instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: callout_tag_find(CalloutTagTable* t, const UChar* name, const UChar* name_end)
{
CalloutTagVal e;
e = -1;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(t)) {
onig_st_lookup_strend(t, name, name_end, (HashDataType* )((void* )(&e)));
}
return e;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 10,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::remove(AXID axID) {
if (!axID)
return;
AXObject* obj = m_objects.at(axID);
if (!obj)
return;
obj->detach();
removeAXID(obj);
if (!m_objects.take(axID))
return;
DCHECK(m_objects.size() >= m_idsInUse.size());
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 17,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::StartNavigation(const WebURLRequest& request) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
DCHECK(!request.IsNull());
DCHECK(!request.Url().ProtocolIs("javascript"));
if (GetTextFinder())
GetTextFinder()->ClearActiveFindMatch();
GetFrame()->Loader().StartNavigation(
FrameLoadRequest(
nullptr, request.ToResourceRequest(), /*frame_name=*/AtomicString(),
kCheckContentSecurityPolicy, base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
WebFrameLoadType::kStandard);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 18,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DiceResponseHandler::CanGetTokenForAccount(const std::string& gaia_id,
const std::string& email) {
if (signin::DiceMethodGreaterOrEqual(
account_consistency_,
signin::AccountConsistencyMethod::kDiceMigration)) {
return true;
}
DCHECK_EQ(signin::AccountConsistencyMethod::kDiceFixAuthErrors,
account_consistency_);
std::string account =
account_tracker_service_->PickAccountIdForAccount(gaia_id, email);
std::string chrome_account = signin_manager_->GetAuthenticatedAccountId();
bool can_get_token = (chrome_account == account);
VLOG_IF(1, !can_get_token)
<< "[Dice] Dropping Dice signin response for " << account;
return can_get_token;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::OnGpuControlErrorMessage(const char* message,
int32_t id) {
SendErrorMessage(message, id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_chpass3_arg(XDR *xdrs, chpass3_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_principal(xdrs, &objp->princ)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_boolean(xdrs, &objp->keepold)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_array(xdrs, (caddr_t *)&objp->ks_tuple,
(unsigned int*)&objp->n_ks_tuple, ~0,
sizeof(krb5_key_salt_tuple),
xdr_krb5_key_salt_tuple)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->pass)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~AutoFillMetricsTest() {
autofill_manager_.reset(NULL);
test_personal_data_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tfxd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free(s);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int http_header_add_tail(struct http_msg *msg, struct hdr_idx *hdr_idx, const char *text)
{
int bytes, len;
len = strlen(text);
bytes = buffer_insert_line2(msg->chn->buf, msg->chn->buf->p + msg->eoh, text, len);
if (!bytes)
return -1;
http_msg_move_end(msg, bytes);
return hdr_idx_add(len, 1, hdr_idx, hdr_idx->tail);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::OpenInstant(WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
if (!instant() || !instant()->is_active() || !instant()->IsCurrent() ||
disposition == NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB) {
return false;
}
if (disposition == CURRENT_TAB) {
instant()->CommitCurrentPreview(INSTANT_COMMIT_PRESSED_ENTER);
return true;
}
if (disposition == NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB) {
TabContentsWrapper* preview_contents = instant()->ReleasePreviewContents(
INSTANT_COMMIT_PRESSED_ENTER);
HideInstant();
preview_contents->controller().PruneAllButActive();
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->AddTabContents(
preview_contents,
-1,
instant()->last_transition_type(),
TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE);
instant()->CompleteRelease(preview_contents);
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::readPixels(GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
long long offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
DCHECK(canvas()->OriginClean());
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("readPixels", "offset", offset))
return;
WebGLBuffer* buffer = bound_pixel_pack_buffer_.Get();
if (!buffer) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"no PIXEL_PACK buffer bound");
return;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer = GetReadFramebufferBinding();
if (framebuffer && framebuffer->CheckDepthStencilStatus(&reason) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, "readPixels", reason);
return;
}
long long size = buffer->GetSize() - offset;
if (!ValidateReadPixelsFuncParameters(width, height, format, type, nullptr,
size))
return;
ClearIfComposited();
{
ScopedDrawingBufferBinder binder(GetDrawingBuffer(), framebuffer);
ContextGL()->ReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type,
reinterpret_cast<void*>(offset));
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct page *__alloc_buddy_huge_page_with_mpol(struct hstate *h,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
{
struct page *page;
struct mempolicy *mpol;
gfp_t gfp_mask = htlb_alloc_mask(h);
int nid;
nodemask_t *nodemask;
nid = huge_node(vma, addr, gfp_mask, &mpol, &nodemask);
page = __alloc_buddy_huge_page(h, gfp_mask, nid, nodemask);
mpol_cond_put(mpol);
return page;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionService::~ExtensionService() {
ProviderCollection::const_iterator i;
for (i = external_extension_providers_.begin();
i != external_extension_providers_.end(); ++i) {
ExternalExtensionProviderInterface* provider = i->get();
provider->ServiceShutdown();
}
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void irda_connect_response(struct irda_sock *self)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s()\n", __func__);
skb = alloc_skb(TTP_MAX_HEADER + TTP_SAR_HEADER, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s() Unable to allocate sk_buff!\n",
__func__);
return;
}
/* Reserve space for MUX_CONTROL and LAP header */
skb_reserve(skb, IRDA_MAX_HEADER);
irttp_connect_response(self->tsap, self->max_sdu_size_rx, skb);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
WidgetHierarchyUpdatesSuspensionScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
unregisterNamedFlowContentNode();
cancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
if (hasRareData()) {
ElementRareData* data = elementRareData();
data->setPseudoElement(BEFORE, 0);
data->setPseudoElement(AFTER, 0);
data->setIsInCanvasSubtree(false);
data->resetComputedStyle();
data->resetDynamicRestyleObservations();
}
if (ElementShadow* shadow = this->shadow())
shadow->detach(context);
ContainerNode::detach(context);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit sha1_s390_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vga_get_offsets(VGACommonState *s,
uint32_t *pline_offset,
uint32_t *pstart_addr,
uint32_t *pline_compare)
{
uint32_t start_addr, line_offset, line_compare;
if (vbe_enabled(s)) {
line_offset = s->vbe_line_offset;
start_addr = s->vbe_start_addr;
line_compare = 65535;
} else {
/* compute line_offset in bytes */
line_offset = s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OFFSET];
line_offset <<= 3;
/* starting address */
start_addr = s->cr[VGA_CRTC_START_LO] |
(s->cr[VGA_CRTC_START_HI] << 8);
/* line compare */
line_compare = s->cr[VGA_CRTC_LINE_COMPARE] |
((s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & 0x10) << 4) |
((s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] & 0x40) << 3);
}
*pline_offset = line_offset;
*pstart_addr = start_addr;
*pline_compare = line_compare;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 27,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::SetCurrentDataListValues(
const std::vector<base::string16>& data_list_values,
const std::vector<base::string16>& data_list_labels) {
data_list_values_ = data_list_values;
data_list_labels_ = data_list_labels;
manager_->client()->UpdateAutofillPopupDataListValues(data_list_values,
data_list_labels);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 pdpte[ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs)];
bool changed = true;
int offset;
gfn_t gfn;
int r;
if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu))
return false;
if (!test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail))
return true;
gfn = (vcpu->arch.cr3 & ~31u) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
offset = (vcpu->arch.cr3 & ~31u) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
r = kvm_read_nested_guest_page(vcpu, gfn, pdpte, offset, sizeof(pdpte),
PFERR_USER_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
changed = memcmp(pdpte, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs, sizeof(pdpte)) != 0;
out:
return changed;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLInputElement::FilteredDataListOptions() const {
HeapVector<Member<HTMLOptionElement>> filtered;
HTMLDataListElement* data_list = DataList();
if (!data_list)
return filtered;
String value = InnerEditorValue();
if (Multiple() && type() == InputTypeNames::email) {
Vector<String> emails;
value.Split(',', true, emails);
if (!emails.IsEmpty())
value = emails.back().StripWhiteSpace();
}
HTMLDataListOptionsCollection* options = data_list->options();
filtered.ReserveCapacity(options->length());
value = value.FoldCase();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < options->length(); ++i) {
HTMLOptionElement* option = options->Item(i);
DCHECK(option);
if (!value.IsEmpty()) {
if (option->value().FoldCase().Find(value) == kNotFound &&
option->label().FoldCase().Find(value) == kNotFound)
continue;
}
if (option->value().IsEmpty() || option->IsDisabledFormControl() ||
!IsValidValue(option->value()))
continue;
filtered.push_back(option);
}
return filtered;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static content::RenderProcessHost* GetExtensionProcess(
Profile* profile, const std::string& extension_id) {
SiteInstance* site_instance =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->process_manager()->
GetSiteInstanceForURL(
Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(extension_id));
if (!site_instance->HasProcess())
return NULL;
return site_instance->GetProcess();
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Destroy_Driver( FT_Driver driver )
{
FT_List_Finalize( &driver->faces_list,
(FT_List_Destructor)destroy_face,
driver->root.memory,
driver );
/* check whether we need to drop the driver's glyph loader */
if ( FT_DRIVER_USES_OUTLINES( driver ) )
FT_GlyphLoader_Done( driver->glyph_loader );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ctrycatch(JF, js_Ast *trystm, js_Ast *catchvar, js_Ast *catchstm)
{
int L1, L2;
L1 = emitjump(J, F, OP_TRY);
{
/* if we get here, we have caught an exception in the try block */
if (J->strict) {
if (!strcmp(catchvar->string, "arguments"))
jsC_error(J, catchvar, "redefining 'arguments' is not allowed in strict mode");
if (!strcmp(catchvar->string, "eval"))
jsC_error(J, catchvar, "redefining 'eval' is not allowed in strict mode");
}
emitstring(J, F, OP_CATCH, catchvar->string);
cstm(J, F, catchstm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
L2 = emitjump(J, F, OP_JUMP); /* skip past the try block */
}
label(J, F, L1);
cstm(J, F, trystm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
label(J, F, L2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 8,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: format_hex_arg(struct ds *s, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (i) {
ds_put_char(s, '.');
}
ds_put_format(s, "%02"PRIx8, data[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::Paint(WebKit::WebCanvas* canvas,
const gfx::Rect& damaged_rect) {
gfx::Rect rect = damaged_rect.Intersect(plugin_rect_);
if (!channel_host_ || !channel_host_->channel_valid()) {
PaintSadPlugin(canvas, rect);
return;
}
if (!uses_shared_bitmaps_)
return;
if (!front_buffer_canvas())
return;
#if WEBKIT_USING_SKIA
if (!skia::SupportsPlatformPaint(canvas)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Could not paint plugin";
return;
}
skia::ScopedPlatformPaint scoped_platform_paint(canvas);
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context =
scoped_platform_paint.GetPlatformSurface();
#elif WEBKIT_USING_CG
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context = canvas;
#endif
gfx::Rect offset_rect = rect;
offset_rect.Offset(-plugin_rect_.x(), -plugin_rect_.y());
gfx::Rect canvas_rect = offset_rect;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
FlipRectVerticallyWithHeight(&canvas_rect, plugin_rect_.height());
#endif
bool background_changed = false;
if (background_store_.canvas.get() && BackgroundChanged(context, rect)) {
background_changed = true;
BlitContextToCanvas(background_store_.canvas.get(), canvas_rect,
context, rect.origin());
}
if (background_changed ||
!transport_store_painted_.Contains(offset_rect)) {
Send(new PluginMsg_Paint(instance_id_, offset_rect));
UpdateFrontBuffer(offset_rect, false);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
CGContextSaveGState(context);
CGContextScaleCTM(context, 1, -1);
rect.set_y(-rect.bottom());
#endif
BlitCanvasToContext(context,
rect,
front_buffer_canvas(),
offset_rect.origin());
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
CGContextRestoreGState(context);
#endif
if (invalidate_pending_) {
invalidate_pending_ = false;
Send(new PluginMsg_DidPaint(instance_id_));
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::BindPendingImagesForSamplers() {
for (TexturePendingBinding& pending : textures_pending_binding_)
BindOnePendingImage(pending.target, pending.texture.get());
textures_pending_binding_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 22,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnProcessSwapMessage(const IPC::Message& message) {
RenderProcessHost* rph = GetProcess();
rph->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parser_get_option)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind;
long opt;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &pind, &opt) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
switch (opt) {
case PHP_XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING:
RETURN_LONG(parser->case_folding);
break;
case PHP_XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING:
RETURN_STRING(parser->target_encoding, 1);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown option");
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
RETVAL_FALSE; /* never reached */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iscsi_copy_param_list(
struct iscsi_param_list **dst_param_list,
struct iscsi_param_list *src_param_list,
int leading)
{
struct iscsi_param *param = NULL;
struct iscsi_param *new_param = NULL;
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list = NULL;
param_list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_param_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!param_list) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for struct iscsi_param_list.\n");
goto err_out;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(¶m_list->param_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(¶m_list->extra_response_list);
list_for_each_entry(param, &src_param_list->param_list, p_list) {
if (!leading && (param->scope & SCOPE_SESSION_WIDE)) {
if ((strcmp(param->name, "TargetName") != 0) &&
(strcmp(param->name, "InitiatorName") != 0) &&
(strcmp(param->name, "TargetPortalGroupTag") != 0))
continue;
}
new_param = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_param), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_param) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for struct iscsi_param.\n");
goto err_out;
}
new_param->name = kstrdup(param->name, GFP_KERNEL);
new_param->value = kstrdup(param->value, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_param->value || !new_param->name) {
kfree(new_param->value);
kfree(new_param->name);
kfree(new_param);
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for parameter name/value.\n");
goto err_out;
}
new_param->set_param = param->set_param;
new_param->phase = param->phase;
new_param->scope = param->scope;
new_param->sender = param->sender;
new_param->type = param->type;
new_param->use = param->use;
new_param->type_range = param->type_range;
list_add_tail(&new_param->p_list, ¶m_list->param_list);
}
if (!list_empty(¶m_list->param_list)) {
*dst_param_list = param_list;
} else {
pr_err("No parameters allocated.\n");
goto err_out;
}
return 0;
err_out:
iscsi_release_param_list(param_list);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WorkerThread::performIdleWork(double deadlineSeconds)
{
double gcDeadlineSeconds = deadlineSeconds;
if (m_webScheduler->canExceedIdleDeadlineIfRequired())
gcDeadlineSeconds = Platform::current()->monotonicallyIncreasingTime() + kLongIdlePeriodSecs;
if (doIdleGc(gcDeadlineSeconds))
m_webScheduler->postIdleTaskAfterWakeup(FROM_HERE, WTF::bind<double>(&WorkerThread::performIdleWork, this));
else
m_webScheduler->postIdleTask(FROM_HERE, WTF::bind<double>(&WorkerThread::performIdleWork, this));
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 12,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_freeCDict(ZSTD_CDict* cdict)
{
if (cdict==NULL) return 0; /* support free on NULL */
{ ZSTD_customMem const cMem = cdict->customMem;
ZSTD_free(cdict->workspace, cMem);
ZSTD_free(cdict->dictBuffer, cMem);
ZSTD_free(cdict, cMem);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 9,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethod(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->voidMethod();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSObject* JSFloat64Array::createPrototype(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return JSFloat64ArrayPrototype::create(exec->globalData(), globalObject, JSFloat64ArrayPrototype::createStructure(exec->globalData(), globalObject, JSArrayBufferViewPrototype::self(exec, globalObject)));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_mod_module_function(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value *argv;
mrb_int argc, i;
mrb_sym mid;
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *rclass;
int ai;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "*", &argv, &argc);
if (argc == 0) {
/* set MODFUNC SCOPE if implemented */
return mod;
}
/* set PRIVATE method visibility if implemented */
/* mrb_mod_dummy_visibility(mrb, mod); */
for (i=0; i<argc; i++) {
mrb_check_type(mrb, argv[i], MRB_TT_SYMBOL);
mid = mrb_symbol(argv[i]);
rclass = mrb_class_ptr(mod);
m = mrb_method_search(mrb, rclass, mid);
prepare_singleton_class(mrb, (struct RBasic*)rclass);
ai = mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb);
mrb_define_method_raw(mrb, rclass->c, mid, m);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
}
return mod;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 29,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSetDrawRectangleCHROMIUM(GLint x,
GLint y,
GLint width,
GLint height) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (framebuffer) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSetDrawRectangleCHROMIUM",
"framebuffer must not be bound");
return;
}
if (!supports_dc_layers_) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSetDrawRectangleCHROMIUM",
"surface doesn't support SetDrawRectangle");
return;
}
gfx::Rect rect(x, y, width, height);
if (!surface_->SetDrawRectangle(rect)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSetDrawRectangleCHROMIUM",
"failed on surface");
LOG(ERROR) << "Context lost because SetDrawRectangleCHROMIUM failed.";
MarkContextLost(error::kUnknown);
group_->LoseContexts(error::kUnknown);
}
OnFboChanged();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void macvlan_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct macvlan_dev *vlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct macvlan_port *port = vlan->port;
free_percpu(vlan->pcpu_stats);
port->count -= 1;
if (!port->count)
macvlan_port_destroy(port->dev);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebPlugin* RenderFrameImpl::createPlugin(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebPluginParams& params) {
DCHECK_EQ(frame_, frame);
blink::WebPlugin* plugin = NULL;
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->OverrideCreatePlugin(
this, frame, params, &plugin)) {
return plugin;
}
if (base::UTF16ToUTF8(base::StringPiece16(params.mimeType)) ==
kBrowserPluginMimeType) {
return BrowserPluginManager::Get()->CreateBrowserPlugin(
this, GetContentClient()
->renderer()
->CreateBrowserPluginDelegate(this, kBrowserPluginMimeType,
GURL(params.url))
->GetWeakPtr());
}
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
WebPluginInfo info;
std::string mime_type;
bool found = false;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_GetPluginInfo(
routing_id_, params.url, frame->top()->document().url(),
params.mimeType.utf8(), &found, &info, &mime_type));
if (!found)
return NULL;
WebPluginParams params_to_use = params;
params_to_use.mimeType = WebString::fromUTF8(mime_type);
return CreatePlugin(frame, info, params_to_use, nullptr /* throttler */);
#else
return NULL;
#endif // defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (guint8 ** p_data, guint64 * p_size)
{
guint32 ret;
g_assert (*p_size >= 4);
ret = GST_READ_UINT32_LE (*p_data);
*p_data += sizeof (guint32);
*p_size -= sizeof (guint32);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Element::pseudoStyleCacheIsInvalid(const RenderStyle* currentStyle, RenderStyle* newStyle)
{
ASSERT(currentStyle == renderStyle());
ASSERT(renderer());
if (!currentStyle)
return false;
const PseudoStyleCache* pseudoStyleCache = currentStyle->cachedPseudoStyles();
if (!pseudoStyleCache)
return false;
size_t cacheSize = pseudoStyleCache->size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < cacheSize; ++i) {
RefPtr<RenderStyle> newPseudoStyle;
PseudoId pseudoId = pseudoStyleCache->at(i)->styleType();
if (pseudoId == FIRST_LINE || pseudoId == FIRST_LINE_INHERITED)
newPseudoStyle = renderer()->uncachedFirstLineStyle(newStyle);
else
newPseudoStyle = renderer()->getUncachedPseudoStyle(PseudoStyleRequest(pseudoId), newStyle, newStyle);
if (!newPseudoStyle)
return true;
if (*newPseudoStyle != *pseudoStyleCache->at(i)) {
if (pseudoId < FIRST_INTERNAL_PSEUDOID)
newStyle->setHasPseudoStyle(pseudoId);
newStyle->addCachedPseudoStyle(newPseudoStyle);
if (pseudoId == FIRST_LINE || pseudoId == FIRST_LINE_INHERITED) {
renderer()->setNeedsLayoutAndPrefWidthsRecalc();
}
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_set_flush_mode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
dec_struct_t * ps_dec;
ivd_ctl_flush_op_t *ps_ctl_op = (ivd_ctl_flush_op_t*)pv_api_op;
ps_ctl_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
UNUSED(pv_api_ip);
/* ! */
/* Signal flush frame control call */
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 1;
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1)
{
ih264d_release_pics_in_dpb((void *)ps_dec, ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs);
ih264d_release_display_bufs(ps_dec);
}
ps_ctl_op->u4_error_code = 0;
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed error concealment when no MBs are decoded in the current pic
Bug: 29493002
Change-Id: I3fae547ddb0616b4e6579580985232bd3d65881e
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 10,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnSetFrame(SurfaceFrameType type) {
if (container_ == ash::kShellWindowId_SystemModalContainer &&
type != SurfaceFrameType::NONE) {
LOG(WARNING)
<< "A surface in system modal container should not have a frame:"
<< static_cast<int>(type);
return;
}
EventTargetingBlocker blocker;
bool suppress_mouse_event = frame_type_ != type && widget_;
if (suppress_mouse_event)
blocker.Block(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
ShellSurfaceBase::OnSetFrame(type);
UpdateAutoHideFrame();
if (suppress_mouse_event)
UpdateSurfaceBounds();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 27,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_scan_keys(PDF pdf)
{
int i, k;
char *p, *q, *r;
const key_entry *key;
if (t1_prefix("/FontType")) {
p = t1_line_array + strlen("FontType") + 1;
if ((i = (int) t1_scan_num(p, 0)) != 1)
formatted_error("type 1","Type%d fonts unsupported by backend", i);
return;
}
for (key = (const key_entry *) font_key; key - font_key < FONT_KEYS_NUM;
key++) {
if (key->t1name[0] != '\0'
&& str_prefix(t1_line_array + 1, key->t1name))
break;
}
if (key - font_key == FONT_KEYS_NUM)
return;
p = t1_line_array + strlen(key->t1name) + 1;
skip_char(p, ' ');
if ((k = (int) (key - font_key)) == FONTNAME_CODE) {
if (*p != '/') {
remove_eol(p, t1_line_array);
formatted_error("type 1","a name expected: '%s'", t1_line_array);
}
/*tex Skip the slash. */
r = ++p;
for (q = t1_buf_array; *p != ' ' && *p != 10; *q++ = *p++);
*q = 0;
xfree(fd_cur->fontname);
fd_cur->fontname = xstrdup(t1_buf_array);
/*tex
At this moment we cannot call |make_subset_tag| yet, as the encoding
is not read; thus we mark the offset of the subset tag and write it
later.
*/
if (is_subsetted(fd_cur->fm)) {
t1_fontname_offset = (int) (t1_offset() + (r - t1_line_array));
strcpy(t1_buf_array, p);
sprintf(r, "ABCDEF+%s%s", fd_cur->fontname, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(r);
}
return;
}
if ((k == STEMV_CODE || k == FONTBBOX1_CODE) && (*p == '[' || *p == '{'))
p++;
if (k == FONTBBOX1_CODE) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, k++) {
fd_cur->font_dim[k].val = (int) t1_scan_num(p, &r);
fd_cur->font_dim[k].set = true;
p = r;
}
return;
}
fd_cur->font_dim[k].val = (int) t1_scan_num(p, 0);
fd_cur->font_dim[k].set = true;
}
static void t1_scan_param(PDF pdf)
{
static const char *lenIV = "/lenIV";
if (!t1_scan || *t1_line_array != '/')
return;
if (t1_prefix(lenIV)) {
t1_lenIV = (short) t1_scan_num(t1_line_array + strlen(lenIV), 0);
if (t1_lenIV < 0)
normal_error("type 1","negative value of lenIV is not supported");
return;
}
t1_scan_keys(pdf);
}
static void copy_glyph_names(char **glyph_names, int a, int b)
{
if (glyph_names[b] != notdef) {
xfree(glyph_names[b]);
glyph_names[b] = (char *) notdef;
}
if (glyph_names[a] != notdef) {
glyph_names[b] = xstrdup(glyph_names[a]);
}
}
/*tex Read encoding from Type1 font file, return |glyph_names| array, or |pdffail|. */
static char **t1_builtin_enc(void)
{
int i, a, b, c, counter = 0;
char *r, *p, **glyph_names;
/*tex At this moment |/Encoding| is the prefix of |t1_line_array|. */
glyph_names = xtalloc(256, char *);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
glyph_names[i] = (char *) notdef;
if (t1_suffix("def")) {
/*tex A predefined encoding: */
sscanf(t1_line_array + strlen("/Encoding"), "%255s", t1_buf_array);
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array, "StandardEncoding") == 0) {
t1_encoding = ENC_STANDARD;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
if (standard_glyph_names[i] != notdef)
glyph_names[i] = xstrdup(standard_glyph_names[i]);
}
return glyph_names;
} else
formatted_error("type 1","cannot subset font (unknown predefined encoding '%s')",t1_buf_array);
}
/*
At this moment |/Encoding| is the prefix of |t1_line_array|, and the
encoding is not a predefined encoding. We have two possible forms of
vector. The first case is
\starttyping
/Encoding [
/a /b /c ...
] readonly def
\stoptyping
and the second case can look like
\starttyping
/Encoding 256 array 0 1 255 {
1 index exch /.notdef put} for
dup 0 /x put
dup 1 /y put
...
} readonly def
\stoptyping
*/
t1_encoding = ENC_BUILTIN;
if (t1_prefix("/Encoding [") || t1_prefix("/Encoding[")) { /* the first case */
r = strchr(t1_line_array, '[') + 1;
skip_char(r, ' ');
for (;;) {
while (*r == '/') {
for (p = t1_buf_array, r++; *r != 32 && *r != 10 && *r != ']' && *r != '/'; *p++ = *r++);
*p = 0;
skip_char(r, ' ');
if (counter > 255)
normal_error("type 1","encoding vector contains more than 256 names");
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array, notdef) != 0)
glyph_names[counter] = xstrdup(t1_buf_array);
counter++;
}
if (*r != 10 && *r != '%') {
if (str_prefix(r, "] def") || str_prefix(r, "] readonly def"))
break;
else {
remove_eol(r, t1_line_array);
formatted_error("type 1","a name or '] def' or '] readonly def' expected: '%s'", t1_line_array);
}
}
t1_getline();
r = t1_line_array;
}
} else {
/*tex The second case. */
p = strchr(t1_line_array, 10);
for (;;) {
if (*p == 10) {
t1_getline();
p = t1_line_array;
}
/*tex Check for |dup <index> <glyph> put|. */
if (sscanf(p, "dup %i%255s put", &i, t1_buf_array) == 2 &&
*t1_buf_array == '/' && valid_code(i)) {
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array + 1, notdef) != 0)
glyph_names[i] = xstrdup(t1_buf_array + 1);
p = strstr(p, " put") + strlen(" put");
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
/*tex Check for |dup dup <to> exch <from> get put|. */
else if (sscanf(p, "dup dup %i exch %i get put", &b, &a) == 2 && valid_code(a) && valid_code(b)) {
copy_glyph_names(glyph_names, a, b);
p = strstr(p, " get put") + strlen(" get put");
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
/*tex Check for |dup dup <from> <size> getinterval <to> exch putinterval|. */
else if (sscanf(p, "dup dup %i %i getinterval %i exch putinterval",
&a, &c, &b) == 3 && valid_code(a) && valid_code(b) && valid_code(c)) {
for (i = 0; i < c; i++)
copy_glyph_names(glyph_names, a + i, b + i);
p = strstr(p, " putinterval") + strlen(" putinterval");
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
/*tex Check for |def or |readonly def|. */
else if ((p == t1_line_array || (p > t1_line_array && p[-1] == ' ')) && strcmp(p, "def\n") == 0) {
return glyph_names;
} else {
/*tex Skip an unrecognizable word. */
while (*p != ' ' && *p != 10)
p++;
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
}
}
return glyph_names;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: drop_privs (void)
{
if (!is_privileged)
return;
/* Drop root uid */
if (setuid (opt_sandbox_uid) < 0)
die_with_error ("unable to drop root uid");
drop_all_caps ();
}
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mem_cgroup_remove_exceeded(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
struct mem_cgroup_per_zone *mz,
struct mem_cgroup_tree_per_zone *mctz)
{
spin_lock(&mctz->lock);
__mem_cgroup_remove_exceeded(memcg, mz, mctz);
spin_unlock(&mctz->lock);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setURL(const KURL& url)
{
const KURL& newURL = url.isEmpty() ? blankURL() : url;
if (newURL == m_url)
return;
m_url = newURL;
m_documentURI = m_url.string();
updateBaseURL();
contextFeatures()->urlDidChange(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::DidFinishNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame()) {
if (committed_load_ && navigation_handle->GetParentFrame() &&
GetMainFrame(navigation_handle->GetParentFrame()) ==
web_contents()->GetMainFrame()) {
committed_load_->DidFinishSubFrameNavigation(navigation_handle);
committed_load_->metrics_update_dispatcher()->DidFinishSubFrameNavigation(
navigation_handle);
}
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<PageLoadTracker> finished_nav(
std::move(provisional_loads_[navigation_handle]));
provisional_loads_.erase(navigation_handle);
if (navigation_handle->HasCommitted() &&
navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
if (finished_nav)
finished_nav->StopTracking();
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->DidCommitSameDocumentNavigation(navigation_handle);
return;
}
if (!navigation_handle->HasCommitted() &&
navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::ERR_ABORTED &&
navigation_handle->GetResponseHeaders()) {
if (finished_nav) {
finished_nav->DidInternalNavigationAbort(navigation_handle);
finished_nav->StopTracking();
}
return;
}
const bool should_track =
finished_nav && ShouldTrackNavigation(navigation_handle);
if (finished_nav && !should_track)
finished_nav->StopTracking();
if (navigation_handle->HasCommitted()) {
UserInitiatedInfo user_initiated_info =
finished_nav
? finished_nav->user_initiated_info()
: CreateUserInitiatedInfo(navigation_handle, committed_load_.get());
NotifyPageEndAllLoadsWithTimestamp(
EndReasonForPageTransition(navigation_handle->GetPageTransition()),
user_initiated_info, navigation_handle->NavigationStart(), false);
if (should_track) {
HandleCommittedNavigationForTrackedLoad(navigation_handle,
std::move(finished_nav));
} else {
committed_load_.reset();
}
} else if (should_track) {
HandleFailedNavigationForTrackedLoad(navigation_handle,
std::move(finished_nav));
}
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 15,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZeroSuggestProvider::~ZeroSuggestProvider() {
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool tcp_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *to,
struct sk_buff *from,
bool *fragstolen)
{
int delta;
*fragstolen = false;
/* Its possible this segment overlaps with prior segment in queue */
if (TCP_SKB_CB(from)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(to)->end_seq)
return false;
if (!skb_try_coalesce(to, from, fragstolen, &delta))
return false;
atomic_add(delta, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
sk_mem_charge(sk, delta);
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPRCVCOALESCE);
TCP_SKB_CB(to)->end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(from)->end_seq;
TCP_SKB_CB(to)->ack_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(from)->ack_seq;
TCP_SKB_CB(to)->tcp_flags |= TCP_SKB_CB(from)->tcp_flags;
return true;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GC_API void GC_CALL GC_incr_bytes_allocd(size_t n)
{
GC_bytes_allocd += n;
}
Commit Message: Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: php_apache_sapi_flush(void *server_context)
{
php_struct *ctx;
request_rec *r;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
ctx = server_context;
/* If we haven't registered a server_context yet,
* then don't bother flushing. */
if (!server_context) {
return;
}
r = ctx->r;
sapi_send_headers(TSRMLS_C);
r->status = SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code;
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
if (ap_rflush(r) < 0 || r->connection->aborted) {
php_handle_aborted_connection();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::RType_Devices(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::string rfilter = request::findValue(&req, "filter");
std::string order = request::findValue(&req, "order");
std::string rused = request::findValue(&req, "used");
std::string rid = request::findValue(&req, "rid");
std::string planid = request::findValue(&req, "plan");
std::string floorid = request::findValue(&req, "floor");
std::string sDisplayHidden = request::findValue(&req, "displayhidden");
std::string sFetchFavorites = request::findValue(&req, "favorite");
std::string sDisplayDisabled = request::findValue(&req, "displaydisabled");
bool bDisplayHidden = (sDisplayHidden == "1");
bool bFetchFavorites = (sFetchFavorites == "1");
int HideDisabledHardwareSensors = 0;
m_sql.GetPreferencesVar("HideDisabledHardwareSensors", HideDisabledHardwareSensors);
bool bDisabledDisabled = (HideDisabledHardwareSensors == 0);
if (sDisplayDisabled == "1")
bDisabledDisabled = true;
std::string sLastUpdate = request::findValue(&req, "lastupdate");
std::string hwidx = request::findValue(&req, "hwidx"); // OTO
time_t LastUpdate = 0;
if (sLastUpdate != "")
{
std::stringstream sstr;
sstr << sLastUpdate;
sstr >> LastUpdate;
}
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Devices";
root["app_version"] = szAppVersion;
GetJSonDevices(root, rused, rfilter, order, rid, planid, floorid, bDisplayHidden, bDisabledDisabled, bFetchFavorites, LastUpdate, session.username, hwidx);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 1,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iwl_sta_rx_agg_stop(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
int tid)
{
unsigned long flags;
int sta_id;
struct iwl_addsta_cmd sta_cmd;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
sta_id = iwl_sta_id(sta);
if (sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Invalid station for AGG tid %d\n", tid);
return -ENXIO;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.station_flags_msk = 0;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.modify_mask = STA_MODIFY_DELBA_TID_MSK;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.remove_immediate_ba_tid = (u8)tid;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode = STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK;
memcpy(&sta_cmd, &priv->stations[sta_id].sta, sizeof(struct iwl_addsta_cmd));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return iwl_send_add_sta(priv, &sta_cmd, CMD_SYNC);
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutPoint RenderBox::flipForWritingMode(const LayoutPoint& position) const
{
if (!style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
return position;
return isHorizontalWritingMode() ? LayoutPoint(position.x(), height() - position.y()) : LayoutPoint(width() - position.x(), position.y());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* php_pgsql_PQescapeInternal(PGconn *conn, const char *str, size_t len, int escape_literal, int safe) {
char *result, *rp, *s;
size_t tmp_len;
if (!conn) {
return NULL;
}
/* allocate enough memory */
rp = result = (char *)safe_emalloc(len, 2, 5); /* leading " E" needs extra 2 bytes + quote_chars on both end for 2 bytes + NULL */
if (escape_literal) {
size_t new_len;
if (safe) {
char *tmp = (char *)safe_emalloc(len, 2, 1);
*rp++ = '\'';
/* PQescapeString does not escape \, but it handles multibyte chars safely.
This escape is incompatible with PQescapeLiteral. */
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(conn, tmp, str, len, NULL);
strncpy(rp, tmp, new_len);
efree(tmp);
rp += new_len;
} else {
char *encoding;
/* This is compatible with PQescapeLiteral, but it cannot handle multbyte chars
such as SJIS, BIG5. Raise warning and return NULL by checking
client_encoding. */
encoding = (char *) pg_encoding_to_char(PQclientEncoding(conn));
if (!strncmp(encoding, "SJIS", sizeof("SJIS")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "SHIFT_JIS_2004", sizeof("SHIFT_JIS_2004")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "BIG5", sizeof("BIG5")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "GB18030", sizeof("GB18030")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "GBK", sizeof("GBK")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "JOHAB", sizeof("JOHAB")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "UHC", sizeof("UHC")-1) ) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unsafe encoding is used. Do not use '%s' encoding or use PostgreSQL 9.0 or later libpq.", encoding);
}
/* check backslashes */
tmp_len = strspn(str, "\\");
if (tmp_len != len) {
/* add " E" for escaping slashes */
*rp++ = ' ';
*rp++ = 'E';
}
*rp++ = '\'';
for (s = (char *)str; s - str < len; ++s) {
if (*s == '\'' || *s == '\\') {
*rp++ = *s;
*rp++ = *s;
} else {
*rp++ = *s;
}
}
}
*rp++ = '\'';
} else {
/* Identifier escape. */
*rp++ = '"';
for (s = (char *)str; s - str < len; ++s) {
if (*s == '"') {
*rp++ = '"';
*rp++ = '"';
} else {
*rp++ = *s;
}
}
*rp++ = '"';
}
*rp = '\0';
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 3,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CronTab::CronTab( const char* minutes,
const char* hours,
const char* days_of_month,
const char* months,
const char* days_of_week ) {
this->parameters[CRONTAB_MINUTES_IDX] = new MyString( minutes );
this->parameters[CRONTAB_HOURS_IDX] = new MyString( hours );
this->parameters[CRONTAB_DOM_IDX] = new MyString( days_of_month );
this->parameters[CRONTAB_MONTHS_IDX] = new MyString( months );
this->parameters[CRONTAB_DOW_IDX] = new MyString( days_of_week );
this->init();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 28,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vaddr_t select_va_in_range(vaddr_t prev_end, uint32_t prev_attr,
vaddr_t next_begin, uint32_t next_attr,
const struct vm_region *reg)
{
size_t granul;
const uint32_t a = TEE_MATTR_EPHEMERAL | TEE_MATTR_PERMANENT;
size_t pad;
vaddr_t begin_va;
vaddr_t end_va;
/*
* Insert an unmapped entry to separate regions with differing
* TEE_MATTR_EPHEMERAL TEE_MATTR_PERMANENT bits as they never are
* to be contiguous with another region.
*/
if (prev_attr && (prev_attr & a) != (reg->attr & a))
pad = SMALL_PAGE_SIZE;
else
pad = 0;
granul = SMALL_PAGE_SIZE;
#ifndef CFG_WITH_LPAE
if ((prev_attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE) != (reg->attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
granul = CORE_MMU_PGDIR_SIZE;
#endif
begin_va = ROUNDUP(prev_end + pad, granul);
if (reg->va) {
if (reg->va < begin_va)
return 0;
begin_va = reg->va;
}
if (next_attr && (next_attr & a) != (reg->attr & a))
pad = SMALL_PAGE_SIZE;
else
pad = 0;
granul = SMALL_PAGE_SIZE;
#ifndef CFG_WITH_LPAE
if ((next_attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE) != (reg->attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
granul = CORE_MMU_PGDIR_SIZE;
#endif
end_va = ROUNDUP(begin_va + reg->size + pad, granul);
if (end_va <= next_begin) {
assert(!reg->va || reg->va == begin_va);
return begin_va;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_sysfs_bmi_deinit(struct ar6_softc *ar)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("BMI: Deleting sysfs entry\n"));
sysfs_remove_bin_file(&(((struct device *)ar->osDevInfo.pOSDevice)->kobj), &bmi_attr);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md)
{
if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1)
return 1;
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (!*palg)
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 addr)
{
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
asm volatile (ASM_VMX_VMXON_RAX
: : "a"(&addr), "m"(addr)
: "memory", "cc");
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_v6_addr_valid(union sctp_addr *addr,
struct sctp_sock *sp,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->v6.sin6_addr);
/* Support v4-mapped-v6 address. */
if (ret == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
/* Note: This routine is used in input, so v4-mapped-v6
* are disallowed here when there is no sctp_sock.
*/
if (!sp || !sp->v4mapped)
return 0;
if (sp && ipv6_only_sock(sctp_opt2sk(sp)))
return 0;
sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
return sctp_get_af_specific(AF_INET)->addr_valid(addr, sp, skb);
}
/* Is this a non-unicast address */
if (!(ret & IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 15,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __exit void veth_exit(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&veth_link_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_iw_listen(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, int backlog)
{
int ret;
struct iw_cm_id *id;
id = iw_create_cm_id(id_priv->id.device,
iw_conn_req_handler,
id_priv);
if (IS_ERR(id))
return PTR_ERR(id);
id_priv->cm_id.iw = id;
memcpy(&id_priv->cm_id.iw->local_addr, cma_src_addr(id_priv),
rdma_addr_size(cma_src_addr(id_priv)));
ret = iw_cm_listen(id_priv->cm_id.iw, backlog);
if (ret) {
iw_destroy_cm_id(id_priv->cm_id.iw);
id_priv->cm_id.iw = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int yr_re_fast_exec(
uint8_t* code,
uint8_t* input_data,
size_t input_forwards_size,
size_t input_backwards_size,
int flags,
RE_MATCH_CALLBACK_FUNC callback,
void* callback_args,
int* matches)
{
RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS* repeat_any_args;
uint8_t* code_stack[MAX_FAST_RE_STACK];
uint8_t* input_stack[MAX_FAST_RE_STACK];
int matches_stack[MAX_FAST_RE_STACK];
uint8_t* ip = code;
uint8_t* input = input_data;
uint8_t* next_input;
uint8_t* next_opcode;
uint8_t mask;
uint8_t value;
int i;
int stop;
int input_incr;
int sp = 0;
int bytes_matched;
int max_bytes_matched;
max_bytes_matched = flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS ?
(int) input_backwards_size :
(int) input_forwards_size;
input_incr = flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS ? -1 : 1;
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS)
input--;
code_stack[sp] = code;
input_stack[sp] = input;
matches_stack[sp] = 0;
sp++;
while (sp > 0)
{
sp--;
ip = code_stack[sp];
input = input_stack[sp];
bytes_matched = matches_stack[sp];
stop = FALSE;
while(!stop)
{
if (*ip == RE_OPCODE_MATCH)
{
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_EXHAUSTIVE)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(callback(
flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS ? input + 1 : input_data,
bytes_matched,
flags,
callback_args));
break;
}
else
{
if (matches != NULL)
*matches = bytes_matched;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (bytes_matched >= max_bytes_matched)
break;
switch(*ip)
{
case RE_OPCODE_LITERAL:
if (*input == *(ip + 1))
{
bytes_matched++;
input += input_incr;
ip += 2;
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case RE_OPCODE_MASKED_LITERAL:
value = *(int16_t*)(ip + 1) & 0xFF;
mask = *(int16_t*)(ip + 1) >> 8;
if ((*input & mask) == value)
{
bytes_matched++;
input += input_incr;
ip += 3;
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case RE_OPCODE_ANY:
bytes_matched++;
input += input_incr;
ip += 1;
break;
case RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_ANY_UNGREEDY:
repeat_any_args = (RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS*)(ip + 1);
next_opcode = ip + 1 + sizeof(RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS);
for (i = repeat_any_args->min + 1; i <= repeat_any_args->max; i++)
{
next_input = input + i * input_incr;
if (bytes_matched + i >= max_bytes_matched)
break;
if ( *(next_opcode) != RE_OPCODE_LITERAL ||
(*(next_opcode) == RE_OPCODE_LITERAL &&
*(next_opcode + 1) == *next_input))
{
if (sp >= MAX_FAST_RE_STACK)
return -4;
code_stack[sp] = next_opcode;
input_stack[sp] = next_input;
matches_stack[sp] = bytes_matched + i;
sp++;
}
}
input += input_incr * repeat_any_args->min;
bytes_matched += repeat_any_args->min;
ip = next_opcode;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
}
}
if (matches != NULL)
*matches = -1;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h.
CWE ID: CWE-674
| 0
| 22,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OomInterventionTabHelper::StartDetectionInRenderer() {
auto* config = OomInterventionConfig::GetInstance();
bool renderer_pause_enabled = config->is_renderer_pause_enabled();
bool navigate_ads_enabled = config->is_navigate_ads_enabled();
if ((renderer_pause_enabled || navigate_ads_enabled) && decider_) {
DCHECK(!web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
const std::string& host = web_contents()->GetVisibleURL().host();
if (!decider_->CanTriggerIntervention(host)) {
renderer_pause_enabled = false;
navigate_ads_enabled = false;
}
}
content::RenderFrameHost* main_frame = web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
DCHECK(main_frame);
content::RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = main_frame->GetProcess();
DCHECK(render_process_host);
content::BindInterface(render_process_host,
mojo::MakeRequest(&intervention_));
DCHECK(!binding_.is_bound());
blink::mojom::OomInterventionHostPtr host;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&host));
blink::mojom::DetectionArgsPtr detection_args =
config->GetRendererOomDetectionArgs();
intervention_->StartDetection(std::move(host), std::move(detection_args),
renderer_pause_enabled, navigate_ads_enabled);
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 26,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlCreateURLParserCtxt(const char *filename, int options)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
char *directory = NULL;
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(NULL, "cannot allocate parser context");
return(NULL);
}
if (options)
xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal(ctxt, options, NULL);
ctxt->linenumbers = 1;
inputStream = xmlLoadExternalEntity(filename, NULL, ctxt);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
if ((ctxt->directory == NULL) && (directory == NULL))
directory = xmlParserGetDirectory(filename);
if ((ctxt->directory == NULL) && (directory != NULL))
ctxt->directory = directory;
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 11,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KURL HTMLAnchorElement::url() const
{
return href();
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 18,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, offsetSet)
{
zval *index, *value;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zz", &index, &value) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_array_write_dimension_ex(0, getThis(), index, value TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
void spl_array_iterator_append(zval *object, zval *append_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t iov_iter_get_pages(struct iov_iter *i,
struct page **pages, size_t maxsize, unsigned maxpages,
size_t *start)
{
if (maxsize > i->count)
maxsize = i->count;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE))
return pipe_get_pages(i, pages, maxsize, maxpages, start);
iterate_all_kinds(i, maxsize, v, ({
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)v.iov_base;
size_t len = v.iov_len + (*start = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
int n;
int res;
if (len > maxpages * PAGE_SIZE)
len = maxpages * PAGE_SIZE;
addr &= ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
n = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PAGE_SIZE);
res = get_user_pages_fast(addr, n, (i->type & WRITE) != WRITE, pages);
if (unlikely(res < 0))
return res;
return (res == n ? len : res * PAGE_SIZE) - *start;
0;}),({
/* can't be more than PAGE_SIZE */
*start = v.bv_offset;
get_page(*pages = v.bv_page);
return v.bv_len;
}),({
return -EFAULT;
})
)
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 18,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init pf_init(void)
{ /* preliminary initialisation */
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pf_init_units();
if (pf_detect())
return -ENODEV;
pf_busy = 0;
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++)
put_disk(pf->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
struct gendisk *disk = pf->disk;
if (!pf->present)
continue;
disk->private_data = pf;
add_disk(disk);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 4,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameteri(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLint param) {
TextureRef* texture = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameteri", "unknown texture");
return;
}
texture_manager()->SetParameteri(
"glTexParameteri", GetErrorState(), texture, pname, param);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapter::NotifyDeviceChanged(BluetoothDevice* device) {
DCHECK(device);
DCHECK_EQ(device->GetAdapter(), this);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DeviceChanged(this, device);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long file_seek(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, long offset, int origin)
{
jas_stream_fileobj_t *fileobj;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("file_seek(%p, %ld, %d)\n", obj, offset, origin));
fileobj = JAS_CAST(jas_stream_fileobj_t *, obj);
return lseek(fileobj->fd, offset, origin);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
{
int i;
int gt,lt;
BN_ULONG t1,t2;
if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL))
{
if (a != NULL)
return(-1);
else if (b != NULL)
return(1);
else
return(0);
}
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
if (a->neg != b->neg)
{
if (a->neg)
return(-1);
else return(1);
}
if (a->neg == 0)
{ gt=1; lt= -1; }
else { gt= -1; lt=1; }
if (a->top > b->top) return(gt);
if (a->top < b->top) return(lt);
for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
{
t1=a->d[i];
t2=b->d[i];
if (t1 > t2) return(gt);
if (t1 < t2) return(lt);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 15,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _cdf_tole4(uint32_t sv)
{
uint32_t rv;
uint8_t *s = (uint8_t *)(void *)&sv;
uint8_t *d = (uint8_t *)(void *)&rv;
d[0] = s[3];
d[1] = s[2];
d[2] = s[1];
d[3] = s[0];
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_sign)
{
zval *key, *signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned int siglen;
zend_string *sigbuf;
zend_resource *keyresource = NULL;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
zval *method = NULL;
zend_long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
sigbuf = zend_string_alloc(siglen, 0);
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md_ctx != NULL &&
EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, mdtype) &&
EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, data, data_len) &&
EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, (unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf), &siglen, pkey)) {
zval_dtor(signature);
ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf)[siglen] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(sigbuf) = siglen;
ZVAL_NEW_STR(signature, sigbuf);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
efree(sigbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
if (keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 3,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_OFPAT_RAW10_ENQUEUE(const struct ofp10_action_enqueue *oae,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_enqueue *enqueue;
enqueue = ofpact_put_ENQUEUE(out);
enqueue->port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(oae->port));
enqueue->queue = ntohl(oae->queue_id);
if (ofp_to_u16(enqueue->port) >= ofp_to_u16(OFPP_MAX)
&& enqueue->port != OFPP_IN_PORT
&& enqueue->port != OFPP_LOCAL) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_OUT_PORT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_xmt_ls_rsp(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
struct nvmet_fc_ls_iod *iod)
{
int ret;
fc_dma_sync_single_for_device(tgtport->dev, iod->rspdma,
NVME_FC_MAX_LS_BUFFER_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
ret = tgtport->ops->xmt_ls_rsp(&tgtport->fc_target_port, iod->lsreq);
if (ret)
nvmet_fc_xmt_ls_rsp_done(iod->lsreq);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~AsyncPixelTransferCompletionObserverImpl() {}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void attach_one_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct rq_flags rf;
rq_lock(rq, &rf);
update_rq_clock(rq);
attach_task(rq, p);
rq_unlock(rq, &rf);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 22,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uv_encode(double u, double v, int em) /* encode (u',v') coordinates */
{
register int vi, ui;
if (v < UV_VSTART)
return oog_encode(u, v);
vi = itrunc((v - UV_VSTART)*(1./UV_SQSIZ), em);
if (vi >= UV_NVS)
return oog_encode(u, v);
if (u < uv_row[vi].ustart)
return oog_encode(u, v);
ui = itrunc((u - uv_row[vi].ustart)*(1./UV_SQSIZ), em);
if (ui >= uv_row[vi].nus)
return oog_encode(u, v);
return (uv_row[vi].ncum + ui);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QModelIndexList Part::addChildren(const QModelIndexList &list) const
{
Q_ASSERT(m_model);
QModelIndexList ret = list;
for (int i = 0; i < ret.size(); ++i) {
QModelIndex index = ret.at(i);
for (int j = 0; j < m_model->rowCount(index); ++j) {
QModelIndex child = m_model->index(j, 0, index);
if (!ret.contains(child)) {
ret << child;
}
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ShellSort(dpbPicture_t *pPic, u32 num)
{
u32 i, j;
u32 step;
dpbPicture_t tmpPic;
step = 7;
while (step)
{
for (i = step; i < num; i++)
{
tmpPic = pPic[i];
j = i;
while (j >= step && ComparePictures(pPic + j - step, &tmpPic) > 0)
{
pPic[j] = pPic[j-step];
j -= step;
}
pPic[j] = tmpPic;
}
step >>= 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FreeArray( _cmsDICarray* a)
{
if (a ->Name.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a->Name);
if (a ->Value.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a ->Value);
if (a ->DisplayName.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a->DisplayName);
if (a ->DisplayValue.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a ->DisplayValue);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 25,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::IsControlledByServiceWorker() {
blink::WebServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* web_provider =
frame_->GetDocumentLoader()->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider();
if (!web_provider)
return false;
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* provider =
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider::FromWebServiceWorkerNetworkProvider(
web_provider);
return provider->IsControlledByServiceWorker();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init snd_card_info_init(void)
{
struct snd_info_entry *entry;
entry = snd_info_create_module_entry(THIS_MODULE, "cards", NULL);
if (! entry)
return -ENOMEM;
entry->c.text.read = snd_card_info_read;
if (snd_info_register(entry) < 0) {
snd_info_free_entry(entry);
return -ENOMEM;
}
snd_card_info_entry = entry;
#ifdef MODULE
entry = snd_info_create_module_entry(THIS_MODULE, "modules", NULL);
if (entry) {
entry->c.text.read = snd_card_module_info_read;
if (snd_info_register(entry) < 0)
snd_info_free_entry(entry);
else
snd_card_module_info_entry = entry;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GDataDirectory::GDataDirectory(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service)
: GDataEntry(parent, directory_service) {
file_info_.is_directory = true;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 26,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
{
bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
bool touched = false; /* any changes made? */
int i;
if (!parent)
return touched;
/* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
if (parent->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
continue;
if (writes && (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
continue;
if (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
parent->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
touched = true;
}
}
/* ... and stack slots */
for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE &&
i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (parent->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
if (parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)
continue;
if (writes &&
(state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
continue;
if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
touched = true;
}
}
return touched;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fd_read_hunk (int fd, hunk_terminator_t terminator, long sizehint, long maxsize)
{
long bufsize = sizehint;
char *hunk = xmalloc (bufsize);
int tail = 0; /* tail position in HUNK */
assert (!maxsize || maxsize >= bufsize);
while (1)
{
const char *end;
int pklen, rdlen, remain;
/* First, peek at the available data. */
pklen = fd_peek (fd, hunk + tail, bufsize - 1 - tail, -1);
if (pklen < 0)
{
xfree (hunk);
return NULL;
}
end = terminator (hunk, hunk + tail, pklen);
if (end)
{
/* The data contains the terminator: we'll drain the data up
to the end of the terminator. */
remain = end - (hunk + tail);
assert (remain >= 0);
if (remain == 0)
{
/* No more data needs to be read. */
hunk[tail] = '\0';
return hunk;
}
if (bufsize - 1 < tail + remain)
{
bufsize = tail + remain + 1;
hunk = xrealloc (hunk, bufsize);
}
}
else
/* No terminator: simply read the data we know is (or should
be) available. */
remain = pklen;
/* Now, read the data. Note that we make no assumptions about
how much data we'll get. (Some TCP stacks are notorious for
read returning less data than the previous MSG_PEEK.) */
rdlen = fd_read (fd, hunk + tail, remain, 0);
if (rdlen < 0)
{
xfree (hunk);
return NULL;
}
tail += rdlen;
hunk[tail] = '\0';
if (rdlen == 0)
{
if (tail == 0)
{
/* EOF without anything having been read */
xfree (hunk);
errno = 0;
return NULL;
}
else
/* EOF seen: return the data we've read. */
return hunk;
}
if (end && rdlen == remain)
/* The terminator was seen and the remaining data drained --
we got what we came for. */
return hunk;
/* Keep looping until all the data arrives. */
if (tail == bufsize - 1)
{
/* Double the buffer size, but refuse to allocate more than
MAXSIZE bytes. */
if (maxsize && bufsize >= maxsize)
{
xfree (hunk);
errno = ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
bufsize <<= 1;
if (maxsize && bufsize > maxsize)
bufsize = maxsize;
hunk = xrealloc (hunk, bufsize);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::adjustMediaTypeForPrinting(bool printing)
{
if (printing) {
if (m_mediaTypeWhenNotPrinting.isNull())
m_mediaTypeWhenNotPrinting = mediaType();
setMediaType("print");
} else {
if (!m_mediaTypeWhenNotPrinting.isNull())
setMediaType(m_mediaTypeWhenNotPrinting);
m_mediaTypeWhenNotPrinting = nullAtom;
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sco_recv_frame(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk = sco_chan_get(conn);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, skb->len);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
goto drop;
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_rss_start_namespaces(raptor_parser* rdf_parser)
{
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
int i;
int n;
/* for each item type (channel, item, ...) */
for(i = 0; i< RAPTOR_RSS_COMMON_SIZE; i++) {
raptor_rss_item* item;
/* for each item instance of a type */
for(item = rss_parser->model.common[i]; item; item = item->next) {
int f;
if(!item->fields_count)
continue;
/* for each field */
for(f = 0; f< RAPTOR_RSS_FIELDS_SIZE; f++) {
raptor_rss_field* field;
/* for each field value */
for(field = item->fields[f]; field; field = field->next) {
rss_info_namespace ns_index = raptor_rss_fields_info[f].nspace;
rss_parser->nspaces_seen[ns_index] = 'Y';
/* knowing there is one value is enough */
break;
}
}
}
}
/* start the namespaces */
for(n = 0; n < RAPTOR_RSS_NAMESPACES_SIZE; n++) {
if(rss_parser->nspaces[n] && rss_parser->nspaces_seen[n] == 'Y')
raptor_parser_start_namespace(rdf_parser, rss_parser->nspaces[n]);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 28,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GSList *nicklist_get_same(SERVER_REC *server, const char *nick)
{
GSList *tmp;
GSList *list = NULL;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server), NULL);
for (tmp = server->channels; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
NICK_REC *nick_rec;
CHANNEL_REC *channel = tmp->data;
for (nick_rec = g_hash_table_lookup(channel->nicks, nick);
nick_rec != NULL;
nick_rec = nick_rec->next) {
list = g_slist_append(list, channel);
list = g_slist_append(list, nick_rec);
}
}
return list;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::garbageCollectDocumentResourcesTimerFired(Timer<ResourceFetcher>* timer)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(timer, timer == &m_garbageCollectDocumentResourcesTimer);
garbageCollectDocumentResources();
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::SendUpdateState(const WebHistoryItem& item) {
if (item.isNull())
return;
if (item.urlString() == WebString::fromUTF8(kSwappedOutURL))
return;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_UpdateState(
routing_id_, page_id_, webkit_glue::HistoryItemToString(item)));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sf_get_chunk_size (const SF_CHUNK_ITERATOR * iterator, SF_CHUNK_INFO * chunk_info)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
SNDFILE *sndfile = iterator ? iterator->sndfile : NULL ;
VALIDATE_SNDFILE_AND_ASSIGN_PSF (sndfile, psf, 1) ;
if (chunk_info == NULL)
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_PTR ;
if (psf->get_chunk_size)
return psf->get_chunk_size (psf, iterator, chunk_info) ;
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_FORMAT ;
return 0 ;
} /* sf_get_chunk_size */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum oom_constraint constrained_alloc(struct zonelist *zonelist,
gfp_t gfp_mask, nodemask_t *nodemask,
unsigned long *totalpages)
{
struct zone *zone;
struct zoneref *z;
enum zone_type high_zoneidx = gfp_zone(gfp_mask);
bool cpuset_limited = false;
int nid;
/* Default to all available memory */
*totalpages = totalram_pages + total_swap_pages;
if (!zonelist)
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
/*
* Reach here only when __GFP_NOFAIL is used. So, we should avoid
* to kill current.We have to random task kill in this case.
* Hopefully, CONSTRAINT_THISNODE...but no way to handle it, now.
*/
if (gfp_mask & __GFP_THISNODE)
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
/*
* This is not a __GFP_THISNODE allocation, so a truncated nodemask in
* the page allocator means a mempolicy is in effect. Cpuset policy
* is enforced in get_page_from_freelist().
*/
if (nodemask && !nodes_subset(node_states[N_HIGH_MEMORY], *nodemask)) {
*totalpages = total_swap_pages;
for_each_node_mask(nid, *nodemask)
*totalpages += node_spanned_pages(nid);
return CONSTRAINT_MEMORY_POLICY;
}
/* Check this allocation failure is caused by cpuset's wall function */
for_each_zone_zonelist_nodemask(zone, z, zonelist,
high_zoneidx, nodemask)
if (!cpuset_zone_allowed_softwall(zone, gfp_mask))
cpuset_limited = true;
if (cpuset_limited) {
*totalpages = total_swap_pages;
for_each_node_mask(nid, cpuset_current_mems_allowed)
*totalpages += node_spanned_pages(nid);
return CONSTRAINT_CPUSET;
}
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string OptimizationHintsComponentInstallerPolicy::GetName() const {
return kOptimizationHintsSetFetcherManifestName;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: usbip_alloc_iso_desc_pdu(struct urb *urb, ssize_t *bufflen)
{
struct usbip_iso_packet_descriptor *iso;
int np = urb->number_of_packets;
ssize_t size = np * sizeof(*iso);
int i;
iso = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iso)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < np; i++) {
usbip_pack_iso(&iso[i], &urb->iso_frame_desc[i], 1);
usbip_iso_packet_correct_endian(&iso[i], 1);
}
*bufflen = size;
return iso;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int phar_dir_close(php_stream *stream, int close_handle TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *data = (HashTable *)stream->abstract;
if (data && data->arBuckets) {
zend_hash_destroy(data);
data->arBuckets = 0;
FREE_HASHTABLE(data);
stream->abstract = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::SuppressLoadEvent() {
if (!LoadEventFinished())
load_event_progress_ = kLoadEventCompleted;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,058
|
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