instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_client_send(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
red_channel_client_ref(rcc);
red_peer_handle_outgoing(rcc->stream, &rcc->outgoing);
red_channel_client_unref(rcc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void test_decrypt_cb(void *decrypt_state, const uint8_t *input,
uint8_t *output, int count) {
const size_t offset = input - reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(decrypt_state);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
output[i] = input[i] ^ secret_key[(offset + i) & 15];
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = &__get_cpu_var(softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies + 2;
int budget = netdev_budget;
void *have;
local_irq_disable();
while (!list_empty(&sd->poll_list)) {
struct napi_struct *n;
int work, weight;
/* If softirq window is exhuasted then punt.
* Allow this to run for 2 jiffies since which will allow
* an average latency of 1.5/HZ.
*/
if (unlikely(budget <= 0 || time_after(jiffies, time_limit)))
goto softnet_break;
local_irq_enable();
/* Even though interrupts have been re-enabled, this
* access is safe because interrupts can only add new
* entries to the tail of this list, and only ->poll()
* calls can remove this head entry from the list.
*/
n = list_first_entry(&sd->poll_list, struct napi_struct, poll_list);
have = netpoll_poll_lock(n);
weight = n->weight;
/* This NAPI_STATE_SCHED test is for avoiding a race
* with netpoll's poll_napi(). Only the entity which
* obtains the lock and sees NAPI_STATE_SCHED set will
* actually make the ->poll() call. Therefore we avoid
* accidently calling ->poll() when NAPI is not scheduled.
*/
work = 0;
if (test_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) {
work = n->poll(n, weight);
trace_napi_poll(n);
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(work > weight);
budget -= work;
local_irq_disable();
/* Drivers must not modify the NAPI state if they
* consume the entire weight. In such cases this code
* still "owns" the NAPI instance and therefore can
* move the instance around on the list at-will.
*/
if (unlikely(work == weight)) {
if (unlikely(napi_disable_pending(n))) {
local_irq_enable();
napi_complete(n);
local_irq_disable();
} else
list_move_tail(&n->poll_list, &sd->poll_list);
}
netpoll_poll_unlock(have);
}
out:
net_rps_action_and_irq_enable(sd);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_DMA
/*
* There may not be any more sk_buffs coming right now, so push
* any pending DMA copies to hardware
*/
dma_issue_pending_all();
#endif
return;
softnet_break:
sd->time_squeeze++;
__raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_RX_SOFTIRQ);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, offsetExists)
{
zval *index;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &index) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(spl_array_has_dimension_ex(0, getThis(), index, 2 TSRMLS_CC));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed ArrayObject::offsetGet(mixed $index)
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_sas_device_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
int phy_handle = -1;
int dev_handle = -1;
int i = mptsas_device_addr_get(s, address);
SCSIDevice *dev = mptsas_phy_get_device(s, i, &phy_handle, &dev_handle);
trace_mptsas_config_sas_device(s, address, i, phy_handle, dev_handle, 1);
if (!dev) {
return -ENOENT;
}
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK_EXT(1, MPI_CONFIG_EXTPAGETYPE_SAS_DEVICE, 0x00,
"*lq*lwbb*s20",
dev->wwn, dev_handle, i, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 30
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 LauncherView::GetAccessibleName(const views::View* view) {
if (!delegate_)
return string16();
int view_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(view);
if (view_index == -1)
return string16();
switch (model_->items()[view_index].type) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
case TYPE_APP_PANEL:
case TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT:
case TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
return delegate_->GetTitle(model_->items()[view_index]);
case TYPE_APP_LIST:
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AURA_APP_LIST_TITLE);
case TYPE_BROWSER_SHORTCUT:
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AURA_NEW_TAB);
}
return string16();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
interface_factory_ptr_.reset();
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 2,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Element::ensureAttr(const QualifiedName& name)
{
AttrNodeList* attrNodeList = ensureAttrNodeListForElement(this);
RefPtr<Attr> attrNode = findAttrNodeInList(attrNodeList, name);
if (!attrNode) {
attrNode = Attr::create(this, name);
treeScope()->adoptIfNeeded(attrNode.get());
attrNodeList->append(attrNode);
}
return attrNode.release();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResultForVideo(
base::WeakPtr<DelegatedFrameHost> dfh,
scoped_refptr<OwnedMailbox> subscriber_texture,
scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame> video_frame,
const base::Callback<void(const gfx::Rect&, bool)>& callback,
std::unique_ptr<viz::CopyOutputResult> result) {
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_callback_runner(
base::Bind(callback, gfx::Rect(), false));
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_return_subscriber_texture(base::Bind(
&ReturnSubscriberTexture, dfh, subscriber_texture, gpu::SyncToken()));
if (!dfh)
return;
if (result->IsEmpty())
return;
if (result->size().IsEmpty())
return;
gfx::Rect region_in_frame = media::ComputeLetterboxRegion(
video_frame->visible_rect(), result->size());
region_in_frame =
gfx::Rect(region_in_frame.x() & ~1, region_in_frame.y() & ~1,
region_in_frame.width() & ~1, region_in_frame.height() & ~1);
if (region_in_frame.IsEmpty())
return;
if (!result->HasTexture()) {
DCHECK(result->HasBitmap());
std::unique_ptr<SkBitmap> bitmap = result->TakeBitmap();
SkBitmap scaled_bitmap;
if (result->size() != region_in_frame.size()) {
skia::ImageOperations::ResizeMethod method =
skia::ImageOperations::RESIZE_GOOD;
scaled_bitmap = skia::ImageOperations::Resize(*bitmap.get(), method,
region_in_frame.width(),
region_in_frame.height());
} else {
scaled_bitmap = *bitmap.get();
}
media::CopyRGBToVideoFrame(
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(scaled_bitmap.getPixels()),
scaled_bitmap.rowBytes(), region_in_frame, video_frame.get());
ignore_result(scoped_callback_runner.Release());
callback.Run(region_in_frame, true);
return;
}
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
viz::GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return;
if (subscriber_texture.get() && !subscriber_texture->texture_id())
return;
viz::TextureMailbox texture_mailbox;
std::unique_ptr<viz::SingleReleaseCallback> release_callback;
result->TakeTexture(&texture_mailbox, &release_callback);
DCHECK(texture_mailbox.IsTexture());
gfx::Rect result_rect(result->size());
viz::ReadbackYUVInterface* yuv_readback_pipeline =
dfh->yuv_readback_pipeline_.get();
if (yuv_readback_pipeline == NULL ||
yuv_readback_pipeline->scaler()->SrcSize() != result_rect.size() ||
yuv_readback_pipeline->scaler()->SrcSubrect() != result_rect ||
yuv_readback_pipeline->scaler()->DstSize() != region_in_frame.size()) {
viz::GLHelper::ScalerQuality quality =
((result_rect.size().width() < region_in_frame.size().width()) &&
(result_rect.size().height() < region_in_frame.size().height()))
? viz::GLHelper::SCALER_QUALITY_BEST
: viz::GLHelper::SCALER_QUALITY_FAST;
DVLOG(1) << "Re-creating YUV readback pipeline for source rect "
<< result_rect.ToString() << " and destination size "
<< region_in_frame.size().ToString();
dfh->yuv_readback_pipeline_.reset(gl_helper->CreateReadbackPipelineYUV(
quality, result_rect.size(), result_rect, region_in_frame.size(), true,
true));
yuv_readback_pipeline = dfh->yuv_readback_pipeline_.get();
}
ignore_result(scoped_callback_runner.Release());
ignore_result(scoped_return_subscriber_texture.Release());
base::Callback<void(bool result)> finished_callback = base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinishedForVideo,
video_frame, dfh->AsWeakPtr(), base::Bind(callback, region_in_frame),
subscriber_texture, base::Passed(&release_callback));
yuv_readback_pipeline->ReadbackYUV(
texture_mailbox.mailbox(), texture_mailbox.sync_token(),
video_frame->visible_rect(),
video_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
video_frame->data(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
video_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
video_frame->data(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
video_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane),
video_frame->data(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane), region_in_frame.origin(),
finished_callback);
media::LetterboxYUV(video_frame.get(), region_in_frame);
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs_find_actor(struct inode *inode, void *opaque)
{
struct nfs_find_desc *desc = (struct nfs_find_desc *)opaque;
struct nfs_fh *fh = desc->fh;
struct nfs_fattr *fattr = desc->fattr;
if (NFS_FILEID(inode) != fattr->fileid)
return 0;
if (nfs_compare_fh(NFS_FH(inode), fh))
return 0;
if (is_bad_inode(inode) || NFS_STALE(inode))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
int err = 0, id;
struct mISDNdevice *dev;
struct mISDNversion ver;
switch (cmd) {
case IMGETVERSION:
ver.major = MISDN_MAJOR_VERSION;
ver.minor = MISDN_MINOR_VERSION;
ver.release = MISDN_RELEASE;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &ver, sizeof(ver)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case IMGETCOUNT:
id = get_mdevice_count();
if (put_user(id, (int __user *)arg))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case IMGETDEVINFO:
if (get_user(id, (int __user *)arg)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
dev = get_mdevice(id);
if (dev) {
struct mISDN_devinfo di;
memset(&di, 0, sizeof(di));
di.id = dev->id;
di.Dprotocols = dev->Dprotocols;
di.Bprotocols = dev->Bprotocols | get_all_Bprotocols();
di.protocol = dev->D.protocol;
memcpy(di.channelmap, dev->channelmap,
sizeof(di.channelmap));
di.nrbchan = dev->nrbchan;
strcpy(di.name, dev_name(&dev->dev));
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &di, sizeof(di)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
err = -ENODEV;
break;
case IMSETDEVNAME:
{
struct mISDN_devrename dn;
if (copy_from_user(&dn, (void __user *)arg,
sizeof(dn))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
dev = get_mdevice(dn.id);
if (dev)
err = device_rename(&dev->dev, dn.name);
else
err = -ENODEV;
}
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl::RenderWidgetHostImpl(RenderWidgetHostDelegate* delegate,
RenderProcessHost* process,
int32_t routing_id,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget,
bool hidden)
: renderer_initialized_(false),
destroyed_(false),
delegate_(delegate),
owner_delegate_(nullptr),
process_(process),
routing_id_(routing_id),
clock_(base::DefaultTickClock::GetInstance()),
is_loading_(false),
is_hidden_(hidden),
visual_properties_ack_pending_(false),
auto_resize_enabled_(false),
waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_(false),
needs_repainting_on_restore_(false),
is_unresponsive_(false),
in_flight_event_count_(0),
in_get_backing_store_(false),
ignore_input_events_(false),
text_direction_updated_(false),
text_direction_(blink::kWebTextDirectionLeftToRight),
text_direction_canceled_(false),
suppress_events_until_keydown_(false),
pending_mouse_lock_request_(false),
allow_privileged_mouse_lock_(false),
is_last_unlocked_by_target_(false),
has_touch_handler_(false),
is_in_touchpad_gesture_fling_(false),
latency_tracker_(delegate_),
next_browser_snapshot_id_(1),
owned_by_render_frame_host_(false),
is_focused_(false),
hung_renderer_delay_(TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kHungRendererDelayMs)),
new_content_rendering_delay_(
TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kNewContentRenderingDelayMs)),
current_content_source_id_(0),
monitoring_composition_info_(false),
compositor_frame_sink_binding_(this),
frame_token_message_queue_(
std::make_unique<FrameTokenMessageQueue>(this)),
render_frame_metadata_provider_(
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
ui::WindowResizeHelperMac::Get()->task_runner(),
#else
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
#endif
frame_token_message_queue_.get()),
frame_sink_id_(base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(process_->GetID()),
base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(routing_id_)),
weak_factory_(this) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
fling_scheduler_ = std::make_unique<FlingSchedulerMac>(this);
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
fling_scheduler_ = std::make_unique<FlingSchedulerAndroid>(this);
#else
fling_scheduler_ = std::make_unique<FlingScheduler>(this);
#endif
CHECK(delegate_);
CHECK_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, routing_id_);
DCHECK(base::TaskScheduler::GetInstance())
<< "Ref. Prerequisite section of post_task.h";
std::pair<RoutingIDWidgetMap::iterator, bool> result =
g_routing_id_widget_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(
RenderWidgetHostID(process->GetID(), routing_id_), this));
CHECK(result.second) << "Inserting a duplicate item!";
process_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
process_->AddWidget(this);
SetupInputRouter();
SetWidget(std::move(widget));
const auto* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (!command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableHangMonitor)) {
input_event_ack_timeout_.reset(new TimeoutMonitor(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnInputEventAckTimeout,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
if (!command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableNewContentRenderingTimeout)) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_.reset(new TimeoutMonitor(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::ClearDisplayedGraphics,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
enable_surface_synchronization_ = features::IsSurfaceSynchronizationEnabled();
enable_viz_ = base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor);
if (!enable_viz_) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (BrowserMainLoop* main_loop = BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance())
shared_bitmap_manager_ = main_loop->GetServerSharedBitmapManager();
#endif
}
delegate_->RenderWidgetCreated(this);
render_frame_metadata_provider_.AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ndisc_error_report(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/*
* "The sender MUST return an ICMP
* destination unreachable"
*/
dst_link_failure(skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 5,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_urb32(struct usbdevfs_urb *kurb,
struct usbdevfs_urb32 __user *uurb)
{
__u32 uptr;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uurb, sizeof(*uurb)) ||
__get_user(kurb->type, &uurb->type) ||
__get_user(kurb->endpoint, &uurb->endpoint) ||
__get_user(kurb->status, &uurb->status) ||
__get_user(kurb->flags, &uurb->flags) ||
__get_user(kurb->buffer_length, &uurb->buffer_length) ||
__get_user(kurb->actual_length, &uurb->actual_length) ||
__get_user(kurb->start_frame, &uurb->start_frame) ||
__get_user(kurb->number_of_packets, &uurb->number_of_packets) ||
__get_user(kurb->error_count, &uurb->error_count) ||
__get_user(kurb->signr, &uurb->signr))
return -EFAULT;
if (__get_user(uptr, &uurb->buffer))
return -EFAULT;
kurb->buffer = compat_ptr(uptr);
if (__get_user(uptr, &uurb->usercontext))
return -EFAULT;
kurb->usercontext = compat_ptr(uptr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static base::PlatformFileError PerformCommonCheckAndPreparationForMoveAndCopy(
const FilePath& src_file_path,
const FilePath& dest_file_path) {
if (!file_util::PathExists(src_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
if (!file_util::DirectoryExists(dest_file_path.DirName()))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
if (src_file_path.IsParent(dest_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION;
if (!file_util::PathExists(dest_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
bool src_is_directory = file_util::DirectoryExists(src_file_path);
bool dest_is_directory = file_util::DirectoryExists(dest_file_path);
if (src_is_directory && !dest_is_directory)
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
if (!src_is_directory && dest_is_directory)
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_FILE;
if (src_file_path.value() == dest_file_path.value())
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_EXISTS;
if (dest_is_directory) {
if (!file_util::Delete(dest_file_path, false /* recursive */)) {
if (!file_util::IsDirectoryEmpty(dest_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_EMPTY;
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
}
}
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static LayoutUnit justifyContentSpaceBetweenChildren(LayoutUnit availableFreeSpace, EJustifyContent justifyContent, unsigned numberOfChildren)
{
if (availableFreeSpace > 0 && numberOfChildren > 1) {
if (justifyContent == JustifySpaceBetween)
return availableFreeSpace / (numberOfChildren - 1);
if (justifyContent == JustifySpaceAround)
return availableFreeSpace / numberOfChildren;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
const u_char *bp = p;
if (length < CHDLC_HDRLEN)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, CHDLC_HDRLEN);
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(p);
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|chdlc]"));
return ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 2,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t WritePascalString(Image *image,const char *value,size_t padding)
{
size_t
count,
length;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Max length is 255.
*/
count=0;
length=(strlen(value) > 255UL ) ? 255UL : strlen(value);
if (length == 0)
count+=WriteBlobByte(image,0);
else
{
count+=WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
}
length++;
if ((length % padding) == 0)
return(count);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (padding-(length % padding)); i++)
count+=WriteBlobByte(image,0);
return(count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 18,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct module *module = NULL;
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
int (*bind)(struct net *net, int group);
void (*unbind)(struct net *net, int group);
int err = 0;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= MAX_LINKS)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
netlink_lock_table();
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if (!nl_table[protocol].registered) {
netlink_unlock_table();
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d", PF_NETLINK, protocol);
netlink_lock_table();
}
#endif
if (nl_table[protocol].registered &&
try_module_get(nl_table[protocol].module))
module = nl_table[protocol].module;
else
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
cb_mutex = nl_table[protocol].cb_mutex;
bind = nl_table[protocol].bind;
unbind = nl_table[protocol].unbind;
netlink_unlock_table();
if (err < 0)
goto out;
err = __netlink_create(net, sock, cb_mutex, protocol, kern);
if (err < 0)
goto out_module;
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, &netlink_proto, 1);
local_bh_enable();
nlk = nlk_sk(sock->sk);
nlk->module = module;
nlk->netlink_bind = bind;
nlk->netlink_unbind = unbind;
out:
return err;
out_module:
module_put(module);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 3,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs_idmap_delete(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct idmap *idmap = clp->cl_idmap;
if (!idmap)
return;
clp->cl_idmap = NULL;
rpc_remove_pipe_dir_object(clp->cl_net,
&clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_pipedir_objects,
&idmap->idmap_pdo);
rpc_destroy_pipe_data(idmap->idmap_pipe);
kfree(idmap);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 15,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RegisterAwContents(JNIEnv* env) {
return RegisterNativesImpl(env);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PersistentHistogramAllocator::Iterator::Iterator(
PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator)
: allocator_(allocator), memory_iter_(allocator->memory_allocator()) {}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proxy_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
{
if (dir_path) {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
} else {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 28,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sse8_c(void *v, uint8_t * pix1, uint8_t * pix2, int line_size, int h)
{
int s, i;
uint32_t *sq = ff_squareTbl + 256;
s = 0;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
s += sq[pix1[0] - pix2[0]];
s += sq[pix1[1] - pix2[1]];
s += sq[pix1[2] - pix2[2]];
s += sq[pix1[3] - pix2[3]];
s += sq[pix1[4] - pix2[4]];
s += sq[pix1[5] - pix2[5]];
s += sq[pix1[6] - pix2[6]];
s += sq[pix1[7] - pix2[7]];
pix1 += line_size;
pix2 += line_size;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothSocketListenFunction::OnGetAdapter(
scoped_refptr<device::BluetoothAdapter> adapter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
BluetoothApiSocket* socket = GetSocket(socket_id());
if (!socket) {
Respond(Error(kSocketNotFoundError));
return;
}
device::BluetoothUUID bluetooth_uuid(uuid());
if (!bluetooth_uuid.IsValid()) {
Respond(Error(kInvalidUuidError));
return;
}
BluetoothPermissionRequest param(uuid());
if (!BluetoothManifestData::CheckRequest(extension(), param)) {
Respond(Error(kPermissionDeniedError));
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<std::string> name;
if (socket->name())
name.reset(new std::string(*socket->name()));
CreateService(
adapter, bluetooth_uuid, std::move(name),
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketListenFunction::OnCreateService, this),
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketListenFunction::OnCreateServiceError, this));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: request_reissue(struct request *req) {
const struct nameserver *const last_ns = req->ns;
ASSERT_LOCKED(req->base);
ASSERT_VALID_REQUEST(req);
/* the last nameserver should have been marked as failing */
/* by the caller of this function, therefore pick will try */
/* not to return it */
request_swap_ns(req, nameserver_pick(req->base));
if (req->ns == last_ns) {
/* ... but pick did return it */
/* not a lot of point in trying again with the */
/* same server */
return 1;
}
req->reissue_count++;
req->tx_count = 0;
req->transmit_me = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 20,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::UpdateLayerTreeHost() {
client_->UpdateLayerTreeHost();
if (needs_animate_) {
needs_animate_ = false;
root_window_->Animate(base::TimeTicks::Now());
}
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CallWithScriptStateExecutionContextIsolateVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::ForRelevantRealm(info);
impl->callWithScriptStateExecutionContextIsolateVoidMethod(info.GetIsolate(), script_state, execution_context);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_server_capabilities(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
_nfs4_server_capabilities(server, fhandle),
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(reg))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[reg->type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
u8 *stype;
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
goto err;
stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
goto mark;
if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
/* helper can write anything into the stack */
*stype = STACK_MISC;
goto mark;
}
err:
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
mark:
/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
* the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
*/
mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent);
}
return update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::TextInputStateChanged(
const ViewHostMsg_TextInputState_Params& params) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init crc32c_sparc64_mod_init(void)
{
if (sparc64_has_crc32c_opcode()) {
pr_info("Using sparc64 crc32c opcode optimized CRC32C implementation\n");
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
pr_info("sparc64 crc32c opcode not available.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trace_recursive_lock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
unsigned int val = cpu_buffer->current_context;
int bit;
if (in_interrupt()) {
if (in_nmi())
bit = RB_CTX_NMI;
else if (in_irq())
bit = RB_CTX_IRQ;
else
bit = RB_CTX_SOFTIRQ;
} else
bit = RB_CTX_NORMAL;
if (unlikely(val & (1 << bit)))
return 1;
val |= (1 << bit);
cpu_buffer->current_context = val;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 13,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int robots_fsio_access(pr_fs_t *fs, const char *path, int mode,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid, array_header *suppl_gids) {
if (mode != R_OK) {
errno = EACCES;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 12,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateTargetURL(RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const GURL& url) {
if (fullscreen_widget_routing_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderWidgetHostView* fs = GetFullscreenRenderWidgetHostView();
if (fs && fs->GetRenderWidgetHost() != render_view_host->GetWidget())
return;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->UpdateTargetURL(this, url);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk, *other;
unsigned int mask, writable;
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
mask = 0;
/* exceptional events? */
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
/* readable? */
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
/* Connection-based need to check for termination and startup */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE)
mask |= POLLHUP;
/* connection hasn't started yet? */
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT)
return mask;
}
/* No write status requested, avoid expensive OUT tests. */
if (!(poll_requested_events(wait) & (POLLWRBAND|POLLWRNORM|POLLOUT)))
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (other) {
if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
if (unix_recvq_full(other))
writable = 0;
}
sock_put(other);
}
if (writable)
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 3,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::Trace(Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(listeners_);
visitor->Trace(context_);
ContextLifecycleObserver::Trace(visitor);
PageVisibilityObserver::Trace(visitor);
HTMLElement::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProCamera2Client::onExclusiveLockStolen() {
ALOGV("%s: ProClient lost exclusivity (id %d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
SharedCameraCallbacks::Lock l(mSharedCameraCallbacks);
if (mExclusiveLock && mRemoteCallback.get() != NULL) {
mRemoteCallback->onLockStatusChanged(
IProCameraCallbacks::LOCK_STOLEN);
}
mExclusiveLock = false;
detachDevice();
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: has_trash_files (GMount *mount)
{
GList *dirs, *l;
GFile *dir;
gboolean res;
dirs = get_trash_dirs_for_mount (mount);
res = FALSE;
for (l = dirs; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
dir = l->data;
if (dir_has_files (dir))
{
res = TRUE;
break;
}
}
g_list_free_full (dirs, g_object_unref);
return res;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::ElementIsAnimatingChanged(
ElementId element_id,
ElementListType list_type,
const PropertyAnimationState& mask,
const PropertyAnimationState& state) {
LayerTreeImpl* tree =
list_type == ElementListType::ACTIVE ? active_tree() : pending_tree();
if (!tree)
return;
LayerImpl* layer = tree->LayerByElementId(element_id);
if (layer)
layer->OnIsAnimatingChanged(mask, state);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_lookup_down(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = nd->path;
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
unsigned seq = nd->seq;
int err;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
/*
* don't bother with unlazy_walk on failure - we are
* at the very beginning of walk, so we lose nothing
* if we simply redo everything in non-RCU mode
*/
if (unlikely(!__follow_mount_rcu(nd, &path, &inode, &seq)))
return -ECHILD;
} else {
dget(path.dentry);
err = follow_managed(&path, nd);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
return err;
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
seq = 0;
}
path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
nd->inode = inode;
nd->seq = seq;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wc_ecc_import_raw_private(ecc_key* key, const char* qx,
const char* qy, const char* d, int curve_id, int encType)
{
int err = MP_OKAY;
/* if d is NULL, only import as public key using Qx,Qy */
if (key == NULL || qx == NULL || qy == NULL) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
/* make sure required variables are reset */
wc_ecc_reset(key);
/* set curve type and index */
err = wc_ecc_set_curve(key, 0, curve_id);
if (err != 0) {
return err;
}
#ifdef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A
/* TODO: Implement equiv call to ATECC508A */
err = BAD_COND_E;
#else
/* init key */
#ifdef ALT_ECC_SIZE
key->pubkey.x = (mp_int*)&key->pubkey.xyz[0];
key->pubkey.y = (mp_int*)&key->pubkey.xyz[1];
key->pubkey.z = (mp_int*)&key->pubkey.xyz[2];
alt_fp_init(key->pubkey.x);
alt_fp_init(key->pubkey.y);
alt_fp_init(key->pubkey.z);
err = mp_init(&key->k);
#else
err = mp_init_multi(&key->k, key->pubkey.x, key->pubkey.y, key->pubkey.z,
NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return MEMORY_E;
/* read Qx */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (encType == ECC_TYPE_HEX_STR)
err = mp_read_radix(key->pubkey.x, qx, MP_RADIX_HEX);
else
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.x, (const byte*)qx,
key->dp->size);
}
/* read Qy */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (encType == ECC_TYPE_HEX_STR)
err = mp_read_radix(key->pubkey.y, qy, MP_RADIX_HEX);
else
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.y, (const byte*)qy,
key->dp->size);
}
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_set(key->pubkey.z, 1);
/* import private key */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (d != NULL) {
key->type = ECC_PRIVATEKEY;
if (encType == ECC_TYPE_HEX_STR)
err = mp_read_radix(&key->k, d, MP_RADIX_HEX);
else
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&key->k, (const byte*)d,
key->dp->size);
} else {
key->type = ECC_PUBLICKEY;
}
}
#ifdef WOLFSSL_VALIDATE_ECC_IMPORT
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = wc_ecc_check_key(key);
#endif
if (err != MP_OKAY) {
mp_clear(key->pubkey.x);
mp_clear(key->pubkey.y);
mp_clear(key->pubkey.z);
mp_clear(&key->k);
}
#endif /* WOLFSSL_ATECC508A */
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderLayerScrollableArea::computeScrollDimensions()
{
m_scrollDimensionsDirty = false;
m_overflowRect = box().layoutOverflowRect();
box().flipForWritingMode(m_overflowRect);
int scrollableLeftOverflow = m_overflowRect.x() - box().borderLeft() - (box().style()->shouldPlaceBlockDirectionScrollbarOnLogicalLeft() ? box().verticalScrollbarWidth() : 0);
int scrollableTopOverflow = m_overflowRect.y() - box().borderTop();
setScrollOrigin(IntPoint(-scrollableLeftOverflow, -scrollableTopOverflow));
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *ConsolidateCMYKImages(const Image *images,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*cmyk_view,
*image_view;
Image
*cmyk_image,
*cmyk_images;
register ssize_t
j;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Consolidate separate C, M, Y, and K planes into a single image.
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
cmyk_images=NewImageList();
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(images); j+=4)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
cmyk_image=CloneImage(images,images->columns,images->rows,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (cmyk_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (SetImageStorageClass(cmyk_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) SetImageColorspace(cmyk_image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(images,exception);
cmyk_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(cmyk_image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) images->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*restrict q;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,images->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(cmyk_view,0,y,cmyk_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) images->columns; x++)
{
Quantum
pixel;
pixel=QuantumRange-GetPixelIntensity(images,p);
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelCyan(cmyk_image,pixel,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelMagenta(cmyk_image,pixel,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelYellow(cmyk_image,pixel,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelBlack(cmyk_image,pixel,q); break;
default: break;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(images);
q+=GetPixelChannels(cmyk_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(cmyk_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
cmyk_view=DestroyCacheView(cmyk_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
images=GetNextImageInList(images);
if (images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
}
AppendImageToList(&cmyk_images,cmyk_image);
}
return(cmyk_images);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_mmap_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct perf_event *event = vma->vm_file->private_data;
atomic_inc(&event->mmap_count);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *usb_cache_string(struct usb_device *udev, int index)
{
char *buf;
char *smallbuf = NULL;
int len;
if (index <= 0)
return NULL;
buf = kmalloc(MAX_USB_STRING_SIZE, GFP_NOIO);
if (buf) {
len = usb_string(udev, index, buf, MAX_USB_STRING_SIZE);
if (len > 0) {
smallbuf = kmalloc(++len, GFP_NOIO);
if (!smallbuf)
return buf;
memcpy(smallbuf, buf, len);
}
kfree(buf);
}
return smallbuf;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crc32_pclmul_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
u32 *crcp = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*crcp = crc32_pclmul_le(*crcp, data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void armv7pmu_start(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pmu_lock, flags);
/* Enable all counters */
armv7_pmnc_write(armv7_pmnc_read() | ARMV7_PMNC_E);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pmu_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: install_secret_key(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char ktype, unsigned char kid,
unsigned char useac, unsigned char modifyac, unsigned char EC,
unsigned char *data, unsigned long dataLen)
{
int r;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char isapp = 0x00; /* appendable */
unsigned char tmp_data[256] = { 0 };
tmp_data[0] = ktype;
tmp_data[1] = kid;
tmp_data[2] = useac;
tmp_data[3] = modifyac;
tmp_data[8] = 0xFF;
if (0x04 == ktype || 0x06 == ktype) {
tmp_data[4] = EPASS2003_AC_MAC_NOLESS | EPASS2003_AC_SO;
tmp_data[5] = EPASS2003_AC_MAC_NOLESS | EPASS2003_AC_SO;
tmp_data[7] = (kid == PIN_ID[0] ? EPASS2003_AC_USER : EPASS2003_AC_SO);
tmp_data[9] = (EC << 4) | EC;
}
memcpy(&tmp_data[10], data, dataLen);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0xe3, isapp, 0x00);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen = 10 + dataLen;
apdu.data = tmp_data;
r = sc_transmit_apdu_t(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU install_secret_key failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "install_secret_key failed");
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 14,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double WebContentsImpl::GetZoomLevel() const {
HostZoomMapImpl* zoom_map = static_cast<HostZoomMapImpl*>(
HostZoomMap::GetForBrowserContext(GetBrowserContext()));
if (!zoom_map)
return 0;
double zoom_level;
if (temporary_zoom_settings_) {
zoom_level = zoom_map->GetTemporaryZoomLevel(
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID(), GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID());
} else {
GURL url;
NavigationEntry* active_entry = GetController().GetActiveEntry();
url = active_entry ? active_entry->GetURL() : GURL::EmptyGURL();
zoom_level = zoom_map->GetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(url.scheme(),
net::GetHostOrSpecFromURL(url));
}
return zoom_level;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::NotifyUserActivation() {
Frame::NotifyUserActivation(GetFrame(), UserGestureToken::kNewGesture);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CastRtpStream* CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetRtpStreamOrThrow(
int transport_id) const {
RtpStreamMap::const_iterator iter = rtp_stream_map_.find(
transport_id);
if (iter != rtp_stream_map_.end())
return iter->second.get();
v8::Isolate* isolate = context()->v8_context()->GetIsolate();
isolate->ThrowException(v8::Exception::RangeError(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, kRtpStreamNotFound)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebsiteSettings::OnSiteDataAccessed() {
PresentSiteData();
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void truncate_partial_data_page(struct inode *inode, u64 from)
{
unsigned offset = from & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
struct page *page;
if (!offset)
return;
page = find_data_page(inode, from >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT, false);
if (IS_ERR(page))
return;
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(page->mapping != inode->i_mapping)) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
return;
}
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA);
zero_user(page, offset, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset);
set_page_dirty(page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool isObservable(JSTestNamedConstructor* jsTestNamedConstructor)
{
if (jsTestNamedConstructor->hasCustomProperties())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_adv_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
double adver_int;
bool res;
res = read_double_strvec(strvec, 1, &adver_int, 0.01, 255.0, true);
/* Simple check - just positive */
if (!res || adver_int <= 0)
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) Advert interval (%s) not valid! Must be > 0 - ignoring", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
else
vrrp->adver_int = (unsigned)(adver_int * TIMER_HZ);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 5,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t req_wct_ofs(struct smb_request *req)
{
size_t buf_size;
if (req->chain_outbuf == NULL) {
return smb_wct - 4;
}
buf_size = talloc_get_size(req->chain_outbuf);
if ((buf_size % 4) != 0) {
buf_size += (4 - (buf_size % 4));
}
return buf_size - 4;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AuthenticatorBlePowerOnManualSheetModel::OnAccept() {
dialog_model()->ContinueWithFlowAfterBleAdapterPowered();
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Tab::AddedToWidget() {
UpdateForegroundColors();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
if (alg == NULL)
return NULL;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
return NULL;
if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 12,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetTreeLayerTransformMutated(
ElementId element_id,
LayerTreeImpl* tree,
const gfx::Transform& transform) {
if (!tree)
return;
PropertyTrees* property_trees = tree->property_trees();
DCHECK_EQ(
1u, property_trees->element_id_to_transform_node_index.count(element_id));
const int transform_node_index =
property_trees->element_id_to_transform_node_index[element_id];
property_trees->transform_tree.OnTransformAnimated(
transform, transform_node_index, tree);
if (LayerImpl* layer = tree->LayerByElementId(element_id))
layer->set_was_ever_ready_since_last_transform_animation(false);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcRenderQueryPictIndexValues(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->format);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::didSameDocumentNavigation()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
q->emitUrlChangeIfNeeded();
emit q->navigationHistoryChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION: {
struct kvm_memory_region kvm_mem;
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm_mem, argp, sizeof kvm_mem))
goto out;
kvm_userspace_mem.slot = kvm_mem.slot;
kvm_userspace_mem.flags = kvm_mem.flags;
kvm_userspace_mem.guest_phys_addr =
kvm_mem.guest_phys_addr;
kvm_userspace_mem.memory_size = kvm_mem.memory_size;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm,
&kvm_userspace_mem, 0);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP:
r = -EFAULT;
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r)
goto out;
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
goto out;
}
break;
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
__s32 status;
status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event.irq, irq_event.level);
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
r = -EFAULT;
irq_event.status = status;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event,
sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
}
break;
}
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip chip;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&chip, argp, sizeof chip))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, &chip);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &chip, sizeof chip))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip chip;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&chip, argp, sizeof chip))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, &chip);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cifs_invalidate_page(struct page *page, unsigned int offset,
unsigned int length)
{
struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(page->mapping->host);
if (offset == 0 && length == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
cifs_fscache_invalidate_page(page, &cifsi->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RBinInfo *info(RBinFile *arch) {
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *obj = NULL;
RBinInfo *info = NULL;
if (!arch || !arch->o || !arch->o->bin_obj) {
return NULL;
}
obj = (struct r_bin_bflt_obj*)arch->o->bin_obj;
if (!(info = R_NEW0 (RBinInfo))) {
return NULL;
}
info->file = arch->file ? strdup (arch->file) : NULL;
info->rclass = strdup ("bflt");
info->bclass = strdup ("bflt" );
info->type = strdup ("bFLT (Executable file)");
info->os = strdup ("Linux");
info->subsystem = strdup ("Linux");
info->arch = strdup ("arm");
info->big_endian = obj->endian;
info->bits = 32;
info->has_va = false;
info->dbg_info = 0;
info->machine = strdup ("unknown");
return info;
}
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rasterize(int interleaved, char* mode)
{
register unsigned long row;
unsigned char *newras;
unsigned char *ras;
TIFF *tif;
tstrip_t strip;
tsize_t stripsize;
if ((newras = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(width*height+EXTRAFUDGE)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "not enough memory for image\n");
return;
}
#define DRAWSEGMENT(offset, step) { \
for (row = offset; row < height; row += step) { \
_TIFFmemcpy(newras + row*width, ras, width);\
ras += width; \
} \
}
ras = raster;
if (interleaved) {
DRAWSEGMENT(0, 8);
DRAWSEGMENT(4, 8);
DRAWSEGMENT(2, 4);
DRAWSEGMENT(1, 2);
} else
DRAWSEGMENT(0, 1);
#undef DRAWSEGMENT
tif = TIFFOpen(imagename, mode);
if (!tif) {
TIFFError(imagename,"Can not open output image");
exit(-1);
}
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, (uint32) width);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, (uint32) height);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, 1);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, 8);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
rowsperstrip = TIFFDefaultStripSize(tif, rowsperstrip));
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, compression);
switch (compression) {
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE:
if (predictor != 0)
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR, predictor);
break;
}
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_COLORMAP, red, green, blue);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION, ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT);
strip = 0;
stripsize = TIFFStripSize(tif);
for (row=0; row<height; row += rowsperstrip) {
if (rowsperstrip > height-row) {
rowsperstrip = height-row;
stripsize = TIFFVStripSize(tif, rowsperstrip);
}
if (TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(tif, strip, newras+row*width, stripsize) < 0)
break;
strip++;
}
TIFFClose(tif);
_TIFFfree(newras);
}
Commit Message: fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i;
int extracted = 0;
for (i=1; i<argc; ++i)
{
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-q") == 0)
verbose = 0;
else if (extract_one_file(argv[i]))
extracted = 1;
}
/* Exit code is true if any extract succeeds */
return extracted == 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uucp_lock(void)
{
int r, fd, pid;
char buf[16];
mode_t m;
if ( lockname[0] == '\0' ) return 0;
fd = open(lockname, O_RDONLY);
if ( fd >= 0 ) {
r = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
/* if r == 4, lock file is binary (old-style) */
pid = (r == 4) ? *(int *)buf : strtol(buf, NULL, 10);
if ( pid > 0
&& kill((pid_t)pid, 0) < 0
&& errno == ESRCH ) {
/* stale lock file */
printf("Removing stale lock: %s\n", lockname);
sleep(1);
unlink(lockname);
} else {
lockname[0] = '\0';
errno = EEXIST;
return -1;
}
}
/* lock it */
m = umask(022);
fd = open(lockname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666);
if ( fd < 0 ) { lockname[0] = '\0'; return -1; }
umask(m);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%04d\n", getpid());
write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
close(fd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_attribute)
{
php_xmlwriter_string_arg(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, xmlTextWriterStartAttribute, "Invalid Attribute Name");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 20,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char type;
int r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return type;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: circle_overabove(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPge((circle1->center.y - circle1->radius),
(circle2->center.y - circle2->radius)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pushquery(QPRS_STATE *state, int32 type, int32 val, int32 distance, int32 lenval, uint16 flag)
{
NODE *tmp = (NODE *) palloc(sizeof(NODE));
tmp->type = type;
tmp->val = val;
tmp->flag = flag;
if (distance > 0xffff)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("value is too big")));
if (lenval > 0xff)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("operand is too long")));
tmp->distance = distance;
tmp->length = lenval;
tmp->next = state->str;
state->str = tmp;
state->num++;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tp_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
perf_trace_destroy(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t FreeList::freeListSize() const {
size_t freeSize = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < blinkPageSizeLog2; ++i) {
FreeListEntry* entry = m_freeLists[i];
while (entry) {
freeSize += entry->size();
entry = entry->next();
}
}
#if DEBUG_HEAP_FREELIST
if (freeSize) {
LOG_HEAP_FREELIST_VERBOSE("FreeList(%p): %zu\n", this, freeSize);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < blinkPageSizeLog2; ++i) {
FreeListEntry* entry = m_freeLists[i];
size_t bucket = 0;
size_t count = 0;
while (entry) {
bucket += entry->size();
count++;
entry = entry->next();
}
if (bucket) {
LOG_HEAP_FREELIST_VERBOSE("[%d, %d]: %zu (%zu)\n", 0x1 << i,
0x1 << (i + 1), bucket, count);
}
}
}
#endif
return freeSize;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void JPEGProgressHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info)
{
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
exception=error_manager->exception;
if (jpeg_info->is_decompressor == 0)
return;
if (((j_decompress_ptr) jpeg_info)->input_scan_number < MaxJPEGScans)
return;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"too many scans","`%s'",image->filename);
longjmp(error_manager->error_recovery,1);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction BluetoothSocketCreateFunction::Run() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
auto params = bluetooth_socket::Create::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
BluetoothApiSocket* socket = new BluetoothApiSocket(extension_id());
bluetooth_socket::SocketProperties* properties = params->properties.get();
if (properties)
SetSocketProperties(socket, properties);
bluetooth_socket::CreateInfo create_info;
create_info.socket_id = AddSocket(socket);
return RespondNow(
ArgumentList(bluetooth_socket::Create::Results::Create(create_info)));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnInputMethodChanged() {
if (!host_)
return;
if (GetInputMethod())
host_->SetInputMethodActive(GetInputMethod()->IsActive());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: confirm_empty_trash (CommonJob *job)
{
char *prompt;
int response;
/* Just Say Yes if the preference says not to confirm. */
if (!should_confirm_trash ())
{
return TRUE;
}
prompt = f (_("Empty all items from Trash?"));
response = run_warning (job,
prompt,
f (_("All items in the Trash will be permanently deleted.")),
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, _("Empty _Trash"),
NULL);
return (response == 1);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpTest41(void)
{
/* IPV6/TCP/no eth header */
uint8_t raw_ip[] = {
0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x28, 0x06, 0x40,
0x20, 0x01, 0x06, 0x18, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x51, 0x99, 0xcc, 0x70,
0x20, 0x01, 0x06, 0x18, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05,
0x8c, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x50, 0x6a, 0xe7, 0x07, 0x36,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30,
0x29, 0x9c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x8c,
0x04, 0x02, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x1a, 0x39,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02 };
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
ThreadVars tv;
DecodeThreadVars dtv;
memset(&dtv, 0, sizeof(DecodeThreadVars));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(ThreadVars));
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
if (PacketCopyData(p, raw_ip, sizeof(raw_ip)) == -1) {
PacketFree(p);
return 1;
}
FlowInitConfig(FLOW_QUIET);
DecodeRaw(&tv, &dtv, p, raw_ip, GET_PKT_LEN(p), NULL);
if (p->ip6h == NULL) {
printf("expected a valid ipv6 header but it was NULL: ");
FlowShutdown();
SCFree(p);
return 1;
}
if(p->tcph == NULL) {
SCFree(p);
return 0;
}
Packet *np = StreamTcpPseudoSetup(p, GET_PKT_DATA(p), GET_PKT_LEN(p));
if (np == NULL) {
printf("the packet received from packet allocation is NULL: ");
return 0;
}
StreamTcpPseudoPacketSetupHeader(np,p);
if (((uint8_t *)p->tcph - (uint8_t *)p->ip6h) != ((uint8_t *)np->tcph - (uint8_t *)np->ip6h)) {
return 0;
}
PACKET_RECYCLE(np);
PACKET_RECYCLE(p);
SCFree(p);
FlowShutdown();
return 1;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didClearWindowObject(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
int enabled_bindings = render_view_->GetEnabledBindings();
if (enabled_bindings & BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI)
WebUIExtension::Install(frame);
if (enabled_bindings & BINDINGS_POLICY_DOM_AUTOMATION)
DomAutomationController::Install(this, frame);
if (enabled_bindings & BINDINGS_POLICY_STATS_COLLECTION)
StatsCollectionController::Install(frame);
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking))
GpuBenchmarking::Install(frame);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMemoryBenchmarking))
MemoryBenchmarkingExtension::Install(frame);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSkiaBenchmarking))
SkiaBenchmarking::Install(frame);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidClearWindowObject(frame));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, DidClearWindowObject());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vrend_renderer_use_threaded_sync(void)
{
struct virgl_gl_ctx_param ctx_params;
if (getenv("VIRGL_DISABLE_MT"))
return;
ctx_params.shared = true;
ctx_params.major_ver = vrend_state.gl_major_ver;
ctx_params.minor_ver = vrend_state.gl_minor_ver;
vrend_state.stop_sync_thread = false;
vrend_state.sync_context = vrend_clicbs->create_gl_context(0, &ctx_params);
if (vrend_state.sync_context == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to create sync opengl context\n");
return;
}
vrend_state.eventfd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC | EFD_NONBLOCK);
if (vrend_state.eventfd == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create eventfd\n");
vrend_clicbs->destroy_gl_context(vrend_state.sync_context);
return;
}
pipe_condvar_init(vrend_state.fence_cond);
pipe_mutex_init(vrend_state.fence_mutex);
vrend_state.sync_thread = pipe_thread_create(thread_sync, NULL);
if (!vrend_state.sync_thread) {
close(vrend_state.eventfd);
vrend_state.eventfd = -1;
vrend_clicbs->destroy_gl_context(vrend_state.sync_context);
pipe_condvar_destroy(vrend_state.fence_cond);
pipe_mutex_destroy(vrend_state.fence_mutex);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 4,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_descramble_buffer (GstASFDemux * demux, AsfStream * stream,
GstBuffer ** p_buffer)
{
GstBuffer *descrambled_buffer;
GstBuffer *scrambled_buffer;
GstBuffer *sub_buffer;
guint offset;
guint off;
guint row;
guint col;
guint idx;
/* descrambled_buffer is initialised in the first iteration */
descrambled_buffer = NULL;
scrambled_buffer = *p_buffer;
if (gst_buffer_get_size (scrambled_buffer) <
stream->ds_packet_size * stream->span)
return;
for (offset = 0; offset < gst_buffer_get_size (scrambled_buffer);
offset += stream->ds_chunk_size) {
off = offset / stream->ds_chunk_size;
row = off / stream->span;
col = off % stream->span;
idx = row + col * stream->ds_packet_size / stream->ds_chunk_size;
GST_DEBUG ("idx=%u, row=%u, col=%u, off=%u, ds_chunk_size=%u", idx, row,
col, off, stream->ds_chunk_size);
GST_DEBUG ("scrambled buffer size=%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT
", span=%u, packet_size=%u", gst_buffer_get_size (scrambled_buffer),
stream->span, stream->ds_packet_size);
GST_DEBUG ("gst_buffer_get_size (scrambled_buffer) = %" G_GSIZE_FORMAT,
gst_buffer_get_size (scrambled_buffer));
sub_buffer =
gst_buffer_copy_region (scrambled_buffer, GST_BUFFER_COPY_MEMORY,
idx * stream->ds_chunk_size, stream->ds_chunk_size);
if (!offset) {
descrambled_buffer = sub_buffer;
} else {
descrambled_buffer = gst_buffer_append (descrambled_buffer, sub_buffer);
}
}
GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (descrambled_buffer) =
GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (scrambled_buffer);
GST_BUFFER_DURATION (descrambled_buffer) =
GST_BUFFER_DURATION (scrambled_buffer);
GST_BUFFER_OFFSET (descrambled_buffer) = GST_BUFFER_OFFSET (scrambled_buffer);
GST_BUFFER_OFFSET_END (descrambled_buffer) =
GST_BUFFER_OFFSET_END (scrambled_buffer);
/* FIXME/CHECK: do we need to transfer buffer flags here too? */
gst_buffer_unref (scrambled_buffer);
*p_buffer = descrambled_buffer;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 25,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rad_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, char *buf, size_t len)
{
if (len < LEN_AUTH)
return (-1);
memcpy(buf, h->request + POS_AUTH, LEN_AUTH);
if (len > LEN_AUTH)
buf[LEN_AUTH] = '\0';
return (LEN_AUTH);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static xmlEntityPtr MSLGetEntity(void *context,const xmlChar *name)
{
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
/*
Get an entity by name.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" SAX.MSLGetEntity(%s)",(const char *) name);
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
return(xmlGetDocEntity(msl_info->document,name));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 14,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GDataCacheMetadata::GDataCacheMetadata(
base::SequencedWorkerPool* pool,
const base::SequencedWorkerPool::SequenceToken& sequence_token)
: pool_(pool),
sequence_token_(sequence_token) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void update_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int not_used1)
{
cfs_rq_util_change(cfs_rq, 0);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 22,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLEnable(GLenum cap) {
glEnable(cap);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_last_buddy(struct sched_entity *se)
{
if (entity_is_task(se) && unlikely(task_has_idle_policy(task_of(se))))
return;
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
if (SCHED_WARN_ON(!se->on_rq))
return;
cfs_rq_of(se)->last = se;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 15,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
{
bool serror_pending = events->exception.serror_pending;
bool has_esr = events->exception.serror_has_esr;
if (serror_pending && has_esr) {
if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN))
return -EINVAL;
if (!((events->exception.serror_esr) & ~ESR_ELx_ISS_MASK))
kvm_set_sei_esr(vcpu, events->exception.serror_esr);
else
return -EINVAL;
} else if (serror_pending) {
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_core_cmd_init(RCore *core) {
struct {
const char *cmd;
const char *description;
r_cmd_callback (cb);
void (*descriptor_init)(RCore *core);
} cmds[] = {
{"!", "run system command", cmd_system},
{"_", "print last output", cmd_last},
{"#", "calculate hash", cmd_hash},
{"$", "alias", cmd_alias},
{"%", "short version of 'env' command", cmd_env},
{"&", "tasks", cmd_tasks},
{"(", "macro", cmd_macro, cmd_macro_init},
{"*", "pointer read/write", cmd_pointer},
{"-", "open cfg.editor and run script", cmd_stdin},
{".", "interpret", cmd_interpret},
{"/", "search kw, pattern aes", cmd_search, cmd_search_init},
{"=", "io pipe", cmd_rap},
{"?", "help message", cmd_help, cmd_help_init},
{"\\", "alias for =!", cmd_rap_run},
{"'", "alias for =!", cmd_rap_run},
{"0x", "alias for s 0x", cmd_ox},
{"analysis", "analysis", cmd_anal, cmd_anal_init},
{"bsize", "change block size", cmd_bsize},
{"cmp", "compare memory", cmd_cmp, cmd_cmp_init},
{"Code", "code metadata", cmd_meta, cmd_meta_init},
{"debug", "debugger operations", cmd_debug, cmd_debug_init},
{"eval", "evaluate configuration variable", cmd_eval, cmd_eval_init},
{"flag", "get/set flags", cmd_flag, cmd_flag_init},
{"g", "egg manipulation", cmd_egg, cmd_egg_init},
{"info", "get file info", cmd_info, cmd_info_init},
{"kuery", "perform sdb query", cmd_kuery},
{"l", "list files and directories", cmd_ls},
{"join", "join the contents of the two files", cmd_join},
{"head", "show the top n number of line in file", cmd_head},
{"L", "manage dynamically loaded plugins", cmd_plugins},
{"mount", "mount filesystem", cmd_mount, cmd_mount_init},
{"open", "open or map file", cmd_open, cmd_open_init},
{"print", "print current block", cmd_print, cmd_print_init},
{"Project", "project", cmd_project, cmd_project_init},
{"quit", "exit program session", cmd_quit, cmd_quit_init},
{"Q", "alias for q!", cmd_Quit},
{":", "long commands starting with :", cmd_colon},
{"resize", "change file size", cmd_resize},
{"seek", "seek to an offset", cmd_seek, cmd_seek_init},
{"t", "type information (cparse)", cmd_type, cmd_type_init},
{"Text", "Text log utility", cmd_log, cmd_log_init},
{"u", "uname/undo", cmd_uname},
{"<", "pipe into RCons.readChar", cmd_pipein},
{"Visual", "enter visual mode", cmd_visual},
{"visualPanels", "enter visual mode", cmd_panels},
{"write", "write bytes", cmd_write, cmd_write_init},
{"x", "alias for px", cmd_hexdump},
{"yank", "yank bytes", cmd_yank},
{"zign", "zignatures", cmd_zign, cmd_zign_init},
};
core->rcmd = r_cmd_new ();
core->rcmd->macro.user = core;
core->rcmd->macro.num = core->num;
core->rcmd->macro.cmd = core_cmd0_wrapper;
core->rcmd->nullcallback = r_core_cmd_nullcallback;
core->rcmd->macro.cb_printf = (PrintfCallback)r_cons_printf;
r_cmd_set_data (core->rcmd, core);
core->cmd_descriptors = r_list_newf (free);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < R_ARRAY_SIZE (cmds); i++) {
r_cmd_add (core->rcmd, cmds[i].cmd, cmds[i].description, cmds[i].cb);
if (cmds[i].descriptor_init) {
cmds[i].descriptor_init (core);
}
}
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, $, dollar);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, %, percent);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, *, star);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, ., dot);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, =, equal);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, b);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, k);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, r);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, u);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, y);
cmd_descriptor_init (core);
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 8,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::ActivateNearestFindResult(float x,
float y) {
GetOrCreateFindRequestManager()->ActivateNearestFindResult(x, y);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void resched_task(struct task_struct *p)
{
int cpu;
assert_raw_spin_locked(&task_rq(p)->lock);
if (test_tsk_need_resched(p))
return;
set_tsk_need_resched(p);
cpu = task_cpu(p);
if (cpu == smp_processor_id())
return;
/* NEED_RESCHED must be visible before we test polling */
smp_mb();
if (!tsk_is_polling(p))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ubifs_do_bulk_read(struct ubifs_info *c, struct bu_info *bu,
struct page *page1)
{
pgoff_t offset = page1->index, end_index;
struct address_space *mapping = page1->mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct ubifs_inode *ui = ubifs_inode(inode);
int err, page_idx, page_cnt, ret = 0, n = 0;
int allocate = bu->buf ? 0 : 1;
loff_t isize;
err = ubifs_tnc_get_bu_keys(c, bu);
if (err)
goto out_warn;
if (bu->eof) {
/* Turn off bulk-read at the end of the file */
ui->read_in_a_row = 1;
ui->bulk_read = 0;
}
page_cnt = bu->blk_cnt >> UBIFS_BLOCKS_PER_PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!page_cnt) {
/*
* This happens when there are multiple blocks per page and the
* blocks for the first page we are looking for, are not
* together. If all the pages were like this, bulk-read would
* reduce performance, so we turn it off for a while.
*/
goto out_bu_off;
}
if (bu->cnt) {
if (allocate) {
/*
* Allocate bulk-read buffer depending on how many data
* nodes we are going to read.
*/
bu->buf_len = bu->zbranch[bu->cnt - 1].offs +
bu->zbranch[bu->cnt - 1].len -
bu->zbranch[0].offs;
ubifs_assert(bu->buf_len > 0);
ubifs_assert(bu->buf_len <= c->leb_size);
bu->buf = kmalloc(bu->buf_len, GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!bu->buf)
goto out_bu_off;
}
err = ubifs_tnc_bulk_read(c, bu);
if (err)
goto out_warn;
}
err = populate_page(c, page1, bu, &n);
if (err)
goto out_warn;
unlock_page(page1);
ret = 1;
isize = i_size_read(inode);
if (isize == 0)
goto out_free;
end_index = ((isize - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
for (page_idx = 1; page_idx < page_cnt; page_idx++) {
pgoff_t page_offset = offset + page_idx;
struct page *page;
if (page_offset > end_index)
break;
page = find_or_create_page(mapping, page_offset,
GFP_NOFS | __GFP_COLD);
if (!page)
break;
if (!PageUptodate(page))
err = populate_page(c, page, bu, &n);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
if (err)
break;
}
ui->last_page_read = offset + page_idx - 1;
out_free:
if (allocate)
kfree(bu->buf);
return ret;
out_warn:
ubifs_warn("ignoring error %d and skipping bulk-read", err);
goto out_free;
out_bu_off:
ui->read_in_a_row = ui->bulk_read = 0;
goto out_free;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameLoadType FrameLoader::determineFrameLoadType(const FrameLoadRequest& request)
{
if (m_frame->tree()->parent() && !m_stateMachine.startedFirstRealLoad())
return FrameLoadTypeInitialInChildFrame;
if (request.resourceRequest().cachePolicy() == ReloadIgnoringCacheData)
return FrameLoadTypeReload;
if (request.lockBackForwardList() || isScriptTriggeredFormSubmissionInChildFrame(request))
return FrameLoadTypeRedirectWithLockedBackForwardList;
if (!request.requester() && shouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(request.resourceRequest().url()))
return FrameLoadTypeSame;
if (shouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(request.substituteData().failingURL()) && m_loadType == FrameLoadTypeReload)
return FrameLoadTypeReload;
return FrameLoadTypeStandard;
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MSG_WriteAngle16( msg_t *sb, float f ) {
MSG_WriteShort (sb, ANGLE2SHORT(f));
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKit::WebCookieJar* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::cookieJar() {
return &cookie_jar_;
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stsg_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *ptr = (GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *)s;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(s, 6);
ptr->grouping_type = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->nb_groups = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(s, ptr->nb_groups*4);
GF_SAFE_ALLOC_N(ptr->group_description_index, ptr->nb_groups, u32);
if (!ptr->group_description_index) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
for (i = 0; i < ptr->nb_groups; i++) {
ptr->group_description_index[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t length,
struct rtable **rtp, unsigned int flags,
const struct sockcm_cookie *sockc)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct iphdr *iph;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int iphlen;
int err;
struct rtable *rt = *rtp;
int hlen, tlen;
if (length > rt->dst.dev->mtu) {
ip_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl4->daddr, inet->inet_dport,
rt->dst.dev->mtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (length < sizeof(struct iphdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
goto out;
hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
tlen = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
length + hlen + tlen + 15,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto error;
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
*rtp = NULL;
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
skb_put(skb, length);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, sockc->tsflags, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
if (flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
skb_set_dst_pending_confirm(skb, 1);
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header;
err = -EFAULT;
if (memcpy_from_msg(iph, msg, length))
goto error_free;
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
/*
* We don't want to modify the ip header, but we do need to
* be sure that it won't cause problems later along the network
* stack. Specifically we want to make sure that iph->ihl is a
* sane value. If ihl points beyond the length of the buffer passed
* in, reject the frame as invalid
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (iphlen > length)
goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
if (!iph->saddr)
iph->saddr = fl4->saddr;
iph->check = 0;
iph->tot_len = htons(length);
if (!iph->id)
ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL);
iph->check = ip_fast_csum((unsigned char *)iph, iph->ihl);
skb->transport_header += iphlen;
if (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP &&
length >= iphlen + sizeof(struct icmphdr))
icmp_out_count(net, ((struct icmphdr *)
skb_transport_header(skb))->type);
}
err = NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
net, sk, skb, NULL, rt->dst.dev,
dst_output);
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
if (err)
goto error;
out:
return 0;
error_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
error:
IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SynchronousCompositorImpl::DemandDrawSw(SkCanvas* canvas) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(output_surface_);
DCHECK(begin_frame_source_);
scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> frame =
output_surface_->DemandDrawSw(canvas);
if (frame.get())
UpdateFrameMetaData(frame->metadata);
return !!frame.get();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,530
|
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