instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 235k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: irc_server_send_signal (struct t_irc_server *server, const char *signal,
const char *command, const char *full_message,
const char *tags)
{
int length;
char *str_signal, *full_message_tags;
length = strlen (server->name) + 1 + strlen (signal) + 1 + strlen (command) + 1;
str_signal = malloc (length);
if (str_signal)
{
snprintf (str_signal, length,
"%s,%s_%s", server->name, signal, command);
if (tags)
{
length = strlen (tags) + 1 + strlen (full_message) + 1;
full_message_tags = malloc (length);
if (full_message_tags)
{
snprintf (full_message_tags, length,
"%s;%s", tags, full_message);
weechat_hook_signal_send (str_signal,
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
(void *)full_message_tags);
free (full_message_tags);
}
}
else
{
weechat_hook_signal_send (str_signal, WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
(void *)full_message);
}
free (str_signal);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int imap_tags_edit(struct Context *ctx, const char *tags, char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
char *new = NULL;
char *checker = NULL;
struct ImapData *idata = (struct ImapData *) ctx->data;
/* Check for \* flags capability */
if (!imap_has_flag(&idata->flags, NULL))
{
mutt_error(_("IMAP server doesn't support custom flags"));
return -1;
}
*buf = '\0';
if (tags)
strncpy(buf, tags, buflen);
if (mutt_get_field("Tags: ", buf, buflen, 0) != 0)
return -1;
/* each keyword must be atom defined by rfc822 as:
*
* atom = 1*<any CHAR except specials, SPACE and CTLs>
* CHAR = ( 0.-127. )
* specials = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / "@"
* / "," / ";" / ":" / "\" / <">
* / "." / "[" / "]"
* SPACE = ( 32. )
* CTLS = ( 0.-31., 127.)
*
* And must be separated by one space.
*/
new = buf;
checker = buf;
SKIPWS(checker);
while (*checker != '\0')
{
if (*checker < 32 || *checker >= 127 || // We allow space because it's the separator
*checker == 40 || // (
*checker == 41 || // )
*checker == 60 || // <
*checker == 62 || // >
*checker == 64 || // @
*checker == 44 || // ,
*checker == 59 || // ;
*checker == 58 || // :
*checker == 92 || // backslash
*checker == 34 || // "
*checker == 46 || // .
*checker == 91 || // [
*checker == 93) // ]
{
mutt_error(_("Invalid IMAP flags"));
return 0;
}
/* Skip duplicate space */
while (*checker == ' ' && *(checker + 1) == ' ')
checker++;
/* copy char to new and go the next one */
*new ++ = *checker++;
}
*new = '\0';
new = buf; /* rewind */
mutt_str_remove_trailing_ws(new);
if (mutt_str_strcmp(tags, buf) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool IsSelecting() { return window_selector_controller()->IsSelecting(); }
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int comm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
return single_open(filp, comm_show, inode);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_remote_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return &conn->remote_ss;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: encode_SET_L4_SRC_PORT(const struct ofpact_l4_port *l4_port,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint8_t proto = l4_port->flow_ip_proto;
enum mf_field_id field = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP ? MFF_TCP_SRC
: proto == IPPROTO_UDP ? MFF_UDP_SRC
: proto == IPPROTO_SCTP ? MFF_SCTP_SRC
: MFF_N_IDS);
encode_SET_L4_port(l4_port, ofp_version, OFPAT_RAW_SET_TP_SRC, field, out);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void sycc444_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b;
const int *y, *cb, *cr;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, i;
int offset, upb;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1 << (upb - 1);
upb = (1 << upb) - 1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w;
maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if (r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) {
goto fails;
}
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y;
++cb;
++cr;
++r;
++g;
++b;
}
opj_image_data_free(img->comps[0].data);
img->comps[0].data = d0;
opj_image_data_free(img->comps[1].data);
img->comps[1].data = d1;
opj_image_data_free(img->comps[2].data);
img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
opj_image_data_free(r);
opj_image_data_free(g);
opj_image_data_free(b);
}/* sycc444_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: color_apply_icc_profile: avoid potential heap buffer overflow
Derived from a patch by Thuan Pham
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int rtecp_decipher(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *out, size_t out_len)
{
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && data && out);
/* decipher */
r = rtecp_cipher(card, data, data_len, out, out_len, 0);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void br_netfilter_fini(void)
{
nf_unregister_hooks(br_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(br_nf_ops));
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
unregister_sysctl_table(brnf_sysctl_header);
#endif
dst_entries_destroy(&fake_dst_ops);
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInDoubleClickWindow(const TouchEvent& event) const {
return IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() &&
IsSecondClickInsideManhattanSquare(event);
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ReadableStreamReader::error()
{
ASSERT(isActive());
m_closed->reject(m_stream->storedException());
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: unsigned HTMLSelectElement::length() const
{
unsigned options = 0;
const Vector<HTMLElement*>& items = listItems();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < items.size(); ++i) {
if (items[i]->hasTagName(optionTag))
++options;
}
return options;
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ProcPanoramiXQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
/* REQUEST(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq); */
xPanoramiXQueryVersionReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.majorVersion = SERVER_PANORAMIX_MAJOR_VERSION,
.minorVersion = SERVER_PANORAMIX_MINOR_VERSION
};
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq);
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swaps(&rep.majorVersion);
swaps(&rep.minorVersion);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::receivedMainResourceError(const ResourceError& error)
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
RefPtr<DocumentLoader> loader = activeDocumentLoader();
if (m_frame->document()->parser())
m_frame->document()->parser()->stopParsing();
ResourceError c(ResourceError::cancelledError(KURL()));
if (error.errorCode() != c.errorCode() || error.domain() != c.domain())
handleFallbackContent();
if (m_state == FrameStateProvisional && m_provisionalDocumentLoader) {
m_client->dispatchDidFailProvisionalLoad(error);
if (loader != m_provisionalDocumentLoader)
return;
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->detachFromFrame();
m_provisionalDocumentLoader = 0;
m_progressTracker->progressCompleted();
m_state = FrameStateComplete;
RefPtr<HistoryItem> item = m_frame->page()->mainFrame()->loader()->history()->currentItem();
if (isBackForwardLoadType(loadType()) && !history()->provisionalItem() && item)
m_frame->page()->backForward().setCurrentItem(item.get());
}
checkCompleted();
if (m_frame->page())
checkLoadComplete();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline int mov_get_stsc_samples(MOVStreamContext *sc, int index)
{
int chunk_count;
if (mov_stsc_index_valid(index, sc->stsc_count))
chunk_count = sc->stsc_data[index + 1].first - sc->stsc_data[index].first;
else
chunk_count = sc->chunk_count - (sc->stsc_data[index].first - 1);
return sc->stsc_data[index].count * chunk_count;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RestoreScissorBox() {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->Scissor(scissor_box_[0], scissor_box_[1], scissor_box_[2],
scissor_box_[3]);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::ActivateWindow() {
if (IsDocked() && GetInspectedBrowserWindow())
web_contents_->GetView()->Focus();
else if (!IsDocked() && !browser_->window()->IsActive())
browser_->window()->Activate();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static irqreturn_t airo_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct net_device *dev = dev_id;
u16 status, savedInterrupts = 0;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
int handled = 0;
if (!netif_device_present(dev))
return IRQ_NONE;
for (;;) {
status = IN4500(ai, EVSTAT);
if (!(status & STATUS_INTS) || (status == 0xffff))
break;
handled = 1;
if (status & EV_AWAKE) {
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_AWAKE);
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_AWAKE);
}
if (!savedInterrupts) {
savedInterrupts = IN4500(ai, EVINTEN);
OUT4500(ai, EVINTEN, 0);
}
if (status & EV_MIC) {
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_MIC);
airo_handle_cisco_mic(ai);
}
if (status & EV_LINK) {
/* Link status changed */
airo_handle_link(ai);
}
/* Check to see if there is something to receive */
if (status & EV_RX)
airo_handle_rx(ai);
/* Check to see if a packet has been transmitted */
if (status & (EV_TX | EV_TXCPY | EV_TXEXC))
airo_handle_tx(ai, status);
if ( status & ~STATUS_INTS & ~IGNORE_INTS ) {
airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Got weird status %x",
status & ~STATUS_INTS & ~IGNORE_INTS );
}
}
if (savedInterrupts)
OUT4500(ai, EVINTEN, savedInterrupts);
return IRQ_RETVAL(handled);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void NavigationController::UpdateVirtualURLToURL(
NavigationEntry* entry, const GURL& new_url) {
GURL new_virtual_url(new_url);
if (BrowserURLHandler::ReverseURLRewrite(
&new_virtual_url, entry->virtual_url(), profile_)) {
entry->set_virtual_url(new_virtual_url);
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int proc_pid_readdir(struct file * filp, void * dirent, filldir_t filldir)
{
unsigned int nr;
struct task_struct *reaper;
struct tgid_iter iter;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
if (filp->f_pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET)
goto out_no_task;
nr = filp->f_pos - FIRST_PROCESS_ENTRY;
reaper = get_proc_task(filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (!reaper)
goto out_no_task;
for (; nr < ARRAY_SIZE(proc_base_stuff); filp->f_pos++, nr++) {
const struct pid_entry *p = &proc_base_stuff[nr];
if (proc_base_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, reaper, p) < 0)
goto out;
}
ns = filp->f_dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
iter.task = NULL;
iter.tgid = filp->f_pos - TGID_OFFSET;
for (iter = next_tgid(ns, iter);
iter.task;
iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) {
filp->f_pos = iter.tgid + TGID_OFFSET;
if (proc_pid_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, iter) < 0) {
put_task_struct(iter.task);
goto out;
}
}
filp->f_pos = PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET;
out:
put_task_struct(reaper);
out_no_task:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidRedirectNavigation(
NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidRedirectNavigation(navigation_handle);
if (navigation_handle->GetReloadType() != ReloadType::NONE) {
NavigationHandleImpl* nhi =
static_cast<NavigationHandleImpl*>(navigation_handle);
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
nhi->frame_tree_node()
->current_frame_host()
->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->UserIsReloading();
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: compat_do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IPT_SO_GET_INFO:
ret = get_info(sock_net(sk), user, len, 1);
break;
case IPT_SO_GET_ENTRIES:
ret = compat_get_entries(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
default:
ret = do_ipt_get_ctl(sk, cmd, user, len);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static uint8_t msix_pending_mask(int vector)
{
return 1 << (vector % 8);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 15,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out,
const tor_addr_t *addr,
uint32_t ttl)
{
const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
int connected_payload_len;
/* should be needless */
memset(payload_out, 0, MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
if (family == AF_INET) {
set_uint32(payload_out, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(addr));
connected_payload_len = 4;
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
set_uint32(payload_out, 0);
set_uint8(payload_out + 4, 6);
memcpy(payload_out + 5, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(addr), 16);
connected_payload_len = 21;
} else {
return -1;
}
set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(ttl)));
connected_payload_len += 4;
tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
return connected_payload_len;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline int crash_local_vmclear_enabled(int cpu)
{
return cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: virtual ~WindowedPersonalDataManagerObserver() {
if (!infobar_service_)
return;
InfoBarDelegate* infobar = NULL;
if (infobar_service_->GetInfoBarCount() > 0 &&
(infobar = infobar_service_->GetInfoBarDelegateAt(0))) {
infobar_service_->RemoveInfoBar(infobar);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 118,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionTestWithArg(
const std::string& extension_name,
const char* custom_arg) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name, std::string(), custom_arg,
kFlagEnableFileAccess);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct file *sock_alloc_file(struct socket *sock, int flags, const char *dname)
{
struct qstr name = { .name = "" };
struct path path;
struct file *file;
if (dname) {
name.name = dname;
name.len = strlen(name.name);
} else if (sock->sk) {
name.name = sock->sk->sk_prot_creator->name;
name.len = strlen(name.name);
}
path.dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(sock_mnt->mnt_sb, &name);
if (unlikely(!path.dentry))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
path.mnt = mntget(sock_mnt);
d_instantiate(path.dentry, SOCK_INODE(sock));
file = alloc_file(&path, FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE,
&socket_file_ops);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
/* drop dentry, keep inode */
ihold(d_inode(path.dentry));
path_put(&path);
return file;
}
sock->file = file;
file->f_flags = O_RDWR | (flags & O_NONBLOCK);
file->private_data = sock;
return file;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 50,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::SendOutstandingReplies(
EstablishChannelStatus failure_status) {
DCHECK_NE(failure_status, EstablishChannelStatus::SUCCESS);
valid_ = false;
while (!channel_requests_.empty()) {
auto callback = channel_requests_.front();
channel_requests_.pop();
std::move(callback).Run(mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle(), gpu::GPUInfo(),
gpu::GpuFeatureInfo(), failure_status);
}
while (!create_gpu_memory_buffer_requests_.empty()) {
auto callback = std::move(create_gpu_memory_buffer_requests_.front());
create_gpu_memory_buffer_requests_.pop();
std::move(callback).Run(gfx::GpuMemoryBufferHandle(),
BufferCreationStatus::GPU_HOST_INVALID);
}
if (!send_destroying_video_surface_done_cb_.is_null())
base::ResetAndReturn(&send_destroying_video_surface_done_cb_).Run();
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int vector)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
/*
* If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
* we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
*/
vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
/* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, true))
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::resetLinkColor()
{
m_linkColor = Color(0, 0, 238);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionApiTest::ExtensionApiTest() {
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleServerRedirectRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleEchoHeaderRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleSetCookieRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleSetHeaderRequest));
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseURI(const char *str) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
int ret;
if (str == NULL)
return(NULL);
uri = xmlCreateURI();
if (uri != NULL) {
ret = xmlParse3986URIReference(uri, str);
if (ret) {
xmlFreeURI(uri);
return(NULL);
}
}
return(uri);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ref_param_read_string_value(gs_memory_t *mem, const iparam_loc * ploc, gs_param_string * pvalue)
{
const ref *pref = ploc->pvalue;
switch (r_type(pref)) {
case t_name: {
ref nref;
name_string_ref(mem, pref, &nref);
pvalue->data = nref.value.const_bytes;
pvalue->size = r_size(&nref);
pvalue->persistent = true;
}
break;
case t_string:
iparam_check_read(*ploc);
pvalue->data = pref->value.const_bytes;
pvalue->size = r_size(pref);
pvalue->persistent = false;
break;
case t_astruct:
/* Note: technically, instead of the "mem" argument, we
should be using the plists's ref_memory. However, in a
simple call to .putdeviceparams, they are identical. */
iparam_check_read(*ploc);
if (gs_object_type(mem, pref->value.pstruct) != &st_bytes)
return iparam_note_error(*ploc, gs_error_typecheck);
pvalue->data = r_ptr(pref, byte);
pvalue->size = gs_object_size(mem, pref->value.pstruct);
pvalue->persistent = false;
break;
default:
return iparam_note_error(*ploc, gs_error_typecheck);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::requiredAttributeChanged()
{
HTMLTextFormControlElement::requiredAttributeChanged();
if (CheckedRadioButtons* buttons = checkedRadioButtons())
buttons->requiredAttributeChanged(this);
m_inputTypeView->requiredAttributeChanged();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ResetLoadProgressState() {
frame_tree_.ResetLoadProgress();
loading_weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
loading_last_progress_update_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static size_t safecatd(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, double d,
int precision)
{
char number[64];
sprintf(number, "%.*f", precision, d);
return safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, number);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->interrupt_allowed(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int UDPSocketWin::Connect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
net_log_.BeginEvent(NetLog::TYPE_UDP_CONNECT,
CreateNetLogUDPConnectCallback(&address));
int rv = InternalConnect(address);
if (rv != OK)
Close();
net_log_.EndEventWithNetErrorCode(NetLog::TYPE_UDP_CONNECT, rv);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ft_var_load_avar( TT_Face face )
{
FT_Stream stream = FT_FACE_STREAM(face);
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
GX_Blend blend = face->blend;
GX_AVarSegment segment;
FT_Error error = TT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong version;
FT_Long axisCount;
FT_Int i, j;
FT_ULong table_len;
FT_UNUSED( error );
blend->avar_checked = TRUE;
if ( (error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_avar, stream, &table_len )) != 0 )
return;
if ( FT_FRAME_ENTER( table_len ) )
return;
version = FT_GET_LONG();
axisCount = FT_GET_LONG();
if ( version != 0x00010000L ||
axisCount != (FT_Long)blend->mmvar->num_axis )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( blend->avar_segment, axisCount ) )
goto Exit;
segment = &blend->avar_segment[0];
for ( i = 0; i < axisCount; ++i, ++segment )
{
segment->pairCount = FT_GET_USHORT();
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( segment->correspondence, segment->pairCount ) )
{
/* Failure. Free everything we have done so far. We must do */
/* it right now since loading the `avar' table is optional. */
for ( j = i - 1; j >= 0; --j )
FT_FREE( blend->avar_segment[j].correspondence );
FT_FREE( blend->avar_segment );
blend->avar_segment = NULL;
goto Exit;
}
for ( j = 0; j < segment->pairCount; ++j )
{
segment->correspondence[j].fromCoord =
FT_GET_SHORT() << 2; /* convert to Fixed */
segment->correspondence[j].toCoord =
FT_GET_SHORT()<<2; /* convert to Fixed */
}
}
Exit:
FT_FRAME_EXIT();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline void sanitize_key(unsigned flags, char *str, size_t len, zval *zv, zend_bool *rfc5987 TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *eos;
zval_dtor(zv);
php_trim(str, len, NULL, 0, zv, 3 TSRMLS_CC);
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_ESCAPED) {
sanitize_escaped(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!Z_STRLEN_P(zv)) {
return;
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5987) {
eos = &Z_STRVAL_P(zv)[Z_STRLEN_P(zv)-1];
if (*eos == '*') {
*eos = '\0';
*rfc5987 = 1;
Z_STRLEN_P(zv) -= 1;
}
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_URLENCODED) {
sanitize_urlencoded(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_DIMENSION) {
sanitize_dimension(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 94,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void mmu_pte_write_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool zap_page,
bool remote_flush, bool local_flush)
{
if (zap_page)
return;
if (remote_flush)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
else if (local_flush)
kvm_mmu_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_shutdown_ack(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = (struct sctp_chunk *) arg;
struct sctp_chunk *reply;
/* There are 2 ways of getting here:
* 1) called in response to a SHUTDOWN chunk
* 2) called when SCTP_EVENT_NO_PENDING_TSN event is issued.
*
* For the case (2), the arg parameter is set to NULL. We need
* to check that we have a chunk before accessing it's fields.
*/
if (chunk) {
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_shutdown_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
}
/* If it has no more outstanding DATA chunks, the SHUTDOWN receiver
* shall send a SHUTDOWN ACK ...
*/
reply = sctp_make_shutdown_ack(asoc, chunk);
if (!reply)
goto nomem;
/* Set the transport for the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk and the timeout for
* the T2-shutdown timer.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SETUP_T2, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
/* and start/restart a T2-shutdown timer of its own, */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN));
if (asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE])
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE));
/* Enter the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT));
/* sctp-implguide 2.10 Issues with Heartbeating and failover
*
* HEARTBEAT ... is discontinued after sending either SHUTDOWN
* or SHUTDOWN-ACK.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_HB_TIMERS_STOP, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> withScriptStateAttributeAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptStateAttribute._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* state = ScriptState::current();
if (!state)
return v8::Undefined();
return v8::Integer::New(imp->withScriptStateAttribute(state));
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int _server_handle_ques(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char message[64];
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
snprintf (message, sizeof (message) - 1, "T05thread:%x;", cmd_cb (core_ptr, "dptr", NULL, 0));
return send_msg (g, message);
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: GDataDirectoryService::GDataDirectoryService()
: blocking_task_runner_(NULL),
serialized_size_(0),
largest_changestamp_(0),
origin_(UNINITIALIZED),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
root_.reset(new GDataDirectory(NULL, this));
if (!util::IsDriveV2ApiEnabled())
InitializeRootEntry(kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void VirtIONetRelease(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
BOOLEAN b;
ULONG i;
DEBUG_ENTRY(0);
/* list NetReceiveBuffersWaiting must be free */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE(pContext->ReceiveQueues); i++)
{
pRxNetDescriptor pBufferDescriptor;
while (NULL != (pBufferDescriptor = ReceiveQueueGetBuffer(pContext->ReceiveQueues + i)))
{
pBufferDescriptor->Queue->ReuseReceiveBuffer(FALSE, pBufferDescriptor);
}
}
do
{
b = pContext->m_upstreamPacketPending != 0;
if (b)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] There are waiting buffers\n", __FUNCTION__));
PrintStatistics(pContext);
NdisMSleep(5000000);
}
} while (b);
RestoreMAC(pContext);
for (i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
if (pContext->pPathBundles[i].txCreated)
{
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.Shutdown();
}
if (pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxCreated)
{
pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.Shutdown();
/* this can be freed, queue shut down */
pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.FreeRxDescriptorsFromList();
}
}
if (pContext->bCXPathCreated)
{
pContext->CXPath.Shutdown();
}
PrintStatistics(pContext);
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void hns_disable_serdes_lb(struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct hnae_handle *h = priv->ae_handle;
struct hnae_ae_ops *ops = h->dev->ops;
ops->stop(h);
ops->set_loopback(h, MAC_INTERNALLOOP_SERDES, 0);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void camellia_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
const struct camellia_ctx *cctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
const __be32 *src = (const __be32 *)in;
__be32 *dst = (__be32 *)out;
unsigned int max;
u32 tmp[4];
tmp[0] = be32_to_cpu(src[0]);
tmp[1] = be32_to_cpu(src[1]);
tmp[2] = be32_to_cpu(src[2]);
tmp[3] = be32_to_cpu(src[3]);
if (cctx->key_length == 16)
max = 24;
else
max = 32; /* for key lengths of 24 and 32 */
camellia_do_decrypt(cctx->key_table, tmp, max);
/* do_decrypt returns 0,1 swapped with 2,3 */
dst[0] = cpu_to_be32(tmp[2]);
dst[1] = cpu_to_be32(tmp[3]);
dst[2] = cpu_to_be32(tmp[0]);
dst[3] = cpu_to_be32(tmp[1]);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void BackingStoreGtk::XShowRect(const gfx::Point &origin,
const gfx::Rect& rect, XID target) {
XCopyArea(display_, pixmap_, target, static_cast<GC>(pixmap_gc_),
rect.x(), rect.y(), rect.width(), rect.height(),
rect.x() + origin.x(), rect.y() + origin.y());
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebKitTestController::WebContentsDestroyed() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
printer_->AddErrorMessage("FAIL: main window was destroyed");
DiscardMainWindow();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int __cpuinit sched_cpu_active(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_ONLINE:
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
set_cpu_active((long)hcpu, true);
return NOTIFY_OK;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: DefragGetOsPolicy(Packet *p)
{
int policy = -1;
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
policy = SCHInfoGetIPv4HostOSFlavour((uint8_t *)GET_IPV4_DST_ADDR_PTR(p));
}
else if (PKT_IS_IPV6(p)) {
policy = SCHInfoGetIPv6HostOSFlavour((uint8_t *)GET_IPV6_DST_ADDR(p));
}
if (policy == -1) {
return default_policy;
}
/* Map the OS policies returned from the configured host info to
* defrag specific policies. */
switch (policy) {
/* BSD. */
case OS_POLICY_BSD:
case OS_POLICY_HPUX10:
case OS_POLICY_IRIX:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_BSD;
/* BSD-Right. */
case OS_POLICY_BSD_RIGHT:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_BSD_RIGHT;
/* Linux. */
case OS_POLICY_OLD_LINUX:
case OS_POLICY_LINUX:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_LINUX;
/* First. */
case OS_POLICY_OLD_SOLARIS:
case OS_POLICY_HPUX11:
case OS_POLICY_MACOS:
case OS_POLICY_FIRST:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_FIRST;
/* Solaris. */
case OS_POLICY_SOLARIS:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_SOLARIS;
/* Windows. */
case OS_POLICY_WINDOWS:
case OS_POLICY_VISTA:
case OS_POLICY_WINDOWS2K3:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_WINDOWS;
/* Last. */
case OS_POLICY_LAST:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_LAST;
default:
return default_policy;
}
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 67,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void TabletModeWindowState::UpdateBounds(wm::WindowState* window_state,
bool animated) {
if (wm::IsDraggingTabs(window_state->window()))
return;
if (current_state_type_ == WindowStateType::kMinimized)
return;
gfx::Rect bounds_in_parent = GetBoundsInTabletMode(window_state);
if (!bounds_in_parent.IsEmpty() &&
bounds_in_parent != window_state->window()->bounds()) {
if (!window_state->window()->IsVisible() || !animated) {
window_state->SetBoundsDirect(bounds_in_parent);
} else {
if (enter_animation_type() == STEP_END) {
window_state->SetBoundsDirectAnimated(bounds_in_parent,
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1),
gfx::Tween::ZERO);
set_enter_animation_type(DEFAULT);
return;
}
if (window_state->IsMaximized())
window_state->SetBoundsDirectCrossFade(bounds_in_parent);
else if (window_state->IsSnapped())
window_state->SetBoundsDirect(bounds_in_parent);
else
window_state->SetBoundsDirectAnimated(bounds_in_parent);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_illinois_acked(struct sock *sk, u32 pkts_acked, s32 rtt)
{
struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
ca->acked = pkts_acked;
/* dup ack, no rtt sample */
if (rtt < 0)
return;
/* ignore bogus values, this prevents wraparound in alpha math */
if (rtt > RTT_MAX)
rtt = RTT_MAX;
/* keep track of minimum RTT seen so far */
if (ca->base_rtt > rtt)
ca->base_rtt = rtt;
/* and max */
if (ca->max_rtt < rtt)
ca->max_rtt = rtt;
++ca->cnt_rtt;
ca->sum_rtt += rtt;
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::RetrieveSurrounding(std::string* text,
size_t* cursor_index) {
if (!selection_range_.IsValid())
return false;
size_t offset = selection_range_.GetMin() - selection_text_offset_;
DCHECK(offset <= selection_text_.length());
if (offset == selection_text_.length()) {
*text = UTF16ToUTF8(selection_text_);
*cursor_index = text->length();
return true;
}
*text = UTF16ToUTF8AndAdjustOffset(
base::StringPiece16(selection_text_), &offset);
if (offset == string16::npos) {
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid offset in UTF16 string.";
return false;
}
*cursor_index = offset;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: clear_mml(MinMax* l)
{
l->min = l->max = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static ext4_lblk_t ext4_ext_next_leaf_block(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
int depth;
BUG_ON(path == NULL);
depth = path->p_depth;
/* zero-tree has no leaf blocks at all */
if (depth == 0)
return EXT_MAX_BLOCK;
/* go to index block */
depth--;
while (depth >= 0) {
if (path[depth].p_idx !=
EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[depth].p_hdr))
return (ext4_lblk_t)
le32_to_cpu(path[depth].p_idx[1].ei_block);
depth--;
}
return EXT_MAX_BLOCK;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: mcopy(struct magic_set *ms, union VALUETYPE *p, int type, int indir,
const unsigned char *s, uint32_t offset, size_t nbytes, struct magic *m)
{
/*
* Note: FILE_SEARCH and FILE_REGEX do not actually copy
* anything, but setup pointers into the source
*/
if (indir == 0) {
switch (type) {
case FILE_SEARCH:
ms->search.s = RCAST(const char *, s) + offset;
ms->search.s_len = nbytes - offset;
ms->search.offset = offset;
return 0;
case FILE_REGEX: {
const char *b;
const char *c;
const char *last; /* end of search region */
const char *buf; /* start of search region */
const char *end;
size_t lines, linecnt, bytecnt;
if (s == NULL) {
ms->search.s_len = 0;
ms->search.s = NULL;
return 0;
}
if (m->str_flags & REGEX_LINE_COUNT) {
linecnt = m->str_range;
bytecnt = linecnt * 80;
} else {
linecnt = 0;
bytecnt = m->str_range;
}
if (bytecnt == 0)
bytecnt = 8192;
if (bytecnt > nbytes)
bytecnt = nbytes;
buf = RCAST(const char *, s) + offset;
end = last = RCAST(const char *, s) + bytecnt;
/* mget() guarantees buf <= last */
for (lines = linecnt, b = buf; lines && b < end &&
((b = CAST(const char *,
memchr(c = b, '\n', CAST(size_t, (end - b)))))
|| (b = CAST(const char *,
memchr(c, '\r', CAST(size_t, (end - c))))));
lines--, b++) {
last = b;
if (b[0] == '\r' && b[1] == '\n')
b++;
}
if (lines)
last = RCAST(const char *, s) + bytecnt;
ms->search.s = buf;
ms->search.s_len = last - buf;
ms->search.offset = offset;
ms->search.rm_len = 0;
return 0;
}
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
const unsigned char *src = s + offset;
const unsigned char *esrc = s + nbytes;
char *dst = p->s;
char *edst = &p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1];
if (type == FILE_BESTRING16)
src++;
/* check that offset is within range */
if (offset >= nbytes)
break;
for (/*EMPTY*/; src < esrc; src += 2, dst++) {
if (dst < edst)
*dst = *src;
else
break;
if (*dst == '\0') {
if (type == FILE_BESTRING16 ?
*(src - 1) != '\0' :
*(src + 1) != '\0')
*dst = ' ';
}
}
*edst = '\0';
return 0;
}
case FILE_STRING: /* XXX - these two should not need */
case FILE_PSTRING: /* to copy anything, but do anyway. */
default:
break;
}
}
if (offset >= nbytes) {
(void)memset(p, '\0', sizeof(*p));
return 0;
}
if (nbytes - offset < sizeof(*p))
nbytes = nbytes - offset;
else
nbytes = sizeof(*p);
(void)memcpy(p, s + offset, nbytes);
/*
* the usefulness of padding with zeroes eludes me, it
* might even cause problems
*/
if (nbytes < sizeof(*p))
(void)memset(((char *)(void *)p) + nbytes, '\0',
sizeof(*p) - nbytes);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
} else {
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *data;
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: header_bin_le(struct archive_read *a, struct cpio *cpio,
struct archive_entry *entry, size_t *namelength, size_t *name_pad)
{
const void *h;
const unsigned char *header;
a->archive.archive_format = ARCHIVE_FORMAT_CPIO_BIN_LE;
a->archive.archive_format_name = "cpio (little-endian binary)";
/* Read fixed-size portion of header. */
h = __archive_read_ahead(a, bin_header_size, NULL);
if (h == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"End of file trying to read next cpio header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Parse out binary fields. */
header = (const unsigned char *)h;
archive_entry_set_dev(entry, header[bin_dev_offset] + header[bin_dev_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_ino(entry, header[bin_ino_offset] + header[bin_ino_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_mode(entry, header[bin_mode_offset] + header[bin_mode_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_uid(entry, header[bin_uid_offset] + header[bin_uid_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_gid(entry, header[bin_gid_offset] + header[bin_gid_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_nlink(entry, header[bin_nlink_offset] + header[bin_nlink_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_rdev(entry, header[bin_rdev_offset] + header[bin_rdev_offset + 1] * 256);
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, le4(header + bin_mtime_offset), 0);
*namelength = header[bin_namesize_offset] + header[bin_namesize_offset + 1] * 256;
*name_pad = *namelength & 1; /* Pad to even. */
cpio->entry_bytes_remaining = le4(header + bin_filesize_offset);
archive_entry_set_size(entry, cpio->entry_bytes_remaining);
cpio->entry_padding = cpio->entry_bytes_remaining & 1; /* Pad to even. */
__archive_read_consume(a, bin_header_size);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 52,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_sigprocmask, int, how, compat_sigset_t __user *, nset,
compat_sigset_t __user *, oset, compat_size_t, sigsetsize)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
sigset_t old_set = current->blocked;
/* XXX: Don't preclude handling different sized sigset_t's. */
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (nset) {
compat_sigset_t new32;
sigset_t new_set;
int error;
if (copy_from_user(&new32, nset, sizeof(compat_sigset_t)))
return -EFAULT;
sigset_from_compat(&new_set, &new32);
sigdelsetmask(&new_set, sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
error = sigprocmask(how, &new_set, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
}
if (oset) {
compat_sigset_t old32;
sigset_to_compat(&old32, &old_set);
if (copy_to_user(oset, &old32, sizeof(compat_sigset_t)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
#else
return sys_rt_sigprocmask(how, (sigset_t __user *)nset,
(sigset_t __user *)oset, sigsetsize);
#endif
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::InitDecoder() {
HMODULE decoder_dll = ::GetModuleHandle(L"msmpeg2vdec.dll");
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(decoder_dll,
"msmpeg2vdec.dll required for decoding is not loaded",
false);
typedef HRESULT (WINAPI* GetClassObject)(const CLSID& clsid,
const IID& iid,
void** object);
GetClassObject get_class_object = reinterpret_cast<GetClassObject>(
GetProcAddress(decoder_dll, "DllGetClassObject"));
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(get_class_object,
"Failed to get DllGetClassObject pointer", false);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IClassFactory> factory;
HRESULT hr = get_class_object(__uuidof(CMSH264DecoderMFT),
__uuidof(IClassFactory),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(factory.Receive()));
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "DllGetClassObject for decoder failed", false);
hr = factory->CreateInstance(NULL, __uuidof(IMFTransform),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(decoder_.Receive()));
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to create decoder instance", false);
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(CheckDecoderDxvaSupport(),
"Failed to check decoder DXVA support", false);
hr = decoder_->ProcessMessage(
MFT_MESSAGE_SET_D3D_MANAGER,
reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(device_manager_));
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to pass D3D manager to decoder", false);
EGLint config_attribs[] = {
EGL_BUFFER_SIZE, 32,
EGL_RED_SIZE, 8,
EGL_GREEN_SIZE, 8,
EGL_BLUE_SIZE, 8,
EGL_SURFACE_TYPE, EGL_PBUFFER_BIT,
EGL_ALPHA_SIZE, 0,
EGL_NONE
};
EGLint num_configs;
if (!eglChooseConfig(
static_cast<EGLDisplay*>(eglGetDisplay(EGL_DEFAULT_DISPLAY)),
config_attribs,
&egl_config_,
1,
&num_configs)) {
return false;
}
return SetDecoderMediaTypes();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void StubOfflinePageModel::DeletePagesByOfflineId(
const std::vector<int64_t>& offline_ids,
const DeletePageCallback& callback) {}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: encode_SET_L4_port(const struct ofpact_l4_port *l4_port,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, enum ofp_raw_action_type raw,
enum mf_field_id field, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint16_t port = l4_port->port;
if (ofp_version >= OFP12_VERSION && field != MFF_N_IDS) {
put_set_field(out, ofp_version, field, port);
} else {
ofpact_put_raw(out, ofp_version, raw, port);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static HB_Error Lookup_ContextPos3( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_ContextPosFormat3* cpf3,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort flags,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UShort index, i, j, property;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_Coverage* c;
HB_GDEFHeader* gdef;
gdef = gpos->gdef;
if ( CHECK_Property( gdef, IN_CURITEM(), flags, &property ) )
return error;
if ( context_length != 0xFFFF && context_length < cpf3->GlyphCount )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( buffer->in_pos + cpf3->GlyphCount > buffer->in_length )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered; /* context is too long */
c = cpf3->Coverage;
for ( i = 1, j = 1; i < cpf3->GlyphCount; i++, j++ )
{
while ( CHECK_Property( gdef, IN_ITEM( j ), flags, &property ) )
{
if ( error && error != HB_Err_Not_Covered )
return error;
if ( j + cpf3->GlyphCount - i == (HB_Int)buffer->in_length )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
j++;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &c[i], IN_GLYPH( j ), &index );
if ( error )
return error;
}
return Do_ContextPos( gpi, cpf3->GlyphCount,
cpf3->PosCount, cpf3->PosLookupRecord,
buffer,
nesting_level );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
char *certname,
char *keyname,
int cindex)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
X509 *x = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *y = NULL;
/* load the certificate */
retval = get_cert(certname, &x);
if (retval != 0 || x == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to load user's certificate from '%s'\n", certname);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = get_key(keyname, &y);
if (retval != 0 || y == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to load user's private key from '%s'\n", keyname);
goto cleanup;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->name = reassemble_files_name(certname,
keyname);
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert = x;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id_len = 0;
#endif
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->key = y;
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex+1] = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (y != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(y);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static QString findImageForSpecImagePath(const QString &_path)
{
QString path = _path;
if (path.startsWith(QLatin1String("file:"))) {
QUrl url(path);
path = url.toLocalFile();
}
return KIconLoader::global()->iconPath(path, -KIconLoader::SizeHuge,
true /* canReturnNull */);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int hugetlb_sysfs_add_hstate(struct hstate *h, struct kobject *parent,
struct kobject **hstate_kobjs,
const struct attribute_group *hstate_attr_group)
{
int retval;
int hi = hstate_index(h);
hstate_kobjs[hi] = kobject_create_and_add(h->name, parent);
if (!hstate_kobjs[hi])
return -ENOMEM;
retval = sysfs_create_group(hstate_kobjs[hi], hstate_attr_group);
if (retval)
kobject_put(hstate_kobjs[hi]);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int bdev_try_to_free_page(struct super_block *sb, struct page *page,
gfp_t wait)
{
journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
WARN_ON(PageChecked(page));
if (!page_has_buffers(page))
return 0;
if (journal)
return jbd2_journal_try_to_free_buffers(journal, page,
wait & ~__GFP_WAIT);
return try_to_free_buffers(page);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: WebMediaPlayer::CORSMode HTMLMediaElement::CorsMode() const {
const AtomicString& cross_origin_mode = FastGetAttribute(crossoriginAttr);
if (cross_origin_mode.IsNull())
return WebMediaPlayer::kCORSModeUnspecified;
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(cross_origin_mode, "use-credentials"))
return WebMediaPlayer::kCORSModeUseCredentials;
return WebMediaPlayer::kCORSModeAnonymous;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void vb2_warn_zero_bytesused(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
{
static bool check_once;
if (check_once)
return;
check_once = true;
WARN_ON(1);
pr_warn("use of bytesused == 0 is deprecated and will be removed in the future,\n");
if (vb->vb2_queue->allow_zero_bytesused)
pr_warn("use VIDIOC_DECODER_CMD(V4L2_DEC_CMD_STOP) instead.\n");
else
pr_warn("use the actual size instead.\n");
}
Commit Message: [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct inode *ovl_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode,
struct ovl_entry *oe)
{
struct inode *inode;
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (!inode)
return NULL;
mode &= S_IFMT;
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
inode->i_mode = mode;
inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME | S_NOCMTIME;
switch (mode) {
case S_IFDIR:
inode->i_private = oe;
inode->i_op = &ovl_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &ovl_dir_operations;
break;
case S_IFLNK:
inode->i_op = &ovl_symlink_inode_operations;
break;
case S_IFREG:
case S_IFSOCK:
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFCHR:
case S_IFIFO:
inode->i_op = &ovl_file_inode_operations;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "illegal file type: %i\n", mode);
iput(inode);
inode = NULL;
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 41,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::FreezePage() {
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_FreezePage(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void InspectorController::connectFrontend(InspectorFrontendChannel* frontendChannel)
{
ASSERT(frontendChannel);
initializeDeferredAgents();
m_inspectorFrontend = adoptPtr(new InspectorFrontend(frontendChannel));
m_state->unmute();
m_agents.setFrontend(m_inspectorFrontend.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::registerInstrumentingAgents(m_instrumentingAgents.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::frontendCreated();
ASSERT(m_inspectorClient);
m_inspectorBackendDispatcher = InspectorBackendDispatcher::create(frontendChannel);
m_agents.registerInDispatcher(m_inspectorBackendDispatcher.get());
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void select_bad_process(struct oom_control *oc)
{
if (is_memcg_oom(oc))
mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, oom_evaluate_task, oc);
else {
struct task_struct *p;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_process(p)
if (oom_evaluate_task(p, oc))
break;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
oc->chosen_points = oc->chosen_points * 1000 / oc->totalpages;
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: path_send(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
StringInfoData buf;
int32 i;
pq_begintypsend(&buf);
pq_sendbyte(&buf, path->closed ? 1 : 0);
pq_sendint(&buf, path->npts, sizeof(int32));
for (i = 0; i < path->npts; i++)
{
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, path->p[i].x);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, path->p[i].y);
}
PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(pq_endtypsend(&buf));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::SetImeBlocked(bool ime_blocked) {
TRACE_EVENT1("exo", "ClientControlledShellSurface::SetImeBlocked",
"ime_blocked", ime_blocked);
if (!widget_)
CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL);
WMHelper::GetInstance()->SetImeBlocked(widget_->GetNativeWindow(),
ime_blocked);
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must "
"not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, params,
params_len, md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before signature length read
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void put_nfs_open_context_sync(struct nfs_open_context *ctx)
{
__put_nfs_open_context(ctx, 1);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl::~RenderWidgetHostImpl() {
SetView(NULL);
BackingStoreManager::RemoveBackingStore(this);
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->RemoveSurface(surface_id_);
surface_id_ = 0;
process_->Release(routing_id_);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetDeleted(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::BindAndApplyTextureParameters(
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info) {
glBindTexture(info->target(), info->service_id());
glTexParameteri(info->target(), GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, info->min_filter());
glTexParameteri(info->target(), GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, info->mag_filter());
glTexParameteri(info->target(), GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, info->wrap_s());
glTexParameteri(info->target(), GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, info->wrap_t());
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: GURL WebSocketJob::GetURLForCookies() const {
GURL url = socket_->url();
std::string scheme = socket_->is_secure() ? "https" : "http";
url_canon::Replacements<char> replacements;
replacements.SetScheme(scheme.c_str(),
url_parse::Component(0, scheme.length()));
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 98,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void __sctp_write_space(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
if ((sctp_wspace(asoc) > 0) && sock) {
if (waitqueue_active(&asoc->wait))
wake_up_interruptible(&asoc->wait);
if (sctp_writeable(sk)) {
if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep);
/* Note that we try to include the Async I/O support
* here by modeling from the current TCP/UDP code.
* We have not tested with it yet.
*/
if (sock->fasync_list &&
!(sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
sock_wake_async(sock, 2, POLL_OUT);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x)
{
BUF_MEM *b = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
void *ret = NULL;
int len;
len = asn1_d2i_read_bio(in, &b);
if (len < 0)
goto err;
p = (unsigned char *)b->data;
ret = d2i(x, &p, len);
err:
BUF_MEM_free(b);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void blk_mq_stop_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
cancel_delayed_work(&hctx->run_work);
cancel_delayed_work(&hctx->delay_work);
set_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
unsigned int segno, offset;
struct seg_entry *se;
bool is_cp = false;
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
return true;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
segno = GET_SEGNO(sbi, blkaddr);
se = get_seg_entry(sbi, segno);
offset = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blkaddr);
if (f2fs_test_bit(offset, se->ckpt_valid_map))
is_cp = true;
mutex_unlock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
return is_cp;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
namespace_lock();
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
namespace_unlock();
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return ERR_CAST(tree);
return &tree->mnt;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: IntSize Document::viewportSize() const
{
if (!view())
return IntSize();
return view()->visibleContentRect(ScrollableArea::IncludeScrollbars).size();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: tsize_t t2p_write_pdf_xobject_icccs_stream(T2P* t2p, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
written += t2p_write_pdf_stream(
(tdata_t) t2p->tiff_iccprofile,
(tsize_t) t2p->tiff_iccprofilelength,
output);
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoMultiDrawEndCHROMIUM() {
MultiDrawManager::ResultData result;
if (!multi_draw_manager_->End(&result)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
switch (result.draw_function) {
case MultiDrawManager::DrawFunction::DrawArrays:
api()->glMultiDrawArraysANGLEFn(result.mode, result.firsts.data(),
result.counts.data(), result.drawcount);
return error::kNoError;
case MultiDrawManager::DrawFunction::DrawArraysInstanced:
api()->glMultiDrawArraysInstancedANGLEFn(
result.mode, result.firsts.data(), result.counts.data(),
result.instance_counts.data(), result.drawcount);
return error::kNoError;
case MultiDrawManager::DrawFunction::DrawElements:
api()->glMultiDrawElementsANGLEFn(result.mode, result.counts.data(),
result.type, result.indices.data(),
result.drawcount);
return error::kNoError;
case MultiDrawManager::DrawFunction::DrawElementsInstanced:
api()->glMultiDrawElementsInstancedANGLEFn(
result.mode, result.counts.data(), result.type, result.indices.data(),
result.instance_counts.data(), result.drawcount);
return error::kNoError;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isEmbeddedObject() const {
return isHTMLPlugInElement(getNode());
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_fpu_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *parent, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct crypto_fpu_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(parent);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
int err;
crypto_blkcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(child, crypto_tfm_get_flags(parent) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen);
crypto_tfm_set_flags(parent, crypto_blkcipher_get_flags(child) &
CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromGd2 (FILE * inFile)
{
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewFileCtx(inFile);
gdImagePtr im;
im = gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: build_sched_groups(struct sched_domain *sd, int cpu)
{
struct sched_group *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
struct sd_data *sdd = sd->private;
const struct cpumask *span = sched_domain_span(sd);
struct cpumask *covered;
int i;
get_group(cpu, sdd, &sd->groups);
atomic_inc(&sd->groups->ref);
if (cpu != cpumask_first(span))
return 0;
lockdep_assert_held(&sched_domains_mutex);
covered = sched_domains_tmpmask;
cpumask_clear(covered);
for_each_cpu(i, span) {
struct sched_group *sg;
int group, j;
if (cpumask_test_cpu(i, covered))
continue;
group = get_group(i, sdd, &sg);
cpumask_setall(sched_group_mask(sg));
for_each_cpu(j, span) {
if (get_group(j, sdd, NULL) != group)
continue;
cpumask_set_cpu(j, covered);
cpumask_set_cpu(j, sched_group_cpus(sg));
}
if (!first)
first = sg;
if (last)
last->next = sg;
last = sg;
}
last->next = first;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
/* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
else
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
perf_event_exec();
__set_task_comm(current, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
* depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
* some architectures like powerpc
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
/* install the new credentials */
if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) ||
!gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) {
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
} else {
would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
}
/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
group */
current->self_exec_id++;
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
do_close_on_exec(current->files);
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static long sock_do_ioctl(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
int err;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
err = sock->ops->ioctl(sock, cmd, arg);
/*
* If this ioctl is unknown try to hand it down
* to the NIC driver.
*/
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SkPath GM2TabStyle::GetPath(PathType path_type,
float scale,
bool force_active,
RenderUnits render_units) const {
const int stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(force_active);
gfx::RectF aligned_bounds =
ScaleAndAlignBounds(tab_->bounds(), scale, stroke_thickness);
if (path_type == PathType::kInteriorClip) {
const auto opacities = GetSeparatorOpacities(true);
constexpr float kChildClipPadding = 2.5f;
aligned_bounds.Inset(gfx::InsetsF(0.0f, kChildClipPadding + opacities.left,
0.0f,
kChildClipPadding + opacities.right));
}
const float radius = GetTopCornerRadiusForWidth(tab_->width()) * scale;
float top_radius = radius;
float bottom_radius = radius;
const float extension = GetCornerRadius() * scale;
const float left = aligned_bounds.x();
const float right = aligned_bounds.right();
float tab_top = aligned_bounds.y();
float tab_left = left + extension;
float tab_right = right - extension;
const float extended_bottom = aligned_bounds.bottom();
const float bottom_extension =
GetLayoutConstant(TABSTRIP_TOOLBAR_OVERLAP) * scale;
float tab_bottom = extended_bottom - bottom_extension;
const float stroke_adjustment = stroke_thickness * scale;
if (path_type == PathType::kInteriorClip) {
tab_left += stroke_adjustment;
tab_right -= stroke_adjustment;
tab_top += stroke_adjustment;
top_radius -= stroke_adjustment;
} else if (path_type == PathType::kFill || path_type == PathType::kBorder) {
tab_left += 0.5f * stroke_adjustment;
tab_right -= 0.5f * stroke_adjustment;
tab_top += 0.5f * stroke_adjustment;
top_radius -= 0.5f * stroke_adjustment;
tab_bottom -= 0.5f * stroke_adjustment;
bottom_radius -= 0.5f * stroke_adjustment;
} else if (path_type == PathType::kHitTest ||
path_type == PathType::kExteriorClip) {
tab_bottom -= stroke_adjustment;
bottom_radius -= stroke_adjustment;
}
const bool extend_to_top =
(path_type == PathType::kHitTest) && ShouldExtendHitTest();
const float corner_gap = (right - tab_right) - bottom_radius;
SkPath path;
if (path_type == PathType::kInteriorClip) {
path.addRect(tab_left, tab_top, tab_right, tab_bottom);
} else if (path_type == PathType::kHighlight) {
const float inset = views::PlatformStyle::kFocusHaloThickness +
views::PlatformStyle::kFocusHaloInset;
SkRRect rrect = SkRRect::MakeRectXY(
SkRect::MakeLTRB(tab_left + inset, tab_top + inset, tab_right - inset,
tab_bottom - inset),
radius - inset, radius - inset);
path.addRRect(rrect);
} else {
path.moveTo(left, extended_bottom);
path.lineTo(left, tab_bottom);
path.lineTo(left + corner_gap, tab_bottom);
path.arcTo(bottom_radius, bottom_radius, 0, SkPath::kSmall_ArcSize,
SkPath::kCCW_Direction, tab_left, tab_bottom - bottom_radius);
if (extend_to_top) {
path.lineTo(tab_left, tab_top);
} else {
path.lineTo(tab_left, tab_top + top_radius);
path.arcTo(top_radius, top_radius, 0, SkPath::kSmall_ArcSize,
SkPath::kCW_Direction, tab_left + top_radius, tab_top);
}
if (extend_to_top) {
path.lineTo(tab_right, tab_top);
} else {
path.lineTo(tab_right - top_radius, tab_top);
path.arcTo(top_radius, top_radius, 0, SkPath::kSmall_ArcSize,
SkPath::kCW_Direction, tab_right, tab_top + top_radius);
}
path.lineTo(tab_right, tab_bottom - bottom_radius);
path.arcTo(bottom_radius, bottom_radius, 0, SkPath::kSmall_ArcSize,
SkPath::kCCW_Direction, right - corner_gap, tab_bottom);
path.lineTo(right, tab_bottom);
path.lineTo(right, extended_bottom);
if (path_type != PathType::kBorder)
path.close();
}
gfx::PointF origin(tab_->origin());
origin.Scale(scale);
path.offset(-origin.x(), -origin.y());
if (render_units == RenderUnits::kDips && scale != 1.0f)
path.transform(SkMatrix::MakeScale(1.f / scale));
return path;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
const struct nlattr *attr)
{
struct nlattr *nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_MAX + 1];
struct nft_data_desc desc;
struct nft_set_elem elem;
struct nft_trans *trans;
int err;
err = nla_parse_nested(nla, NFTA_SET_ELEM_MAX, attr,
nft_set_elem_policy);
if (err < 0)
goto err1;
err = -EINVAL;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY] == NULL)
goto err1;
err = nft_data_init(ctx, &elem.key, &desc, nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY]);
if (err < 0)
goto err1;
err = -EINVAL;
if (desc.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE || desc.len != set->klen)
goto err2;
err = set->ops->get(set, &elem);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
trans = nft_trans_elem_alloc(ctx, NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM, set);
if (trans == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err2;
}
nft_trans_elem(trans) = elem;
list_add_tail(&trans->list, &ctx->net->nft.commit_list);
return 0;
err2:
nft_data_uninit(&elem.key, desc.type);
err1:
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 58,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int open_wait(char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
{
if (!open_unlimited) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&open_mutex);
while (open_count == 0)
pthread_cond_wait(&open_empty, &open_mutex);
open_count --;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&open_mutex);
}
return open(pathname, flags, mode);
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,280 |
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