST_PRUNED,
Source<NavigationController>(controller));
tracker->ListenFor(NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_CHANGED,
Source<NavigationController>(controller));
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t virtio_config_readb(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint8_t val;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return (uint32_t)-1;
}
k->get_config(vdev, vdev->config);
val = ldub_p(vdev->config + addr);
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_stats(conn c, fmt_fn fmt, void *data)
{
int r, stats_len;
/* first, measure how big a buffer we will need */
stats_len = fmt(NULL, 0, data) + 16;
c->out_job = allocate_job(stats_len); /* fake job to hold stats data */
if (!c->out_job) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
/* Mark this job as a copy so it can be appropriately freed later on */
c->out_job->state = JOB_STATE_COPY;
/* now actually format the stats data */
r = fmt(c->out_job->body, stats_len, data);
/* and set the actual body size */
c->out_job->body_size = r;
if (r > stats_len) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
c->out_job_sent = 0;
return reply_line(c, STATE_SENDJOB, "OK %d\r\n", r - 2);
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: escapeGahpString(const char * input)
{
static std::string output;
if (!input) return NULL;
output = "";
unsigned int i = 0;
size_t input_len = strlen(input);
for (i=0; i < input_len; i++) {
if ( input[i] == ' ' || input[i] == '\\' || input[i] == '\r' ||
input[i] == '\n' ) {
output += '\\';
}
output += input[i];
}
return output.c_str();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 13,911
|
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