instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void path_get(struct path *path)
{
mntget(path->mnt);
dget(path->dentry);
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Part::resetGui()
{
m_messageWidget->hide();
m_commentView->clear();
m_commentBox->hide();
m_infoPanel->setIndex(QModelIndex());
m_compressionOptions = CompressionOptions();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 14,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableWebGLDraftExtensions(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setWebGLDraftExtensionsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 19,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void remove_deferred_open_smb_message(uint16 mid)
{
struct pending_message_list *pml;
for (pml = deferred_open_queue; pml; pml = pml->next) {
if (mid == SVAL(pml->buf.data,smb_mid)) {
DEBUG(10,("remove_deferred_open_smb_message: "
"deleting mid %u len %u\n",
(unsigned int)mid,
(unsigned int)pml->buf.length ));
DLIST_REMOVE(deferred_open_queue, pml);
TALLOC_FREE(pml);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
enum rpcrdma_errcode err, __be32 *va)
{
__be32 *startp = va;
*va++ = rmsgp->rm_xid;
*va++ = rmsgp->rm_vers;
*va++ = xprt->sc_fc_credits;
*va++ = rdma_error;
*va++ = cpu_to_be32(err);
if (err == ERR_VERS) {
*va++ = rpcrdma_version;
*va++ = rpcrdma_version;
}
return (int)((unsigned long)va - (unsigned long)startp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 1
| 1,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pseudo_get_job_info(ClassAd *&ad, bool &delete_ad)
{
ClassAd * the_ad;
delete_ad = false;
the_ad = thisRemoteResource->getJobAd();
ASSERT( the_ad );
thisRemoteResource->filetrans.Init( the_ad, false, PRIV_USER, false );
std::string file;
if ( the_ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_OUTPUT, file ) &&
strcmp( file.c_str(), StdoutRemapName ) ) {
thisRemoteResource->filetrans.AddDownloadFilenameRemap( StdoutRemapName, file.c_str() );
}
if ( the_ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, file ) &&
strcmp( file.c_str(), StderrRemapName ) ) {
thisRemoteResource->filetrans.AddDownloadFilenameRemap( StderrRemapName, file.c_str() );
}
Shadow->publishShadowAttrs( the_ad );
ad = the_ad;
const CondorVersionInfo *vi = syscall_sock->get_peer_version();
if ( vi && !vi->built_since_version(7,7,2) ) {
std::string value;
ad->LookupString( ATTR_SHOULD_TRANSFER_FILES, value );
ShouldTransferFiles_t should_transfer = getShouldTransferFilesNum( value.c_str() );
if ( should_transfer == STF_IF_NEEDED || should_transfer == STF_YES ) {
ad = new ClassAd( *ad );
delete_ad = true;
bool stream;
std::string stdout_name;
std::string stderr_name;
ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_OUTPUT, stdout_name );
ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, stderr_name );
if ( ad->LookupBool( ATTR_STREAM_OUTPUT, stream ) && !stream &&
!nullFile( stdout_name.c_str() ) ) {
ad->Assign( ATTR_JOB_OUTPUT, StdoutRemapName );
}
if ( ad->LookupBool( ATTR_STREAM_ERROR, stream ) && !stream &&
!nullFile( stderr_name.c_str() ) ) {
if ( stdout_name == stderr_name ) {
ad->Assign( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, StdoutRemapName );
} else {
ad->Assign( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, StderrRemapName );
}
}
} else if ( should_transfer != STF_NO ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "pseudo_get_job_info(): Unexpected value for %s: %s (%d)!\n",
ATTR_SHOULD_TRANSFER_FILES, value.c_str(),
should_transfer );
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 1,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: align_column_to_tab (parser_line_counter_t column) /**< current column */
{
/* Tab aligns to zero column start position. */
return (parser_line_counter_t) (((column + (8u - 1u)) & ~ECMA_STRING_CONTAINER_MASK) + 1u);
} /* align_column_to_tab */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sched_irq_time_avg_update(struct rq *rq, u64 curr_irq_time) { }
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 20,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FixedLengthEncoder::getChar() {
if (length >= 0 && count >= length)
return EOF;
++count;
return str->getChar();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Editor::copyImage(const HitTestResult& result) {
writeImageNodeToPasteboard(Pasteboard::generalPasteboard(),
result.innerNodeOrImageMapImage(),
result.altDisplayString());
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageLoader::getImageAnimationPolicy(ImageAnimationPolicy& policy) {
if (!element()->document().settings())
return false;
policy = element()->document().settings()->getImageAnimationPolicy();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void camellia_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
camellia_dec_blk(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pat_parse_meth(const char *text, struct pattern *pattern, int mflags, char **err)
{
int len, meth;
len = strlen(text);
meth = find_http_meth(text, len);
pattern->val.i = meth;
if (meth == HTTP_METH_OTHER) {
pattern->ptr.str = (char *)text;
pattern->len = len;
}
else {
pattern->ptr.str = NULL;
pattern->len = 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void handle_rc_features()
{
btrc_remote_features_t rc_features = BTRC_FEAT_NONE;
bt_bdaddr_t rc_addr;
bdcpy(rc_addr.address, btif_rc_cb.rc_addr);
if (btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_BROWSE)
{
rc_features |= BTRC_FEAT_BROWSE;
}
if ( (btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL) &&
(btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG))
{
rc_features |= BTRC_FEAT_ABSOLUTE_VOLUME;
}
if (btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_METADATA)
{
rc_features |= BTRC_FEAT_METADATA;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: rc_features=0x%x", __FUNCTION__, rc_features);
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_callbacks, remote_features_cb, &rc_addr, rc_features)
#if (AVRC_ADV_CTRL_INCLUDED == TRUE)
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Checking for feature flags in btif_rc_handler with label %d",
btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label);
if(btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL &&
btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG)
{
rc_transaction_t *p_transaction=NULL;
bt_status_t status = BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
if(MAX_LABEL==btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label)
{
status=get_transaction(&p_transaction);
}
else
{
p_transaction=get_transaction_by_lbl(btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label);
if(NULL!=p_transaction)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("register_volumechange already in progress for label %d",
btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label);
return;
}
else
status=get_transaction(&p_transaction);
}
if(BT_STATUS_SUCCESS == status && NULL!=p_transaction)
{
btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label=p_transaction->lbl;
register_volumechange(btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label);
}
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 5,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String XMLHttpRequest::responseMIMEType() const
{
String mimeType = extractMIMETypeFromMediaType(m_mimeTypeOverride);
if (mimeType.isEmpty()) {
if (m_response.isHTTP())
mimeType = extractMIMETypeFromMediaType(m_response.httpHeaderField("Content-Type"));
else
mimeType = m_response.mimeType();
}
if (mimeType.isEmpty())
mimeType = "text/xml";
return mimeType;
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::LoadEvent(const OxideQLoadEvent& event) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
emit q->loadEvent(event);
if (!using_old_load_event_signal_ ||
event.type() == OxideQLoadEvent::TypeCommitted ||
event.type() == OxideQLoadEvent::TypeRedirected) {
return;
}
emit q->loadingChanged(event);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool_t xdr_authgssapi_init_arg(
XDR *xdrs,
auth_gssapi_init_arg *init_arg)
{
if (! xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &init_arg->version) ||
! xdr_gss_buf(xdrs, &init_arg->token))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserView::CanClose() {
if (tabstrip_ && !tabstrip_->IsTabStripCloseable())
return false;
if (!browser_->ShouldCloseWindow())
return false;
bool fast_tab_closing_enabled =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableFastUnload);
if (!browser_->tab_strip_model()->empty()) {
frame_->Hide();
browser_->OnWindowClosing();
if (fast_tab_closing_enabled)
browser_->tab_strip_model()->CloseAllTabs();
return false;
} else if (fast_tab_closing_enabled &&
!browser_->HasCompletedUnloadProcessing()) {
frame_->Hide();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageInfo::OnSiteDataAccessed() {
PresentSiteData();
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 14,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::RunUnloadEventsHelper(WebContents* contents) {
if (contents->NeedToFireBeforeUnload()) {
contents->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dump_short (FILE *dumpfile, int format, char *dump_tag, uint16 data)
{
int j, k;
char dump_array[20];
unsigned char bitset;
if (dumpfile == NULL)
{
TIFFError ("", "Invalid FILE pointer for dump file");
return (1);
}
if (format == DUMP_TEXT)
{
fprintf (dumpfile," %s ", dump_tag);
for (j = 0, k = 15; k >= 0; j++, k--)
{
bitset = data & (((unsigned char)1 << k)) ? 1 : 0;
sprintf(&dump_array[j], (bitset) ? "1" : "0");
if ((k % 8) == 0)
sprintf(&dump_array[++j], " ");
}
dump_array[17] = '\0';
fprintf (dumpfile," %s\n", dump_array);
}
else
{
if ((fwrite (&data, 2, 1, dumpfile)) != 2)
{
TIFFError ("", "Unable to write binary data to dump file");
return (1);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_CALL( INS_ARG )
{
PCallRecord pCrec;
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.numFDefs ) || !CUR.FDefs[args[0]].Active )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
if ( CUR.callTop >= CUR.callSize )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Stack_Overflow;
return;
}
DBG_PRINT1("%d", args[0]);
pCrec = &CUR.callStack[CUR.callTop];
pCrec->Caller_Range = CUR.curRange;
pCrec->Caller_IP = CUR.IP + 1;
pCrec->Cur_Count = 1;
pCrec->Cur_Restart = CUR.FDefs[args[0]].Start;
CUR.callTop++;
INS_Goto_CodeRange( CUR.FDefs[args[0]].Range,
CUR.FDefs[args[0]].Start );
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::RemovedFrom(ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "removedFrom(" << (void*)this << ", " << insertion_point
<< ")";
HTMLElement::RemovedFrom(insertion_point);
if (insertion_point->InActiveDocument()) {
UpdateControlsVisibility();
if (network_state_ > kNetworkEmpty)
PauseInternal();
}
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool doDeserialize()
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> value;
if (!m_reader.read(&value, *this))
return false;
if (!value.IsEmpty())
push(value);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long disk_events_poll_jiffies(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct disk_events *ev = disk->ev;
long intv_msecs = 0;
/*
* If device-specific poll interval is set, always use it. If
* the default is being used, poll iff there are events which
* can't be monitored asynchronously.
*/
if (ev->poll_msecs >= 0)
intv_msecs = ev->poll_msecs;
else if (disk->events & ~disk->async_events)
intv_msecs = disk_events_dfl_poll_msecs;
return msecs_to_jiffies(intv_msecs);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseExternalEntity(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
int depth, const xmlChar *URL, const xmlChar *ID, xmlNodePtr *lst) {
return(xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(doc, NULL, sax, user_data, depth, URL,
ID, lst));
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void read_huffman_code_simple(WebPContext *s, HuffReader *hc)
{
hc->nb_symbols = get_bits1(&s->gb) + 1;
if (get_bits1(&s->gb))
hc->simple_symbols[0] = get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
else
hc->simple_symbols[0] = get_bits1(&s->gb);
if (hc->nb_symbols == 2)
hc->simple_symbols[1] = get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
hc->simple = 1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void radeon_restore_bios_scratch_regs(struct radeon_device *rdev)
{
uint32_t scratch_reg;
int i;
if (rdev->family >= CHIP_R600)
scratch_reg = R600_BIOS_0_SCRATCH;
else
scratch_reg = RADEON_BIOS_0_SCRATCH;
for (i = 0; i < RADEON_BIOS_NUM_SCRATCH; i++)
WREG32(scratch_reg + (i * 4), rdev->bios_scratch[i]);
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_string(struct xkb_compose_table *table, const char *string, size_t len,
const char *file_name)
{
struct scanner s;
scanner_init(&s, table->ctx, string, len, file_name, NULL);
if (!parse(table, &s, 0))
return false;
/* Maybe the allocator can use the excess space. */
darray_shrink(table->nodes);
darray_shrink(table->utf8);
return true;
}
Commit Message: compose: fix infinite loop in parser on some inputs
The parser would enter an infinite loop if an unterminated keysym
literal occurs at EOF.
Found with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <ran234@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 27,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start_,
long long size_)
{
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; //default
while (pos < stop)
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) //CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) //CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) //CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 23,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebRunnerContentBrowserClient::CreateBrowserMainParts(
const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
DCHECK(context_channel_);
return new WebRunnerBrowserMainParts(std::move(context_channel_));
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 11,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebNotificationPermission Notification::checkPermission(ExecutionContext* context)
{
SecurityOrigin* origin = context->securityOrigin();
ASSERT(origin);
return notificationManager()->checkPermission(WebSecurityOrigin(origin));
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::OnViewContextSwapBuffersPosted() {
RenderWidget::OnSwapBuffersPosted();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: clnp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *pptr, u_int length)
{
const uint8_t *optr,*source_address,*dest_address;
u_int li,tlen,nsap_offset,source_address_length,dest_address_length, clnp_pdu_type, clnp_flags;
const struct clnp_header_t *clnp_header;
const struct clnp_segment_header_t *clnp_segment_header;
uint8_t rfd_error_major,rfd_error_minor;
clnp_header = (const struct clnp_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*clnp_header);
li = clnp_header->length_indicator;
optr = pptr;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CLNP"));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (clnp_header->version != CLNP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", clnp_header->version));
return (0);
}
if (li > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator(%u) > PDU size (%u)!", li, length));
return (0);
}
if (li < sizeof(struct clnp_header_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator %u < min PDU size:", li));
while (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", *pptr++));
return (0);
}
/* FIXME further header sanity checking */
clnp_pdu_type = clnp_header->type & CLNP_PDU_TYPE_MASK;
clnp_flags = clnp_header->type & CLNP_FLAG_MASK;
pptr += sizeof(struct clnp_header_t);
li -= sizeof(struct clnp_header_t);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
dest_address_length = *pptr;
pptr += 1;
li -= 1;
if (li < dest_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, dest_address_length);
dest_address = pptr;
pptr += dest_address_length;
li -= dest_address_length;
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr += 1;
li -= 1;
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
source_address = pptr;
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s > %s, %s, length %u",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
isonsap_string(ndo, source_address, source_address_length),
isonsap_string(ndo, dest_address, dest_address_length),
tok2str(clnp_pdu_values,"unknown (%u)",clnp_pdu_type),
length));
return (1);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s PDU, hlen: %u, v: %u, lifetime: %u.%us, Segment PDU length: %u, checksum: 0x%04x",
tok2str(clnp_pdu_values, "unknown (%u)",clnp_pdu_type),
clnp_header->length_indicator,
clnp_header->version,
clnp_header->lifetime/2,
(clnp_header->lifetime%2)*5,
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_header->segment_length),
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_header->cksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, optr, EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_header->cksum), 7,
clnp_header->length_indicator);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tFlags [%s]",
bittok2str(clnp_flag_values, "none", clnp_flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tsource address (length %u): %s\n\tdest address (length %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, source_address, source_address_length),
dest_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, dest_address, dest_address_length)));
if (clnp_flags & CLNP_SEGMENT_PART) {
if (li < sizeof(const struct clnp_segment_header_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header, addresses, and segment part"));
return (0);
}
clnp_segment_header = (const struct clnp_segment_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*clnp_segment_header);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tData Unit ID: 0x%04x, Segment Offset: %u, Total PDU Length: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_segment_header->data_unit_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_segment_header->segment_offset),
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_segment_header->total_length)));
pptr+=sizeof(const struct clnp_segment_header_t);
li-=sizeof(const struct clnp_segment_header_t);
}
/* now walk the options */
while (li >= 2) {
u_int op, opli;
const uint8_t *tptr;
if (li < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opts/li"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
op = *pptr++;
opli = *pptr++;
li -= 2;
if (opli > li) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", opt (%d) too long", op));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, opli);
li -= opli;
tptr = pptr;
tlen = opli;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option #%u, length %u, value: ",
tok2str(clnp_option_values,"Unknown",op),
op,
opli));
/*
* We've already checked that the entire option is present
* in the captured packet with the ND_TCHECK2() call.
* Therefore, we don't need to do ND_TCHECK()/ND_TCHECK2()
* checks.
* We do, however, need to check tlen, to make sure we
* don't run past the end of the option.
*/
switch (op) {
case CLNP_OPTION_ROUTE_RECORDING: /* those two options share the format */
case CLNP_OPTION_SOURCE_ROUTING:
if (tlen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s",
tok2str(clnp_option_sr_rr_values,"Unknown",*tptr),
tok2str(clnp_option_sr_rr_string_values, "Unknown Option %u", op)));
nsap_offset=*(tptr+1);
if (nsap_offset == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Bad NSAP offset (0)"));
break;
}
nsap_offset-=1; /* offset to nsap list */
if (nsap_offset > tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Bad NSAP offset (past end of option)"));
break;
}
tptr+=nsap_offset;
tlen-=nsap_offset;
while (tlen > 0) {
source_address_length=*tptr;
if (tlen < source_address_length+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NSAP address goes past end of option"));
break;
}
if (source_address_length > 0) {
source_address=(tptr+1);
ND_TCHECK2(*source_address, source_address_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NSAP address (length %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, source_address, source_address_length)));
}
tlen-=source_address_length+1;
}
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_PRIORITY:
if (tlen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%1x", *tptr&0x0f));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_QOS_MAINTENANCE:
if (tlen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Format Code: %s",
tok2str(clnp_option_scope_values, "Reserved", *tptr&CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_MASK)));
if ((*tptr&CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_MASK) == CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_GLOBAL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t QoS Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(clnp_option_qos_global_values,
"none",
*tptr&CLNP_OPTION_OPTION_QOS_MASK)));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_SECURITY:
if (tlen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Format Code: %s, Security-Level %u",
tok2str(clnp_option_scope_values,"Reserved",*tptr&CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_MASK),
*(tptr+1)));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_DISCARD_REASON:
if (tlen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
rfd_error_major = (*tptr&0xf0) >> 4;
rfd_error_minor = *tptr&0x0f;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Class: %s Error (0x%01x), %s (0x%01x)",
tok2str(clnp_option_rfd_class_values,"Unknown",rfd_error_major),
rfd_error_major,
tok2str(clnp_option_rfd_error_class[rfd_error_major],"Unknown",rfd_error_minor),
rfd_error_minor));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_PADDING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "padding data"));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined Options that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", opli);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", opli);
pptr += opli;
}
switch (clnp_pdu_type) {
case CLNP_PDU_ER: /* fall through */
case CLNP_PDU_ERP:
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (*(pptr) == NLPID_CLNP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t-----original packet-----\n\t"));
/* FIXME recursion protection */
clnp_print(ndo, pptr, length - clnp_header->length_indicator);
break;
}
case CLNP_PDU_DT:
case CLNP_PDU_MD:
case CLNP_PDU_ERQ:
default:
/* dump the PDU specific data */
if (length-(pptr-optr) > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t undecoded non-header data, length %u", length-clnp_header->length_indicator));
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", length - (pptr - optr));
}
}
return (1);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|clnp]"));
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
int err = __shm_open(vma);
/*
* We raced in the idr lookup or with shm_destroy().
* Either way, the ID is busted.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
}
Commit Message: ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection
The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931
The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and the
address rounded down to 0. For the regular mmap case, the protection
mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the address --
arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and return that
address. So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things get funky for
shmat().
The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will not
have a problem attaching a nil-page. There are two possible fixes to
this. The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root to
crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking up
the testcase and adding mmap(... |MAP_FIXED). While this approach is the
safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the rounded
address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags. This makes the behavior
of shmat() identical to the mmap() case. The downside of this is
obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains semantics
after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.
Passes shm related ltp tests.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Gareth Evans <gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_timer_init(void)
{
int cpu;
max_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
cpu_notifier_register_begin();
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_FREQ
struct cpufreq_policy policy;
memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
cpu = get_cpu();
cpufreq_get_policy(&policy, cpu);
if (policy.cpuinfo.max_freq)
max_tsc_khz = policy.cpuinfo.max_freq;
put_cpu();
#endif
cpufreq_register_notifier(&kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier_block,
CPUFREQ_TRANSITION_NOTIFIER);
}
pr_debug("kvm: max_tsc_khz = %ld\n", max_tsc_khz);
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
smp_call_function_single(cpu, tsc_khz_changed, NULL, 1);
__register_hotcpu_notifier(&kvmclock_cpu_notifier_block);
cpu_notifier_register_done();
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 15,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> CreateAndNavigateWebContents() {
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> web_contents =
CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents.get());
content::WebContentsTester::For(web_contents.get())
->NavigateAndCommit(GURL("https://www.example.com"));
return web_contents;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *rdev_get_name(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
if (rdev->constraints && rdev->constraints->name)
return rdev->constraints->name;
else if (rdev->desc->name)
return rdev->desc->name;
else
return "";
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int f2fs_get_block(struct dnode_of_data *dn, pgoff_t index)
{
struct extent_info ei;
struct inode *inode = dn->inode;
if (f2fs_lookup_extent_cache(inode, index, &ei)) {
dn->data_blkaddr = ei.blk + index - ei.fofs;
return 0;
}
return f2fs_reserve_block(dn, index);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 24,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t proc_skip_spaces(char **buf)
{
size_t ret;
char *tmp = skip_spaces(*buf);
ret = tmp - *buf;
*buf = tmp;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint16_t tcp_port_number_get(struct tcp_sock_t *sock)
{
sock->info_size = sizeof sock->info;
int query_status = getsockname(
sock->sd,
(struct sockaddr *) &(sock->info),
&(sock->info_size));
if (query_status == -1) {
ERR("query on socket port number failed");
goto error;
}
return ntohs(sock->info.sin6_port);
error:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start, int nr_pages, int write, int force,
struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas)
{
int flags = FOLL_TOUCH;
if (pages)
flags |= FOLL_GET;
if (write)
flags |= FOLL_WRITE;
if (force)
flags |= FOLL_FORCE;
return __get_user_pages(tsk, mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LogClientServiceForInfo(
T* /* info */, GLuint /* client_id */, const char* /* function_name */) {
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hasevery (struct tree const *a, struct tree const *b)
{
if (!b)
return 1;
if (!hasevery(a, b->llink))
return 0;
if (!hasevery(a, b->rlink))
return 0;
while (a && b->label != a->label)
if (b->label < a->label)
a = a->llink;
else
a = a->rlink;
return !!a;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlCreateEntityParserCtxtInternal(const xmlChar *URL, const xmlChar *ID,
const xmlChar *base, xmlParserCtxtPtr pctx) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
char *directory = NULL;
xmlChar *uri;
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
if (pctx != NULL) {
ctxt->options = pctx->options;
ctxt->_private = pctx->_private;
}
uri = xmlBuildURI(URL, base);
if (uri == NULL) {
inputStream = xmlLoadExternalEntity((char *)URL, (char *)ID, ctxt);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
if ((ctxt->directory == NULL) && (directory == NULL))
directory = xmlParserGetDirectory((char *)URL);
if ((ctxt->directory == NULL) && (directory != NULL))
ctxt->directory = directory;
} else {
inputStream = xmlLoadExternalEntity((char *)uri, (char *)ID, ctxt);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFree(uri);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
if ((ctxt->directory == NULL) && (directory == NULL))
directory = xmlParserGetDirectory((char *)uri);
if ((ctxt->directory == NULL) && (directory != NULL))
ctxt->directory = directory;
xmlFree(uri);
}
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 4,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mojo::PendingRemote<mojom::InputChannel> CreatePendingRemote() {
return receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote();
}
Commit Message: ime-service: Delete InputEngine.ProcessText.
It is deprecated and no longer used.
Bug: 1009903
Change-Id: I6774a4506bd0bb41a5d1a5909a40a2a781564b16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1833029
Auto-Submit: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keith Lee <keithlee@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#705445}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 2,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockAutofillDriver() {}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLUseProgram(GLuint program) {
glUseProgram(program);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QNetworkAccessManager* WebContext::GetCustomNetworkAccessManager() {
return client_->GetCustomNetworkAccessManager();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
const u8 *addr, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct sta_info *sta;
struct timespec uptime;
struct ieee80211_tx_latency_bin_ranges *tx_latency;
int i;
sta = kzalloc(sizeof(*sta) + local->hw.sta_data_size, gfp);
if (!sta)
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
tx_latency = rcu_dereference(local->tx_latency);
/* init stations Tx latency statistics && TID bins */
if (tx_latency) {
sta->tx_lat = kzalloc(IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS *
sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_latency_stat),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sta->tx_lat) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto free;
}
if (tx_latency->n_ranges) {
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
/* size of bins is size of the ranges +1 */
sta->tx_lat[i].bin_count =
tx_latency->n_ranges + 1;
sta->tx_lat[i].bins =
kcalloc(sta->tx_lat[i].bin_count,
sizeof(u32), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sta->tx_lat[i].bins) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto free;
}
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_lock_init(&sta->lock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->drv_unblock_wk, sta_unblock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->ampdu_mlme.work, ieee80211_ba_session_work);
mutex_init(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_MESH
if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif) &&
!sdata->u.mesh.user_mpm)
init_timer(&sta->plink_timer);
sta->nonpeer_pm = NL80211_MESH_POWER_ACTIVE;
#endif
memcpy(sta->sta.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
sta->local = local;
sta->sdata = sdata;
sta->last_rx = jiffies;
sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE;
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&uptime);
sta->last_connected = uptime.tv_sec;
ewma_init(&sta->avg_signal, 1024, 8);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->chain_signal_avg); i++)
ewma_init(&sta->chain_signal_avg[i], 1024, 8);
if (sta_prepare_rate_control(local, sta, gfp))
goto free;
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
/*
* timer_to_tid must be initialized with identity mapping
* to enable session_timer's data differentiation. See
* sta_rx_agg_session_timer_expired for usage.
*/
sta->timer_to_tid[i] = i;
}
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; i++) {
skb_queue_head_init(&sta->ps_tx_buf[i]);
skb_queue_head_init(&sta->tx_filtered[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
sta->last_seq_ctrl[i] = cpu_to_le16(USHRT_MAX);
sta->sta.smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_OFF;
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband =
local->hw.wiphy->bands[ieee80211_get_sdata_band(sdata)];
u8 smps = (sband->ht_cap.cap & IEEE80211_HT_CAP_SM_PS) >>
IEEE80211_HT_CAP_SM_PS_SHIFT;
/*
* Assume that hostapd advertises our caps in the beacon and
* this is the known_smps_mode for a station that just assciated
*/
switch (smps) {
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_DISABLED:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_OFF;
break;
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_STATIC:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_STATIC;
break;
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_DYNAMIC:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_DYNAMIC;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
}
}
sta_dbg(sdata, "Allocated STA %pM\n", sta->sta.addr);
return sta;
free:
if (sta->tx_lat) {
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
kfree(sta->tx_lat[i].bins);
kfree(sta->tx_lat);
}
kfree(sta);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 8,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __sys_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *uservaddr, int addrlen)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, fput_needed;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
err = move_addr_to_kernel(uservaddr, addrlen, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
err =
security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&address, addrlen);
if (err)
goto out_put;
err = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&address, addrlen,
sock->file->f_flags);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: record_loop_stats(
double offset, /* offset */
double freq, /* frequency (PPM) */
double jitter, /* jitter */
double wander, /* wander (PPM) */
int spoll
)
{
l_fp now;
u_long day;
if (!stats_control)
return;
get_systime(&now);
filegen_setup(&loopstats, now.l_ui);
day = now.l_ui / 86400 + MJD_1900;
now.l_ui %= 86400;
if (loopstats.fp != NULL) {
fprintf(loopstats.fp, "%lu %s %.9f %.3f %.9f %.6f %d\n",
day, ulfptoa(&now, 3), offset, freq * 1e6, jitter,
wander * 1e6, spoll);
fflush(loopstats.fp);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void usbnet_link_change(struct usbnet *dev, bool link, bool need_reset)
{
/* update link after link is reseted */
if (link && !need_reset)
netif_carrier_on(dev->net);
else
netif_carrier_off(dev->net);
if (need_reset && link)
usbnet_defer_kevent(dev, EVENT_LINK_RESET);
else
usbnet_defer_kevent(dev, EVENT_LINK_CHANGE);
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HasGzipHeader(const base::RefCountedMemory& maybe_gzipped) {
net::GZipHeader header;
net::GZipHeader::Status header_status = net::GZipHeader::INCOMPLETE_HEADER;
const char* header_end = nullptr;
while (header_status == net::GZipHeader::INCOMPLETE_HEADER) {
header_status = header.ReadMore(maybe_gzipped.front_as<char>(),
maybe_gzipped.size(),
&header_end);
}
return header_status == net::GZipHeader::COMPLETE_HEADER;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static fetchProc fetchProcForPicture (PicturePtr pict)
{
switch(pict->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8: return fbFetch_a8r8g8b8;
case PICT_x8r8g8b8: return fbFetch_x8r8g8b8;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8: return fbFetch_a8b8g8r8;
case PICT_x8b8g8r8: return fbFetch_x8b8g8r8;
/* 24bpp formats */
case PICT_r8g8b8: return fbFetch_r8g8b8;
case PICT_b8g8r8: return fbFetch_b8g8r8;
/* 16bpp formats */
case PICT_r5g6b5: return fbFetch_r5g6b5;
case PICT_b5g6r5: return fbFetch_b5g6r5;
case PICT_a1r5g5b5: return fbFetch_a1r5g5b5;
case PICT_x1r5g5b5: return fbFetch_x1r5g5b5;
case PICT_a1b5g5r5: return fbFetch_a1b5g5r5;
case PICT_x1b5g5r5: return fbFetch_x1b5g5r5;
case PICT_a4r4g4b4: return fbFetch_a4r4g4b4;
case PICT_x4r4g4b4: return fbFetch_x4r4g4b4;
case PICT_a4b4g4r4: return fbFetch_a4b4g4r4;
case PICT_x4b4g4r4: return fbFetch_x4b4g4r4;
/* 8bpp formats */
case PICT_a8: return fbFetch_a8;
case PICT_r3g3b2: return fbFetch_r3g3b2;
case PICT_b2g3r3: return fbFetch_b2g3r3;
case PICT_a2r2g2b2: return fbFetch_a2r2g2b2;
case PICT_a2b2g2r2: return fbFetch_a2b2g2r2;
case PICT_c8: return fbFetch_c8;
case PICT_g8: return fbFetch_c8;
case PICT_x4a4: return fbFetch_x4a4;
/* 4bpp formats */
case PICT_a4: return fbFetch_a4;
case PICT_r1g2b1: return fbFetch_r1g2b1;
case PICT_b1g2r1: return fbFetch_b1g2r1;
case PICT_a1r1g1b1: return fbFetch_a1r1g1b1;
case PICT_a1b1g1r1: return fbFetch_a1b1g1r1;
case PICT_c4: return fbFetch_c4;
case PICT_g4: return fbFetch_c4;
/* 1bpp formats */
case PICT_a1: return fbFetch_a1;
case PICT_g1: return fbFetch_g1;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ComplexTextLayout(const Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const char *text,const size_t length,const FT_Face face,const FT_Int32 flags,
GraphemeInfo **grapheme,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_RAQM_DELEGATE)
const char
*features;
raqm_t
*rq;
raqm_glyph_t
*glyphs;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
extent;
extent=0;
rq=raqm_create();
if (rq == (raqm_t *) NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (raqm_set_text_utf8(rq,text,length) == 0)
goto cleanup;
if (raqm_set_par_direction(rq,(raqm_direction_t) draw_info->direction) == 0)
goto cleanup;
if (raqm_set_freetype_face(rq,face) == 0)
goto cleanup;
features=GetImageProperty(image,"type:features",exception);
if (features != (const char *) NULL)
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
int
next,
status_token;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
next=0;
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
token=AcquireString("");
status_token=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,50,features,"",",","",'\0',
&breaker,&next,"e);
while (status_token == 0)
{
raqm_add_font_feature(rq,token,strlen(token));
status_token=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,50,features,"",",","",'\0',
&breaker,&next,"e);
}
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
token=DestroyString(token);
}
if (raqm_layout(rq) == 0)
goto cleanup;
glyphs=raqm_get_glyphs(rq,&extent);
if (glyphs == (raqm_glyph_t *) NULL)
{
extent=0;
goto cleanup;
}
*grapheme=(GraphemeInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(extent,sizeof(**grapheme));
if (*grapheme == (GraphemeInfo *) NULL)
{
extent=0;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) extent; i++)
{
(*grapheme)[i].index=glyphs[i].index;
(*grapheme)[i].x_offset=glyphs[i].x_offset;
(*grapheme)[i].x_advance=glyphs[i].x_advance;
(*grapheme)[i].y_offset=glyphs[i].y_offset;
(*grapheme)[i].cluster=glyphs[i].cluster;
}
cleanup:
raqm_destroy(rq);
return(extent);
#else
const char
*p;
FT_Error
ft_status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
last_glyph;
/*
Simple layout for bi-directional text (right-to-left or left-to-right).
*/
magick_unreferenced(image);
magick_unreferenced(exception);
*grapheme=(GraphemeInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(**grapheme));
if (*grapheme == (GraphemeInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
last_glyph=0;
p=text;
for (i=0; GetUTFCode(p) != 0; p+=GetUTFOctets(p), i++)
{
(*grapheme)[i].index=(ssize_t) FT_Get_Char_Index(face,GetUTFCode(p));
(*grapheme)[i].x_offset=0;
(*grapheme)[i].y_offset=0;
if (((*grapheme)[i].index != 0) && (last_glyph != 0))
{
if (FT_HAS_KERNING(face))
{
FT_Vector
kerning;
ft_status=FT_Get_Kerning(face,(FT_UInt) last_glyph,(FT_UInt)
(*grapheme)[i].index,ft_kerning_default,&kerning);
if (ft_status == 0)
(*grapheme)[i-1].x_advance+=(FT_Pos) ((draw_info->direction ==
RightToLeftDirection ? -1.0 : 1.0)*kerning.x);
}
}
ft_status=FT_Load_Glyph(face,(FT_UInt) (*grapheme)[i].index,flags);
(*grapheme)[i].x_advance=face->glyph->advance.x;
(*grapheme)[i].cluster=p-text;
last_glyph=(*grapheme)[i].index;
}
return((size_t) i);
#endif
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void futex_get_mm(union futex_key *key)
{
mmgrab(key->private.mm);
/*
* Ensure futex_get_mm() implies a full barrier such that
* get_futex_key() implies a full barrier. This is relied upon
* as smp_mb(); (B), see the ordering comment above.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 25,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ovsinst_bitmap_to_openflow(uint32_t ovsinst_bitmap, enum ofp_version version)
{
uint32_t ofpit_bitmap = 0;
const struct ovsinst_map *x;
for (x = get_ovsinst_map(version); x->ofpit >= 0; x++) {
if (ovsinst_bitmap & (1u << x->ovsinst)) {
ofpit_bitmap |= 1u << x->ofpit;
}
}
return htonl(ofpit_bitmap);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_connect_gnutls_verify_certificates (gnutls_session_t tls_session)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook;
int rc;
rc = -1;
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_CONNECT];
while (ptr_hook)
{
/* looking for the right hook using to the gnutls session pointer */
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& HOOK_CONNECT(ptr_hook, gnutls_sess)
&& (*(HOOK_CONNECT(ptr_hook, gnutls_sess)) == tls_session))
{
rc = (int) (HOOK_CONNECT(ptr_hook, gnutls_cb))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, tls_session, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NULL,
WEECHAT_HOOK_CONNECT_GNUTLS_CB_VERIFY_CERT);
break;
}
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PermissionsData::SetActivePermissions(
const PermissionSet* permissions) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
active_permissions_unsafe_ = permissions;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix3x4fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
MaybeShared<DOMFloat32Array> value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateUniformMatrixParameters(
"uniformMatrix3x4fv", location, transpose,
value.View(), 12, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->UniformMatrix3x4fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.View()->length() - src_offset)) / 12,
transpose, value.View()->DataMaybeShared() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FreeList::AddToFreeList(Address address, size_t size) {
DCHECK_LT(size, BlinkPagePayloadSize());
DCHECK(!((reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(address) + sizeof(HeapObjectHeader)) &
kAllocationMask));
DCHECK(!(size & kAllocationMask));
ASAN_UNPOISON_MEMORY_REGION(address, size);
FreeListEntry* entry;
if (size < sizeof(*entry)) {
DCHECK_GE(size, sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
new (NotNull, address) HeapObjectHeader(size, kGcInfoIndexForFreeListHeader,
HeapObjectHeader::kNormalPage);
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(address, size);
return;
}
entry = new (NotNull, address) FreeListEntry(size);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON() || defined(LEAK_SANITIZER) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
size_t allowed_count = 0;
size_t forbidden_count = 0;
GetAllowedAndForbiddenCounts(address, size, allowed_count, forbidden_count);
size_t entry_count = size - sizeof(FreeListEntry);
if (forbidden_count == entry_count) {
for (size_t i = sizeof(FreeListEntry); i < size; i++)
address[i] = kReuseAllowedZapValue;
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(address, size);
return;
}
if (allowed_count != entry_count) {
for (size_t i = sizeof(FreeListEntry); i < size; i++)
address[i] = kReuseForbiddenZapValue;
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(address, size);
return;
}
#endif
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(address, size);
int index = BucketIndexForSize(size);
entry->Link(&free_lists_[index]);
if (index > biggest_free_list_index_)
biggest_free_list_index_ = index;
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: freefileinfo (struct fileinfo *f)
{
while (f)
{
struct fileinfo *next = f->next;
xfree (f->name);
if (f->linkto)
xfree (f->linkto);
xfree (f);
f = next;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::Reshape(const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space,
bool has_alpha,
bool use_stencil) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (initialize_waitable_event_) {
initialize_waitable_event_->Wait();
initialize_waitable_event_ = nullptr;
}
SkSurfaceCharacterization* characterization = nullptr;
if (characterization_.isValid()) {
characterization_ =
characterization_.createResized(size.width(), size.height());
RecreateRootRecorder();
} else {
characterization = &characterization_;
initialize_waitable_event_ = std::make_unique<base::WaitableEvent>(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
}
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::Reshape,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), size, device_scale_factor,
std::move(color_space), has_alpha, use_stencil, pre_transform_,
characterization, initialize_waitable_event_.get());
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 1
| 29,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xen_vbd_resize(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
struct xen_vbd *vbd = &blkif->vbd;
struct xenbus_transaction xbt;
int err;
struct xenbus_device *dev = xen_blkbk_xenbus(blkif->be);
unsigned long long new_size = vbd_sz(vbd);
pr_info(DRV_PFX "VBD Resize: Domid: %d, Device: (%d, %d)\n",
blkif->domid, MAJOR(vbd->pdevice), MINOR(vbd->pdevice));
pr_info(DRV_PFX "VBD Resize: new size %llu\n", new_size);
vbd->size = new_size;
again:
err = xenbus_transaction_start(&xbt);
if (err) {
pr_warn(DRV_PFX "Error starting transaction");
return;
}
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename, "sectors", "%llu",
(unsigned long long)vbd_sz(vbd));
if (err) {
pr_warn(DRV_PFX "Error writing new size");
goto abort;
}
/*
* Write the current state; we will use this to synchronize
* the front-end. If the current state is "connected" the
* front-end will get the new size information online.
*/
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename, "state", "%d", dev->state);
if (err) {
pr_warn(DRV_PFX "Error writing the state");
goto abort;
}
err = xenbus_transaction_end(xbt, 0);
if (err == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
if (err)
pr_warn(DRV_PFX "Error ending transaction");
return;
abort:
xenbus_transaction_end(xbt, 1);
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodAnyArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodAnyArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
ScriptValue any_arg;
any_arg = ScriptValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]);
impl->voidMethodAnyArg(any_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 1,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t __fuse_direct_read(struct fuse_io_priv *io,
struct iov_iter *iter,
loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t res;
struct file *file = io->file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
if (is_bad_inode(inode))
return -EIO;
res = fuse_direct_io(io, iter, ppos, 0);
fuse_invalidate_attr(inode);
return res;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScreenPositionController::ConvertPointFromScreen(
const aura::Window* window,
gfx::Point* point) {
const aura::Window* root = window->GetRootWindow();
const gfx::Point display_origin = Shell::GetScreen()->GetDisplayNearestWindow(
const_cast<aura::Window*>(root)).bounds().origin();
point->Offset(-display_origin.x(), -display_origin.y());
aura::Window::ConvertPointToTarget(root, window, point);
}
Commit Message: Use the host coordinate when comparing to host window bounds.
I somehow overlooked this and the test was not strict enough to catch this.
BUG=521919
TEST=Updated ScreenPositionControllerTest.ConvertHostPointToScreenHiDPI so that it fails without the patch.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344186}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_setdevice_no_erase(gs_gstate * pgs, gx_device * dev)
{
int open_code = 0, code;
gs_lib_ctx_t *libctx = gs_lib_ctx_get_interp_instance(pgs->memory);
/* If the ICC manager is not yet initialized, set it up now. But only
if we have file io capability now */
if (libctx->io_device_table != NULL) {
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
if (pgs->icc_manager->lab_profile == NULL) { /* pick one not set externally */
gsicc_init_iccmanager(pgs);
}
/* Also, if the device profile is not yet set then take care of that
before we start filling pages, if we can */
/* Although device methods should not be NULL, they are not completely filled in until
* gx_device_fill_in_procs is called, and its possible for us to get here before this
* happens, so we *must* make sure the method is not NULL before we use it.
*/
if (dev->procs.get_profile != NULL) {
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code < 0) {
return(code);
}
if (dev_profile == NULL ||
dev_profile->device_profile[gsDEFAULTPROFILE] == NULL) {
if ((code = gsicc_init_device_profile_struct(dev, NULL,
gsDEFAULTPROFILE)) < 0)
return(code);
/* set the intent too */
if ((code = gsicc_set_device_profile_intent(dev, gsRINOTSPECIFIED,
gsDEFAULTPROFILE)) < 0)
return(code);
}
}
}
/* Initialize the device */
if (!dev->is_open) {
gx_device_fill_in_procs(dev);
/* If we have not yet done so, and if we can, set the device profile
* Doing so *before* the device is opened means that a device which
* opens other devices can pass a profile on - for example, pswrite
* also opens a bbox device
*/
if (libctx->io_device_table != NULL) {
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
/* Although device methods should not be NULL, they are not completely filled in until
* gx_device_fill_in_procs is called, and its possible for us to get here before this
* happens, so we *must* make sure the method is not NULL before we use it.
*/
if (dev->procs.get_profile != NULL) {
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code < 0) {
return(code);
}
if (dev_profile == NULL ||
dev_profile->device_profile[gsDEFAULTPROFILE] == NULL) {
if ((code = gsicc_init_device_profile_struct(dev, NULL,
gsDEFAULTPROFILE)) < 0)
return(code);
}
}
}
if (gs_device_is_memory(dev)) {
/* Set the target to the current device. */
gx_device *odev = gs_currentdevice_inline(pgs);
while (odev != 0 && gs_device_is_memory(odev))
odev = ((gx_device_memory *)odev)->target;
gx_device_set_target(((gx_device_forward *)dev), odev);
}
code = open_code = gs_opendevice(dev);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
gs_setdevice_no_init(pgs, dev);
pgs->ctm_default_set = false;
if ((code = gs_initmatrix(pgs)) < 0 ||
(code = gs_initclip(pgs)) < 0
)
return code;
/* If we were in a charpath or a setcachedevice, */
/* we aren't any longer. */
pgs->in_cachedevice = 0;
pgs->in_charpath = (gs_char_path_mode) 0;
return open_code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 12,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sm_adaptive_routing(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
uint32_t enable=0;
if (argc == 1) {
enable = atol(argv[0]);
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_SET_ADAPTIVE_ROUTING, mgr, sizeof(enable), (void*)&enable, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_adaptive_routing: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent SM Adaptive Routing control to local SM instance\n");
}
} else if (argc == 0) {
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_GET_ADAPTIVE_ROUTING, mgr, sizeof(enable), (void*)&enable, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_adaptive_routing: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("SM Adaptive Routing is %s\n", enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_resume(void)
{
if (kvm_usage_count) {
WARN_ON(raw_spin_is_locked(&kvm_count_lock));
hardware_enable_nolock(NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_xml_free_wrapper(void *ptr)
{
if (ptr != NULL) {
efree(ptr);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init ipv4_proc_init(void)
{
int rc = 0;
if (raw_proc_init())
goto out_raw;
if (tcp4_proc_init())
goto out_tcp;
if (udp4_proc_init())
goto out_udp;
if (ping_proc_init())
goto out_ping;
if (ip_misc_proc_init())
goto out_misc;
out:
return rc;
out_misc:
ping_proc_exit();
out_ping:
udp4_proc_exit();
out_udp:
tcp4_proc_exit();
out_tcp:
raw_proc_exit();
out_raw:
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
{
unsigned long val;
memcpy(dbgregs->db, vcpu->arch.db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val);
dbgregs->dr6 = val;
dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
dbgregs->flags = 0;
memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebPlugin* ChromeContentRendererClient::CreatePlugin(
RenderView* render_view,
WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginParams& original_params) {
bool found = false;
CommandLine* cmd = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
webkit::npapi::WebPluginInfo info;
GURL url(original_params.url);
std::string actual_mime_type;
render_view->Send(new ViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo(
render_view->routing_id(), url, frame->top()->document().url(),
original_params.mimeType.utf8(), &found, &info, &actual_mime_type));
if (!found)
return NULL;
if (!webkit::npapi::IsPluginEnabled(info))
return NULL;
const webkit::npapi::PluginGroup* group =
webkit::npapi::PluginList::Singleton()->GetPluginGroup(info);
DCHECK(group != NULL);
ContentSetting plugin_setting = CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT;
std::string resource;
if (cmd->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableResourceContentSettings))
resource = group->identifier();
render_view->Send(new ViewHostMsg_GetPluginContentSetting(
frame->top()->document().url(), resource, &plugin_setting));
DCHECK(plugin_setting != CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT);
WebPluginParams params(original_params);
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.mime_types.size(); ++i) {
if (info.mime_types[i].mime_type == actual_mime_type) {
AppendParams(info.mime_types[i].additional_param_names,
info.mime_types[i].additional_param_values,
¶ms.attributeNames,
¶ms.attributeValues);
break;
}
}
ContentSetting outdated_policy = CONTENT_SETTING_ASK;
ContentSetting authorize_policy = CONTENT_SETTING_ASK;
if (group->IsVulnerable() || group->RequiresAuthorization()) {
render_view->Send(new ViewHostMsg_GetPluginPolicies(
&outdated_policy, &authorize_policy));
}
if (group->IsVulnerable()) {
if (outdated_policy == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK ||
outdated_policy == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK) {
if (outdated_policy == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK) {
render_view->Send(new ViewHostMsg_BlockedOutdatedPlugin(
render_view->routing_id(), group->GetGroupName(),
GURL(group->GetUpdateURL())));
}
return CreatePluginPlaceholder(
render_view, frame, params, *group, IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML,
IDS_PLUGIN_OUTDATED, false, outdated_policy == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK);
} else {
DCHECK(outdated_policy == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW);
}
}
ContentSettingsObserver* observer = ContentSettingsObserver::Get(render_view);
ContentSetting host_setting =
observer->GetContentSetting(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS);
if (group->RequiresAuthorization() &&
authorize_policy == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK &&
(plugin_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW ||
plugin_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK) &&
host_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT) {
render_view->Send(new ViewHostMsg_BlockedOutdatedPlugin(
render_view->routing_id(), group->GetGroupName(), GURL()));
return CreatePluginPlaceholder(
render_view, frame, params, *group, IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML,
IDS_PLUGIN_NOT_AUTHORIZED, false, true);
}
if (info.path.value() == webkit::npapi::kDefaultPluginLibraryName ||
plugin_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW ||
host_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW) {
if (prerender::PrerenderHelper::IsPrerendering(render_view)) {
return CreatePluginPlaceholder(
render_view, frame, params, *group, IDR_CLICK_TO_PLAY_PLUGIN_HTML,
IDS_PLUGIN_LOAD, true, true);
}
bool pepper_plugin_was_registered = false;
scoped_refptr<webkit::ppapi::PluginModule> pepper_module(
render_view->pepper_delegate()->CreatePepperPlugin(
info.path, &pepper_plugin_was_registered));
if (pepper_plugin_was_registered) {
if (pepper_module) {
return render_view->CreatePepperPlugin(
frame, params, info.path, pepper_module.get());
}
return NULL;
}
return render_view->CreateNPAPIPlugin(
frame, params, info.path, actual_mime_type);
}
observer->DidBlockContentType(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS, resource);
if (plugin_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK) {
return CreatePluginPlaceholder(
render_view, frame, params, *group, IDR_CLICK_TO_PLAY_PLUGIN_HTML,
IDS_PLUGIN_LOAD, false, true);
} else {
return CreatePluginPlaceholder(
render_view, frame, params, *group, IDR_BLOCKED_PLUGIN_HTML,
IDS_PLUGIN_BLOCKED, false, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent navigation to chrome-devtools: and chrome-internal: schemas from http
BUG=87815
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7275032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91002 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_class_defined(mrb_state *mrb, const char *name)
{
mrb_value sym = mrb_check_intern_cstr(mrb, name);
if (mrb_nil_p(sym)) {
return FALSE;
}
return mrb_const_defined(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->object_class), mrb_symbol(sym));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 12,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int pit_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
if (pit && kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) && pit->pit_state.irq_ack)
return atomic_read(&pit->pit_state.pit_timer.pending);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_io_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
u32 ioasc = le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.ioasc);
u32 reslen = le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.residual_data_length);
if (_pmcraid_io_done(cmd, reslen, ioasc) == 0)
pmcraid_return_cmd(cmd);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *listening_get_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *cur)
{
struct tcp_iter_state *st = seq->private;
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb;
struct sock *sk = cur;
if (!sk) {
get_head:
ilb = &tcp_hashinfo.listening_hash[st->bucket];
spin_lock_bh(&ilb->lock);
sk = sk_head(&ilb->head);
st->offset = 0;
goto get_sk;
}
ilb = &tcp_hashinfo.listening_hash[st->bucket];
++st->num;
++st->offset;
sk = sk_next(sk);
get_sk:
sk_for_each_from(sk) {
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net))
continue;
if (sk->sk_family == st->family)
return sk;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ilb->lock);
st->offset = 0;
if (++st->bucket < INET_LHTABLE_SIZE)
goto get_head;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ia64_patch_vtop (unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
s32 *offp = (s32 *) start;
u64 ip;
while (offp < (s32 *) end) {
ip = (u64) offp + *offp;
/* replace virtual address with corresponding physical address: */
ia64_patch_imm64(ip, ia64_tpa(get_imm64(ip)));
ia64_fc((void *) ip);
++offp;
}
ia64_sync_i();
ia64_srlz_i();
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool jas_image_cmpt_domains_same(jas_image_t *image)
{
int cmptno;
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt0;
cmpt0 = image->cmpts_[0];
for (cmptno = 1; cmptno < image->numcmpts_; ++cmptno) {
cmpt = image->cmpts_[cmptno];
if (cmpt->tlx_ != cmpt0->tlx_ || cmpt->tly_ != cmpt0->tly_ ||
cmpt->hstep_ != cmpt0->hstep_ || cmpt->vstep_ != cmpt0->vstep_ ||
cmpt->width_ != cmpt0->width_ || cmpt->height_ != cmpt0->height_) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 5,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_uncached_readv_complete(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct cifs_readdata *rdata = container_of(work,
struct cifs_readdata, work);
complete(&rdata->done);
kref_put(&rdata->refcount, cifs_uncached_readdata_release);
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mem_cgroup_inactive_anon_is_low(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, struct zone *zone)
{
unsigned long inactive_ratio;
int nid = zone_to_nid(zone);
int zid = zone_idx(zone);
unsigned long inactive;
unsigned long active;
unsigned long gb;
inactive = mem_cgroup_zone_nr_lru_pages(memcg, nid, zid,
BIT(LRU_INACTIVE_ANON));
active = mem_cgroup_zone_nr_lru_pages(memcg, nid, zid,
BIT(LRU_ACTIVE_ANON));
gb = (inactive + active) >> (30 - PAGE_SHIFT);
if (gb)
inactive_ratio = int_sqrt(10 * gb);
else
inactive_ratio = 1;
return inactive * inactive_ratio < active;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_features(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct multipath *m)
{
int r;
unsigned argc;
struct dm_target *ti = m->ti;
const char *arg_name;
static struct dm_arg _args[] = {
{0, 5, "invalid number of feature args"},
{1, 50, "pg_init_retries must be between 1 and 50"},
{0, 60000, "pg_init_delay_msecs must be between 0 and 60000"},
};
r = dm_read_arg_group(_args, as, &argc, &ti->error);
if (r)
return -EINVAL;
if (!argc)
return 0;
do {
arg_name = dm_shift_arg(as);
argc--;
if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, "queue_if_no_path")) {
r = queue_if_no_path(m, 1, 0);
continue;
}
if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, "pg_init_retries") &&
(argc >= 1)) {
r = dm_read_arg(_args + 1, as, &m->pg_init_retries, &ti->error);
argc--;
continue;
}
if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, "pg_init_delay_msecs") &&
(argc >= 1)) {
r = dm_read_arg(_args + 2, as, &m->pg_init_delay_msecs, &ti->error);
argc--;
continue;
}
ti->error = "Unrecognised multipath feature request";
r = -EINVAL;
} while (argc && !r);
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotifications(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetNotificationsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 8,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
surface_width(vs->vd->ds),
surface_height(vs->vd->ds),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 26,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mnt_drop_write(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
__mnt_drop_write(mnt);
sb_end_write(mnt->mnt_sb);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit crypto_ccm_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_rfc4309_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_ccm_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_ccm_base_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_cbcmac_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ieee80211_assign_perm_addr(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct net_device *dev,
enum nl80211_iftype type)
{
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
u64 mask, start, addr, val, inc;
u8 *m;
u8 tmp_addr[ETH_ALEN];
int i;
/* default ... something at least */
memcpy(dev->perm_addr, local->hw.wiphy->perm_addr, ETH_ALEN);
if (is_zero_ether_addr(local->hw.wiphy->addr_mask) &&
local->hw.wiphy->n_addresses <= 1)
return;
mutex_lock(&local->iflist_mtx);
switch (type) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR:
/* doesn't matter */
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_WDS:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
/* match up with an AP interface */
list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) {
if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP)
continue;
memcpy(dev->perm_addr, sdata->vif.addr, ETH_ALEN);
break;
}
/* keep default if no AP interface present */
break;
default:
/* assign a new address if possible -- try n_addresses first */
for (i = 0; i < local->hw.wiphy->n_addresses; i++) {
bool used = false;
list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) {
if (memcmp(local->hw.wiphy->addresses[i].addr,
sdata->vif.addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
used = true;
break;
}
}
if (!used) {
memcpy(dev->perm_addr,
local->hw.wiphy->addresses[i].addr,
ETH_ALEN);
break;
}
}
/* try mask if available */
if (is_zero_ether_addr(local->hw.wiphy->addr_mask))
break;
m = local->hw.wiphy->addr_mask;
mask = ((u64)m[0] << 5*8) | ((u64)m[1] << 4*8) |
((u64)m[2] << 3*8) | ((u64)m[3] << 2*8) |
((u64)m[4] << 1*8) | ((u64)m[5] << 0*8);
if (__ffs64(mask) + hweight64(mask) != fls64(mask)) {
/* not a contiguous mask ... not handled now! */
printk(KERN_DEBUG "not contiguous\n");
break;
}
m = local->hw.wiphy->perm_addr;
start = ((u64)m[0] << 5*8) | ((u64)m[1] << 4*8) |
((u64)m[2] << 3*8) | ((u64)m[3] << 2*8) |
((u64)m[4] << 1*8) | ((u64)m[5] << 0*8);
inc = 1ULL<<__ffs64(mask);
val = (start & mask);
addr = (start & ~mask) | (val & mask);
do {
bool used = false;
tmp_addr[5] = addr >> 0*8;
tmp_addr[4] = addr >> 1*8;
tmp_addr[3] = addr >> 2*8;
tmp_addr[2] = addr >> 3*8;
tmp_addr[1] = addr >> 4*8;
tmp_addr[0] = addr >> 5*8;
val += inc;
list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) {
if (memcmp(tmp_addr, sdata->vif.addr,
ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
used = true;
break;
}
}
if (!used) {
memcpy(dev->perm_addr, tmp_addr, ETH_ALEN);
break;
}
addr = (start & ~mask) | (val & mask);
} while (addr != start);
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&local->iflist_mtx);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int cifs_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
if (file->private_data != NULL) {
cifsFileInfo_put(file->private_data);
file->private_data = NULL;
}
/* return code from the ->release op is always ignored */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_close(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_closeargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_close(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage void __sched schedule(void)
{
struct task_struct *prev, *next;
unsigned long *switch_count;
struct rq *rq;
int cpu;
need_resched:
preempt_disable();
cpu = smp_processor_id();
rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
rcu_note_context_switch(cpu);
prev = rq->curr;
schedule_debug(prev);
if (sched_feat(HRTICK))
hrtick_clear(rq);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&rq->lock);
switch_count = &prev->nivcsw;
if (prev->state && !(preempt_count() & PREEMPT_ACTIVE)) {
if (unlikely(signal_pending_state(prev->state, prev))) {
prev->state = TASK_RUNNING;
} else {
deactivate_task(rq, prev, DEQUEUE_SLEEP);
prev->on_rq = 0;
/*
* If a worker went to sleep, notify and ask workqueue
* whether it wants to wake up a task to maintain
* concurrency.
*/
if (prev->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER) {
struct task_struct *to_wakeup;
to_wakeup = wq_worker_sleeping(prev, cpu);
if (to_wakeup)
try_to_wake_up_local(to_wakeup);
}
/*
* If we are going to sleep and we have plugged IO
* queued, make sure to submit it to avoid deadlocks.
*/
if (blk_needs_flush_plug(prev)) {
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
blk_schedule_flush_plug(prev);
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
}
}
switch_count = &prev->nvcsw;
}
pre_schedule(rq, prev);
if (unlikely(!rq->nr_running))
idle_balance(cpu, rq);
put_prev_task(rq, prev);
next = pick_next_task(rq);
clear_tsk_need_resched(prev);
rq->skip_clock_update = 0;
if (likely(prev != next)) {
rq->nr_switches++;
rq->curr = next;
++*switch_count;
context_switch(rq, prev, next); /* unlocks the rq */
/*
* The context switch have flipped the stack from under us
* and restored the local variables which were saved when
* this task called schedule() in the past. prev == current
* is still correct, but it can be moved to another cpu/rq.
*/
cpu = smp_processor_id();
rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
} else
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&rq->lock);
post_schedule(rq);
preempt_enable_no_resched();
if (need_resched())
goto need_resched;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Page* ChromeClientImpl::CreateWindow(LocalFrame* frame,
const FrameLoadRequest& r,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
NavigationPolicy navigation_policy,
SandboxFlags sandbox_flags) {
if (!web_view_->Client())
return nullptr;
if (!frame->GetPage() || frame->GetPage()->Paused())
return nullptr;
DCHECK(frame->GetDocument());
Fullscreen::FullyExitFullscreen(*frame->GetDocument());
const AtomicString& frame_name =
!EqualIgnoringASCIICase(r.FrameName(), "_blank") ? r.FrameName()
: g_empty_atom;
WebViewImpl* new_view =
static_cast<WebViewImpl*>(web_view_->Client()->CreateView(
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame),
WrappedResourceRequest(r.GetResourceRequest()), features, frame_name,
static_cast<WebNavigationPolicy>(navigation_policy),
r.GetShouldSetOpener() == kNeverSetOpener,
static_cast<WebSandboxFlags>(sandbox_flags)));
if (!new_view)
return nullptr;
return new_view->GetPage();
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 16,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* TrayCast::CreateDetailedView(user::LoginStatus status) {
Shell::GetInstance()->metrics()->RecordUserMetricsAction(
ash::UMA_STATUS_AREA_DETAILED_CAST_VIEW);
CHECK(detailed_ == nullptr);
detailed_ = new tray::CastDetailedView(this, cast_config_delegate_, status);
return detailed_;
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 8,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int git_pack_config(const char *k, const char *v, void *cb)
{
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.window")) {
window = git_config_int(k, v);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.windowmemory")) {
window_memory_limit = git_config_ulong(k, v);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.depth")) {
depth = git_config_int(k, v);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.compression")) {
int level = git_config_int(k, v);
if (level == -1)
level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
else if (level < 0 || level > Z_BEST_COMPRESSION)
die("bad pack compression level %d", level);
pack_compression_level = level;
pack_compression_seen = 1;
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.deltacachesize")) {
max_delta_cache_size = git_config_int(k, v);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.deltacachelimit")) {
cache_max_small_delta_size = git_config_int(k, v);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.writebitmaphashcache")) {
if (git_config_bool(k, v))
write_bitmap_options |= BITMAP_OPT_HASH_CACHE;
else
write_bitmap_options &= ~BITMAP_OPT_HASH_CACHE;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.usebitmaps")) {
use_bitmap_index = git_config_bool(k, v);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.threads")) {
delta_search_threads = git_config_int(k, v);
if (delta_search_threads < 0)
die("invalid number of threads specified (%d)",
delta_search_threads);
#ifdef NO_PTHREADS
if (delta_search_threads != 1)
warning("no threads support, ignoring %s", k);
#endif
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.indexversion")) {
pack_idx_opts.version = git_config_int(k, v);
if (pack_idx_opts.version > 2)
die("bad pack.indexversion=%"PRIu32,
pack_idx_opts.version);
return 0;
}
return git_default_config(k, v, cb);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int validate_t2(struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMB)
{
unsigned int total_size;
/* check for plausible wct */
if (pSMB->hdr.WordCount < 10)
goto vt2_err;
/* check for parm and data offset going beyond end of smb */
if (get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB->t2_rsp.ParameterOffset) > 1024 ||
get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB->t2_rsp.DataOffset) > 1024)
goto vt2_err;
total_size = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB->t2_rsp.ParameterCount);
if (total_size >= 512)
goto vt2_err;
/* check that bcc is at least as big as parms + data, and that it is
* less than negotiated smb buffer
*/
total_size += get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB->t2_rsp.DataCount);
if (total_size > get_bcc(&pSMB->hdr) ||
total_size >= CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE)
goto vt2_err;
return 0;
vt2_err:
cifs_dump_mem("Invalid transact2 SMB: ", (char *)pSMB,
sizeof(struct smb_t2_rsp) + 16);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eth_pkt_types_e net_tx_pkt_get_packet_type(struct NetTxPkt *pkt)
{
assert(pkt);
return pkt->packet_type;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 25,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int board_early_init_f(void)
{
ccsr_gur_t *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_MPC85xx_GUTS_ADDR);
bool cpuwd_flag = false;
/* configure mode for uP reset request */
qrio_uprstreq(UPREQ_CORE_RST);
/* board only uses the DDR_MCK0, so disable the DDR_MCK1/2/3 */
setbits_be32(&gur->ddrclkdr, 0x001f000f);
/* set reset reason according CPU register */
if ((gur->rstrqsr1 & (RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR | RSTRQSR1_SW_RR)) ==
RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR)
cpuwd_flag = true;
qrio_cpuwd_flag(cpuwd_flag);
/* clear CPU bits by writing 1 */
setbits_be32(&gur->rstrqsr1, RSTRQSR1_WDT_RR | RSTRQSR1_SW_RR);
/* set the BFTIC's prstcfg to reset at power-up and unit reset only */
qrio_prstcfg(BFTIC4_RST, PRSTCFG_POWUP_UNIT_RST);
/* and enable WD on it */
qrio_wdmask(BFTIC4_RST, true);
/* set the ZL30138's prstcfg to reset at power-up only */
qrio_prstcfg(ZL30158_RST, PRSTCFG_POWUP_RST);
/* and take it out of reset as soon as possible (needed for Hooper) */
qrio_prst(ZL30158_RST, false, false);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 19,114
|
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