instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
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int64 0
30k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::LayoutUpdated() {
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->IsMainFrame())
GetFrame()->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().LayoutUpdated();
Markers().InvalidateRectsForAllTextMatchMarkers();
if (IsRenderingReady() && body() &&
!GetStyleEngine().HasPendingScriptBlockingSheets()) {
if (!document_timing_.FirstLayout())
document_timing_.MarkFirstLayout();
}
root_scroller_controller_->DidUpdateLayout();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void find_new_snapshot_id(BlockDriverState *bs,
char *id_str, int id_str_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
int i;
unsigned long id, id_max = 0;
for(i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) {
sn = s->snapshots + i;
id = strtoul(sn->id_str, NULL, 10);
if (id > id_max)
id_max = id;
}
snprintf(id_str, id_str_size, "%lu", id_max + 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool X86_insn_reg_att2(unsigned int id, x86_reg *reg1, enum cs_ac_type *access1, x86_reg *reg2, enum cs_ac_type *access2)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel2); i++) {
if (insn_regs_intel2[i].insn == id) {
*reg1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg2;
*reg2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg1;
if (access1)
*access1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access2;
if (access2)
*access2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access1;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLTextAreaElement::hasCustomFocusLogic() const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::CreateMemoryAllocatorDump(
DiscardableSharedMemoryHeap::Span* span,
const char* name,
base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump* pmd) const {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
return heap_->CreateMemoryAllocatorDump(span, name, pmd);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 26,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetIsEffectivelyFullscreen(
blink::WebFullscreenVideoStatus fullscreen_video_status) {
delegate_->SetIsEffectivelyFullscreen(delegate_id_, fullscreen_video_status);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 26,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t setDefaultBufferFormat(PixelFormat defaultFormat) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(defaultFormat));
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MultibufferDataSource::~MultibufferDataSource() {
DCHECK(render_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _vivid_fb_check_var(struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, struct vivid_dev *dev)
{
dprintk(dev, 1, "vivid_fb_check_var\n");
var->bits_per_pixel = 16;
if (var->green.length == 5) {
var->red.offset = 10;
var->red.length = 5;
var->green.offset = 5;
var->green.length = 5;
var->blue.offset = 0;
var->blue.length = 5;
var->transp.offset = 15;
var->transp.length = 1;
} else {
var->red.offset = 11;
var->red.length = 5;
var->green.offset = 5;
var->green.length = 6;
var->blue.offset = 0;
var->blue.length = 5;
var->transp.offset = 0;
var->transp.length = 0;
}
var->xoffset = var->yoffset = 0;
var->left_margin = var->upper_margin = 0;
var->nonstd = 0;
var->vmode &= ~FB_VMODE_MASK;
var->vmode = FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED;
/* Dummy values */
var->hsync_len = 24;
var->vsync_len = 2;
var->pixclock = 84316;
var->right_margin = 776;
var->lower_margin = 591;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext3_handle_error(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext3_super_block *es = EXT3_SB(sb)->s_es;
EXT3_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT3_ERROR_FS;
es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT3_ERROR_FS);
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return;
if (!test_opt (sb, ERRORS_CONT)) {
journal_t *journal = EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal;
set_opt(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_mount_opt, ABORT);
if (journal)
journal_abort(journal, -EIO);
}
if (test_opt (sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT,
"error: remounting filesystem read-only");
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
}
ext3_commit_super(sb, es, 1);
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC))
panic("EXT3-fs (%s): panic forced after error\n",
sb->s_id);
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnLocalSurfaceIdChanged(
const cc::RenderFrameMetadata& metadata) {
DidUpdateVisualProperties(metadata);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_check_space(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK)) {
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK);
/* pairs with tcp_poll() */
smp_mb__after_atomic();
if (sk->sk_socket &&
test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags))
tcp_new_space(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool path_is_under(struct path *path1, struct path *path2)
{
bool res;
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
res = is_path_reachable(real_mount(path1->mnt), path1->dentry, path2);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 15,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static netdev_tx_t ifb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ifb_private *dp = netdev_priv(dev);
u32 from = G_TC_FROM(skb->tc_verd);
u64_stats_update_begin(&dp->rsync);
dp->rx_packets++;
dp->rx_bytes += skb->len;
u64_stats_update_end(&dp->rsync);
if (!(from & (AT_INGRESS|AT_EGRESS)) || !skb->skb_iif) {
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
if (skb_queue_len(&dp->rq) >= dev->tx_queue_len) {
netif_stop_queue(dev);
}
__skb_queue_tail(&dp->rq, skb);
if (!dp->tasklet_pending) {
dp->tasklet_pending = 1;
tasklet_schedule(&dp->ifb_tasklet);
}
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool childAttachedAllowedWhenAttachingChildren(ContainerNode* node)
{
if (node->isShadowRoot())
return true;
if (node->isInsertionPoint())
return true;
if (node->isElementNode() && toElement(node)->shadow())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_sasl_enabled (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
const char *sasl_username, *sasl_password;
sasl_username = IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server,
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_USERNAME);
sasl_password = IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server,
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_PASSWORD);
/* SASL is enabled if username AND password are set */
return (sasl_username && sasl_username[0]
&& sasl_password && sasl_password[0]) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ttwu_do_wakeup(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int wake_flags)
{
trace_sched_wakeup(p, true);
check_preempt_curr(rq, p, wake_flags);
p->state = TASK_RUNNING;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (p->sched_class->task_woken)
p->sched_class->task_woken(rq, p);
if (unlikely(rq->idle_stamp)) {
u64 delta = rq->clock - rq->idle_stamp;
u64 max = 2*sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
if (delta > max)
rq->avg_idle = max;
else
update_avg(&rq->avg_idle, delta);
rq->idle_stamp = 0;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CaptivePortalDetector::Cancel() {
url_fetcher_.reset();
detection_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned char *PopHexPixel(const char hex_digits[][3],
const size_t pixel,unsigned char *pixels)
{
register const char
*hex;
hex=hex_digits[pixel];
*pixels++=(unsigned char) (*hex++);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) (*hex);
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::PopError() {
GLenum error = GL_NO_ERROR;
if (!errors_.empty()) {
error = *errors_.begin();
errors_.erase(errors_.begin());
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestingAutomationProvider::AddPrivateNetwork(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
std::string hostname, service_name, provider_type, key, cert_id, cert_nss,
username, password;
if (!args->GetString("hostname", &hostname) ||
!args->GetString("service_name", &service_name) ||
!args->GetString("provider_type", &provider_type) ||
!args->GetString("username", &username) ||
!args->GetString("password", &password)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("Invalid or missing args.");
return;
}
NetworkLibrary* network_library = CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
if (provider_type == VPNProviderTypeToString(
chromeos::PROVIDER_TYPE_L2TP_IPSEC_PSK)) {
if (!args->GetString("key", &key)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("Missing key arg.");
return;
}
new VirtualConnectObserver(this, reply_message, service_name);
chromeos::NetworkLibrary::VPNConfigData config_data;
config_data.psk = key;
config_data.username = username;
config_data.user_passphrase = password;
network_library->ConnectToUnconfiguredVirtualNetwork(
service_name,
hostname,
chromeos::PROVIDER_TYPE_L2TP_IPSEC_PSK,
config_data);
} else if (provider_type == VPNProviderTypeToString(
chromeos::PROVIDER_TYPE_L2TP_IPSEC_USER_CERT)) {
if (!args->GetString("cert_id", &cert_id) ||
!args->GetString("cert_nss", &cert_nss)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("Missing a certificate arg.");
return;
}
new VirtualConnectObserver(this, reply_message, service_name);
chromeos::NetworkLibrary::VPNConfigData config_data;
config_data.server_ca_cert_nss_nickname = cert_nss;
config_data.client_cert_pkcs11_id = cert_id;
config_data.username = username;
config_data.user_passphrase = password;
network_library->ConnectToUnconfiguredVirtualNetwork(
service_name,
hostname,
chromeos::PROVIDER_TYPE_L2TP_IPSEC_USER_CERT,
config_data);
} else if (provider_type == VPNProviderTypeToString(
chromeos::PROVIDER_TYPE_OPEN_VPN)) {
std::string otp;
args->GetString("otp", &otp);
chromeos::NetworkLibrary::VPNConfigData config_data;
config_data.server_ca_cert_nss_nickname = cert_nss;
config_data.client_cert_pkcs11_id = cert_id;
config_data.username = username;
config_data.user_passphrase = password;
config_data.otp = otp;
network_library->ConnectToUnconfiguredVirtualNetwork(
service_name,
hostname,
chromeos::PROVIDER_TYPE_OPEN_VPN,
config_data);
} else {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("Unsupported provider type.");
return;
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_set_agent_file_xfer(SpiceServer *s, int enable)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
agent_file_xfer = enable;
reds->agent_state.write_filter.file_xfer_enabled = agent_file_xfer;
reds->agent_state.read_filter.file_xfer_enabled = agent_file_xfer;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VBRISeeker::VBRISeeker()
: mDurationUs(-1) {
}
Commit Message: Make VBRISeeker more robust
Bug: 32577290
Change-Id: I9bcc9422ae7dd3ae4a38df330c9dcd7ac4941ec8
(cherry picked from commit 7fdd36418e945cf6a500018632dfb0ed8cb1a343)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw;
BYTE ccl;
const BYTE* src;
BYTE* yplane = NULL;
BYTE* coplane = NULL;
BYTE* cgplane = NULL;
BYTE* aplane = NULL;
INT16 r_val;
INT16 g_val;
INT16 b_val;
BYTE a_val;
UINT32 tempWidth;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
rw = (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? tempWidth : context->width);
ccl = context->ColorLossLevel;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
src = data + (context->height - 1 - y) * scanline;
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width;
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
switch (context->format)
{
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRX32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBX32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBA32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB24:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16:
b_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
r_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB16:
r_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
b_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_A4:
{
int shift;
BYTE idx;
shift = (7 - (x % 8));
idx = ((*src) >> shift) & 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 1)) >> shift) & 1) << 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 2)) >> shift) & 1) << 2;
idx |= (((*(src + 3)) >> shift) & 1) << 3;
idx *= 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
if (shift == 0)
src += 4;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8:
{
int idx = (*src) * 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
src++;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
default:
r_val = g_val = b_val = a_val = 0;
break;
}
*yplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val >> 2) + (g_val >> 1) + (b_val >> 2));
/* Perform color loss reduction here */
*coplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val - b_val) >> ccl);
*cgplane++ = (BYTE)((-(r_val >> 1) + g_val - (b_val >> 1)) >> ccl);
*aplane++ = a_val;
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (x % 2) == 1)
{
*yplane = *(yplane - 1);
*coplane = *(coplane - 1);
*cgplane = *(cgplane - 1);
}
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (y % 2) == 1)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
CopyMemory(yplane, yplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(coplane, coplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(cgplane, cgplane - rw, rw);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 12,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nd_jump_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
path_put(&nd->path);
nd->path = *path;
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 22,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveUniformsiv(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformsiv& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformsiv*>(cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.indices_bucket_id);
if (!bucket) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!validators_->uniform_parameter.IsValid(pname)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glGetActiveUniformsiv", pname, "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(bucket->size() / sizeof(GLuint));
const GLuint* indices = bucket->GetDataAs<const GLuint*>(0, bucket->size());
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniformsiv::Result Result;
uint32_t checked_size = 0;
if (!Result::ComputeSize(count).AssignIfValid(&checked_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset, checked_size);
GLint* params = result ? result->GetData() : nullptr;
if (params == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->size != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveUniformsiv");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint activeUniforms = 0;
program->GetProgramiv(GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &activeUniforms);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (indices[i] >= static_cast<GLuint>(activeUniforms)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetActiveUniformsiv", "index >= active uniforms");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
GLuint service_id = program->service_id();
GLint link_status = GL_FALSE;
api()->glGetProgramivFn(service_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &link_status);
if (link_status != GL_TRUE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetActiveUniformsiv", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_id, count, indices, pname, params);
result->SetNumResults(count);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Policy* Document::policy() {
if (!policy_)
policy_ = new DocumentPolicy(this);
return policy_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_port_suspend(struct usb_device *udev, pm_message_t msg)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
struct usb_port *port_dev = hub->ports[udev->portnum - 1];
int port1 = udev->portnum;
int status;
bool really_suspend = true;
usb_lock_port(port_dev);
/* enable remote wakeup when appropriate; this lets the device
* wake up the upstream hub (including maybe the root hub).
*
* NOTE: OTG devices may issue remote wakeup (or SRP) even when
* we don't explicitly enable it here.
*/
if (udev->do_remote_wakeup) {
status = usb_enable_remote_wakeup(udev);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "won't remote wakeup, status %d\n",
status);
/* bail if autosuspend is requested */
if (PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg))
goto err_wakeup;
}
}
/* disable USB2 hardware LPM */
if (udev->usb2_hw_lpm_enabled == 1)
usb_set_usb2_hardware_lpm(udev, 0);
if (usb_disable_ltm(udev)) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "Failed to disable LTM before suspend\n.");
status = -ENOMEM;
if (PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg))
goto err_ltm;
}
if (usb_unlocked_disable_lpm(udev)) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "Failed to disable LPM before suspend\n.");
status = -ENOMEM;
if (PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg))
goto err_lpm3;
}
/* see 7.1.7.6 */
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
status = hub_set_port_link_state(hub, port1, USB_SS_PORT_LS_U3);
/*
* For system suspend, we do not need to enable the suspend feature
* on individual USB-2 ports. The devices will automatically go
* into suspend a few ms after the root hub stops sending packets.
* The USB 2.0 spec calls this "global suspend".
*
* However, many USB hubs have a bug: They don't relay wakeup requests
* from a downstream port if the port's suspend feature isn't on.
* Therefore we will turn on the suspend feature if udev or any of its
* descendants is enabled for remote wakeup.
*/
else if (PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg) || wakeup_enabled_descendants(udev) > 0)
status = set_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1,
USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND);
else {
really_suspend = false;
status = 0;
}
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&port_dev->dev, "can't suspend, status %d\n", status);
/* Try to enable USB3 LPM and LTM again */
usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(udev);
err_lpm3:
usb_enable_ltm(udev);
err_ltm:
/* Try to enable USB2 hardware LPM again */
if (udev->usb2_hw_lpm_capable == 1)
usb_set_usb2_hardware_lpm(udev, 1);
if (udev->do_remote_wakeup)
(void) usb_disable_remote_wakeup(udev);
err_wakeup:
/* System sleep transitions should never fail */
if (!PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg))
status = 0;
} else {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "usb %ssuspend, wakeup %d\n",
(PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg) ? "auto-" : ""),
udev->do_remote_wakeup);
if (really_suspend) {
udev->port_is_suspended = 1;
/* device has up to 10 msec to fully suspend */
msleep(10);
}
usb_set_device_state(udev, USB_STATE_SUSPENDED);
}
if (status == 0 && !udev->do_remote_wakeup && udev->persist_enabled
&& test_and_clear_bit(port1, hub->child_usage_bits))
pm_runtime_put_sync(&port_dev->dev);
usb_mark_last_busy(hub->hdev);
usb_unlock_port(port_dev);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Instance::DocumentHasUnsupportedFeature(const std::string& feature) {
std::string metric("PDF_Unsupported_");
metric += feature;
if (!unsupported_features_reported_.count(metric)) {
unsupported_features_reported_.insert(metric);
UserMetricsRecordAction(metric);
}
if (!full_)
return;
if (told_browser_about_unsupported_feature_)
return;
told_browser_about_unsupported_feature_ = true;
pp::PDF::HasUnsupportedFeature(this);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnOfflinePageAcquireFileAccessPermissionDone(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& web_contents_getter,
const ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject>& j_tab_ref,
const std::string& origin,
bool granted) {
if (!granted)
return;
content::WebContents* web_contents = web_contents_getter.Run();
if (!web_contents)
return;
GURL url = web_contents->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (url.is_empty())
return;
if (!offline_pages::OfflinePageUtils::CanDownloadAsOfflinePage(
url, web_contents->GetContentsMimeType())) {
DownloadAsFile(web_contents, url);
return;
}
GURL original_url =
offline_pages::OfflinePageUtils::GetOriginalURLFromWebContents(
web_contents);
OfflinePageUtils::CheckDuplicateDownloads(
chrome::GetBrowserContextRedirectedInIncognito(
web_contents->GetBrowserContext()),
url,
base::Bind(&DuplicateCheckDone, url, original_url, j_tab_ref, origin));
}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XmlWriter::StartWriting() {
buffer_ = xmlBufferCreate();
writer_ = xmlNewTextWriterMemory(buffer_, 0);
xmlTextWriterSetIndent(writer_, 1);
xmlTextWriterStartDocument(writer_, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 11,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UpdatePolicyDuration(base::TimeTicks now,
base::TimeTicks policy_expiration,
base::TimeDelta* policy_duration) {
if (policy_expiration <= now)
return;
if (policy_duration->is_zero()) {
*policy_duration = policy_expiration - now;
return;
}
*policy_duration = std::min(*policy_duration, policy_expiration - now);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void disk_check_events(struct disk_events *ev,
unsigned int *clearing_ptr)
{
struct gendisk *disk = ev->disk;
char *envp[ARRAY_SIZE(disk_uevents) + 1] = { };
unsigned int clearing = *clearing_ptr;
unsigned int events;
unsigned long intv;
int nr_events = 0, i;
/* check events */
events = disk->fops->check_events(disk, clearing);
/* accumulate pending events and schedule next poll if necessary */
spin_lock_irq(&ev->lock);
events &= ~ev->pending;
ev->pending |= events;
*clearing_ptr &= ~clearing;
intv = disk_events_poll_jiffies(disk);
if (!ev->block && intv)
queue_delayed_work(system_freezable_power_efficient_wq,
&ev->dwork, intv);
spin_unlock_irq(&ev->lock);
/*
* Tell userland about new events. Only the events listed in
* @disk->events are reported. Unlisted events are processed the
* same internally but never get reported to userland.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disk_uevents); i++)
if (events & disk->events & (1 << i))
envp[nr_events++] = disk_uevents[i];
if (nr_events)
kobject_uevent_env(&disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE, envp);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 3,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void transmit_fragment(BT_HDR *packet, bool send_transmit_finished) {
uint16_t event = packet->event & MSG_EVT_MASK;
serial_data_type_t type = event_to_data_type(event);
btsnoop->capture(packet, false);
hal->transmit_data(type, packet->data + packet->offset, packet->len);
if (event != MSG_STACK_TO_HC_HCI_CMD && send_transmit_finished)
buffer_allocator->free(packet);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DisableBeforeUnloadHangMonitorForTesting() {
beforeunload_timeout_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
{
/* some versions of heimdal use bit 14 instead of 16 for
request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft prior to
version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but all S4U2Proxy
requests will have a second ticket; don't consider those anonymous */
return (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
(b->kdc_options.constrained_delegation && !b->additional_tickets));
}
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 2,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool IsSVGAttributeHandle(const PropertyHandle& property_handle) {
return property_handle.IsSVGAttribute();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 16,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void daemonize(const char *name, ...)
{
va_list args;
sigset_t blocked;
va_start(args, name);
vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
va_end(args);
/*
* If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
* user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
* they would be locked into memory.
*/
exit_mm(current);
/*
* We don't want to have TIF_FREEZE set if the system-wide hibernation
* or suspend transition begins right now.
*/
current->flags |= (PF_NOFREEZE | PF_KTHREAD);
if (current->nsproxy != &init_nsproxy) {
get_nsproxy(&init_nsproxy);
switch_task_namespaces(current, &init_nsproxy);
}
set_special_pids(&init_struct_pid);
proc_clear_tty(current);
/* Block and flush all signals */
sigfillset(&blocked);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &blocked, NULL);
flush_signals(current);
/* Become as one with the init task */
daemonize_fs_struct();
exit_files(current);
current->files = init_task.files;
atomic_inc(¤t->files->count);
reparent_to_kthreadd();
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_apic_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 offset = exit_qualification & 0xfff;
/* APIC-write VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_send_apr(struct ib_ucm_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
return ib_ucm_send_info(file, inbuf, in_len, (void *)ib_send_cm_apr);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void igmp_heard_report(struct in_device *in_dev, __be32 group)
{
struct ip_mc_list *im;
/* Timers are only set for non-local groups */
if (group == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
return;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, im) {
if (im->multiaddr == group) {
igmp_stop_timer(im);
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint64_t msix_table_mmio_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
PCIDevice *dev = opaque;
return pci_get_long(dev->msix_table + addr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs40_open_expired(struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
/* NFSv4.0 doesn't allow for delegation recovery on open expire */
nfs40_clear_delegation_stateid(state);
return nfs4_open_expired(sp, state);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct operand *op,
unsigned d)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
switch (d) {
case OpReg:
decode_register_operand(ctxt, op,
op == &ctxt->dst &&
ctxt->twobyte && (ctxt->b == 0xb6 || ctxt->b == 0xb7));
break;
case OpImmUByte:
rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, 1, false);
break;
case OpMem:
ctxt->memop.bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
mem_common:
*op = ctxt->memop;
ctxt->memopp = op;
if ((ctxt->d & BitOp) && op == &ctxt->dst)
fetch_bit_operand(ctxt);
op->orig_val = op->val;
break;
case OpMem64:
ctxt->memop.bytes = 8;
goto mem_common;
case OpAcc:
op->type = OP_REG;
op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
op->addr.reg = &ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
fetch_register_operand(op);
op->orig_val = op->val;
break;
case OpDI:
op->type = OP_MEM;
op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
op->addr.mem.ea =
register_address(ctxt, ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI]);
op->addr.mem.seg = VCPU_SREG_ES;
op->val = 0;
break;
case OpDX:
op->type = OP_REG;
op->bytes = 2;
op->addr.reg = &ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
fetch_register_operand(op);
break;
case OpCL:
op->bytes = 1;
op->val = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] & 0xff;
break;
case OpImmByte:
rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, 1, true);
break;
case OpOne:
op->bytes = 1;
op->val = 1;
break;
case OpImm:
rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, imm_size(ctxt), true);
break;
case OpMem16:
ctxt->memop.bytes = 2;
goto mem_common;
case OpMem32:
ctxt->memop.bytes = 4;
goto mem_common;
case OpImmU16:
rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, 2, false);
break;
case OpImmU:
rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, imm_size(ctxt), false);
break;
case OpSI:
op->type = OP_MEM;
op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
op->addr.mem.ea =
register_address(ctxt, ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI]);
op->addr.mem.seg = seg_override(ctxt);
op->val = 0;
break;
case OpImmFAddr:
op->type = OP_IMM;
op->addr.mem.ea = ctxt->_eip;
op->bytes = ctxt->op_bytes + 2;
insn_fetch_arr(op->valptr, op->bytes, ctxt);
break;
case OpMemFAddr:
ctxt->memop.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes + 2;
goto mem_common;
case OpES:
op->val = VCPU_SREG_ES;
break;
case OpCS:
op->val = VCPU_SREG_CS;
break;
case OpSS:
op->val = VCPU_SREG_SS;
break;
case OpDS:
op->val = VCPU_SREG_DS;
break;
case OpFS:
op->val = VCPU_SREG_FS;
break;
case OpGS:
op->val = VCPU_SREG_GS;
break;
case OpImplicit:
/* Special instructions do their own operand decoding. */
default:
op->type = OP_NONE; /* Disable writeback. */
break;
}
done:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long __find_rev_next_zero_bit(const unsigned long *addr,
unsigned long size, unsigned long offset)
{
const unsigned long *p = addr + BIT_WORD(offset);
unsigned long result = size;
unsigned long tmp;
if (offset >= size)
return size;
size -= (offset & ~(BITS_PER_LONG - 1));
offset %= BITS_PER_LONG;
while (1) {
if (*p == ~0UL)
goto pass;
tmp = __reverse_ulong((unsigned char *)p);
if (offset)
tmp |= ~0UL << (BITS_PER_LONG - offset);
if (size < BITS_PER_LONG)
tmp |= ~0UL >> size;
if (tmp != ~0UL)
goto found;
pass:
if (size <= BITS_PER_LONG)
break;
size -= BITS_PER_LONG;
offset = 0;
p++;
}
return result;
found:
return result - size + __reverse_ffz(tmp);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void ShowCreatedFullscreenWidget(int route_id) {}
Commit Message: Add unit test for AllowBindings check.
BUG=117418
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9701038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126929 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStrip::SetDropArrow(
const base::Optional<BrowserRootView::DropIndex>& index) {
if (!index) {
controller_->OnDropIndexUpdate(-1, false);
drop_arrow_.reset();
return;
}
controller_->OnDropIndexUpdate(index->value, index->drop_before);
if (drop_arrow_ && (index == drop_arrow_->index))
return;
bool is_beneath;
gfx::Rect drop_bounds =
GetDropBounds(index->value, index->drop_before, &is_beneath);
if (!drop_arrow_) {
drop_arrow_ = std::make_unique<DropArrow>(*index, !is_beneath, GetWidget());
} else {
drop_arrow_->index = *index;
if (is_beneath == drop_arrow_->point_down) {
drop_arrow_->point_down = !is_beneath;
drop_arrow_->arrow_view->SetImage(
GetDropArrowImage(drop_arrow_->point_down));
}
}
drop_arrow_->arrow_window->SetBounds(drop_bounds);
drop_arrow_->arrow_window->Show();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::SetEnableDCLayers(bool enable) {
auto task = base::BindOnce(&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::SetEnableDCLayers,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), enable);
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(task), {});
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 17,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::addOutOfFlowPositionedLayer(RenderLayer* layer)
{
m_outOfFlowPositionedLayers.add(layer);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int encap_same(const struct bgp_attr_encap_subtlv *h1,
const struct bgp_attr_encap_subtlv *h2)
{
const struct bgp_attr_encap_subtlv *p;
const struct bgp_attr_encap_subtlv *q;
if (h1 == h2)
return 1;
if (h1 == NULL || h2 == NULL)
return 0;
for (p = h1; p; p = p->next) {
for (q = h2; q; q = q->next) {
if ((p->type == q->type) && (p->length == q->length)
&& !memcmp(p->value, q->value, p->length)) {
break;
}
}
if (!q)
return 0;
}
for (p = h2; p; p = p->next) {
for (q = h1; q; q = q->next) {
if ((p->type == q->type) && (p->length == q->length)
&& !memcmp(p->value, q->value, p->length)) {
break;
}
}
if (!q)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool parse_diff(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
double old_diff, diff;
if (opt_diff_mult == 0.0)
diff = json_number_value(json_array_get(val, 0)) * pool->algorithm.diff_multiplier1;
else
diff = json_number_value(json_array_get(val, 0)) * opt_diff_mult;
if (diff == 0)
return false;
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
old_diff = pool->swork.diff;
pool->swork.diff = diff;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (old_diff != diff) {
int idiff = diff;
if ((double)idiff == diff)
applog(pool == current_pool() ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG, "%s difficulty changed to %d", get_pool_name(pool), idiff);
else
applog(pool == current_pool() ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG, "%s difficulty changed to %.3f", get_pool_name(pool), diff);
} else
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s difficulty set to %f", get_pool_name(pool), diff);
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::Init() {
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_scripts;
ResourceRequest initial_request{KURL(g_empty_string)};
initial_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal);
initial_request.SetFrameType(
frame_->IsMainFrame() ? network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kTopLevel
: network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested);
provisional_document_loader_ =
Client()->CreateDocumentLoader(frame_, initial_request, SubstituteData(),
ClientRedirectPolicy::kNotClientRedirect,
base::UnguessableToken::Create());
provisional_document_loader_->StartLoading();
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
state_machine_.AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument);
document_loader_->SetSentDidFinishLoad();
if (frame_->GetPage()->Paused())
SetDefersLoading(true);
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int split_header_filename(LHAFileHeader *header)
{
char *sep;
char *new_filename;
sep = strrchr(header->filename, '/');
if (sep != NULL) {
new_filename = strdup(sep + 1);
if (new_filename == NULL) {
return 0;
}
*(sep + 1) = '\0';
header->path = header->filename;
header->filename = new_filename;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistogramTimeMedium(const std::string& name, int64_t ms) {
if (ms < 0) return;
const PPB_UMA_Private* ptr = GetUMAInterface();
if (ptr == NULL) return;
ptr->HistogramCustomTimes(pp::Var(name).pp_var(),
ms,
kTimeMediumMin, kTimeMediumMax,
kTimeMediumBuckets);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MetricsLog::RecordCurrentSessionData(
DelegatingProvider* delegating_provider,
base::TimeDelta incremental_uptime,
base::TimeDelta uptime) {
DCHECK(!closed_);
DCHECK(has_environment_);
WriteRealtimeStabilityAttributes(incremental_uptime, uptime);
delegating_provider->ProvideCurrentSessionData(uma_proto());
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 1,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RedirectToNtpOrAppsPageIfNecessary(
content::WebContents* contents,
signin_metrics::AccessPoint access_point) {
if (access_point != signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_SETTINGS)
RedirectToNtpOrAppsPage(contents, access_point);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void clamp_output_samples(struct iw_context *ctx, iw_tmpsample *out_pix, int num_out_pix)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<num_out_pix;i++) {
if(out_pix[i]<0.0) out_pix[i]=0.0;
else if(out_pix[i]>1.0) out_pix[i]=1.0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 29,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebString BlinkTestRunner::GetAbsoluteWebStringFromUTF8Path(
const std::string& utf8_path) {
base::FilePath path = base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(utf8_path);
if (!path.IsAbsolute()) {
GURL base_url =
net::FilePathToFileURL(test_config_.current_working_directory.Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("foo")));
net::FileURLToFilePath(base_url.Resolve(utf8_path), &path);
}
return path.AsUTF16Unsafe();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 mem_cgroup_move_charge_read(struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct cftype *cft)
{
return mem_cgroup_from_cont(cgrp)->move_charge_at_immigrate;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QDECL Com_Error( int code, const char *fmt, ... ) {
va_list argptr;
static int lastErrorTime;
static int errorCount;
int currentTime;
qboolean restartClient;
if(com_errorEntered)
Sys_Error("recursive error after: %s", com_errorMessage);
com_errorEntered = qtrue;
Cvar_Set("com_errorCode", va("%i", code));
if ( com_buildScript && com_buildScript->integer ) {
code = ERR_FATAL;
}
currentTime = Sys_Milliseconds();
if ( currentTime - lastErrorTime < 100 ) {
if ( ++errorCount > 3 ) {
code = ERR_FATAL;
}
} else {
errorCount = 0;
}
lastErrorTime = currentTime;
va_start (argptr,fmt);
Q_vsnprintf (com_errorMessage, sizeof(com_errorMessage),fmt,argptr);
va_end (argptr);
if (code != ERR_DISCONNECT && code != ERR_NEED_CD)
Cvar_Set("com_errorMessage", com_errorMessage);
restartClient = com_gameClientRestarting && !( com_cl_running && com_cl_running->integer );
com_gameRestarting = qfalse;
com_gameClientRestarting = qfalse;
if (code == ERR_DISCONNECT || code == ERR_SERVERDISCONNECT) {
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
SV_Shutdown( "Server disconnected" );
if ( restartClient ) {
CL_Init();
}
CL_Disconnect( qtrue );
CL_FlushMemory( );
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
FS_PureServerSetLoadedPaks("", "");
com_errorEntered = qfalse;
longjmp (abortframe, -1);
} else if (code == ERR_DROP) {
Com_Printf ("********************\nERROR: %s\n********************\n", com_errorMessage);
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
SV_Shutdown (va("Server crashed: %s", com_errorMessage));
if ( restartClient ) {
CL_Init();
}
CL_Disconnect( qtrue );
CL_FlushMemory( );
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
FS_PureServerSetLoadedPaks("", "");
com_errorEntered = qfalse;
longjmp (abortframe, -1);
} else if ( code == ERR_NEED_CD ) {
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
SV_Shutdown( "Server didn't have CD" );
if ( restartClient ) {
CL_Init();
}
if ( com_cl_running && com_cl_running->integer ) {
CL_Disconnect( qtrue );
CL_FlushMemory( );
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
CL_CDDialog();
} else {
Com_Printf("Server didn't have CD\n" );
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
}
FS_PureServerSetLoadedPaks("", "");
com_errorEntered = qfalse;
longjmp (abortframe, -1);
} else {
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
CL_Shutdown(va("Client fatal crashed: %s", com_errorMessage), qtrue, qtrue);
SV_Shutdown(va("Server fatal crashed: %s", com_errorMessage));
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
}
Com_Shutdown ();
Sys_Error ("%s", com_errorMessage);
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 9,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WtsSessionProcessDelegate::~WtsSessionProcessDelegate() {
core_->Stop();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sr_do_ioctl(Scsi_CD *cd, struct packet_command *cgc)
{
struct scsi_device *SDev;
struct scsi_sense_hdr sshdr;
int result, err = 0, retries = 0;
SDev = cd->device;
retry:
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(SDev)) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
result = scsi_execute(SDev, cgc->cmd, cgc->data_direction,
cgc->buffer, cgc->buflen,
(unsigned char *)cgc->sense, &sshdr,
cgc->timeout, IOCTL_RETRIES, 0, 0, NULL);
/* Minimal error checking. Ignore cases we know about, and report the rest. */
if (driver_byte(result) != 0) {
switch (sshdr.sense_key) {
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
SDev->changed = 1;
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"disc change detected.\n");
if (retries++ < 10)
goto retry;
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case NOT_READY: /* This happens if there is no disc in drive */
if (sshdr.asc == 0x04 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x01) {
/* sense: Logical unit is in process of becoming ready */
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready yet.\n");
if (retries++ < 10) {
/* sleep 2 sec and try again */
ssleep(2);
goto retry;
} else {
/* 20 secs are enough? */
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
}
}
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready. Make sure there "
"is a disc in the drive.\n");
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case ILLEGAL_REQUEST:
err = -EIO;
if (sshdr.asc == 0x20 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x00)
/* sense: Invalid command operation code */
err = -EDRIVE_CANT_DO_THIS;
break;
default:
err = -EIO;
}
}
/* Wake up a process waiting for device */
out:
cgc->stat = err;
return err;
}
Commit Message: sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer
We're casting the CDROM layer request_sense to the SCSI sense
buffer, but the former is 64 bytes and the latter is 96 bytes.
As we generally allocate these on the stack, we end up blowing
up the stack.
Fix this by wrapping the scsi_execute() call with a properly
sized sense buffer, and copying back the bits for the CDROM
layer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Piotr Gabriel Kosinski <pg.kosinski@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <daniel@twistlock.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 82ed4db499b8 ("block: split scsi_request out of struct request")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 25,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int devinet_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
struct sockaddr_in sin_orig;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct in_ifaddr **ifap = NULL;
struct in_ifaddr *ifa = NULL;
struct net_device *dev;
char *colon;
int ret = -EFAULT;
int tryaddrmatch = 0;
/*
* Fetch the caller's info block into kernel space
*/
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(struct ifreq)))
goto out;
ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ - 1] = 0;
/* save original address for comparison */
memcpy(&sin_orig, sin, sizeof(*sin));
colon = strchr(ifr.ifr_name, ':');
if (colon)
*colon = 0;
dev_load(net, ifr.ifr_name);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGIFADDR: /* Get interface address */
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR: /* Get the broadcast address */
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR: /* Get the destination address */
case SIOCGIFNETMASK: /* Get the netmask for the interface */
/* Note that these ioctls will not sleep,
so that we do not impose a lock.
One day we will be forced to put shlock here (I mean SMP)
*/
tryaddrmatch = (sin_orig.sin_family == AF_INET);
memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
break;
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto out;
break;
case SIOCSIFADDR: /* Set interface address (and family) */
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR: /* Set the broadcast address */
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: /* Set the destination address */
case SIOCSIFNETMASK: /* Set the netmask for the interface */
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (sin->sin_family != AF_INET)
goto out;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rtnl_lock();
ret = -ENODEV;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr.ifr_name);
if (!dev)
goto done;
if (colon)
*colon = ':';
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rtnl(dev);
if (in_dev) {
if (tryaddrmatch) {
/* Matthias Andree */
/* compare label and address (4.4BSD style) */
/* note: we only do this for a limited set of ioctls
and only if the original address family was AF_INET.
This is checked above. */
for (ifap = &in_dev->ifa_list; (ifa = *ifap) != NULL;
ifap = &ifa->ifa_next) {
if (!strcmp(ifr.ifr_name, ifa->ifa_label) &&
sin_orig.sin_addr.s_addr ==
ifa->ifa_local) {
break; /* found */
}
}
}
/* we didn't get a match, maybe the application is
4.3BSD-style and passed in junk so we fall back to
comparing just the label */
if (!ifa) {
for (ifap = &in_dev->ifa_list; (ifa = *ifap) != NULL;
ifap = &ifa->ifa_next)
if (!strcmp(ifr.ifr_name, ifa->ifa_label))
break;
}
}
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ifa && cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFFLAGS)
goto done;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGIFADDR: /* Get interface address */
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
goto rarok;
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR: /* Get the broadcast address */
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_broadcast;
goto rarok;
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR: /* Get the destination address */
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_address;
goto rarok;
case SIOCGIFNETMASK: /* Get the netmask for the interface */
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_mask;
goto rarok;
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
if (colon) {
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ifa)
break;
ret = 0;
if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP))
inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, 1);
break;
}
ret = dev_change_flags(dev, ifr.ifr_flags);
break;
case SIOCSIFADDR: /* Set interface address (and family) */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (inet_abc_len(sin->sin_addr.s_addr) < 0)
break;
if (!ifa) {
ret = -ENOBUFS;
ifa = inet_alloc_ifa();
if (!ifa)
break;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&ifa->hash);
if (colon)
memcpy(ifa->ifa_label, ifr.ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
else
memcpy(ifa->ifa_label, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
} else {
ret = 0;
if (ifa->ifa_local == sin->sin_addr.s_addr)
break;
inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, 0);
ifa->ifa_broadcast = 0;
ifa->ifa_scope = 0;
}
ifa->ifa_address = ifa->ifa_local = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)) {
ifa->ifa_prefixlen = inet_abc_len(ifa->ifa_address);
ifa->ifa_mask = inet_make_mask(ifa->ifa_prefixlen);
if ((dev->flags & IFF_BROADCAST) &&
ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 31)
ifa->ifa_broadcast = ifa->ifa_address |
~ifa->ifa_mask;
} else {
ifa->ifa_prefixlen = 32;
ifa->ifa_mask = inet_make_mask(32);
}
set_ifa_lifetime(ifa, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME);
ret = inet_set_ifa(dev, ifa);
break;
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR: /* Set the broadcast address */
ret = 0;
if (ifa->ifa_broadcast != sin->sin_addr.s_addr) {
inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, 0);
ifa->ifa_broadcast = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
inet_insert_ifa(ifa);
}
break;
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: /* Set the destination address */
ret = 0;
if (ifa->ifa_address == sin->sin_addr.s_addr)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (inet_abc_len(sin->sin_addr.s_addr) < 0)
break;
ret = 0;
inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, 0);
ifa->ifa_address = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
inet_insert_ifa(ifa);
break;
case SIOCSIFNETMASK: /* Set the netmask for the interface */
/*
* The mask we set must be legal.
*/
ret = -EINVAL;
if (bad_mask(sin->sin_addr.s_addr, 0))
break;
ret = 0;
if (ifa->ifa_mask != sin->sin_addr.s_addr) {
__be32 old_mask = ifa->ifa_mask;
inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, 0);
ifa->ifa_mask = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
ifa->ifa_prefixlen = inet_mask_len(ifa->ifa_mask);
/* See if current broadcast address matches
* with current netmask, then recalculate
* the broadcast address. Otherwise it's a
* funny address, so don't touch it since
* the user seems to know what (s)he's doing...
*/
if ((dev->flags & IFF_BROADCAST) &&
(ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 31) &&
(ifa->ifa_broadcast ==
(ifa->ifa_local|~old_mask))) {
ifa->ifa_broadcast = (ifa->ifa_local |
~sin->sin_addr.s_addr);
}
inet_insert_ifa(ifa);
}
break;
}
done:
rtnl_unlock();
out:
return ret;
rarok:
rtnl_unlock();
ret = copy_to_user(arg, &ifr, sizeof(struct ifreq)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_on_issue_scsi(PVSCSIState *s)
{
trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_noimpl("PVSCSI_CMD_ISSUE_SCSI");
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(timer_create, clockid_t, which_clock,
struct compat_sigevent __user *, timer_event_spec,
timer_t __user *, created_timer_id)
{
if (timer_event_spec) {
sigevent_t event;
if (get_compat_sigevent(&event, timer_event_spec))
return -EFAULT;
return do_timer_create(which_clock, &event, created_timer_id);
}
return do_timer_create(which_clock, NULL, created_timer_id);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 15,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsTimerRunning() {
return GetLongPressTimer()->IsRunning();
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cwexec (kwset_t kws, char const *text, size_t len, struct kwsmatch *kwsmatch)
{
struct kwset const *kwset;
struct trie * const *next;
struct trie const *trie;
struct trie const *accept;
char const *beg, *lim, *mch, *lmch;
unsigned char c;
unsigned char const *delta;
int d;
char const *end, *qlim;
struct tree const *tree;
char const *trans;
#ifdef lint
accept = NULL;
#endif
/* Initialize register copies and look for easy ways out. */
kwset = (struct kwset *) kws;
if (len < kwset->mind)
return -1;
next = kwset->next;
delta = kwset->delta;
trans = kwset->trans;
lim = text + len;
end = text;
if ((d = kwset->mind) != 0)
mch = NULL;
else
{
mch = text, accept = kwset->trie;
goto match;
}
if (len >= 4 * kwset->mind)
qlim = lim - 4 * kwset->mind;
else
qlim = NULL;
while (lim - end >= d)
{
if (qlim && end <= qlim)
{
end += d - 1;
while ((d = delta[c = *end]) && end < qlim)
{
end += d;
end += delta[U(*end)];
end += delta[U(*end)];
}
++end;
}
else
d = delta[c = (end += d)[-1]];
if (d)
continue;
beg = end - 1;
trie = next[c];
if (trie->accepting)
{
mch = beg;
accept = trie;
}
d = trie->shift;
while (beg > text)
{
c = trans ? trans[U(*--beg)] : *--beg;
tree = trie->links;
while (tree && c != tree->label)
if (c < tree->label)
tree = tree->llink;
else
tree = tree->rlink;
if (tree)
{
trie = tree->trie;
if (trie->accepting)
{
mch = beg;
accept = trie;
}
}
else
break;
d = trie->shift;
}
if (mch)
goto match;
}
return -1;
match:
/* Given a known match, find the longest possible match anchored
at or before its starting point. This is nearly a verbatim
copy of the preceding main search loops. */
if (lim - mch > kwset->maxd)
lim = mch + kwset->maxd;
lmch = 0;
d = 1;
while (lim - end >= d)
{
if ((d = delta[c = (end += d)[-1]]) != 0)
continue;
beg = end - 1;
if (!(trie = next[c]))
{
d = 1;
continue;
}
if (trie->accepting && beg <= mch)
{
lmch = beg;
accept = trie;
}
d = trie->shift;
while (beg > text)
{
c = trans ? trans[U(*--beg)] : *--beg;
tree = trie->links;
while (tree && c != tree->label)
if (c < tree->label)
tree = tree->llink;
else
tree = tree->rlink;
if (tree)
{
trie = tree->trie;
if (trie->accepting && beg <= mch)
{
lmch = beg;
accept = trie;
}
}
else
break;
d = trie->shift;
}
if (lmch)
{
mch = lmch;
goto match;
}
if (!d)
d = 1;
}
kwsmatch->index = accept->accepting / 2;
kwsmatch->offset[0] = mch - text;
kwsmatch->size[0] = accept->depth;
return mch - text;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iodev_os_open_file(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, uint len,
const char *file_access, stream ** ps, gs_memory_t * mem)
{
return file_open_stream(fname, len, file_access,
file_default_buffer_size, ps,
iodev, iodev->procs.gp_fopen, mem);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BackendImpl::DoomAllEntries(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
background_queue_.DoomAllEntries(callback);
return net::ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenPrivacyDashboardTabAndActivate() {
OpenURL(GURL(kPrivacyDashboardUrl), GURL(),
NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, PageTransition::LINK);
window_->Activate();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::getCSSCanvasContext(const String& type, const String& name, int width, int height, CanvasRenderingContext2DOrWebGLRenderingContext& returnValue)
{
HTMLCanvasElement& element = getCSSCanvasElement(name);
element.setSize(IntSize(width, height));
element.getContext(type, CanvasContextCreationAttributes(), returnValue);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 13,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::MaybeStackBookmarkBarAtTop() {
if (bookmark_bar_view_.get())
bookmark_bar_view_->MaybeStackAtTop();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleManagePrinters(const ListValue* /*args*/) {
++manage_printers_dialog_request_count_;
printing::PrinterManagerDialog::ShowPrinterManagerDialog();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 18,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Document::domain() const
{
return securityOrigin()->domain();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp;
struct sk_buff *opt_skb = NULL;
/* Imagine: socket is IPv6. IPv4 packet arrives,
goes to IPv4 receive handler and backlogged.
From backlog it always goes here. Kerboom...
Fortunately, tcp_rcv_established and rcv_established
handle them correctly, but it is not case with
tcp_v6_hnd_req and tcp_v6_send_reset(). --ANK
*/
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
return tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard;
/*
* socket locking is here for SMP purposes as backlog rcv
* is currently called with bh processing disabled.
*/
/* Do Stevens' IPV6_PKTOPTIONS.
Yes, guys, it is the only place in our code, where we
may make it not affecting IPv4.
The rest of code is protocol independent,
and I do not like idea to uglify IPv4.
Actually, all the idea behind IPV6_PKTOPTIONS
looks not very well thought. For now we latch
options, received in the last packet, enqueued
by tcp. Feel free to propose better solution.
--ANK (980728)
*/
if (np->rxopt.all)
opt_skb = skb_clone(skb, sk_gfp_atomic(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) { /* Fast path */
struct dst_entry *dst = sk->sk_rx_dst;
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(sk, skb);
if (dst) {
if (inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex != skb->skb_iif ||
dst->ops->check(dst, np->rx_dst_cookie) == NULL) {
dst_release(dst);
sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
}
}
tcp_rcv_established(sk, skb, tcp_hdr(skb), skb->len);
if (opt_skb)
goto ipv6_pktoptions;
return 0;
}
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_err;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
struct sock *nsk = tcp_v6_cookie_check(sk, skb);
if (!nsk)
goto discard;
if (nsk != sk) {
sock_rps_save_rxhash(nsk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(nsk, skb);
if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb))
goto reset;
if (opt_skb)
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
return 0;
}
} else
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
if (tcp_rcv_state_process(sk, skb))
goto reset;
if (opt_skb)
goto ipv6_pktoptions;
return 0;
reset:
tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
discard:
if (opt_skb)
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
csum_err:
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
goto discard;
ipv6_pktoptions:
/* Do you ask, what is it?
1. skb was enqueued by tcp.
2. skb is added to tail of read queue, rather than out of order.
3. socket is not in passive state.
4. Finally, it really contains options, which user wants to receive.
*/
tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (TCP_SKB_CB(opt_skb)->end_seq == tp->rcv_nxt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN))) {
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo)
np->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(opt_skb);
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim || np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim)
np->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(opt_skb)->hop_limit;
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxflow || np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass)
np->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(opt_skb));
if (np->repflow)
np->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(opt_skb));
if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, opt_skb, &TCP_SKB_CB(opt_skb)->header.h6)) {
skb_set_owner_r(opt_skb, sk);
opt_skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, opt_skb);
} else {
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
opt_skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
}
}
kfree_skb(opt_skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CURLcode imap_regular_transfer(struct connectdata *conn,
bool *dophase_done)
{
CURLcode result=CURLE_OK;
bool connected=FALSE;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
data->req.size = -1; /* make sure this is unknown at this point */
Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, 0);
Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter(data, 0);
Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, 0);
Curl_pgrsSetDownloadSize(data, 0);
result = imap_perform(conn,
&connected, /* have we connected after PASV/PORT */
dophase_done); /* all commands in the DO-phase done? */
if(CURLE_OK == result) {
if(!*dophase_done)
/* the DO phase has not completed yet */
return CURLE_OK;
result = imap_dophase_done(conn, connected);
if(result)
return result;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_named_pipe ()
{
char *tname;
tname = sh_mktmpname ("sh-np", MT_USERANDOM|MT_USETMPDIR);
if (mkfifo (tname, 0600) < 0)
{
free (tname);
return ((char *)NULL);
}
add_fifo_list (tname);
return (tname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
{
static LIST_HEAD(graveyard);
static u8 gc_state; /* Internal persistent state */
#define KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN 0x01 /* - Need another cycle */
#define KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS 0x02 /* - We need to reap links */
#define KEY_GC_SET_TIMER 0x04 /* - We need to restart the timer */
#define KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 0x10 /* - We need to mark dead keys */
#define KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2 0x20 /* - We need to reap dead key links */
#define KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3 0x40 /* - We need to reap dead keys */
#define KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY 0x80 /* - We found at least one dead key */
struct rb_node *cursor;
struct key *key;
time_t new_timer, limit;
kenter("[%lx,%x]", key_gc_flags, gc_state);
limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
if (limit > key_gc_delay)
limit -= key_gc_delay;
else
limit = key_gc_delay;
/* Work out what we're going to be doing in this pass */
gc_state &= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 | KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2;
gc_state <<= 1;
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags))
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS | KEY_GC_SET_TIMER;
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags))
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1;
kdebug("new pass %x", gc_state);
new_timer = LONG_MAX;
/* As only this function is permitted to remove things from the key
* serial tree, if cursor is non-NULL then it will always point to a
* valid node in the tree - even if lock got dropped.
*/
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
cursor = rb_first(&key_serial_tree);
continue_scanning:
while (cursor) {
key = rb_entry(cursor, struct key, serial_node);
cursor = rb_next(cursor);
if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
goto found_unreferenced_key;
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1)) {
if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype) {
gc_state |= KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY;
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
key->perm = 0;
goto skip_dead_key;
} else if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
key->restrict_link) {
goto found_restricted_keyring;
}
}
if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER) {
if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) {
kdebug("will expire %x in %ld",
key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit);
new_timer = key->expiry;
}
}
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2))
if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype)
gc_state |= KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY;
if ((gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS) ||
unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2)) {
if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
goto found_keyring;
}
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3))
if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype)
goto destroy_dead_key;
skip_dead_key:
if (spin_is_contended(&key_serial_lock) || need_resched())
goto contended;
}
contended:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
maybe_resched:
if (cursor) {
cond_resched();
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
goto continue_scanning;
}
/* We've completed the pass. Set the timer if we need to and queue a
* new cycle if necessary. We keep executing cycles until we find one
* where we didn't reap any keys.
*/
kdebug("pass complete");
if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time_t)LONG_MAX) {
new_timer += key_gc_delay;
key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
}
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2) ||
!list_empty(&graveyard)) {
/* Make sure that all pending keyring payload destructions are
* fulfilled and that people aren't now looking at dead or
* dying keys that they don't have a reference upon or a link
* to.
*/
kdebug("gc sync");
synchronize_rcu();
}
if (!list_empty(&graveyard)) {
kdebug("gc keys");
key_gc_unused_keys(&graveyard);
}
if (unlikely(gc_state & (KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 |
KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2))) {
if (!(gc_state & KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY)) {
/* No remaining dead keys: short circuit the remaining
* keytype reap cycles.
*/
kdebug("dead short");
gc_state &= ~(KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 | KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2);
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3;
} else {
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN;
}
}
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3)) {
kdebug("dead wake");
smp_mb();
clear_bit(KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags);
wake_up_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE);
}
if (gc_state & KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN)
schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
kleave(" [end %x]", gc_state);
return;
/* We found an unreferenced key - once we've removed it from the tree,
* we can safely drop the lock.
*/
found_unreferenced_key:
kdebug("unrefd key %d", key->serial);
rb_erase(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
list_add_tail(&key->graveyard_link, &graveyard);
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN;
goto maybe_resched;
/* We found a restricted keyring and need to update the restriction if
* it is associated with the dead key type.
*/
found_restricted_keyring:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
keyring_restriction_gc(key, key_gc_dead_keytype);
goto maybe_resched;
/* We found a keyring and we need to check the payload for links to
* dead or expired keys. We don't flag another reap immediately as we
* have to wait for the old payload to be destroyed by RCU before we
* can reap the keys to which it refers.
*/
found_keyring:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
keyring_gc(key, limit);
goto maybe_resched;
/* We found a dead key that is still referenced. Reset its type and
* destroy its payload with its semaphore held.
*/
destroy_dead_key:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
kdebug("destroy key %d", key->serial);
down_write(&key->sem);
key->type = &key_type_dead;
if (key_gc_dead_keytype->destroy)
key_gc_dead_keytype->destroy(key);
memset(&key->payload, KEY_DESTROY, sizeof(key->payload));
up_write(&key->sem);
goto maybe_resched;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKit::WebNode* PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::node() const {
return node_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: safe_read(png_structp png_ptr, int fd, void *buffer_in, size_t nbytes)
{
size_t ntotal = 0;
char *buffer = png_voidcast(char*, buffer_in);
while (nbytes > 0)
{
unsigned int nread;
int iread;
/* Passing nread > INT_MAX to read is implementation defined in POSIX
* 1003.1, therefore despite the unsigned argument portable code must
* limit the value to INT_MAX!
*/
if (nbytes > INT_MAX)
nread = INT_MAX;
else
nread = (unsigned int)/*SAFE*/nbytes;
iread = read(fd, buffer, nread);
if (iread == -1)
{
/* This is the devil in the details, a read can terminate early with 0
* bytes read because of EINTR, yet it still returns -1 otherwise end
* of file cannot be distinguished.
*/
if (errno != EINTR)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "/proc read failed");
return 0; /* I.e., a permanent failure */
}
}
else if (iread < 0)
{
/* Not a valid 'read' result: */
png_warning(png_ptr, "OS /proc read bug");
return 0;
}
else if (iread > 0)
{
/* Continue reading until a permanent failure, or EOF */
buffer += iread;
nbytes -= (unsigned int)/*SAFE*/iread;
ntotal += (unsigned int)/*SAFE*/iread;
}
else
return ntotal;
}
return ntotal; /* nbytes == 0 */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int br_rports_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_bridge_port *p;
struct nlattr *nest;
if (!br->multicast_router || hlist_empty(&br->router_list))
return 0;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_ROUTER);
if (nest == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(p, &br->router_list, rlist) {
if (p && nla_put_u32(skb, MDBA_ROUTER_PORT, p->dev->ifindex))
goto fail;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return 0;
fail:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCrop(gdImagePtr src, const gdRect *crop)
{
gdImagePtr dst;
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(crop->width, crop->height);
if (!dst) return NULL;
gdImageCopy(dst, src, 0, 0, crop->x, crop->y, crop->width, crop->height);
return dst;
}
Commit Message: fix php 72494, invalid color index not handled, can lead to crash
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static noinline int search_ioctl(struct inode *inode,
struct btrfs_ioctl_search_args *args)
{
struct btrfs_root *root;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key max_key;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_ioctl_search_key *sk = &args->key;
struct btrfs_fs_info *info = BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info;
int ret;
int num_found = 0;
unsigned long sk_offset = 0;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
if (sk->tree_id == 0) {
/* search the root of the inode that was passed */
root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
} else {
key.objectid = sk->tree_id;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
root = btrfs_read_fs_root_no_name(info, &key);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "could not find root %llu\n",
sk->tree_id);
btrfs_free_path(path);
return -ENOENT;
}
}
key.objectid = sk->min_objectid;
key.type = sk->min_type;
key.offset = sk->min_offset;
max_key.objectid = sk->max_objectid;
max_key.type = sk->max_type;
max_key.offset = sk->max_offset;
path->keep_locks = 1;
while(1) {
ret = btrfs_search_forward(root, &key, &max_key, path, 0,
sk->min_transid);
if (ret != 0) {
if (ret > 0)
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
ret = copy_to_sk(root, path, &key, sk, args->buf,
&sk_offset, &num_found);
btrfs_release_path(path);
if (ret || num_found >= sk->nr_items)
break;
}
ret = 0;
err:
sk->nr_items = num_found;
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(const SharedMemoryHandle& handle) {
return handle != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __save_altstack(stack_t __user *uss, unsigned long sp)
{
struct task_struct *t = current;
return __put_user((void __user *)t->sas_ss_sp, &uss->ss_sp) |
__put_user(sas_ss_flags(sp), &uss->ss_flags) |
__put_user(t->sas_ss_size, &uss->ss_size);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (vmx_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 16,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usbnet_get_settings (struct net_device *net, struct ethtool_cmd *cmd)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(net);
if (!dev->mii.mdio_read)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return mii_ethtool_gset(&dev->mii, cmd);
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue Performance::toJSONForBinding(ScriptState* script_state) const {
V8ObjectBuilder result(script_state);
BuildJSONValue(result);
return result.GetScriptValue();
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeRemoteGattService* FakeCentral::GetFakeRemoteGattService(
const std::string& peripheral_address,
const std::string& service_id) const {
FakePeripheral* fake_peripheral = GetFakePeripheral(peripheral_address);
if (fake_peripheral == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return static_cast<FakeRemoteGattService*>(
fake_peripheral->GetGattService(service_id));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_SLOOP( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SLOOP
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const HttpResponseInfo* HttpProxyClientSocket::GetConnectResponseInfo() const {
return response_.headers.get() ? &response_ : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 14,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::NativePixmapHandle>::Read(gfx::mojom::NativePixmapHandleDataView data,
gfx::NativePixmapHandle* out) {
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
mojo::ArrayDataView<mojo::ScopedHandle> handles_data_view;
data.GetFdsDataView(&handles_data_view);
for (size_t i = 0; i < handles_data_view.size(); ++i) {
mojo::ScopedHandle handle = handles_data_view.Take(i);
base::PlatformFile platform_file;
if (mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(handle), &platform_file) !=
MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return false;
constexpr bool auto_close = true;
out->fds.push_back(base::FileDescriptor(platform_file, auto_close));
}
return data.ReadPlanes(&out->planes);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 28,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebGLRenderingContextBase::drawingBufferWidth() const {
return isContextLost() ? 0 : GetDrawingBuffer()->Size().Width();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsRemoteStream(
const std::vector<std::unique_ptr<RTCRtpReceiver>>& rtp_receivers,
const std::string& stream_id) {
for (const auto& receiver : rtp_receivers) {
for (const auto& receiver_stream_id : receiver->state().stream_ids()) {
if (stream_id == receiver_stream_id)
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read_line(zval * this_ptr, spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
while (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY) && ret == SUCCESS && spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(intern TSRMLS_CC)) {
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 9,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct inode *btrfs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct btrfs_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(btrfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->root = NULL;
ei->generation = 0;
ei->last_trans = 0;
ei->last_sub_trans = 0;
ei->logged_trans = 0;
ei->delalloc_bytes = 0;
ei->disk_i_size = 0;
ei->flags = 0;
ei->csum_bytes = 0;
ei->index_cnt = (u64)-1;
ei->last_unlink_trans = 0;
ei->last_log_commit = 0;
spin_lock_init(&ei->lock);
ei->outstanding_extents = 0;
ei->reserved_extents = 0;
ei->runtime_flags = 0;
ei->force_compress = BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE;
ei->delayed_node = NULL;
inode = &ei->vfs_inode;
extent_map_tree_init(&ei->extent_tree);
extent_io_tree_init(&ei->io_tree, &inode->i_data);
extent_io_tree_init(&ei->io_failure_tree, &inode->i_data);
ei->io_tree.track_uptodate = 1;
ei->io_failure_tree.track_uptodate = 1;
atomic_set(&ei->sync_writers, 0);
mutex_init(&ei->log_mutex);
mutex_init(&ei->delalloc_mutex);
btrfs_ordered_inode_tree_init(&ei->ordered_tree);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->delalloc_inodes);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->ordered_operations);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&ei->rb_node);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 28,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t hugetlbfs_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_file(filp);
struct address_space *mapping = filp->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
unsigned long index = *ppos >> huge_page_shift(h);
unsigned long offset = *ppos & ~huge_page_mask(h);
unsigned long end_index;
loff_t isize;
ssize_t retval = 0;
/* validate length */
if (len == 0)
goto out;
for (;;) {
struct page *page;
unsigned long nr, ret;
int ra;
/* nr is the maximum number of bytes to copy from this page */
nr = huge_page_size(h);
isize = i_size_read(inode);
if (!isize)
goto out;
end_index = (isize - 1) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (index >= end_index) {
if (index > end_index)
goto out;
nr = ((isize - 1) & ~huge_page_mask(h)) + 1;
if (nr <= offset)
goto out;
}
nr = nr - offset;
/* Find the page */
page = find_lock_page(mapping, index);
if (unlikely(page == NULL)) {
/*
* We have a HOLE, zero out the user-buffer for the
* length of the hole or request.
*/
ret = len < nr ? len : nr;
if (clear_user(buf, ret))
ra = -EFAULT;
else
ra = 0;
} else {
unlock_page(page);
/*
* We have the page, copy it to user space buffer.
*/
ra = hugetlbfs_read_actor(page, offset, buf, len, nr);
ret = ra;
page_cache_release(page);
}
if (ra < 0) {
if (retval == 0)
retval = ra;
goto out;
}
offset += ret;
retval += ret;
len -= ret;
index += offset >> huge_page_shift(h);
offset &= ~huge_page_mask(h);
/* short read or no more work */
if ((ret != nr) || (len == 0))
break;
}
out:
*ppos = ((loff_t)index << huge_page_shift(h)) + offset;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnSetFrame(SurfaceFrameType type) {
if (container_ == ash::kShellWindowId_SystemModalContainer &&
type != SurfaceFrameType::NONE) {
LOG(WARNING)
<< "A surface in system modal container should not have a frame:"
<< static_cast<int>(type);
return;
}
EventTargetingBlocker blocker;
bool suppress_mouse_event = frame_type_ != type && widget_;
if (suppress_mouse_event)
blocker.Block(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
ShellSurfaceBase::OnSetFrame(type);
UpdateAutoHideFrame();
if (suppress_mouse_event)
UpdateSurfaceBounds();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 10,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GraphicBuffer::GraphicBuffer()
: BASE(), mOwner(ownData), mBufferMapper(GraphicBufferMapper::get()),
mInitCheck(NO_ERROR), mId(getUniqueId())
{
width =
height =
stride =
format =
usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
{
int i, errno;
struct new_utsname *u;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&uts_sem);
u = utsname();
i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
if (i > len)
i = len;
errno = 0;
if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i))
errno = -EFAULT;
up_read(&uts_sem);
return errno;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 24,273
|
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