instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_starttls(char *tag, int imaps)
{
int result;
int *layerp;
char *auth_id;
sasl_ssf_t ssf;
/* SASL and openssl have different ideas about whether ssf is signed */
layerp = (int *) &ssf;
if (imapd_starttls_done == 1)
{
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO TLS already active\r\n", tag);
return;
}
result=tls_init_serverengine("imap",
5, /* depth to verify */
!imaps, /* can client auth? */
NULL);
if (result == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "error initializing TLS");
if (imaps == 0) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Error initializing TLS\r\n", tag);
} else {
shut_down(0);
}
return;
}
if (imaps == 0)
{
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK Begin TLS negotiation now\r\n", tag);
/* must flush our buffers before starting tls */
prot_flush(imapd_out);
}
result=tls_start_servertls(0, /* read */
1, /* write */
imaps ? 180 : imapd_timeout,
layerp,
&auth_id,
&tls_conn);
/* if error */
if (result==-1) {
if (imaps == 0) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Starttls negotiation failed\r\n", tag);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "STARTTLS negotiation failed: %s", imapd_clienthost);
return;
} else {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "imaps TLS negotiation failed: %s", imapd_clienthost);
shut_down(0);
}
}
/* tell SASL about the negotiated layer */
result = sasl_setprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &ssf);
if (result == SASL_OK) {
saslprops.ssf = ssf;
result = sasl_setprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, auth_id);
}
if (result != SASL_OK) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "sasl_setprop() failed: cmd_starttls()");
if (imaps == 0) {
fatal("sasl_setprop() failed: cmd_starttls()", EC_TEMPFAIL);
} else {
shut_down(0);
}
}
if(saslprops.authid) {
free(saslprops.authid);
saslprops.authid = NULL;
}
if(auth_id)
saslprops.authid = xstrdup(auth_id);
/* tell the prot layer about our new layers */
prot_settls(imapd_in, tls_conn);
prot_settls(imapd_out, tls_conn);
imapd_starttls_done = 1;
imapd_tls_required = 0;
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL)
imapd_tls_comp = (void *) SSL_get_current_compression(tls_conn);
#endif
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *sdtp_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SampleDependencyTypeBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SDTP);
tmp->flags = 1;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 20,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_status acpi_os_purge_cache(acpi_cache_t * cache)
{
kmem_cache_shrink(cache);
return (AE_OK);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetInitiatorSchemeBypassingDocumentBlocking() {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return extensions::kExtensionScheme;
#else
return nullptr;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int json_array_insert_new(json_t *json, size_t index, json_t *value)
{
json_array_t *array;
json_t **old_table;
if(!value)
return -1;
if(!json_is_array(json) || json == value) {
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
array = json_to_array(json);
if(index > array->entries) {
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
old_table = json_array_grow(array, 1, 0);
if(!old_table) {
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
if(old_table != array->table) {
array_copy(array->table, 0, old_table, 0, index);
array_copy(array->table, index + 1, old_table, index,
array->entries - index);
jsonp_free(old_table);
}
else
array_move(array, index + 1, index, array->entries - index);
array->table[index] = value;
array->entries++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 26,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Select_Charmap( FT_Face face,
FT_Encoding encoding )
{
FT_CharMap* cur;
FT_CharMap* limit;
if ( !face )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Face_Handle;
if ( encoding == FT_ENCODING_NONE )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
/* FT_ENCODING_UNICODE is special. We try to find the `best' Unicode */
/* charmap available, i.e., one with UCS-4 characters, if possible. */
/* */
/* This is done by find_unicode_charmap() above, to share code. */
if ( encoding == FT_ENCODING_UNICODE )
return find_unicode_charmap( face );
cur = face->charmaps;
if ( !cur )
return FT_Err_Invalid_CharMap_Handle;
limit = cur + face->num_charmaps;
for ( ; cur < limit; cur++ )
{
if ( cur[0]->encoding == encoding )
{
face->charmap = cur[0];
return 0;
}
}
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_sequence(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_sequence *seq)
{
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
struct nfsd4_session *session;
struct nfs4_client *clp;
struct nfsd4_slot *slot;
struct nfsd4_conn *conn;
__be32 status;
int buflen;
struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
if (resp->opcnt != 1)
return nfserr_sequence_pos;
/*
* Will be either used or freed by nfsd4_sequence_check_conn
* below.
*/
conn = alloc_conn(rqstp, NFS4_CDFC4_FORE);
if (!conn)
return nfserr_jukebox;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
session = find_in_sessionid_hashtbl(&seq->sessionid, net, &status);
if (!session)
goto out_no_session;
clp = session->se_client;
status = nfserr_too_many_ops;
if (nfsd4_session_too_many_ops(rqstp, session))
goto out_put_session;
status = nfserr_req_too_big;
if (nfsd4_request_too_big(rqstp, session))
goto out_put_session;
status = nfserr_badslot;
if (seq->slotid >= session->se_fchannel.maxreqs)
goto out_put_session;
slot = session->se_slots[seq->slotid];
dprintk("%s: slotid %d\n", __func__, seq->slotid);
/* We do not negotiate the number of slots yet, so set the
* maxslots to the session maxreqs which is used to encode
* sr_highest_slotid and the sr_target_slot id to maxslots */
seq->maxslots = session->se_fchannel.maxreqs;
status = check_slot_seqid(seq->seqid, slot->sl_seqid,
slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE);
if (status == nfserr_replay_cache) {
status = nfserr_seq_misordered;
if (!(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED))
goto out_put_session;
cstate->slot = slot;
cstate->session = session;
cstate->clp = clp;
/* Return the cached reply status and set cstate->status
* for nfsd4_proc_compound processing */
status = nfsd4_replay_cache_entry(resp, seq);
cstate->status = nfserr_replay_cache;
goto out;
}
if (status)
goto out_put_session;
status = nfsd4_sequence_check_conn(conn, session);
conn = NULL;
if (status)
goto out_put_session;
buflen = (seq->cachethis) ?
session->se_fchannel.maxresp_cached :
session->se_fchannel.maxresp_sz;
status = (seq->cachethis) ? nfserr_rep_too_big_to_cache :
nfserr_rep_too_big;
if (xdr_restrict_buflen(xdr, buflen - rqstp->rq_auth_slack))
goto out_put_session;
svc_reserve(rqstp, buflen);
status = nfs_ok;
/* Success! bump slot seqid */
slot->sl_seqid = seq->seqid;
slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE;
if (seq->cachethis)
slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS;
else
slot->sl_flags &= ~NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS;
cstate->slot = slot;
cstate->session = session;
cstate->clp = clp;
out:
switch (clp->cl_cb_state) {
case NFSD4_CB_DOWN:
seq->status_flags = SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN;
break;
case NFSD4_CB_FAULT:
seq->status_flags = SEQ4_STATUS_BACKCHANNEL_FAULT;
break;
default:
seq->status_flags = 0;
}
if (!list_empty(&clp->cl_revoked))
seq->status_flags |= SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED;
out_no_session:
if (conn)
free_conn(conn);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
return status;
out_put_session:
nfsd4_put_session_locked(session);
goto out_no_session;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 6,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyIOData::MarkProxiesAsBad(
base::TimeDelta bypass_duration,
const net::ProxyList& bad_proxies,
mojom::DataReductionProxy::MarkProxiesAsBadCallback callback) {
if (bypass_duration < base::TimeDelta()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received bad MarkProxiesAsBad() -- invalid bypass_duration: "
<< bypass_duration;
std::move(callback).Run();
return;
}
if (bypass_duration > base::TimeDelta::FromDays(1))
bypass_duration = base::TimeDelta::FromDays(1);
for (const auto& proxy : bad_proxies.GetAll()) {
if (!config_->FindConfiguredDataReductionProxy(proxy)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received bad MarkProxiesAsBad() -- not a DRP server: "
<< proxy.ToURI();
std::move(callback).Run();
return;
}
}
proxy_config_client_->MarkProxiesAsBad(bypass_duration, bad_proxies,
std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& Document::referrer() const {
if (Loader())
return Loader()->GetReferrer().referrer;
return g_null_atom;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint GetTransformFeedbackServiceID(GLuint client_id,
ClientServiceMap<GLuint, GLuint>* id_map) {
return id_map->GetServiceIDOrInvalid(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *jslGetTokenValueAsString() {
assert(lex->tokenl < JSLEX_MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH);
lex->token[lex->tokenl] = 0; // add final null
return lex->token;
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(ImageBitmap) {}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 29,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ap_set_wapi_key(struct ar6_softc *ar, void *ikey)
{
struct ieee80211req_key *ik = (struct ieee80211req_key *)ikey;
KEY_USAGE keyUsage = 0;
int status;
if (memcmp(ik->ik_macaddr, bcast_mac, IEEE80211_ADDR_LEN) == 0) {
keyUsage = GROUP_USAGE;
} else {
keyUsage = PAIRWISE_USAGE;
}
A_PRINTF("WAPI_KEY: Type:%d ix:%d mac:%02x:%02x len:%d\n",
keyUsage, ik->ik_keyix, ik->ik_macaddr[4], ik->ik_macaddr[5],
ik->ik_keylen);
status = wmi_addKey_cmd(ar->arWmi, ik->ik_keyix, WAPI_CRYPT, keyUsage,
ik->ik_keylen, (u8 *)&ik->ik_keyrsc,
ik->ik_keydata, KEY_OP_INIT_VAL, ik->ik_macaddr,
SYNC_BOTH_WMIFLAG);
if (0 != status) {
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmxnet3_cleanup_msix(VMXNET3State *s)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
if (s->msix_used) {
vmxnet3_unuse_msix_vectors(s, VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS);
msix_uninit(d, &s->msix_bar, &s->msix_bar);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct mutex *aio_mutex = NULL;
struct blk_plug plug;
int o_direct = iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT;
int overwrite = 0;
ssize_t ret;
/*
* Unaligned direct AIO must be serialized; see comment above
* In the case of O_APPEND, assume that we must always serialize
*/
if (o_direct &&
ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS) &&
!is_sync_kiocb(iocb) &&
(iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND ||
ext4_unaligned_aio(inode, from, iocb->ki_pos))) {
aio_mutex = ext4_aio_mutex(inode);
mutex_lock(aio_mutex);
ext4_unwritten_wait(inode);
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = generic_write_checks(iocb, from);
if (ret <= 0)
goto out;
/*
* If we have encountered a bitmap-format file, the size limit
* is smaller than s_maxbytes, which is for extent-mapped files.
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
if (iocb->ki_pos >= sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
iov_iter_truncate(from, sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes - iocb->ki_pos);
}
iocb->private = &overwrite;
if (o_direct) {
size_t length = iov_iter_count(from);
loff_t pos = iocb->ki_pos;
blk_start_plug(&plug);
/* check whether we do a DIO overwrite or not */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode) && !aio_mutex &&
!file->f_mapping->nrpages && pos + length <= i_size_read(inode)) {
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
int err, len;
map.m_lblk = pos >> blkbits;
map.m_len = (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(pos + length, blkbits) >> blkbits)
- map.m_lblk;
len = map.m_len;
err = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
/*
* 'err==len' means that all of blocks has
* been preallocated no matter they are
* initialized or not. For excluding
* unwritten extents, we need to check
* m_flags. There are two conditions that
* indicate for initialized extents. 1) If we
* hit extent cache, EXT4_MAP_MAPPED flag is
* returned; 2) If we do a real lookup,
* non-flags are returned. So we should check
* these two conditions.
*/
if (err == len && (map.m_flags & EXT4_MAP_MAPPED))
overwrite = 1;
}
}
ret = __generic_file_write_iter(iocb, from);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (ret > 0) {
ssize_t err;
err = generic_write_sync(file, iocb->ki_pos - ret, ret);
if (err < 0)
ret = err;
}
if (o_direct)
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
if (aio_mutex)
mutex_unlock(aio_mutex);
return ret;
out:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (aio_mutex)
mutex_unlock(aio_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
download_manager_ = new TestDownloadManager();
request_handle_.reset(new MockDownloadRequestHandle(download_manager_));
download_file_factory_ = new MockDownloadFileFactory;
download_file_manager_ = new DownloadFileManager(download_file_factory_);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MetricsLog::MetricsLog(const std::string& client_id,
int session_id,
LogType log_type,
MetricsServiceClient* client)
: closed_(false),
log_type_(log_type),
client_(client),
creation_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
has_environment_(false) {
if (IsTestingID(client_id))
uma_proto_.set_client_id(0);
else
uma_proto_.set_client_id(Hash(client_id));
uma_proto_.set_session_id(session_id);
const int32_t product = client_->GetProduct();
if (product != uma_proto_.product())
uma_proto_.set_product(product);
SystemProfileProto* system_profile = uma_proto()->mutable_system_profile();
RecordCoreSystemProfile(client_, system_profile);
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 12,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ecb_crypt_copy(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
struct cword *cword, int count)
{
/*
* Padlock prefetches extra data so we must provide mapped input buffers.
* Assume there are at least 16 bytes of stack already in use.
*/
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * (MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS - 1) + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - 1];
u8 *tmp = PTR_ALIGN(&buf[0], PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT);
memcpy(tmp, in, count * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
rep_xcrypt_ecb(tmp, out, key, cword, count);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_SubmitForm(IPDF_JSPLATFORM* param,
void* form_data,
int length,
FPDF_WIDESTRING url) {
std::string url_str = WideStringToString(url);
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
engine->client_->SubmitForm(url_str, form_data, length);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t show_uart_mode(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = to_usb_serial_port(dev);
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", edge_port->bUartMode);
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::FailedNavigation(FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int error_code) {
CHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
NavigationRequest* navigation_request = frame_tree_node->navigation_request();
DCHECK(navigation_request);
if (!IsRendererDebugURL(navigation_request->navigation_handle()->GetURL()))
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(navigation_request->navigation_handle());
if (error_code == net::ERR_ABORTED) {
frame_tree_node->ResetNavigationRequest(false);
return;
}
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host =
frame_tree_node->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(
*navigation_request);
CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(
render_frame_host, navigation_request->common_params().url);
navigation_request->TransferNavigationHandleOwnership(render_frame_host);
render_frame_host->navigation_handle()->ReadyToCommitNavigation(
render_frame_host);
render_frame_host->FailedNavigation(navigation_request->common_params(),
navigation_request->request_params(),
has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code);
}
Commit Message: Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DelOld( PProfileList list,
PProfile profile )
{
PProfile *old, current;
old = list;
current = *old;
while ( current )
{
if ( current == profile )
{
*old = current->link;
return;
}
old = ¤t->link;
current = *old;
}
/* we should never get there, unless the profile was not part of */
/* the list. */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: send_peer_reply(xmlNode * msg, xmlNode * result_diff, const char *originator, gboolean broadcast)
{
CRM_ASSERT(msg != NULL);
if (broadcast) {
/* this (successful) call modified the CIB _and_ the
* change needs to be broadcast...
* send via HA to other nodes
*/
int diff_add_updates = 0;
int diff_add_epoch = 0;
int diff_add_admin_epoch = 0;
int diff_del_updates = 0;
int diff_del_epoch = 0;
int diff_del_admin_epoch = 0;
const char *digest = NULL;
digest = crm_element_value(result_diff, XML_ATTR_DIGEST);
cib_diff_version_details(result_diff,
&diff_add_admin_epoch, &diff_add_epoch, &diff_add_updates,
&diff_del_admin_epoch, &diff_del_epoch, &diff_del_updates);
crm_trace("Sending update diff %d.%d.%d -> %d.%d.%d %s",
diff_del_admin_epoch, diff_del_epoch, diff_del_updates,
diff_add_admin_epoch, diff_add_epoch, diff_add_updates, digest);
crm_xml_add(msg, F_CIB_ISREPLY, originator);
crm_xml_add(msg, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE, XML_BOOLEAN_TRUE);
crm_xml_add(msg, F_CIB_OPERATION, CIB_OP_APPLY_DIFF);
CRM_ASSERT(digest != NULL);
add_message_xml(msg, F_CIB_UPDATE_DIFF, result_diff);
crm_log_xml_trace(msg, "copy");
return send_cluster_message(NULL, crm_msg_cib, msg, TRUE);
} else if (originator != NULL) {
/* send reply via HA to originating node */
crm_trace("Sending request result to originator only");
crm_xml_add(msg, F_CIB_ISREPLY, originator);
return send_cluster_message(crm_get_peer(0, originator), crm_msg_cib, msg, FALSE);
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::FrameMetadataUpdated(
oxide::qt::FrameMetadataChangeFlags flags) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
QFlags<oxide::qt::FrameMetadataChangeFlags> f(flags);
if (f.testFlag(oxide::qt::FRAME_METADATA_CHANGE_SCROLL_OFFSET)) {
emit q->contentXChanged();
emit q->contentYChanged();
}
if (f.testFlag(oxide::qt::FRAME_METADATA_CHANGE_CONTENT)) {
emit q->contentWidthChanged();
emit q->contentHeightChanged();
}
if (f.testFlag(oxide::qt::FRAME_METADATA_CHANGE_VIEWPORT)) {
emit q->viewportWidthChanged();
emit q->viewportHeightChanged();
}
if (!location_bar_controller_) {
return;
}
if (f.testFlag(oxide::qt::FRAME_METADATA_CHANGE_CONTROLS_OFFSET)) {
emit location_bar_controller_->offsetChanged();
}
if (f.testFlag(oxide::qt::FRAME_METADATA_CHANGE_CONTENT_OFFSET)) {
emit location_bar_controller_->contentOffsetChanged();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void strip_text(char * text) {
char * ch_loc = NULL;
ch_loc = strrchr(text, '\n');
while (ch_loc != NULL) {
*ch_loc = ' ';
ch_loc = strrchr(text, '\n');
}
ch_loc = strrchr(text, '\r');
while (ch_loc != NULL) {
*ch_loc = ' ';
ch_loc = strrchr(text, '\r');
}
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long vmsplice_to_pipe(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
struct page *pages[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct partial_page partial[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
.nr_pages_max = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS,
.flags = flags,
.ops = &user_page_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = spd_release_page,
};
long ret;
pipe = get_pipe_info(file);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
if (splice_grow_spd(pipe, &spd))
return -ENOMEM;
spd.nr_pages = get_iovec_page_array(iov, nr_segs, spd.pages,
spd.partial, false,
spd.nr_pages_max);
if (spd.nr_pages <= 0)
ret = spd.nr_pages;
else
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
splice_shrink_spd(&spd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sched_feat_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
char buf[64];
char *cmp;
int neg = 0;
int i;
if (cnt > 63)
cnt = 63;
if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, cnt))
return -EFAULT;
buf[cnt] = 0;
cmp = strstrip(buf);
if (strncmp(buf, "NO_", 3) == 0) {
neg = 1;
cmp += 3;
}
for (i = 0; sched_feat_names[i]; i++) {
if (strcmp(cmp, sched_feat_names[i]) == 0) {
if (neg)
sysctl_sched_features &= ~(1UL << i);
else
sysctl_sched_features |= (1UL << i);
break;
}
}
if (!sched_feat_names[i])
return -EINVAL;
*ppos += cnt;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gboolean BrowserWindowGtk::OnMainWindowDeleteEvent(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEvent* event) {
Close();
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static WebGestureEvent MakeGestureEvent(WebInputEvent::Type type,
double timestamp_seconds,
int x,
int y,
int modifiers) {
WebGestureEvent result;
result.type = type;
result.x = x;
result.y = y;
result.timeStampSeconds = timestamp_seconds;
result.modifiers = modifiers;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::DeleteCache(int64_t cache_id) {
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] = "DELETE FROM Caches WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
return statement.Run();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType GetTIFFInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,TIFF *tiff,
TIFFInfo *tiff_info)
{
const char
*option;
MagickStatusType
flags;
uint32
tile_columns,
tile_rows;
assert(tiff_info != (TIFFInfo *) NULL);
(void) memset(tiff_info,0,sizeof(*tiff_info));
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:tile-geometry");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
{
uint32
rows_per_strip;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:rows-per-strip");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
rows_per_strip=(size_t) strtol(option,(char **) NULL,10);
else
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&rows_per_strip) == 0)
rows_per_strip=0; /* use default */
rows_per_strip=TIFFDefaultStripSize(tiff,rows_per_strip);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,rows_per_strip);
return(MagickTrue);
}
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(option,&tiff_info->tile_geometry);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height=tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
tile_columns=(uint32) tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
tile_rows=(uint32) tiff_info->tile_geometry.height;
TIFFDefaultTileSize(tiff,&tile_columns,&tile_rows);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,tile_columns);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,tile_rows);
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width=tile_columns;
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height=tile_rows;
if ((TIFFScanlineSize(tiff) <= 0) || (TIFFTileSize(tiff) <= 0))
{
DestroyTIFFInfo(tiff_info);
return(MagickFalse);
}
tiff_info->scanlines=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tile_rows*TIFFScanlineSize(tiff),sizeof(*tiff_info->scanlines));
tiff_info->pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tile_rows*TIFFTileSize(tiff),sizeof(*tiff_info->scanlines));
if ((tiff_info->scanlines == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(tiff_info->pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
DestroyTIFFInfo(tiff_info);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1560
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RemoteFrame::BubbleLogicalScrollFromChildFrame(
ScrollDirection direction,
ScrollGranularity granularity,
Frame* child) {
DCHECK(child->IsLocalFrame());
DCHECK(child->Client());
ToLocalFrame(child)->Client()->BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame(direction,
granularity);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 5,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServerOrder(void)
{
int whichbyte = 1;
if (*((char *) &whichbyte))
return LSBFirst;
return MSBFirst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 3,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: transit_hash_alloc (void *p)
{
/* Transit structure is already allocated. */
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(
IPC::Sender* sender,
int request_id,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientPtr url_loader_client) {
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus status;
status.error_code = net::ERR_ABORTED;
status.exists_in_cache = false;
status.completion_time = base::TimeTicks();
status.encoded_data_length = 0;
status.encoded_body_length = 0;
url_loader_client->OnComplete(status);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 22,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_handle_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte buf[13];
png_uint_32 width, height;
int bit_depth, color_type, compression_type, filter_type;
int interlace_type;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_IHDR");
if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR)
png_error(png_ptr, "Out of place IHDR");
/* Check the length */
if (length != 13)
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid IHDR chunk");
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_HAVE_IHDR;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 13);
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0);
width = png_get_uint_31(png_ptr, buf);
height = png_get_uint_31(png_ptr, buf + 4);
bit_depth = buf[8];
color_type = buf[9];
compression_type = buf[10];
filter_type = buf[11];
interlace_type = buf[12];
/* Set internal variables */
png_ptr->width = width;
png_ptr->height = height;
png_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
png_ptr->interlaced = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
#endif
png_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
/* Find number of channels */
switch (png_ptr->color_type)
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
png_ptr->channels = 1;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
png_ptr->channels = 3;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
png_ptr->channels = 2;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
png_ptr->channels = 4;
break;
}
/* Set up other useful info */
png_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(png_ptr->bit_depth *
png_ptr->channels);
png_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth, png_ptr->width);
png_debug1(3, "bit_depth = %d", png_ptr->bit_depth);
png_debug1(3, "channels = %d", png_ptr->channels);
png_debug1(3, "rowbytes = %lu", png_ptr->rowbytes);
png_set_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, width, height, bit_depth,
color_type, interlace_type, compression_type, filter_type);
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void default_idle(void)
{
if (arm_pm_idle)
arm_pm_idle();
else
cpu_do_idle();
local_irq_enable();
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetIsLoading(bool is_loading,
bool to_different_document,
LoadNotificationDetails* details) {
if (is_loading == is_loading_)
return;
if (!is_loading) {
load_state_ = net::LoadStateWithParam(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE,
base::string16());
load_state_host_.clear();
upload_size_ = 0;
upload_position_ = 0;
}
GetRenderManager()->SetIsLoading(is_loading);
is_loading_ = is_loading;
waiting_for_response_ = is_loading;
is_load_to_different_document_ = to_different_document;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->LoadingStateChanged(this, to_different_document);
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD);
std::string url = (details ? details->url.possibly_invalid_spec() : "NULL");
if (is_loading) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN2("browser,navigation", "WebContentsImpl Loading",
this, "URL", url, "Main FrameTreeNode id",
GetFrameTree()->root()->frame_tree_node_id());
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, DidStartLoading());
} else {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END1("browser,navigation", "WebContentsImpl Loading",
this, "URL", url);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, DidStopLoading());
}
int type = is_loading ? NOTIFICATION_LOAD_START : NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP;
NotificationDetails det = NotificationService::NoDetails();
if (details)
det = Details<LoadNotificationDetails>(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
type, Source<NavigationController>(&controller_), det);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcXvQueryExtension(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvQueryExtensionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryExtensionReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
return XvProcVector[xv_QueryExtension] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)
{
struct key *keyring = info->data;
return install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void crypto_authenc_esn_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct authenc_esn_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->enc);
crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->auth);
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sapi_cgi_log_message(char *message TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (fcgi_is_fastcgi() && CGIG(fcgi_logging)) {
fcgi_request *request;
request = (fcgi_request*) SG(server_context);
if (request) {
int len = strlen(message);
char *buf = malloc(len+2);
memcpy(buf, message, len);
memcpy(buf + len, "\n", sizeof("\n"));
fcgi_write(request, FCGI_STDERR, buf, len+1);
free(buf);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", message);
}
/* ignore return code */
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", message);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_check_block_len(boolean decrypt)
{
int l, c;
if (t1_block_length == 0)
return;
c = t1_getbyte();
if (decrypt)
c = edecrypt((byte)c);
l = t1_block_length;
if (!(l == 0 && (c == 10 || c == 13))) {
pdftex_fail("%i bytes more than expected", l + 1);
}
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_SHP( INS_ARG )
{
TT_GlyphZoneRec zp;
FT_UShort refp;
FT_F26Dot6 dx,
dy;
FT_UShort point;
FT_UNUSED_ARG;
if ( CUR.top < CUR.GS.loop )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
if ( COMPUTE_Point_Displacement( &dx, &dy, &zp, &refp ) )
return;
while ( CUR.GS.loop > 0 )
{
CUR.args--;
point = (FT_UShort)CUR.stack[CUR.args];
if ( BOUNDS( point, CUR.zp2.n_points ) )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
}
else
/* XXX: UNDOCUMENTED! SHP touches the points */
MOVE_Zp2_Point( point, dx, dy, TRUE );
CUR.GS.loop--;
}
CUR.GS.loop = 1;
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintNativeHandler::Print(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
if (args.Length() < 1)
return;
std::vector<std::string> components;
for (int i = 0; i < args.Length(); ++i)
components.push_back(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[i]));
LOG(ERROR) << base::JoinString(components, ",");
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 22,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(date)
{
UNREGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
if (DATEG(last_errors)) {
timelib_error_container_dtor(DATEG(last_errors));
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nsPluginInstance::getCmdLine(int hostfd, int controlfd)
{
std::vector<std::string> arg_vec;
std::string cmd = getGnashExecutable();
if (cmd.empty()) {
gnash::log_error("Failed to locate the Gnash executable!");
return arg_vec;
}
arg_vec.push_back(cmd);
arg_vec.push_back("-u");
arg_vec.push_back(_swf_url);
std::string pageurl = getCurrentPageURL();
if (pageurl.empty()) {
gnash::log_error("Could not get current page URL!");
} else {
arg_vec.push_back("-U");
arg_vec.push_back(pageurl);
}
setupCookies(pageurl);
setupProxy(pageurl);
std::stringstream pars;
pars << "-x " << _window // X window ID to render into
<< " -j " << _width // Width of window
<< " -k " << _height; // Height of window
#if GNASH_PLUGIN_DEBUG > 1
pars << " -vv ";
#endif
if ((hostfd > 0) && (controlfd)) {
pars << " -F " << hostfd // Socket to send commands to
<< ":" << controlfd; // Socket determining lifespan
}
std::string pars_str = pars.str();
typedef boost::char_separator<char> char_sep;
boost::tokenizer<char_sep> tok(pars_str, char_sep(" "));
arg_vec.insert(arg_vec.end(), tok.begin(), tok.end());
for (std::map<std::string,std::string>::const_iterator it = _params.begin(),
itEnd = _params.end(); it != itEnd; ++it) {
const std::string& nam = it->first;
const std::string& val = it->second;
arg_vec.push_back("-P");
arg_vec.push_back(nam + "=" + val);
}
arg_vec.push_back("-");
create_standalone_launcher(pageurl, _swf_url, _params);
return arg_vec;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *can_gather_numa_stats_pmd(pmd_t pmd,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr)
{
struct page *page;
int nid;
if (!pmd_present(pmd))
return NULL;
page = vm_normal_page_pmd(vma, addr, pmd);
if (!page)
return NULL;
if (PageReserved(page))
return NULL;
nid = page_to_nid(page);
if (!node_isset(nid, node_states[N_MEMORY]))
return NULL;
return page;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks(struct inode *inode, int extents)
{
int index;
int depth;
/* If we are converting the inline data, only one is needed here. */
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
return 1;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
if (extents <= 1)
index = depth * 2;
else
index = depth * 3;
return index;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 26,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long realpath_cache_key(const char *path, int path_len) /* {{{ */
{
register unsigned long h;
const char *e = path + path_len;
for (h = 2166136261U; path < e;) {
h *= 16777619;
h ^= *path++;
}
return h;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SWFInput_getUInt16_BE(SWFInput input)
{
int num = SWFInput_getChar(input) << 8;
num += SWFInput_getChar(input);
return num;
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 18,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t PPB_URLLoader_Impl::Open(PP_Resource request_id,
scoped_refptr<TrackedCallback> callback) {
EnterResourceNoLock<PPB_URLRequestInfo_API> enter_request(request_id, true);
if (enter_request.failed()) {
Log(PP_LOGLEVEL_ERROR,
"PPB_URLLoader.Open: invalid request resource ID. (Hint to C++ wrapper"
" users: use the ResourceRequest constructor that takes an instance or"
" else the request will be null.)");
return PP_ERROR_BADARGUMENT;
}
return Open(enter_request.object()->GetData(), 0, callback);
}
Commit Message: Break path whereby AssociatedURLLoader::~AssociatedURLLoader() is re-entered on top of itself.
BUG=159429
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11359222
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168150 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrack::TraceWrappers(const ScriptWrappableVisitor* visitor) const {
visitor->TraceWrappers(cues_);
EventTargetWithInlineData::TraceWrappers(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t GPMF_SizeofType(GPMF_SampleType type)
{
uint32_t ssize = 0;
switch ((int)type)
{
case GPMF_TYPE_STRING_ASCII: ssize = 1; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_SIGNED_BYTE: ssize = 1; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_UNSIGNED_BYTE: ssize = 1; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_SIGNED_SHORT: ssize = 2; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_UNSIGNED_SHORT: ssize = 2; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_FLOAT: ssize = 4; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_FOURCC: ssize = 4; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_SIGNED_LONG: ssize = 4; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_UNSIGNED_LONG: ssize = 4; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_Q15_16_FIXED_POINT: ssize = 4; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_Q31_32_FIXED_POINT: ssize = 8; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_DOUBLE: ssize = 8; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_SIGNED_64BIT_INT: ssize = 8; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_UNSIGNED_64BIT_INT: ssize = 8; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_GUID: ssize = 16; break;
case GPMF_TYPE_UTC_DATE_TIME: ssize = 16; break;
}
return ssize;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 18,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_ratemask_rx(void *devt, u32 ratemask)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)devt;
ar->arRateMask = ratemask;
wake_up(&arEvent);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ACodec::ExecutingToIdleState::onInputBufferFilled(
const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
BaseState::onInputBufferFilled(msg);
changeStateIfWeOwnAllBuffers();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int padlock_sha_export_nano(struct shash_desc *desc,
void *out)
{
int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize(desc->tfm);
void *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, statesize);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool emulator_bad_iopl(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int iopl;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return false;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return true;
iopl = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) >> IOPL_SHIFT;
return ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > iopl;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codeEqualityTerm(
Parse *pParse, /* The parsing context */
WhereTerm *pTerm, /* The term of the WHERE clause to be coded */
WhereLevel *pLevel, /* The level of the FROM clause we are working on */
int iEq, /* Index of the equality term within this level */
int bRev, /* True for reverse-order IN operations */
int iTarget /* Attempt to leave results in this register */
){
Expr *pX = pTerm->pExpr;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
int iReg; /* Register holding results */
assert( pLevel->pWLoop->aLTerm[iEq]==pTerm );
assert( iTarget>0 );
if( pX->op==TK_EQ || pX->op==TK_IS ){
iReg = sqlite3ExprCodeTarget(pParse, pX->pRight, iTarget);
}else if( pX->op==TK_ISNULL ){
iReg = iTarget;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Null, 0, iReg);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SUBQUERY
}else{
int eType = IN_INDEX_NOOP;
int iTab;
struct InLoop *pIn;
WhereLoop *pLoop = pLevel->pWLoop;
int i;
int nEq = 0;
int *aiMap = 0;
if( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_VIRTUALTABLE)==0
&& pLoop->u.btree.pIndex!=0
&& pLoop->u.btree.pIndex->aSortOrder[iEq]
){
testcase( iEq==0 );
testcase( bRev );
bRev = !bRev;
}
assert( pX->op==TK_IN );
iReg = iTarget;
for(i=0; i<iEq; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i] && pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
disableTerm(pLevel, pTerm);
return iTarget;
}
}
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( ALWAYS(pLoop->aLTerm[i]) && pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ) nEq++;
}
if( (pX->flags & EP_xIsSelect)==0 || pX->x.pSelect->pEList->nExpr==1 ){
eType = sqlite3FindInIndex(pParse, pX, IN_INDEX_LOOP, 0, 0);
}else{
Select *pSelect = pX->x.pSelect;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
u16 savedDbOptFlags = db->dbOptFlags;
ExprList *pOrigRhs = pSelect->pEList;
ExprList *pOrigLhs = pX->pLeft->x.pList;
ExprList *pRhs = 0; /* New Select.pEList for RHS */
ExprList *pLhs = 0; /* New pX->pLeft vector */
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
int iField = pLoop->aLTerm[i]->iField - 1;
Expr *pNewRhs = sqlite3ExprDup(db, pOrigRhs->a[iField].pExpr, 0);
Expr *pNewLhs = sqlite3ExprDup(db, pOrigLhs->a[iField].pExpr, 0);
pRhs = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, pRhs, pNewRhs);
pLhs = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, pLhs, pNewLhs);
}
}
if( !db->mallocFailed ){
Expr *pLeft = pX->pLeft;
if( pSelect->pOrderBy ){
/* If the SELECT statement has an ORDER BY clause, zero the
** iOrderByCol variables. These are set to non-zero when an
** ORDER BY term exactly matches one of the terms of the
** result-set. Since the result-set of the SELECT statement may
** have been modified or reordered, these variables are no longer
** set correctly. Since setting them is just an optimization,
** it's easiest just to zero them here. */
ExprList *pOrderBy = pSelect->pOrderBy;
for(i=0; i<pOrderBy->nExpr; i++){
pOrderBy->a[i].u.x.iOrderByCol = 0;
}
}
/* Take care here not to generate a TK_VECTOR containing only a
** single value. Since the parser never creates such a vector, some
** of the subroutines do not handle this case. */
if( pLhs->nExpr==1 ){
pX->pLeft = pLhs->a[0].pExpr;
}else{
pLeft->x.pList = pLhs;
aiMap = (int*)sqlite3DbMallocZero(pParse->db, sizeof(int) * nEq);
testcase( aiMap==0 );
}
pSelect->pEList = pRhs;
db->dbOptFlags |= SQLITE_QueryFlattener;
eType = sqlite3FindInIndex(pParse, pX, IN_INDEX_LOOP, 0, aiMap);
db->dbOptFlags = savedDbOptFlags;
testcase( aiMap!=0 && aiMap[0]!=0 );
pSelect->pEList = pOrigRhs;
pLeft->x.pList = pOrigLhs;
pX->pLeft = pLeft;
}
sqlite3ExprListDelete(pParse->db, pLhs);
sqlite3ExprListDelete(pParse->db, pRhs);
}
if( eType==IN_INDEX_INDEX_DESC ){
testcase( bRev );
bRev = !bRev;
}
iTab = pX->iTable;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, bRev ? OP_Last : OP_Rewind, iTab, 0);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, !bRev);
assert( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_MULTI_OR)==0 );
pLoop->wsFlags |= WHERE_IN_ABLE;
if( pLevel->u.in.nIn==0 ){
pLevel->addrNxt = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(v);
}
i = pLevel->u.in.nIn;
pLevel->u.in.nIn += nEq;
pLevel->u.in.aInLoop =
sqlite3DbReallocOrFree(pParse->db, pLevel->u.in.aInLoop,
sizeof(pLevel->u.in.aInLoop[0])*pLevel->u.in.nIn);
pIn = pLevel->u.in.aInLoop;
if( pIn ){
int iMap = 0; /* Index in aiMap[] */
pIn += i;
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
int iOut = iReg + i - iEq;
if( eType==IN_INDEX_ROWID ){
testcase( nEq>1 ); /* Happens with a UNIQUE index on ROWID */
pIn->addrInTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Rowid, iTab, iOut);
}else{
int iCol = aiMap ? aiMap[iMap++] : 0;
pIn->addrInTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v,OP_Column,iTab, iCol, iOut);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IsNull, iOut); VdbeCoverage(v);
if( i==iEq ){
pIn->iCur = iTab;
pIn->eEndLoopOp = bRev ? OP_PrevIfOpen : OP_NextIfOpen;
}else{
pIn->eEndLoopOp = OP_Noop;
}
pIn++;
}
}
}else{
pLevel->u.in.nIn = 0;
}
sqlite3DbFree(pParse->db, aiMap);
#endif
}
disableTerm(pLevel, pTerm);
return iReg;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LocalFrame::~LocalFrame() {
DCHECK(!view_);
if (is_ad_subframe_)
InstanceCounters::DecrementCounter(InstanceCounters::kAdSubframeCounter);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 6,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ktypes2str(char *s, size_t len, int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
{
int i;
char stmp[D_LEN(krb5_enctype) + 1];
char *p;
if (nktypes < 0
|| len < (sizeof(" etypes {...}") + D_LEN(int))) {
*s = '\0';
return;
}
snprintf(s, len, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), "%s%ld", i ? " " : "", (long)ktype[i]);
if (strlen(s) + strlen(stmp) + sizeof("}") > len)
break;
strlcat(s, stmp, len);
}
if (i < nktypes) {
/*
* We broke out of the loop. Try to truncate the list.
*/
p = s + strlen(s);
while (p - s + sizeof("...}") > len) {
while (p > s && *p != ' ' && *p != '{')
*p-- = '\0';
if (p > s && *p == ' ') {
*p-- = '\0';
continue;
}
}
strlcat(s, "...", len);
}
strlcat(s, "}", len);
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cxusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
if (0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_medion_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_bluebird_lgh064f_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_bluebird_dee1601_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_bluebird_lgz201_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_bluebird_dtt7579_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_bluebird_dualdig4_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_bluebird_nano2_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf,
&cxusb_bluebird_nano2_needsfirmware_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_aver_a868r_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf,
&cxusb_bluebird_dualdig4_rev2_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_d680_dmb_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_mygica_d689_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0 == dvb_usb_device_init(intf, &cxusb_mygica_t230_properties,
THIS_MODULE, NULL, adapter_nr) ||
0)
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::InitLoginWindowAndView() {
if (login_window_)
return;
if (system::InputDeviceSettings::Get()->ForceKeyboardDrivenUINavigation()) {
views::FocusManager::set_arrow_key_traversal_enabled(true);
focus_ring_controller_ = std::make_unique<ash::FocusRingController>();
focus_ring_controller_->SetVisible(true);
keyboard_driven_oobe_key_handler_.reset(new KeyboardDrivenOobeKeyHandler);
}
views::Widget::InitParams params(
views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_WINDOW_FRAMELESS);
params.bounds = CalculateScreenBounds(gfx::Size());
if (!is_voice_interaction_oobe_)
params.show_state = ui::SHOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
ash::ShellWindowId container = is_voice_interaction_oobe_
? ash::kShellWindowId_AlwaysOnTopContainer
: ash::kShellWindowId_LockScreenContainer;
if (features::IsAshInBrowserProcess()) {
params.parent =
ash::Shell::GetContainer(ash::Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), container);
} else {
using ui::mojom::WindowManager;
params.mus_properties[WindowManager::kContainerId_InitProperty] =
mojo::ConvertTo<std::vector<uint8_t>>(static_cast<int32_t>(container));
}
login_window_ = new views::Widget;
params.delegate = login_window_delegate_ =
new LoginWidgetDelegate(login_window_, this);
login_window_->Init(params);
login_view_ = new WebUILoginView(WebUILoginView::WebViewSettings());
login_view_->Init();
if (login_view_->webui_visible())
OnLoginPromptVisible();
if (features::IsAshInBrowserProcess() && !is_voice_interaction_oobe_) {
login_window_->SetVisibilityAnimationDuration(
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoginFadeoutTransitionDurationMs));
login_window_->SetVisibilityAnimationTransition(
views::Widget::ANIMATE_HIDE);
}
login_window_->AddRemovalsObserver(this);
login_window_->SetContentsView(login_view_);
if (!initialize_webui_hidden_ || !waiting_for_wallpaper_load_) {
VLOG(1) << "Login WebUI >> show login wnd on create";
login_window_->Show();
} else {
VLOG(1) << "Login WebUI >> login wnd is hidden on create";
login_view_->set_is_hidden(true);
}
login_window_->GetNativeView()->SetName("WebUILoginView");
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cc_init(void)
{
int i;
if (is_cc_init)
return;
for (i = 0; i < CS_MAX; i++)
cc_tab[i].valid = false;
set_cc(CS_HSTEM, true, 2, true);
set_cc(CS_VSTEM, true, 2, true);
set_cc(CS_VMOVETO, true, 1, true);
set_cc(CS_RLINETO, true, 2, true);
set_cc(CS_HLINETO, true, 1, true);
set_cc(CS_VLINETO, true, 1, true);
set_cc(CS_RRCURVETO, true, 6, true);
set_cc(CS_CLOSEPATH, false, 0, true);
set_cc(CS_CALLSUBR, false, 1, false);
set_cc(CS_RETURN, false, 0, false);
set_cc(CS_HSBW, true, 2, true);
set_cc(CS_ENDCHAR, false, 0, true);
set_cc(CS_RMOVETO, true, 2, true);
set_cc(CS_HMOVETO, true, 1, true);
set_cc(CS_VHCURVETO, true, 4, true);
set_cc(CS_HVCURVETO, true, 4, true);
set_cc(CS_DOTSECTION, false, 0, true);
set_cc(CS_VSTEM3, true, 6, true);
set_cc(CS_HSTEM3, true, 6, true);
set_cc(CS_SEAC, true, 5, true);
set_cc(CS_SBW, true, 4, true);
set_cc(CS_DIV, false, 2, false);
set_cc(CS_CALLOTHERSUBR, false, 0, false);
set_cc(CS_POP, false, 0, false);
set_cc(CS_SETCURRENTPOINT, true, 2, true);
is_cc_init = true;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_full(struct kmem_cache_node *n, struct page *page)
{
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
list_add(&page->lru, &n->full);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 8,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CanonicalizeScheme(const char* spec,
const Component& scheme,
CanonOutput* output,
Component* out_scheme) {
return DoScheme<char, unsigned char>(spec, scheme, output, out_scheme);
}
Commit Message: Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 11,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnSessionDetached() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(launcher_.get() != NULL);
launcher_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs_revalidate_inode(struct nfs_server *server, struct inode *inode)
{
if (!(NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR)
&& !nfs_attribute_timeout(inode))
return NFS_STALE(inode) ? -ESTALE : 0;
return __nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KURL Document::openSearchDescriptionURL()
{
static const char openSearchMIMEType[] = "application/opensearchdescription+xml";
static const char openSearchRelation[] = "search";
if (!frame() || frame()->tree().parent())
return KURL();
if (!loadEventFinished())
return KURL();
if (!head())
return KURL();
for (HTMLLinkElement* linkElement = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::firstChild(*head()); linkElement; linkElement = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::nextSibling(*linkElement)) {
if (!equalIgnoringCase(linkElement->type(), openSearchMIMEType) || !equalIgnoringCase(linkElement->rel(), openSearchRelation))
continue;
if (linkElement->href().isEmpty())
continue;
return linkElement->href();
}
return KURL();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HeadlessWebContentsImpl::OpenURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false;
content::NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR);
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
web_contents_delegate_->ActivateContents(web_contents_.get());
web_contents_->Focus();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 2,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long ip)
{
unsigned short ud2;
if (__copy_from_user(&ud2, (const void __user *) ip, sizeof(ud2)))
return 0;
return ud2 == 0x0b0f;
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XineramaConfineCursorToWindow(DeviceIntPtr pDev,
WindowPtr pWin, Bool generateEvents)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
int x, y, off_x, off_y, i;
if (!XineramaSetWindowPntrs(pDev, pWin))
return;
i = PanoramiXNumScreens - 1;
RegionCopy(&pSprite->Reg1, &pSprite->windows[i]->borderSize);
off_x = screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
off_y = screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
while (i--) {
x = off_x - screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
y = off_y - screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
if (x || y)
RegionTranslate(&pSprite->Reg1, x, y);
RegionUnion(&pSprite->Reg1, &pSprite->Reg1,
&pSprite->windows[i]->borderSize);
off_x = screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
off_y = screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
}
pSprite->hotLimits = *RegionExtents(&pSprite->Reg1);
if (RegionNumRects(&pSprite->Reg1) > 1)
pSprite->hotShape = &pSprite->Reg1;
else
pSprite->hotShape = NullRegion;
pSprite->confined = FALSE;
pSprite->confineWin =
(pWin == screenInfo.screens[0]->root) ? NullWindow : pWin;
CheckPhysLimits(pDev, pSprite->current, generateEvents, FALSE, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ClassAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->GetClassAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: apprentice_buf(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *buf, size_t len)
{
struct magic_map *map;
if ((map = CAST(struct magic_map *, calloc(1, sizeof(*map)))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*map));
return NULL;
}
map->len = len;
map->p = buf;
map->type = MAP_TYPE_USER;
if (check_buffer(ms, map, "buffer") != 0) {
apprentice_unmap(map);
return NULL;
}
return map;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char **DestroyXMLTreeAttributes(char **attributes)
{
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Destroy a tag attribute list.
*/
if ((attributes == (char **) NULL) || (attributes == sentinel))
return((char **) NULL);
for (i=0; attributes[i] != (char *) NULL; i+=2)
{
/*
Destroy attribute tag and value.
*/
if (attributes[i] != (char *) NULL)
attributes[i]=DestroyString(attributes[i]);
if (attributes[i+1] != (char *) NULL)
attributes[i+1]=DestroyString(attributes[i+1]);
}
attributes=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(attributes);
return((char **) NULL);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 7,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::SetNeedsCompositingUpdate() {
Element::SetNeedsCompositingUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_individual_addr(void)
{
return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR_BIT;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: insert_nameinfo (DBusGProxyManager *manager,
const char *owner,
DBusGProxyNameOwnerInfo *info)
{
GSList *names;
gboolean insert;
names = g_hash_table_lookup (manager->owner_names, owner);
/* Only need to g_hash_table_insert the first time */
insert = (names == NULL);
names = g_slist_append (names, info);
if (insert)
g_hash_table_insert (manager->owner_names, g_strdup (owner), names);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ReleaseVP9FrameBuffer(void *user_priv,
vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
ExternalFrameBufferMD5Test *const md5Test =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBufferMD5Test*>(user_priv);
return md5Test->fb_list_.ReturnFrameBuffer(fb);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *FLTGetMapserverExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode, layerObj *lp)
{
char *pszExpression = NULL;
const char *pszAttribute = NULL;
char szTmp[256];
char **tokens = NULL;
int nTokens = 0, i=0,bString=0;
if (!psFilterNode)
return NULL;
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_COMPARISON) {
if ( psFilterNode->psLeftNode && psFilterNode->psRightNode) {
if (FLTIsBinaryComparisonFilterType(psFilterNode->pszValue)) {
pszExpression = FLTGetBinaryComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue,
"PropertyIsBetween") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetIsBetweenComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue,
"PropertyIsLike") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetIsLikeComparisonExpression(psFilterNode);
}
}
} else if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_LOGICAL) {
if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "AND") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "OR") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetLogicalComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "NOT") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetLogicalComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
}
} else if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_SPATIAL) {
/* TODO */
} else if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_FEATUREID) {
#if defined(USE_WMS_SVR) || defined (USE_WFS_SVR) || defined (USE_WCS_SVR) || defined(USE_SOS_SVR)
if (psFilterNode->pszValue) {
pszAttribute = msOWSLookupMetadata(&(lp->metadata), "OFG", "featureid");
if (pszAttribute) {
tokens = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->pszValue,',', &nTokens);
if (tokens && nTokens > 0) {
for (i=0; i<nTokens; i++) {
const char* pszId = tokens[i];
const char* pszDot = strchr(pszId, '.');
if( pszDot )
pszId = pszDot + 1;
if (i == 0) {
if(FLTIsNumeric(pszId) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
if (bString)
snprintf(szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), "('[%s]' = '%s')" , pszAttribute, pszId);
else
snprintf(szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), "([%s] = %s)" , pszAttribute, pszId);
if (pszExpression != NULL)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, " OR ");
else
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "(");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szTmp);
}
msFreeCharArray(tokens, nTokens);
}
}
/*opening and closing brackets are needed for mapserver expressions*/
if (pszExpression)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, ")");
}
#else
msSetError(MS_MISCERR, "OWS support is not available.",
"FLTGetMapserverExpression()");
return(MS_FAILURE);
#endif
}
return pszExpression;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::bufferData(GLenum target,
long long size,
GLenum usage) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::bufferData(target, size, usage);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::Buffer_Dev PDFiumEngine::PrintPagesAsPDF(
const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev* page_ranges,
uint32_t page_range_count,
const PP_PrintSettings_Dev& print_settings) {
if (!page_range_count)
return pp::Buffer_Dev();
DCHECK(doc_);
FPDF_DOCUMENT output_doc = FPDF_CreateNewDocument();
if (!output_doc)
return pp::Buffer_Dev();
KillFormFocus();
std::string page_number_str;
for (uint32_t index = 0; index < page_range_count; ++index) {
if (!page_number_str.empty())
page_number_str.append(",");
const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev& range = page_ranges[index];
page_number_str.append(base::UintToString(range.first_page_number + 1));
if (range.first_page_number != range.last_page_number) {
page_number_str.append("-");
page_number_str.append(base::UintToString(range.last_page_number + 1));
}
}
std::vector<uint32_t> page_numbers =
GetPageNumbersFromPrintPageNumberRange(page_ranges, page_range_count);
for (uint32_t page_number : page_numbers) {
pages_[page_number]->GetPage();
if (!IsPageVisible(page_number))
pages_[page_number]->Unload();
}
FPDF_CopyViewerPreferences(output_doc, doc_);
if (!FPDF_ImportPages(output_doc, doc_, page_number_str.c_str(), 0)) {
FPDF_CloseDocument(output_doc);
return pp::Buffer_Dev();
}
FitContentsToPrintableAreaIfRequired(output_doc, print_settings);
pp::Buffer_Dev buffer = GetFlattenedPrintData(output_doc);
FPDF_CloseDocument(output_doc);
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
int cr = exit_qualification & 15;
int reg;
unsigned long val;
switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
case 0: /* mov to cr */
reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
val = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg);
switch (cr) {
case 0:
if (vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask &
(val ^ vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow))
return true;
break;
case 3:
if ((vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 1 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value0 == val) ||
(vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 2 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value1 == val) ||
(vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 3 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value2 == val) ||
(vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 4 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value3 == val))
return false;
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))
return true;
break;
case 4:
if (vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask &
(vmcs12->cr4_read_shadow ^ val))
return true;
break;
case 8:
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING))
return true;
break;
}
break;
case 2: /* clts */
if ((vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & X86_CR0_TS) &&
(vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow & X86_CR0_TS))
return true;
break;
case 1: /* mov from cr */
switch (cr) {
case 3:
if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING)
return true;
break;
case 8:
if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING)
return true;
break;
}
break;
case 3: /* lmsw */
/*
* lmsw can change bits 1..3 of cr0, and only set bit 0 of
* cr0. Other attempted changes are ignored, with no exit.
*/
val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
if (vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & 0xe &
(val ^ vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow))
return true;
if ((vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & 0x1) &&
!(vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow & 0x1) &&
(val & 0x1))
return true;
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceError DocumentLoader::interruptedForPolicyChangeError() const
{
return frameLoader()->client()->interruptedForPolicyChangeError(request());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: s16 rssi_compensation_reverse_calc(struct ar6_softc *ar, s16 rssi, bool Above)
{
s16 i;
if (ar->arBssChannel > 5000)
{
if (rssi_compensation_param.enable)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, (">>> 11a\n"));
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("rssi before rev compensation = %d\n", rssi));
rssi = rssi * 100;
rssi = (rssi - rssi_compensation_param.a_param_b) / rssi_compensation_param.a_param_a;
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("rssi after rev compensation = %d\n", rssi));
}
}
else
{
if (rssi_compensation_param.enable)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, (">>> 11bg\n"));
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("rssi before rev compensation = %d\n", rssi));
if (Above) {
for (i=95; i>=0; i--) {
if (rssi <= rssi_compensation_table[i]) {
rssi = 0 - i;
break;
}
}
} else {
for (i=0; i<=95; i++) {
if (rssi >= rssi_compensation_table[i]) {
rssi = 0 - i;
break;
}
}
}
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("rssi after rev compensation = %d\n", rssi));
}
}
return rssi;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AwMainDelegate::~AwMainDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int ownerstr_hashval(struct xdr_netobj *ownername)
{
unsigned int ret;
ret = opaque_hashval(ownername->data, ownername->len);
return ret & OWNER_HASH_MASK;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 1,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static INLINE BOOL zgfx_GetBits(ZGFX_CONTEXT* _zgfx, UINT32 _nbits)
{
if (!_zgfx)
return FALSE;
while (_zgfx->cBitsCurrent < _nbits)
{
_zgfx->BitsCurrent <<= 8;
if (_zgfx->pbInputCurrent < _zgfx->pbInputEnd)
_zgfx->BitsCurrent += *(_zgfx->pbInputCurrent)++;
_zgfx->cBitsCurrent += 8;
}
_zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= _nbits;
_zgfx->cBitsCurrent -= _nbits;
_zgfx->bits = _zgfx->BitsCurrent >> _zgfx->cBitsCurrent;
_zgfx->BitsCurrent &= ((1 << _zgfx->cBitsCurrent) - 1);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8784
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 20,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionNavigationThrottle::WillStartOrRedirectRequest() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
content::WebContents* web_contents = navigation_handle()->GetWebContents();
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
const GURL& url = navigation_handle()->GetURL();
bool url_has_extension_scheme = url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme);
url::Origin target_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
const Extension* target_extension = nullptr;
if (url_has_extension_scheme) {
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
} else if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme) {
DCHECK(url.SchemeIsFileSystem() || url.SchemeIsBlob());
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(target_origin.host());
} else {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
if (!target_extension) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
if (target_extension->is_hosted_app()) {
base::StringPiece resource_root_relative_path =
url.path_piece().empty() ? base::StringPiece()
: url.path_piece().substr(1);
if (!IconsInfo::GetIcons(target_extension)
.ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
}
if (navigation_handle()->IsInMainFrame()) {
bool current_frame_is_extension_process =
!!registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (!url_has_extension_scheme && !current_frame_is_extension_process) {
if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme &&
navigation_handle()->GetSuggestedFilename().has_value()) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
bool has_webview_permission =
target_extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
APIPermission::kWebView);
if (!has_webview_permission)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
}
guest_view::GuestViewBase* guest =
guest_view::GuestViewBase::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (url_has_extension_scheme && guest) {
const std::string& owner_extension_id = guest->owner_host();
const Extension* owner_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(owner_extension_id);
std::string partition_domain;
std::string partition_id;
bool in_memory = false;
bool is_guest = WebViewGuest::GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL(),
&partition_domain, &partition_id, &in_memory);
bool allowed = true;
url_request_util::AllowCrossRendererResourceLoadHelper(
is_guest, target_extension, owner_extension, partition_id, url.path(),
navigation_handle()->GetPageTransition(), &allowed);
if (!allowed)
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
content::RenderFrameHost* parent = navigation_handle()->GetParentFrame();
bool external_ancestor = false;
for (auto* ancestor = parent; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->GetParent()) {
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedOrigin() == target_origin)
continue;
if (url::Origin::Create(ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL()) == target_origin)
continue;
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL().SchemeIs(
content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
continue;
external_ancestor = true;
break;
}
if (external_ancestor) {
if (!url_has_extension_scheme)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
if (!WebAccessibleResourcesInfo::IsResourceWebAccessible(target_extension,
url.path()))
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
if (target_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
const Extension* parent_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
parent->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (parent_extension && parent_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 2,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::paintOverhangAreas(GraphicsContext* context, const IntRect& horizontalOverhangArea, const IntRect& verticalOverhangArea, const IntRect& dirtyRect)
{
if (m_frame->document()->printing())
return;
if (m_frame->isMainFrame()) {
if (m_frame->page()->chrome().client().paintCustomOverhangArea(context, horizontalOverhangArea, verticalOverhangArea, dirtyRect))
return;
}
ScrollView::paintOverhangAreas(context, horizontalOverhangArea, verticalOverhangArea, dirtyRect);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
return;
}
}
}
}
RefPtr<Image> image = VideoFrameToImage(video);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.Get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: write_to_evbuffer_zlib(struct evbuffer *buf, tor_zlib_state_t *state,
const char *data, size_t data_len,
int done)
{
char *next;
size_t old_avail, avail;
int over = 0, n;
struct evbuffer_iovec vec[1];
do {
{
size_t cap = data_len / 4;
if (cap < 128)
cap = 128;
/* XXXX NM this strategy is fragmentation-prone. We should really have
* two iovecs, and write first into the one, and then into the
* second if the first gets full. */
n = evbuffer_reserve_space(buf, cap, vec, 1);
tor_assert(n == 1);
}
next = vec[0].iov_base;
avail = old_avail = vec[0].iov_len;
switch (tor_zlib_process(state, &next, &avail, &data, &data_len, done)) {
case TOR_ZLIB_DONE:
over = 1;
break;
case TOR_ZLIB_ERR:
return -1;
case TOR_ZLIB_OK:
if (data_len == 0)
over = 1;
break;
case TOR_ZLIB_BUF_FULL:
if (avail) {
/* Zlib says we need more room (ZLIB_BUF_FULL). Start a new chunk
* automatically, whether were going to or not. */
}
break;
}
/* XXXX possible infinite loop on BUF_FULL. */
vec[0].iov_len = old_avail - avail;
evbuffer_commit_space(buf, vec, 1);
} while (!over);
check();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLAnchorElement::draggable() const
{
const AtomicString& value = getAttribute(draggableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "false"))
return false;
return hasAttribute(hrefAttr);
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 13,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: combineSeparateSamplesBytes (unsigned char *srcbuffs[], unsigned char *out,
uint32 cols, uint32 rows, uint16 spp, uint16 bps,
FILE *dumpfile, int format, int level)
{
int i, bytes_per_sample;
uint32 row, col, col_offset, src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, row_offset;
unsigned char *src;
unsigned char *dst;
tsample_t s;
src = srcbuffs[0];
dst = out;
if ((src == NULL) || (dst == NULL))
{
TIFFError("combineSeparateSamplesBytes","Invalid buffer address");
return (1);
}
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
src_rowsize = ((bps * cols) + 7) / 8;
dst_rowsize = ((bps * spp * cols) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < rows; row++)
{
if ((dumpfile != NULL) && (level == 2))
{
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++)
{
dump_info (dumpfile, format, "combineSeparateSamplesBytes","Input data, Sample %d", s);
dump_buffer(dumpfile, format, 1, cols, row, srcbuffs[s] + (row * src_rowsize));
}
}
dst = out + (row * dst_rowsize);
row_offset = row * src_rowsize;
for (col = 0; col < cols; col++)
{
col_offset = row_offset + (col * (bps / 8));
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
src = srcbuffs[s] + col_offset;
for (i = 0; i < bytes_per_sample; i++)
*(dst + i) = *(src + i);
src += bytes_per_sample;
dst += bytes_per_sample;
}
}
if ((dumpfile != NULL) && (level == 2))
{
dump_info (dumpfile, format, "combineSeparateSamplesBytes","Output data, combined samples");
dump_buffer(dumpfile, format, 1, dst_rowsize, row, out + (row * dst_rowsize));
}
}
return (0);
} /* end combineSeparateSamplesBytes */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 20,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::BeginningTransaction(const wchar_t* url,
const wchar_t* current_headers, DWORD reserved,
wchar_t** additional_headers) {
DCHECK_EQ(thread_, base::PlatformThread::CurrentId());
if (!additional_headers) {
NOTREACHED();
return E_POINTER;
}
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "headers: \n" << current_headers;
if (status_.get_state() == Status::ABORTING) {
DLOG(WARNING) << __FUNCTION__ << me()
<< ": Aborting connection to URL:"
<< url
<< " as the binding has been aborted";
return E_ABORT;
}
HRESULT hr = S_OK;
std::string new_headers;
if (post_data_len() > 0) {
if (is_chunked_upload()) {
new_headers = base::StringPrintf("Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n");
}
}
if (!extra_headers().empty()) {
new_headers += extra_headers();
}
if (!referrer().empty()) {
new_headers += base::StringPrintf("Referer: %s\r\n", referrer().c_str());
}
std::string user_agent = http_utils::AddChromeFrameToUserAgentValue(
http_utils::GetChromeUserAgent());
new_headers += ReplaceOrAddUserAgent(current_headers, user_agent);
if (!new_headers.empty()) {
*additional_headers = reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(
CoTaskMemAlloc((new_headers.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
if (*additional_headers == NULL) {
NOTREACHED();
hr = E_OUTOFMEMORY;
} else {
lstrcpynW(*additional_headers, ASCIIToWide(new_headers).c_str(),
new_headers.size());
}
}
request_headers_ = new_headers;
return hr;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TT_Goto_CodeRange( TT_ExecContext exec,
FT_Int range,
FT_Long IP )
{
TT_CodeRange* coderange;
FT_ASSERT( range >= 1 && range <= 3 );
coderange = &exec->codeRangeTable[range - 1];
FT_ASSERT( coderange->base != NULL );
/* NOTE: Because the last instruction of a program may be a CALL */
/* which will return to the first byte *after* the code */
/* range, we test for IP <= Size instead of IP < Size. */
/* */
FT_ASSERT( (FT_ULong)IP <= coderange->size );
exec->code = coderange->base;
exec->codeSize = coderange->size;
exec->IP = IP;
exec->curRange = range;
return TT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Location::setHostname(LocalDOMWindow* current_window,
LocalDOMWindow* entered_window,
const String& hostname,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
KURL url = GetDocument()->Url();
url.SetHost(hostname);
SetLocation(url.GetString(), current_window, entered_window,
&exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_params __user *_params)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_params params;
struct snd_timer *t;
struct snd_timer_read *tr;
struct snd_timer_tread *ttr;
int err;
tu = file->private_data;
if (!tu->timeri)
return -EBADFD;
t = tu->timeri->timer;
if (!t)
return -EBADFD;
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, _params, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!(t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE) && params.ticks < 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(params.queue_size < 32 || params.queue_size > 1024)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.filter & ~((1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_STOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_SUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESUME)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MCONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MPAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
snd_timer_stop(tu->timeri);
spin_lock_irq(&t->lock);
tu->timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT);
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_AUTO)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EXCLUSIVE)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EARLY_EVENT)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&t->lock);
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(unsigned int)tu->queue_size != params.queue_size) {
if (tu->tread) {
ttr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*ttr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ttr) {
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->tqueue = ttr;
}
} else {
tr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*tr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tr) {
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->queue = tr;
}
}
}
tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
if (tu->tread) {
struct snd_timer_tread tread;
tread.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_EARLY;
tread.tstamp.tv_sec = 0;
tread.tstamp.tv_nsec = 0;
tread.val = 0;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &tread);
} else {
struct snd_timer_read *r = &tu->queue[0];
r->resolution = 0;
r->ticks = 0;
tu->qused++;
tu->qtail++;
}
}
tu->filter = params.filter;
tu->ticks = params.ticks;
err = 0;
_end:
if (copy_to_user(_params, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS
The stack object “tread” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 16,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::string& CSPInfo::GetResourceContentSecurityPolicy(
const Extension* extension,
const std::string& relative_path) {
return SandboxedPageInfo::IsSandboxedPage(extension, relative_path) ?
SandboxedPageInfo::GetContentSecurityPolicy(extension) :
GetContentSecurityPolicy(extension);
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_dch_dl_synchronisation(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
{
/* CFN control */
guint cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn_control, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " CFN = %u", cfn);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,534
|
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