instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Rp_toString(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
char *out;
re = js_toregexp(J, 0);
out = js_malloc(J, strlen(re->source) + 6); /* extra space for //gim */
strcpy(out, "/");
strcat(out, re->source);
strcat(out, "/");
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) strcat(out, "g");
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_I) strcat(out, "i");
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_M) strcat(out, "m");
if (js_try(J)) {
js_free(J, out);
js_throw(J);
}
js_pop(J, 0);
js_pushstring(J, out);
js_endtry(J);
js_free(J, out);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 1,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int raw_hash_sk(struct sock *sk)
{
struct raw_hashinfo *h = sk->sk_prot->h.raw_hash;
struct hlist_head *head;
head = &h->ht[inet_sk(sk)->inet_num & (RAW_HTABLE_SIZE - 1)];
write_lock_bh(&h->lock);
sk_add_node(sk, head);
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
write_unlock_bh(&h->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t vhost_scsi_tpg_show_nexus(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
char *page)
{
struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg = container_of(se_tpg,
struct vhost_scsi_tpg, se_tpg);
struct vhost_scsi_nexus *tv_nexus;
ssize_t ret;
mutex_lock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus;
if (!tv_nexus) {
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
ret = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",
tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess->se_node_acl->initiatorname);
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void predictor_decode_mono_3800(APEContext *ctx, int count)
{
APEPredictor *p = &ctx->predictor;
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
int start = 4, shift = 10;
if (ctx->compression_level == COMPRESSION_LEVEL_HIGH) {
start = 16;
long_filter_high_3800(decoded0, 16, 9, count);
} else if (ctx->compression_level == COMPRESSION_LEVEL_EXTRA_HIGH) {
int order = 128, shift2 = 11;
if (ctx->fileversion >= 3830) {
order <<= 1;
shift++;
shift2++;
long_filter_ehigh_3830(decoded0 + order, count - order);
}
start = order;
long_filter_high_3800(decoded0, order, shift2, count);
}
while (count--) {
if (ctx->compression_level == COMPRESSION_LEVEL_FAST) {
*decoded0 = filter_fast_3320(p, *decoded0, 0, YDELAYA);
decoded0++;
} else {
*decoded0 = filter_3800(p, *decoded0, 0, YDELAYA, YDELAYB,
start, shift);
decoded0++;
}
/* Combined */
p->buf++;
p->sample_pos++;
/* Have we filled the history buffer? */
if (p->buf == p->historybuffer + HISTORY_SIZE) {
memmove(p->historybuffer, p->buf,
PREDICTOR_SIZE * sizeof(*p->historybuffer));
p->buf = p->historybuffer;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
{
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 0);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 14);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 1,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tun_mainloop(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int *timeout)
{
int work_done = 0;
int prefix_size = 0;
#ifdef TUN_HAS_AF_PREFIX
if (!vpninfo->script_tun)
prefix_size = sizeof(int);
#endif
if (FD_ISSET(vpninfo->tun_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds)) {
while (1) {
int len = vpninfo->mtu;
if (!out_pkt) {
out_pkt = malloc(sizeof(struct pkt) + len);
if (!out_pkt) {
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, "Allocation failed\n");
break;
}
}
len = read(vpninfo->tun_fd, out_pkt->data - prefix_size, len + prefix_size);
if (len <= prefix_size)
break;
out_pkt->len = len - prefix_size;
queue_packet(&vpninfo->outgoing_queue, out_pkt);
out_pkt = NULL;
work_done = 1;
vpninfo->outgoing_qlen++;
if (vpninfo->outgoing_qlen == vpninfo->max_qlen) {
FD_CLR(vpninfo->tun_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
break;
}
}
} else if (vpninfo->outgoing_qlen < vpninfo->max_qlen) {
FD_SET(vpninfo->tun_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
}
/* The kernel returns -ENOMEM when the queue is full, so theoretically
we could handle that and retry... but it doesn't let us poll() for
the no-longer-full situation, so let's not bother. */
while (vpninfo->incoming_queue) {
struct pkt *this = vpninfo->incoming_queue;
unsigned char *data = this->data;
int len = this->len;
#ifdef TUN_HAS_AF_PREFIX
if (!vpninfo->script_tun) {
struct ip *iph = (void *)data;
int type;
if (iph->ip_v == 6)
type = AF_INET6;
else if (iph->ip_v == 4)
type = AF_INET;
else {
static int complained = 0;
if (!complained) {
complained = 1;
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
_("Unknown packet (len %d) received: %02x %02x %02x %02x...\n"),
len, data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]);
}
free(this);
continue;
}
data -= 4;
len += 4;
*(int *)data = htonl(type);
}
#endif
vpninfo->incoming_queue = this->next;
if (write(vpninfo->tun_fd, data, len) < 0) {
/* Handle death of "script" socket */
if (vpninfo->script_tun && errno == ENOTCONN) {
vpninfo->quit_reason = "Client connection terminated";
return 1;
}
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
_("Failed to write incoming packet: %s\n"),
strerror(errno));
}
free(this);
}
/* Work is not done if we just got rid of packets off the queue */
return work_done;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int huff_reader_get_symbol(HuffReader *r, GetBitContext *gb)
{
if (r->simple) {
if (r->nb_symbols == 1)
return r->simple_symbols[0];
else
return r->simple_symbols[get_bits1(gb)];
} else
return webp_get_vlc(gb, r->vlc.table);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline size_t xfrm_polexpire_msgsize(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_polexpire))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr)
+ nla_total_size(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp->security))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark))
+ userpolicy_type_attrsize();
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SpdyWriteQueue::PendingWrite::PendingWrite(
SpdyFrameType frame_type,
SpdyBufferProducer* frame_producer,
const base::WeakPtr<SpdyStream>& stream)
: frame_type(frame_type),
frame_producer(frame_producer),
stream(stream),
has_stream(stream.get() != NULL) {}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::FileSelectedWithExtraInfo(const ui::SelectedFileInfo& file_info,
int index,
void* params) {
profile_->set_last_selected_directory(file_info.file_path.DirName());
GURL url = net::FilePathToFileURL(file_info.local_path);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
const GURL external_url =
chromeos::CreateExternalFileURLFromPath(profile_, file_info.file_path);
if (!external_url.is_empty())
url = external_url;
#endif
if (url.is_empty())
return;
OpenURL(OpenURLParams(url, Referrer(), WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, false));
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usbnet_write_cmd(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype,
u16 value, u16 index, const void *data, u16 size)
{
int ret;
if (usb_autopm_get_interface(dev->intf) < 0)
return -ENODEV;
ret = __usbnet_write_cmd(dev, cmd, reqtype, value, index,
data, size);
usb_autopm_put_interface(dev->intf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PopupContainer::~PopupContainer()
{
if (m_listBox && m_listBox->parent())
removeChild(m_listBox.get());
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vrend_renderer_context_create(uint32_t handle, uint32_t nlen, const char *debug_name)
{
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return EINVAL;
/* context 0 is always available with no guarantees */
if (handle == 0)
return EINVAL;
vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(handle, nlen, debug_name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 25,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidCommitCompositorFrameForWidget() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidCommitCompositorFrame();
UpdatePreferredSize();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 20,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetBoundFramebufferStencilFormat(
GLenum target) {
DCHECK(target == GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER ||
target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(target);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->GetStencilFormat();
} else { // Back buffer.
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_stencil_format_;
}
if (back_buffer_has_stencil_)
return GL_STENCIL;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setTheContextObject(sp<BBinder> obj)
{
the_context_object = obj;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err elst_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
u32 nb_entries;
GF_EdtsEntry *p;
GF_EditListBox *ptr = (GF_EditListBox *)s;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
nb_entries = gf_list_count(ptr->entryList);
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, nb_entries);
for (i = 0; i < nb_entries; i++ ) {
p = (GF_EdtsEntry*)gf_list_get(ptr->entryList, i);
if (ptr->version == 1) {
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, p->segmentDuration);
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, p->mediaTime);
} else {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, (u32) p->segmentDuration);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, (s32) p->mediaTime);
}
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, p->mediaRate);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, 0);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 27,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListSyncableService::RemoveSyncItem(const std::string& id) {
VLOG(2) << this << ": RemoveSyncItem: " << id.substr(0, 8);
SyncItemMap::iterator iter = sync_items_.find(id);
if (iter == sync_items_.end()) {
DVLOG(2) << this << " : RemoveSyncItem: No Item.";
return;
}
SyncItem* sync_item = iter->second;
sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::AppListItemType type = sync_item->item_type;
if (type == sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP) {
DVLOG(2) << this << " : RemoveDefault Item exists.";
return;
}
if (type == sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_APP &&
AppIsDefault(extension_system_->extension_service(), id)) {
VLOG(2) << this << " -> SYNC UPDATE: REMOVE_DEFAULT: "
<< sync_item->item_id;
sync_item->item_type = sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP;
SendSyncChange(sync_item, SyncChange::ACTION_UPDATE);
return;
}
DeleteSyncItem(sync_item);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_linux_shareopts_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *cookie)
{
char **plinux_opts = (char **)cookie;
/* host-specific options, these are taken care of elsewhere */
if (strcmp(key, "ro") == 0 || strcmp(key, "rw") == 0 ||
strcmp(key, "sec") == 0)
return (SA_OK);
if (strcmp(key, "anon") == 0)
key = "anonuid";
if (strcmp(key, "root_mapping") == 0) {
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "root_squash", NULL);
key = "anonuid";
}
if (strcmp(key, "nosub") == 0)
key = "subtree_check";
if (strcmp(key, "insecure") != 0 && strcmp(key, "secure") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "async") != 0 && strcmp(key, "sync") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "no_wdelay") != 0 && strcmp(key, "wdelay") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "nohide") != 0 && strcmp(key, "hide") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "crossmnt") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "no_subtree_check") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "subtree_check") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "insecure_locks") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "secure_locks") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "no_auth_nlm") != 0 && strcmp(key, "auth_nlm") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "no_acl") != 0 && strcmp(key, "mountpoint") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "mp") != 0 && strcmp(key, "fsuid") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "refer") != 0 && strcmp(key, "replicas") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "root_squash") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "no_root_squash") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "all_squash") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "no_all_squash") != 0 && strcmp(key, "fsid") != 0 &&
strcmp(key, "anonuid") != 0 && strcmp(key, "anongid") != 0) {
return (SA_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, key, value);
return (SA_OK);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void safe_send(const void* buf, size_t len, bool hickup)
{
off_t offset = 0;
const char* ptr = buf;
#ifdef MESSAGE_DEBUG
uint8_t val = *ptr;
assert(val == (uint8_t)0x80);
fprintf(stderr, "About to send %lu bytes:", (unsigned long)len);
for (int ii = 0; ii < len; ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ");
}
val = *(ptr + ii);
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", val);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
usleep(500);
#endif
do {
size_t num_bytes = len - offset;
if (hickup) {
if (num_bytes > 1024) {
num_bytes = (rand() % 1023) + 1;
}
}
ssize_t nw = write(sock, ptr + offset, num_bytes);
if (nw == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to write: %s\n", strerror(errno));
abort();
}
} else {
if (hickup) {
usleep(100);
}
offset += nw;
}
} while (offset < len);
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: message_is_name_owner_changed (FlatpakProxyClient *client, Header *header)
{
if (header->type == G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL &&
g_strcmp0 (header->sender, "org.freedesktop.DBus") == 0 &&
g_strcmp0 (header->interface, "org.freedesktop.DBus") == 0 &&
g_strcmp0 (header->member, "NameOwnerChanged") == 0)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 23,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmd_pointer(void *data, const char *input) {
RCore *core = (RCore*) data;
int ret = true;
char *str, *eq;
while (*input == ' ') input++;
if (!*input || *input == '?') {
const char* help_msg[] = {
"Usage:", "*<addr>[=[0x]value]", "Pointer read/write data/values",
"*", "entry0=cc", "write trap in entrypoint",
"*", "entry0+10=0x804800", "write value in delta address",
"*", "entry0", "read byte at given address",
"TODO: last command should honor asm.bits", "", "",
NULL};
r_core_cmd_help (core, help_msg);
return ret;
}
str = strdup (input);
eq = strchr (str, '=');
if (eq) {
*eq++ = 0;
if (!strncmp (eq, "0x", 2)) {
ret = r_core_cmdf (core, "wv %s@%s", eq, str);
} else {
ret = r_core_cmdf (core, "wx %s@%s", eq, str);
}
} else {
ret = r_core_cmdf (core, "?v [%s]", input);
}
free (str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_getpfcstate(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfcstate)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_PFC_STATE,
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfcstate(netdev));
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize FrameView::inputEventsOffsetForEmulation() const
{
return m_inputEventsOffsetForEmulation;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_io_bus_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
int len, const void *val)
{
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
struct kvm_io_range range;
int r;
range = (struct kvm_io_range) {
.addr = addr,
.len = len,
};
bus = srcu_dereference(vcpu->kvm->buses[bus_idx], &vcpu->kvm->srcu);
if (!bus)
return -ENOMEM;
r = __kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, bus, &range, val);
return r < 0 ? r : 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 16,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataEntry::SetFileNameFromTitle() {
file_name_ = EscapeUtf8FileName(title_);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fib6_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
rt6_ifdown(net, NULL);
del_timer_sync(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&net->ipv6.fib6_local_tbl->tb6_peers);
kfree(net->ipv6.fib6_local_tbl);
#endif
inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl->tb6_peers);
kfree(net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl);
kfree(net->ipv6.fib_table_hash);
kfree(net->ipv6.rt6_stats);
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateTargetURL(RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const GURL& url) {
if (fullscreen_widget_routing_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderWidgetHostView* fs = GetFullscreenRenderWidgetHostView();
if (fs && fs->GetRenderWidgetHost() != render_view_host->GetWidget())
return;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->UpdateTargetURL(this, url);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t HevcParameterSets::parseVps(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
NALBitReader reader(data, size);
reader.skipBits(4);
reader.skipBits(1);
reader.skipBits(1);
reader.skipBits(6);
reader.skipBits(1);
reader.skipBits(16);
if (reader.atLeastNumBitsLeft(96)) {
mParams.add(kGeneralProfileSpace, reader.getBits(2));
mParams.add(kGeneralTierFlag, reader.getBits(1));
mParams.add(kGeneralProfileIdc, reader.getBits(5));
mParams.add(kGeneralProfileCompatibilityFlags, reader.getBits(32));
mParams.add(
kGeneralConstraintIndicatorFlags,
((uint64_t)reader.getBits(16) << 32) | reader.getBits(32));
mParams.add(kGeneralLevelIdc, reader.getBits(8));
} else {
reader.skipBits(96);
}
return reader.overRead() ? ERROR_MALFORMED : OK;
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 24,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didFailLoad(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebURLError& error) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
WebDataSource* ds = frame->dataSource();
DCHECK(ds);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidFailLoad(frame, error));
const WebURLRequest& failed_request = ds->request();
base::string16 error_description;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorStrings(
render_view_.get(),
frame,
failed_request,
error,
NULL,
&error_description);
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError(routing_id_,
failed_request.url(),
error.reason,
error_description));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: wv_csp10_opaque_binary_tag(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
guint8 token, guint8 codepage, guint32 *length)
{
guint32 data_len = tvb_get_guintvar(tvb, offset, length);
char *str = NULL;
switch (codepage) {
case 0: /* Common code page */
switch (token) {
case 0x0B: /* <Code> */
case 0x0F: /* <ContentSize> */
case 0x1A: /* <MessageCount> */
case 0x3C: /* <Validity> */
str = wv_integer_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
case 0x11: /* <DateTime> */
str = wv_datetime_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
case 1: /* Access code page */
switch (token) {
case 0x1C: /* <KeepAliveTime> */
case 0x32: /* <TimeToLive> */
str = wv_integer_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
case 3: /* Client capability code page */
switch (token) {
case 0x06: /* <AcceptedContentLength> */
case 0x0C: /* <MultiTrans> */
case 0x0D: /* <ParserSize> */
case 0x0E: /* <ServerPollMin> */
case 0x11: /* <TCPAddress> */
case 0x12: /* <TCPPort> */
case 0x13: /* <UDPPort> */
str = wv_integer_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (str == NULL) { /* Error, or not parsed */
str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "(%d bytes of unparsed opaque data)", data_len);
}
*length += data_len;
return str;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_hmacalgo __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
__u16 data_len = 0;
u32 num_idents;
int i;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
hmacs = ep->auth_hmacs_list;
data_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len)
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len;
num_idents = data_len / sizeof(u16);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < num_idents; i++) {
__u16 hmacid = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
if (copy_to_user(&p->shmac_idents[i], &hmacid, sizeof(__u16)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 7,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_openssl_dispose_config(struct php_x509_request * req TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (req->priv_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(req->priv_key);
req->priv_key = NULL;
}
if (req->global_config) {
CONF_free(req->global_config);
req->global_config = NULL;
}
if (req->req_config) {
CONF_free(req->req_config);
req->req_config = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isSpeechEnabled() const
{
return m_inputType->shouldRespectSpeechAttribute() && RuntimeEnabledFeatures::speechInputEnabled() && hasAttribute(webkitspeechAttr);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_setup_tx_offloads(E1000ECore *core, struct e1000e_tx *tx)
{
if (tx->props.tse && tx->props.cptse) {
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(tx->tx_pkt, true, true, tx->props.mss);
net_tx_pkt_update_ip_checksums(tx->tx_pkt);
e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(core->mac, TSCTC);
return;
}
if (tx->props.sum_needed & E1000_TXD_POPTS_TXSM) {
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(tx->tx_pkt, false, true, 0);
}
if (tx->props.sum_needed & E1000_TXD_POPTS_IXSM) {
net_tx_pkt_update_ip_hdr_checksum(tx->tx_pkt);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 13,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *gid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->gid_map);
}
Commit Message: userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::FocusedNodeChanged(
bool editable,
const gfx::Rect& node_bounds_in_screen) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!editable && virtual_keyboard_requested_) {
virtual_keyboard_requested_ = false;
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(host_);
if (rvh && rvh->GetDelegate())
rvh->GetDelegate()->SetIsVirtualKeyboardRequested(false);
DCHECK(ui::OnScreenKeyboardDisplayManager::GetInstance());
ui::OnScreenKeyboardDisplayManager::GetInstance()->DismissVirtualKeyboard();
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 26,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_get_test_json_output(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->json_output;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_startcap_request (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
proto_tree *tree, *field_tree;
proto_item *ti, *field_ti;
guint16 flags;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_startcap_request, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_startcap_request);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_snaplen, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_read_timeout, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
flags = tvb_get_ntohs (tvb, offset);
field_ti = proto_tree_add_uint_format (tree, hf_flags, tvb, offset, 2, flags, "Flags");
field_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (field_ti, ett_startcap_flags);
proto_tree_add_item (field_tree, hf_flags_promisc, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (field_tree, hf_flags_dgram, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (field_tree, hf_flags_serveropen, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (field_tree, hf_flags_inbound, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (field_tree, hf_flags_outbound, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if (flags & 0x1F) {
gchar *flagstr = wmem_strdup_printf (wmem_packet_scope(), "%s%s%s%s%s",
(flags & FLAG_PROMISC) ? ", Promiscuous" : "",
(flags & FLAG_DGRAM) ? ", Datagram" : "",
(flags & FLAG_SERVEROPEN) ? ", ServerOpen" : "",
(flags & FLAG_INBOUND) ? ", Inbound" : "",
(flags & FLAG_OUTBOUND) ? ", Outbound" : "");
proto_item_append_text (field_ti, ":%s", &flagstr[1]);
} else {
proto_item_append_text (field_ti, " (none)");
}
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_client_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
dissect_rpcap_filter (tvb, pinfo, tree, offset);
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool acpi_queue_hotplug_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
return queue_work(kacpi_hotplug_wq, work);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ExecuteJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld(
const base::string16& javascript,
const JavaScriptResultCallback& callback,
int world_id) {
if (world_id <= ISOLATED_WORLD_ID_GLOBAL ||
world_id > ISOLATED_WORLD_ID_MAX) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
int key = 0;
bool request_reply = false;
if (!callback.is_null()) {
request_reply = true;
key = g_next_javascript_callback_id++;
javascript_callbacks_.emplace(key, callback);
}
Send(new FrameMsg_JavaScriptExecuteRequestInIsolatedWorld(
routing_id_, javascript, key, request_reply, world_id));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arm_timer(struct k_itimer *timer)
{
struct task_struct *p = timer->it.cpu.task;
struct list_head *head, *listpos;
struct task_cputime *cputime_expires;
struct cpu_timer_list *const nt = &timer->it.cpu;
struct cpu_timer_list *next;
if (CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(timer->it_clock)) {
head = p->cpu_timers;
cputime_expires = &p->cputime_expires;
} else {
head = p->signal->cpu_timers;
cputime_expires = &p->signal->cputime_expires;
}
head += CPUCLOCK_WHICH(timer->it_clock);
listpos = head;
list_for_each_entry(next, head, entry) {
if (nt->expires < next->expires)
break;
listpos = &next->entry;
}
list_add(&nt->entry, listpos);
if (listpos == head) {
u64 exp = nt->expires;
/*
* We are the new earliest-expiring POSIX 1.b timer, hence
* need to update expiration cache. Take into account that
* for process timers we share expiration cache with itimers
* and RLIMIT_CPU and for thread timers with RLIMIT_RTTIME.
*/
switch (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(timer->it_clock)) {
case CPUCLOCK_PROF:
if (expires_gt(cputime_expires->prof_exp, exp))
cputime_expires->prof_exp = exp;
break;
case CPUCLOCK_VIRT:
if (expires_gt(cputime_expires->virt_exp, exp))
cputime_expires->virt_exp = exp;
break;
case CPUCLOCK_SCHED:
if (expires_gt(cputime_expires->sched_exp, exp))
cputime_expires->sched_exp = exp;
break;
}
if (CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(timer->it_clock))
tick_dep_set_task(p, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER);
else
tick_dep_set_signal(p->signal, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER);
}
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 3,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int fpm_stdio_parent_use_pipes(struct fpm_child_s *child) /* {{{ */
{
if (0 == child->wp->config->catch_workers_output) { /* not required */
return 0;
}
close(fd_stdout[1]);
close(fd_stderr[1]);
child->fd_stdout = fd_stdout[0];
child->fd_stderr = fd_stderr[0];
fpm_event_set(&child->ev_stdout, child->fd_stdout, FPM_EV_READ, fpm_stdio_child_said, child);
fpm_event_add(&child->ev_stdout, 0);
fpm_event_set(&child->ev_stderr, child->fd_stderr, FPM_EV_READ, fpm_stdio_child_said, child);
fpm_event_add(&child->ev_stderr, 0);
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 28,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Parcel::freeDataNoInit()
{
if (mOwner) {
LOG_ALLOC("Parcel %p: freeing other owner data", this);
mOwner(this, mData, mDataSize, mObjects, mObjectsSize, mOwnerCookie);
} else {
LOG_ALLOC("Parcel %p: freeing allocated data", this);
releaseObjects();
if (mData) {
LOG_ALLOC("Parcel %p: freeing with %zu capacity", this, mDataCapacity);
pthread_mutex_lock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
gParcelGlobalAllocSize -= mDataCapacity;
gParcelGlobalAllocCount--;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
free(mData);
}
if (mObjects) free(mObjects);
}
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
return;
}
}
}
}
RefPtr<Image> image = VideoFrameToImage(video);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.Get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedVideo(video->GetWebMediaPlayer());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
GLuint client_id, const char* function_name) {
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
if (GetProgramInfo(client_id)) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
(std::string(function_name) +
": program passed for shader").c_str());
} else {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
(std::string(function_name) + ": unknown shader").c_str());
}
}
return info;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Session_SetConfig(preproc_session_t *session, effect_config_t *config)
{
uint32_t sr;
uint32_t inCnl = audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(config->inputCfg.channels);
uint32_t outCnl = audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(config->outputCfg.channels);
if (config->inputCfg.samplingRate != config->outputCfg.samplingRate ||
config->inputCfg.format != config->outputCfg.format ||
config->inputCfg.format != AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT) {
return -EINVAL;
}
ALOGV("Session_SetConfig sr %d cnl %08x",
config->inputCfg.samplingRate, config->inputCfg.channels);
int status;
if (session->enabledMsk) {
if (session->samplingRate != config->inputCfg.samplingRate ||
session->inChannelCount != inCnl ||
session->outChannelCount != outCnl) {
return -ENOSYS;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
if (config->inputCfg.samplingRate >= 32000 && !(session->createdMsk & (1 << PREPROC_AEC))) {
session->apmSamplingRate = 32000;
} else
if (config->inputCfg.samplingRate >= 16000) {
session->apmSamplingRate = 16000;
} else if (config->inputCfg.samplingRate >= 8000) {
session->apmSamplingRate = 8000;
}
status = session->apm->set_sample_rate_hz(session->apmSamplingRate);
if (status < 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
status = session->apm->set_num_channels(inCnl, outCnl);
if (status < 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
status = session->apm->set_num_reverse_channels(inCnl);
if (status < 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
session->samplingRate = config->inputCfg.samplingRate;
session->apmFrameCount = session->apmSamplingRate / 100;
if (session->samplingRate == session->apmSamplingRate) {
session->frameCount = session->apmFrameCount;
} else {
session->frameCount = (session->apmFrameCount * session->samplingRate) /
session->apmSamplingRate + 1;
}
session->inChannelCount = inCnl;
session->outChannelCount = outCnl;
session->procFrame->_audioChannel = inCnl;
session->procFrame->_frequencyInHz = session->apmSamplingRate;
session->revChannelCount = inCnl;
session->revFrame->_audioChannel = inCnl;
session->revFrame->_frequencyInHz = session->apmSamplingRate;
session->inBufSize = 0;
session->outBufSize = 0;
session->framesIn = 0;
session->framesOut = 0;
if (session->inResampler != NULL) {
speex_resampler_destroy(session->inResampler);
session->inResampler = NULL;
}
if (session->outResampler != NULL) {
speex_resampler_destroy(session->outResampler);
session->outResampler = NULL;
}
if (session->revResampler != NULL) {
speex_resampler_destroy(session->revResampler);
session->revResampler = NULL;
}
if (session->samplingRate != session->apmSamplingRate) {
int error;
session->inResampler = speex_resampler_init(session->inChannelCount,
session->samplingRate,
session->apmSamplingRate,
RESAMPLER_QUALITY,
&error);
if (session->inResampler == NULL) {
ALOGW("Session_SetConfig Cannot create speex resampler: %s",
speex_resampler_strerror(error));
return -EINVAL;
}
session->outResampler = speex_resampler_init(session->outChannelCount,
session->apmSamplingRate,
session->samplingRate,
RESAMPLER_QUALITY,
&error);
if (session->outResampler == NULL) {
ALOGW("Session_SetConfig Cannot create speex resampler: %s",
speex_resampler_strerror(error));
speex_resampler_destroy(session->inResampler);
session->inResampler = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
session->revResampler = speex_resampler_init(session->inChannelCount,
session->samplingRate,
session->apmSamplingRate,
RESAMPLER_QUALITY,
&error);
if (session->revResampler == NULL) {
ALOGW("Session_SetConfig Cannot create speex resampler: %s",
speex_resampler_strerror(error));
speex_resampler_destroy(session->inResampler);
session->inResampler = NULL;
speex_resampler_destroy(session->outResampler);
session->outResampler = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
}
session->state = PREPROC_SESSION_STATE_CONFIG;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udp6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_printf(seq,
" sl "
"local_address "
"remote_address "
"st tx_queue rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt"
" uid timeout inode ref pointer drops\n");
else
udp6_sock_seq_show(seq, v, ((struct udp_iter_state *)seq->private)->bucket);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::DeleteSyncStub(GLsizei n, const GLuint* syncs) {
DCHECK_EQ(1, n);
helper_->DeleteSync(syncs[0]);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSbyteLong8(uint64 value)
{
if (value>0x7F)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ihevcd_unmark_pps(codec_t *ps_codec, WORD32 sps_id)
{
WORD32 pps_id = 0;
pps_t *ps_pps = ps_codec->ps_pps_base;
for(pps_id = 0; pps_id < MAX_PPS_CNT - 1; pps_id++, ps_pps++)
{
if((ps_pps->i1_pps_valid) &&
(ps_pps->i1_sps_id == sps_id))
ps_pps->i1_pps_valid = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: init_ppp_file(struct ppp_file *pf, int kind)
{
pf->kind = kind;
skb_queue_head_init(&pf->xq);
skb_queue_head_init(&pf->rq);
atomic_set(&pf->refcnt, 1);
init_waitqueue_head(&pf->rwait);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit_signal(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
BUG_ON(!sig);
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&sig->count));
sighand = rcu_dereference(tsk->sighand);
spin_lock(&sighand->siglock);
posix_cpu_timers_exit(tsk);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sig->count))
posix_cpu_timers_exit_group(tsk);
else {
/*
* If there is any task waiting for the group exit
* then notify it:
*/
if (sig->group_exit_task && atomic_read(&sig->count) == sig->notify_count)
wake_up_process(sig->group_exit_task);
if (tsk == sig->curr_target)
sig->curr_target = next_thread(tsk);
/*
* Accumulate here the counters for all threads but the
* group leader as they die, so they can be added into
* the process-wide totals when those are taken.
* The group leader stays around as a zombie as long
* as there are other threads. When it gets reaped,
* the exit.c code will add its counts into these totals.
* We won't ever get here for the group leader, since it
* will have been the last reference on the signal_struct.
*/
sig->gtime = cputime_add(sig->gtime, task_gtime(tsk));
sig->min_flt += tsk->min_flt;
sig->maj_flt += tsk->maj_flt;
sig->nvcsw += tsk->nvcsw;
sig->nivcsw += tsk->nivcsw;
sig->inblock += task_io_get_inblock(tsk);
sig->oublock += task_io_get_oublock(tsk);
task_io_accounting_add(&sig->ioac, &tsk->ioac);
sig = NULL; /* Marker for below. */
}
__unhash_process(tsk);
/*
* Do this under ->siglock, we can race with another thread
* doing sigqueue_free() if we have SIGQUEUE_PREALLOC signals.
*/
flush_sigqueue(&tsk->pending);
tsk->signal = NULL;
tsk->sighand = NULL;
spin_unlock(&sighand->siglock);
__cleanup_sighand(sighand);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk,TIF_SIGPENDING);
if (sig) {
flush_sigqueue(&sig->shared_pending);
taskstats_tgid_free(sig);
/*
* Make sure ->signal can't go away under rq->lock,
* see account_group_exec_runtime().
*/
task_rq_unlock_wait(tsk);
__cleanup_signal(sig);
}
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripModel::UpdateTabContentsStateAt(int index,
TabStripModelObserver::TabChangeType change_type) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabChangedAt(GetContentsAt(index), index, change_type));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::JavaScriptDialogManager* Browser::GetJavaScriptDialogManager(
WebContents* source) {
return JavaScriptDialogTabHelper::FromWebContents(source);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileSyncService::ShutdownImpl(bool sync_disabled) {
base::Time shutdown_start_time = base::Time::Now();
if (backend_.get())
backend_->StopSyncingForShutdown();
if (data_type_manager_.get()) {
if (data_type_manager_->state() != DataTypeManager::STOPPED) {
expect_sync_configuration_aborted_ = true;
data_type_manager_->Stop();
}
registrar_.Remove(
this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_SYNC_CONFIGURE_START,
content::Source<DataTypeManager>(data_type_manager_.get()));
registrar_.Remove(
this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_SYNC_CONFIGURE_DONE,
content::Source<DataTypeManager>(data_type_manager_.get()));
registrar_.Remove(
this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_SYNC_CONFIGURE_BLOCKED,
content::Source<DataTypeManager>(data_type_manager_.get()));
data_type_manager_.reset();
}
migrator_.reset();
sync_js_controller_.AttachJsBackend(WeakHandle<JsBackend>());
scoped_ptr<SyncBackendHost> doomed_backend(backend_.release());
if (doomed_backend.get()) {
doomed_backend->Shutdown(sync_disabled);
doomed_backend.reset();
}
base::TimeDelta shutdown_time = base::Time::Now() - shutdown_start_time;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("Sync.Shutdown.BackendDestroyedTime", shutdown_time);
weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
expect_sync_configuration_aborted_ = false;
is_auth_in_progress_ = false;
backend_initialized_ = false;
cached_passphrase_.clear();
encryption_pending_ = false;
encrypt_everything_ = false;
encrypted_types_ = browser_sync::Cryptographer::SensitiveTypes();
passphrase_required_reason_ = sync_api::REASON_PASSPHRASE_NOT_REQUIRED;
last_auth_error_ = GoogleServiceAuthError::None();
if (sync_global_error_.get()) {
GlobalErrorServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->RemoveGlobalError(
sync_global_error_.get());
RemoveObserver(sync_global_error_.get());
sync_global_error_.reset(NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 25,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf = debug_fault_info + DBG_ESR_EVT(esr);
struct siginfo info;
if (!inf->fn(addr, esr, regs))
return 1;
pr_alert("Unhandled debug exception: %s (0x%08x) at 0x%016lx\n",
inf->name, esr, addr);
info.si_signo = inf->sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = inf->code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 12,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t vfio_pci_rw(void *device_data, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos, bool iswrite)
{
unsigned int index = VFIO_PCI_OFFSET_TO_INDEX(*ppos);
struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
if (index >= VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS + vdev->num_regions)
return -EINVAL;
switch (index) {
case VFIO_PCI_CONFIG_REGION_INDEX:
return vfio_pci_config_rw(vdev, buf, count, ppos, iswrite);
case VFIO_PCI_ROM_REGION_INDEX:
if (iswrite)
return -EINVAL;
return vfio_pci_bar_rw(vdev, buf, count, ppos, false);
case VFIO_PCI_BAR0_REGION_INDEX ... VFIO_PCI_BAR5_REGION_INDEX:
return vfio_pci_bar_rw(vdev, buf, count, ppos, iswrite);
case VFIO_PCI_VGA_REGION_INDEX:
return vfio_pci_vga_rw(vdev, buf, count, ppos, iswrite);
default:
index -= VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS;
return vdev->region[index].ops->rw(vdev, buf,
count, ppos, iswrite);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 17,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI pcre_cache_entry* pcre_get_compiled_regex_cache(char *regex, int regex_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
pcre *re = NULL;
pcre_extra *extra;
int coptions = 0;
int soptions = 0;
const char *error;
int erroffset;
char delimiter;
char start_delimiter;
char end_delimiter;
char *p, *pp;
char *pattern;
int do_study = 0;
int poptions = 0;
int count = 0;
unsigned const char *tables = NULL;
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
char *locale;
#endif
pcre_cache_entry *pce;
pcre_cache_entry new_entry;
char *tmp = NULL;
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
# if defined(PHP_WIN32) && defined(ZTS)
_configthreadlocale(_ENABLE_PER_THREAD_LOCALE);
# endif
locale = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
#endif
/* Try to lookup the cached regex entry, and if successful, just pass
back the compiled pattern, otherwise go on and compile it. */
if (zend_hash_find(&PCRE_G(pcre_cache), regex, regex_len+1, (void **)&pce) == SUCCESS) {
/*
* We use a quick pcre_fullinfo() check to see whether cache is corrupted, and if it
* is, we flush it and compile the pattern from scratch.
*/
if (pcre_fullinfo(pce->re, NULL, PCRE_INFO_CAPTURECOUNT, &count) == PCRE_ERROR_BADMAGIC) {
zend_hash_clean(&PCRE_G(pcre_cache));
} else {
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
if (!strcmp(pce->locale, locale)) {
#endif
return pce;
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
}
#endif
}
}
p = regex;
/* Parse through the leading whitespace, and display a warning if we
get to the end without encountering a delimiter. */
while (isspace((int)*(unsigned char *)p)) p++;
if (*p == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
p < regex + regex_len ? "Null byte in regex" : "Empty regular expression");
return NULL;
}
/* Get the delimiter and display a warning if it is alphanumeric
or a backslash. */
delimiter = *p++;
if (isalnum((int)*(unsigned char *)&delimiter) || delimiter == '\\') {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC,E_WARNING, "Delimiter must not be alphanumeric or backslash");
return NULL;
}
start_delimiter = delimiter;
if ((pp = strchr("([{< )]}> )]}>", delimiter)))
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void put_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
if (disk)
kobject_put(&disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hns_roce_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
struct hns_roce_ib_iboe *iboe = NULL;
struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev = NULL;
u8 port = 0;
int ret = 0;
hr_dev = container_of(self, struct hns_roce_dev, iboe.nb);
iboe = &hr_dev->iboe;
for (port = 0; port < hr_dev->caps.num_ports; port++) {
if (dev == iboe->netdevs[port]) {
ret = handle_en_event(hr_dev, port, event);
if (ret)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
break;
}
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <liuyixian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-665
| 0
| 7,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nl_pid_hash_free(struct hlist_head *table, size_t size)
{
if (size <= PAGE_SIZE)
kfree(table);
else
free_pages((unsigned long)table, get_order(size));
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 1,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *can_gather_numa_stats(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr)
{
struct page *page;
int nid;
if (!pte_present(pte))
return NULL;
page = vm_normal_page(vma, addr, pte);
if (!page)
return NULL;
if (PageReserved(page))
return NULL;
nid = page_to_nid(page);
if (!node_isset(nid, node_states[N_HIGH_MEMORY]))
return NULL;
return page;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXNodeObject::increment() {
UserGestureIndicator gestureIndicator(DocumentUserGestureToken::create(
getDocument(), UserGestureToken::NewGesture));
alterSliderValue(true);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 16,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
{
BUG_ON(!child->ptrace);
child->ptrace = 0;
child->parent = child->real_parent;
list_del_init(&child->ptrace_entry);
spin_lock(&child->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Clear all pending traps and TRAPPING. TRAPPING should be
* cleared regardless of JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING. Do it explicitly.
*/
task_clear_jobctl_pending(child, JOBCTL_TRAP_MASK);
task_clear_jobctl_trapping(child);
/*
* Reinstate JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING if group stop is in effect and
* @child isn't dead.
*/
if (!(child->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
(child->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED ||
child->signal->group_stop_count)) {
child->jobctl |= JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING;
/*
* This is only possible if this thread was cloned by the
* traced task running in the stopped group, set the signal
* for the future reports.
* FIXME: we should change ptrace_init_task() to handle this
* case.
*/
if (!(child->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_SIGMASK))
child->jobctl |= SIGSTOP;
}
/*
* If transition to TASK_STOPPED is pending or in TASK_TRACED, kick
* @child in the butt. Note that @resume should be used iff @child
* is in TASK_TRACED; otherwise, we might unduly disrupt
* TASK_KILLABLE sleeps.
*/
if (child->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING || task_is_traced(child))
ptrace_signal_wake_up(child, true);
spin_unlock(&child->sighand->siglock);
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean delayed_destroys_process_cb(gpointer user_data)
{
while (g_delayed_destroys != NULL) {
PluginInstance *plugin = (PluginInstance *)g_delayed_destroys->data;
g_delayed_destroys = g_list_delete_link(g_delayed_destroys,
g_delayed_destroys);
g_NPP_Destroy_Now(plugin, NULL);
}
if (g_delayed_destroys)
return TRUE;
if (g_delayed_destroys_id) {
g_source_remove(g_delayed_destroys_id);
g_delayed_destroys_id = 0;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dev_addr_del_multiple(struct net_device *to_dev,
struct net_device *from_dev,
unsigned char addr_type)
{
ASSERT_RTNL();
if (from_dev->addr_len != to_dev->addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
__hw_addr_del_multiple(&to_dev->dev_addrs, &from_dev->dev_addrs,
to_dev->addr_len, addr_type);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEADDR, to_dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConfigureEntriesForRestore(
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl>>* entries,
RestoreType type) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < entries->size(); ++i) {
(*entries)[i]->SetTransitionType(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD);
(*entries)[i]->set_restore_type(type);
SetPageStateIfEmpty((*entries)[i].get());
}
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 4,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = state->au_state;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, state->server,
state->auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
/* If we didn't find a client long-term key and no preauth mechanism
* replaced the reply key, error out now. */
if (state->client_keyblock.enctype == ENCTYPE_NULL) {
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
NULL,
state->local_tgt,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
state->auth_indicators,
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &state->ticket_reply,
&au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state->rstate))
state->reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
if (state->client_key != NULL)
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = state->client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname,
state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
kau_as_req(kdc_context,
(errcode || state->preauth_err) ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
state->local_tgt, errcode,
state->e_data, state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->local_tgt_storage);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(state->auth_indicators);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 1
| 2,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: garp_group_gna_interval_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
garp_delay_t *delay = LIST_TAIL_DATA(garp_delay);
double val;
if (!read_double_strvec(strvec, 1, &val, 0, INT_MAX / 1000000, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "garp_group gna_interval '%s' invalid", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
delay->gna_interval.tv_sec = (time_t)val;
delay->gna_interval.tv_usec = (suseconds_t)((val - delay->gna_interval.tv_sec) * 1000000);
delay->have_gna_interval = true;
if (delay->gna_interval.tv_sec >= 1)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "The gna_interval is very large - %s seconds", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec,1));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 10,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedLong8(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint64* value)
{
if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF))
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
uint32 offset = direntry->tdir_offset.toff_long;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong(&offset);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryData(tif,offset,8,value);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
}
else
*value = direntry->tdir_offset.toff_long8;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong8(value);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FilterAudioEffects(const StreamControls& controls, int* effects) {
DCHECK(effects);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLButtonElement::accessKeyAction(bool sendMouseEvents)
{
focus();
dispatchSimulatedClick(0, sendMouseEvents ? SendMouseUpDownEvents : SendNoEvents);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::BeginLifecycleUpdatesIfRenderingReady() {
if (!IsActive())
return;
if (!IsRenderingReady())
return;
View()->BeginLifecycleUpdates();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 15,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct operand *op)
{
if (op->type == OP_MM)
read_mmx_reg(ctxt, &op->mm_val, op->addr.mm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poolBytesToAllocateFor(int blockSize)
{
/* Unprotected math would be:
** return offsetof(BLOCK, s) + blockSize * sizeof(XML_Char);
**
** Detect overflow, avoiding _signed_ overflow undefined behavior
** For a + b * c we check b * c in isolation first, so that addition of a
** on top has no chance of making us accept a small non-negative number
*/
const size_t stretch = sizeof(XML_Char); /* can be 4 bytes */
if (blockSize <= 0)
return 0;
if (blockSize > (int)(INT_MAX / stretch))
return 0;
{
const int stretchedBlockSize = blockSize * (int)stretch;
const int bytesToAllocate = (int)(
offsetof(BLOCK, s) + (unsigned)stretchedBlockSize);
if (bytesToAllocate < 0)
return 0;
return (size_t)bytesToAllocate;
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 11,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
const char *ll;
const char *uri;
const char *pro;
unsigned int major = 1, minor = 0; /* Assume HTTP/1.0 if non-"HTTP" protocol */
char http[5];
apr_size_t len;
int num_blank_lines = 0;
int max_blank_lines = r->server->limit_req_fields;
core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
int strict = conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT;
int enforce_strict = !(conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_LOGONLY);
if (max_blank_lines <= 0) {
max_blank_lines = DEFAULT_LIMIT_REQUEST_FIELDS;
}
/* Read past empty lines until we get a real request line,
* a read error, the connection closes (EOF), or we timeout.
*
* We skip empty lines because browsers have to tack a CRLF on to the end
* of POSTs to support old CERN webservers. But note that we may not
* have flushed any previous response completely to the client yet.
* We delay the flush as long as possible so that we can improve
* performance for clients that are pipelining requests. If a request
* is pipelined then we won't block during the (implicit) read() below.
* If the requests aren't pipelined, then the client is still waiting
* for the final buffer flush from us, and we will block in the implicit
* read(). B_SAFEREAD ensures that the BUFF layer flushes if it will
* have to block during a read.
*/
do {
apr_status_t rv;
/* ensure ap_rgetline allocates memory each time thru the loop
* if there are empty lines
*/
r->the_request = NULL;
rv = ap_rgetline(&(r->the_request), (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_line + 2),
&len, r, 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
/* ap_rgetline returns APR_ENOSPC if it fills up the
* buffer before finding the end-of-line. This is only going to
* happen if it exceeds the configured limit for a request-line.
*/
if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1,0);
r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT;
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_EINVAL(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
return 0;
}
} while ((len <= 0) && (++num_blank_lines < max_blank_lines));
if (APLOGrtrace5(r)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE5, 0, r,
"Request received from client: %s",
ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, r->the_request));
}
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
ll = r->the_request;
r->method = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
uri = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
/* Provide quick information about the request method as soon as known */
r->method_number = ap_method_number_of(r->method);
if (r->method_number == M_GET && r->method[0] == 'H') {
r->header_only = 1;
}
ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
if (ll[0]) {
r->assbackwards = 0;
pro = ll;
len = strlen(ll);
} else {
r->assbackwards = 1;
pro = "HTTP/0.9";
len = 8;
if (conf->http09_enable == AP_HTTP09_DISABLE) {
r->status = HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* If we deny 0.9, send error message with 1.x */
r->assbackwards = 0;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(0, 9);
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02401)
"HTTP/0.9 denied by server configuration");
return 0;
}
}
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* Avoid sscanf in the common case */
if (len == 8
&& pro[0] == 'H' && pro[1] == 'T' && pro[2] == 'T' && pro[3] == 'P'
&& pro[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(pro[5]) && pro[6] == '.'
&& apr_isdigit(pro[7])) {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(pro[5] - '0', pro[7] - '0');
}
else {
if (strict) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02418)
"Invalid protocol '%s'", r->protocol);
if (enforce_strict) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
}
if (3 == sscanf(r->protocol, "%4s/%u.%u", http, &major, &minor)
&& (strcasecmp("http", http) == 0)
&& (minor < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) ) { /* don't allow HTTP/0.1000 */
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(major, minor);
}
else {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1, 0);
}
}
if (strict) {
int err = 0;
if (ap_has_cntrl(r->the_request)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02420)
"Request line must not contain control characters");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (r->parsed_uri.fragment) {
/* RFC3986 3.5: no fragment */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02421)
"URI must not contain a fragment");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->parsed_uri.user || r->parsed_uri.password) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02422)
"URI must not contain a username/password");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->method_number == M_INVALID) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02423)
"Invalid HTTP method string: %s", r->method);
err = HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
else if (r->assbackwards == 0 && r->proto_num < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02424)
"HTTP/0.x does not take a protocol");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (err && enforce_strict) {
r->status = err;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 1
| 12,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompleteSavingAsAlreadyExists() {
DCHECK(mock_saving_);
mock_saving_ = false;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(std::move(save_page_callback_),
SavePageResult::ALREADY_EXISTS, 123456));
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAudioMuted(bool mute) {
DVLOG(1) << "SetAudioMuted(mute=" << mute << "), was " << IsAudioMuted()
<< " for WebContentsImpl@" << this;
if (mute == IsAudioMuted())
return;
if (mute) {
if (!audio_muter_)
audio_muter_.reset(new WebContentsAudioMuter(this));
audio_muter_->StartMuting();
} else {
DCHECK(audio_muter_);
audio_muter_->StopMuting();
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidUpdateAudioMutingState(mute);
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_TAB);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum test_return test_vperror(void) {
int rv = 0;
int oldstderr = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
char tmpl[sizeof(TMP_TEMPLATE)+1];
strncpy(tmpl, TMP_TEMPLATE, sizeof(TMP_TEMPLATE)+1);
int newfile = mkstemp(tmpl);
assert(newfile > 0);
rv = dup2(newfile, STDERR_FILENO);
assert(rv == STDERR_FILENO);
rv = close(newfile);
assert(rv == 0);
errno = EIO;
vperror("Old McDonald had a farm. %s", "EI EIO");
/* Restore stderr */
rv = dup2(oldstderr, STDERR_FILENO);
assert(rv == STDERR_FILENO);
/* Go read the file */
char buf[80] = { 0 };
FILE *efile = fopen(tmpl, "r");
assert(efile);
char *prv = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), efile);
assert(prv);
fclose(efile);
unlink(tmpl);
char expected[80] = { 0 };
snprintf(expected, sizeof(expected),
"Old McDonald had a farm. EI EIO: %s\n", strerror(EIO));
/*
fprintf(stderr,
"\nExpected: ``%s''"
"\nGot: ``%s''\n", expected, buf);
*/
return strcmp(expected, buf) == 0 ? TEST_PASS : TEST_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p > limit)
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 16,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_h264_parse_framesize(AVCodecParameters *par, const char *p)
{
char buf1[50];
char *dst = buf1;
while (*p && *p == ' ')
p++; // strip spaces.
while (*p && *p != ' ')
p++; // eat protocol identifier
while (*p && *p == ' ')
p++; // strip trailing spaces.
while (*p && *p != '-' && (dst - buf1) < sizeof(buf1) - 1)
*dst++ = *p++;
*dst = '\0';
par->width = atoi(buf1);
par->height = atoi(p + 1); // skip the -
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtpdec_h264: Fix heap-buffer-overflow
Fixes: rtp_sdp/poc.sdp
Found-by: Bingchang <l.bing.chang.bc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_enable_on_exec(int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx, *clone_ctx = NULL;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long flags;
int enabled = 0;
local_irq_save(flags);
ctx = current->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn];
if (!ctx || !ctx->nr_events)
goto out;
cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, ctx);
ctx_sched_out(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME);
list_for_each_entry(event, &ctx->event_list, event_entry)
enabled |= event_enable_on_exec(event, ctx);
/*
* Unclone and reschedule this context if we enabled any event.
*/
if (enabled) {
clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(ctx);
ctx_resched(cpuctx, ctx);
}
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, ctx);
out:
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (clone_ctx)
put_ctx(clone_ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 7,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg_next(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *remaining)
{
int totlen = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
*remaining -= totlen;
return (struct nlmsghdr *) ((unsigned char *) nlh + totlen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 15,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_layoutreturn_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutreturn *lrp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server;
struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo = lrp->args.layout;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &lrp->res.seq_res))
return;
server = NFS_SERVER(lrp->args.inode);
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, NULL) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return;
}
spin_lock(&lo->plh_inode->i_lock);
if (task->tk_status == 0) {
if (lrp->res.lrs_present) {
pnfs_set_layout_stateid(lo, &lrp->res.stateid, true);
} else
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&lo->plh_segs));
}
lo->plh_block_lgets--;
spin_unlock(&lo->plh_inode->i_lock);
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: log_patypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *padata)
{
struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
char *str;
size_t n, m;
for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
break;
}
}
if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
if (p == NULL) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
return;
}
}
if (p == NULL)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
free(str);
}
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 2,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jp2_getcs(jp2_colr_t *colr)
{
if (colr->method == JP2_COLR_ENUM) {
switch (colr->csid) {
case JP2_COLR_SRGB:
return JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB;
break;
case JP2_COLR_SYCC:
return JAS_CLRSPC_SYCBCR;
break;
case JP2_COLR_SGRAY:
return JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY;
break;
}
}
return JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long count_partial(struct kmem_cache_node *n,
int (*get_count)(struct page *))
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long x = 0;
struct page *page;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->partial, lru)
x += get_count(page);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
return x;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlBufBackToBuffer(xmlBufPtr buf) {
xmlBufferPtr ret;
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error))
return(NULL);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (buf->buffer == NULL) {
xmlBufFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
ret = buf->buffer;
/*
* What to do in case of error in the buffer ???
*/
if (buf->use > INT_MAX) {
/*
* Worse case, we really allocated and used more than the
* maximum allowed memory for an xmlBuffer on this architecture.
* Keep the buffer but provide a truncated size value.
*/
xmlBufOverflowError(buf, "Used size too big for xmlBuffer");
ret->use = INT_MAX;
ret->size = INT_MAX;
} else if (buf->size > INT_MAX) {
/*
* milder case, we allocated more than the maximum allowed memory
* for an xmlBuffer on this architecture, but used less than the
* limit.
* Keep the buffer but provide a truncated size value.
*/
xmlBufOverflowError(buf, "Allocated size too big for xmlBuffer");
ret->size = INT_MAX;
}
ret->use = (int) buf->use;
ret->size = (int) buf->size;
ret->alloc = buf->alloc;
ret->content = buf->content;
ret->contentIO = buf->contentIO;
xmlFree(buf);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(MultipleIterator, getFlags)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix2fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
Vector<GLfloat>& v) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix2fv(location, transpose, v);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_bounds(void)
{
rect_t bounds;
int tile_w, tile_h;
tileset_get_size(s_map->tileset, &tile_w, &tile_h);
bounds.x1 = 0; bounds.y1 = 0;
bounds.x2 = s_map->width * tile_w;
bounds.y2 = s_map->height * tile_h;
return bounds;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 15,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser* InProcessBrowserTest::CreateBrowserForPopup(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser = Browser::CreateForType(Browser::TYPE_POPUP, profile);
AddBlankTabAndShow(browser);
return browser;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTaskCompleted(
scoped_refptr<internal::RasterWorkerPoolTask> task,
bool was_canceled,
bool needs_upload) {
TRACE_EVENT2(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("cc"),
"PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTaskCompleted",
"was_canceled", was_canceled,
"needs_upload", needs_upload);
DCHECK(!task->use_gpu_rasterization());
DCHECK(pixel_buffer_tasks_.find(task.get()) != pixel_buffer_tasks_.end());
resource_provider()->UnmapPixelBuffer(task->resource()->id());
if (!needs_upload) {
resource_provider()->ReleasePixelBuffer(task->resource()->id());
if (was_canceled) {
RasterTaskVector::const_iterator it = std::find(raster_tasks().begin(),
raster_tasks().end(),
task);
if (it != raster_tasks().end()) {
pixel_buffer_tasks_[task.get()] = NULL;
return;
}
}
task->DidRun(was_canceled);
DCHECK(std::find(completed_tasks_.begin(),
completed_tasks_.end(),
task) == completed_tasks_.end());
completed_tasks_.push_back(task);
tasks_required_for_activation_.erase(task);
return;
}
DCHECK(!was_canceled);
resource_provider()->BeginSetPixels(task->resource()->id());
has_performed_uploads_since_last_flush_ = true;
bytes_pending_upload_ += task->resource()->bytes();
tasks_with_pending_upload_.push_back(task);
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_fetch_timestamp(AVCodecParserContext *s, int off, int remove){
int i;
s->dts= s->pts= AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
s->pos= -1;
s->offset= 0;
for(i = 0; i < AV_PARSER_PTS_NB; i++) {
if ( s->cur_offset + off >= s->cur_frame_offset[i]
&& (s->frame_offset < s->cur_frame_offset[i] ||
(!s->frame_offset && !s->next_frame_offset)) // first field/frame
&& /*s->next_frame_offset + off <*/ s->cur_frame_end[i]){
s->dts= s->cur_frame_dts[i];
s->pts= s->cur_frame_pts[i];
s->pos= s->cur_frame_pos[i];
s->offset = s->next_frame_offset - s->cur_frame_offset[i];
if(remove)
s->cur_frame_offset[i]= INT64_MAX;
if(s->cur_offset + off < s->cur_frame_end[i])
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindFramebuffer(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
framebuffer = GetFramebuffer(client_id);
if (!framebuffer) {
if (!group_->bind_generates_resource()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindFramebuffer",
"id not generated by glGenFramebuffers");
return;
}
glGenFramebuffersEXT(1, &service_id);
CreateFramebuffer(client_id, service_id);
framebuffer = GetFramebuffer(client_id);
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kFramebuffers);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
} else {
service_id = framebuffer->service_id();
}
framebuffer->MarkAsValid();
}
LogClientServiceForInfo(framebuffer, client_id, "glBindFramebuffer");
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer = framebuffer;
}
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer = framebuffer;
}
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
if (framebuffer == NULL) {
service_id = GetBackbufferServiceId();
}
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, service_id);
OnFboChanged();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setAutofocusElement(Element* element)
{
if (!element) {
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
return;
}
if (m_hasAutofocused)
return;
m_hasAutofocused = true;
ASSERT(!m_autofocusElement);
m_autofocusElement = element;
m_taskRunner->postTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE, AutofocusTask::create());
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf, __u8 *data)
{
struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
nfca_poll->rats_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
data, nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
}
break;
case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
data, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
}
break;
default:
pr_err("unsupported activation_rf_tech_and_mode 0x%x\n",
ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode);
return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return NCI_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 23,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usb_net_handle_statusin(USBNetState *s, USBPacket *p)
{
le32 buf[2];
if (p->iov.size < 8) {
p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
return;
}
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(1);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(0);
usb_packet_copy(p, buf, 8);
if (!s->rndis_resp.tqh_first) {
p->status = USB_RET_NAK;
}
#ifdef TRAFFIC_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "usbnet: interrupt poll len %zu return %d",
p->iov.size, p->status);
iov_hexdump(p->iov.iov, p->iov.niov, stderr, "usbnet", p->status);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sysapi_opsys_versioned(void)
{
if( ! arch_inited ) {
init_arch();
}
return opsys_versioned;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 12,913
|
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