instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 235k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: RenderView* RenderView::FromWebView(WebKit::WebView* webview) {
return RenderViewImpl::FromWebView(webview);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int sctp_send_asconf_del_ip(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addrs,
int addrcnt)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
union sctp_addr *laddr;
void *addr_buf;
struct sctp_af *af;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *saddr;
int i;
int retval = 0;
int stored = 0;
chunk = NULL;
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
return retval;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, addrs:%p, addrcnt:%d\n",
__func__, sk, addrs, addrcnt);
list_for_each_entry(asoc, &ep->asocs, asocs) {
if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable)
continue;
if (asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask & SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP)
continue;
if (!sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED))
continue;
/* Check if any address in the packed array of addresses is
* not present in the bind address list of the association.
* If so, do not send the asconf chunk to its peer, but
* continue with other associations.
*/
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
laddr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(laddr->v4.sin_family);
if (!af) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, laddr))
break;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
if (i < addrcnt)
continue;
/* Find one address in the association's bind address list
* that is not in the packed array of addresses. This is to
* make sure that we do not delete all the addresses in the
* association.
*/
bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
laddr = sctp_find_unmatch_addr(bp, (union sctp_addr *)addrs,
addrcnt, sp);
if ((laddr == NULL) && (addrcnt == 1)) {
if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending)
continue;
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending =
kzalloc(sizeof(union sctp_addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending == NULL) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending->sa.sa_family =
addrs->sa_family;
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending->v4.sin_port =
htons(bp->port);
if (addrs->sa_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)addrs;
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending->v4.sin_addr.s_addr = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
} else if (addrs->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addrs;
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending->v6.sin6_addr = sin6->sin6_addr;
}
pr_debug("%s: keep the last address asoc:%p %pISc at %p\n",
__func__, asoc, &asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending->sa,
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending);
asoc->src_out_of_asoc_ok = 1;
stored = 1;
goto skip_mkasconf;
}
if (laddr == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/* We do not need RCU protection throughout this loop
* because this is done under a socket lock from the
* setsockopt call.
*/
chunk = sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(asoc, laddr, addrs, addrcnt,
SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP);
if (!chunk) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
skip_mkasconf:
/* Reset use_as_src flag for the addresses in the bind address
* list that are to be deleted.
*/
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
laddr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(laddr->v4.sin_family);
list_for_each_entry(saddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&saddr->a, laddr))
saddr->state = SCTP_ADDR_DEL;
}
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
/* Update the route and saddr entries for all the transports
* as some of the addresses in the bind address list are
* about to be deleted and cannot be used as source addresses.
*/
list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
dst_release(transport->dst);
sctp_transport_route(transport, NULL,
sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk));
}
if (stored)
/* We don't need to transmit ASCONF */
continue;
retval = sctp_send_asconf(asoc, chunk);
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_open_confirm(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_open_confirmargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 0,
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_open_confirm(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ExpectUpgrade(const char* input, const char* expected) {
ExpectUpgrade(input, WebURLRequest::kRequestContextScript,
WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeNone, expected);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::WidgetRestored() {
DCHECK_EQ(backgrounded_, (visible_widgets_ == 0));
visible_widgets_++;
SetBackgrounded(false);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: CURLcode Curl_protocol_doing(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
if(conn && conn->handler->doing) {
*done = FALSE;
result = conn->handler->doing(conn, done);
}
else
*done = TRUE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost(
WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
current_lock_(NULL) {
provider_.reset(ScreenOrientationProvider::Create(this, web_contents));
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetCaretBounds() {
const gfx::Rect rect =
gfx::UnionRects(selection_start_rect_, selection_end_rect_);
return ConvertRectToScreen(rect);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: png_process_IDAT_data(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep buffer,
png_size_t buffer_length)
{
/* The caller checks for a non-zero buffer length. */
if (!(buffer_length > 0) || buffer == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "No IDAT data (internal error)");
/* This routine must process all the data it has been given
* before returning, calling the row callback as required to
* handle the uncompressed results.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = buffer;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = (uInt)buffer_length;
/* Keep going until the decompressed data is all processed
* or the stream marked as finished.
*/
while (png_ptr->zstream.avail_in > 0 &&
!(png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED))
{
int ret;
/* We have data for zlib, but we must check that zlib
* has somewhere to put the results. It doesn't matter
* if we don't expect any results -- it may be the input
* data is just the LZ end code.
*/
if (!(png_ptr->zstream.avail_out > 0))
{
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out =
(uInt) PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth,
png_ptr->iwidth) + 1;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->row_buf;
}
/* Using Z_SYNC_FLUSH here means that an unterminated
* LZ stream can still be handled (a stream with a missing
* end code), otherwise (Z_NO_FLUSH) a future zlib
* implementation might defer output and, therefore,
* change the current behavior. (See comments in inflate.c
* for why this doesn't happen at present with zlib 1.2.5.)
*/
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
/* Check for any failure before proceeding. */
if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END)
{
/* Terminate the decompression. */
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED;
/* This may be a truncated stream (missing or
* damaged end code). Treat that as a warning.
*/
if (png_ptr->row_number >= png_ptr->num_rows ||
png_ptr->pass > 6)
png_warning(png_ptr, "Truncated compressed data in IDAT");
else
png_error(png_ptr, "Decompression error in IDAT");
/* Skip the check on unprocessed input */
return;
}
/* Did inflate output any data? */
if (png_ptr->zstream.next_out != png_ptr->row_buf)
{
/* Is this unexpected data after the last row?
* If it is, artificially terminate the LZ output
* here.
*/
if (png_ptr->row_number >= png_ptr->num_rows ||
png_ptr->pass > 6)
{
/* Extra data. */
png_warning(png_ptr, "Extra compressed data in IDAT");
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED;
/* Do no more processing; skip the unprocessed
* input check below.
*/
return;
}
/* Do we have a complete row? */
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out == 0)
png_push_process_row(png_ptr);
}
/* And check for the end of the stream. */
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED;
}
/* All the data should have been processed, if anything
* is left at this point we have bytes of IDAT data
* after the zlib end code.
*/
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_in > 0)
png_warning(png_ptr, "Extra compression data");
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int bnep_rx_extension(struct bnep_session *s, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct bnep_ext_hdr *h;
int err = 0;
do {
h = (void *) skb->data;
if (!skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*h))) {
err = -EILSEQ;
break;
}
BT_DBG("type 0x%x len %d", h->type, h->len);
switch (h->type & BNEP_TYPE_MASK) {
case BNEP_EXT_CONTROL:
bnep_rx_control(s, skb->data, skb->len);
break;
default:
/* Unknown extension, skip it. */
break;
}
if (!skb_pull(skb, h->len)) {
err = -EILSEQ;
break;
}
} while (!err && (h->type & BNEP_EXT_HEADER));
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: _dbus_lookup_launchd_socket (DBusString *socket_path,
const char *launchd_env_var,
DBusError *error)
{
#ifdef DBUS_ENABLE_LAUNCHD
char *argv[4];
int i;
_DBUS_ASSERT_ERROR_IS_CLEAR (error);
if (_dbus_check_setuid ())
{
dbus_set_error_const (error, DBUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"Unable to find launchd socket when setuid");
return FALSE;
}
i = 0;
argv[i] = "launchctl";
++i;
argv[i] = "getenv";
++i;
argv[i] = (char*)launchd_env_var;
++i;
argv[i] = NULL;
++i;
_dbus_assert (i == _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (argv));
if (!_read_subprocess_line_argv(argv[0], TRUE, argv, socket_path, error))
{
return FALSE;
}
/* no error, but no result either */
if (_dbus_string_get_length(socket_path) == 0)
{
return FALSE;
}
/* strip the carriage-return */
_dbus_string_shorten(socket_path, 1);
return TRUE;
#else /* DBUS_ENABLE_LAUNCHD */
dbus_set_error(error, DBUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"can't lookup socket from launchd; launchd support not compiled in");
return FALSE;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: intel_pebs_constraints(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct event_constraint *c;
if (!event->attr.precise_ip)
return NULL;
if (x86_pmu.pebs_constraints) {
for_each_event_constraint(c, x86_pmu.pebs_constraints) {
if ((event->hw.config & c->cmask) == c->code)
return c;
}
}
return &emptyconstraint;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static bool tcp_ecn_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
if (th->ece && !th->syn && (tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void mpol_relative_nodemask(nodemask_t *ret, const nodemask_t *orig,
const nodemask_t *rel)
{
nodemask_t tmp;
nodes_fold(tmp, *orig, nodes_weight(*rel));
nodes_onto(*ret, tmp, *rel);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::canBeSuccessfulSubmitButton() const
{
return m_inputType->canBeSuccessfulSubmitButton();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: my_snprintf( char* str, size_t size, const char* format, ... )
{
va_list ap;
int r;
va_start( ap, format );
#ifdef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
r = vsnprintf( str, size, format, ap );
#else /* HAVE_VSNPRINTF */
r = vsprintf( str, format, ap );
#endif /* HAVE_VSNPRINTF */
va_end( ap );
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool Browser::CanDuplicateContentsAt(int index) {
NavigationController& nc = GetTabContentsAt(index)->controller();
return nc.tab_contents() && nc.GetLastCommittedEntry();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(content::WebContents* contents) {
DevToolsWindow* window =
DevToolsWindow::GetInstanceForInspectedRenderViewHost(
contents->GetRenderViewHost());
if (!window || window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_)
return false;
window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_ = true;
if (!DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(window->web_contents())) {
window->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: png_set_rgb_to_gray(png_structp png_ptr, int error_action, double red,
double green)
{
int red_fixed, green_fixed;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (red > 21474.83647 || red < -21474.83648 ||
green > 21474.83647 || green < -21474.83648)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "ignoring out of range rgb_to_gray coefficients");
red_fixed = -1;
green_fixed = -1;
}
else
{
red_fixed = (int)((float)red*100000.0 + 0.5);
green_fixed = (int)((float)green*100000.0 + 0.5);
}
png_set_rgb_to_gray_fixed(png_ptr, error_action, red_fixed, green_fixed);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Profile* GetStartupProfile(const base::FilePath& user_data_dir,
const base::CommandLine& command_line) {
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
base::FilePath profile_path =
GetStartupProfilePath(user_data_dir, command_line);
Profile* profile = profile_manager->GetProfile(profile_path);
auto* storage = &profile_manager->GetProfileAttributesStorage();
ProfileAttributesEntry* entry;
bool has_entry = storage->GetProfileAttributesWithPath(profile_path, &entry);
if (has_entry && (!entry->IsSigninRequired() || !profile)) {
return profile;
}
return profile_manager->GetProfile(ProfileManager::GetSystemProfilePath()) ?
profile_manager->GetProfile(ProfileManager::GetGuestProfilePath()) :
nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 137,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int behavior)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
int error = 0;
pgoff_t pgoff;
unsigned long new_flags = vma->vm_flags;
switch (behavior) {
case MADV_NORMAL:
new_flags = new_flags & ~VM_RAND_READ & ~VM_SEQ_READ;
break;
case MADV_SEQUENTIAL:
new_flags = (new_flags & ~VM_RAND_READ) | VM_SEQ_READ;
break;
case MADV_RANDOM:
new_flags = (new_flags & ~VM_SEQ_READ) | VM_RAND_READ;
break;
case MADV_DONTFORK:
new_flags |= VM_DONTCOPY;
break;
case MADV_DOFORK:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_IO) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
new_flags &= ~VM_DONTCOPY;
break;
case MADV_WIPEONFORK:
/* MADV_WIPEONFORK is only supported on anonymous memory. */
if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
new_flags |= VM_WIPEONFORK;
break;
case MADV_KEEPONFORK:
new_flags &= ~VM_WIPEONFORK;
break;
case MADV_DONTDUMP:
new_flags |= VM_DONTDUMP;
break;
case MADV_DODUMP:
if (new_flags & VM_SPECIAL) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
new_flags &= ~VM_DONTDUMP;
break;
case MADV_MERGEABLE:
case MADV_UNMERGEABLE:
error = ksm_madvise(vma, start, end, behavior, &new_flags);
if (error) {
/*
* madvise() returns EAGAIN if kernel resources, such as
* slab, are temporarily unavailable.
*/
if (error == -ENOMEM)
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
break;
case MADV_HUGEPAGE:
case MADV_NOHUGEPAGE:
error = hugepage_madvise(vma, &new_flags, behavior);
if (error) {
/*
* madvise() returns EAGAIN if kernel resources, such as
* slab, are temporarily unavailable.
*/
if (error == -ENOMEM)
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (new_flags == vma->vm_flags) {
*prev = vma;
goto out;
}
pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
*prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, new_flags, vma->anon_vma,
vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
if (*prev) {
vma = *prev;
goto success;
}
*prev = vma;
if (start != vma->vm_start) {
if (unlikely(mm->map_count >= sysctl_max_map_count)) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
error = __split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (error) {
/*
* madvise() returns EAGAIN if kernel resources, such as
* slab, are temporarily unavailable.
*/
if (error == -ENOMEM)
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
}
if (end != vma->vm_end) {
if (unlikely(mm->map_count >= sysctl_max_map_count)) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
error = __split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (error) {
/*
* madvise() returns EAGAIN if kernel resources, such as
* slab, are temporarily unavailable.
*/
if (error == -ENOMEM)
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
}
success:
/*
* vm_flags is protected by the mmap_sem held in write mode.
*/
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[mhocko@suse.com: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127115318.911-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 85,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void SimulateMouseClick(RenderWidgetHost* rwh, int x, int y) {
blink::WebMouseEvent mouse_event(
blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown, blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
blink::WebInputEvent::GetStaticTimeStampForTests());
mouse_event.button = blink::WebPointerProperties::Button::kLeft;
mouse_event.SetPositionInWidget(x, y);
rwh->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::MultiDrawArraysWEBGLHelper(GLenum mode,
const GLint* firsts,
const GLsizei* counts,
GLsizei drawcount) {
DCHECK_GT(drawcount, 0);
uint32_t buffer_size = ComputeCombinedCopySize(drawcount, firsts, counts);
ScopedTransferBufferPtr buffer(buffer_size, helper_, transfer_buffer_);
helper_->MultiDrawBeginCHROMIUM(drawcount);
auto DoMultiDraw = [&](const std::array<uint32_t, 2>& offsets, uint32_t,
uint32_t copy_count) {
helper_->MultiDrawArraysCHROMIUM(
mode, buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset() + offsets[0], buffer.shm_id(),
buffer.offset() + offsets[1], copy_count);
};
if (!TransferArraysAndExecute(drawcount, &buffer, DoMultiDraw, firsts,
counts)) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glMultiDrawArraysWEBGL", "out of memory");
}
helper_->MultiDrawEndCHROMIUM();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: sp<IOMXObserver> OMXNodeInstance::observer() {
return mObserver;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static bool vrend_is_timer_query(GLenum gltype)
{
return gltype == GL_TIMESTAMP ||
gltype == GL_TIME_ELAPSED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void __exit prng_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct dentry *lock_rename(struct dentry *p1, struct dentry *p2)
{
struct dentry *p;
if (p1 == p2) {
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
return NULL;
}
mutex_lock(&p1->d_sb->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
p = d_ancestor(p2, p1);
if (p) {
inode_lock_nested(p2->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_CHILD);
return p;
}
p = d_ancestor(p1, p2);
if (p) {
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(p2->d_inode, I_MUTEX_CHILD);
return p;
}
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(p2->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT2);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: js_Environment *jsR_newenvironment(js_State *J, js_Object *vars, js_Environment *outer)
{
js_Environment *E = js_malloc(J, sizeof *E);
E->gcmark = 0;
E->gcnext = J->gcenv;
J->gcenv = E;
++J->gccounter;
E->outer = outer;
E->variables = vars;
return E;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int mmc_ioctl(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct packet_command cgc;
void __user *userptr = (void __user *)arg;
memset(&cgc, 0, sizeof(cgc));
/* build a unified command and queue it through
cdo->generic_packet() */
switch (cmd) {
case CDROMREADRAW:
case CDROMREADMODE1:
case CDROMREADMODE2:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_read_data(cdi, userptr, &cgc, cmd);
case CDROMREADAUDIO:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_read_audio(cdi, userptr);
case CDROMSUBCHNL:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_subchannel(cdi, userptr);
case CDROMPLAYMSF:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_play_msf(cdi, userptr, &cgc);
case CDROMPLAYBLK:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_play_blk(cdi, userptr, &cgc);
case CDROMVOLCTRL:
case CDROMVOLREAD:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume(cdi, userptr, &cgc, cmd);
case CDROMSTART:
case CDROMSTOP:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_start_stop(cdi, &cgc, cmd);
case CDROMPAUSE:
case CDROMRESUME:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_pause_resume(cdi, &cgc, cmd);
case DVD_READ_STRUCT:
return mmc_ioctl_dvd_read_struct(cdi, userptr, &cgc);
case DVD_AUTH:
return mmc_ioctl_dvd_auth(cdi, userptr);
case CDROM_NEXT_WRITABLE:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_next_writable(cdi, userptr);
case CDROM_LAST_WRITTEN:
return mmc_ioctl_cdrom_last_written(cdi, userptr);
}
return -ENOTTY;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionWebRequestTest::FireURLRequestWithData(
const std::string& method,
const char* content_type,
const std::vector<char>& bytes_1,
const std::vector<char>& bytes_2) {
GURL request_url("http://www.example.com");
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> request(
context_->CreateRequest(request_url, net::DEFAULT_PRIORITY, &delegate_));
request->set_method(method);
if (content_type != NULL) {
request->SetExtraRequestHeaderByName(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kContentType,
content_type,
true /* overwrite */);
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<net::UploadElementReader>> element_readers;
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<net::UploadBytesElementReader>(
&(bytes_1[0]), bytes_1.size()));
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<net::UploadFileElementReader>(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get(), base::FilePath(), 0, 0,
base::Time()));
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<net::UploadBytesElementReader>(
&(bytes_2[0]), bytes_2.size()));
request->set_upload(base::MakeUnique<net::ElementsUploadDataStream>(
std::move(element_readers), 0));
ipc_sender_.PushTask(base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
request->Start();
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_term_null(const char *s)
{
return strlen_m_ext_term_null(s, CH_UNIX, CH_UTF16LE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_reqsk_record_syn(const struct sock *sk,
struct request_sock *req,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (tcp_sk(sk)->save_syn) {
u32 len = skb_network_header_len(skb) + tcp_hdrlen(skb);
u32 *copy;
copy = kmalloc(len + sizeof(u32), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (copy) {
copy[0] = len;
memcpy(©[1], skb_network_header(skb), len);
req->saved_syn = copy;
}
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool SupportsSeparateFramebufferBinds() const {
return (feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_framebuffer_multisample ||
feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int handle_NP_Shutdown(rpc_connection_t *connection)
{
D(bug("handle_NP_Shutdown\n"));
int error = rpc_method_get_args(connection, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NP_Shutdown() get args", error);
return error;
}
/* Clear any NPP_Destroys we may have delayed. Although it doesn't
really matter, and the plugin is going to die soon.
XXX: To be really picky, we should probably delay this and make
sure it is run on a new event loop iteration. */
delayed_destroys_process_cb(NULL);
NPError ret = g_NP_Shutdown();
return rpc_method_send_reply(connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, ret, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_STACK_PUSH(const struct nx_action_stack *nasp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *tlv_bitmap, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
struct ofpact_stack *push = ofpact_put_STACK_PUSH(ofpacts);
enum ofperr error = decode_stack_action(nasp, vl_mff_map, tlv_bitmap,
push);
return error ? error : nxm_stack_push_check(push, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: best_name (char *const *name, int const *ignore)
{
enum nametype i;
int components[3];
int components_min = INT_MAX;
size_t basename_len[3];
size_t basename_len_min = SIZE_MAX;
size_t len[3];
size_t len_min = SIZE_MAX;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (name[i] && !ignore[i])
{
/* Take the names with the fewest prefix components. */
components[i] = prefix_components (name[i], false);
if (components_min < components[i])
continue;
components_min = components[i];
/* Of those, take the names with the shortest basename. */
basename_len[i] = base_len (name[i]);
if (basename_len_min < basename_len[i])
continue;
basename_len_min = basename_len[i];
/* Of those, take the shortest names. */
len[i] = strlen (name[i]);
if (len_min < len[i])
continue;
len_min = len[i];
}
/* Of those, take the first name. */
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (name[i] && !ignore[i]
&& components[i] == components_min
&& basename_len[i] == basename_len_min
&& len[i] == len_min)
break;
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 5,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::BindCoordinatorRequest(
mojom::CoordinatorRequest request,
const service_manager::BindSourceInfo& source_info) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request), source_info.identity);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 155,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: unsigned CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::length() const
{
Node* node = m_node.get();
if (!node)
return 0;
RenderStyle* style = node->computedStyle(m_pseudoElementSpecifier);
if (!style)
return 0;
return numComputedProperties;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::DidRemoveAllPendingBodyStylesheets() {
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser())
parser->DidLoadAllBodyStylesheets();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int req_assbackwards_field(request_rec *r)
{
return r->assbackwards;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool ContainerNode::replaceChild(PassRefPtr<Node> newChild, Node* oldChild, ExceptionCode& ec, bool shouldLazyAttach)
{
ASSERT(refCount() || parentOrHostNode());
RefPtr<Node> protect(this);
ec = 0;
if (oldChild == newChild) // nothing to do
return true;
checkReplaceChild(newChild.get(), oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
if (!oldChild || oldChild->parentNode() != this) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return false;
}
#if ENABLE(MUTATION_OBSERVERS)
ChildListMutationScope mutation(this);
#endif
RefPtr<Node> next = oldChild->nextSibling();
RefPtr<Node> removedChild = oldChild;
removeChild(oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
if (next && (next->previousSibling() == newChild || next == newChild)) // nothing to do
return true;
checkReplaceChild(newChild.get(), oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
NodeVector targets;
collectChildrenAndRemoveFromOldParent(newChild.get(), targets, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
InspectorInstrumentation::willInsertDOMNode(document(), this);
for (NodeVector::const_iterator it = targets.begin(); it != targets.end(); ++it) {
Node* child = it->get();
if (next && next->parentNode() != this)
break;
if (child->parentNode())
break;
treeScope()->adoptIfNeeded(child);
forbidEventDispatch();
if (next)
insertBeforeCommon(next.get(), child);
else
appendChildToContainer(child, this);
allowEventDispatch();
updateTreeAfterInsertion(this, child, shouldLazyAttach);
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
return true;
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int hugetlbfs_migrate_page(struct address_space *mapping,
struct page *newpage, struct page *page,
enum migrate_mode mode)
{
int rc;
rc = migrate_huge_page_move_mapping(mapping, newpage, page);
if (rc)
return rc;
migrate_page_copy(newpage, page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int xfrm_get_sadinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct sk_buff *r_skb;
u32 *flags = nlmsg_data(nlh);
u32 spid = NETLINK_CB(skb).pid;
u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
r_skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_sadinfo_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r_skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_sadinfo(r_skb, net, spid, seq, *flags) < 0)
BUG();
return nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, spid);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: TabContents* CreateTabContents() {
return chrome::TabContentsFactory(profile(), NULL, MSG_ROUTING_NONE, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync");
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (!gpu_channel_->IsLost())
return gpu_channel_.get();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
gpu::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&gpu_info)) ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
channel_handle.name.empty()) {
return NULL;
}
GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
io_message_loop_proxy_ = ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop_proxy();
gpu_channel_ = GpuChannelHost::Create(
this, gpu_info, channel_handle,
ChildProcess::current()->GetShutDownEvent());
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool SVGLayoutSupport::hasFilterResource(const LayoutObject& object)
{
SVGResources* resources = SVGResourcesCache::cachedResourcesForLayoutObject(&object);
return resources && resources->filter();
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void IndexedDBConnection::AbortAllTransactions(
const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
std::unordered_map<int64_t, std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBTransaction>> temp_map;
std::swap(temp_map, transactions_);
for (const auto& pair : temp_map) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::Abort(error)", "txn.id", pair.second->id());
pair.second->Abort(error);
}
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_tdlt(GetByteContext *gb, uint8_t *frame, int width, int height)
{
const uint8_t *frame_end = frame + width * height;
uint32_t segments = bytestream2_get_le32(gb);
int skip, copy;
while (segments--) {
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
copy = bytestream2_get_byteu(gb) * 2;
skip = bytestream2_get_byteu(gb) * 2;
if (frame_end - frame < copy + skip ||
bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < copy)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += skip;
bytestream2_get_buffer(gb, frame, copy);
frame += copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dfa: Fix off by 1 error
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1345/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6062963045695488
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static struct dentry *aio_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
static const struct dentry_operations ops = {
.d_dname = simple_dname,
};
return mount_pseudo(fs_type, "aio:", NULL, &ops, AIO_RING_MAGIC);
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 168,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool AutofillDialogViews::SuggestionView::CanUseVerticallyCompactText(
int available_width,
int* resulting_height) const {
if (!calculated_heights_.count(available_width)) {
SuggestionView sizing_view(NULL);
sizing_view.SetLabelText(state_.vertically_compact_text);
sizing_view.SetIcon(state_.icon);
sizing_view.SetTextfield(state_.extra_text, state_.extra_icon);
sizing_view.label_->SetSize(gfx::Size(available_width, 0));
sizing_view.label_line_2_->SetSize(gfx::Size(available_width, 0));
views::LayoutManager* layout = sizing_view.GetLayoutManager();
if (layout->GetPreferredSize(&sizing_view).width() <= available_width) {
calculated_heights_[available_width] = std::make_pair(
true,
layout->GetPreferredHeightForWidth(&sizing_view, available_width));
} else {
sizing_view.SetLabelText(state_.horizontally_compact_text);
calculated_heights_[available_width] = std::make_pair(
false,
layout->GetPreferredHeightForWidth(&sizing_view, available_width));
}
}
const std::pair<bool, int>& values = calculated_heights_[available_width];
*resulting_height = values.second;
return values.first;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 109,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void UiSceneCreator::CreateWebVRExitWarning() {
auto scrim = base::MakeUnique<FullScreenRect>();
scrim->SetName(kScreenDimmer);
scrim->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseOverlayBackground);
scrim->SetVisible(false);
scrim->set_hit_testable(false);
scrim->SetOpacity(kScreenDimmerOpacity);
scrim->SetCenterColor(model_->color_scheme().dimmer_inner);
scrim->SetEdgeColor(model_->color_scheme().dimmer_outer);
scrim->AddBinding(VR_BIND_FUNC(bool, Model, model_, exiting_vr, UiElement,
scrim.get(), SetVisible));
scene_->AddUiElement(k2dBrowsingRoot, std::move(scrim));
auto scaler = base::MakeUnique<ScaledDepthAdjuster>(kExitWarningDistance);
auto exit_warning_text = base::MakeUnique<Text>(kExitWarningFontHeightDMM);
exit_warning_text->SetName(kExitWarningText);
exit_warning_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseOverlayForeground);
exit_warning_text->SetText(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_VR_BROWSER_UNSUPPORTED_PAGE));
exit_warning_text->SetSize(kExitWarningTextWidthDMM, 0);
exit_warning_text->SetVisible(true);
exit_warning_text->set_hit_testable(false);
BindColor(model_, exit_warning_text.get(),
&ColorScheme::exit_warning_foreground, &Text::SetColor);
auto exit_warning_bg = base::MakeUnique<Rect>();
exit_warning_bg->SetName(kExitWarningBackground);
exit_warning_bg->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseOverlayForeground);
exit_warning_bg->set_bounds_contain_children(true);
exit_warning_bg->set_padding(kExitWarningXPaddingDMM,
kExitWarningYPaddingDMM);
exit_warning_bg->set_corner_radius(kExitWarningCornerRadiusDMM);
exit_warning_bg->set_hit_testable(false);
exit_warning_bg->AddChild(std::move(exit_warning_text));
exit_warning_bg->AddBinding(VR_BIND_FUNC(bool, Model, model_, exiting_vr,
UiElement, exit_warning_bg.get(),
SetVisible));
BindColor(model_, exit_warning_bg.get(),
&ColorScheme::exit_warning_background, &Rect::SetColor);
scaler->AddChild(std::move(exit_warning_bg));
scene_->AddUiElement(k2dBrowsingViewportAwareRoot, std::move(scaler));
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <cjgrant@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Event> Document::createEvent(const String& eventType, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Event> event = nullptr;
for (const auto& factory : eventFactories()) {
event = factory->create(eventType);
if (event)
return event.release();
}
exceptionState.throwDOMException(NotSupportedError, "The provided event type ('" + eventType + "') is invalid.");
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(exit, int, error_code)
{
do_exit((error_code&0xff)<<8);
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool AudioHandler::PropagatesSilence() const {
return last_non_silent_time_ + LatencyTime() + TailTime() <
Context()->currentTime();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 148,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int proto_register(struct proto *prot, int alloc_slab)
{
if (alloc_slab) {
prot->slab = kmem_cache_create(prot->name, prot->obj_size, 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | prot->slab_flags,
NULL);
if (prot->slab == NULL) {
pr_crit("%s: Can't create sock SLAB cache!\n",
prot->name);
goto out;
}
if (req_prot_init(prot))
goto out_free_request_sock_slab;
if (prot->twsk_prot != NULL) {
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "tw_sock_%s", prot->name);
if (prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name == NULL)
goto out_free_request_sock_slab;
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab =
kmem_cache_create(prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name,
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_obj_size,
0,
prot->slab_flags,
NULL);
if (prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab == NULL)
goto out_free_timewait_sock_slab_name;
}
}
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
list_add(&prot->node, &proto_list);
assign_proto_idx(prot);
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
return 0;
out_free_timewait_sock_slab_name:
kfree(prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name);
out_free_request_sock_slab:
req_prot_cleanup(prot->rsk_prot);
kmem_cache_destroy(prot->slab);
prot->slab = NULL;
out:
return -ENOBUFS;
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 47,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)uaddr;
char *sun_path = sunaddr->sun_path;
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct unix_address *addr;
struct hlist_head *list;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sunaddr->sun_family != AF_UNIX)
goto out;
if (addr_len == sizeof(short)) {
err = unix_autobind(sock);
goto out;
}
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, addr_len, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
addr_len = err;
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
if (err)
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
if (u->addr)
goto out_up;
err = -ENOMEM;
addr = kmalloc(sizeof(*addr)+addr_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!addr)
goto out_up;
memcpy(addr->name, sunaddr, addr_len);
addr->len = addr_len;
addr->hash = hash ^ sk->sk_type;
atomic_set(&addr->refcnt, 1);
if (sun_path[0]) {
struct path path;
umode_t mode = S_IFSOCK |
(SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current_umask());
err = unix_mknod(sun_path, mode, &path);
if (err) {
if (err == -EEXIST)
err = -EADDRINUSE;
unix_release_addr(addr);
goto out_up;
}
addr->hash = UNIX_HASH_SIZE;
hash = d_backing_inode(path.dentry)->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1);
spin_lock(&unix_table_lock);
u->path = path;
list = &unix_socket_table[hash];
} else {
spin_lock(&unix_table_lock);
err = -EADDRINUSE;
if (__unix_find_socket_byname(net, sunaddr, addr_len,
sk->sk_type, hash)) {
unix_release_addr(addr);
goto out_unlock;
}
list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
}
err = 0;
__unix_remove_socket(sk);
u->addr = addr;
__unix_insert_socket(list, sk);
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&unix_table_lock);
out_up:
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t widget_route_id,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget) {
CreateNewWidget(render_process_id, widget_route_id, /*is_fullscreen=*/false,
std::move(widget));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::SetFeaturePolicy(const String& feature_policy_header) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::FeaturePolicyEnabled())
return;
if (!feature_policy_header.IsEmpty())
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kFeaturePolicyHeader);
FeaturePolicy* parent_feature_policy = nullptr;
ParsedFeaturePolicy container_policy;
Vector<String> messages;
const ParsedFeaturePolicy& parsed_header = ParseFeaturePolicyHeader(
feature_policy_header, GetSecurityOrigin(), &messages);
if (frame_) {
if (!frame_->IsMainFrame()) {
parent_feature_policy =
frame_->Tree().Parent()->GetSecurityContext()->GetFeaturePolicy();
}
if (frame_->Owner())
container_policy = frame_->Owner()->ContainerPolicy();
}
InitializeFeaturePolicy(parsed_header, container_policy,
parent_feature_policy);
for (const auto& message : messages) {
AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(kOtherMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error with Feature-Policy header: " + message));
}
if (frame_ && !parsed_header.empty())
frame_->Client()->DidSetFeaturePolicyHeader(parsed_header);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: juniper_pppoe_atm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_PPPOE_ATM;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw PPPoE frames,
* prepended with a type field*/
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.length-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.caplen-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown ethertype 0x%04x", extracted_ethertype));
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void V8TestObject::IdAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_id_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::IdAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_hash_bucket_renum_swap(Bucket *p, Bucket *q)
{
zval val;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&val, &p->val);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&p->val, &q->val);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&q->val, &val);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int dcbnl_getpfcstate(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfcstate)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_PFC_STATE,
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfcstate(netdev));
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void *kvm_kvzalloc(unsigned long size)
{
if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
return vzalloc(size);
else
return kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline bool allocated(struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
return buf->ops == &default_pipe_buf_ops;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 68,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::UpdateScrollbarEnabledState() {
bool force_disable =
GetPageScrollbarTheme().ShouldDisableInvisibleScrollbars() &&
ScrollbarsHiddenIfOverlay();
if (HorizontalScrollbar())
HorizontalScrollbar()->SetEnabled(HasHorizontalOverflow() &&
!force_disable);
if (VerticalScrollbar())
VerticalScrollbar()->SetEnabled(HasVerticalOverflow() && !force_disable);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void iscsi_retry_timer_expired(void *opaque)
{
struct IscsiTask *iTask = opaque;
iTask->complete = 1;
if (iTask->co) {
qemu_coroutine_enter(iTask->co, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void virtio_gpu_resource_destroy(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res)
{
pixman_image_unref(res->image);
virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(res);
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&g->reslist, res, next);
g->hostmem -= res->hostmem;
g_free(res);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ppp_output_wakeup(struct ppp_channel *chan)
{
struct channel *pch = chan->ppp;
if (!pch)
return;
ppp_channel_push(pch);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_copy_handle)
{
CURL *cp;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch, *dupch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &zid) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(ch, php_curl *, zid, -1, le_curl_name, le_curl);
cp = curl_easy_duphandle(ch->cp);
if (!cp) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Cannot duplicate cURL handle");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
dupch = alloc_curl_handle();
dupch->cp = cp;
Z_ADDREF_P(zid);
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->write->stream)) {
Z_ADDREF(ch->handlers->write->stream);
}
dupch->handlers->write->stream = ch->handlers->write->stream;
dupch->handlers->write->method = ch->handlers->write->method;
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->read->stream)) {
Z_ADDREF(ch->handlers->read->stream);
}
dupch->handlers->read->stream = ch->handlers->read->stream;
dupch->handlers->read->method = ch->handlers->read->method;
dupch->handlers->write_header->method = ch->handlers->write_header->method;
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->write_header->stream)) {
Z_ADDREF(ch->handlers->write_header->stream);
}
dupch->handlers->write_header->stream = ch->handlers->write_header->stream;
dupch->handlers->write->fp = ch->handlers->write->fp;
dupch->handlers->write_header->fp = ch->handlers->write_header->fp;
dupch->handlers->read->fp = ch->handlers->read->fp;
dupch->handlers->read->res = ch->handlers->read->res;
#if CURLOPT_PASSWDDATA != 0
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->passwd)) {
ZVAL_COPY(&dupch->handlers->passwd, &ch->handlers->passwd);
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_PASSWDDATA, (void *) dupch);
}
#endif
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->write->func_name)) {
ZVAL_COPY(&dupch->handlers->write->func_name, &ch->handlers->write->func_name);
}
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->read->func_name)) {
ZVAL_COPY(&dupch->handlers->read->func_name, &ch->handlers->read->func_name);
}
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->write_header->func_name)) {
ZVAL_COPY(&dupch->handlers->write_header->func_name, &ch->handlers->write_header->func_name);
}
curl_easy_setopt(dupch->cp, CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, dupch->err.str);
curl_easy_setopt(dupch->cp, CURLOPT_FILE, (void *) dupch);
curl_easy_setopt(dupch->cp, CURLOPT_INFILE, (void *) dupch);
curl_easy_setopt(dupch->cp, CURLOPT_WRITEHEADER, (void *) dupch);
if (ch->handlers->progress) {
dupch->handlers->progress = ecalloc(1, sizeof(php_curl_progress));
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->progress->func_name)) {
ZVAL_COPY(&dupch->handlers->progress->func_name, &ch->handlers->progress->func_name);
}
dupch->handlers->progress->method = ch->handlers->progress->method;
curl_easy_setopt(dupch->cp, CURLOPT_PROGRESSDATA, (void *) dupch);
}
/* Available since 7.21.0 */
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071500
if (ch->handlers->fnmatch) {
dupch->handlers->fnmatch = ecalloc(1, sizeof(php_curl_fnmatch));
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->fnmatch->func_name)) {
ZVAL_COPY(&dupch->handlers->fnmatch->func_name, &ch->handlers->fnmatch->func_name);
}
dupch->handlers->fnmatch->method = ch->handlers->fnmatch->method;
curl_easy_setopt(dupch->cp, CURLOPT_FNMATCH_DATA, (void *) dupch);
}
#endif
efree(dupch->to_free->slist);
efree(dupch->to_free);
dupch->to_free = ch->to_free;
/* Keep track of cloned copies to avoid invoking curl destructors for every clone */
ch->clone++;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, dupch, le_curl);
dupch->res = Z_RES_P(return_value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ProcChangeCloseDownMode(ClientPtr client)
{
int rc;
REQUEST(xSetCloseDownModeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSetCloseDownModeReq);
rc = XaceHook(XACE_CLIENT_ACCESS, client, client, DixManageAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if ((stuff->mode == AllTemporary) ||
(stuff->mode == RetainPermanent) || (stuff->mode == RetainTemporary)) {
client->closeDownMode = stuff->mode;
return Success;
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->mode;
return BadValue;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: CSSStyleSheetResource::CSSStyleSheetResource(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options,
const TextResourceDecoderOptions& decoder_options)
: TextResource(resource_request,
ResourceType::kCSSStyleSheet,
options,
decoder_options) {}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: GF_Err tssy_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
s->size += 1;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void get_openreq4(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
struct seq_file *f, int i, int uid, int *len)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
int ttd = req->expires - jiffies;
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %u %d %p%n",
i,
ireq->loc_addr,
ntohs(inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport),
ireq->rmt_addr,
ntohs(ireq->rmt_port),
TCP_SYN_RECV,
0, 0, /* could print option size, but that is af dependent. */
1, /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd),
req->retrans,
uid,
0, /* non standard timer */
0, /* open_requests have no inode */
atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt),
req,
len);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetImageKurtosis(const Image *image,
double *kurtosis,double *skewness,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelStatistics
*channel_statistics;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
channel_statistics=GetImageStatistics(image,exception);
if (channel_statistics == (ChannelStatistics *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
*kurtosis=channel_statistics[CompositePixelChannel].kurtosis;
*skewness=channel_statistics[CompositePixelChannel].skewness;
channel_statistics=(ChannelStatistics *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
channel_statistics);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 96,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static char *sapi_fcgi_getenv(char *name, size_t name_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
/* when php is started by mod_fastcgi, no regular environment
* is provided to PHP. It is always sent to PHP at the start
* of a request. So we have to do our own lookup to get env
* vars. This could probably be faster somehow. */
fcgi_request *request = (fcgi_request*) SG(server_context);
char *ret = fcgi_getenv(request, name, name_len);
if (ret) return ret;
/* if cgi, or fastcgi and not found in fcgi env
check the regular environment */
return getenv(name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Ins_FLIPRGOFF( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort I, K, L;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL
/* See `ttinterp.h' for details on backward compatibility mode. */
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL &&
exc->backward_compatibility &&
exc->iupx_called &&
exc->iupy_called )
return;
#endif
K = (FT_UShort)args[1];
L = (FT_UShort)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( K, exc->pts.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( L, exc->pts.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
for ( I = L; I <= K; I++ )
exc->pts.tags[I] &= ~FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void TrackBeforeUnloadEventListener(LocalDOMWindow* dom_window) {
DOMWindowSet& set = WindowsWithBeforeUnloadEventListeners();
if (set.insert(dom_window).is_new_entry) {
UpdateSuddenTerminationStatus(dom_window, true, kBeforeUnloadHandler);
}
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: MediaStreamDevices MediaStreamManager::GetDevicesOpenedByRequest(
const std::string& label) const {
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request)
return MediaStreamDevices();
return request->devices;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int pharobj_cancompress(HashTable *manifest) /* {{{ */
{
int test;
test = 1;
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(manifest, phar_test_compression, &test);
return test;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void iriap_close(struct iriap_cb *self)
{
struct iriap_cb *entry;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s()\n", __func__);
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
if (self->lsap) {
irlmp_close_lsap(self->lsap);
self->lsap = NULL;
}
entry = (struct iriap_cb *) hashbin_remove(iriap, (long) self, NULL);
IRDA_ASSERT(entry == self, return;);
__iriap_close(self);
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 35,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void dinf_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_DataInformationBox *ptr = (GF_DataInformationBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->dref);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void choose_devnum(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int devnum;
struct usb_bus *bus = udev->bus;
/* be safe when more hub events are proceed in parallel */
mutex_lock(&bus->usb_address0_mutex);
if (udev->wusb) {
devnum = udev->portnum + 1;
BUG_ON(test_bit(devnum, bus->devmap.devicemap));
} else {
/* Try to allocate the next devnum beginning at
* bus->devnum_next. */
devnum = find_next_zero_bit(bus->devmap.devicemap, 128,
bus->devnum_next);
if (devnum >= 128)
devnum = find_next_zero_bit(bus->devmap.devicemap,
128, 1);
bus->devnum_next = (devnum >= 127 ? 1 : devnum + 1);
}
if (devnum < 128) {
set_bit(devnum, bus->devmap.devicemap);
udev->devnum = devnum;
}
mutex_unlock(&bus->usb_address0_mutex);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateAttributeAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateAttribute._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
TestObj* v = V8TestObj::HasInstance(value) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(value)) : 0;
ScriptState* state = ScriptState::current();
if (!state)
return;
ScriptExecutionContext* scriptContext = getScriptExecutionContext();
if (!scriptContext)
return;
imp->setWithScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateAttribute(state, scriptContext, WTF::getPtr(v));
if (state.hadException())
throwError(state.exception(), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int readBSSListRid(struct airo_info *ai, int first,
BSSListRid *list)
{
Cmd cmd;
Resp rsp;
if (first == 1) {
if (ai->flags & FLAG_RADIO_MASK) return -ENETDOWN;
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(cmd));
cmd.cmd=CMD_LISTBSS;
if (down_interruptible(&ai->sem))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
ai->list_bss_task = current;
issuecommand(ai, &cmd, &rsp);
up(&ai->sem);
/* Let the command take effect */
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(3 * HZ);
ai->list_bss_task = NULL;
}
return PC4500_readrid(ai, first ? ai->bssListFirst : ai->bssListNext,
list, ai->bssListRidLen, 1);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_fingerprint)
{
X509 *cert;
zval **zcert;
long certresource;
zend_bool raw_output = 0;
char *method = "sha1";
int method_len;
char *fingerprint;
int fingerprint_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Z|sb", &zcert, &method, &method_len, &raw_output) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_openssl_x509_fingerprint(cert, method, raw_output, &fingerprint, &fingerprint_len TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(fingerprint, fingerprint_len, 0);
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (certresource == -1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int do_rawv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
int val;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_CHECKSUM:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num == IPPROTO_ICMPV6 &&
level == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
/*
* RFC3542 tells that IPV6_CHECKSUM socket
* option in the IPPROTO_IPV6 level is not
* allowed on ICMPv6 sockets.
* If you want to set it, use IPPROTO_RAW
* level IPV6_CHECKSUM socket option
* (Linux extension).
*/
return -EINVAL;
}
/* You may get strange result with a positive odd offset;
RFC2292bis agrees with me. */
if (val > 0 && (val&1))
return -EINVAL;
if (val < 0) {
rp->checksum = 0;
} else {
rp->checksum = 1;
rp->offset = val;
}
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static __always_inline void vmcs_set_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x2000,
"vmcs_set_bits does not support 64-bit fields");
__vmcs_writel(field, __vmcs_readl(field) | mask);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ShouldCompareEffectiveURLsForSiteInstanceSelection(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
content::SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& candidate_url,
const GURL& destination_url) {
DCHECK(browser_context);
DCHECK(candidate_site_instance);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::
ShouldCompareEffectiveURLsForSiteInstanceSelection(
browser_context, candidate_site_instance, is_main_frame,
candidate_url, destination_url);
#else
return true;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool tee_mmu_is_vbuf_intersect_ta_private(const struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
const void *va, size_t size)
{
struct vm_region *r;
TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &utc->vm_info->regions, link) {
if (r->attr & (TEE_MATTR_EPHEMERAL | TEE_MATTR_PERMANENT))
continue;
if (core_is_buffer_intersect(va, size, r->va, r->size))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Dispatch(void)
{
int *clientReady; /* array of request ready clients */
int result;
ClientPtr client;
int nready;
HWEventQueuePtr *icheck = checkForInput;
long start_tick;
nextFreeClientID = 1;
nClients = 0;
clientReady = malloc(sizeof(int) * MaxClients);
if (!clientReady)
return;
SmartScheduleSlice = SmartScheduleInterval;
while (!dispatchException) {
if (*icheck[0] != *icheck[1]) {
ProcessInputEvents();
FlushIfCriticalOutputPending();
}
nready = WaitForSomething(clientReady);
if (nready && !SmartScheduleDisable) {
clientReady[0] = SmartScheduleClient(clientReady, nready);
nready = 1;
}
/*****************
* Handle events in round robin fashion, doing input between
* each round
*****************/
while (!dispatchException && (--nready >= 0)) {
client = clients[clientReady[nready]];
if (!client) {
/* KillClient can cause this to happen */
continue;
}
/* GrabServer activation can cause this to be true */
if (grabState == GrabKickout) {
grabState = GrabActive;
break;
}
isItTimeToYield = FALSE;
start_tick = SmartScheduleTime;
while (!isItTimeToYield) {
if (*icheck[0] != *icheck[1])
ProcessInputEvents();
FlushIfCriticalOutputPending();
if (!SmartScheduleDisable &&
(SmartScheduleTime - start_tick) >= SmartScheduleSlice) {
/* Penalize clients which consume ticks */
if (client->smart_priority > SMART_MIN_PRIORITY)
client->smart_priority--;
break;
}
/* now, finally, deal with client requests */
/* Update currentTime so request time checks, such as for input
* device grabs, are calculated correctly */
UpdateCurrentTimeIf();
result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
if (result <= 0) {
if (result < 0)
CloseDownClient(client);
break;
}
client->sequence++;
client->majorOp = ((xReq *) client->requestBuffer)->reqType;
client->minorOp = 0;
if (client->majorOp >= EXTENSION_BASE) {
ExtensionEntry *ext = GetExtensionEntry(client->majorOp);
if (ext)
client->minorOp = ext->MinorOpcode(client);
}
#ifdef XSERVER_DTRACE
if (XSERVER_REQUEST_START_ENABLED())
XSERVER_REQUEST_START(LookupMajorName(client->majorOp),
client->majorOp,
((xReq *) client->requestBuffer)->length,
client->index,
client->requestBuffer);
#endif
if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
result = BadLength;
else {
result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
if (result == Success)
result =
(*client->requestVector[client->majorOp]) (client);
XaceHookAuditEnd(client, result);
}
#ifdef XSERVER_DTRACE
if (XSERVER_REQUEST_DONE_ENABLED())
XSERVER_REQUEST_DONE(LookupMajorName(client->majorOp),
client->majorOp, client->sequence,
client->index, result);
#endif
if (client->noClientException != Success) {
CloseDownClient(client);
break;
}
else if (result != Success) {
SendErrorToClient(client, client->majorOp,
client->minorOp,
client->errorValue, result);
break;
}
}
FlushAllOutput();
client = clients[clientReady[nready]];
if (client)
client->smart_stop_tick = SmartScheduleTime;
}
dispatchException &= ~DE_PRIORITYCHANGE;
}
#if defined(DDXBEFORERESET)
ddxBeforeReset();
#endif
KillAllClients();
free(clientReady);
dispatchException &= ~DE_RESET;
SmartScheduleLatencyLimited = 0;
ResetOsBuffers();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned int id)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
unsigned long vm_base = kvm->arch.vm_base;
int r;
int cpu;
BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu) > VCPU_STRUCT_SIZE/2);
r = -EINVAL;
if (id >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
printk(KERN_ERR"kvm: Can't configure vcpus > %ld",
KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
goto fail;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!vm_base) {
printk(KERN_ERR"kvm: Create vcpu[%d] error!\n", id);
goto fail;
}
vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *)(vm_base + offsetof(struct kvm_vm_data,
vcpu_data[id].vcpu_struct));
vcpu->kvm = kvm;
cpu = get_cpu();
r = vti_vcpu_setup(vcpu, id);
put_cpu();
if (r) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG"kvm: vcpu_setup error!!\n");
goto fail;
}
return vcpu;
fail:
return ERR_PTR(r);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: test_bson_iter_init_from_data_at_offset (void)
{
bson_t *bson = bson_with_all_types ();
/* zero out iter, since bson_iter_init doesn't zero out iter->value. */
bson_iter_t iter = {0};
BSON_ASSERT (bson_iter_init (&iter, bson));
ASSERT_CMPINT (bson_iter_offset (&iter), ==, 0);
while (bson_iter_next (&iter)) {
const uint8_t *data = bson_get_data (bson);
int keylen = bson_iter_key_len (&iter);
uint32_t offset = bson_iter_offset (&iter);
bson_iter_t recreated = {0};
BSON_ASSERT (bson_iter_init_from_data_at_offset (
&recreated, data, bson->len, offset, keylen));
if (memcmp ((void *) &iter, (void *) &recreated, sizeof (bson_iter_t)) !=
0) {
int i;
bson_iter_t *iters[] = {&iter, &recreated};
fprintf (stderr,
"recreated iterator does not match initial iterator:\n");
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
fprintf (stderr, "iter %d: ", i);
fprintf (stderr,
"len=%d, off=%d, type=%d, key=%d, d1=%d, d2=%d, "
"d3=%d, d4=%d, next_off=%d, err_off=%d\n",
iters[i]->len,
iters[i]->off,
iters[i]->type,
iters[i]->key,
iters[i]->d1,
iters[i]->d2,
iters[i]->d3,
iters[i]->d4,
iters[i]->next_off,
iters[i]->err_off);
}
ASSERT (false);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void DeleteImpl(Handle<JSObject> obj, uint32_t entry) {
ElementsKind kind = KindTraits::Kind;
if (IsFastPackedElementsKind(kind)) {
JSObject::TransitionElementsKind(obj, GetHoleyElementsKind(kind));
}
if (IsFastSmiOrObjectElementsKind(KindTraits::Kind)) {
JSObject::EnsureWritableFastElements(obj);
}
DeleteCommon(obj, entry, handle(obj->elements()));
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int sctp_inet_af_supported(sa_family_t family, struct sctp_sock *sp)
{
/* PF_INET only supports AF_INET addresses. */
return AF_INET == family;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: srcip_matches(struct sockaddr *srcaddr, struct sockaddr *rhs)
{
switch (srcaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
return (rhs->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC);
case AF_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *saddr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)srcaddr;
struct sockaddr_in *vaddr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)rhs;
return (saddr4->sin_addr.s_addr == vaddr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
}
case AF_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)srcaddr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *vaddr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)rhs;
return ipv6_addr_equal(&saddr6->sin6_addr, &vaddr6->sin6_addr);
}
default:
WARN_ON(1);
return false; /* don't expect to be here */
}
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_journalled_write_end(struct file *file,
struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied,
struct page *page, void *fsdata)
{
handle_t *handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
loff_t old_size = inode->i_size;
int ret = 0, ret2;
int partial = 0;
unsigned from, to;
int size_changed = 0;
trace_ext4_journalled_write_end(inode, pos, len, copied);
from = pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
to = from + len;
BUG_ON(!ext4_handle_valid(handle));
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
copied = ext4_write_inline_data_end(inode, pos, len,
copied, page);
else {
if (copied < len) {
if (!PageUptodate(page))
copied = 0;
zero_new_buffers(page, from+copied, to);
}
ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page), from,
to, &partial, write_end_fn);
if (!partial)
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
size_changed = ext4_update_inode_size(inode, pos + copied);
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (old_size < pos)
pagecache_isize_extended(inode, old_size, pos);
if (size_changed) {
ret2 = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (!ret)
ret = ret2;
}
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
/* if we have allocated more blocks and copied
* less. We will have blocks allocated outside
* inode->i_size. So truncate them
*/
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = ret2;
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might still be
* on the orphan list; we need to make sure the inode
* is removed from the orphan list in that case.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
}
return ret ? ret : copied;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: GF_Err stri_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_SubTrackInformationBox *p = (GF_SubTrackInformationBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SubTrackInformationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "switch_group=\"%d\" alternate_group=\"%d\" sub_track_id=\"%d\">\n", p->switch_group, p->alternate_group, p->sub_track_id);
for (i = 0; i < p->attribute_count; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<SubTrackInformationAttribute value=\"%s\"/>\n", gf_4cc_to_str(p->attribute_list[i]) );
}
if (!p->size)
fprintf(trace, "<SubTrackInformationAttribute value=\"\"/>\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SubTrackInformationBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet ProfileSyncService::GetEncryptedDataTypes() const {
DCHECK(encrypted_types_.Has(syncable::PASSWORDS));
return encrypted_types_;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SchedulerObject::remove(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Remove: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!abortJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true // Always perform within a transaction
)) {
text = "Failed to remove job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 164,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: AVCodecParserContext *av_parser_init(int codec_id)
{
AVCodecParserContext *s = NULL;
AVCodecParser *parser;
int ret;
if(codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE)
return NULL;
for(parser = av_first_parser; parser != NULL; parser = parser->next) {
if (parser->codec_ids[0] == codec_id ||
parser->codec_ids[1] == codec_id ||
parser->codec_ids[2] == codec_id ||
parser->codec_ids[3] == codec_id ||
parser->codec_ids[4] == codec_id)
goto found;
}
return NULL;
found:
s = av_mallocz(sizeof(AVCodecParserContext));
if (!s)
goto err_out;
s->parser = parser;
s->priv_data = av_mallocz(parser->priv_data_size);
if (!s->priv_data)
goto err_out;
s->fetch_timestamp=1;
s->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (parser->parser_init) {
ret = parser->parser_init(s);
if (ret != 0)
goto err_out;
}
s->key_frame = -1;
s->convergence_duration = 0;
s->dts_sync_point = INT_MIN;
s->dts_ref_dts_delta = INT_MIN;
s->pts_dts_delta = INT_MIN;
return s;
err_out:
if (s)
av_freep(&s->priv_data);
av_free(s);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,022 |
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