instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
uint32_t intr;
int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq);
++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
int inc_eip = 0;
if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
if (kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip) != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return;
}
intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
} else
intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QQuickWebPage* QQuickWebView::page()
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
return d->pageView.data();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 2,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_RSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(phar) /* {{{ */
{
int i;
PHAR_GLOBALS->request_ends = 1;
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->request_init)
{
phar_release_functions(TSRMLS_C);
zend_hash_destroy(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map));
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map.arBuckets = NULL;
zend_hash_destroy(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map));
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map.arBuckets = NULL;
zend_hash_destroy(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map));
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map.arBuckets = NULL;
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list = 0;
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp) {
for (i = 0; i < zend_hash_num_elements(&cached_phars); ++i) {
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp[i].fp) {
php_stream_close(PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp[i].fp);
}
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp[i].ufp) {
php_stream_close(PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp[i].ufp);
}
efree(PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp[i].manifest);
}
efree(PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp);
PHAR_GLOBALS->cached_fp = 0;
}
PHAR_GLOBALS->request_init = 0;
if (PHAR_G(cwd)) {
efree(PHAR_G(cwd));
}
PHAR_G(cwd) = NULL;
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = 0;
PHAR_G(cwd_init) = 0;
}
PHAR_GLOBALS->request_done = 1;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int __sock_recvmsg_nosec(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
return sock->ops->recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, size, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cm_send_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *mad_agent,
struct ib_mad_send_wc *mad_send_wc)
{
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = mad_send_wc->send_buf;
struct cm_port *port;
u16 attr_index;
port = mad_agent->context;
attr_index = be16_to_cpu(((struct ib_mad_hdr *)
msg->mad)->attr_id) - CM_ATTR_ID_OFFSET;
/*
* If the send was in response to a received message (context[0] is not
* set to a cm_id), and is not a REJ, then it is a send that was
* manually retried.
*/
if (!msg->context[0] && (attr_index != CM_REJ_COUNTER))
msg->retries = 1;
atomic_long_add(1 + msg->retries,
&port->counter_group[CM_XMIT].counter[attr_index]);
if (msg->retries)
atomic_long_add(msg->retries,
&port->counter_group[CM_XMIT_RETRIES].
counter[attr_index]);
switch (mad_send_wc->status) {
case IB_WC_SUCCESS:
case IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR:
cm_free_msg(msg);
break;
default:
if (msg->context[0] && msg->context[1])
cm_process_send_error(msg, mad_send_wc->status);
else
cm_free_msg(msg);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltFreeExtData(xsltExtDataPtr ext)
{
if (ext == NULL)
return;
xmlFree(ext);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceFetcher::RevalidationPolicy ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy(Resource::Type type, ResourceRequest& request, bool forPreload, Resource* existingResource, FetchRequest::DeferOption defer, const ResourceLoaderOptions& options) const
{
if (!existingResource)
return Load;
if (forPreload && existingResource->isPreloaded())
return Use;
if (existingResource->type() != type) {
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy reloading due to type mismatch.");
return Reload;
}
if (FetchRequest::DeferredByClient == defer)
return Reload;
if (type == Resource::Image && request.url().protocolIsData())
return Use;
if (type == Resource::MainResource && m_documentLoader->substituteData().isValid())
return Use;
if (!existingResource->canReuse(request))
return Reload;
if (request.downloadToFile())
return Reload;
if (request.isConditional())
return Reload;
if (m_allowStaleResources)
return Use;
if (existingResource->isPreloaded())
return Use;
CachePolicy cachePolicy = context().cachePolicy(document());
if (cachePolicy == CachePolicyHistoryBuffer)
return Use;
if (existingResource->hasCacheControlNoStoreHeader()) {
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy reloading due to Cache-control: no-store.");
return Reload;
}
if (type != Resource::MainResource && options.corsEnabled != existingResource->options().corsEnabled)
return Reload;
if (existingResource->resourceRequest().allowStoredCredentials() != request.allowStoredCredentials()) {
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy reloading due to difference in credentials settings.");
return Reload;
}
if (type != Resource::Raw) {
if (document() && !document()->loadEventFinished() && m_validatedURLs.contains(existingResource->url()))
return Use;
if (existingResource->isLoading())
return Use;
}
if (cachePolicy == CachePolicyReload) {
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy reloading due to CachePolicyReload.");
return Reload;
}
if (existingResource->errorOccurred()) {
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicye reloading due to resource being in the error state");
return Reload;
}
if (type == Resource::Image && existingResource == cachedResource(request.url()))
return Use;
if (!existingResource->canReuseRedirectChain()) {
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy reloading due to an uncacheable redirect");
return Reload;
}
if (cachePolicy == CachePolicyRevalidate || existingResource->mustRevalidateDueToCacheHeaders()
|| request.cacheControlContainsNoCache()) {
if (existingResource->canUseCacheValidator())
return Revalidate;
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::determineRevalidationPolicy reloading due to missing cache validators.");
return Reload;
}
return Use;
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PermissionsData::HasHostPermission(const GURL& url) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
return active_permissions_unsafe_->HasExplicitAccessToOrigin(url) &&
!IsPolicyBlockedHostUnsafe(url);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void* hashbin_remove( hashbin_t* hashbin, long hashv, const char* name)
{
int bin, found = FALSE;
unsigned long flags = 0;
irda_queue_t* entry;
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin != NULL, return NULL;);
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return NULL;);
/*
* Locate hashbin
*/
if ( name )
hashv = hash( name );
bin = GET_HASHBIN( hashv );
/* Synchronize */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
} /* Default is no-lock */
/*
* Search for entry
*/
entry = hashbin->hb_queue[ bin ];
if ( entry ) {
do {
/*
* Check for key
*/
if ( entry->q_hash == hashv ) {
/*
* Name compare too?
*/
if ( name ) {
if ( strcmp( entry->q_name, name) == 0)
{
found = TRUE;
break;
}
} else {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
entry = entry->q_next;
} while ( entry != hashbin->hb_queue[ bin ] );
}
/*
* If entry was found, dequeue it
*/
if ( found ) {
dequeue_general( (irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[ bin ],
entry);
hashbin->hb_size--;
/*
* Check if this item is the currently selected item, and in
* that case we must reset hb_current
*/
if ( entry == hashbin->hb_current)
hashbin->hb_current = NULL;
}
/* Release lock */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
} /* Default is no-lock */
/* Return */
if ( found )
return entry;
else
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_write_ioctldata2iop_in_DWORD(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
uint8_t *pQbuffer;
struct QBUFFER __iomem *pwbuffer;
uint8_t *buf1 = NULL;
uint32_t __iomem *iop_data;
uint32_t allxfer_len = 0, data_len, *buf2 = NULL, data;
if (acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_READED) {
buf1 = kmalloc(128, GFP_ATOMIC);
buf2 = (uint32_t *)buf1;
if (buf1 == NULL)
return;
acb->acb_flags &= (~ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_READED);
pwbuffer = arcmsr_get_iop_wqbuffer(acb);
iop_data = (uint32_t __iomem *)pwbuffer->data;
while ((acb->wqbuf_getIndex != acb->wqbuf_putIndex)
&& (allxfer_len < 124)) {
pQbuffer = &acb->wqbuffer[acb->wqbuf_getIndex];
*buf1 = *pQbuffer;
acb->wqbuf_getIndex++;
acb->wqbuf_getIndex %= ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER;
buf1++;
allxfer_len++;
}
data_len = allxfer_len;
buf1 = (uint8_t *)buf2;
while (data_len >= 4) {
data = *buf2++;
writel(data, iop_data);
iop_data++;
data_len -= 4;
}
if (data_len) {
data = *buf2;
writel(data, iop_data);
}
writel(allxfer_len, &pwbuffer->data_len);
kfree(buf1);
arcmsr_iop_message_wrote(acb);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
OMX_PTR param) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitrate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)param;
if (bitrate->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
bitrate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_VBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
} else if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_CBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateConstant;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *vp8Params =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *)param;
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8Params->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain;
vp8Params->eLevel = mLevel;
vp8Params->nDCTPartitions = mDCTPartitions;
vp8Params->bErrorResilientMode = mErrorResilience;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAndroidVp8Encoder: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vp8AndroidParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *)param;
if (vp8AndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8AndroidParams->nKeyFrameInterval = mKeyFrameInterval;
vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern = mTemporalPatternType;
vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerCount = mTemporalLayers;
vp8AndroidParams->nMinQuantizer = mMinQuantizer;
vp8AndroidParams->nMaxQuantizer = mMaxQuantizer;
memcpy(vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio,
mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio, sizeof(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, param);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in VP8 encoder.
Bug: 27569635
Change-Id: I469573f40e21dc9f4c200749d4f220e3a2d31761
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetElementSize() const { return m_element_size; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_turtle_writer_set_option_string(raptor_turtle_writer *turtle_writer,
raptor_option option,
const unsigned char *value)
{
if(!value ||
!raptor_option_is_valid_for_area(option, RAPTOR_OPTION_AREA_TURTLE_WRITER))
return 1;
if(raptor_option_value_is_numeric(option))
return raptor_turtle_writer_set_option(turtle_writer, option,
atoi((const char*)value));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification;
int dr, reg;
/* Do not handle if the CPL > 0, will trigger GP on re-entry */
if (!kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
return 1;
dr = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
if (dr & DR7_GD) {
/*
* As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
* need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
* guest debugging itself.
*/
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr;
vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc =
vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) +
vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
return 0;
} else {
vcpu->arch.dr7 &= ~DR7_GD;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_BD | DR6_RTM;
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, vcpu->arch.dr7);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
}
if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
cpu_based_vm_exec_control = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
cpu_based_vm_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control);
/*
* No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
* and reenter on this instruction. The next vmexit will
* retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
*/
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
return 1;
}
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
unsigned long val;
if (kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val))
return 1;
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
} else
if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg)))
return 1;
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t radeon_atom_get_memory_clock(struct radeon_device *rdev)
{
GET_MEMORY_CLOCK_PS_ALLOCATION args;
int index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(COMMAND, GetMemoryClock);
atom_execute_table(rdev->mode_info.atom_context, index, (uint32_t *)&args);
return args.ulReturnMemoryClock;
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code;
*olen = 5;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 23,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateVideoDecoder(
media::mojom::VideoDecoderRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateVideoDecoder(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RedirectTest() {}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppLauncherHandler::OnExtensionPreferenceChanged() {
base::DictionaryValue dictionary;
FillAppDictionary(&dictionary);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("ntp.appsPrefChangeCallback", dictionary);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __wait_discard_cmd(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool wait_cond)
{
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
struct list_head *wait_list = &(dcc->wait_list);
struct discard_cmd *dc, *tmp;
bool need_wait;
next:
need_wait = false;
mutex_lock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dc, tmp, wait_list, list) {
if (!wait_cond || (dc->state == D_DONE && !dc->ref)) {
wait_for_completion_io(&dc->wait);
__remove_discard_cmd(sbi, dc);
} else {
dc->ref++;
need_wait = true;
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
if (need_wait) {
__wait_one_discard_bio(sbi, dc);
goto next;
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_notify_retrieve(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_retrieve_out outarg;
struct inode *inode;
int err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size != sizeof(outarg))
goto copy_finish;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto copy_finish;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb) {
u64 nodeid = outarg.nodeid;
inode = ilookup5(fc->sb, nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, &nodeid);
if (inode) {
err = fuse_retrieve(fc, inode, &outarg);
iput(inode);
}
}
up_read(&fc->killsb);
return err;
copy_finish:
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser::Type SessionService::BrowserTypeForWindowType(WindowType type) {
switch (type) {
case TYPE_POPUP:
return Browser::TYPE_POPUP;
case TYPE_TABBED:
default:
return Browser::TYPE_TABBED;
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::vector<bool>& resource_is_associated_with_main_frame() const {
return resource_is_associated_with_main_frame_;
}
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u8 kvm_get_guest_memory_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
u8 mtrr;
mtrr = get_mtrr_type(&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
(gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + PAGE_SIZE);
if (mtrr == 0xfe || mtrr == 0xff)
mtrr = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
return mtrr;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_sec_attr_from_acl(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
const sc_acl_entry_t *entry;
u8 sec_attr[SC_RTECP_SEC_ATTR_SIZE] = { 0 };
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && file);
assert(!file->sec_attr && file->sec_attr_len == 0);
assert(1 + 6 < sizeof(sec_attr));
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE);
if (entry)
{
sec_attr[0] |= 0x40;
sec_attr[1 + 6] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF)
{
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE);
if (entry)
{
/* ATTR: Create DF/EF file */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x01;
sec_attr[1 + 0] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
/* ATTR: Create Internal EF (RSF) file */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x02;
sec_attr[1 + 1] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
}
else
{
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
if (entry)
{
sec_attr[0] |= 0x01;
sec_attr[1 + 0] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE);
if (entry)
{
sec_attr[0] |= 0x02;
sec_attr[1 + 1] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE);
if (entry)
{
/* rewrite if sec_attr[1 + 1] already set */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x02;
sec_attr[1 + 1] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
}
/* FIXME: Find the best solution */
if (file->path.len == 2 && !memcmp(file->path.value, "\x3F\x00", 2))
{
/* ATTR: Put data */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x04;
sec_attr[1 + 2] = 1; /* so-pin reference */
}
r = sc_file_set_sec_attr(file, sec_attr, sizeof(sec_attr));
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 28,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetAutoplayPrefValue(bool value) {
profile()->GetPrefs()->SetBoolean(prefs::kBlockAutoplayEnabled, value);
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 14,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qreal OxideQQuickWebView::contentWidth() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return 0.f;
}
return const_cast<OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate*>(
d)->proxy_->compositorFrameContentSize().width();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Framebuffer* FramebufferManager::GetFramebuffer(
GLuint client_id) {
FramebufferMap::iterator it = framebuffers_.find(client_id);
return it != framebuffers_.end() ? it->second.get() : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ForwardShapeDetectionRequest(R request) {
service_manager::Connector* connector =
ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector();
connector->BindInterface(shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Blob> Blob::slice(long long start, long long end, const String& contentType) const
{
long long size;
double modificationTime;
if (isFile()) {
toFile(this)->captureSnapshot(size, modificationTime);
} else {
ASSERT(m_size != -1);
size = m_size;
}
if (start < 0)
start = start + size;
if (end < 0)
end = end + size;
if (start < 0)
start = 0;
if (end < 0)
end = 0;
if (start >= size) {
start = 0;
end = 0;
} else if (end < start)
end = start;
else if (end > size)
end = size;
long long length = end - start;
OwnPtr<BlobData> blobData = BlobData::create();
blobData->setContentType(contentType);
if (isFile()) {
if (!toFile(this)->fileSystemURL().isEmpty())
blobData->appendURL(toFile(this)->fileSystemURL(), start, length, modificationTime);
else
blobData->appendFile(toFile(this)->path(), start, length, modificationTime);
} else
blobData->appendBlob(m_internalURL, start, length);
return Blob::create(blobData.release(), length);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cryptd_hash_init(struct crypto_async_request *req_async, int err)
{
struct cryptd_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req_async->tfm);
struct crypto_shash *child = ctx->child;
struct ahash_request *req = ahash_request_cast(req_async);
struct cryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
struct shash_desc *desc = &rctx->desc;
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
desc->tfm = child;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::configureBitrate(
int32_t bitrate, OMX_VIDEO_CONTROLRATETYPE bitrateMode) {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE bitrateType;
InitOMXParams(&bitrateType);
bitrateType.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate,
&bitrateType, sizeof(bitrateType));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
bitrateType.eControlRate = bitrateMode;
bitrateType.nTargetBitrate = bitrate;
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate,
&bitrateType, sizeof(bitrateType));
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_array_it_dtor(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_it *iterator = (spl_array_it *)iter;
zend_user_it_invalidate_current(iter TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor((zval**)&iterator->intern.it.data);
efree(iterator);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t lbs_rdmac_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct lbs_private *priv = file->private_data;
ssize_t pos = 0;
int ret;
unsigned long addr = get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
char *buf = (char *)addr;
u32 val = 0;
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = lbs_get_reg(priv, CMD_MAC_REG_ACCESS, priv->mac_offset, &val);
mdelay(10);
if (!ret) {
pos = snprintf(buf, len, "MAC[0x%x] = 0x%08x\n",
priv->mac_offset, val);
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, buf, pos);
}
free_page(addr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize PaintLayerScrollableArea::PixelSnappedContentsSize(
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) const {
return PixelSnappedIntSize(overflow_rect_.Size(), paint_offset);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 21,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didStartProvisionalLoad(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
WebDataSource* ds = frame->provisionalDataSource();
if (!ds)
return;
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
CHECK((ds->request().url() != GURL(kSwappedOutURL)) ||
is_swapped_out_ ||
render_view_->is_swapped_out()) <<
"Heard swappedout:// when not swapped out.";
if (document_state->request_time().is_null()) {
double event_time = ds->triggeringEventTime();
if (event_time != 0.0)
document_state->set_request_time(Time::FromDoubleT(event_time));
}
document_state->set_start_load_time(Time::Now());
bool is_top_most = !frame->parent();
if (is_top_most) {
render_view_->set_navigation_gesture(
WebUserGestureIndicator::isProcessingUserGesture() ?
NavigationGestureUser : NavigationGestureAuto);
} else if (ds->replacesCurrentHistoryItem()) {
document_state->navigation_state()->set_transition_type(
PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_SUBFRAME);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidStartProvisionalLoad(frame));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, DidStartProvisionalLoad());
int parent_routing_id = frame->parent() ?
FromWebFrame(frame->parent())->GetRoutingID() : -1;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidStartProvisionalLoadForFrame(
routing_id_, parent_routing_id, ds->request().url()));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: G_DEFINE_TYPE (RSFilter, rs_filter, G_TYPE_OBJECT)
enum {
CHANGED_SIGNAL,
LAST_SIGNAL
};
Commit Message: Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 26,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner;
struct tty_struct *tty;
if (!dev) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
tty = dev->port.tty;
if (!tty || !skb_queue_empty(&dev->pending)) {
skb_queue_tail(&dev->pending, skb);
return;
}
BT_DBG("dlc %p tty %p len %d", dlc, tty, skb->len);
tty_insert_flip_string(tty, skb->data, skb->len);
tty_flip_buffer_push(tty);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlBufFree(xmlBufPtr buf) {
if (buf == NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG_BUFFER
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlBufFree: buf == NULL\n");
#endif
return;
}
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) &&
(buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
xmlFree(buf->contentIO);
} else if ((buf->content != NULL) &&
(buf->alloc != XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE)) {
xmlFree(buf->content);
}
xmlFree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 23,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_garp_lower_prio_rep_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
unsigned garp_lower_prio_rep;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &garp_lower_prio_rep, 0, INT_MAX, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): Invalid garp_lower_prio_repeat '%s'", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
vrrp->garp_lower_prio_rep = garp_lower_prio_rep;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 1,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_device_raster_chunky(const gx_device * dev, bool pad)
{
ulong bits = (ulong) dev->width * dev->color_info.depth;
ulong raster;
int l2align;
raster = (uint)((bits + 7) >> 3);
if (!pad)
return raster;
l2align = dev->log2_align_mod;
if (l2align < log2_align_bitmap_mod)
l2align = log2_align_bitmap_mod;
return (uint)(((bits + (8 << l2align) - 1) >> (l2align + 3)) << l2align);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 25,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
EnableDOMAutomation();
InProcessBrowserTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
if (!command_line->HasSwitch("enable-gpu")) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
CHECK(test_launcher_utils::OverrideGLImplementation(
command_line, gfx::kGLImplementationOSMesaName)) <<
"kUseGL must not be set by test framework code!";
#endif
}
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePopupBlocking);
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Compute_Point_Displacement( EXEC_OP_ FT_F26Dot6* x,
FT_F26Dot6* y,
TT_GlyphZone zone,
FT_UShort* refp )
{
TT_GlyphZoneRec zp;
FT_UShort p;
FT_F26Dot6 d;
if ( CUR.opcode & 1 )
{
zp = CUR.zp0;
p = CUR.GS.rp1;
}
else
{
zp = CUR.zp1;
p = CUR.GS.rp2;
}
if ( BOUNDS( p, zp.n_points ) )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
*refp = 0;
return FAILURE;
}
*zone = zp;
*refp = p;
d = CUR_Func_project( zp.cur + p, zp.org + p );
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_UNPATENTED_HINTING
if ( CUR.face->unpatented_hinting )
{
if ( CUR.GS.both_x_axis )
{
*x = d;
*y = 0;
}
else
{
*x = 0;
*y = d;
}
}
else
#endif
{
*x = TT_MULDIV( d,
(FT_Long)CUR.GS.freeVector.x * 0x10000L,
CUR.F_dot_P );
*y = TT_MULDIV( d,
(FT_Long)CUR.GS.freeVector.y * 0x10000L,
CUR.F_dot_P );
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::GenVertexArraysOESHelper(GLsizei n,
const GLuint* arrays) {
vertex_array_object_manager_->GenVertexArrays(n, arrays);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nl80211_valid_cipher_suite(u32 cipher)
{
return cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 ||
cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_SceneManager *gf_sm_new(GF_SceneGraph *graph)
{
GF_SceneManager *tmp;
if (!graph) return NULL;
GF_SAFEALLOC(tmp, GF_SceneManager);
if (!tmp) return NULL;
tmp->streams = gf_list_new();
tmp->scene_graph = graph;
return tmp;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::IsBrowsingInstanceSwapAllowedForPageTransition(
ui::PageTransition transition,
const GURL& dest_url) {
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())
return false;
if (dest_url.SchemeIsFile() || dest_url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme))
return false;
switch (ui::PageTransitionStripQualifier(transition)) {
case ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED:
case ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_BOOKMARK:
case ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED:
case ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_KEYWORD:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 19,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gtco_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
{
/* Grab private device ptr */
struct gtco *gtco = usb_get_intfdata(interface);
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
/* Now reverse all the registration stuff */
if (gtco) {
input_unregister_device(gtco->inputdevice);
usb_kill_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
usb_free_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
usb_free_coherent(udev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco->buffer, gtco->buf_dma);
kfree(gtco);
}
dev_info(&interface->dev, "gtco driver disconnected\n");
}
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix potential out-of-bound access
parse_hid_report_descriptor() has a while (i < length) loop, which
only guarantees that there's at least 1 byte in the buffer, but the
loop body can read multiple bytes which causes out-of-bounds access.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::AddNewContents(TabContents* source,
TabContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_pos,
bool user_gesture) {
DCHECK(disposition != SAVE_TO_DISK);
DCHECK(disposition != CURRENT_TAB);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (disposition == NEW_POPUP) {
GdkScreen* screen = gdk_screen_get_default();
int max_width = gdk_screen_get_width(screen) * kPopupMaxWidthFactor;
int max_height = gdk_screen_get_height(screen) * kPopupMaxHeightFactor;
if (initial_pos.width() > max_width || initial_pos.width() == 0 ||
initial_pos.height() > max_height || initial_pos.height() == 0) {
disposition = NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
}
}
#endif
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = new TabContentsWrapper(new_contents);
browser::NavigateParams params(this, wrapper);
params.source_contents =
tabstrip_model()->GetTabContentsAt(
tabstrip_model()->GetWrapperIndex(source));
params.disposition = disposition;
params.window_bounds = initial_pos;
params.show_window = true;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnSetVolume(int stream_id, double volume) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
AudioOutputDelegate* delegate = LookupById(stream_id);
if (!delegate) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
if (volume < 0 || volume > 1.0)
return;
delegate->OnSetVolume(volume);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ASCII85Encoder::~ASCII85Encoder() {
if (str->isEncoder())
delete str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_IDEF( INS_ARG )
{
if (CUR.countIDefs >= CUR.numIDefs || args[0] > 255)
CUR.error = TT_Err_Storage_Overflow;
else
{
PDefRecord pTDR;
CUR.IDefPtr[(Byte)(args[0])] = CUR.countIDefs;
pTDR = &CUR.IDefs[CUR.countIDefs++];
pTDR->Opc = (Byte)(args[0]);
pTDR->Start = CUR.IP + 1;
pTDR->Range = CUR.curRange;
pTDR->Active = TRUE;
skip_FDEF(EXEC_ARG);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType Huffman2DEncodeImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,Image *inject_image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*group4_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*group4;
status=MagickTrue;
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->filename,"GROUP4:",MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"GROUP4",MagickPathExtent);
group4_image=CloneImage(inject_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (group4_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
group4=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(write_info,group4_image,&length,
exception);
group4_image=DestroyImage(group4_image);
if (group4 == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (WriteBlob(image,length,group4) != (ssize_t) length)
status=MagickFalse;
group4=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(group4);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: polkit_backend_interactive_authority_enumerate_actions (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
PolkitSubject *caller,
const gchar *interactivee,
GError **error)
{
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *interactive_authority;
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthorityPrivate *priv;
GList *actions;
interactive_authority = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY (authority);
priv = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY_GET_PRIVATE (interactive_authority);
actions = polkit_backend_action_pool_get_all_actions (priv->action_pool, interactivee);
return actions;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void task_clock_event_update(struct perf_event *event, u64 now)
{
u64 prev;
s64 delta;
prev = local64_xchg(&event->hw.prev_count, now);
delta = now - prev;
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int feh_wm_get_num_desks(void)
{
char *buf, *ptr;
int desks;
if (!feh_wm_get_wm_is_e())
return(-1);
buf = enl_send_and_wait("num_desks ?");
if (buf == IPC_FAKE) /* Fake E17 IPC */
return(-1);
D(("Got from E IPC: %s\n", buf));
ptr = buf;
while (ptr && !isdigit(*ptr))
ptr++;
desks = atoi(ptr);
return(desks);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 13,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::getMySlotNumber( void )
{
char *logappend = param("STARTER_LOG");
char const *tmp = NULL;
int slot_number = 0; // default to 0, let our caller decide how to
if ( logappend ) {
char const *log_basename = condor_basename(logappend);
MyString prefix;
char* resource_prefix = param("STARTD_RESOURCE_PREFIX");
if( resource_prefix ) {
prefix.sprintf(".%s",resource_prefix);
free( resource_prefix );
}
else {
prefix = ".slot";
}
tmp = strstr(log_basename, prefix.Value());
if ( tmp ) {
prefix += "%d";
if ( sscanf(tmp, prefix.Value(), &slot_number) < 1 ) {
slot_number = 0;
}
}
free(logappend);
}
return slot_number;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 13,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 4,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct extent_buffer *btrfs_read_lock_root_node(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct extent_buffer *eb;
while (1) {
eb = btrfs_root_node(root);
btrfs_tree_read_lock(eb);
if (eb == root->node)
break;
btrfs_tree_read_unlock(eb);
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
return eb;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 22,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentClient::CanHandleWhileSwappedOut(
const IPC::Message& msg) {
switch (msg.type()) {
case ChromeViewHostMsg_Snapshot::ID:
return true;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_ghash (unsigned char *hsub, unsigned char *result, const unsigned char *buf)
{
unsigned long V[4];
int i, j;
byte *p;
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
p = result;
#else
unsigned long T[4];
cipher_block_xor (V, result, buf, 16);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
V[i] = (V[i] & 0x00ff00ff) << 8 | (V[i] & 0xff00ff00) >> 8;
V[i] = (V[i] & 0x0000ffff) << 16 | (V[i] & 0xffff0000) >> 16;
}
p = (byte *) T;
#endif
memset (p, 0, 16);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
for (j = 0x80; j; j >>= 1)
{
if (hsub[i] & j)
cipher_block_xor (p, p, V, 16);
if (bshift (V))
V[0] ^= 0xe1000000;
}
}
#ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
for (i = 0, p = (byte *) T; i < 16; i += 4, p += 4)
{
result[i + 0] = p[3];
result[i + 1] = p[2];
result[i + 2] = p[1];
result[i + 3] = p[0];
}
#endif
return (sizeof(V) + sizeof(T) + sizeof(int)*2 + sizeof(void*)*5);
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 24,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppListControllerDelegateImpl::ShouldShowUserIcon() {
return g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetNumberOfProfiles() > 1;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RegisterChromeDownloadDelegate(JNIEnv* env) {
return RegisterNativesImpl(env);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void efx_remove_tx_queue(struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue)
{
if (!tx_queue->buffer)
return;
netif_dbg(tx_queue->efx, drv, tx_queue->efx->net_dev,
"destroying TX queue %d\n", tx_queue->queue);
efx_nic_remove_tx(tx_queue);
kfree(tx_queue->buffer);
tx_queue->buffer = NULL;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 18,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_urlpos (struct urlpos *l)
{
while (l)
{
struct urlpos *next = l->next;
if (l->url)
url_free (l->url);
xfree (l->local_name);
xfree (l);
l = next;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_perf_sw_event(enum perf_type_id type, u32 event_id,
u64 nr,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = this_cpu_ptr(&swevent_htable);
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
head = find_swevent_head_rcu(swhash, type, event_id);
if (!head)
goto end;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_swevent_match(event, type, event_id, data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, nr, data, regs);
}
end:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MemoryInfo* Performance::memory() const {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform1iv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleInt32ArrayView& v) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform1iv(location, v);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags)
{
int r;
flags &= ~(CMS_DETACHED | CMS_TEXT);
r = CMS_verify(rcms, certs, store, NULL, NULL, flags);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
return cms_Receipt_verify(rcms, ocms);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 17,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AwContents::SmoothScroll(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jint target_x,
jint target_y,
jlong duration_ms) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
float scale = browser_view_renderer_.dip_scale() *
browser_view_renderer_.page_scale_factor();
render_view_host_ext_->SmoothScroll(target_x / scale, target_y / scale,
duration_ms);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::StringPiece TestContentClient::GetDataResource(int resource_id) const {
base::StringPiece resource;
data_pack_.GetStringPiece(resource_id, &resource);
return resource;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS parse_thumb_note (int base, unsigned toff, unsigned tlen)
{
unsigned entries, tag, type, len, save;
entries = get2();
while (entries--) {
tiff_get (base, &tag, &type, &len, &save);
if (tag == toff) thumb_offset = get4()+base;
if (tag == tlen) thumb_length = get4();
fseek (ifp, save, SEEK_SET);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xenvif_down(struct xenvif *vif)
{
disable_irq(vif->irq);
xen_netbk_deschedule_xenvif(vif);
xen_netbk_remove_xenvif(vif);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int inet_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(in_skb->sk);
struct nlattr *tb[NETCONFA_MAX+1];
struct netconfmsg *ncm;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ipv4_devconf *devconf;
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct net_device *dev;
int ifindex;
int err;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ncm), tb, NETCONFA_MAX,
devconf_ipv4_policy);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
ifindex = nla_get_s32(tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX]);
switch (ifindex) {
case NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL:
devconf = net->ipv4.devconf_all;
break;
case NETCONFA_IFINDEX_DEFAULT:
devconf = net->ipv4.devconf_dflt;
break;
default:
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex);
if (!dev)
goto errout;
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rtnl(dev);
if (!in_dev)
goto errout;
devconf = &in_dev->cnf;
break;
}
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(inet_netconf_msgsize_devconf(NETCONFA_ALL), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto errout;
err = inet_netconf_fill_devconf(skb, ifindex, devconf,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWNETCONF, 0,
NETCONFA_ALL);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in inet_netconf_msgsize_devconf() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
err = rtnl_unicast(skb, net, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid);
errout:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_free_slabs(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(odstate_slab);
kmem_cache_destroy(openowner_slab);
kmem_cache_destroy(lockowner_slab);
kmem_cache_destroy(file_slab);
kmem_cache_destroy(stateid_slab);
kmem_cache_destroy(deleg_slab);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 28,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MSLReference(void *context,const xmlChar *name)
{
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
xmlParserCtxtPtr
parser;
/*
Called when an entity reference is detected.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" SAX.reference(%s)",name);
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
parser=msl_info->parser;
if (*name == '#')
(void) xmlAddChild(parser->node,xmlNewCharRef(msl_info->document,name));
else
(void) xmlAddChild(parser->node,xmlNewReference(msl_info->document,name));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init fscrypt_init(void)
{
fscrypt_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fscrypt_read_queue",
WQ_HIGHPRI, 0);
if (!fscrypt_read_workqueue)
goto fail;
fscrypt_ctx_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fscrypt_ctx, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
if (!fscrypt_ctx_cachep)
goto fail_free_queue;
fscrypt_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fscrypt_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
if (!fscrypt_info_cachep)
goto fail_free_ctx;
return 0;
fail_free_ctx:
kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
fail_free_queue:
destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
fail:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
s->init_num);
if (ret < 0) return(-1);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold int dct_init(MpegEncContext *s)
{
ff_blockdsp_init(&s->bdsp, s->avctx);
ff_h264chroma_init(&s->h264chroma, 8); //for lowres
ff_hpeldsp_init(&s->hdsp, s->avctx->flags);
ff_mpegvideodsp_init(&s->mdsp);
ff_videodsp_init(&s->vdsp, s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample);
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_NOMC) {
int i;
for (i=0; i<4; i++) {
s->hdsp.avg_pixels_tab[0][i] = gray16;
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[0][i] = gray16;
s->hdsp.put_no_rnd_pixels_tab[0][i] = gray16;
s->hdsp.avg_pixels_tab[1][i] = gray8;
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[1][i] = gray8;
s->hdsp.put_no_rnd_pixels_tab[1][i] = gray8;
}
}
s->dct_unquantize_h263_intra = dct_unquantize_h263_intra_c;
s->dct_unquantize_h263_inter = dct_unquantize_h263_inter_c;
s->dct_unquantize_mpeg1_intra = dct_unquantize_mpeg1_intra_c;
s->dct_unquantize_mpeg1_inter = dct_unquantize_mpeg1_inter_c;
s->dct_unquantize_mpeg2_intra = dct_unquantize_mpeg2_intra_c;
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_BITEXACT)
s->dct_unquantize_mpeg2_intra = dct_unquantize_mpeg2_intra_bitexact;
s->dct_unquantize_mpeg2_inter = dct_unquantize_mpeg2_inter_c;
if (HAVE_INTRINSICS_NEON)
ff_mpv_common_init_neon(s);
if (ARCH_ALPHA)
ff_mpv_common_init_axp(s);
if (ARCH_ARM)
ff_mpv_common_init_arm(s);
if (ARCH_PPC)
ff_mpv_common_init_ppc(s);
if (ARCH_X86)
ff_mpv_common_init_x86(s);
if (ARCH_MIPS)
ff_mpv_common_init_mips(s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_dev_loopback_xmit(struct sk_buff *newskb)
{
skb_reset_mac_header(newskb);
__skb_pull(newskb, skb_network_offset(newskb));
newskb->pkt_type = PACKET_LOOPBACK;
newskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
WARN_ON(!skb_dst(newskb));
netif_rx_ni(newskb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 20,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t fuse_direct_io(struct fuse_io_priv *io, struct iov_iter *iter,
loff_t *ppos, int flags)
{
int write = flags & FUSE_DIO_WRITE;
int cuse = flags & FUSE_DIO_CUSE;
struct file *file = io->file;
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
size_t nmax = write ? fc->max_write : fc->max_read;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
pgoff_t idx_from = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
pgoff_t idx_to = (pos + count - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
ssize_t res = 0;
struct fuse_req *req;
if (io->async)
req = fuse_get_req_for_background(fc, fuse_iter_npages(iter));
else
req = fuse_get_req(fc, fuse_iter_npages(iter));
if (IS_ERR(req))
return PTR_ERR(req);
if (!cuse && fuse_range_is_writeback(inode, idx_from, idx_to)) {
if (!write)
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
fuse_sync_writes(inode);
if (!write)
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
while (count) {
size_t nres;
fl_owner_t owner = current->files;
size_t nbytes = min(count, nmax);
int err = fuse_get_user_pages(req, iter, &nbytes, write);
if (err) {
res = err;
break;
}
if (write)
nres = fuse_send_write(req, io, pos, nbytes, owner);
else
nres = fuse_send_read(req, io, pos, nbytes, owner);
if (!io->async)
fuse_release_user_pages(req, !write);
if (req->out.h.error) {
if (!res)
res = req->out.h.error;
break;
} else if (nres > nbytes) {
res = -EIO;
break;
}
count -= nres;
res += nres;
pos += nres;
if (nres != nbytes)
break;
if (count) {
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
if (io->async)
req = fuse_get_req_for_background(fc,
fuse_iter_npages(iter));
else
req = fuse_get_req(fc, fuse_iter_npages(iter));
if (IS_ERR(req))
break;
}
}
if (!IS_ERR(req))
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
if (res > 0)
*ppos = pos;
return res;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRtcAudioRenderer::SetVolume(float volume) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == UNINITIALIZED)
return;
sink_->SetVolume(volume);
}
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IRCView::append(const QString& nick, const QString& message)
{
QString channelColor = Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::ChannelMessage).name();
m_tabNotification = Konversation::tnfNormal;
QString nickLine = createNickLine(nick, channelColor);
QChar::Direction dir;
QString text(filter(message, channelColor, nick, true, true, false, &dir));
QString line;
bool rtl = (dir == QChar::DirR);
if(rtl)
{
line = RLE;
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + channelColor + "\">" + nickLine +" %1" + PDF + RLM + " %3</font>";
}
else
{
if (!QApplication::isLeftToRight())
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + channelColor + "\">%1" + nickLine + " %3</font>";
}
line = line.arg(timeStamp(), nick, text);
emit textToLog(QString("<%1>\t%2").arg(nick, message));
doAppend(line, rtl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void LOAD_OP(int I, u32 *W, const u8 *input)
{
W[I] = get_unaligned_be32((__u32 *)input + I);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sadb_msg *pfkey_get_base_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, int *errp)
{
struct sadb_msg *hdr = NULL;
if (skb->len < sizeof(*hdr)) {
*errp = -EMSGSIZE;
} else {
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb->data;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_version != PF_KEY_V2 ||
hdr->sadb_msg_reserved != 0 ||
(hdr->sadb_msg_type <= SADB_RESERVED ||
hdr->sadb_msg_type > SADB_MAX)) {
hdr = NULL;
*errp = -EINVAL;
} else if (hdr->sadb_msg_len != (skb->len /
sizeof(uint64_t)) ||
hdr->sadb_msg_len < (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) /
sizeof(uint64_t))) {
hdr = NULL;
*errp = -EMSGSIZE;
} else {
*errp = 0;
}
}
return hdr;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CCLayerTreeHostTestCommitingWithContinuousRedraw()
: m_numCompleteCommits(0)
, m_numDraws(0)
{
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePTIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*images,
*next,
*pyramid_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
resolution;
size_t
columns,
rows;
/*
Create pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
exception=(&image->exception);
images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
AppendImageToList(&images,clone_image);
columns=next->columns;
rows=next->rows;
resolution.x=next->x_resolution;
resolution.y=next->y_resolution;
while ((columns > 64) && (rows > 64))
{
columns/=2;
rows/=2;
resolution.x/=2.0;
resolution.y/=2.0;
pyramid_image=ResizeImage(next,columns,rows,image->filter,image->blur,
exception);
if (pyramid_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
pyramid_image->x_resolution=resolution.x;
pyramid_image->y_resolution=resolution.y;
AppendImageToList(&images,pyramid_image);
}
}
/*
Write pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
write_info->adjoin=MagickTrue;
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,GetFirstImageInList(images));
images=DestroyImageList(images);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PerformSelectAll() {
const base::string16 expected_title =
base::UTF8ToUTF16("SELECTION_CHANGED");
content::TitleWatcher title_watcher(shell()->web_contents(),
expected_title);
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(interstitial_->GetMainFrame());
rfh->GetRenderWidgetHost()->delegate()->SelectAll();
EXPECT_EQ(expected_title, title_watcher.WaitAndGetTitle());
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<IMediaSource> AMRExtractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
if (mInitCheck != OK || index != 0) {
return NULL;
}
return new AMRSource(mDataSource, mMeta, mIsWide,
mOffsetTable, mOffsetTableLength);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 9,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int android_net_wifi_getInterfaces(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls) {
int n = 0;
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_handle halHandle = getWifiHandle(helper, cls);
wifi_interface_handle *ifaceHandles = NULL;
int result = hal_fn.wifi_get_ifaces(halHandle, &n, &ifaceHandles);
if (result < 0) {
return result;
}
if (n < 0) {
THROW(helper,"android_net_wifi_getInterfaces no interfaces");
return 0;
}
if (ifaceHandles == NULL) {
THROW(helper,"android_net_wifi_getInterfaces null interface array");
return 0;
}
if (n > 8) {
THROW(helper,"Too many interfaces");
return 0;
}
jlongArray array = (env)->NewLongArray(n);
if (array == NULL) {
THROW(helper,"Error in accessing array");
return 0;
}
jlong elems[8];
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
elems[i] = reinterpret_cast<jlong>(ifaceHandles[i]);
}
helper.setLongArrayRegion(array, 0, n, elems);
helper.setStaticLongArrayField(cls, WifiIfaceHandleVarName, array);
return (result < 0) ? result : n;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPage::isDNSPrefetchEnabled() const
{
return d->m_page->settings()->dnsPrefetchingEnabled();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Decimal InputType::FindStepBase(const Decimal& default_value) const {
Decimal step_base =
ParseToNumber(GetElement().FastGetAttribute(minAttr), Decimal::Nan());
if (!step_base.IsFinite())
step_base =
ParseToNumber(GetElement().FastGetAttribute(valueAttr), default_value);
return step_base;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SystemClipboard::WriteImage(Image* image,
const KURL& url,
const String& title) {
DCHECK(image);
PaintImage paint_image = image->PaintImageForCurrentFrame();
SkBitmap bitmap;
if (sk_sp<SkImage> sk_image = paint_image.GetSkImage())
sk_image->asLegacyBitmap(&bitmap);
if (bitmap.isNull())
return;
if (!bitmap.getPixels())
return;
clipboard_->WriteImage(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard, bitmap);
if (url.IsValid() && !url.IsEmpty()) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
clipboard_->WriteBookmark(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
url.GetString(), NonNullString(title));
#endif
clipboard_->WriteHtml(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
URLToImageMarkup(url, title), KURL());
}
clipboard_->CommitWrite(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
}
Commit Message: System Clipboard: Remove extraneous check for bitmap.getPixels()
Bug 369621 originally led to this check being introduced via
https://codereview.chromium.org/289573002/patch/40001/50002, but after
https://crrev.com/c/1345809, I'm not sure that it's still necessary.
This change succeeds when tested against the "minimized test case" provided in
crbug.com/369621 's description, but I'm unsure how to make the minimized test
case fail, so this doesn't prove that the change would succeed against the
fuzzer's test case (which originally filed the bug).
As I'm unable to view the relevant fuzzer test case, (see crbug.com/918705),
I don't know exactly what may have caused the fuzzer to fail. Therefore,
I've added a CHECK for the time being, so that we will be notified in canary
if my assumption was incorrect.
Bug: 369621
Change-Id: Ie9b47a4b38ba1ed47624de776015728e541d27f7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1393436
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#619591}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 13,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PasswordAutofillAgent::IsUsernameOrPasswordField(
const WebInputElement& element) {
if (element.IsPasswordFieldForAutofill())
return true;
if (AutocompleteFlagForElement(element) == AutocompleteFlag::USERNAME)
return true;
std::unique_ptr<PasswordForm> password_form;
if (element.Form().IsNull()) {
DCHECK_EQ(element.GetDocument().GetFrame(), render_frame()->GetWebFrame());
password_form = GetPasswordFormFromUnownedInputElements();
} else {
password_form = GetPasswordFormFromWebForm(element.Form());
}
if (!password_form)
return false;
return (password_form->username_element == element.NameForAutofill().Utf16());
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_proc_lookup(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *name, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
int status;
struct nfs4_lookup_arg args = {
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
.dir_fh = NFS_FH(dir),
.name = name,
};
struct nfs4_lookup_res res = {
.server = server,
.fattr = fattr,
.fh = fhandle,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOOKUP],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
nfs_fattr_init(fattr);
dprintk("NFS call lookup %s\n", name->name);
status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
dprintk("NFS reply lookup: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* PageInfoBubbleView::CreateSiteSettingsView(int side_margin) {
views::View* site_settings_view = new views::View();
views::BoxLayout* box_layout = new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kVertical, gfx::Insets(0, side_margin),
ChromeLayoutProvider::Get()->GetDistanceMetric(
DISTANCE_CONTROL_LIST_VERTICAL));
site_settings_view->SetLayoutManager(box_layout);
box_layout->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CROSS_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_STRETCH);
return site_settings_view;
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 28,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashPath *Splash::makeDashedPath(SplashPath *path) {
SplashPath *dPath;
SplashCoord lineDashTotal;
SplashCoord lineDashStartPhase, lineDashDist, segLen;
SplashCoord x0, y0, x1, y1, xa, ya;
GBool lineDashStartOn, lineDashOn, newPath;
int lineDashStartIdx, lineDashIdx;
int i, j, k;
lineDashTotal = 0;
for (i = 0; i < state->lineDashLength; ++i) {
lineDashTotal += state->lineDash[i];
}
if (lineDashTotal == 0) {
return new SplashPath();
}
lineDashStartPhase = state->lineDashPhase;
i = splashFloor(lineDashStartPhase / lineDashTotal);
lineDashStartPhase -= (SplashCoord)i * lineDashTotal;
lineDashStartOn = gTrue;
lineDashStartIdx = 0;
if (lineDashStartPhase > 0) {
while (lineDashStartPhase >= state->lineDash[lineDashStartIdx]) {
lineDashStartOn = !lineDashStartOn;
lineDashStartPhase -= state->lineDash[lineDashStartIdx];
++lineDashStartIdx;
}
}
dPath = new SplashPath();
i = 0;
while (i < path->length) {
for (j = i;
j < path->length - 1 && !(path->flags[j] & splashPathLast);
++j) ;
lineDashOn = lineDashStartOn;
lineDashIdx = lineDashStartIdx;
lineDashDist = state->lineDash[lineDashIdx] - lineDashStartPhase;
newPath = gTrue;
for (k = i; k < j; ++k) {
x0 = path->pts[k].x;
y0 = path->pts[k].y;
x1 = path->pts[k+1].x;
y1 = path->pts[k+1].y;
segLen = splashDist(x0, y0, x1, y1);
while (segLen > 0) {
if (lineDashDist >= segLen) {
if (lineDashOn) {
if (newPath) {
dPath->moveTo(x0, y0);
newPath = gFalse;
}
dPath->lineTo(x1, y1);
}
lineDashDist -= segLen;
segLen = 0;
} else {
xa = x0 + (lineDashDist / segLen) * (x1 - x0);
ya = y0 + (lineDashDist / segLen) * (y1 - y0);
if (lineDashOn) {
if (newPath) {
dPath->moveTo(x0, y0);
newPath = gFalse;
}
dPath->lineTo(xa, ya);
}
x0 = xa;
y0 = ya;
segLen -= lineDashDist;
lineDashDist = 0;
}
if (lineDashDist <= 0) {
lineDashOn = !lineDashOn;
if (++lineDashIdx == state->lineDashLength) {
lineDashIdx = 0;
}
lineDashDist = state->lineDash[lineDashIdx];
newPath = gTrue;
}
}
}
i = j + 1;
}
if (dPath->length == 0) {
GBool allSame = gTrue;
for (int i = 0; allSame && i < path->length - 1; ++i) {
allSame = path->pts[i].x == path->pts[i + 1].x && path->pts[i].y == path->pts[i + 1].y;
}
if (allSame) {
x0 = path->pts[0].x;
y0 = path->pts[0].y;
dPath->moveTo(x0, y0);
dPath->lineTo(x0, y0);
}
}
return dPath;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Segment::DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(m_pos < 0);
assert(m_pUnknownSize);
#if 0
assert(m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize() < 0); //TODO: verify this
const long long element_start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
pos = -m_pos;
assert(pos > element_start);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long element_size = -1;
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
element_size = total - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
element_size = segment_stop - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) //Cluster ID or Cues ID
{
element_size = pos - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
#endif
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
assert(element_size >= 0);
m_pos = element_start + element_size;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#else
const long status = m_pUnknownSize->Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
return status;
if (status == 0) //parsed a block
return 2; //continue parsing
assert(status > 0); //nothing left to parse of this cluster
const long long start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
const long long size = m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize();
assert(size >= 0);
pos = start + size;
m_pos = pos;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#endif
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 9,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::Play() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreateEvent(media::MediaLogEvent::PLAY));
if (!paused_)
return;
if (video_frame_provider_)
video_frame_provider_->Resume();
compositor_->StartRendering();
if (audio_renderer_)
audio_renderer_->Play();
if (HasVideo())
delegate_->DidPlayerSizeChange(delegate_id_, NaturalSize());
if (HasAudio() || HasVideo()) {
delegate_->DidPlay(delegate_id_, HasVideo(), HasAudio(),
media::MediaContentType::OneShot);
}
delegate_->SetIdle(delegate_id_, false);
paused_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 26,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iasecc_se_get_info()
{
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 20,870
|
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