instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ipv6_generate_eui64(u8 *eui, struct net_device *dev)
{
switch (dev->type) {
case ARPHRD_ETHER:
case ARPHRD_FDDI:
return addrconf_ifid_eui48(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_ARCNET:
return addrconf_ifid_arcnet(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_INFINIBAND:
return addrconf_ifid_infiniband(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_SIT:
return addrconf_ifid_sit(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_IPGRE:
return addrconf_ifid_gre(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_6LOWPAN:
case ARPHRD_IEEE802154:
return addrconf_ifid_eui64(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_IEEE1394:
return addrconf_ifid_ieee1394(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_TUNNEL6:
return addrconf_ifid_ip6tnl(eui, dev);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *enl_ipc_get(const char *msg_data)
{
static char *message = NULL;
static unsigned short len = 0;
char buff[13], *ret_msg = NULL;
register unsigned char i;
unsigned char blen;
if (msg_data == IPC_TIMEOUT) {
return(IPC_TIMEOUT);
}
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
buff[i] = msg_data[i];
}
buff[12] = 0;
blen = strlen(buff);
if (message != NULL) {
len += blen;
message = (char *) erealloc(message, len + 1);
strcat(message, buff);
} else {
len = blen;
message = (char *) emalloc(len + 1);
strcpy(message, buff);
}
if (blen < 12) {
ret_msg = message;
message = NULL;
D(("Received complete reply: \"%s\"\n", ret_msg));
}
return(ret_msg);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 4,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FPDF_BOOL PDFiumEngine::IsDataAvail(FX_FILEAVAIL* param,
size_t offset,
size_t size) {
auto* file_avail = static_cast<FileAvail*>(param);
return file_avail->engine->doc_loader_->IsDataAvailable(offset, size);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel::IsBackButtonVisible() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int validatecalrgbspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref **r)
{
int code=0;
ref *space, calrgbdict;
space = *r;
if (!r_is_array(space))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Validate parameters, check we have enough operands */
if (r_size(space) < 2)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &calrgbdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&calrgbdict, t_dictionary))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Check the white point, which is required */
code = checkWhitePoint(i_ctx_p, &calrgbdict);
if (code != 0)
return code;
/* The rest are optional. Need to validate though */
code = checkBlackPoint(i_ctx_p, &calrgbdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Check Gamma values */
code = checkGamma(i_ctx_p, &calrgbdict, 3);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Check Matrix */
code = checkCalMatrix(i_ctx_p, &calrgbdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
*r = 0; /* No nested space */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 19,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_brushcache(STREAM s, uint16 flags)
{
UNUSED(flags);
BRUSHDATA brush_data;
uint8 cache_idx, colour_code, width, height, size, type;
uint8 *comp_brush;
int index;
int Bpp;
in_uint8(s, cache_idx);
in_uint8(s, colour_code);
in_uint8(s, width);
in_uint8(s, height);
in_uint8(s, type); /* type, 0x8x = cached */
in_uint8(s, size);
logger(Graphics, Debug, "process_brushcache(), idx=%d, wd=%d, ht=%d, type=0x%x sz=%d",
cache_idx, width, height, type, size);
if ((width == 8) && (height == 8))
{
if (colour_code == 1)
{
brush_data.colour_code = 1;
brush_data.data_size = 8;
brush_data.data = xmalloc(8);
if (size == 8)
{
/* read it bottom up */
for (index = 7; index >= 0; index--)
{
in_uint8(s, brush_data.data[index]);
}
}
else
{
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_brushcache(), incompatible brush, colour_code %d size %d",
colour_code, size);
}
cache_put_brush_data(1, cache_idx, &brush_data);
}
else if ((colour_code >= 3) && (colour_code <= 6))
{
Bpp = colour_code - 2;
brush_data.colour_code = colour_code;
brush_data.data_size = 8 * 8 * Bpp;
brush_data.data = xmalloc(8 * 8 * Bpp);
if (size == 16 + 4 * Bpp)
{
in_uint8p(s, comp_brush, 16 + 4 * Bpp);
process_compressed_8x8_brush_data(comp_brush, brush_data.data, Bpp);
}
else
{
in_uint8a(s, brush_data.data, 8 * 8 * Bpp);
}
cache_put_brush_data(colour_code, cache_idx, &brush_data);
}
else
{
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_brushcache(), incompatible brush, colour_code %d size %d",
colour_code, size);
}
}
else
{
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_brushcache(), incompatible brush, width height %d %d", width,
height);
}
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
{
if (a->current_fixup == NULL)
a->current_fixup = new_fixup(a, pathname);
return (a->current_fixup);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 7,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int perf_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *rb;
unsigned int events = POLLHUP;
poll_wait(file, &event->waitq, wait);
if (is_event_hup(event))
return events;
/*
* Pin the event->rb by taking event->mmap_mutex; otherwise
* perf_event_set_output() can swizzle our rb and make us miss wakeups.
*/
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
rb = event->rb;
if (rb)
events = atomic_xchg(&rb->poll, 0);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
return events;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SavePackage::Stop() {
if (wait_state_ == INITIALIZE)
return;
DCHECK(canceled());
if (in_process_count()) {
SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = in_progress_items_.begin();
for (; it != in_progress_items_.end(); ++it) {
SaveItem* save_item = it->second;
DCHECK(save_item->state() == SaveItem::IN_PROGRESS);
save_item->Cancel();
}
while (in_process_count())
PutInProgressItemToSavedMap(in_progress_items_.begin()->second);
}
SaveIDList save_ids;
for (SavedItemMap::iterator it = saved_success_items_.begin();
it != saved_success_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->first);
for (SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = saved_failed_items_.begin();
it != saved_failed_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->second->save_id());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::RemoveSavedFileFromFileMap,
file_manager_,
save_ids));
finished_ = true;
wait_state_ = FAILED;
if (download_) {
download_->Cancel(false);
FinalizeDownloadEntry();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::ImageSkia BrowserView::GetWindowAppIcon() {
if (browser_->is_app()) {
WebContents* contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get());
extensions::TabHelper* extensions_tab_helper =
contents ? extensions::TabHelper::FromWebContents(contents) : NULL;
if (extensions_tab_helper && extensions_tab_helper->GetExtensionAppIcon())
return gfx::ImageSkia(*extensions_tab_helper->GetExtensionAppIcon());
}
return GetWindowIcon();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_our_module(void)
{
struct kmod_list *list = NULL, *itr;
struct kmod_ctx *ctx;
struct stat sb;
struct utsname u;
int ret;
ctx = kmod_new(NULL, NULL);
if (!ctx) {
tcmu_err("kmod_new() failed: %m\n");
return -1;
}
ret = kmod_module_new_from_lookup(ctx, "target_core_user", &list);
if (ret < 0) {
/* In some environments like containers, /lib/modules/`uname -r`
* will not exist, in such cases the load module job be taken
* care by admin, either by manual load or makesure it's builtin
*/
if (ENOENT == errno) {
if (uname(&u) < 0) {
tcmu_err("uname() failed: %m\n");
} else {
tcmu_info("no modules directory '/lib/modules/%s', checking module target_core_user entry in '/sys/modules/'\n",
u.release);
ret = stat("/sys/module/target_core_user", &sb);
if (!ret) {
tcmu_dbg("Module target_core_user already loaded\n");
} else {
tcmu_err("stat() on '/sys/module/target_core_user' failed: %m\n");
}
}
} else {
tcmu_err("kmod_module_new_from_lookup() failed to lookup alias target_core_use %m\n");
}
kmod_unref(ctx);
return ret;
}
if (!list) {
tcmu_err("kmod_module_new_from_lookup() failed to find module target_core_user\n");
kmod_unref(ctx);
return -ENOENT;
}
kmod_list_foreach(itr, list) {
int state, err;
struct kmod_module *mod = kmod_module_get_module(itr);
state = kmod_module_get_initstate(mod);
switch (state) {
case KMOD_MODULE_BUILTIN:
tcmu_info("Module '%s' is builtin\n",
kmod_module_get_name(mod));
break;
case KMOD_MODULE_LIVE:
tcmu_dbg("Module '%s' is already loaded\n",
kmod_module_get_name(mod));
break;
default:
err = kmod_module_probe_insert_module(mod,
KMOD_PROBE_APPLY_BLACKLIST,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (err == 0) {
tcmu_info("Inserted module '%s'\n",
kmod_module_get_name(mod));
} else if (err == KMOD_PROBE_APPLY_BLACKLIST) {
tcmu_err("Module '%s' is blacklisted\n",
kmod_module_get_name(mod));
} else {
tcmu_err("Failed to insert '%s'\n",
kmod_module_get_name(mod));
}
ret = err;
}
kmod_module_unref(mod);
}
kmod_module_unref_list(list);
kmod_unref(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void parse_new_tag(const char *arg)
{
static struct strbuf msg = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *from;
char *tagger;
struct branch *s;
struct tag *t;
uintmax_t from_mark = 0;
unsigned char sha1[20];
enum object_type type;
const char *v;
t = pool_alloc(sizeof(struct tag));
memset(t, 0, sizeof(struct tag));
t->name = pool_strdup(arg);
if (last_tag)
last_tag->next_tag = t;
else
first_tag = t;
last_tag = t;
read_next_command();
/* from ... */
if (!skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "from ", &from))
die("Expected from command, got %s", command_buf.buf);
s = lookup_branch(from);
if (s) {
if (is_null_sha1(s->sha1))
die("Can't tag an empty branch.");
hashcpy(sha1, s->sha1);
type = OBJ_COMMIT;
} else if (*from == ':') {
struct object_entry *oe;
from_mark = parse_mark_ref_eol(from);
oe = find_mark(from_mark);
type = oe->type;
hashcpy(sha1, oe->idx.sha1);
} else if (!get_sha1(from, sha1)) {
struct object_entry *oe = find_object(sha1);
if (!oe) {
type = sha1_object_info(sha1, NULL);
if (type < 0)
die("Not a valid object: %s", from);
} else
type = oe->type;
} else
die("Invalid ref name or SHA1 expression: %s", from);
read_next_command();
/* tagger ... */
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "tagger ", &v)) {
tagger = parse_ident(v);
read_next_command();
} else
tagger = NULL;
/* tag payload/message */
parse_data(&msg, 0, NULL);
/* build the tag object */
strbuf_reset(&new_data);
strbuf_addf(&new_data,
"object %s\n"
"type %s\n"
"tag %s\n",
sha1_to_hex(sha1), typename(type), t->name);
if (tagger)
strbuf_addf(&new_data,
"tagger %s\n", tagger);
strbuf_addch(&new_data, '\n');
strbuf_addbuf(&new_data, &msg);
free(tagger);
if (store_object(OBJ_TAG, &new_data, NULL, t->sha1, 0))
t->pack_id = MAX_PACK_ID;
else
t->pack_id = pack_id;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit CustomFrameView(views::Widget* widget) : widget_(widget) {}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct transit *transit_intern(struct transit *transit)
{
struct transit *find;
find = hash_get(transit_hash, transit, transit_hash_alloc);
if (find != transit)
transit_free(transit);
find->refcnt++;
return find;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct scm_cookie scm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb, *last;
long timeo;
int err;
int peeked, skip;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
do {
mutex_lock(&u->readlock);
skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags);
skb = __skb_try_recv_datagram(sk, flags, &peeked, &skip, &err,
&last);
if (skb)
break;
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
if (err != -EAGAIN)
break;
} while (timeo &&
!__skb_wait_for_more_packets(sk, &err, &timeo, last));
if (!skb) { /* implies readlock unlocked */
unix_state_lock(sk);
/* Signal EOF on disconnected non-blocking SEQPACKET socket. */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && err == -EAGAIN &&
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
err = 0;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
goto out;
}
if (wq_has_sleeper(&u->peer_wait))
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&u->peer_wait,
POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM |
POLLWRBAND);
if (msg->msg_name)
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
if (size > skb->len - skip)
size = skb->len - skip;
else if (size < skb->len - skip)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, skip, msg, size);
if (err)
goto out_free;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
scm_set_cred(&scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
unix_set_secdata(&scm, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
sk_peek_offset_bwd(sk, skb->len);
} else {
/* It is questionable: on PEEK we could:
- do not return fds - good, but too simple 8)
- return fds, and do not return them on read (old strategy,
apparently wrong)
- clone fds (I chose it for now, it is the most universal
solution)
POSIX 1003.1g does not actually define this clearly
at all. POSIX 1003.1g doesn't define a lot of things
clearly however!
*/
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
}
err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size;
scm_recv(sock, msg, &scm, flags);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reserve_memory (void)
{
int n = 0;
unsigned long total_memory;
/*
* none of the entries in this table overlap
*/
rsvd_region[n].start = (unsigned long) ia64_boot_param;
rsvd_region[n].end = rsvd_region[n].start + sizeof(*ia64_boot_param);
n++;
rsvd_region[n].start = (unsigned long) __va(ia64_boot_param->efi_memmap);
rsvd_region[n].end = rsvd_region[n].start + ia64_boot_param->efi_memmap_size;
n++;
rsvd_region[n].start = (unsigned long) __va(ia64_boot_param->command_line);
rsvd_region[n].end = (rsvd_region[n].start
+ strlen(__va(ia64_boot_param->command_line)) + 1);
n++;
rsvd_region[n].start = (unsigned long) ia64_imva((void *)KERNEL_START);
rsvd_region[n].end = (unsigned long) ia64_imva(_end);
n++;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
if (ia64_boot_param->initrd_start) {
rsvd_region[n].start = (unsigned long)__va(ia64_boot_param->initrd_start);
rsvd_region[n].end = rsvd_region[n].start + ia64_boot_param->initrd_size;
n++;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE
if (reserve_elfcorehdr(&rsvd_region[n].start,
&rsvd_region[n].end) == 0)
n++;
#endif
total_memory = efi_memmap_init(&rsvd_region[n].start, &rsvd_region[n].end);
n++;
setup_crashkernel(total_memory, &n);
/* end of memory marker */
rsvd_region[n].start = ~0UL;
rsvd_region[n].end = ~0UL;
n++;
num_rsvd_regions = n;
BUG_ON(IA64_MAX_RSVD_REGIONS + 1 < n);
sort_regions(rsvd_region, num_rsvd_regions);
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *enveloped_data,
unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned int size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
int msg_type = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
"/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
#endif
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, out)) {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
} else {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decrypt PKCS7 message"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the decoded PKCS7 SignedData message into a separate buffer */
for (;;) {
if ((tmp_buf = realloc(tmp_buf, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i = BIO_read(out, &(tmp_buf[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (i <= 0)
break;
else
size += i;
}
tmp_buf_len = size;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
#endif
/* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP:
msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pa_type);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* If this is the RFC style, wrap the signed data to make
* decoding easier in the verify routine.
* For draft9-compatible, we don't do anything because it
* is already wrapped.
*/
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, msg_type,
require_crl_checking,
vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
data, data_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!retval)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
else {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
free(tmp_buf);
free(tmp_buf2);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int reiserfs_file_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct reiserfs_transaction_handle th;
int err;
int jbegin_failure = 0;
BUG_ON(!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode));
if (atomic_add_unless(&REISERFS_I(inode)->openers, -1, 1))
return 0;
mutex_lock(&(REISERFS_I(inode)->tailpack));
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&REISERFS_I(inode)->openers)) {
mutex_unlock(&(REISERFS_I(inode)->tailpack));
return 0;
}
/* fast out for when nothing needs to be done */
if ((!(REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_pack_on_close_mask) ||
!tail_has_to_be_packed(inode)) &&
REISERFS_I(inode)->i_prealloc_count <= 0) {
mutex_unlock(&(REISERFS_I(inode)->tailpack));
return 0;
}
reiserfs_write_lock(inode->i_sb);
/* freeing preallocation only involves relogging blocks that
* are already in the current transaction. preallocation gets
* freed at the end of each transaction, so it is impossible for
* us to log any additional blocks (including quota blocks)
*/
err = journal_begin(&th, inode->i_sb, 1);
if (err) {
/* uh oh, we can't allow the inode to go away while there
* is still preallocation blocks pending. Try to join the
* aborted transaction
*/
jbegin_failure = err;
err = journal_join_abort(&th, inode->i_sb, 1);
if (err) {
/* hmpf, our choices here aren't good. We can pin the inode
* which will disallow unmount from every happening, we can
* do nothing, which will corrupt random memory on unmount,
* or we can forcibly remove the file from the preallocation
* list, which will leak blocks on disk. Lets pin the inode
* and let the admin know what is going on.
*/
igrab(inode);
reiserfs_warning(inode->i_sb, "clm-9001",
"pinning inode %lu because the "
"preallocation can't be freed",
inode->i_ino);
goto out;
}
}
reiserfs_update_inode_transaction(inode);
#ifdef REISERFS_PREALLOCATE
reiserfs_discard_prealloc(&th, inode);
#endif
err = journal_end(&th, inode->i_sb, 1);
/* copy back the error code from journal_begin */
if (!err)
err = jbegin_failure;
if (!err &&
(REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_pack_on_close_mask) &&
tail_has_to_be_packed(inode)) {
/* if regular file is released by last holder and it has been
appended (we append by unformatted node only) or its direct
item(s) had to be converted, then it may have to be
indirect2direct converted */
err = reiserfs_truncate_file(inode, 0);
}
out:
reiserfs_write_unlock(inode->i_sb);
mutex_unlock(&(REISERFS_I(inode)->tailpack));
return err;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WriteRiffHeader (FILE *outfile, WavpackContext *wpc, int64_t total_samples, int qmode)
{
int do_rf64 = 0, write_junk = 1;
ChunkHeader ds64hdr, datahdr, fmthdr;
RiffChunkHeader riffhdr;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
JunkChunk junkchunk;
WaveHeader wavhdr;
uint32_t bcount;
int64_t total_data_bytes, total_riff_bytes;
int num_channels = WavpackGetNumChannels (wpc);
int32_t channel_mask = WavpackGetChannelMask (wpc);
int32_t sample_rate = WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc);
int bytes_per_sample = WavpackGetBytesPerSample (wpc);
int bits_per_sample = WavpackGetBitsPerSample (wpc);
int format = WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) ? 3 : 1;
int wavhdrsize = 16;
if (format == 3 && WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) != 127) {
error_line ("can't create valid RIFF wav header for non-normalized floating data!");
return FALSE;
}
if (total_samples == -1)
total_samples = 0x7ffff000 / (bytes_per_sample * num_channels);
total_data_bytes = total_samples * bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
if (total_data_bytes > 0xff000000) {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so rf64", total_data_bytes);
write_junk = 0;
do_rf64 = 1;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so riff", total_data_bytes);
CLEAR (wavhdr);
wavhdr.FormatTag = format;
wavhdr.NumChannels = num_channels;
wavhdr.SampleRate = sample_rate;
wavhdr.BytesPerSecond = sample_rate * num_channels * bytes_per_sample;
wavhdr.BlockAlign = bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
if (num_channels > 2 || channel_mask != 0x5 - num_channels) {
wavhdrsize = sizeof (wavhdr);
wavhdr.cbSize = 22;
wavhdr.ValidBitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
wavhdr.SubFormat = format;
wavhdr.ChannelMask = channel_mask;
wavhdr.FormatTag = 0xfffe;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bytes_per_sample * 8;
wavhdr.GUID [4] = 0x10;
wavhdr.GUID [6] = 0x80;
wavhdr.GUID [9] = 0xaa;
wavhdr.GUID [11] = 0x38;
wavhdr.GUID [12] = 0x9b;
wavhdr.GUID [13] = 0x71;
}
strncpy (riffhdr.ckID, do_rf64 ? "RF64" : "RIFF", sizeof (riffhdr.ckID));
strncpy (riffhdr.formType, "WAVE", sizeof (riffhdr.formType));
total_riff_bytes = sizeof (riffhdr) + wavhdrsize + sizeof (datahdr) + ((total_data_bytes + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
if (do_rf64) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (ds64hdr) + sizeof (ds64_chunk);
if (write_junk) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (junkchunk);
strncpy (fmthdr.ckID, "fmt ", sizeof (fmthdr.ckID));
strncpy (datahdr.ckID, "data", sizeof (datahdr.ckID));
fmthdr.ckSize = wavhdrsize;
if (write_junk) {
CLEAR (junkchunk);
strncpy (junkchunk.ckID, "junk", sizeof (junkchunk.ckID));
junkchunk.ckSize = sizeof (junkchunk) - 8;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&junkchunk, ChunkHeaderFormat);
}
if (do_rf64) {
strncpy (ds64hdr.ckID, "ds64", sizeof (ds64hdr.ckID));
ds64hdr.ckSize = sizeof (ds64_chunk);
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
ds64_chunk.riffSize64 = total_riff_bytes;
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 = total_data_bytes;
ds64_chunk.sampleCount64 = total_samples;
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64hdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
}
else {
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_riff_bytes;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_data_bytes;
}
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&riffhdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&fmthdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&wavhdr, WaveHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&datahdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &riffhdr, sizeof (riffhdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (riffhdr) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64hdr, sizeof (ds64hdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64hdr))) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (ds64_chunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64_chunk))) ||
(write_junk && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &junkchunk, sizeof (junkchunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (junkchunk))) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &fmthdr, sizeof (fmthdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (fmthdr) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &wavhdr, wavhdrsize, &bcount) || bcount != wavhdrsize ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &datahdr, sizeof (datahdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (datahdr)) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: issue #27, do not overwrite stack on corrupt RF64 file
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 28,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout() {
if (!wait_for_policy_fetch_)
return;
LOG(WARNING) << "Timed out while waiting for the initial policy fetch. "
<< "The first session will start without policy.";
CancelWaitForPolicyFetch();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool arcmsr_get_firmware_spec(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
bool rtn = false;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A:
rtn = arcmsr_hbaA_get_config(acb);
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B:
rtn = arcmsr_hbaB_get_config(acb);
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C:
rtn = arcmsr_hbaC_get_config(acb);
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D:
rtn = arcmsr_hbaD_get_config(acb);
break;
default:
break;
}
if (acb->firm_numbers_queue > ARCMSR_MAX_OUTSTANDING_CMD)
acb->maxOutstanding = ARCMSR_MAX_OUTSTANDING_CMD;
else
acb->maxOutstanding = acb->firm_numbers_queue - 1;
acb->host->can_queue = acb->maxOutstanding;
return rtn;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~NodeIDPlusAttributeWrapper() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_remove_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg, struct list_head *list)
{
if (unlikely(list_empty(&alg->cra_list)))
return -ENOENT;
alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD;
crypto_notify(CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_UNREGISTER, alg);
list_del_init(&alg->cra_list);
crypto_remove_spawns(alg, list, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dmxProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
{
int ret;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
ret = dmxSaveRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType] (client);
/* For the following to work with PanoramiX, it assumes that Render
* wraps the ProcRenderVector after dmxRenderInit has been called.
*/
if (ret == Success) {
PicturePtr pSrc;
dmxPictPrivPtr pSrcPriv;
PicturePtr pDst;
dmxPictPrivPtr pDstPriv;
PictFormatPtr pFmt;
XRenderPictFormat *pFormat;
int size;
int scrnNum;
DMXScreenInfo *dmxScreen;
CARD8 *buffer;
CARD8 *end;
int space;
int nglyph;
char *glyphs;
char *curGlyph;
xGlyphElt *elt;
int nelt;
XGlyphElt8 *elts;
XGlyphElt8 *curElt;
GlyphSetPtr glyphSet;
dmxGlyphPrivPtr glyphPriv;
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pSrc,
stuff->src, PictureType, client, DixReadAccess);
pSrcPriv = DMX_GET_PICT_PRIV(pSrc);
if (!pSrcPriv->pict)
return ret;
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pDst,
stuff->dst, PictureType,
client, DixWriteAccess);
pDstPriv = DMX_GET_PICT_PRIV(pDst);
if (!pDstPriv->pict)
return ret;
scrnNum = pDst->pDrawable->pScreen->myNum;
dmxScreen = &dmxScreens[scrnNum];
/* Note: If the back-end display has been detached, then it
* should not be possible to reach here since the pSrcPriv->pict
* and pDstPriv->pict will have already been set to 0.
*/
if (!dmxScreen->beDisplay)
return ret;
if (stuff->maskFormat)
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pFmt,
stuff->maskFormat, PictFormatType,
client, DixReadAccess);
else
pFmt = NULL;
pFormat = dmxFindFormat(dmxScreen, pFmt);
switch (stuff->renderReqType) {
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs8:
size = sizeof(CARD8);
break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs16:
size = sizeof(CARD16);
break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs32:
size = sizeof(CARD32);
break;
default:
return BadPictOp; /* Can't happen */
}
buffer = (CARD8 *) (stuff + 1);
end = (CARD8 *) stuff + (stuff->length << 2);
nelt = 0;
nglyph = 0;
while (buffer + sizeof(xGlyphElt) < end) {
elt = (xGlyphElt *) buffer;
buffer += sizeof(xGlyphElt);
if (elt->len == 0xff) {
buffer += 4;
}
else {
nelt++;
nglyph += elt->len;
space = size * elt->len;
if (space & 3)
space += 4 - (space & 3);
buffer += space;
}
}
/* The following only works for Render version > 0.2 */
/* All of the XGlyphElt* structure sizes are identical */
elts = xallocarray(nelt, sizeof(XGlyphElt8));
if (!elts)
return BadAlloc;
glyphs = xallocarray(nglyph, size);
if (!glyphs) {
free(elts);
return BadAlloc;
}
buffer = (CARD8 *) (stuff + 1);
end = (CARD8 *) stuff + (stuff->length << 2);
curGlyph = glyphs;
curElt = elts;
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &glyphSet,
stuff->glyphset, GlyphSetType,
client, DixReadAccess);
glyphPriv = DMX_GET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet);
while (buffer + sizeof(xGlyphElt) < end) {
elt = (xGlyphElt *) buffer;
buffer += sizeof(xGlyphElt);
if (elt->len == 0xff) {
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &glyphSet,
*((CARD32 *) buffer),
GlyphSetType, client, DixReadAccess);
glyphPriv = DMX_GET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet);
buffer += 4;
}
else {
curElt->glyphset = glyphPriv->glyphSets[scrnNum];
curElt->xOff = elt->deltax;
curElt->yOff = elt->deltay;
curElt->nchars = elt->len;
curElt->chars = curGlyph;
memcpy(curGlyph, buffer, size * elt->len);
curGlyph += size * elt->len;
curElt++;
space = size * elt->len;
if (space & 3)
space += 4 - (space & 3);
buffer += space;
}
}
switch (stuff->renderReqType) {
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs8:
XRenderCompositeText8(dmxScreen->beDisplay, stuff->op,
pSrcPriv->pict, pDstPriv->pict,
pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc, 0, 0, elts, nelt);
break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs16:
XRenderCompositeText16(dmxScreen->beDisplay, stuff->op,
pSrcPriv->pict, pDstPriv->pict,
pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc,
0, 0, (XGlyphElt16 *) elts, nelt);
break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs32:
XRenderCompositeText32(dmxScreen->beDisplay, stuff->op,
pSrcPriv->pict, pDstPriv->pict,
pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc,
0, 0, (XGlyphElt32 *) elts, nelt);
break;
}
dmxSync(dmxScreen, FALSE);
free(elts);
free(glyphs);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> Document::applets()
{
return ensureCachedCollection(DocApplets);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoIsShader(GLuint shader,
uint32_t* result) {
*result = api()->glIsShaderFn(GetShaderServiceID(shader, resources_));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 10,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void touch_atime(const struct path *path)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = path->mnt;
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
struct timespec now;
if (inode->i_flags & S_NOATIME)
return;
if (IS_NOATIME(inode))
return;
if ((inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_NODIRATIME) && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return;
if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOATIME)
return;
if ((mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODIRATIME) && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return;
now = current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
if (!relatime_need_update(mnt, inode, now))
return;
if (timespec_equal(&inode->i_atime, &now))
return;
if (!sb_start_write_trylock(inode->i_sb))
return;
if (__mnt_want_write(mnt))
goto skip_update;
/*
* File systems can error out when updating inodes if they need to
* allocate new space to modify an inode (such is the case for
* Btrfs), but since we touch atime while walking down the path we
* really don't care if we failed to update the atime of the file,
* so just ignore the return value.
* We may also fail on filesystems that have the ability to make parts
* of the fs read only, e.g. subvolumes in Btrfs.
*/
update_time(inode, &now, S_ATIME);
__mnt_drop_write(mnt);
skip_update:
sb_end_write(inode->i_sb);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: header_put_be_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 56) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 48) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 40) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 32) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 25,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const CompositorElementId PropertyTreeState::GetCompositorElementId(
const CompositorElementIdSet& element_ids) const {
if (Effect()->GetCompositorElementId() &&
!element_ids.Contains(Effect()->GetCompositorElementId()))
return Effect()->GetCompositorElementId();
if (Transform()->GetCompositorElementId() &&
!element_ids.Contains(Transform()->GetCompositorElementId()))
return Transform()->GetCompositorElementId();
return CompositorElementId();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeString8(result);
data.writeString8(String8(prefix ? prefix : ""));
remote()->transact(DUMP, data, &reply);
reply.readString8();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *jsvGetNativeFunctionPtr(const JsVar *function) {
/* see descriptions in jsvar.h. If we have a child called JSPARSE_FUNCTION_CODE_NAME
* then we execute code straight from that */
JsVar *flatString = jsvFindChildFromString((JsVar*)function, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_CODE_NAME, 0);
if (flatString) {
flatString = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(flatString);
void *v = (void*)((size_t)function->varData.native.ptr + (char*)jsvGetFlatStringPointer(flatString));
jsvUnLock(flatString);
return v;
} else
return (void *)function->varData.native.ptr;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_filename(struct xdr_stream *xdr, char *name, u32 *length)
{
__be32 *p;
u32 count;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_overflow;
count = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p));
if (count > 255)
goto out_nametoolong;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, count);
if (!p)
goto out_overflow;
memcpy(name, p, count);
name[count] = 0;
*length = count;
return 0;
out_nametoolong:
pr_err("%s: returned a too long filename: %u\n", __func__, count);
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
out_overflow:
pr_err("%s: premature end of packet\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int param_set_scroll_speed(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) {
unsigned long speed;
if (!val || kstrtoul(val, 0, &speed) || speed > 63)
return -EINVAL;
scroll_speed = speed;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_report(transport_smart *transport, git_push *push)
{
git_pkt *pkt = NULL;
const char *line_end = NULL;
gitno_buffer *buf = &transport->buffer;
int error, recvd;
git_buf data_pkt_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
for (;;) {
if (buf->offset > 0)
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, buf->data,
&line_end, buf->offset);
else
error = GIT_EBUFS;
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_EBUFS) {
error = -1;
goto done;
}
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0) {
error = recvd;
goto done;
}
if (recvd == 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "early EOF");
error = GIT_EEOF;
goto done;
}
continue;
}
gitno_consume(buf, line_end);
error = 0;
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
switch (pkt->type) {
case GIT_PKT_DATA:
/* This is a sideband packet which contains other packets */
error = add_push_report_sideband_pkt(push, (git_pkt_data *)pkt, &data_pkt_buf);
break;
case GIT_PKT_ERR:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "report-status: Error reported: %s",
((git_pkt_err *)pkt)->error);
error = -1;
break;
case GIT_PKT_PROGRESS:
if (transport->progress_cb) {
git_pkt_progress *p = (git_pkt_progress *) pkt;
error = transport->progress_cb(p->data, p->len, transport->message_cb_payload);
}
break;
default:
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
break;
}
git_pkt_free(pkt);
/* add_push_report_pkt returns GIT_ITEROVER when it receives a flush */
if (error == GIT_ITEROVER) {
error = 0;
if (data_pkt_buf.size > 0) {
/* If there was data remaining in the pack data buffer,
* then the server sent a partial pkt-line */
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Incomplete pack data pkt-line");
error = GIT_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
if (error < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
done:
git_buf_free(&data_pkt_buf);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 3,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct sctp_ulpevent *event = NULL;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
int skb_len;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_recvmsg(%s: %p, %s: %p, %s: %zd, %s: %d, %s: "
"0x%x, %s: %p)\n", "sk", sk, "msghdr", msg,
"len", len, "knoblauch", noblock,
"flags", flags, "addr_len", addr_len);
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && !sctp_sstate(sk, ESTABLISHED)) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
skb = sctp_skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
/* Get the total length of the skb including any skb's in the
* frag_list.
*/
skb_len = skb->len;
copied = skb_len;
if (copied > len)
copied = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (err)
goto out_free;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
if (sctp_ulpevent_is_notification(event)) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_NOTIFICATION;
sp->pf->event_msgname(event, msg->msg_name, addr_len);
} else {
sp->pf->skb_msgname(skb, msg->msg_name, addr_len);
}
/* Check if we allow SCTP_SNDRCVINFO. */
if (sp->subscribe.sctp_data_io_event)
sctp_ulpevent_read_sndrcvinfo(event, msg);
#if 0
/* FIXME: we should be calling IP/IPv6 layers. */
if (sk->sk_protinfo.af_inet.cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#endif
err = copied;
/* If skb's length exceeds the user's buffer, update the skb and
* push it back to the receive_queue so that the next call to
* recvmsg() will return the remaining data. Don't set MSG_EOR.
*/
if (skb_len > copied) {
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK)
goto out_free;
sctp_skb_pull(skb, copied);
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
/* When only partial message is copied to the user, increase
* rwnd by that amount. If all the data in the skb is read,
* rwnd is updated when the event is freed.
*/
sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase(event->asoc, copied);
goto out;
} else if ((event->msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) ||
(event->msg_flags & MSG_EOR))
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
else
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
out_free:
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
/* Release the skb reference acquired after peeking the skb in
* sctp_skb_recv_datagram().
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
/* Free the event which includes releasing the reference to
* the owner of the skb, freeing the skb and updating the
* rwnd.
*/
sctp_ulpevent_free(event);
}
out:
sctp_release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: s_bitwidth_to_subformat (int bits)
{ static int array [] =
{ SF_FORMAT_PCM_S8, SF_FORMAT_PCM_16, SF_FORMAT_PCM_24, SF_FORMAT_PCM_32
} ;
if (bits < 8 || bits > 32)
return 0 ;
return array [((bits + 7) / 8) - 1] ;
} /* bitwidth_to_subformat */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool CheckGsm(const uint8* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size >= 1024); // Need enough data to do a decent check.
int offset = 0;
while (offset < buffer_size) {
RCHECK((buffer[offset] & 0xf0) == 0xd0);
offset += 33;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sequencer_write(int dev, struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int count)
{
unsigned char event_rec[EV_SZ], ev_code;
int p = 0, c, ev_size;
int mode = translate_mode(file);
dev = dev >> 4;
DEB(printk("sequencer_write(dev=%d, count=%d)\n", dev, count));
if (mode == OPEN_READ)
return -EIO;
c = count;
while (c >= 4)
{
if (copy_from_user((char *) event_rec, &(buf)[p], 4))
goto out;
ev_code = event_rec[0];
if (ev_code == SEQ_FULLSIZE)
{
int err, fmt;
dev = *(unsigned short *) &event_rec[2];
if (dev < 0 || dev >= max_synthdev || synth_devs[dev] == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(synth_open_mask & (1 << dev)))
return -ENXIO;
fmt = (*(short *) &event_rec[0]) & 0xffff;
err = synth_devs[dev]->load_patch(dev, fmt, buf, p + 4, c, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return err;
}
if (ev_code >= 128)
{
if (seq_mode == SEQ_2 && ev_code == SEQ_EXTENDED)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "Sequencer: Invalid level 2 event %x\n", ev_code);
return -EINVAL;
}
ev_size = 8;
if (c < ev_size)
{
if (!seq_playing)
seq_startplay();
return count - c;
}
if (copy_from_user((char *)&event_rec[4],
&(buf)[p + 4], 4))
goto out;
}
else
{
if (seq_mode == SEQ_2)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "Sequencer: 4 byte event in level 2 mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ev_size = 4;
if (event_rec[0] != SEQ_MIDIPUTC)
obsolete_api_used = 1;
}
if (event_rec[0] == SEQ_MIDIPUTC)
{
if (!midi_opened[event_rec[2]])
{
int err, mode;
int dev = event_rec[2];
if (dev >= max_mididev || midi_devs[dev]==NULL)
{
/*printk("Sequencer Error: Nonexistent MIDI device %d\n", dev);*/
return -ENXIO;
}
mode = translate_mode(file);
if ((err = midi_devs[dev]->open(dev, mode,
sequencer_midi_input, sequencer_midi_output)) < 0)
{
seq_reset();
printk(KERN_WARNING "Sequencer Error: Unable to open Midi #%d\n", dev);
return err;
}
midi_opened[dev] = 1;
}
}
if (!seq_queue(event_rec, (file->f_flags & (O_NONBLOCK) ? 1 : 0)))
{
int processed = count - c;
if (!seq_playing)
seq_startplay();
if (!processed && (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))
return -EAGAIN;
else
return processed;
}
p += ev_size;
c -= ev_size;
}
if (!seq_playing)
seq_startplay();
out:
return count;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 9,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void methodWithCallbackInterfaceArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sysfs_add_func(struct work_struct *w)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
down_write(&slub_lock);
list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
if (s->flags & __SYSFS_ADD_DEFERRED) {
s->flags &= ~__SYSFS_ADD_DEFERRED;
sysfs_slab_add(s);
}
}
up_write(&slub_lock);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 2,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ndp_msgra_router_lifetime_set(struct ndp_msgra *msgra,
uint16_t router_lifetime)
{
msgra->ra->nd_ra_router_lifetime = htons(router_lifetime);
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 17,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserTabStripController::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int model_index) {
SetTabDataAt(new_contents->web_contents(), model_index);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsWindow::InspectedWebContentsObserver::InspectedWebContentsObserver(
content::WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Mac_Read_POST_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* pfb_data;
int i, type, flags;
FT_Long len;
FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
FT_Long rlen, temp;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index != 0 )
return error;
/* Find the length of all the POST resources, concatenated. Assume */
/* worst case (each resource in its own section). */
pfb_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_len += temp + 6;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_data[0] = 0x80;
pfb_data[1] = 1; /* Ascii section */
pfb_data[2] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[3] = 0;
pfb_data[4] = 0;
pfb_data[5] = 0;
pfb_pos = 6;
pfb_lenpos = 2;
len = 0;
type = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) )
goto Exit;
FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n",
i, offsets[i], rlen, flags ));
/* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2. */
/* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */
if ( rlen > 2 )
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type )
len += rlen;
else
{
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */
break;
if ( pfb_pos + 6 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
type = flags >> 8;
len = rlen;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = (FT_Byte)type;
pfb_lenpos = pfb_pos;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
}
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
pfb_pos += rlen;
}
if ( pfb_pos + 2 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 3;
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
return open_face_from_buffer( library,
pfb_data,
pfb_pos,
face_index,
"type1",
aface );
Exit2:
FT_FREE( pfb_data );
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 4,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::prepareTexture() {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu",
"WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::SwapBuffers",
"frame", frame_number_);
frame_number_++;
if (ShouldUseSwapClient())
swap_client_->OnViewContextSwapBuffersPosted();
if (command_buffer_->GetLastState().error == gpu::error::kNoError)
gl_->SwapBuffers();
command_buffer_->Echo(base::Bind(
&WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::OnSwapBuffersComplete,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
gl_->Flush();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool canCollapseMarginAfterWithChildren() const { return m_canCollapseMarginAfterWithChildren; }
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DictionaryValue* AppSettingSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::AppSettingSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(extension_setting, ExtensionSettingSpecificsToValue);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 5,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trace (const char *format, ...)
#else
trace (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
static FILE *tracefp = (FILE *)NULL;
if (tracefp == NULL)
tracefp = fopen("/tmp/bash-trace.log", "a+");
if (tracefp == NULL)
tracefp = stderr;
else
fcntl (fileno (tracefp), F_SETFD, 1); /* close-on-exec */
fprintf(tracefp, "TRACE: pid %ld: ", (long)getpid());
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (tracefp, format, args);
fprintf (tracefp, "\n");
va_end (args);
fflush(tracefp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EditorClientBlackBerry::spellCheckerDocumentTag()
{
notImplemented();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aac_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
{
unsigned index = id->driver_data;
struct Scsi_Host *shost;
struct aac_dev *aac;
struct list_head *insert = &aac_devices;
int error = -ENODEV;
int unique_id = 0;
u64 dmamask;
extern int aac_sync_mode;
list_for_each_entry(aac, &aac_devices, entry) {
if (aac->id > unique_id)
break;
insert = &aac->entry;
unique_id++;
}
pci_disable_link_state(pdev, PCIE_LINK_STATE_L0S | PCIE_LINK_STATE_L1 |
PCIE_LINK_STATE_CLKPM);
error = pci_enable_device(pdev);
if (error)
goto out;
error = -ENODEV;
/*
* If the quirk31 bit is set, the adapter needs adapter
* to driver communication memory to be allocated below 2gig
*/
if (aac_drivers[index].quirks & AAC_QUIRK_31BIT)
dmamask = DMA_BIT_MASK(31);
else
dmamask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32);
if (pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, dmamask) ||
pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, dmamask))
goto out_disable_pdev;
pci_set_master(pdev);
shost = scsi_host_alloc(&aac_driver_template, sizeof(struct aac_dev));
if (!shost)
goto out_disable_pdev;
shost->irq = pdev->irq;
shost->unique_id = unique_id;
shost->max_cmd_len = 16;
aac = (struct aac_dev *)shost->hostdata;
aac->base_start = pci_resource_start(pdev, 0);
aac->scsi_host_ptr = shost;
aac->pdev = pdev;
aac->name = aac_driver_template.name;
aac->id = shost->unique_id;
aac->cardtype = index;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aac->entry);
aac->fibs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fib) * (shost->can_queue + AAC_NUM_MGT_FIB), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aac->fibs)
goto out_free_host;
spin_lock_init(&aac->fib_lock);
/*
* Map in the registers from the adapter.
*/
aac->base_size = AAC_MIN_FOOTPRINT_SIZE;
if ((*aac_drivers[index].init)(aac))
goto out_unmap;
if (aac->sync_mode) {
if (aac_sync_mode)
printk(KERN_INFO "%s%d: Sync. mode enforced "
"by driver parameter. This will cause "
"a significant performance decrease!\n",
aac->name,
aac->id);
else
printk(KERN_INFO "%s%d: Async. mode not supported "
"by current driver, sync. mode enforced."
"\nPlease update driver to get full performance.\n",
aac->name,
aac->id);
}
/*
* Start any kernel threads needed
*/
aac->thread = kthread_run(aac_command_thread, aac, AAC_DRIVERNAME);
if (IS_ERR(aac->thread)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "aacraid: Unable to create command thread.\n");
error = PTR_ERR(aac->thread);
aac->thread = NULL;
goto out_deinit;
}
/*
* If we had set a smaller DMA mask earlier, set it to 4gig
* now since the adapter can dma data to at least a 4gig
* address space.
*/
if (aac_drivers[index].quirks & AAC_QUIRK_31BIT)
if (pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32)))
goto out_deinit;
aac->maximum_num_channels = aac_drivers[index].channels;
error = aac_get_adapter_info(aac);
if (error < 0)
goto out_deinit;
/*
* Lets override negotiations and drop the maximum SG limit to 34
*/
if ((aac_drivers[index].quirks & AAC_QUIRK_34SG) &&
(shost->sg_tablesize > 34)) {
shost->sg_tablesize = 34;
shost->max_sectors = (shost->sg_tablesize * 8) + 112;
}
if ((aac_drivers[index].quirks & AAC_QUIRK_17SG) &&
(shost->sg_tablesize > 17)) {
shost->sg_tablesize = 17;
shost->max_sectors = (shost->sg_tablesize * 8) + 112;
}
error = pci_set_dma_max_seg_size(pdev,
(aac->adapter_info.options & AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(shost->max_sectors << 9) : 65536);
if (error)
goto out_deinit;
/*
* Firmware printf works only with older firmware.
*/
if (aac_drivers[index].quirks & AAC_QUIRK_34SG)
aac->printf_enabled = 1;
else
aac->printf_enabled = 0;
/*
* max channel will be the physical channels plus 1 virtual channel
* all containers are on the virtual channel 0 (CONTAINER_CHANNEL)
* physical channels are address by their actual physical number+1
*/
if (aac->nondasd_support || expose_physicals || aac->jbod)
shost->max_channel = aac->maximum_num_channels;
else
shost->max_channel = 0;
aac_get_config_status(aac, 0);
aac_get_containers(aac);
list_add(&aac->entry, insert);
shost->max_id = aac->maximum_num_containers;
if (shost->max_id < aac->maximum_num_physicals)
shost->max_id = aac->maximum_num_physicals;
if (shost->max_id < MAXIMUM_NUM_CONTAINERS)
shost->max_id = MAXIMUM_NUM_CONTAINERS;
else
shost->this_id = shost->max_id;
/*
* dmb - we may need to move the setting of these parms somewhere else once
* we get a fib that can report the actual numbers
*/
shost->max_lun = AAC_MAX_LUN;
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, shost);
error = scsi_add_host(shost, &pdev->dev);
if (error)
goto out_deinit;
scsi_scan_host(shost);
return 0;
out_deinit:
__aac_shutdown(aac);
out_unmap:
aac_fib_map_free(aac);
if (aac->comm_addr)
pci_free_consistent(aac->pdev, aac->comm_size, aac->comm_addr,
aac->comm_phys);
kfree(aac->queues);
aac_adapter_ioremap(aac, 0);
kfree(aac->fibs);
kfree(aac->fsa_dev);
out_free_host:
scsi_host_put(shost);
out_disable_pdev:
pci_disable_device(pdev);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
DoubleOrString result;
impl->doubleOrStringAttribute(result);
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sc_asn1_decode_utf8string(const u8 *inbuf, size_t inlen,
u8 *out, size_t *outlen)
{
if (inlen+1 > *outlen)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
*outlen = inlen+1;
memcpy(out, inbuf, inlen);
out[inlen] = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 2,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(getprotobyname)
{
char *name;
int name_len;
struct protoent *ent;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ent = getprotobyname(name);
if (ent == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(ent->p_proto);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be32 nfsd4_encode_fsloc_fsroot(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp, const struct path *path)
{
struct svc_export *exp_ps;
__be32 res;
exp_ps = rqst_find_fsidzero_export(rqstp);
if (IS_ERR(exp_ps))
return nfserrno(PTR_ERR(exp_ps));
res = nfsd4_encode_path(xdr, &exp_ps->ex_path, path);
exp_put(exp_ps);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 18,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_disabled(struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, "#\n"
"# Stack tracer disabled\n"
"#\n"
"# To enable the stack tracer, either add 'stacktrace' to the\n"
"# kernel command line\n"
"# or 'echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/stack_tracer_enabled'\n"
"#\n");
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_heap_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *object = (zval*)((zend_user_iterator *)iter)->it.data;
spl_heap_it *iterator = (spl_heap_it *)iter;
spl_ptr_heap_element elem;
if (iterator->object->heap->flags & SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Heap is corrupted, heap properties are no longer ensured.", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
elem = spl_ptr_heap_delete_top(iterator->object->heap, object TSRMLS_CC);
if (elem != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor((zval **)&elem);
}
zend_user_it_invalidate_current(iter TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t poison_store(struct kmem_cache *s,
const char *buf, size_t length)
{
if (any_slab_objects(s))
return -EBUSY;
s->flags &= ~SLAB_POISON;
if (buf[0] == '1')
s->flags |= SLAB_POISON;
calculate_sizes(s, -1);
return length;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pvc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int error;
lock_sock(sk);
error = vcc_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
Commit Message: atm: fix info leak via getsockname()
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TaskRunner* RenderMessageFilter::OverrideTaskRunnerForMessage(
const IPC::Message& message) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (message.type() == ViewHostMsg_GetMonitorColorProfile::ID)
return BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool();
#endif
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 8,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int req_ap_get_server_port(request_rec *r)
{
return (int) ap_get_server_port(r);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcSetDashes(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
int result;
REQUEST(xSetDashesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xSetDashesReq, stuff->nDashes);
if (stuff->nDashes == 0) {
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
result = dixLookupGC(&pGC, stuff->gc, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
/* If there's an error, either there's no sensible errorValue,
* or there was a dash segment of 0. */
client->errorValue = 0;
return SetDashes(pGC, stuff->dashOffset, stuff->nDashes,
(unsigned char *) &stuff[1]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 13,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_proc_exit(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
sctp_snmp_proc_exit(net);
sctp_eps_proc_exit(net);
sctp_assocs_proc_exit(net);
sctp_remaddr_proc_exit(net);
remove_proc_entry("sctp", net->proc_net);
net->sctp.proc_net_sctp = NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold void uninit(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
av_expr_free(s->comp_expr[i]);
s->comp_expr[i] = NULL;
av_freep(&s->comp_expr_str[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::ShouldSwapProcessesForRedirect(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
return CrossesExtensionProcessBoundary(
ExtensionRegistry::Get(browser_context)->enabled_extensions(),
current_url, new_url, false);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool is_local_source() { return data_source_->assume_fully_buffered(); }
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 56
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_dict_get_key(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, int i)
{
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_DICT(obj))
return NULL;
if (i < 0 || i >= DICT(obj)->len)
return NULL;
return DICT(obj)->items[i].k;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 23,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int err;
if (level != SOL_IP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = do_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL &&
optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY &&
optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY &&
!ip_mroute_opt(optname)) {
lock_sock(sk);
err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
}
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options
Andrey Konovalov got crashes in __ip_options_echo() when a NULL skb->dst
is accessed.
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare() should not drop the dst if (evil) IP options
are present.
We could refine the test to the presence of ts_needtime or srr,
but IP options are not often used, so let's be conservative.
Thanks to syzkaller team for finding this bug.
Fixes: d826eb14ecef ("ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst reference")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 21,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Initialize(bool dump_at_crash) {
request_dump_ = dump_at_crash ? 1 : 0;
SetSanitizationInfo(crash_reporter::GetCrashReporterClient(),
&sanitization_);
server_fd_ = base::GlobalDescriptors::GetInstance()->Get(
service_manager::kCrashDumpSignal);
return Signals::InstallCrashHandlers(HandleCrash, 0, &old_actions_);
}
Commit Message: Add Android SDK version to crash reports.
Bug: 911669
Change-Id: I62a97d76a0b88099a5a42b93463307f03be9b3e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1361104
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Michael van Ouwerkerk <mvanouwerkerk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615851}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::HandleAccessibleAction(
const ui::AXActionData& action_data) {
if (read_only())
return Textfield::HandleAccessibleAction(action_data);
if (action_data.action == ui::AX_ACTION_SET_VALUE) {
SetUserText(action_data.value, true);
return true;
} else if (action_data.action == ui::AX_ACTION_REPLACE_SELECTED_TEXT) {
model()->SetInputInProgress(true);
if (saved_selection_for_focus_change_.IsValid()) {
SelectRange(saved_selection_for_focus_change_);
saved_selection_for_focus_change_ = gfx::Range::InvalidRange();
}
InsertOrReplaceText(action_data.value);
TextChanged();
return true;
}
return Textfield::HandleAccessibleAction(action_data);
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 12,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_proc_dointvec_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
int *valp,
int write, void *data)
{
if (write) {
if (*lvalp > LONG_MAX / HZ)
return 1;
*valp = *negp ? -(*lvalp*HZ) : (*lvalp*HZ);
} else {
int val = *valp;
unsigned long lval;
if (val < 0) {
*negp = true;
lval = (unsigned long)-val;
} else {
*negp = false;
lval = (unsigned long)val;
}
*lvalp = lval / HZ;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reds_char_device_remove_state(SpiceCharDeviceState *st)
{
RingItem *item;
RING_FOREACH(item, &reds->char_devs_states) {
SpiceCharDeviceStateItem *st_item;
st_item = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(item, SpiceCharDeviceStateItem, link);
if (st_item->st == st) {
ring_remove(item);
free(st_item);
return;
}
}
spice_error("char dev state not found %p", st);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RedChannelClient *red_client_get_channel(RedClient *client, int type, int id)
{
RingItem *link;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
RedChannelClient *ret = NULL;
RING_FOREACH(link, &client->channels) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, client_link);
if (rcc->channel->type == type && rcc->channel->id == id) {
ret = rcc;
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebviewHandler::~WebviewHandler() {
}
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_initialize(OnigEncoding encodings[], int n)
{
int i;
int r;
if (onig_inited != 0)
return 0;
onigenc_init();
onig_inited = 1;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
OnigEncoding enc = encodings[i];
r = onig_initialize_encoding(enc);
if (r != 0)
return r;
}
return ONIG_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdf_unpack_header(cdf_header_t *h, char *buf)
{
size_t i;
size_t len = 0;
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_magic);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_uuid);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_revision);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_version);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_byte_order);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_sec_size_p2);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_short_sec_size_p2);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_unused0);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_directory);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_unused1);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_min_size_standard_stream);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_sector_in_short_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_short_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_sector_in_master_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat);
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(h->h_master_sat); i++)
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_master_sat[i]);
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u8 ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(char *cipher_name, size_t key_bytes)
{
int i;
u8 code = 0;
struct ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map_elem *map =
ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map;
if (strcmp(cipher_name, "aes") == 0) {
switch (key_bytes) {
case 16:
code = RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_128;
break;
case 24:
code = RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_192;
break;
case 32:
code = RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map); i++)
if (strcmp(cipher_name, map[i].cipher_str) == 0) {
code = map[i].cipher_code;
break;
}
}
return code;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScrollObserver(double delta_x, double delta_y) { Reset(delta_x, delta_y); }
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 28,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void efx_fini_struct(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < EFX_MAX_CHANNELS; i++)
kfree(efx->channel[i]);
if (efx->workqueue) {
destroy_workqueue(efx->workqueue);
efx->workqueue = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_events(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
if (optlen > sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* At the time when a user app subscribes to SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT,
* if there is no data to be sent or retransmit, the stack will
* immediately send up this notification.
*/
if (sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled(SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT,
&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe)) {
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, 0);
if (asoc && sctp_outq_is_empty(&asoc->outqueue)) {
event = sctp_ulpevent_make_sender_dry_event(asoc,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!event)
return -ENOMEM;
sctp_ulpq_tail_event(&asoc->ulpq, event);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static s64 cpu_rt_runtime_read(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
struct cftype *cft)
{
return sched_group_rt_runtime(css_tg(css));
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::enqueuePageshowEvent(PageshowEventPersistence persisted)
{
dispatchWindowEvent(PageTransitionEvent::create(eventNames().pageshowEvent, persisted), this);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_da_write_end(struct file *file,
struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied,
struct page *page, void *fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int ret = 0, ret2;
handle_t *handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
loff_t new_i_size;
unsigned long start, end;
int write_mode = (int)(unsigned long)fsdata;
if (write_mode == FALL_BACK_TO_NONDELALLOC) {
if (ext4_should_order_data(inode)) {
return ext4_ordered_write_end(file, mapping, pos,
len, copied, page, fsdata);
} else if (ext4_should_writeback_data(inode)) {
return ext4_writeback_write_end(file, mapping, pos,
len, copied, page, fsdata);
} else {
BUG();
}
}
trace_ext4_da_write_end(inode, pos, len, copied);
start = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
end = start + copied - 1;
/*
* generic_write_end() will run mark_inode_dirty() if i_size
* changes. So let's piggyback the i_disksize mark_inode_dirty
* into that.
*/
new_i_size = pos + copied;
if (new_i_size > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize) {
if (ext4_da_should_update_i_disksize(page, end)) {
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (new_i_size > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize) {
/*
* Updating i_disksize when extending file
* without needing block allocation
*/
if (ext4_should_order_data(inode))
ret = ext4_jbd2_file_inode(handle,
inode);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = new_i_size;
}
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/* We need to mark inode dirty even if
* new_i_size is less that inode->i_size
* bu greater than i_disksize.(hint delalloc)
*/
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
}
ret2 = generic_write_end(file, mapping, pos, len, copied,
page, fsdata);
copied = ret2;
if (ret2 < 0)
ret = ret2;
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = ret2;
return ret ? ret : copied;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPolicies(
bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPoliciesEnabled(
enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 2,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PanoramiXRenderTriangles(ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderTrianglesReq);
char *extra;
int extra_len;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderTrianglesReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
extra_len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderTrianglesReq);
if (extra_len &&
(extra = (char *) malloc(extra_len))) {
memcpy (extra, stuff + 1, extra_len);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
if (j) memcpy (stuff + 1, extra, extra_len);
if (dst->u.pict.root) {
int x_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
int y_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
if(x_off || y_off) {
xTriangle *tri = (xTriangle *) (stuff + 1);
int i = extra_len / sizeof (xTriangle);
while (i--) {
tri->p1.x -= x_off;
tri->p1.y -= y_off;
tri->p2.x -= x_off;
tri->p2.y -= y_off;
tri->p3.x -= x_off;
tri->p3.y -= y_off;
tri++;
}
}
}
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
result =
(*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderTriangles]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
free(extra);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void show_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
if (!mm)
mm = &init_mm;
printk(KERN_ALERT "pgd = %p\n", mm->pgd);
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
printk(KERN_ALERT "[%08lx] *pgd=%08llx",
addr, (long long)pgd_val(*pgd));
do {
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
if (pgd_none(*pgd))
break;
if (pgd_bad(*pgd)) {
printk("(bad)");
break;
}
pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
if (PTRS_PER_PUD != 1)
printk(", *pud=%08lx", pud_val(*pud));
if (pud_none(*pud))
break;
if (pud_bad(*pud)) {
printk("(bad)");
break;
}
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
if (PTRS_PER_PMD != 1)
printk(", *pmd=%08llx", (long long)pmd_val(*pmd));
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
break;
if (pmd_bad(*pmd)) {
printk("(bad)");
break;
}
/* We must not map this if we have highmem enabled */
if (PageHighMem(pfn_to_page(pmd_val(*pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT)))
break;
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
printk(", *pte=%08llx", (long long)pte_val(*pte));
printk(", *ppte=%08llx",
(long long)pte_val(pte[PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]));
pte_unmap(pte);
} while(0);
printk("\n");
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::SupportsSpeech() const {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestInterfaceEmpty> result(imp->perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute());
if (result && DOMDataStore::setReturnValueFromWrapper<V8TestInterfaceEmpty>(info.GetReturnValue(), result.get()))
return;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> wrapper = toV8(result.get(), info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty()) {
V8HiddenValue::setHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute"), wrapper);
v8SetReturnValue(info, wrapper);
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::resetScrollbars()
{
m_firstLayout = true;
setScrollbarsSuppressed(true);
if (m_canHaveScrollbars)
setScrollbarModes(ScrollbarAuto, ScrollbarAuto);
else
setScrollbarModes(ScrollbarAlwaysOff, ScrollbarAlwaysOff);
setScrollbarsSuppressed(false);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AudioNode::DisconnectFromOutputIfConnected(unsigned output_index,
AudioParam& param) {
AudioNodeOutput& output = Handler().Output(output_index);
if (!output.IsConnectedToAudioParam(param.Handler()))
return false;
output.DisconnectAudioParam(param.Handler());
connected_params_[output_index]->erase(¶m);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getPath)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(phar_obj->archive->fname, phar_obj->archive->fname_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setup_swap_extents(struct swap_info_struct *sis, sector_t *span)
{
struct inode *inode;
unsigned blocks_per_page;
unsigned long page_no;
unsigned blkbits;
sector_t probe_block;
sector_t last_block;
sector_t lowest_block = -1;
sector_t highest_block = 0;
int nr_extents = 0;
int ret;
inode = sis->swap_file->f_mapping->host;
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
ret = add_swap_extent(sis, 0, sis->max, 0);
*span = sis->pages;
goto out;
}
blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
blocks_per_page = PAGE_SIZE >> blkbits;
/*
* Map all the blocks into the extent list. This code doesn't try
* to be very smart.
*/
probe_block = 0;
page_no = 0;
last_block = i_size_read(inode) >> blkbits;
while ((probe_block + blocks_per_page) <= last_block &&
page_no < sis->max) {
unsigned block_in_page;
sector_t first_block;
first_block = bmap(inode, probe_block);
if (first_block == 0)
goto bad_bmap;
/*
* It must be PAGE_SIZE aligned on-disk
*/
if (first_block & (blocks_per_page - 1)) {
probe_block++;
goto reprobe;
}
for (block_in_page = 1; block_in_page < blocks_per_page;
block_in_page++) {
sector_t block;
block = bmap(inode, probe_block + block_in_page);
if (block == 0)
goto bad_bmap;
if (block != first_block + block_in_page) {
/* Discontiguity */
probe_block++;
goto reprobe;
}
}
first_block >>= (PAGE_SHIFT - blkbits);
if (page_no) { /* exclude the header page */
if (first_block < lowest_block)
lowest_block = first_block;
if (first_block > highest_block)
highest_block = first_block;
}
/*
* We found a PAGE_SIZE-length, PAGE_SIZE-aligned run of blocks
*/
ret = add_swap_extent(sis, page_no, 1, first_block);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
nr_extents += ret;
page_no++;
probe_block += blocks_per_page;
reprobe:
continue;
}
ret = nr_extents;
*span = 1 + highest_block - lowest_block;
if (page_no == 0)
page_no = 1; /* force Empty message */
sis->max = page_no;
sis->pages = page_no - 1;
sis->highest_bit = page_no - 1;
out:
return ret;
bad_bmap:
printk(KERN_ERR "swapon: swapfile has holes\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::enableAutoSizeMode(const IntSize& minSize, const IntSize& maxSize)
{
if (!m_autoSizeInfo)
m_autoSizeInfo = adoptPtr(new FrameViewAutoSizeInfo(this));
m_autoSizeInfo->configureAutoSizeMode(minSize, maxSize);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI void php_pcre_split_impl(pcre_cache_entry *pce, char *subject, int subject_len, zval *return_value,
long limit_val, long flags TSRMLS_DC)
{
pcre_extra *extra = NULL; /* Holds results of studying */
pcre *re_bump = NULL; /* Regex instance for empty matches */
pcre_extra *extra_bump = NULL; /* Almost dummy */
pcre_extra extra_data; /* Used locally for exec options */
int *offsets; /* Array of subpattern offsets */
int size_offsets; /* Size of the offsets array */
int exoptions = 0; /* Execution options */
int count = 0; /* Count of matched subpatterns */
int start_offset; /* Where the new search starts */
int next_offset; /* End of the last delimiter match + 1 */
int g_notempty = 0; /* If the match should not be empty */
char *last_match; /* Location of last match */
int rc;
int no_empty; /* If NO_EMPTY flag is set */
int delim_capture; /* If delimiters should be captured */
int offset_capture; /* If offsets should be captured */
no_empty = flags & PREG_SPLIT_NO_EMPTY;
delim_capture = flags & PREG_SPLIT_DELIM_CAPTURE;
offset_capture = flags & PREG_SPLIT_OFFSET_CAPTURE;
if (limit_val == 0) {
limit_val = -1;
}
if (extra == NULL) {
extra_data.flags = PCRE_EXTRA_MATCH_LIMIT | PCRE_EXTRA_MATCH_LIMIT_RECURSION;
extra = &extra_data;
}
extra->match_limit = PCRE_G(backtrack_limit);
extra->match_limit_recursion = PCRE_G(recursion_limit);
/* Initialize return value */
array_init(return_value);
/* Calculate the size of the offsets array, and allocate memory for it. */
rc = pcre_fullinfo(pce->re, extra, PCRE_INFO_CAPTURECOUNT, &size_offsets);
if (rc < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Internal pcre_fullinfo() error %d", rc);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size_offsets = (size_offsets + 1) * 3;
offsets = (int *)safe_emalloc(size_offsets, sizeof(int), 0);
/* Start at the beginning of the string */
start_offset = 0;
next_offset = 0;
last_match = subject;
PCRE_G(error_code) = PHP_PCRE_NO_ERROR;
/* Get next piece if no limit or limit not yet reached and something matched*/
while ((limit_val == -1 || limit_val > 1)) {
count = pcre_exec(pce->re, extra, subject,
subject_len, start_offset,
exoptions|g_notempty, offsets, size_offsets);
/* the string was already proved to be valid UTF-8 */
exoptions |= PCRE_NO_UTF8_CHECK;
/* Check for too many substrings condition. */
if (count == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC,E_NOTICE, "Matched, but too many substrings");
count = size_offsets/3;
}
/* If something matched */
if (count > 0) {
if (!no_empty || &subject[offsets[0]] != last_match) {
if (offset_capture) {
/* Add (match, offset) pair to the return value */
add_offset_pair(return_value, last_match, &subject[offsets[0]]-last_match, next_offset, NULL);
} else {
/* Add the piece to the return value */
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, last_match,
&subject[offsets[0]]-last_match, 1);
}
/* One less left to do */
if (limit_val != -1)
limit_val--;
}
last_match = &subject[offsets[1]];
next_offset = offsets[1];
if (delim_capture) {
int i, match_len;
for (i = 1; i < count; i++) {
match_len = offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1];
/* If we have matched a delimiter */
if (!no_empty || match_len > 0) {
if (offset_capture) {
add_offset_pair(return_value, &subject[offsets[i<<1]], match_len, offsets[i<<1], NULL);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value,
&subject[offsets[i<<1]],
match_len, 1);
}
}
}
}
} else if (count == PCRE_ERROR_NOMATCH) {
/* If we previously set PCRE_NOTEMPTY after a null match,
this is not necessarily the end. We need to advance
the start offset, and continue. Fudge the offset values
to achieve this, unless we're already at the end of the string. */
if (g_notempty != 0 && start_offset < subject_len) {
if (pce->compile_options & PCRE_UTF8) {
if (re_bump == NULL) {
int dummy;
if ((re_bump = pcre_get_compiled_regex("/./us", &extra_bump, &dummy TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
count = pcre_exec(re_bump, extra_bump, subject,
subject_len, start_offset,
exoptions, offsets, size_offsets);
if (count < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown error");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
offsets[0] = start_offset;
offsets[1] = start_offset + 1;
}
} else
break;
} else {
pcre_handle_exec_error(count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
/* If we have matched an empty string, mimic what Perl's /g options does.
This turns out to be rather cunning. First we set PCRE_NOTEMPTY and try
the match again at the same point. If this fails (picked up above) we
advance to the next character. */
g_notempty = (offsets[1] == offsets[0])? PCRE_NOTEMPTY | PCRE_ANCHORED : 0;
/* Advance to the position right after the last full match */
start_offset = offsets[1];
}
start_offset = last_match - subject; /* the offset might have been incremented, but without further successful matches */
if (!no_empty || start_offset < subject_len)
{
if (offset_capture) {
/* Add the last (match, offset) pair to the return value */
add_offset_pair(return_value, &subject[start_offset], subject_len - start_offset, start_offset, NULL);
} else {
/* Add the last piece to the return value */
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, last_match, subject + subject_len - last_match, 1);
}
}
/* Clean up */
efree(offsets);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init setup_numabalancing(char *str)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!str)
goto out;
if (!strcmp(str, "enable")) {
numabalancing_override = 1;
ret = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "disable")) {
numabalancing_override = -1;
ret = 1;
}
out:
if (!ret)
pr_warn("Unable to parse numa_balancing=\n");
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 19,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileImplIOData::Handle::ClearNetworkingHistorySince(
base::Time time) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
LazyInitialize();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&ClearNetworkingHistorySinceOnIOThread,
io_data_,
time));
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestCustomNamedGetter::derefObject(void* object)
{
static_cast<TestCustomNamedGetter*>(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_session(void)
{
int type;
int interactive = 0;
int have_tty = 0;
struct winsize ws;
char *cp;
const char *display;
/* Enable compression if requested. */
if (options.compression) {
options.compression_level);
if (options.compression_level < 1 ||
options.compression_level > 9)
fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to "
"9 (slow, best).");
/* Send the request. */
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
type = packet_read();
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
else
packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for "
"compression response.");
}
/* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
if (tty_flag) {
debug("Requesting pty.");
/* Start the packet. */
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
/* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the
length of the string. */
cp = getenv("TERM");
if (!cp)
cp = "";
packet_put_cstring(cp);
/* Store window size in the packet. */
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
/* Store tty modes in the packet. */
tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
/* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
/* Read response from the server. */
type = packet_read();
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
interactive = 1;
have_tty = 1;
} else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to "
"allocate a pseudo tty.");
else
packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty "
"request response.");
}
/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted,
options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto,
data, 0);
/* Read response from the server. */
type = packet_read();
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
interactive = 1;
} else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
} else {
packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 "
"forwarding");
}
}
/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
packet_set_interactive(interactive,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
/* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
check_agent_present();
if (options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
auth_request_forwarding();
/* Read response from the server. */
type = packet_read();
packet_check_eom();
if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
}
/* Initiate port forwardings. */
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
ssh_init_forwarding();
/* Execute a local command */
if (options.local_command != NULL &&
options.permit_local_command)
ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
/*
* If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
* forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
*/
if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
"confirmation received");
} else
fork_postauth();
}
/*
* If a command was specified on the command line, execute the
* command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell.
*/
if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) {
int len = buffer_len(&command);
if (len > 900)
len = 900;
debug("Sending command: %.*s", len,
(u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
} else {
debug("Requesting shell.");
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
}
/* Enter the interactive session. */
return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ?
options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 1,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_daily_error_info(unsigned long arg)
{
struct super_block *sb = (struct super_block *) arg;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
struct ext4_super_block *es;
sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
es = sbi->s_es;
if (es->s_error_count)
/* fsck newer than v1.41.13 is needed to clean this condition. */
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_NOTICE, "error count since last fsck: %u",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_error_count));
if (es->s_first_error_time) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "EXT4-fs (%s): initial error at time %u: %.*s:%d",
sb->s_id, le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_error_time),
(int) sizeof(es->s_first_error_func),
es->s_first_error_func,
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_error_line));
if (es->s_first_error_ino)
printk(KERN_CONT ": inode %u",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_error_ino));
if (es->s_first_error_block)
printk(KERN_CONT ": block %llu", (unsigned long long)
le64_to_cpu(es->s_first_error_block));
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
}
if (es->s_last_error_time) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "EXT4-fs (%s): last error at time %u: %.*s:%d",
sb->s_id, le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_error_time),
(int) sizeof(es->s_last_error_func),
es->s_last_error_func,
le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_error_line));
if (es->s_last_error_ino)
printk(KERN_CONT ": inode %u",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_error_ino));
if (es->s_last_error_block)
printk(KERN_CONT ": block %llu", (unsigned long long)
le64_to_cpu(es->s_last_error_block));
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
}
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 24*60*60*HZ); /* Once a day */
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey, guint8 *decryption_key, PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa, guint eapol_len)
{
guint8 key_version;
guint8 *key_data;
guint8 *szEncryptedKey;
guint16 key_bytes_len = 0; /* Length of the total key data field */
guint16 key_len; /* Actual group key length */
static AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM dummy_key; /* needed in case AirPDcapRsnaMng() wants the key structure */
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa;
/* We skip verifying the MIC of the key. If we were implementing a WPA supplicant we'd want to verify, but for a sniffer it's not needed. */
/* Preparation for decrypting the group key - determine group key data length */
/* depending on whether the pairwise key is TKIP or AES encryption key */
key_version = AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(pEAPKey->key_information[1]);
if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
/* TKIP */
key_bytes_len = pntoh16(pEAPKey->key_length);
}else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
/* AES */
key_bytes_len = pntoh16(pEAPKey->key_data_len);
/* AES keys must be at least 128 bits = 16 bytes. */
if (key_bytes_len < 16) {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
}
if (key_bytes_len < GROUP_KEY_MIN_LEN || key_bytes_len > eapol_len - sizeof(EAPOL_RSN_KEY)) {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Encrypted key is in the information element field of the EAPOL key packet */
key_data = (guint8 *)pEAPKey + sizeof(EAPOL_RSN_KEY);
szEncryptedKey = (guint8 *)g_memdup(key_data, key_bytes_len);
DEBUG_DUMP("Encrypted Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
DEBUG_DUMP("KeyIV:", pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
DEBUG_DUMP("decryption_key:", decryption_key, 16);
/* We are rekeying, save old sa */
tmp_sa=(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *)g_malloc(sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
sa->next=tmp_sa;
/* As we have no concept of the prior association request at this point, we need to deduce the */
/* group key cipher from the length of the key bytes. In WPA this is straightforward as the */
/* keybytes just contain the GTK, and the GTK is only in the group handshake, NOT the M3. */
/* In WPA2 its a little more tricky as the M3 keybytes contain an RSN_IE, but the group handshake */
/* does not. Also there are other (variable length) items in the keybytes which we need to account */
/* for to determine the true key length, and thus the group cipher. */
if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
guint8 new_key[32];
guint8 dummy[256];
/* TKIP key */
/* Per 802.11i, Draft 3.0 spec, section 8.5.2, p. 97, line 4-8, */
/* group key is decrypted using RC4. Concatenate the IV with the 16 byte EK (PTK+16) to get the decryption key */
rc4_state_struct rc4_state;
/* The WPA group key just contains the GTK bytes so deducing the type is straightforward */
/* Note - WPA M3 doesn't contain a group key so we'll only be here for the group handshake */
sa->wpa.key_ver = (key_bytes_len >=TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN)?AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP:AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
/* Build the full decryption key based on the IV and part of the pairwise key */
memcpy(new_key, pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
memcpy(new_key+16, decryption_key, 16);
DEBUG_DUMP("FullDecrKey:", new_key, 32);
crypt_rc4_init(&rc4_state, new_key, sizeof(new_key));
/* Do dummy 256 iterations of the RC4 algorithm (per 802.11i, Draft 3.0, p. 97 line 6) */
crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, dummy, 256);
crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
} else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
/* AES CCMP key */
guint8 key_found;
guint8 key_length;
guint16 key_index;
guint8 *decrypted_data;
/* Unwrap the key; the result is key_bytes_len in length */
decrypted_data = AES_unwrap(decryption_key, 16, szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
/* With WPA2 what we get after Broadcast Key decryption is an actual RSN structure.
The key itself is stored as a GTK KDE
WPA2 IE (1 byte) id = 0xdd, length (1 byte), GTK OUI (4 bytes), key index (1 byte) and 1 reserved byte. Thus we have to
pass pointer to the actual key with 8 bytes offset */
key_found = FALSE;
key_index = 0;
/* Parse Key data until we found GTK KDE */
/* GTK KDE = 00-0F-AC 01 */
while(key_index < (key_bytes_len - 6) && !key_found){
guint8 rsn_id;
guint32 type;
/* Get RSN ID */
rsn_id = decrypted_data[key_index];
type = ((decrypted_data[key_index + 2] << 24) +
(decrypted_data[key_index + 3] << 16) +
(decrypted_data[key_index + 4] << 8) +
(decrypted_data[key_index + 5]));
if (rsn_id == 0xdd && type == 0x000fac01) {
key_found = TRUE;
} else {
key_index += decrypted_data[key_index+1]+2;
}
}
if (key_found){
key_length = decrypted_data[key_index+1] - 6;
if (key_index+8 >= key_bytes_len ||
key_length > key_bytes_len - key_index - 8) {
g_free(decrypted_data);
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Skip over the GTK header info, and don't copy past the end of the encrypted data */
memcpy(szEncryptedKey, decrypted_data+key_index+8, key_length);
} else {
g_free(decrypted_data);
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
if (key_length == TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN)
sa->wpa.key_ver = AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP;
else
sa->wpa.key_ver = AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
g_free(decrypted_data);
}
key_len = (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP)?TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN:CCMP_GROUP_KEY_LEN;
if (key_len > key_bytes_len) {
/* the key required for this protocol is longer than the key that we just calculated */
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Decrypted key is now in szEncryptedKey with len of key_len */
DEBUG_DUMP("Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_len);
/* Load the proper key material info into the SA */
sa->key = &dummy_key; /* we just need key to be not null because it is checked in AirPDcapRsnaMng(). The WPA key materials are actually in the .wpa structure */
sa->validKey = TRUE;
/* Since this is a GTK and its size is only 32 bytes (vs. the 64 byte size of a PTK), we fake it and put it in at a 32-byte offset so the */
/* AirPDcapRsnaMng() function will extract the right piece of the GTK for decryption. (The first 16 bytes of the GTK are used for decryption.) */
memset(sa->wpa.ptk, 0, sizeof(sa->wpa.ptk));
memcpy(sa->wpa.ptk+32, szEncryptedKey, key_len);
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelPixels(Image *image,
const size_t channels,const size_t row,const ssize_t type,
const unsigned char *pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Quantum
pixel;
register const unsigned char
*p;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned short
nibble;
p=pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,row,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
pixel=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
else
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&nibble);
pixel=ScaleShortToQuantum(nibble);
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
if (channels == 1 || type == -2)
SetPixelGray(image,pixel,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception),q);
if (image->depth == 1)
{
ssize_t
bit,
number_bits;
number_bits=image->columns-x;
if (number_bits > 8)
number_bits=8;
for (bit=0; bit < number_bits; bit++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(((unsigned char) pixel) &
(0x01 << (7-bit))) != 0 ? 0 : 255,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),
exception),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
x++;
}
x--;
continue;
}
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
return(SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception));
}
Commit Message: Rewrite reading pixel values.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 11,554
|
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