instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct perf_event *event = vma->vm_file->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *rb = ring_buffer_get(event);
struct user_struct *mmap_user = rb->mmap_user;
int mmap_locked = rb->mmap_locked;
unsigned long size = perf_data_size(rb);
atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
if (!atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&event->mmap_count, &event->mmap_mutex))
goto out_put;
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/* If there's still other mmap()s of this buffer, we're done. */
if (atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count))
goto out_put;
/*
* No other mmap()s, detach from all other events that might redirect
* into the now unreachable buffer. Somewhat complicated by the
* fact that rb::event_lock otherwise nests inside mmap_mutex.
*/
again:
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &rb->event_list, rb_entry) {
if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)) {
/*
* This event is en-route to free_event() which will
* detach it and remove it from the list.
*/
continue;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/*
* Check we didn't race with perf_event_set_output() which can
* swizzle the rb from under us while we were waiting to
* acquire mmap_mutex.
*
* If we find a different rb; ignore this event, a next
* iteration will no longer find it on the list. We have to
* still restart the iteration to make sure we're not now
* iterating the wrong list.
*/
if (event->rb == rb)
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
put_event(event);
/*
* Restart the iteration; either we're on the wrong list or
* destroyed its integrity by doing a deletion.
*/
goto again;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* It could be there's still a few 0-ref events on the list; they'll
* get cleaned up by free_event() -- they'll also still have their
* ref on the rb and will free it whenever they are done with it.
*
* Aside from that, this buffer is 'fully' detached and unmapped,
* undo the VM accounting.
*/
atomic_long_sub((size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1, &mmap_user->locked_vm);
vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm -= mmap_locked;
free_uid(mmap_user);
out_put:
ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetupInputRouter() {
in_flight_event_count_ = 0;
StopInputEventAckTimeout();
associated_widget_input_handler_ = nullptr;
widget_input_handler_ = nullptr;
input_router_.reset(new InputRouterImpl(this, this, fling_scheduler_.get(),
GetInputRouterConfigForPlatform()));
input_router_->SetForceEnableZoom(force_enable_zoom_);
if (IsUseZoomForDSFEnabled()) {
input_router_->SetDeviceScaleFactor(GetScaleFactorForView(view_.get()));
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_str_add_or_update(HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len, zval *pData, uint32_t flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
zend_string *key = zend_string_init(str, len, ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
zval *ret = _zend_hash_add_or_update_i(ht, key, pData, flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
zend_string_release(key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 6,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void collectTargetNodes(Node* node, NodeVector& nodes)
{
if (node->nodeType() != Node::DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE) {
nodes.append(node);
return;
}
getChildNodes(node, nodes);
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSSPropertyValue::CSSPropertyValue(CSSPropertyID id, const StylePropertySet& propertySet)
: property(id), value(propertySet.getPropertyCSSValue(id).get())
{ }
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) {
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on){
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1; pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1; pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < opj_uint_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) && ((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))){
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) && ((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))){
continue;
}
if ((res->pw==0)||(res->ph==0)) continue;
if ((trx0==trx1)||(try0==try1)) continue;
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smp_proc_id_addr(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PID_KEYS pid_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(pid_key.addr_type, p);
STREAM_TO_BDADDR(pid_key.static_addr, p);
memcpy(pid_key.irk, p_cb->tk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
/* to use as BD_ADDR for lk derived from ltk */
p_cb->id_addr_rcvd = true;
p_cb->id_addr_type = pid_key.addr_type;
p_cb->id_addr = pid_key.static_addr;
/* store the ID key from peer device */
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PID,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&pid_key, true);
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API bool r_config_save_char(RConfigHold *h, ...) {
va_list ap;
char *key;
if (!h->list_char) {
h->list_char = r_list_newf ((RListFree) free);
if (!h->list_char) {
return false;
}
}
va_start (ap, h);
while ((key = va_arg (ap, char *))) {
RConfigHoldChar *hc = R_NEW0 (RConfigHoldChar);
if (!hc) {
continue;
}
hc->key = key;
hc->value = r_config_get (h->cfg, key);
r_list_append (h->list_char, hc);
}
va_end (ap);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ucma_unlock_files(struct ucma_file *file1, struct ucma_file *file2)
{
if (file1 < file2) {
mutex_unlock(&file2->mut);
mutex_unlock(&file1->mut);
} else {
mutex_unlock(&file1->mut);
mutex_unlock(&file2->mut);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
/*
* RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension
* from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption
* with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an
* encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client."
*/
if( ( suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) == NULL ||
( cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( suite->cipher ) ) == NULL ||
cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int devicepdomain(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
int code;
ref tref;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &tref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
ptr[0] = 0;
ptr[1] = (float)(1 << tref.value.intval);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 14,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init tcp_init_mem(void)
{
unsigned long limit = nr_free_buffer_pages() / 16;
limit = max(limit, 128UL);
sysctl_tcp_mem[0] = limit / 4 * 3; /* 4.68 % */
sysctl_tcp_mem[1] = limit; /* 6.25 % */
sysctl_tcp_mem[2] = sysctl_tcp_mem[0] * 2; /* 9.37 % */
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 20,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(strtr)
{
zval *from;
zend_string *str;
char *to = NULL;
size_t to_len = 0;
int ac = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
#ifndef FAST_ZPP
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "Sz|s", &str, &from, &to, &to_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#else
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_START(2, 3)
Z_PARAM_STR(str)
Z_PARAM_ZVAL(from)
Z_PARAM_OPTIONAL
Z_PARAM_STRING(to, to_len)
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_END();
#endif
if (ac == 2 && Z_TYPE_P(from) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The second argument is not an array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* shortcut for empty string */
if (ZSTR_LEN(str) == 0) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (ac == 2) {
HashTable *pats = HASH_OF(from);
if (zend_hash_num_elements(pats) < 1) {
RETURN_STR_COPY(str);
} else if (zend_hash_num_elements(pats) == 1) {
zend_long num_key;
zend_string *str_key, *replace;
zval *entry, tmp;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_KEY_VAL(pats, num_key, str_key, entry) {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&tmp);
if (UNEXPECTED(!str_key)) {
ZVAL_LONG(&tmp, num_key);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
str_key = Z_STR(tmp);
}
replace = zval_get_string(entry);
if (ZSTR_LEN(str_key) < 1) {
RETVAL_STR_COPY(str);
} else if (ZSTR_LEN(str_key) == 1) {
RETVAL_STR(php_char_to_str_ex(str,
ZSTR_VAL(str_key)[0],
ZSTR_VAL(replace),
ZSTR_LEN(replace),
1,
NULL));
} else {
zend_long dummy;
RETVAL_STR(php_str_to_str_ex(str,
ZSTR_VAL(str_key), ZSTR_LEN(str_key),
ZSTR_VAL(replace), ZSTR_LEN(replace), &dummy));
}
zend_string_release(replace);
zval_dtor(&tmp);
return;
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
} else {
php_strtr_array(return_value, str, pats);
}
} else {
convert_to_string_ex(from);
RETURN_STR(php_strtr_ex(str,
Z_STRVAL_P(from),
to,
MIN(Z_STRLEN_P(from), to_len)));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 12,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString ustr_host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(ustr_host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) ==
ustr_host.length())
transliterator_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString ustr_skeleton;
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, ustr_host, ustr_skeleton,
&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status))
return false;
std::string skeleton;
ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton);
return LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton);
}
Commit Message: Disallow Arabic/Hebrew NSMs to come after an unrelated base char.
Arabic NSM(non-spacing mark)s and Hebrew NSMs are allowed to mix with
Latin with the current 'moderately restrictive script mixing policy'.
They're not blocked by BiDi check either because both LTR and RTL labels
can have an NSM.
Block them from coming after an unrelated script (e.g. Latin + Arabic
NSM).
Bug: chromium:729979
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: I5b93fbcf76d17121bf1baaa480ef3624424b3317
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/528348
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478205}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long page_address_in_vma(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long address;
if (PageAnon(page)) {
struct anon_vma *page__anon_vma = page_anon_vma(page);
/*
* Note: swapoff's unuse_vma() is more efficient with this
* check, and needs it to match anon_vma when KSM is active.
*/
if (!vma->anon_vma || !page__anon_vma ||
vma->anon_vma->root != page__anon_vma->root)
return -EFAULT;
} else if (page->mapping && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_NONLINEAR)) {
if (!vma->vm_file ||
vma->vm_file->f_mapping != page->mapping)
return -EFAULT;
} else
return -EFAULT;
address = __vma_address(page, vma);
if (unlikely(address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end))
return -EFAULT;
return address;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::StartPluginIme() {
IPC::Message* msg = new ViewHostMsg_StartPluginIme(routing_id());
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CrosMock::SetSpeechSynthesisLibraryExpectations() {
InSequence s;
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(false))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimulateBufferReceived(int buffer_id, const gfx::Size& size) {
media::mojom::VideoFrameInfoPtr info = media::mojom::VideoFrameInfo::New();
const base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
media::VideoFrameMetadata frame_metadata;
frame_metadata.SetTimeTicks(media::VideoFrameMetadata::REFERENCE_TIME, now);
info->metadata = frame_metadata.CopyInternalValues();
info->timestamp = now - base::TimeTicks();
info->pixel_format = media::PIXEL_FORMAT_I420;
info->storage_type = media::VideoPixelStorage::CPU;
info->coded_size = size;
info->visible_rect = gfx::Rect(size);
video_capture_impl_->OnBufferReady(buffer_id, std::move(info));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 22,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int redisIsSupervised(int mode) {
if (mode == SUPERVISED_AUTODETECT) {
const char *upstart_job = getenv("UPSTART_JOB");
const char *notify_socket = getenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET");
if (upstart_job) {
redisSupervisedUpstart();
} else if (notify_socket) {
redisSupervisedSystemd();
}
} else if (mode == SUPERVISED_UPSTART) {
return redisSupervisedUpstart();
} else if (mode == SUPERVISED_SYSTEMD) {
return redisSupervisedSystemd();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 14,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long ocfs2_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ocfs2_space_resv sr;
int change_size = 1;
int cmd = OCFS2_IOC_RESVSP64;
if (mode & ~(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!ocfs2_writes_unwritten_extents(osb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
change_size = 0;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
cmd = OCFS2_IOC_UNRESVSP64;
sr.l_whence = 0;
sr.l_start = (s64)offset;
sr.l_len = (s64)len;
return __ocfs2_change_file_space(NULL, inode, offset, cmd, &sr,
change_size);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void overloadedPerWorldMethod1MethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedPerWorldMethod", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->overloadedPerWorldMethod(longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 24,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServerStartedOnUI(base::WeakPtr<DevToolsHttpHandler> handler,
base::Thread* thread,
ServerWrapper* server_wrapper,
DevToolsSocketFactory* socket_factory,
std::unique_ptr<net::IPEndPoint> ip_address) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (handler && thread && server_wrapper) {
handler->ServerStarted(
std::unique_ptr<base::Thread>(thread),
std::unique_ptr<ServerWrapper>(server_wrapper),
std::unique_ptr<DevToolsSocketFactory>(socket_factory),
std::move(ip_address));
} else {
TerminateOnUI(std::unique_ptr<base::Thread>(thread),
std::unique_ptr<ServerWrapper>(server_wrapper),
std::unique_ptr<DevToolsSocketFactory>(socket_factory));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long ioctl_file_clone(struct file *dst_file, unsigned long srcfd,
u64 off, u64 olen, u64 destoff)
{
struct fd src_file = fdget(srcfd);
int ret;
if (!src_file.file)
return -EBADF;
ret = vfs_clone_file_range(src_file.file, off, dst_file, destoff, olen);
fdput(src_file);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decode_ascii_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, __u16 bleft,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int len;
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d\n", bleft);
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
if (len >= bleft)
return;
kfree(ses->serverOS);
ses->serverOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ses->serverOS) {
strncpy(ses->serverOS, bcc_ptr, len);
if (strncmp(ses->serverOS, "OS/2", 4) == 0)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "OS/2 server\n");
}
bcc_ptr += len + 1;
bleft -= len + 1;
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
if (len >= bleft)
return;
kfree(ses->serverNOS);
ses->serverNOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ses->serverNOS)
strncpy(ses->serverNOS, bcc_ptr, len);
bcc_ptr += len + 1;
bleft -= len + 1;
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
if (len > bleft)
return;
/* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is
returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */
/* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode,
but thus do return domain here we could add parsing
for it later, but it is not very important */
cifs_dbg(FYI, "ascii: bytes left %d\n", bleft);
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 27,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::PerformanceWarning(
const char* filename, int line, const std::string& msg) {
logger_.LogMessage(filename, line,
std::string("PERFORMANCE WARNING: ") + msg);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t setDefaultMaxBufferCount(int bufferCount) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(bufferCount);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetIgnoreCount(const GURL& url, ContentSettingsType permission) {
return autoblocker_->GetIgnoreCount(url, permission);
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackgroundBleedAvoidance RenderBox::determineBackgroundBleedAvoidance(GraphicsContext* context) const
{
if (context->paintingDisabled())
return BackgroundBleedNone;
const RenderStyle* style = this->style();
if (!style->hasBackground() || !style->hasBorder() || !style->hasBorderRadius() || borderImageIsLoadedAndCanBeRendered())
return BackgroundBleedNone;
AffineTransform ctm = context->getCTM();
FloatSize contextScaling(static_cast<float>(ctm.xScale()), static_cast<float>(ctm.yScale()));
if (contextScaling.width() > 1)
contextScaling.setWidth(1);
if (contextScaling.height() > 1)
contextScaling.setHeight(1);
if (borderObscuresBackgroundEdge(contextScaling))
return BackgroundBleedShrinkBackground;
if (!style->hasAppearance() && borderObscuresBackground() && backgroundHasOpaqueTopLayer())
return BackgroundBleedBackgroundOverBorder;
return BackgroundBleedClipBackground;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int logi_djdevice_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
int ret;
struct dj_device *dj_dev = hdev->driver_data;
if (!is_dj_device(dj_dev))
return -ENODEV;
ret = hid_parse(hdev);
if (!ret)
ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::DeleteObject(WebGLObject* object) {
if (isContextLost() || !object)
return false;
if (!object->Validate(ContextGroup(), this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "delete",
"object does not belong to this context");
return false;
}
if (object->MarkedForDeletion()) {
return false;
}
if (object->HasObject()) {
object->DeleteObject(ContextGL());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_send_NPEmbedPrint(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPEmbedPrint *embedPrint = (NPEmbedPrint *)p_value;
int error;
if ((error = do_send_NPWindowData(message, &embedPrint->window)) < 0)
return error;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void FixLogical(unsigned char *Buff,int ldblk)
{
unsigned char mask=128;
unsigned char *BuffL = Buff;
unsigned char val = 0;
while(ldblk-->0)
{
if(*Buff++ != 0)
val |= mask;
mask >>= 1;
if(mask==0)
{
*BuffL++ = val;
val = 0;
mask = 128;
}
}
*BuffL = val;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/598
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 24,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SiteInstanceImpl::HasSite() const {
return has_site_;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 9,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dns_packet_rewind(DnsPacket *p, size_t idx) {
assert(p);
assert(idx <= p->size);
assert(idx >= DNS_PACKET_HEADER_SIZE);
p->rindex = idx;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int _zend_ts_hash_quick_add_or_update(TsHashTable *ht, char *arKey, uint nKeyLength, ulong h, void *pData, uint nDataSize, void **pDest, int flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
int retval;
begin_write(ht);
retval = _zend_hash_quick_add_or_update(TS_HASH(ht), arKey, nKeyLength, h, pData, nDataSize, pDest, flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
end_write(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
const BN_ULONG b)
{
register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61;
register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8;
a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
a2 = a1 << 1;
a4 = a2 << 1;
a8 = a4 << 1;
tab[0] = 0;
tab[1] = a1;
tab[2] = a2;
tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
tab[4] = a4;
tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
tab[8] = a8;
tab[9] = a1 ^ a8;
tab[10] = a2 ^ a8;
tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8;
tab[12] = a4 ^ a8;
tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8;
tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
s = tab[b & 0xF];
l = s;
s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 4;
h = s >> 60;
s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 8;
h ^= s >> 56;
s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 12;
h ^= s >> 52;
s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 16;
h ^= s >> 48;
s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 20;
h ^= s >> 44;
s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 24;
h ^= s >> 40;
s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 28;
h ^= s >> 36;
s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 32;
h ^= s >> 32;
s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 36;
h ^= s >> 28;
s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 40;
h ^= s >> 24;
s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 44;
h ^= s >> 20;
s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 48;
h ^= s >> 16;
s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 52;
h ^= s >> 12;
s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 56;
h ^= s >> 8;
s = tab[b >> 60];
l ^= s << 60;
h ^= s >> 4;
/* compensate for the top three bits of a */
if (top3b & 01) {
l ^= b << 61;
h ^= b >> 3;
}
if (top3b & 02) {
l ^= b << 62;
h ^= b >> 2;
}
if (top3b & 04) {
l ^= b << 63;
h ^= b >> 1;
}
*r1 = h;
*r0 = l;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: signconsistent(QUERYTYPE *query, BITVEC sign, bool calcnot)
{
return execute(GETQUERY(query) + query->size - 1,
(void *) sign, calcnot,
checkcondition_bit);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 13,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 perf_event_time(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
return perf_cgroup_event_time(event);
return ctx ? ctx->time : 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 1
| 6,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameSelection::FrameSelection(LocalFrame& frame)
: frame_(frame),
layout_selection_(LayoutSelection::Create(*this)),
selection_editor_(SelectionEditor::Create(frame)),
granularity_(TextGranularity::kCharacter),
x_pos_for_vertical_arrow_navigation_(NoXPosForVerticalArrowNavigation()),
focused_(frame.GetPage() &&
frame.GetPage()->GetFocusController().FocusedFrame() == frame),
frame_caret_(new FrameCaret(frame, *selection_editor_)) {}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::GetJobEnv( ClassAd *jobad, Env *job_env, MyString *env_errors )
{
char *env_str = param( "STARTER_JOB_ENVIRONMENT" );
ASSERT( jobad );
ASSERT( job_env );
if( !job_env->MergeFromV1RawOrV2Quoted(env_str,env_errors) ) {
if( env_errors ) {
env_errors->sprintf_cat(
" The full value for STARTER_JOB_ENVIRONMENT: %s\n",env_str);
}
free(env_str);
return false;
}
free(env_str);
if(!job_env->MergeFrom(jobad,env_errors)) {
if( env_errors ) {
env_errors->sprintf_cat(
" (This error was from the environment string in the job "
"ClassAd.)");
}
return false;
}
PublishToEnv( job_env );
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 13,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
int chunk_size;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length) {
while (!sg.resid) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
assert(data_length > 0);
chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 18,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextState::RestoreSamplerBinding(GLuint unit,
const ContextState* prev_state) const {
if (!feature_info_->IsES3Capable())
return;
const scoped_refptr<Sampler>& cur_sampler = sampler_units[unit];
GLuint cur_id = cur_sampler ? cur_sampler->service_id() : 0;
GLuint prev_id = 0;
if (prev_state) {
const scoped_refptr<Sampler>& prev_sampler =
prev_state->sampler_units[unit];
prev_id = prev_sampler ? prev_sampler->service_id() : 0;
}
if (!prev_state || cur_id != prev_id) {
api()->glBindSamplerFn(unit, cur_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashPattern *Splash::getFillPattern() {
return state->fillPattern;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cached_NPN_IdentifierIsString(NPIdentifier ident)
{
#if USE_NPIDENTIFIER_CACHE
if (use_npidentifier_cache()) {
NPIdentifierInfo *npi = npidentifier_cache_lookup(ident);
if (npi)
return npi->string_len > 0;
}
#endif
/* cache update is postponed to actual NPN_UTF8FromIdentifier() or
NPN_IntFromIdentifier() */
return invoke_NPN_IdentifierIsString(ident);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_for_getaddrinfo_hacks(void)
{
int r, r2;
struct evutil_addrinfo *ai=NULL, *ai2=NULL;
struct evutil_addrinfo hints;
memset(&hints,0,sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_flags =
#ifdef AI_NUMERICHOST
AI_NUMERICHOST |
#endif
#ifdef AI_NUMERICSERV
AI_NUMERICSERV |
#endif
0;
r = getaddrinfo("1.2.3.4", "80", &hints, &ai);
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
r2 = getaddrinfo("1.2.3.4", "80", &hints, &ai2);
if (r2 == 0 && r != 0) {
need_numeric_port_hack_=1;
}
if (ai2 && ai2->ai_protocol == 0) {
need_socktype_protocol_hack_=1;
}
if (ai)
freeaddrinfo(ai);
if (ai2)
freeaddrinfo(ai2);
tested_for_getaddrinfo_hacks=1;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8TestObjectPython::findInstanceInPrototypeChain(v8::Handle<v8::Value> jsValue, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate)->findInstanceInPrototypeChain(&wrapperTypeInfo, jsValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpk_finish(sc_card_t *card)
{
if (card->drv_data)
free(card->drv_data);
card->drv_data = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 15,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::applyBorderAttributeToStyle(const Attribute& attribute, StylePropertySet* style)
{
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyBorderWidth, parseBorderWidthAttribute(attribute), CSSPrimitiveValue::CSS_PX);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyBorderStyle, CSSValueSolid);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool llc_dgram_match(const struct llc_sap *sap,
const struct llc_addr *laddr,
const struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
return sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM &&
llc->laddr.lsap == laddr->lsap &&
ether_addr_equal(llc->laddr.mac, laddr->mac);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *s_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t n = *pos;
down_read(&slub_lock);
if (!n)
print_slabinfo_header(m);
return seq_list_start(&slab_caches, *pos);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 2,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_open(uint16_t port)
{
struct tcp_sock_t *this = calloc(1, sizeof *this);
if (this == NULL) {
ERR("callocing this failed");
goto error;
}
this->sd = -1;
this->sd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (this->sd < 0) {
ERR("sockect open failed");
goto error;
}
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof addr);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(port);
addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
if (bind(this->sd,
(struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof addr) < 0) {
if (g_options.only_desired_port == 1)
ERR("Bind on port failed. "
"Requested port may be taken or require root permissions.");
goto error;
}
if (listen(this->sd, HTTP_MAX_PENDING_CONNS) < 0) {
ERR("listen failed on socket");
goto error;
}
return this;
error:
if (this != NULL) {
if (this->sd != -1) {
close(this->sd);
}
free(this);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 8,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: State() : result_(PP_OK), run_called_(false), quit_called_(false) {}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<disk_cache::BackendImpl> CreateExistingEntryCache(
const base::FilePath& cache_path) {
net::TestCompletionCallback cb;
std::unique_ptr<disk_cache::BackendImpl> cache(
std::make_unique<disk_cache::BackendImpl>(cache_path,
/* cleanup_tracker = */ nullptr,
/* cache_thread = */ nullptr,
/* net_log = */ nullptr));
int rv = cache->Init(cb.callback());
if (cb.GetResult(rv) != net::OK)
return std::unique_ptr<disk_cache::BackendImpl>();
disk_cache::Entry* entry = NULL;
rv = cache->CreateEntry(kExistingEntryKey, &entry, cb.callback());
if (cb.GetResult(rv) != net::OK)
return std::unique_ptr<disk_cache::BackendImpl>();
entry->Close();
return cache;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcRenderTriFan (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderTriFanReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTriFanReq);
swaps (&stuff->length, n);
swapl (&stuff->src, n);
swapl (&stuff->dst, n);
swapl (&stuff->maskFormat, n);
swaps (&stuff->xSrc, n);
swaps (&stuff->ySrc, n);
SwapRestL(stuff);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int idx;
kvm_pmu_destroy(vcpu);
kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
static_key_slow_dec(&kvm_no_apic_vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int inet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, sin, uaddr);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
if (peer) {
if (!inet->inet_dport ||
(((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_SYN_SENT)) &&
peer == 1))
return -ENOTCONN;
sin->sin_port = inet->inet_dport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = inet->inet_daddr;
} else {
__be32 addr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
if (!addr)
addr = inet->inet_saddr;
sin->sin_port = inet->inet_sport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
}
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*sin);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameListContainsMainFrameOnUI(
std::unique_ptr<std::vector<std::pair<int, int>>> frames) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
for (const auto& frame : *frames) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host =
RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(frame.first, frame.second);
if (!render_frame_host)
continue;
if (!render_frame_host->GetParent())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> PrivateScriptRunner::runDOMAttributeGetter(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptState* scriptStateInUserScript, const char* className, const char* attributeName, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject = classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
v8::Local<v8::Value> descriptor;
if (!classObject->GetOwnPropertyDescriptor(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, attributeName)).ToLocal(&descriptor) || !descriptor->IsObject()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> getter;
if (!v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(descriptor)->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "get")).ToLocal(&getter) || !getter->IsFunction()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
initializeHolderIfNeeded(scriptState, classObject, holder);
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(getter), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
rethrowExceptionInPrivateScript(isolate, block, scriptStateInUserScript, ExceptionState::GetterContext, attributeName, className);
block.ReThrow();
return v8::Local<v8::Value>();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 1
| 24,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Text* FrameSelectionTest::AppendTextNode(const String& data) {
Text* text = GetDocument().createTextNode(data);
GetDocument().body()->AppendChild(text);
return text;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
{
ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
if (res > 0)
flush_icache_range(addr, addr + len);
return res;
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip_local_out(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
err = __ip_local_out(skb);
if (likely(err == 1))
err = dst_output(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 8,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::unregisterVisibilityObserver(DocumentVisibilityObserver* observer)
{
ASSERT(m_visibilityObservers.contains(observer));
m_visibilityObservers.remove(observer);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: autofill::AutofillDriver* PasswordAutofillManager::GetAutofillDriver() {
return password_manager_driver_->GetAutofillDriver();
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::textInserted(Node* text, unsigned offset, unsigned length)
{
if (!m_ranges.isEmpty()) {
HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator end = m_ranges.end();
for (HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator it = m_ranges.begin(); it != end; ++it)
(*it)->textInserted(text, offset, length);
}
m_markers->shiftMarkers(text, offset, length);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ReportContentSecurityPolicyViolation(
const CSPViolationParams& violation_params) {
Send(new FrameMsg_ReportContentSecurityPolicyViolation(routing_id_,
violation_params));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 3,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nested_vmx_succeed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, vmx_get_rflags(vcpu)
& ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF |
X86_EFLAGS_ZF | X86_EFLAGS_SF | X86_EFLAGS_OF));
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 24,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: av_cold void ff_mpegvideodsp_init_x86(MpegVideoDSPContext *c)
{
#if HAVE_INLINE_ASM
int cpu_flags = av_get_cpu_flags();
if (INLINE_MMX(cpu_flags))
c->gmc = gmc_mmx;
#endif /* HAVE_INLINE_ASM */
}
Commit Message: avcodec/x86/mpegvideodsp: Fix signedness bug in need_emu
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: 3516/attachment-311488.dat
Found-by: Insu Yun, Georgia Tech.
Tested-by: wuninsu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long vsock_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
return vsock_dev_do_ioctl(filp, cmd, (void __user *)arg);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::WebContents* web_contents() { return web_contents_; }
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long jsvGetLongInteger(const JsVar *v) {
if (jsvIsInt(v)) return jsvGetInteger(v);
return (long long)jsvGetFloat(v);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void chmd_close(struct mschm_decompressor *base,
struct mschmd_header *chm)
{
struct mschm_decompressor_p *self = (struct mschm_decompressor_p *) base;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *nfi;
struct mspack_system *sys;
unsigned int i;
if (!base) return;
sys = self->system;
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
/* free files */
for (fi = chm->files; fi; fi = nfi) {
nfi = fi->next;
sys->free(fi);
}
for (fi = chm->sysfiles; fi; fi = nfi) {
nfi = fi->next;
sys->free(fi);
}
/* if this CHM was being decompressed, free decompression state */
if (self->d && (self->d->chm == chm)) {
if (self->d->infh) sys->close(self->d->infh);
if (self->d->state) lzxd_free(self->d->state);
sys->free(self->d);
self->d = NULL;
}
/* if this CHM had a chunk cache, free it and contents */
if (chm->chunk_cache) {
for (i = 0; i < chm->num_chunks; i++) sys->free(chm->chunk_cache[i]);
sys->free(chm->chunk_cache);
}
sys->free(chm);
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
"sk Eth Pid Groups "
"Rmem Wmem Dump Locks Drops Inode\n");
} else {
struct sock *s = v;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(s);
seq_printf(seq, "%pK %-3d %-6u %08x %-8d %-8d %d %-8d %-8d %-8lu\n",
s,
s->sk_protocol,
nlk->portid,
nlk->groups ? (u32)nlk->groups[0] : 0,
sk_rmem_alloc_get(s),
sk_wmem_alloc_get(s),
nlk->cb_running,
atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
atomic_read(&s->sk_drops),
sock_i_ino(s)
);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_reg_overflow(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
if (reg->max_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
if (reg->min_value < BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE ||
reg->min_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::processHttpEquivXFrameOptions(const AtomicString& content)
{
if (!m_frame)
return;
unsigned long requestIdentifier = loader()->mainResourceIdentifier();
if (m_frame->loader().shouldInterruptLoadForXFrameOptions(content, url(), requestIdentifier)) {
String message = "Refused to display '" + url().elidedString() + "' in a frame because it set 'X-Frame-Options' to '" + content + "'.";
m_frame->loader().stopAllLoaders();
if (!m_frame)
return;
m_frame->navigate(*this, SecurityOrigin::urlWithUniqueSecurityOrigin(), true, UserGestureStatus::None);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ConsoleMessage> consoleMessage = ConsoleMessage::create(SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, message);
consoleMessage->setRequestIdentifier(requestIdentifier);
addConsoleMessage(consoleMessage.release());
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 12,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void put_signal_struct(struct signal_struct *sig)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sig->sigcnt))
free_signal_struct(sig);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateDateTimeFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *ret;
if (nargs != 0) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
ret = exsltDateDateTime();
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void V8LazyEventListenerToString(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8SetReturnValue(info, V8HiddenValue::getHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), V8HiddenValue::toStringString(info.GetIsolate())));
}
Commit Message: Turn a bunch of ASSERTs into graceful failures when compiling listeners
BUG=456192
R=yangguo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/906193002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189796 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 19,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dispatchSetNeedsRedraw(void* self)
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
CCLayerTreeHostTest* test = static_cast<CCLayerTreeHostTest*>(self);
ASSERT(test);
if (test->m_layerTreeHost)
test->m_layerTreeHost->setNeedsRedraw();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ucma_copy_conn_param(struct rdma_cm_id *id,
struct rdma_conn_param *dst,
struct rdma_ucm_conn_param *src)
{
dst->private_data = src->private_data;
dst->private_data_len = src->private_data_len;
dst->responder_resources =src->responder_resources;
dst->initiator_depth = src->initiator_depth;
dst->flow_control = src->flow_control;
dst->retry_count = src->retry_count;
dst->rnr_retry_count = src->rnr_retry_count;
dst->srq = src->srq;
dst->qp_num = src->qp_num;
dst->qkey = (id->route.addr.src_addr.ss_family == AF_IB) ? src->qkey : 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ReturnSubscriberTexture(
base::WeakPtr<DelegatedFrameHost> dfh,
scoped_refptr<OwnedMailbox> subscriber_texture,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (!subscriber_texture.get())
return;
if (!dfh)
return;
subscriber_texture->UpdateSyncPoint(sync_point);
if (dfh->frame_subscriber_ && subscriber_texture->texture_id())
dfh->idle_frame_subscriber_textures_.push_back(subscriber_texture);
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char uprcase( char c )
{
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
return c + 'A' - 'a';
return c;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int snd_seq_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client = file->private_data;
unsigned int mask = 0;
/* check client structures are in place */
if (snd_BUG_ON(!client))
return -ENXIO;
if ((snd_seq_file_flags(file) & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_INPUT) &&
client->data.user.fifo) {
/* check if data is available in the outqueue */
if (snd_seq_fifo_poll_wait(client->data.user.fifo, file, wait))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
if (snd_seq_file_flags(file) & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OUTPUT) {
/* check if data is available in the pool */
if (!snd_seq_write_pool_allocated(client) ||
snd_seq_pool_poll_wait(client->pool, file, wait))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
if (!irq_fpu_usable())
crypto_aes_encrypt_x86(ctx, dst, src);
else {
kernel_fpu_begin();
aesni_enc(ctx, dst, src);
kernel_fpu_end();
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int _yr_emit_inst_arg_int16(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
int16_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
int16_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(int16_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(int16_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 8,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->_eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4)
ctxt->_eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 11,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_vol_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
int width, height, vo_ver_id;
/* vol header */
skip_bits(gb, 1); /* random access */
s->vo_type = get_bits(gb, 8);
/* If we are in studio profile (per vo_type), check if its all consistent
* and if so continue pass control to decode_studio_vol_header().
* elIf something is inconsistent, error out
* else continue with (non studio) vol header decpoding.
*/
if (s->vo_type == CORE_STUDIO_VO_TYPE ||
s->vo_type == SIMPLE_STUDIO_VO_TYPE) {
if (s->avctx->profile != FF_PROFILE_UNKNOWN && s->avctx->profile != FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->studio_profile = 1;
s->avctx->profile = FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO;
return decode_studio_vol_header(ctx, gb);
} else if (s->studio_profile) {
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (get_bits1(gb) != 0) { /* is_ol_id */
vo_ver_id = get_bits(gb, 4); /* vo_ver_id */
skip_bits(gb, 3); /* vo_priority */
} else {
vo_ver_id = 1;
}
s->aspect_ratio_info = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (s->aspect_ratio_info == FF_ASPECT_EXTENDED) {
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num = get_bits(gb, 8); // par_width
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den = get_bits(gb, 8); // par_height
} else {
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = ff_h263_pixel_aspect[s->aspect_ratio_info];
}
if ((ctx->vol_control_parameters = get_bits1(gb))) { /* vol control parameter */
int chroma_format = get_bits(gb, 2);
if (chroma_format != CHROMA_420)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal chroma format\n");
s->low_delay = get_bits1(gb);
if (get_bits1(gb)) { /* vbv parameters */
get_bits(gb, 15); /* first_half_bitrate */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after first_half_bitrate");
get_bits(gb, 15); /* latter_half_bitrate */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after latter_half_bitrate");
get_bits(gb, 15); /* first_half_vbv_buffer_size */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after first_half_vbv_buffer_size");
get_bits(gb, 3); /* latter_half_vbv_buffer_size */
get_bits(gb, 11); /* first_half_vbv_occupancy */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after first_half_vbv_occupancy");
get_bits(gb, 15); /* latter_half_vbv_occupancy */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after latter_half_vbv_occupancy");
}
} else {
/* is setting low delay flag only once the smartest thing to do?
* low delay detection will not be overridden. */
if (s->picture_number == 0) {
switch(s->vo_type) {
case SIMPLE_VO_TYPE:
case ADV_SIMPLE_VO_TYPE:
s->low_delay = 1;
break;
default:
s->low_delay = 0;
}
}
}
ctx->shape = get_bits(gb, 2); /* vol shape */
if (ctx->shape != RECT_SHAPE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "only rectangular vol supported\n");
if (ctx->shape == GRAY_SHAPE && vo_ver_id != 1) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Gray shape not supported\n");
skip_bits(gb, 4); /* video_object_layer_shape_extension */
}
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before time_increment_resolution");
s->avctx->framerate.num = get_bits(gb, 16);
if (!s->avctx->framerate.num) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "framerate==0\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ctx->time_increment_bits = av_log2(s->avctx->framerate.num - 1) + 1;
if (ctx->time_increment_bits < 1)
ctx->time_increment_bits = 1;
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before fixed_vop_rate");
if (get_bits1(gb) != 0) /* fixed_vop_rate */
s->avctx->framerate.den = get_bits(gb, ctx->time_increment_bits);
else
s->avctx->framerate.den = 1;
s->avctx->time_base = av_inv_q(av_mul_q(s->avctx->framerate, (AVRational){s->avctx->ticks_per_frame, 1}));
ctx->t_frame = 0;
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
if (ctx->shape == RECT_SHAPE) {
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before width");
width = get_bits(gb, 13);
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before height");
height = get_bits(gb, 13);
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after height");
if (width && height && /* they should be non zero but who knows */
!(s->width && s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("MP4S"))) {
if (s->width && s->height &&
(s->width != width || s->height != height))
s->context_reinit = 1;
s->width = width;
s->height = height;
}
}
s->progressive_sequence =
s->progressive_frame = get_bits1(gb) ^ 1;
s->interlaced_dct = 0;
if (!get_bits1(gb) && (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_PICT_INFO))
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, /* OBMC Disable */
"MPEG-4 OBMC not supported (very likely buggy encoder)\n");
if (vo_ver_id == 1)
ctx->vol_sprite_usage = get_bits1(gb); /* vol_sprite_usage */
else
ctx->vol_sprite_usage = get_bits(gb, 2); /* vol_sprite_usage */
if (ctx->vol_sprite_usage == STATIC_SPRITE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Static Sprites not supported\n");
if (ctx->vol_sprite_usage == STATIC_SPRITE ||
ctx->vol_sprite_usage == GMC_SPRITE) {
if (ctx->vol_sprite_usage == STATIC_SPRITE) {
skip_bits(gb, 13); // sprite_width
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after sprite_width");
skip_bits(gb, 13); // sprite_height
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after sprite_height");
skip_bits(gb, 13); // sprite_left
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after sprite_left");
skip_bits(gb, 13); // sprite_top
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after sprite_top");
}
ctx->num_sprite_warping_points = get_bits(gb, 6);
if (ctx->num_sprite_warping_points > 3) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"%d sprite_warping_points\n",
ctx->num_sprite_warping_points);
ctx->num_sprite_warping_points = 0;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->sprite_warping_accuracy = get_bits(gb, 2);
ctx->sprite_brightness_change = get_bits1(gb);
if (ctx->vol_sprite_usage == STATIC_SPRITE)
skip_bits1(gb); // low_latency_sprite
}
if (get_bits1(gb) == 1) { /* not_8_bit */
s->quant_precision = get_bits(gb, 4); /* quant_precision */
if (get_bits(gb, 4) != 8) /* bits_per_pixel */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "N-bit not supported\n");
if (s->quant_precision != 5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"quant precision %d\n", s->quant_precision);
if (s->quant_precision<3 || s->quant_precision>9) {
s->quant_precision = 5;
}
} else {
s->quant_precision = 5;
}
if ((s->mpeg_quant = get_bits1(gb))) { /* vol_quant_type */
int i, v;
mpeg4_load_default_matrices(s);
/* load custom intra matrix */
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
int last = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
int j;
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 8) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "insufficient data for custom matrix\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
if (v == 0)
break;
last = v;
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = last;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = last;
}
/* replicate last value */
for (; i < 64; i++) {
int j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = last;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = last;
}
}
/* load custom non intra matrix */
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
int last = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
int j;
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 8) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "insufficient data for custom matrix\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
if (v == 0)
break;
last = v;
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->inter_matrix[j] = v;
s->chroma_inter_matrix[j] = v;
}
/* replicate last value */
for (; i < 64; i++) {
int j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->inter_matrix[j] = last;
s->chroma_inter_matrix[j] = last;
}
}
}
if (vo_ver_id != 1)
s->quarter_sample = get_bits1(gb);
else
s->quarter_sample = 0;
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 4) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "VOL Header truncated\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!get_bits1(gb)) {
int pos = get_bits_count(gb);
int estimation_method = get_bits(gb, 2);
if (estimation_method < 2) {
if (!get_bits1(gb)) {
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* opaque */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* transparent */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* intra_cae */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* inter_cae */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* no_update */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* upsampling */
}
if (!get_bits1(gb)) {
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* intra_blocks */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* inter_blocks */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* inter4v_blocks */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* not coded blocks */
}
if (!check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "in complexity estimation part 1")) {
skip_bits_long(gb, pos - get_bits_count(gb));
goto no_cplx_est;
}
if (!get_bits1(gb)) {
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* dct_coeffs */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* dct_lines */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* vlc_syms */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 4 * get_bits1(gb); /* vlc_bits */
}
if (!get_bits1(gb)) {
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* apm */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* npm */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_b += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* interpolate_mc_q */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* forwback_mc_q */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* halfpel2 */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* halfpel4 */
}
if (!check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "in complexity estimation part 2")) {
skip_bits_long(gb, pos - get_bits_count(gb));
goto no_cplx_est;
}
if (estimation_method == 1) {
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* sadct */
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p += 8 * get_bits1(gb); /* qpel */
}
} else
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid Complexity estimation method %d\n",
estimation_method);
} else {
no_cplx_est:
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i =
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p =
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_b = 0;
}
ctx->resync_marker = !get_bits1(gb); /* resync_marker_disabled */
s->data_partitioning = get_bits1(gb);
if (s->data_partitioning)
ctx->rvlc = get_bits1(gb);
if (vo_ver_id != 1) {
ctx->new_pred = get_bits1(gb);
if (ctx->new_pred) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "new pred not supported\n");
skip_bits(gb, 2); /* requested upstream message type */
skip_bits1(gb); /* newpred segment type */
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) // reduced_res_vop
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"reduced resolution VOP not supported\n");
} else {
ctx->new_pred = 0;
}
ctx->scalability = get_bits1(gb);
if (ctx->scalability) {
GetBitContext bak = *gb;
int h_sampling_factor_n;
int h_sampling_factor_m;
int v_sampling_factor_n;
int v_sampling_factor_m;
skip_bits1(gb); // hierarchy_type
skip_bits(gb, 4); /* ref_layer_id */
skip_bits1(gb); /* ref_layer_sampling_dir */
h_sampling_factor_n = get_bits(gb, 5);
h_sampling_factor_m = get_bits(gb, 5);
v_sampling_factor_n = get_bits(gb, 5);
v_sampling_factor_m = get_bits(gb, 5);
ctx->enhancement_type = get_bits1(gb);
if (h_sampling_factor_n == 0 || h_sampling_factor_m == 0 ||
v_sampling_factor_n == 0 || v_sampling_factor_m == 0) {
/* illegal scalability header (VERY broken encoder),
* trying to workaround */
ctx->scalability = 0;
*gb = bak;
} else
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "scalability not supported\n");
}
}
if (s->avctx->debug&FF_DEBUG_PICT_INFO) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "tb %d/%d, tincrbits:%d, qp_prec:%d, ps:%d, low_delay:%d %s%s%s%s\n",
s->avctx->framerate.den, s->avctx->framerate.num,
ctx->time_increment_bits,
s->quant_precision,
s->progressive_sequence,
s->low_delay,
ctx->scalability ? "scalability " :"" , s->quarter_sample ? "qpel " : "",
s->data_partitioning ? "partition " : "", ctx->rvlc ? "rvlc " : ""
);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: log_syslog(struct passwd const *pw, bool successful)
{
const char *new_user, *old_user, *tty;
new_user = pw->pw_name;
/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify
the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. */
old_user = getlogin ();
if (!old_user)
{
/* getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
Resort to getpwuid. */
struct passwd *pwd = current_getpwuid();
old_user = pwd ? pwd->pw_name : "";
}
if (get_terminal_name(NULL, &tty, NULL) != 0 || !tty)
tty = "none";
openlog (program_invocation_short_name, 0 , LOG_AUTH);
syslog (LOG_NOTICE, "%s(to %s) %s on %s",
successful ? "" :
su_mode == RUNUSER_MODE ? "FAILED RUNUSER " : "FAILED SU ",
new_user, old_user, tty);
closelog ();
}
Commit Message: su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 20,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual const std::string GetResult() { return std::string(); }
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gdImageClipRectangle(gdImagePtr im, gdRectPtr r)
{
int c1x, c1y, c2x, c2y;
int x1,y1;
gdImageGetClip(im, &c1x, &c1y, &c2x, &c2y);
x1 = r->x + r->width - 1;
y1 = r->y + r->height - 1;
r->x = CLAMP(r->x, c1x, c2x);
r->y = CLAMP(r->y, c1y, c2y);
r->width = CLAMP(x1, c1x, c2x) - r->x + 1;
r->height = CLAMP(y1, c1y, c2y) - r->y + 1;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ahash_sha1_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
{
int ret2, ret1;
ret1 = ahash_sha1_init(req);
if (ret1)
goto out;
ret1 = ahash_update(req);
ret2 = ahash_final(req);
out:
return ret1 ? ret1 : ret2;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_@_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reds_link_free(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
reds_stream_free(link->stream);
link->stream = NULL;
free(link->link_mess);
link->link_mess = NULL;
BN_free(link->tiTicketing.bn);
link->tiTicketing.bn = NULL;
if (link->tiTicketing.rsa) {
RSA_free(link->tiTicketing.rsa);
link->tiTicketing.rsa = NULL;
}
free(link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hugetlb_no_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t idx,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, unsigned int flags)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
int ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
int anon_rmap = 0;
unsigned long size;
struct page *page;
pte_t new_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
/*
* Currently, we are forced to kill the process in the event the
* original mapper has unmapped pages from the child due to a failed
* COW. Warn that such a situation has occurred as it may not be obvious
*/
if (is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_UNMAPPED)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("PID %d killed due to inadequate hugepage pool\n",
current->pid);
return ret;
}
/*
* Use page lock to guard against racing truncation
* before we get page_table_lock.
*/
retry:
page = find_lock_page(mapping, idx);
if (!page) {
size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (idx >= size)
goto out;
/*
* Check for page in userfault range
*/
if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) {
u32 hash;
struct vm_fault vmf = {
.vma = vma,
.address = address,
.flags = flags,
/*
* Hard to debug if it ends up being
* used by a callee that assumes
* something about the other
* uninitialized fields... same as in
* memory.c
*/
};
/*
* hugetlb_fault_mutex must be dropped before
* handling userfault. Reacquire after handling
* fault to make calling code simpler.
*/
hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, vma, mapping,
idx, address);
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
ret = handle_userfault(&vmf, VM_UFFD_MISSING);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
goto out;
}
page = alloc_huge_page(vma, address, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(page);
if (ret == -ENOMEM)
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
else
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
goto out;
}
clear_huge_page(page, address, pages_per_huge_page(h));
__SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_huge_active(page);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
int err = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (err) {
put_page(page);
if (err == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
goto out;
}
} else {
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto backout_unlocked;
}
anon_rmap = 1;
}
} else {
/*
* If memory error occurs between mmap() and fault, some process
* don't have hwpoisoned swap entry for errored virtual address.
* So we need to block hugepage fault by PG_hwpoison bit check.
*/
if (unlikely(PageHWPoison(page))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON |
VM_FAULT_SET_HINDEX(hstate_index(h));
goto backout_unlocked;
}
}
/*
* If we are going to COW a private mapping later, we examine the
* pending reservations for this page now. This will ensure that
* any allocations necessary to record that reservation occur outside
* the spinlock.
*/
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
if (vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, address) < 0) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto backout_unlocked;
}
/* Just decrements count, does not deallocate */
vma_end_reservation(h, vma, address);
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (idx >= size)
goto backout;
ret = 0;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(ptep)))
goto backout;
if (anon_rmap) {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
} else
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
new_pte = make_huge_pte(vma, page, ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
&& (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)));
set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, new_pte);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), mm);
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
/* Optimization, do the COW without a second fault */
ret = hugetlb_cow(mm, vma, address, ptep, page, ptl);
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
unlock_page(page);
out:
return ret;
backout:
spin_unlock(ptl);
backout_unlocked:
unlock_page(page);
restore_reserve_on_error(h, vma, address, page);
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtnl_net_getid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlattr *tb[NETNSA_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *nla;
struct sk_buff *msg;
struct net *peer;
int err, id;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[NETNSA_PID]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_pid(nla_get_u32(tb[NETNSA_PID]));
nla = tb[NETNSA_PID];
} else if (tb[NETNSA_FD]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_fd(nla_get_u32(tb[NETNSA_FD]));
nla = tb[NETNSA_FD];
} else {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Peer netns reference is missing");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Peer netns reference is invalid");
return PTR_ERR(peer);
}
msg = nlmsg_new(rtnl_net_get_size(), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
id = peernet2id(net, peer);
err = rtnl_net_fill(msg, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq, 0,
RTM_NEWNSID, net, id);
if (err < 0)
goto err_out;
err = rtnl_unicast(msg, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
goto out;
err_out:
nlmsg_free(msg);
out:
put_net(peer);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Vector<FileChooserFileInfo> HTMLInputElement::filesFromFileInputFormControlState(const FormControlState& state)
{
return FileInputType::filesFromFormControlState(state);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RequestAXTreeSnapshot(
const AXTreeSnapshotCallback& callback) {
AXTreeSnapshotCombiner* combiner = new AXTreeSnapshotCombiner(callback);
for (FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node : frame_tree_.Nodes()) {
bool is_root = frame_tree_node->parent() == nullptr;
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->RequestAXTreeSnapshot(
combiner->AddFrame(is_root));
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_query_ib_route(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, int timeout_ms,
struct cma_work *work)
{
struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr = &id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr;
struct ib_sa_path_rec path_rec;
ib_sa_comp_mask comp_mask;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
struct sockaddr_ib *sib;
memset(&path_rec, 0, sizeof path_rec);
rdma_addr_get_sgid(dev_addr, &path_rec.sgid);
rdma_addr_get_dgid(dev_addr, &path_rec.dgid);
path_rec.pkey = cpu_to_be16(ib_addr_get_pkey(dev_addr));
path_rec.numb_path = 1;
path_rec.reversible = 1;
path_rec.service_id = rdma_get_service_id(&id_priv->id, cma_dst_addr(id_priv));
comp_mask = IB_SA_PATH_REC_DGID | IB_SA_PATH_REC_SGID |
IB_SA_PATH_REC_PKEY | IB_SA_PATH_REC_NUMB_PATH |
IB_SA_PATH_REC_REVERSIBLE | IB_SA_PATH_REC_SERVICE_ID;
switch (cma_family(id_priv)) {
case AF_INET:
path_rec.qos_class = cpu_to_be16((u16) id_priv->tos);
comp_mask |= IB_SA_PATH_REC_QOS_CLASS;
break;
case AF_INET6:
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) cma_src_addr(id_priv);
path_rec.traffic_class = (u8) (be32_to_cpu(sin6->sin6_flowinfo) >> 20);
comp_mask |= IB_SA_PATH_REC_TRAFFIC_CLASS;
break;
case AF_IB:
sib = (struct sockaddr_ib *) cma_src_addr(id_priv);
path_rec.traffic_class = (u8) (be32_to_cpu(sib->sib_flowinfo) >> 20);
comp_mask |= IB_SA_PATH_REC_TRAFFIC_CLASS;
break;
}
id_priv->query_id = ib_sa_path_rec_get(&sa_client, id_priv->id.device,
id_priv->id.port_num, &path_rec,
comp_mask, timeout_ms,
GFP_KERNEL, cma_query_handler,
work, &id_priv->query);
return (id_priv->query_id < 0) ? id_priv->query_id : 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lexer_construct_function_object (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
uint32_t extra_status_flags) /**< extra status flags */
{
ecma_compiled_code_t *compiled_code_p;
lexer_literal_t *literal_p;
uint16_t result_index;
if (context_p->literal_count >= PARSER_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_LITERALS)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_LITERAL_LIMIT_REACHED);
}
if (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_RESOLVE_THIS_FOR_CALLS)
{
extra_status_flags |= PARSER_RESOLVE_THIS_FOR_CALLS;
}
literal_p = (lexer_literal_t *) parser_list_append (context_p, &context_p->literal_pool);
literal_p->type = LEXER_UNUSED_LITERAL;
literal_p->status_flags = 0;
result_index = context_p->literal_count;
context_p->literal_count++;
compiled_code_p = parser_parse_function (context_p, extra_status_flags);
literal_p->u.bytecode_p = compiled_code_p;
literal_p->type = LEXER_FUNCTION_LITERAL;
return result_index;
} /* lexer_construct_function_object */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 14,042
|
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