instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 235k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int xmlThrDefIndentTreeOutput(int v) {
int ret;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
ret = xmlIndentTreeOutputThrDef;
xmlIndentTreeOutputThrDef = v;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::dispatchWindowLoadEvent()
{
ASSERT(!NoEventDispatchAssertion::isEventDispatchForbidden());
DOMWindow* domWindow = this->domWindow();
if (!domWindow)
return;
domWindow->dispatchLoadEvent();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void PluginServiceImpl::UnregisterInternalPlugin(const FilePath& path) {
plugin_list_->UnregisterInternalPlugin(path);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Type_Signature_Free(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void* Ptr)
{
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Ptr);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static TRBCCode xhci_enable_slot(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid)
{
trace_usb_xhci_slot_enable(slotid);
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled = 1;
xhci->slots[slotid-1].uport = NULL;
memset(xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps, 0, sizeof(XHCIEPContext*)*31);
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheDispatcherHost::OnStartUpdate(int host_id,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (pending_reply_msg_) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
this, bad_message::ACDH_PENDING_REPLY_IN_START_UPDATE);
delete reply_msg;
return;
}
pending_reply_msg_.reset(reply_msg);
if (appcache_service_.get()) {
if (!backend_impl_.StartUpdateWithCallback(
host_id, start_update_callback_, reply_msg)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(this, bad_message::ACDH_START_UPDATE);
}
return;
}
StartUpdateCallback(false, reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ImageLoader::DecodeRequest::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(resolver_);
visitor->Trace(loader_);
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: WM_SYMBOL int WildMidi_SetCvtOption(uint16_t tag, uint16_t setting) {
_WM_Lock(&WM_ConvertOptions.lock);
switch (tag) {
case WM_CO_XMI_TYPE: /* validation happens in xmidi.c */
WM_ConvertOptions.xmi_convert_type = setting;
break;
case WM_CO_FREQUENCY: /* validation happens in format */
WM_ConvertOptions.frequency = setting;
break;
default:
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(invalid setting)", 0);
_WM_Unlock(&WM_ConvertOptions.lock);
return (-1);
}
_WM_Unlock(&WM_ConvertOptions.lock);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::Shutdown() {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::shutdown");
CHECK(!frame_ || frame_->Tree().ChildCount() == 0);
if (!IsActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigation_disabler(*frame_);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::PluginDisposeSuspendScope suspend_plugin_dispose;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_script;
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kStopping);
View()->Dispose();
CHECK(!View()->IsAttached());
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner_element = frame_->DeprecatedLocalOwner();
if (owner_element)
owner_element->SetEmbeddedContentView(nullptr);
markers_->PrepareForDestruction();
if (GetPage())
GetPage()->DocumentDetached(this);
probe::documentDetached(this);
if (frame_->Client()->GetSharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
frame_->Client()->GetSharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->DocumentDetached(this);
if (scripted_animation_controller_)
scripted_animation_controller_->ClearDocumentPointer();
scripted_animation_controller_.Clear();
scripted_idle_task_controller_.Clear();
if (SvgExtensions())
AccessSVGExtensions().PauseAnimations();
if (dom_window_)
dom_window_->ClearEventQueue();
if (layout_view_)
layout_view_->SetIsInWindow(false);
if (RegistrationContext())
RegistrationContext()->DocumentWasDetached();
MutationObserver::CleanSlotChangeList(*this);
hover_element_ = nullptr;
active_element_ = nullptr;
autofocus_element_ = nullptr;
if (focused_element_.Get()) {
Element* old_focused_element = focused_element_;
focused_element_ = nullptr;
if (GetPage())
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().FocusedNodeChanged(old_focused_element,
nullptr);
}
sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_ = nullptr;
if (this == &AxObjectCacheOwner())
ClearAXObjectCache();
layout_view_ = nullptr;
ContainerNode::DetachLayoutTree();
CHECK(!View()->IsAttached());
if (this != &AxObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = ExistingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::DescendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->Remove(&node);
}
}
}
GetStyleEngine().DidDetach();
GetPage()->GetEventHandlerRegistry().DocumentDetached(*this);
DocumentShutdownNotifier::NotifyContextDestroyed();
SynchronousMutationNotifier::NotifyContextDestroyed();
if (!Loader())
fetcher_->ClearContext();
if (imports_controller_) {
imports_controller_->Dispose();
ClearImportsController();
}
timers_.SetTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->Scheduler()->TimerTaskRunner());
if (media_query_matcher_)
media_query_matcher_->DocumentDetached();
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kStopped);
CHECK(!View()->IsAttached());
ExecutionContext::NotifyContextDestroyed();
CHECK(!View()->IsAttached());
frame_ = nullptr;
document_outlive_time_reporter_ =
WTF::WrapUnique(new DocumentOutliveTimeReporter(this));
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int vmsave_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb *nested_vmcb;
struct page *page;
if (nested_svm_check_permissions(svm))
return 1;
nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, svm->vmcb->save.rax, &page);
if (!nested_vmcb)
return 1;
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 3;
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
nested_svm_vmloadsave(svm->vmcb, nested_vmcb);
nested_svm_unmap(page);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: MockAppCacheStorage* mock_storage() {
return static_cast<MockAppCacheStorage*>(service_->storage());
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static u32 tun_xdp_query(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
const struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog;
xdp_prog = rtnl_dereference(tun->xdp_prog);
if (xdp_prog)
return xdp_prog->aux->id;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ReadUserLogState::ReadUserLogState(
const char *path,
int max_rotations,
int recent_thresh )
: ReadUserLogFileState( )
{
Reset( RESET_INIT );
m_max_rotations = max_rotations;
m_recent_thresh = recent_thresh;
if ( path ) {
m_base_path = path;
}
m_initialized = true;
m_update_time = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int __net_init icmp_sk_init(struct net *net)
{
int i, err;
net->ipv4.icmp_sk =
kzalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(struct sock *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (net->ipv4.icmp_sk == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct sock *sk;
err = inet_ctl_sock_create(&sk, PF_INET,
SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMP, net);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
net->ipv4.icmp_sk[i] = sk;
/* Enough space for 2 64K ICMP packets, including
* sk_buff struct overhead.
*/
sk->sk_sndbuf =
(2 * ((64 * 1024) + sizeof(struct sk_buff)));
/*
* Speedup sock_wfree()
*/
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE);
inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
}
/* Control parameters for ECHO replies. */
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all = 0;
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1;
/* Control parameter - ignore bogus broadcast responses? */
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1;
/*
* Configurable global rate limit.
*
* ratelimit defines tokens/packet consumed for dst->rate_token
* bucket ratemask defines which icmp types are ratelimited by
* setting it's bit position.
*
* default:
* dest unreachable (3), source quench (4),
* time exceeded (11), parameter problem (12)
*/
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit = 1 * HZ;
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask = 0x1818;
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr = 0;
return 0;
fail:
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
inet_ctl_sock_destroy(net->ipv4.icmp_sk[i]);
kfree(net->ipv4.icmp_sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *pformatslen)
{
/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
* use default */
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
{
*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
*pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
else
{
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
else
*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
AutoReset<bool> in_stop_all_loaders(&in_stop_all_loaders_, true);
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->StopLoading();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
DidFinishNavigation();
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
u32 exit_intr_info,
unsigned long exit_qualification)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
/* trying to cancel vmlaunch/vmresume is a bug */
WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending);
leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
prepare_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason, exit_intr_info,
exit_qualification);
vmx_load_vmcs01(vcpu);
if ((exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
&& nested_exit_intr_ack_set(vcpu)) {
int irq = kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(vcpu);
WARN_ON(irq < 0);
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = irq |
INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
}
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit_inject(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason,
vmcs12->exit_qualification,
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field,
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info,
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code,
KVM_ISA_VMX);
vm_entry_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS));
vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS));
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
/* if no vmcs02 cache requested, remove the one we used */
if (VMCS02_POOL_SIZE == 0)
nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmx->nested.current_vmptr);
load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
/* Update TSC_OFFSET if TSC was changed while L2 ran */
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vmx->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset);
/* This is needed for same reason as it was needed in prepare_vmcs02 */
vmx->host_rsp = 0;
/* Unpin physical memory we referred to in vmcs02 */
if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) {
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL;
}
if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) {
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = NULL;
}
/*
* We are now running in L2, mmu_notifier will force to reload the
* page's hpa for L2 vmcs. Need to reload it for L1 before entering L1.
*/
kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(vcpu);
/*
* Exiting from L2 to L1, we're now back to L1 which thinks it just
* finished a VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME instruction, so we need to set the
* success or failure flag accordingly.
*/
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
vmx->fail = 0;
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
} else
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = true;
/* in case we halted in L2 */
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void TabCloseableStateWatcher::TabStripWatcher::TabChangedAt(
TabContentsWrapper* tab_contents, int index, TabChangeType change_type) {
main_watcher_->OnTabStripChanged(browser_, false);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SitePerProcessAndroidImeTest() : SitePerProcessBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Browser::OnWindowClosing() {
if (!ShouldCloseWindow())
return;
bool should_quit_if_last_browser =
browser_shutdown::IsTryingToQuit() || !browser::WillKeepAlive();
if (should_quit_if_last_browser && BrowserList::size() == 1)
browser_shutdown::OnShutdownStarting(browser_shutdown::WINDOW_CLOSE);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (session_service)
session_service->WindowClosing(session_id());
TabRestoreService* tab_restore_service =
TabRestoreServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
#if defined(USE_AURA)
if (tab_restore_service && is_app())
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosing(tab_restore_service_delegate());
#endif
if (tab_restore_service && is_type_tabbed() && tab_count())
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosing(tab_restore_service_delegate());
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSING,
content::Source<Browser>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
chrome::CloseAllTabs(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexSubImage3D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei image_size,
const void* pixels) {
ScopedUnpackStateButAlignmentReset reset_unpack(
api(), image_size != 0 && feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_es3, true);
api()->glTexSubImage3DRobustANGLEFn(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
width, height, depth, format, type,
image_size, pixels);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ZEND_API void *zend_object_store_get_object_by_handle(zend_object_handle handle TSRMLS_DC)
{
return EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj.object;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline void build_tablename(smart_str *querystr, PGconn *pg_link, const char *table) /* {{{ */
{
char *table_copy, *escaped, *token, *tmp;
size_t len;
/* schame.table should be "schame"."table" */
table_copy = estrdup(table);
token = php_strtok_r(table_copy, ".", &tmp);
len = strlen(token);
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(token, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, token, len);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
if (tmp && *tmp) {
len = strlen(tmp);
/* "schema"."table" format */
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(tmp, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appendl(querystr, tmp, len);
} else {
escaped = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pg_link, tmp, len);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appends(querystr, escaped);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
}
efree(table_copy);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 164,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: learn_min_len(uint16_t header)
{
int n_bits = header & NX_LEARN_N_BITS_MASK;
int src_type = header & NX_LEARN_SRC_MASK;
int dst_type = header & NX_LEARN_DST_MASK;
unsigned int min_len;
min_len = 0;
if (src_type == NX_LEARN_SRC_FIELD) {
min_len += sizeof(ovs_be32); /* src_field */
min_len += sizeof(ovs_be16); /* src_ofs */
} else {
min_len += DIV_ROUND_UP(n_bits, 16);
}
if (dst_type == NX_LEARN_DST_MATCH ||
dst_type == NX_LEARN_DST_LOAD) {
min_len += sizeof(ovs_be32); /* dst_field */
min_len += sizeof(ovs_be16); /* dst_ofs */
}
return min_len;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetBrowserContext(
BrowserContext* browser_context) {
browser_context_ = browser_context;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool CreateInputAndSetText(const std::string& text) {
return ExecuteScript(interstitial_->GetMainFrame(),
"create_input_and_set_text('" + text + "')");
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionService::SetBackgroundPageReady(const Extension* extension) {
DCHECK(!extension->background_url().is_empty());
extension_runtime_data_[extension->id()].background_page_ready = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_BACKGROUND_PAGE_READY,
Source<const Extension>(extension),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void guess_mv(ERContext *s)
{
int (*blocklist)[2], (*next_blocklist)[2];
uint8_t *fixed;
const ptrdiff_t mb_stride = s->mb_stride;
const int mb_width = s->mb_width;
int mb_height = s->mb_height;
int i, depth, num_avail;
int mb_x, mb_y;
ptrdiff_t mot_step, mot_stride;
int blocklist_length, next_blocklist_length;
if (s->last_pic.f && s->last_pic.f->data[0])
mb_height = FFMIN(mb_height, (s->last_pic.f->height+15)>>4);
if (s->next_pic.f && s->next_pic.f->data[0])
mb_height = FFMIN(mb_height, (s->next_pic.f->height+15)>>4);
blocklist = (int (*)[2])s->er_temp_buffer;
next_blocklist = blocklist + s->mb_stride * s->mb_height;
fixed = (uint8_t *)(next_blocklist + s->mb_stride * s->mb_height);
set_mv_strides(s, &mot_step, &mot_stride);
num_avail = 0;
if (s->last_pic.motion_val[0])
ff_thread_await_progress(s->last_pic.tf, mb_height-1, 0);
for (i = 0; i < mb_width * mb_height; i++) {
const int mb_xy = s->mb_index2xy[i];
int f = 0;
int error = s->error_status_table[mb_xy];
if (IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]))
f = MV_FROZEN; // intra // FIXME check
if (!(error & ER_MV_ERROR))
f = MV_FROZEN; // inter with undamaged MV
fixed[mb_xy] = f;
if (f == MV_FROZEN)
num_avail++;
else if(s->last_pic.f->data[0] && s->last_pic.motion_val[0]){
const int mb_y= mb_xy / s->mb_stride;
const int mb_x= mb_xy % s->mb_stride;
const int mot_index= (mb_x + mb_y*mot_stride) * mot_step;
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0]= s->last_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1]= s->last_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1];
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4*mb_xy] = s->last_pic.ref_index[0][4*mb_xy];
}
}
if ((!(s->avctx->error_concealment&FF_EC_GUESS_MVS)) ||
num_avail <= mb_width / 2) {
for (mb_y = 0; mb_y < mb_height; mb_y++) {
for (mb_x = 0; mb_x < s->mb_width; mb_x++) {
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * s->mb_stride;
int mv_dir = (s->last_pic.f && s->last_pic.f->data[0]) ? MV_DIR_FORWARD : MV_DIR_BACKWARD;
if (IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]))
continue;
if (!(s->error_status_table[mb_xy] & ER_MV_ERROR))
continue;
s->mv[0][0][0] = 0;
s->mv[0][0][1] = 0;
s->decode_mb(s->opaque, 0, mv_dir, MV_TYPE_16X16, &s->mv,
mb_x, mb_y, 0, 0);
}
}
return;
}
blocklist_length = 0;
for (mb_y = 0; mb_y < mb_height; mb_y++) {
for (mb_x = 0; mb_x < mb_width; mb_x++) {
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * mb_stride;
if (fixed[mb_xy] == MV_FROZEN) {
if (mb_x) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x - 1, mb_y, mb_xy - 1);
if (mb_y) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y - 1, mb_xy - mb_stride);
if (mb_x+1 < mb_width) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x + 1, mb_y, mb_xy + 1);
if (mb_y+1 < mb_height) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y + 1, mb_xy + mb_stride);
}
}
}
for (depth = 0; ; depth++) {
int changed, pass, none_left;
int blocklist_index;
none_left = 1;
changed = 1;
for (pass = 0; (changed || pass < 2) && pass < 10; pass++) {
int score_sum = 0;
changed = 0;
for (blocklist_index = 0; blocklist_index < blocklist_length; blocklist_index++) {
const int mb_x = blocklist[blocklist_index][0];
const int mb_y = blocklist[blocklist_index][1];
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * mb_stride;
int mv_predictor[8][2];
int ref[8];
int pred_count;
int j;
int best_score;
int best_pred;
int mot_index;
int prev_x, prev_y, prev_ref;
if ((mb_x ^ mb_y ^ pass) & 1)
continue;
av_assert2(fixed[mb_xy] != MV_FROZEN);
av_assert1(!IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]));
av_assert1(s->last_pic.f && s->last_pic.f->data[0]);
j = 0;
if (mb_x > 0)
j |= fixed[mb_xy - 1];
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width)
j |= fixed[mb_xy + 1];
if (mb_y > 0)
j |= fixed[mb_xy - mb_stride];
if (mb_y + 1 < mb_height)
j |= fixed[mb_xy + mb_stride];
av_assert2(j & MV_FROZEN);
if (!(j & MV_CHANGED) && pass > 1)
continue;
none_left = 0;
pred_count = 0;
mot_index = (mb_x + mb_y * mot_stride) * mot_step;
if (mb_x > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - 1] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy - 1)];
pred_count++;
}
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width && fixed[mb_xy + 1] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy + 1)];
pred_count++;
}
if (mb_y > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - mb_stride] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_stride * mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_stride * mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy - s->mb_stride)];
pred_count++;
}
if (mb_y + 1<mb_height && fixed[mb_xy + mb_stride] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_stride * mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_stride * mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy + s->mb_stride)];
pred_count++;
}
if (pred_count == 0)
continue;
if (pred_count > 1) {
int sum_x = 0, sum_y = 0, sum_r = 0;
int max_x, max_y, min_x, min_y, max_r, min_r;
for (j = 0; j < pred_count; j++) {
sum_x += mv_predictor[j][0];
sum_y += mv_predictor[j][1];
sum_r += ref[j];
if (j && ref[j] != ref[j - 1])
goto skip_mean_and_median;
}
/* mean */
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] = sum_x / j;
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] = sum_y / j;
ref[pred_count] = sum_r / j;
/* median */
if (pred_count >= 3) {
min_y = min_x = min_r = 99999;
max_y = max_x = max_r = -99999;
} else {
min_x = min_y = max_x = max_y = min_r = max_r = 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < pred_count; j++) {
max_x = FFMAX(max_x, mv_predictor[j][0]);
max_y = FFMAX(max_y, mv_predictor[j][1]);
max_r = FFMAX(max_r, ref[j]);
min_x = FFMIN(min_x, mv_predictor[j][0]);
min_y = FFMIN(min_y, mv_predictor[j][1]);
min_r = FFMIN(min_r, ref[j]);
}
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][0] = sum_x - max_x - min_x;
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][1] = sum_y - max_y - min_y;
ref[pred_count + 1] = sum_r - max_r - min_r;
if (pred_count == 4) {
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][0] /= 2;
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][1] /= 2;
ref[pred_count + 1] /= 2;
}
pred_count += 2;
}
skip_mean_and_median:
/* zero MV */
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
ref[pred_count] = 0;
pred_count++;
prev_x = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0];
prev_y = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1];
prev_ref = s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * mb_xy];
/* last MV */
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] = prev_x;
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] = prev_y;
ref[pred_count] = prev_ref;
pred_count++;
best_pred = 0;
best_score = 256 * 256 * 256 * 64;
for (j = 0; j < pred_count; j++) {
int *linesize = s->cur_pic.f->linesize;
int score = 0;
uint8_t *src = s->cur_pic.f->data[0] +
mb_x * 16 + mb_y * 16 * linesize[0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0] =
s->mv[0][0][0] = mv_predictor[j][0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1] =
s->mv[0][0][1] = mv_predictor[j][1];
if (ref[j] < 0)
continue;
s->decode_mb(s->opaque, ref[j], MV_DIR_FORWARD,
MV_TYPE_16X16, &s->mv, mb_x, mb_y, 0, 0);
if (mb_x > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - 1] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k * linesize[0] - 1] -
src[k * linesize[0]]);
}
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width && fixed[mb_xy + 1] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k * linesize[0] + 15] -
src[k * linesize[0] + 16]);
}
if (mb_y > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - mb_stride] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k - linesize[0]] - src[k]);
}
if (mb_y + 1 < mb_height && fixed[mb_xy + mb_stride] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k + linesize[0] * 15] -
src[k + linesize[0] * 16]);
}
if (score <= best_score) { // <= will favor the last MV
best_score = score;
best_pred = j;
}
}
score_sum += best_score;
s->mv[0][0][0] = mv_predictor[best_pred][0];
s->mv[0][0][1] = mv_predictor[best_pred][1];
for (i = 0; i < mot_step; i++)
for (j = 0; j < mot_step; j++) {
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + i + j * mot_stride][0] = s->mv[0][0][0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + i + j * mot_stride][1] = s->mv[0][0][1];
}
s->decode_mb(s->opaque, ref[best_pred], MV_DIR_FORWARD,
MV_TYPE_16X16, &s->mv, mb_x, mb_y, 0, 0);
if (s->mv[0][0][0] != prev_x || s->mv[0][0][1] != prev_y) {
fixed[mb_xy] = MV_CHANGED;
changed++;
} else
fixed[mb_xy] = MV_UNCHANGED;
}
}
if (none_left)
return;
next_blocklist_length = 0;
for (blocklist_index = 0; blocklist_index < blocklist_length; blocklist_index++) {
const int mb_x = blocklist[blocklist_index][0];
const int mb_y = blocklist[blocklist_index][1];
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * mb_stride;
if (fixed[mb_xy] & (MV_CHANGED|MV_UNCHANGED|MV_FROZEN)) {
fixed[mb_xy] = MV_FROZEN;
if (mb_x > 0)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x - 1, mb_y, mb_xy - 1);
if (mb_y > 0)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y - 1, mb_xy - mb_stride);
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x + 1, mb_y, mb_xy + 1);
if (mb_y + 1 < mb_height)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y + 1, mb_xy + mb_stride);
}
}
av_assert0(next_blocklist_length <= mb_height * mb_width);
FFSWAP(int , blocklist_length, next_blocklist_length);
FFSWAP(void*, blocklist, next_blocklist);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 79,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void camellia_do_encrypt(const u32 *subkey, u32 *io, unsigned max)
{
u32 il, ir, t0, t1; /* temporary variables */
/* pre whitening but absorb kw2 */
io[0] ^= SUBKEY_L(0);
io[1] ^= SUBKEY_R(0);
/* main iteration */
#define ROUNDS(i) ({ \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[0], io[1], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 2), SUBKEY_R(i + 2), \
io[2], io[3], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 3), SUBKEY_R(i + 3), \
io[0], io[1], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[0], io[1], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 4), SUBKEY_R(i + 4), \
io[2], io[3], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 5), SUBKEY_R(i + 5), \
io[0], io[1], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[0], io[1], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 6), SUBKEY_R(i + 6), \
io[2], io[3], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 7), SUBKEY_R(i + 7), \
io[0], io[1], il, ir); \
})
#define FLS(i) ({ \
CAMELLIA_FLS(io[0], io[1], io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 0), SUBKEY_R(i + 0), \
SUBKEY_L(i + 1), SUBKEY_R(i + 1), \
t0, t1, il, ir); \
})
ROUNDS(0);
FLS(8);
ROUNDS(8);
FLS(16);
ROUNDS(16);
if (max == 32) {
FLS(24);
ROUNDS(24);
}
#undef ROUNDS
#undef FLS
/* post whitening but kw4 */
io[2] ^= SUBKEY_L(max);
io[3] ^= SUBKEY_R(max);
/* NB: io[0],[1] should be swapped with [2],[3] by caller! */
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionContextMenuModel::GetAcceleratorForCommandId(
int command_id, ui::Accelerator* accelerator) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_get_cipher_methods)
{
zend_bool aliases = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|b", &aliases) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
aliases ? openssl_add_method_or_alias: openssl_add_method,
return_value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static noinline void *cache_alloc_pfmemalloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct kmem_cache_node *n, gfp_t flags)
{
struct page *page;
void *obj;
void *list = NULL;
if (!gfp_pfmemalloc_allowed(flags))
return NULL;
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
page = get_first_slab(n, true);
if (!page) {
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
return NULL;
}
obj = slab_get_obj(cachep, page);
n->free_objects--;
fixup_slab_list(cachep, n, page, &list);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
fixup_objfreelist_debug(cachep, &list);
return obj;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: virConnectListDomains(virConnectPtr conn, int *ids, int maxids)
{
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p, ids=%p, maxids=%d", conn, ids, maxids);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(ids, error);
virCheckNonNegativeArgGoto(maxids, error);
if (conn->driver->connectListDomains) {
int ret = conn->driver->connectListDomains(conn, ids, maxids);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void TestLessDrawing() {
FakeDisplayItemClient first("first");
GraphicsContext context(GetPaintController());
InitRootChunk();
DrawRect(context, first, kBackgroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
DrawRect(context, first, kForegroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
GetPaintController().CommitNewDisplayItems();
InitRootChunk();
DrawRect(context, first, kBackgroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
GetPaintController().CommitNewDisplayItems();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_ctl(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t *ps_ctl_ip;
ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t *ps_ctl_op;
WORD32 ret = 0;
WORD32 subcommand;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ps_ctl_ip = (ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_ctl_op = (ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t *)pv_api_op;
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_ctl_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_ctl_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
subcommand = ps_ctl_ip->e_sub_cmd;
switch(subcommand)
{
case IVD_CMD_CTL_GETPARAMS:
ret = ihevcd_get_status(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IVD_CMD_CTL_SETPARAMS:
ret = ihevcd_set_params(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IVD_CMD_CTL_RESET:
ret = ihevcd_reset(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IVD_CMD_CTL_SETDEFAULT:
{
ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t *s_ctl_dynparams_op =
(ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ret = ihevcd_set_default_params(ps_codec);
if(IV_SUCCESS == ret)
s_ctl_dynparams_op->u4_error_code = 0;
break;
}
case IVD_CMD_CTL_FLUSH:
ret = ihevcd_set_flush_mode(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IVD_CMD_CTL_GETBUFINFO:
ret = ihevcd_get_buf_info(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IVD_CMD_CTL_GETVERSION:
{
ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_ip_t *ps_ip;
ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_op_t *ps_op;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T ret;
ps_ip = (ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_op = (ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_op->u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
if((WORD32)ps_ip->u4_version_buffer_size <= 0)
{
ps_op->u4_error_code = IHEVCD_CXA_VERS_BUF_INSUFFICIENT;
ret = IV_FAIL;
}
else
{
ret = ihevcd_get_version((CHAR *)ps_ip->pv_version_buffer,
ps_ip->u4_version_buffer_size);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
ps_op->u4_error_code = IHEVCD_CXA_VERS_BUF_INSUFFICIENT;
ret = IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
break;
case IHEVCD_CXA_CMD_CTL_DEGRADE:
ret = ihevcd_set_degrade(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IHEVCD_CXA_CMD_CTL_SET_NUM_CORES:
ret = ihevcd_set_num_cores(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IHEVCD_CXA_CMD_CTL_GET_BUFFER_DIMENSIONS:
ret = ihevcd_get_frame_dimensions(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IHEVCD_CXA_CMD_CTL_GET_VUI_PARAMS:
ret = ihevcd_get_vui_params(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IHEVCD_CXA_CMD_CTL_GET_SEI_MASTERING_PARAMS:
ret = ihevcd_get_sei_mastering_params(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
case IHEVCD_CXA_CMD_CTL_SET_PROCESSOR:
ret = ihevcd_set_processor(ps_codec_obj, (void *)pv_api_ip,
(void *)pv_api_op);
break;
default:
DEBUG("\nDo nothing\n");
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 163,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserMainLoop::RunMainMessageLoopParts() {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN0("toplevel", "BrowserMain:MESSAGE_LOOP", this);
bool ran_main_loop = false;
if (parts_)
ran_main_loop = parts_->MainMessageLoopRun(&result_code_);
if (!ran_main_loop)
MainMessageLoopRun();
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("toplevel", "BrowserMain:MESSAGE_LOOP", this);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: print_pixel(char string[64], const Pixel *pixel, png_uint_32 format)
{
switch (format & (PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA|PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR))
{
case 0:
sprintf(string, "%s(%d)", format_names[format], pixel->g);
break;
case PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA:
sprintf(string, "%s(%d,%d)", format_names[format], pixel->g,
pixel->a);
break;
case PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR:
sprintf(string, "%s(%d,%d,%d)", format_names[format],
pixel->r, pixel->g, pixel->b);
break;
case PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR|PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA:
sprintf(string, "%s(%d,%d,%d,%d)", format_names[format],
pixel->r, pixel->g, pixel->b, pixel->a);
break;
default:
sprintf(string, "invalid-format");
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void LockContentsView::OnUsersChanged(
const std::vector<mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr>& users) {
main_view_->RemoveAllChildViews(true /*delete_children*/);
opt_secondary_big_view_ = nullptr;
users_list_ = nullptr;
rotation_actions_.clear();
users_.clear();
if (users.empty()) {
LOG_IF(FATAL, screen_type_ != LockScreen::ScreenType::kLogin)
<< "Empty user list received";
Shell::Get()->login_screen_controller()->ShowGaiaSignin(
false /*can_close*/, base::nullopt /*prefilled_account*/);
return;
}
for (const mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr& user : users) {
UserState state(user->basic_user_info->account_id);
state.fingerprint_state = user->allow_fingerprint_unlock
? mojom::FingerprintUnlockState::AVAILABLE
: mojom::FingerprintUnlockState::UNAVAILABLE;
users_.push_back(std::move(state));
}
auto box_layout =
std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal);
main_layout_ = box_layout.get();
main_layout_->set_main_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::MAIN_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_CENTER);
main_layout_->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CROSS_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_CENTER);
main_view_->SetLayoutManager(std::move(box_layout));
primary_big_view_ = AllocateLoginBigUserView(users[0], true /*is_primary*/);
main_view_->AddChildView(primary_big_view_);
if (users.size() == 2)
CreateLowDensityLayout(users);
else if (users.size() >= 3 && users.size() <= 6)
CreateMediumDensityLayout(users);
else if (users.size() >= 7)
CreateHighDensityLayout(users);
LayoutAuth(primary_big_view_, opt_secondary_big_view_, false /*animate*/);
OnBigUserChanged();
PreferredSizeChanged();
Layout();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SelectionBoundsChanged(
const gfx::Rect& start_rect,
WebKit::WebTextDirection start_direction,
const gfx::Rect& end_rect,
WebKit::WebTextDirection end_direction) {
if (selection_start_rect_ == start_rect && selection_end_rect_ == end_rect)
return;
selection_start_rect_ = start_rect;
selection_end_rect_ = end_rect;
if (GetInputMethod())
GetInputMethod()->OnCaretBoundsChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnRendererHistograms(
int sequence_number,
const std::vector<std::string>& histograms) {
HistogramSynchronizer::DeserializeHistogramList(sequence_number, histograms);
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::~SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
current_paint_.reset();
root_recorder_.reset();
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<ImageContextImpl>> render_pass_image_contexts;
render_pass_image_contexts.reserve(render_pass_image_cache_.size());
for (auto& id_and_image_context : render_pass_image_cache_) {
id_and_image_context.second->clear_image();
render_pass_image_contexts.push_back(
std::move(id_and_image_context.second));
}
base::WaitableEvent event;
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
[](std::vector<std::unique_ptr<ImageContextImpl>> render_passes,
std::unique_ptr<SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu> impl_on_gpu,
base::WaitableEvent* event) {
if (!render_passes.empty())
impl_on_gpu->RemoveRenderPassResource(std::move(render_passes));
impl_on_gpu = nullptr;
event->Signal();
},
std::move(render_pass_image_contexts), std::move(impl_on_gpu_), &event);
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
event.Wait();
task_sequence_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 136,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::AppendPage(PDFEngine* engine, int index) {
pages_[index]->Unload();
pages_[index]->set_calculated_links(false);
pp::Size curr_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
FPDFPage_Delete(doc_, index);
FPDF_ImportPages(doc_,
static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(engine)->doc(),
"1",
index);
pp::Size new_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
if (curr_page_size != new_page_size)
LoadPageInfo(true);
client_->Invalidate(GetPageScreenRect(index));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidChangeOpener(int32_t opener_routing_id) {
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->DidChangeOpener(opener_routing_id,
GetSiteInstance());
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setFlickableViewportEnabled(bool enable)
{
s_flickableViewportEnabled = enable;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnGestureEventAck(
const GestureEventWithLatencyInfo& event,
InputEventAckSource ack_source,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
latency_tracker_.OnInputEventAck(event.event, &event.latency, ack_result);
for (auto& input_event_observer : input_event_observers_)
input_event_observer.OnInputEventAck(ack_source, ack_result, event.event);
if (touch_emulator_)
touch_emulator_->OnGestureEventAck(event.event);
if (view_)
view_->GestureEventAck(event.event, ack_result);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool AudioFlinger::EffectModule::isOffloaded() const
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
return mOffloaded;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::didReceiveTouchEventMode(TouchEventMode mode)
{
if (mode != m_touchEventMode)
m_client->touchEventModeChanged(toPlatformTouchEventMode(mode));
m_touchEventMode = mode;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int ptrace_peek_siginfo(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long data)
{
struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args arg;
struct sigpending *pending;
struct sigqueue *q;
int ret, i;
ret = copy_from_user(&arg, (void __user *) addr,
sizeof(struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args));
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
if (arg.flags & ~PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED)
return -EINVAL; /* unknown flags */
if (arg.nr < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.flags & PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED)
pending = &child->signal->shared_pending;
else
pending = &child->pending;
for (i = 0; i < arg.nr; ) {
siginfo_t info;
s32 off = arg.off + i;
spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
list_for_each_entry(q, &pending->list, list) {
if (!off--) {
copy_siginfo(&info, &q->info);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
if (off >= 0) /* beyond the end of the list */
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(is_compat_task())) {
compat_siginfo_t __user *uinfo = compat_ptr(data);
if (copy_siginfo_to_user32(uinfo, &info) ||
__put_user(info.si_code, &uinfo->si_code)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
} else
#endif
{
siginfo_t __user *uinfo = (siginfo_t __user *) data;
if (copy_siginfo_to_user(uinfo, &info) ||
__put_user(info.si_code, &uinfo->si_code)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
data += sizeof(siginfo_t);
i++;
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
cond_resched();
}
if (i > 0)
return i;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL;
struct unix_sock *u;
atomic_long_inc(&unix_nr_socks);
if (atomic_long_read(&unix_nr_socks) > 2 * get_max_files())
goto out;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_UNIX, GFP_KERNEL, &unix_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
lockdep_set_class(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock,
&af_unix_sk_receive_queue_lock_key);
sk->sk_write_space = unix_write_space;
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen;
sk->sk_destruct = unix_sock_destructor;
u = unix_sk(sk);
u->path.dentry = NULL;
u->path.mnt = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&u->lock);
atomic_long_set(&u->inflight, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
atomic_long_dec(&unix_nr_socks);
else {
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
}
return sk;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: circle_contain(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPle((point_dt(&circle1->center, &circle2->center) + circle2->radius), circle1->radius));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void __net_exit nf_ct_frags6_sysctl_unregister(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = net->nf_frag.sysctl.frags_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->nf_frag.sysctl.frags_hdr);
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
kfree(table);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 47,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDisableVertexAttribArray(
GLuint index) {
api()->glDisableVertexAttribArrayFn(index);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::NotifyTextDirection() {
if (text_direction_updated_) {
if (!text_direction_canceled_)
Send(new ViewMsg_SetTextDirection(GetRoutingID(), text_direction_));
text_direction_updated_ = false;
text_direction_canceled_ = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::CrossesExtensionExtents(WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& new_url) {
const ExtensionSet* extensions = extension_dispatcher_->extensions();
GURL old_url(frame->document().url());
if (old_url.is_empty() && frame->opener())
old_url = frame->opener()->document().url();
if (old_url == new_url) {
bool is_extension_url = !!extensions->GetByURL(new_url);
if (is_extension_url != extension_dispatcher_->is_extension_process())
return true;
}
return !extensions->InSameExtent(old_url, new_url);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void sighand_ctor(void *data)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand = data;
spin_lock_init(&sighand->siglock);
init_waitqueue_head(&sighand->signalfd_wqh);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Browser::FindInPage(bool find_next, bool forward_direction) {
ShowFindBar();
if (find_next) {
string16 find_text;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
find_text = GetFindPboardText();
#endif
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->
GetFindManager()->StartFinding(find_text,
forward_direction,
false); // Not case sensitive.
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DispatchDidFailLoad(
const ResourceError& error,
WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
web_frame_->DidFail(error, false, commit_type);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int f2fs_reserve_block(struct dnode_of_data *dn, pgoff_t index)
{
bool need_put = dn->inode_page ? false : true;
int err;
err = get_dnode_of_data(dn, index, ALLOC_NODE);
if (err)
return err;
if (dn->data_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
err = reserve_new_block(dn);
if (err || need_put)
f2fs_put_dnode(dn);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
struct bpf_insn *insn;
void *old_bpf_func;
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
return 0;
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
* need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
* propagated in any case.
*/
subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
if (subprog < 0) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
i + insn->imm + 1);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
* aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
*/
insn->off = subprog;
/* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
* to interpreter will be needed
*/
env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
insn->imm = 1;
}
func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!func)
goto out_undo_insn;
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
subprog_start = subprog_end;
subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
if (!func[i])
goto out_free;
memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
func[i]->type = prog->type;
func[i]->len = len;
if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
goto out_free;
func[i]->is_func = 1;
/* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces.
* Long term would need debug info to populate names
*/
func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (!func[i]->jited) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto out_free;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
* now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
* run last pass of JIT
*/
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
insn = func[i]->insnsi;
for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
subprog = insn->off;
insn->imm = (u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64))
func[subprog]->bpf_func -
__bpf_call_base;
}
/* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
* of the JITed images for each function in the program
*
* for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
* might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
* address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
*
* in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
* by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
* the call instruction, as an index for this list
*/
func[i]->aux->func = func;
func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
}
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto out_free;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
* populate kallsysm
*/
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
}
/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
* prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
* later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
*/
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
insn->imm = subprog;
}
prog->jited = 1;
prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
prog->aux->func = func;
prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
return 0;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
if (func[i])
bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
kfree(func);
out_undo_insn:
/* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
prog->jit_requested = 0;
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
insn->off = 0;
insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr*)skb->data;
const struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)(skb->data+offset);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
struct sock *sk;
int err;
struct tcp_sock *tp;
__u32 seq;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
sk = inet6_lookup(net, &tcp_hashinfo, &hdr->daddr,
th->dest, &hdr->saddr, th->source, skb->dev->ifindex);
if (sk == NULL) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, __in6_dev_get(skb->dev),
ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
return;
}
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_LOCKDROPPEDICMPS);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE)
goto out;
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit < inet6_sk(sk)->min_hopcount) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP);
goto out;
}
tp = tcp_sk(sk);
seq = ntohl(th->seq);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN &&
!between(seq, tp->snd_una, tp->snd_nxt)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG) {
struct dst_entry *dst;
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE))
goto out;
/* icmp should have updated the destination cache entry */
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (dst == NULL) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
/* BUGGG_FUTURE: Again, it is not clear how
to handle rthdr case. Ignore this complexity
for now.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &np->daddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr);
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, NULL, false);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
} else
dst_hold(dst);
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie > dst_mtu(dst)) {
tcp_sync_mss(sk, dst_mtu(dst));
tcp_simple_retransmit(sk);
} /* else let the usual retransmit timer handle it */
dst_release(dst);
goto out;
}
icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
/* Might be for an request_sock */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
struct request_sock *req, **prev;
case TCP_LISTEN:
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
req = inet6_csk_search_req(sk, &prev, th->dest, &hdr->daddr,
&hdr->saddr, inet6_iif(skb));
if (!req)
goto out;
/* ICMPs are not backlogged, hence we cannot get
* an established socket here.
*/
WARN_ON(req->sk != NULL);
if (seq != tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req, prev);
goto out;
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
case TCP_SYN_RECV: /* Cannot happen.
It can, it SYNs are crossed. --ANK */
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk); /* Wake people up to see the error (see connect in sock.c) */
tcp_done(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
goto out;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk) && np->recverr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool RenderViewHostImpl::IsFullscreen() const {
return delegate_->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab();
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
{
switch (sig_alg) {
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
# endif
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: cmsPipeline* CMSEXPORT _cmsDefaultICCintents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
return DefaultICCintents(ContextID, nProfiles, TheIntents, hProfiles, BPC, AdaptationStates, dwFlags);
}
Commit Message: Fix a double free on error recovering
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DumpBrowserHistograms(const base::FilePath& output_file) {
std::string output_string(
base::StatisticsRecorder::ToJSON(base::JSON_VERBOSITY_LEVEL_FULL));
base::ScopedBlockingCall scoped_blocking_call(FROM_HERE,
base::BlockingType::MAY_BLOCK);
base::WriteFile(output_file, output_string.data(),
static_cast<int>(output_string.size()));
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 137,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getStream)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
struct zip_stat sb;
char *mode = "rb";
zend_string *filename;
php_stream *stream;
ze_zip_object *obj;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "P", &filename) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zip_stat(intern, ZSTR_VAL(filename), 0, &sb) != 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
obj = Z_ZIP_P(self);
stream = php_stream_zip_open(obj->filename, ZSTR_VAL(filename), mode STREAMS_CC);
if (stream) {
php_stream_to_zval(stream, return_value);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: DownloadId DownloadItemImpl::GetGlobalId() const { return download_id_; }
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer(const WebRTCSessionDescriptionRequest& request, const WebMediaConstraints& constraints)
{
WebString shouldSucceed;
if (constraints.getMandatoryConstraintValue("succeed", shouldSucceed) && shouldSucceed == "true") {
WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor sessionDescription;
sessionDescription.initialize("offer", "Some SDP here");
postTask(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestSuccededTask(this, request, sessionDescription));
} else
postTask(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestFailedTask(this, request));
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void jas_matrix_clip(jas_matrix_t *matrix, jas_seqent_t minval,
jas_seqent_t maxval)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t v;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
jas_seqent_t *data;
int rowstep;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
data = rowstart;
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
v = *data;
if (v < minval) {
*data = minval;
} else if (v > maxval) {
*data = maxval;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int basic_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
!zend_hash_exists(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest"))) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void CSoundFile::InvertLoop(ModChannel *pChn)
{
if(GetType() != MOD_TYPE_MOD || pChn->nEFxSpeed == 0) return;
ModSample *pModSample = const_cast<ModSample *>(pChn->pModSample);
if(pModSample == nullptr || !pModSample->HasSampleData() || !pModSample->uFlags[CHN_LOOP] || pModSample->uFlags[CHN_16BIT]) return;
pChn->nEFxDelay += ModEFxTable[pChn->nEFxSpeed & 0x0F];
if((pChn->nEFxDelay & 0x80) == 0) return; // only applied if the "delay" reaches 128
pChn->nEFxDelay = 0;
if (++pChn->nEFxOffset >= pModSample->nLoopEnd - pModSample->nLoopStart)
pChn->nEFxOffset = 0;
uint8 &sample = mpt::byte_cast<uint8 *>(pModSample->sampleb())[pModSample->nLoopStart + pChn->nEFxOffset];
sample = ~sample;
ctrlSmp::PrecomputeLoops(*pModSample, *this, false);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int opfisubr(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xda;
data[l++] = 0x28 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xde;
data[l++] = 0x28 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void UsbTabHelper::DecrementConnectionCount(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
auto it = frame_usb_services_.find(render_frame_host);
DCHECK(it != frame_usb_services_.end());
DCHECK_GT(it->second->device_connection_count_, 0);
it->second->device_connection_count_--;
NotifyTabStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
* right in front, treat it the very same way.
*/
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
pointer_desc = "value ";
break;
case PTR_TO_CTX:
pointer_desc = "context ";
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
break;
default:
break;
}
return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
strict);
}
Commit Message: bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didDisplayInsecureContent(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidDisplayInsecureContent(
render_view_->GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: FT_New_Face_From_FSSpec( FT_Library library,
const FSSpec* spec,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face* aface )
{
#if ( __LP64__ ) || ( defined( MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5 ) && \
( MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5 ) )
FT_UNUSED( library );
FT_UNUSED( spec );
FT_UNUSED( face_index );
FT_UNUSED( aface );
return FT_THROW( Unimplemented_Feature );
#else
FSRef ref;
if ( !spec || FSpMakeFSRef( spec, &ref ) != noErr )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
else
return FT_New_Face_From_FSRef( library, &ref, face_index, aface );
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void MagnetometerCallback(scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> sensor) {
magnetometer_callback_called_ = true;
magnetometer_ = static_cast<FakePlatformSensor*>(sensor.get());
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void arcmsr_done4abort_postqueue(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
int i = 0;
uint32_t flag_ccb, ccb_cdb_phy;
struct ARCMSR_CDB *pARCMSR_CDB;
bool error;
struct CommandControlBlock *pCCB;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
uint32_t outbound_intstatus;
outbound_intstatus = readl(®->outbound_intstatus) &
acb->outbound_int_enable;
/*clear and abort all outbound posted Q*/
writel(outbound_intstatus, ®->outbound_intstatus);/*clear interrupt*/
while(((flag_ccb = readl(®->outbound_queueport)) != 0xFFFFFFFF)
&& (i++ < ARCMSR_MAX_OUTSTANDING_CMD)) {
pARCMSR_CDB = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset + (flag_ccb << 5));/*frame must be 32 bytes aligned*/
pCCB = container_of(pARCMSR_CDB, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE0) ? true : false;
arcmsr_drain_donequeue(acb, pCCB, error);
}
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
/*clear all outbound posted Q*/
writel(ARCMSR_DOORBELL_INT_CLEAR_PATTERN, reg->iop2drv_doorbell); /* clear doorbell interrupt */
for (i = 0; i < ARCMSR_MAX_HBB_POSTQUEUE; i++) {
flag_ccb = reg->done_qbuffer[i];
if (flag_ccb != 0) {
reg->done_qbuffer[i] = 0;
pARCMSR_CDB = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset+(flag_ccb << 5));/*frame must be 32 bytes aligned*/
pCCB = container_of(pARCMSR_CDB, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE0) ? true : false;
arcmsr_drain_donequeue(acb, pCCB, error);
}
reg->post_qbuffer[i] = 0;
}
reg->doneq_index = 0;
reg->postq_index = 0;
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = acb->pmuC;
while ((readl(®->host_int_status) & ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_POSTQUEUE_ISR) && (i++ < ARCMSR_MAX_OUTSTANDING_CMD)) {
/*need to do*/
flag_ccb = readl(®->outbound_queueport_low);
ccb_cdb_phy = (flag_ccb & 0xFFFFFFF0);
pARCMSR_CDB = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset+ccb_cdb_phy);/*frame must be 32 bytes aligned*/
pCCB = container_of(pARCMSR_CDB, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE1) ? true : false;
arcmsr_drain_donequeue(acb, pCCB, error);
}
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D: {
struct MessageUnit_D *pmu = acb->pmuD;
uint32_t outbound_write_pointer;
uint32_t doneq_index, index_stripped, addressLow, residual, toggle;
unsigned long flags;
residual = atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount);
for (i = 0; i < residual; i++) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->doneq_lock, flags);
outbound_write_pointer =
pmu->done_qbuffer[0].addressLow + 1;
doneq_index = pmu->doneq_index;
if ((doneq_index & 0xFFF) !=
(outbound_write_pointer & 0xFFF)) {
toggle = doneq_index & 0x4000;
index_stripped = (doneq_index & 0xFFF) + 1;
index_stripped %= ARCMSR_MAX_ARC1214_DONEQUEUE;
pmu->doneq_index = index_stripped ? (index_stripped | toggle) :
((toggle ^ 0x4000) + 1);
doneq_index = pmu->doneq_index;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->doneq_lock, flags);
addressLow = pmu->done_qbuffer[doneq_index &
0xFFF].addressLow;
ccb_cdb_phy = (addressLow & 0xFFFFFFF0);
pARCMSR_CDB = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)
(acb->vir2phy_offset + ccb_cdb_phy);
pCCB = container_of(pARCMSR_CDB,
struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
error = (addressLow &
ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE1) ?
true : false;
arcmsr_drain_donequeue(acb, pCCB, error);
writel(doneq_index,
pmu->outboundlist_read_pointer);
} else {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->doneq_lock, flags);
mdelay(10);
}
}
pmu->postq_index = 0;
pmu->doneq_index = 0x40FF;
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: archive_read_format_lha_read_data_skip(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct lha *lha;
int64_t bytes_skipped;
lha = (struct lha *)(a->format->data);
if (lha->entry_unconsumed) {
/* Consume as much as the decompressor actually used. */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->entry_unconsumed);
lha->entry_unconsumed = 0;
}
/* if we've already read to end of data, we're done. */
if (lha->end_of_entry_cleanup)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
/*
* If the length is at the beginning, we can skip the
* compressed data much more quickly.
*/
bytes_skipped = __archive_read_consume(a, lha->entry_bytes_remaining);
if (bytes_skipped < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* This entry is finished and done. */
lha->end_of_entry_cleanup = lha->end_of_entry = 1;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static struct crypto_instance *alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
alg = crypto_get_attr_alg(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return ERR_CAST(alg);
inst = crypto_alloc_instance("xts", alg);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER;
inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
if (alg->cra_alignmask < 7)
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = 7;
else
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.min_keysize =
2 * alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.max_keysize =
2 * alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct priv);
inst->alg.cra_init = init_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_exit = exit_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.setkey = setkey;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.encrypt = encrypt;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.decrypt = decrypt;
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return inst;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ExtendSelectionAndDelete(
size_t before, size_t after) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh = GetFocusedFrame();
if (rfh)
rfh->ExtendSelectionAndDelete(before, after);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ConstructClientIds(ClientPtr client,
int numSpecs, xXResClientIdSpec* specs,
ConstructClientIdCtx *ctx)
{
int specIdx;
for (specIdx = 0; specIdx < numSpecs; ++specIdx) {
if (specs[specIdx].client == 0) {
int c;
for (c = 0; c < currentMaxClients; ++c) {
if (clients[c]) {
if (!ConstructClientIdValue(client, clients[c],
specs[specIdx].mask, ctx)) {
return BadAlloc;
}
}
}
} else {
int clientID = CLIENT_ID(specs[specIdx].client);
if ((clientID < currentMaxClients) && clients[clientID]) {
if (!ConstructClientIdValue(client, clients[clientID],
specs[specIdx].mask, ctx)) {
return BadAlloc;
}
}
}
}
/* memory allocation errors earlier may return with BadAlloc */
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int __init sha256_s390_init(void)
{
int ret;
if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KIMD_SHA_256, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha256_alg);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha224_alg);
if (ret < 0)
crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Release(int old_route_id) {
session_storage_namespaces_awaiting_close_->erase(old_route_id);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void activityLoggedAttrGetter2AttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedAttrGetter2", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedAttrGetter2(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::updateLayoutTreeForNodeIfNeeded(Node* node)
{
ASSERT(node);
if (!node->canParticipateInComposedTree())
return;
if (!needsLayoutTreeUpdate())
return;
bool needsRecalc = needsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() || node->needsStyleRecalc() || node->needsStyleInvalidation();
if (!needsRecalc) {
for (const ContainerNode* ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*node); ancestor && !needsRecalc; ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*ancestor))
needsRecalc = ancestor->needsStyleRecalc() || ancestor->needsStyleInvalidation() || ancestor->needsAdjacentStyleRecalc();
}
if (needsRecalc)
updateLayoutTreeIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnZoom(PageZoom zoom) {
if (!webview()) // Not sure if this can happen, but no harm in being safe.
return;
webview()->hidePopups();
double old_zoom_level = webview()->zoomLevel();
double zoom_level;
if (zoom == PAGE_ZOOM_RESET) {
zoom_level = 0;
} else if (static_cast<int>(old_zoom_level) == old_zoom_level) {
zoom_level = old_zoom_level + zoom;
} else {
if ((old_zoom_level > 1 && zoom > 0) ||
(old_zoom_level < 1 && zoom < 0)) {
zoom_level = static_cast<int>(old_zoom_level + zoom);
} else {
zoom_level = static_cast<int>(old_zoom_level);
}
}
webview()->setZoomLevel(false, zoom_level);
zoomLevelChanged();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void TabStripModel::TabNavigating(TabContentsWrapper* contents,
PageTransition::Type transition) {
if (ShouldForgetOpenersForTransition(transition)) {
if (!IsNewTabAtEndOfTabStrip(contents)) {
ForgetAllOpeners();
ForgetGroup(contents);
}
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int dev_set_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
{
int err, orig_mtu;
if (new_mtu == dev->mtu)
return 0;
/* MTU must be positive, and in range */
if (new_mtu < 0 || new_mtu < dev->min_mtu) {
net_err_ratelimited("%s: Invalid MTU %d requested, hw min %d\n",
dev->name, new_mtu, dev->min_mtu);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (dev->max_mtu > 0 && new_mtu > dev->max_mtu) {
net_err_ratelimited("%s: Invalid MTU %d requested, hw max %d\n",
dev->name, new_mtu, dev->max_mtu);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!netif_device_present(dev))
return -ENODEV;
err = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_PRECHANGEMTU, dev);
err = notifier_to_errno(err);
if (err)
return err;
orig_mtu = dev->mtu;
err = __dev_set_mtu(dev, new_mtu);
if (!err) {
err = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEMTU, dev);
err = notifier_to_errno(err);
if (err) {
/* setting mtu back and notifying everyone again,
* so that they have a chance to revert changes.
*/
__dev_set_mtu(dev, orig_mtu);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEMTU, dev);
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: virtual ~TestFieldTrialObserver() {
FieldTrialList::RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DeviceServiceAction::execute(Solid::Device &device)
{
new DelayedExecutor(m_service, device);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 10,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Ins_ROLL( FT_Long* args )
{
FT_Long A, B, C;
A = args[2];
B = args[1];
C = args[0];
args[2] = C;
args[1] = A;
args[0] = B;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode);
nfs4_stateid *res_stateid = NULL;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &calldata->res.seq_res))
return;
trace_nfs4_close(state, &calldata->arg, &calldata->res, task->tk_status);
/* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing
* the state_owner. we keep this around to process errors
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
res_stateid = &calldata->res.stateid;
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0 && calldata->roc)
pnfs_roc_set_barrier(state->inode,
calldata->roc_barrier);
renew_lease(server, calldata->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (!nfs4_stateid_match(&calldata->arg.stateid,
&state->open_stateid)) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
goto out_release;
}
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0)
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, state, NULL) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
goto out_release;
}
}
nfs_clear_open_stateid(state, res_stateid, calldata->arg.fmode);
out_release:
nfs_release_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
nfs_refresh_inode(calldata->inode, calldata->res.fattr);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, task->tk_status);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Dispatcher::RunScriptsAtDocumentStart(content::RenderFrame* render_frame) {
ExtensionFrameHelper* frame_helper = ExtensionFrameHelper::Get(render_frame);
if (!frame_helper)
return; // The frame is invisible to extensions.
frame_helper->RunScriptsAtDocumentStart();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
kfree(epayload);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::AddedToWidget() {
views::Textfield::AddedToWidget();
scoped_compositor_observer_.Add(GetWidget()->GetCompositor());
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: t2p_disable(TIFF *tif)
{
T2P *t2p = (T2P*) TIFFClientdata(tif);
t2p->outputdisable = 1;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int special_mapping_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *new_vma)
{
struct vm_special_mapping *sm = new_vma->vm_private_data;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm != new_vma->vm_mm))
return -EFAULT;
if (sm->mremap)
return sm->mremap(sm, new_vma);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int sctp_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum)
{
union sctp_addr addr;
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_sk(sk)->pf->af;
/* Set up a dummy address struct from the sk. */
af->from_sk(&addr, sk);
addr.v4.sin_port = htons(snum);
/* Note: sk->sk_num gets filled in if ephemeral port request. */
return !!sctp_get_port_local(sk, &addr);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void smp_send_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
p_cb->local_keypress_notification = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF, p_cb);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: selRotateOrth(SEL *sel,
l_int32 quads)
{
l_int32 i, j, ni, nj, sx, sy, cx, cy, nsx, nsy, ncx, ncy, type;
SEL *seld;
PROCNAME("selRotateOrth");
if (!sel)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel not defined", procName, NULL);
if (quads < 0 || quads > 4)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("quads not in {0,1,2,3,4}", procName, NULL);
if (quads == 0 || quads == 4)
return selCopy(sel);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, &cy, &cx);
if (quads == 1) { /* 90 degrees cw */
nsx = sy;
nsy = sx;
ncx = sy - cy - 1;
ncy = cx;
} else if (quads == 2) { /* 180 degrees cw */
nsx = sx;
nsy = sy;
ncx = sx - cx - 1;
ncy = sy - cy - 1;
} else { /* 270 degrees cw */
nsx = sy;
nsy = sx;
ncx = cy;
ncy = sx - cx - 1;
}
seld = selCreateBrick(nsy, nsx, ncy, ncx, SEL_DONT_CARE);
if (sel->name)
seld->name = stringNew(sel->name);
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < sx; j++) {
selGetElement(sel, i, j, &type);
if (quads == 1) {
ni = j;
nj = sy - i - 1;
} else if (quads == 2) {
ni = sy - i - 1;
nj = sx - j - 1;
} else { /* quads == 3 */
ni = sx - j - 1;
nj = i;
}
selSetElement(seld, ni, nj, type);
}
}
return seld;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,222 |
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