instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int misaligned_fpu_store(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_paired_load)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int srcreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
srcreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
/* Initialise these to NaNs. */
__u32 buflo=0xffffffffUL, bufhi=0xffffffffUL;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
/* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so
context switch the registers into memory so they can be
indexed by register number. */
if (last_task_used_math == current) {
enable_fpu();
save_fpu(current);
disable_fpu();
last_task_used_math = NULL;
regs->sr |= SR_FD;
}
switch (width_shift) {
case 2:
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
break;
case 3:
if (do_paired_load) {
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
} else {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
#else
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
#endif
}
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_store, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
*(__u32*) &buffer = buflo;
*(1 + (__u32*) &buffer) = bufhi;
if (__copy_user((void *)(int)address, &buffer, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
return 0;
} else {
die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0);
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,798
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void oinf_entry_dump(GF_OperatingPointsInformation *ptr, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i, count;
if (!ptr) {
fprintf(trace, "<OperatingPointsInformation scalability_mask=\"Multiview|Spatial scalability|Auxilary|unknown\" num_profile_tier_level=\"\" num_operating_points=\"\" dependency_layers=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, " <ProfileTierLevel general_profile_space=\"\" general_tier_flag=\"\" general_profile_idc=\"\" general_profile_compatibility_flags=\"\" general_constraint_indicator_flags=\"\" />\n");
fprintf(trace, "<OperatingPoint output_layer_set_idx=\"\" max_temporal_id=\"\" layer_count=\"\" minPicWidth=\"\" minPicHeight=\"\" maxPicWidth=\"\" maxPicHeight=\"\" maxChromaFormat=\"\" maxBitDepth=\"\" frame_rate_info_flag=\"\" bit_rate_info_flag=\"\" avgFrameRate=\"\" constantFrameRate=\"\" maxBitRate=\"\" avgBitRate=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "<Layer dependent_layerID=\"\" num_layers_dependent_on=\"\" dependent_on_layerID=\"\" dimension_identifier=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</OperatingPointsInformation>\n");
return;
}
fprintf(trace, "<OperatingPointsInformation");
fprintf(trace, " scalability_mask=\"%u (", ptr->scalability_mask);
switch (ptr->scalability_mask) {
case 2:
fprintf(trace, "Multiview");
break;
case 4:
fprintf(trace, "Spatial scalability");
break;
case 8:
fprintf(trace, "Auxilary");
break;
default:
fprintf(trace, "unknown");
}
fprintf(trace, ")\" num_profile_tier_level=\"%u\"", gf_list_count(ptr->profile_tier_levels) );
fprintf(trace, " num_operating_points=\"%u\" dependency_layers=\"%u\"", gf_list_count(ptr->operating_points), gf_list_count(ptr->dependency_layers));
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
count=gf_list_count(ptr->profile_tier_levels);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel *ptl = (LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel *)gf_list_get(ptr->profile_tier_levels, i);
fprintf(trace, " <ProfileTierLevel general_profile_space=\"%u\" general_tier_flag=\"%u\" general_profile_idc=\"%u\" general_profile_compatibility_flags=\"%X\" general_constraint_indicator_flags=\""LLX"\" />\n", ptl->general_profile_space, ptl->general_tier_flag, ptl->general_profile_idc, ptl->general_profile_compatibility_flags, ptl->general_constraint_indicator_flags);
}
count=gf_list_count(ptr->operating_points);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_OperatingPoint *op = (LHEVC_OperatingPoint *)gf_list_get(ptr->operating_points, i);
fprintf(trace, "<OperatingPoint output_layer_set_idx=\"%u\"", op->output_layer_set_idx);
fprintf(trace, " max_temporal_id=\"%u\" layer_count=\"%u\"", op->max_temporal_id, op->layer_count);
fprintf(trace, " minPicWidth=\"%u\" minPicHeight=\"%u\"", op->minPicWidth, op->minPicHeight);
fprintf(trace, " maxPicWidth=\"%u\" maxPicHeight=\"%u\"", op->maxPicWidth, op->maxPicHeight);
fprintf(trace, " maxChromaFormat=\"%u\" maxBitDepth=\"%u\"", op->maxChromaFormat, op->maxBitDepth);
fprintf(trace, " frame_rate_info_flag=\"%u\" bit_rate_info_flag=\"%u\"", op->frame_rate_info_flag, op->bit_rate_info_flag);
if (op->frame_rate_info_flag)
fprintf(trace, " avgFrameRate=\"%u\" constantFrameRate=\"%u\"", op->avgFrameRate, op->constantFrameRate);
if (op->bit_rate_info_flag)
fprintf(trace, " maxBitRate=\"%u\" avgBitRate=\"%u\"", op->maxBitRate, op->avgBitRate);
fprintf(trace, "/>\n");
}
count=gf_list_count(ptr->dependency_layers);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
u32 j;
LHEVC_DependentLayer *dep = (LHEVC_DependentLayer *)gf_list_get(ptr->dependency_layers, i);
fprintf(trace, "<Layer dependent_layerID=\"%u\" num_layers_dependent_on=\"%u\"", dep->dependent_layerID, dep->num_layers_dependent_on);
if (dep->num_layers_dependent_on) {
fprintf(trace, " dependent_on_layerID=\"");
for (j = 0; j < dep->num_layers_dependent_on; j++)
fprintf(trace, "%d ", dep->dependent_on_layerID[j]);
fprintf(trace, "\"");
}
fprintf(trace, " dimension_identifier=\"");
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
if (ptr->scalability_mask & (1 << j))
fprintf(trace, "%d ", dep->dimension_identifier[j]);
fprintf(trace, "\"/>\n");
}
fprintf(trace, "</OperatingPointsInformation>\n");
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in MP4Box in GPAC 0.7.1. There is a heap-based buffer over-read in the isomedia/box_dump.c function hdlr_dump.
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
Low
| 169,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool CreateIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& pipe_security_descriptor,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* channel_out) {
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
ULONG security_descriptor_length = 0;
if (!ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_security_descriptor).c_str(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
reinterpret_cast<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(
&security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor),
&security_descriptor_length)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create a security descriptor for the Chromoting IPC channel";
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
pipe.Set(CreateNamedPipe(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE,
1,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
5000,
&security_attributes));
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create the server end of the Chromoting IPC channel";
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
return false;
}
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
channel_out->reset(new IPC::ChannelProxy(
IPC::ChannelHandle(pipe),
IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER,
delegate,
io_task_runner));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> PrivateScriptRunner::runDOMAttributeGetter(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptState* scriptStateInUserScript, const char* className, const char* attributeName, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject = classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
v8::Local<v8::Value> descriptor;
if (!classObject->GetOwnPropertyDescriptor(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, attributeName)).ToLocal(&descriptor) || !descriptor->IsObject()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> getter;
if (!v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(descriptor)->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "get")).ToLocal(&getter) || !getter->IsFunction()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
initializeHolderIfNeeded(scriptState, classObject, holder);
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(getter), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
rethrowExceptionInPrivateScript(isolate, block, scriptStateInUserScript, ExceptionState::GetterContext, attributeName, className);
block.ReThrow();
return v8::Local<v8::Value>();
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android permitted execution of v8 microtasks while the DOM was in an inconsistent state, which allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874}
|
Medium
| 172,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::Parse(long long& pos, long& len) const {
long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const long long cluster_stop =
(m_element_size < 0) ? -1 : m_element_start + m_element_size;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= cluster_stop))
return 1; // nothing else to do
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_pos;
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total)) {
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) // weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) { // Cluster or Cues ID
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long block_stop = pos + size;
if (cluster_stop >= 0) {
if (block_stop > cluster_stop) {
if ((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos = cluster_stop;
break;
}
} else if ((total >= 0) && (block_stop > total)) {
m_element_size = total - m_element_start;
pos = total;
break;
} else if (block_stop > avail) {
len = static_cast<long>(size);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
Cluster* const this_ = const_cast<Cluster*>(this);
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup
return this_->ParseBlockGroup(size, pos, len);
if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock
return this_->ParseSimpleBlock(size, pos, len);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert(m_element_size > 0);
m_pos = pos;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= cluster_stop));
if (m_entries_count > 0) {
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
const Block* const pBlock = pLast->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long start = pBlock->m_start;
if ((total >= 0) && (start > total))
return -1; // defend against trucated stream
const long long size = pBlock->m_size;
const long long stop = start + size;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (stop <= cluster_stop));
if ((total >= 0) && (stop > total))
return -1; // defend against trucated stream
}
return 1; // no more entries
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,846
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int uio_mmap_physical(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct uio_device *idev = vma->vm_private_data;
int mi = uio_find_mem_index(vma);
if (mi < 0)
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_ops = &uio_physical_vm_ops;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
return remap_pfn_range(vma,
vma->vm_start,
idev->info->mem[mi].addr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The uio_mmap_physical function in drivers/uio/uio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not validate the size of a memory block, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges via crafted mmap operations, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4511.
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
|
Medium
| 165,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: header_put_le_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_int */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,057
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WallpaperManager::SetDefaultWallpaperPath(
const base::FilePath& default_small_wallpaper_file,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia> small_wallpaper_image,
const base::FilePath& default_large_wallpaper_file,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia> large_wallpaper_image) {
default_small_wallpaper_file_ = default_small_wallpaper_file;
default_large_wallpaper_file_ = default_large_wallpaper_file;
ash::WallpaperController* controller =
ash::Shell::Get()->wallpaper_controller();
const bool need_update_screen =
default_wallpaper_image_.get() &&
controller->WallpaperIsAlreadyLoaded(default_wallpaper_image_->image(),
false /* compare_layouts */,
wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER);
default_wallpaper_image_.reset();
if (GetAppropriateResolution() == WALLPAPER_RESOLUTION_SMALL) {
if (small_wallpaper_image) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset(
new user_manager::UserImage(*small_wallpaper_image));
default_wallpaper_image_->set_file_path(default_small_wallpaper_file);
}
} else {
if (large_wallpaper_image) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset(
new user_manager::UserImage(*large_wallpaper_image));
default_wallpaper_image_->set_file_path(default_large_wallpaper_file);
}
}
if (need_update_screen)
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(EmptyAccountId(), MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder());
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
Low
| 171,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::unflatten(
void const*& buffer, size_t& size, int const*& fds, size_t& count) {
if (size < 8*sizeof(int)) return NO_MEMORY;
int const* buf = static_cast<int const*>(buffer);
if (buf[0] != 'GBFR') return BAD_TYPE;
const size_t numFds = buf[8];
const size_t numInts = buf[9];
const size_t sizeNeeded = (10 + numInts) * sizeof(int);
if (size < sizeNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
size_t fdCountNeeded = 0;
if (count < fdCountNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
if (handle) {
free_handle();
}
if (numFds || numInts) {
width = buf[1];
height = buf[2];
stride = buf[3];
format = buf[4];
usage = buf[5];
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
memcpy(h->data, fds, numFds*sizeof(int));
memcpy(h->data + numFds, &buf[10], numInts*sizeof(int));
handle = h;
} else {
width = height = stride = format = usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
}
mId = static_cast<uint64_t>(buf[6]) << 32;
mId |= static_cast<uint32_t>(buf[7]);
mOwner = ownHandle;
if (handle != 0) {
status_t err = mBufferMapper.registerBuffer(handle);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
width = height = stride = format = usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
ALOGE("unflatten: registerBuffer failed: %s (%d)",
strerror(-err), err);
return err;
}
}
buffer = reinterpret_cast<void const*>(static_cast<int const*>(buffer) + sizeNeeded);
size -= sizeNeeded;
fds += numFds;
count -= numFds;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the GraphicBuffer::unflatten function in platform/frameworks/native/libs/ui/GraphicBuffer.cpp in Android through 5.0 allow attackers to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via vectors that trigger a large number of (1) file descriptors or (2) integer values.
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
|
Low
| 173,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int iwch_l2t_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb, struct l2t_entry *l2e)
{
int error = 0;
struct cxio_rdev *rdev;
rdev = (struct cxio_rdev *)tdev->ulp;
if (cxio_fatal_error(rdev)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
error = l2t_send(tdev, skb, l2e);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not properly identify error conditions, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,496
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void _php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int image_type, char *tn, gdImagePtr (*func_p)(), gdImagePtr (*ioctx_func_p)())
{
char *file;
int file_len;
long srcx, srcy, width, height;
gdImagePtr im = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
FILE * fp = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
long ignore_warning;
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sllll", &file, &file_len, &srcx, &srcy, &width, &height) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (width < 1 || height < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Zero width or height not allowed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS|IGNORE_PATH|IGNORE_URL_WIN, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef USE_GD_IOCTX
ioctx_func_p = NULL; /* don't allow sockets without IOCtx */
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_WEBP) {
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(buff_size, buff);
if (!im) {
goto out_err;
}
goto register_im;
}
/* try and avoid allocating a FILE* if the stream is not naturally a FILE* */
if (php_stream_is(stream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
} else if (ioctx_func_p) {
#ifdef USE_GD_IOCTX
/* we can create an io context */
gdIOCtx* io_ctx;
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
io_ctx = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(buff_size, buff, 0);
if (!io_ctx) {
pefree(buff, 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot allocate GD IO context");
goto out_err;
}
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx, srcx, srcy, width, height);
} else {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx);
}
#if HAVE_LIBGD204
io_ctx->gd_free(io_ctx);
#else
io_ctx->free(io_ctx);
#endif
pefree(buff, 1);
#endif
}
else {
/* try and force the stream to be FILE* */
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO | PHP_STREAM_CAST_TRY_HARD, (void **) &fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
}
if (!im && fp) {
switch (image_type) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART:
im = (*func_p)(fp, srcx, srcy, width, height);
break;
#if defined(HAVE_GD_XPM) && defined(HAVE_GD_BUNDLED)
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_XPM:
im = gdImageCreateFromXpm(file);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
ignore_warning = INI_INT("gd.jpeg_ignore_warning");
#ifdef HAVE_GD_BUNDLED
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp, ignore_warning);
#else
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
im = (*func_p)(fp);
break;
}
fflush(fp);
}
register_im:
if (im) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im, le_gd);
php_stream_close(stream);
return;
}
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s' is not a valid %s file", file, tn);
out_err:
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
/* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-295
Summary: The transit path validation code in Heimdal before 7.3 might allow attackers to bypass the capath policy protection mechanism by leveraging failure to add the previous hop realm to the transit path of issued tickets.
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
|
Low
| 168,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::OnSuggestionsReturned(
int query_id,
const std::vector<Suggestion>& input_suggestions,
bool autoselect_first_suggestion,
bool is_all_server_suggestions) {
if (query_id != query_id_)
return;
std::vector<Suggestion> suggestions(input_suggestions);
PossiblyRemoveAutofillWarnings(&suggestions);
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (!suggestions.empty() && !features::ShouldUseNativeViews()) {
suggestions.push_back(Suggestion());
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR;
}
#endif
if (should_show_scan_credit_card_) {
Suggestion scan_credit_card(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD));
scan_credit_card.frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD;
scan_credit_card.icon = base::ASCIIToUTF16("scanCreditCardIcon");
suggestions.push_back(scan_credit_card);
}
has_autofill_suggestions_ = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < suggestions.size(); ++i) {
if (suggestions[i].frontend_id > 0) {
has_autofill_suggestions_ = true;
break;
}
}
if (should_show_cards_from_account_option_) {
suggestions.emplace_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS));
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS;
suggestions.back().icon = base::ASCIIToUTF16("google");
}
if (has_autofill_suggestions_)
ApplyAutofillOptions(&suggestions, is_all_server_suggestions);
if (suggestions.empty() && should_show_cc_signin_promo_) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (has_autofill_suggestions_) {
suggestions.push_back(Suggestion());
suggestions.back().frontend_id = POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR;
}
#endif
Suggestion signin_promo_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO));
signin_promo_suggestion.frontend_id =
POPUP_ITEM_ID_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO;
suggestions.push_back(signin_promo_suggestion);
signin_metrics::RecordSigninImpressionUserActionForAccessPoint(
signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_AUTOFILL_DROPDOWN);
}
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (!suggestions.empty() &&
suggestions.back().frontend_id == POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR) {
suggestions.pop_back();
}
#endif
InsertDataListValues(&suggestions);
if (suggestions.empty()) {
manager_->client()->HideAutofillPopup();
return;
}
if (query_field_.is_focusable) {
manager_->client()->ShowAutofillPopup(
element_bounds_, query_field_.text_direction, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion, GetWeakPtr());
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android incorrectly allowed reentrance of FrameView::updateLifecyclePhasesInternal(), which allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
Medium
| 172,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] << 8;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
Medium
| 174,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FeatureInfo::InitializeFeatures() {
std::string extensions_string(gl::GetGLExtensionsFromCurrentContext());
gfx::ExtensionSet extensions(gfx::MakeExtensionSet(extensions_string));
const char* version_str =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(glGetString(GL_VERSION));
const char* renderer_str =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(glGetString(GL_RENDERER));
gl_version_info_.reset(
new gl::GLVersionInfo(version_str, renderer_str, extensions));
bool enable_es3 = IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext();
bool has_pixel_buffers =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object");
ScopedPixelUnpackBufferOverride scoped_pbo_override(has_pixel_buffers, 0);
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_async_pixel_transfers");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_bind_uniform_location");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_color_space_metadata");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_command_buffer_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_command_buffer_latency_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_copy_texture");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_deschedule");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_get_error_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_lose_context");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_pixel_transfer_buffer_object");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_rate_limit_offscreen_context");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_resize");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_resource_safe");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_strict_attribs");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_texture_mailbox");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_trace_marker");
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_debug_marker");
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_unpack_subimage");
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_vertex_array_object");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source")) {
feature_flags_.angle_translated_shader_source = true;
}
bool enable_dxt1 = false;
bool enable_dxt3 = false;
bool enable_dxt5 = false;
bool have_s3tc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc");
bool have_dxt3 =
have_s3tc ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3");
bool have_dxt5 =
have_s3tc ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_dxt1") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1") ||
have_s3tc) {
enable_dxt1 = true;
}
if (have_dxt3) {
enable_dxt3 = true;
}
if (have_dxt5) {
enable_dxt5 = true;
}
if (enable_dxt1) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_dxt1 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
}
if (enable_dxt3) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
}
if (enable_dxt5) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_dxt5 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
}
bool have_astc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr");
if (have_astc) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_astc = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr");
GLint astc_format_it = GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_ASTC_4x4_KHR;
GLint astc_format_max = GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_ASTC_12x12_KHR;
for (; astc_format_it <= astc_format_max; astc_format_it++) {
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(astc_format_it);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(astc_format_it);
}
astc_format_it = GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB8_ALPHA8_ASTC_4x4_KHR;
astc_format_max = GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB8_ALPHA8_ASTC_12x12_KHR;
for (; astc_format_it <= astc_format_max; astc_format_it++) {
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(astc_format_it);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(astc_format_it);
}
}
bool have_atc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ATI_texture_compression_atitc");
if (have_atc) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_atc = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
}
bool enable_depth_texture = false;
GLenum depth_texture_format = GL_NONE;
if (!workarounds_.disable_depth_texture &&
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_depth_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_depth_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_depth_texture") ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile)) {
enable_depth_texture = true;
depth_texture_format = GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT;
feature_flags_.angle_depth_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_depth_texture");
}
if (enable_depth_texture) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_depth_texture");
AddExtensionString("GL_GOOGLE_depth_texture");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
validators_.texture_depth_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
}
GLenum depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_NONE;
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_packed_depth_stencil") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil") ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
feature_flags_.packed_depth24_stencil8 = true;
if (enable_depth_texture) {
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3) {
depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
} else {
depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_DEPTH_STENCIL;
}
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_24_8);
validators_.texture_depth_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.texture_stencil_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
}
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8);
if (context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1) {
validators_.attachment.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
validators_.attachment_query.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
}
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_vertex_array_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_vertex_array_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_vertex_array_object")) {
feature_flags_.native_vertex_array_object = true;
}
if (workarounds_.use_client_side_arrays_for_stream_buffers) {
feature_flags_.native_vertex_array_object = false;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_element_index_uint") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_element_index_uint");
validators_.index_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
}
bool has_srgb_framebuffer_support = false;
if (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(2, 0) &&
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_sRGB") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_framebuffer_sRGB")))) {
feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support = true;
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
}
if ((((gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8")) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_sRGB")) ||
feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support) &&
IsWebGL1OrES2Context()) {
feature_flags_.ext_srgb = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_sRGB");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_attachment_parameter.AddValue(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COLOR_ENCODING_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3)
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
if (has_srgb_framebuffer_support && !IsWebGLContext()) {
if (feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control")) {
feature_flags_.ext_srgb_write_control = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control");
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB_EXT);
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode") &&
!IsWebGLContext()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_SRGB_DECODE_EXT);
}
bool have_s3tc_srgb = false;
if (gl_version_info_->is_es) {
have_s3tc_srgb =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_sRGB_formats") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc_srgb");
} else {
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_sRGB") ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 1)) {
have_s3tc_srgb =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc");
}
}
if (have_s3tc_srgb) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc_srgb");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
}
bool has_apple_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_texture_format_BGRA8888");
bool has_ext_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888");
bool enable_texture_format_bgra8888 =
has_ext_bgra || has_apple_bgra || !gl_version_info_->is_es;
bool has_ext_texture_storage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_storage");
bool has_arb_texture_storage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_storage");
bool has_texture_storage =
!workarounds_.disable_texture_storage &&
(has_ext_texture_storage || has_arb_texture_storage ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 2));
bool enable_texture_storage = has_texture_storage;
bool texture_storage_incompatible_with_bgra =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 && !has_ext_texture_storage && !has_apple_bgra;
if (texture_storage_incompatible_with_bgra &&
enable_texture_format_bgra8888 && enable_texture_storage) {
switch (context_type_) {
case CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2:
enable_texture_storage = false;
break;
case CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES3:
enable_texture_format_bgra8888 = false;
break;
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2_COMPUTE:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGPU:
break;
}
}
if (enable_texture_storage) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_storage = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_storage");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_IMMUTABLE_FORMAT_EXT);
}
if (enable_texture_format_bgra8888) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_bgra8888 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_BGRA8_EXT);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_BGRA8_EXT);
validators_.texture_sized_texture_filterable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_BGRA8_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::BGRA_8888);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::BGRX_8888);
}
bool enable_render_buffer_bgra =
gl_version_info_->is_angle || !gl_version_info_->is_es;
if (enable_render_buffer_bgra) {
feature_flags_.ext_render_buffer_format_bgra8888 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_renderbuffer_format_BGRA8888");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA8_EXT);
}
bool enable_read_format_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_read_format_bgra") ||
!gl_version_info_->is_es;
if (enable_read_format_bgra) {
feature_flags_.ext_read_format_bgra = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_read_format_bgra");
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
}
feature_flags_.arb_es3_compatibility =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_ES3_compatibility") &&
!gl_version_info_->is_es;
feature_flags_.ext_disjoint_timer_query =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query");
if (feature_flags_.ext_disjoint_timer_query ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_timer_query") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_timer_query")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGB8_OES);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGBA8_OES);
}
if (!disallowed_features_.npot_support &&
(gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_non_power_of_two") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_texture_npot"))) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_npot");
feature_flags_.npot_ok = true;
}
InitializeFloatAndHalfFloatFeatures(extensions);
if (!workarounds_.disable_chromium_framebuffer_multisample) {
bool ext_has_multisample =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_framebuffer_object") ||
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_blit")) ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile;
if (gl_version_info_->is_angle || gl_version_info_->is_swiftshader) {
ext_has_multisample |=
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_framebuffer_multisample");
}
if (ext_has_multisample) {
feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_multisample = true;
validators_.framebuffer_target.AddValue(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_target.AddValue(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_RENDERBUFFER_SAMPLES_EXT);
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample");
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture")) {
feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
} else if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_IMG_multisampled_render_to_texture")) {
feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
feature_flags_.use_img_for_multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
}
if (feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture) {
validators_.render_buffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_RENDERBUFFER_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_attachment_parameter.AddValue(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_SAMPLES_EXT);
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture");
}
if (!gl_version_info_->is_es ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_multisample_compatibility")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_multisample_compatibility");
feature_flags_.ext_multisample_compatibility = true;
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_MULTISAMPLE_EXT);
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_SAMPLE_ALPHA_TO_ONE_EXT);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_INTEL_framebuffer_CMAA")) {
feature_flags_.chromium_screen_space_antialiasing = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_screen_space_antialiasing");
} else if (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 1) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 0) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_shading_language_420pack") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_storage") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_gather") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_explicit_uniform_location") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_explicit_attrib_location") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_shader_image_load_store"))) {
feature_flags_.chromium_screen_space_antialiasing = true;
feature_flags_.use_chromium_screen_space_antialiasing_via_shaders = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_screen_space_antialiasing");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_depth24") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures() || gl_version_info_->is_es3) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_depth24");
feature_flags_.oes_depth24 = true;
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT24);
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_standard_derivatives") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_standard_derivatives");
feature_flags_.oes_standard_derivatives = true;
validators_.hint_target.AddValue(GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_texture_filtering_hint")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_texture_filtering_hint");
feature_flags_.chromium_texture_filtering_hint = true;
validators_.hint_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_FILTERING_HINT_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_FILTERING_HINT_CHROMIUM);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_EGL_image_external")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_EGL_image_external");
feature_flags_.oes_egl_image_external = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external");
feature_flags_.nv_egl_stream_consumer_external = true;
}
if (feature_flags_.oes_egl_image_external ||
feature_flags_.nv_egl_stream_consumer_external) {
validators_.texture_bind_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
validators_.get_tex_param_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_REQUIRED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS_OES);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_EXTERNAL_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture") &&
!gl_version_info_->is_angle) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture");
feature_flags_.oes_compressed_etc1_rgb8_texture = true;
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_compressed_texture_etc") ||
(gl_version_info_->is_es3 && !gl_version_info_->is_angle)) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_compressed_texture_etc");
validators_.UpdateETCCompressedTextureFormats();
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rectangle") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_rectangle") ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ARB_texture_rectangle");
feature_flags_.arb_texture_rectangle = true;
validators_.texture_bind_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.texture_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.get_tex_param_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_RECTANGLE_ARB);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_ycbcr_420v_image");
feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_420v = true;
#endif
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_420v) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::YUV_420_BIPLANAR);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_ycbcr_422")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_ycbcr_422_image");
feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_422 = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::UYVY_422);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30 = base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_13();
#elif !defined(OS_WIN)
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30 =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_type_2_10_10_10_REV");
#endif
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30 ||
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30) {
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV);
}
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::BGRX_1010102);
}
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::RGBX_1010102);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_usage")) {
feature_flags_.angle_texture_usage = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_usage");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_USAGE_ANGLE);
}
bool have_occlusion_query = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3);
bool have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean");
bool have_arb_occlusion_query2 =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_occlusion_query2");
bool have_arb_occlusion_query =
(gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile &&
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(1, 5)) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_occlusion_query");
if (have_occlusion_query || have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean ||
have_arb_occlusion_query2 || have_arb_occlusion_query) {
feature_flags_.occlusion_query = have_arb_occlusion_query;
if (context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean");
}
feature_flags_.occlusion_query_boolean = true;
feature_flags_.use_arb_occlusion_query2_for_occlusion_query_boolean =
!have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean &&
(have_arb_occlusion_query2 || (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) &&
gl_version_info_->IsLowerThanGL(4, 3)));
feature_flags_.use_arb_occlusion_query_for_occlusion_query_boolean =
!have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean && have_arb_occlusion_query &&
!have_arb_occlusion_query2;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays") ||
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_instanced_arrays") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_draw_instanced")) ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays");
feature_flags_.angle_instanced_arrays = true;
validators_.vertex_attribute.AddValue(GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_DIVISOR_ANGLE);
}
bool have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic =
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_draw_buffers") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_draw_buffers");
bool can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_draw_buffers");
bool is_webgl_compatibility_context =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_webgl_compatibility");
bool have_es2_draw_buffers =
!workarounds_.disable_ext_draw_buffers &&
(have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic ||
can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv) &&
(context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2 ||
(context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1 &&
IsWebGLDrawBuffersSupported(is_webgl_compatibility_context,
depth_texture_format,
depth_stencil_texture_format)));
if (have_es2_draw_buffers) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_draw_buffers");
feature_flags_.ext_draw_buffers = true;
feature_flags_.nv_draw_buffers = can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv &&
!have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic;
}
if (IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext() || have_es2_draw_buffers) {
GLint max_color_attachments = 0;
glGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT, &max_color_attachments);
for (GLenum i = GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT1_EXT;
i < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + max_color_attachments);
++i) {
validators_.attachment.AddValue(i);
validators_.attachment_query.AddValue(i);
}
static_assert(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT == GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
"GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT should equal GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0");
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_ARB);
GLint max_draw_buffers = 0;
glGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_ARB, &max_draw_buffers);
for (GLenum i = GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB;
i < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB + max_draw_buffers); ++i) {
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(i);
}
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_blend_minmax") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_blend_minmax");
validators_.equation.AddValue(GL_MIN_EXT);
validators_.equation.AddValue(GL_MAX_EXT);
static_assert(GL_MIN_EXT == GL_MIN && GL_MAX_EXT == GL_MAX,
"min & max variations must match");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_frag_depth") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_frag_depth");
feature_flags_.ext_frag_depth = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod");
feature_flags_.ext_shader_texture_lod = true;
}
bool ui_gl_fence_works = gl::GLFence::IsSupported();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.FenceSupport", ui_gl_fence_works);
feature_flags_.map_buffer_range =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_map_buffer_range") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_map_buffer_range");
if (has_pixel_buffers && ui_gl_fence_works &&
!workarounds_.disable_async_readpixels) {
feature_flags_.use_async_readpixels = true;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_sampler_objects")) {
feature_flags_.enable_samplers = true;
}
if ((gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer")) &&
!workarounds_.disable_discard_framebuffer) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
feature_flags_.ext_discard_framebuffer = true;
}
if (ui_gl_fence_works) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_sync_query");
feature_flags_.chromium_sync_query = true;
}
if (!workarounds_.disable_blend_equation_advanced) {
bool blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced_coherent") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent");
if (blend_equation_advanced_coherent ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced")) {
const GLenum equations[] = {
GL_MULTIPLY_KHR, GL_SCREEN_KHR, GL_OVERLAY_KHR,
GL_DARKEN_KHR, GL_LIGHTEN_KHR, GL_COLORDODGE_KHR,
GL_COLORBURN_KHR, GL_HARDLIGHT_KHR, GL_SOFTLIGHT_KHR,
GL_DIFFERENCE_KHR, GL_EXCLUSION_KHR, GL_HSL_HUE_KHR,
GL_HSL_SATURATION_KHR, GL_HSL_COLOR_KHR, GL_HSL_LUMINOSITY_KHR};
for (GLenum equation : equations)
validators_.equation.AddValue(equation);
if (blend_equation_advanced_coherent)
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent");
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced");
feature_flags_.blend_equation_advanced = true;
feature_flags_.blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
blend_equation_advanced_coherent;
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_framebuffer_mixed_samples")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_mixed_samples");
feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_mixed_samples = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_COVERAGE_MODULATION_CHROMIUM);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_path_rendering")) {
bool has_dsa = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 5) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_direct_state_access");
bool has_piq =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 3) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_program_interface_query");
bool has_fms = feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_mixed_samples;
if ((gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 1) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) && has_dsa && has_piq)) &&
has_fms) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_path_rendering");
feature_flags_.chromium_path_rendering = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_MODELVIEW_MATRIX_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_PROJECTION_MATRIX_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_FUNC_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_REF_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_VALUE_MASK_CHROMIUM);
}
}
if ((gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_rg") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rg")) &&
IsGL_REDSupportedOnFBOs()) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_rg = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_rg");
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::R_8);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RG_88);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.TextureRG", feature_flags_.ext_texture_rg);
if (gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(2, 1) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rg")) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_norm16")) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_norm16 = true;
g_r16_is_present = true;
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R16_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_R16_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::R_16);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"GPU.TextureR16Ext_LuminanceF16", GpuTextureUMAHelper(),
static_cast<int>(GpuTextureResultR16_L16::kMax) + 1);
if (enable_es3 && gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_window_rectangles")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_window_rectangles");
feature_flags_.ext_window_rectangles = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_MODE_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_WINDOW_RECTANGLES_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_NUM_WINDOW_RECTANGLES_EXT);
validators_.indexed_g_l_state.AddValue(GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_EXT);
}
bool has_opengl_dual_source_blending =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_blend_func_extended"));
if (!disable_shader_translator_ && !workarounds_.get_frag_data_info_bug &&
((gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) &&
has_opengl_dual_source_blending) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_blend_func_extended")))) {
feature_flags_.ext_blend_func_extended = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_blend_func_extended");
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC_ALPHA_SATURATE_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_DUAL_SOURCE_DRAW_BUFFERS_EXT);
}
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (workarounds_.ignore_egl_sync_failures) {
gl::GLFenceEGL::SetIgnoreFailures();
}
#endif
if (workarounds_.avoid_egl_image_target_texture_reuse) {
TextureDefinition::AvoidEGLTargetTextureReuse();
}
if (gl_version_info_->IsLowerThanGL(4, 3)) {
feature_flags_.emulate_primitive_restart_fixed_index = true;
}
feature_flags_.angle_robust_client_memory =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_robust_client_memory");
feature_flags_.khr_debug = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 3) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 2) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_debug");
feature_flags_.chromium_gpu_fence = gl::GLFence::IsGpuFenceSupported();
if (feature_flags_.chromium_gpu_fence)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_gpu_fence");
feature_flags_.chromium_bind_generates_resource =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_bind_generates_resource");
feature_flags_.angle_webgl_compatibility = is_webgl_compatibility_context;
feature_flags_.chromium_copy_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_copy_texture");
feature_flags_.chromium_copy_compressed_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_copy_compressed_texture");
feature_flags_.angle_client_arrays =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_client_arrays");
feature_flags_.angle_request_extension =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_request_extension");
feature_flags_.ext_debug_marker =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_debug_marker");
feature_flags_.arb_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_robustness");
feature_flags_.khr_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_robustness");
feature_flags_.ext_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_robustness");
feature_flags_.ext_pixel_buffer_object =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object");
feature_flags_.ext_unpack_subimage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_unpack_subimage");
feature_flags_.oes_rgb8_rgba8 =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
feature_flags_.angle_robust_resource_initialization =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_robust_resource_initialization");
feature_flags_.nv_fence = gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_fence");
feature_flags_.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy = !is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_;
if (feature_flags_.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_unpremultiply_and_dither_copy");
feature_flags_.separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask =
!(gl_version_info_->is_d3d) && !IsWebGLContext();
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_MESA_framebuffer_flip_y")) {
feature_flags_.mesa_framebuffer_flip_y = true;
validators_.framebuffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_FLIP_Y_MESA);
AddExtensionString("GL_MESA_framebuffer_flip_y");
}
if (is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OVR_multiview2")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OVR_multiview2");
feature_flags_.ovr_multiview2 = true;
}
if (is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_parallel_shader_compile")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_parallel_shader_compile");
feature_flags_.khr_parallel_shader_compile = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SHADER_COMPILER_THREADS_KHR);
validators_.shader_parameter.AddValue(GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR);
validators_.program_parameter.AddValue(GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior");
feature_flags_.khr_robust_buffer_access_behavior = true;
}
if (!is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_multi_draw")) {
feature_flags_.webgl_multi_draw = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays") ||
feature_flags_.angle_instanced_arrays || gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
feature_flags_.webgl_multi_draw_instanced = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw_instanced");
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_internalformat_sample_query")) {
feature_flags_.nv_internalformat_sample_query = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_AMD_framebuffer_multisample_advanced")) {
feature_flags_.amd_framebuffer_multisample_advanced = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_framebuffer_multisample_advanced");
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
Medium
| 172,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_cmdline(int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
bool reopen_log = false;
int signum;
struct utsname uname_buf;
int longindex;
int curind;
bool bad_option = false;
unsigned facility;
mode_t new_umask_val;
struct option long_options[] = {
{"use-file", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
{"vrrp", no_argument, NULL, 'P'},
{"check", no_argument, NULL, 'C'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
{"no_bfd", no_argument, NULL, 'B'},
#endif
{"all", no_argument, NULL, 3 },
{"log-console", no_argument, NULL, 'l'},
{"log-detail", no_argument, NULL, 'D'},
{"log-facility", required_argument, NULL, 'S'},
{"log-file", optional_argument, NULL, 'g'},
{"flush-log-file", no_argument, NULL, 2 },
{"no-syslog", no_argument, NULL, 'G'},
{"umask", required_argument, NULL, 'u'},
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
{"release-vips", no_argument, NULL, 'X'},
{"dont-release-vrrp", no_argument, NULL, 'V'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
{"dont-release-ipvs", no_argument, NULL, 'I'},
#endif
{"dont-respawn", no_argument, NULL, 'R'},
{"dont-fork", no_argument, NULL, 'n'},
{"dump-conf", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
{"pid", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
{"vrrp_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
{"checkers_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
{"address-monitoring", no_argument, NULL, 'a'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
{"bfd_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'b'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
{"snmp", no_argument, NULL, 'x'},
{"snmp-agent-socket", required_argument, NULL, 'A'},
#endif
{"core-dump", no_argument, NULL, 'm'},
{"core-dump-pattern", optional_argument, NULL, 'M'},
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
{"mem-check-log", no_argument, NULL, 'L'},
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
{"namespace", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
#endif
{"config-id", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
{"signum", required_argument, NULL, 4 },
{"config-test", optional_argument, NULL, 't'},
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
{"perf", optional_argument, NULL, 5 },
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
{"debug", optional_argument, NULL, 6 },
#endif
{"version", no_argument, NULL, 'v'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
/* Unfortunately, if a short option is used, getopt_long() doesn't change the value
* of longindex, so we need to ensure that before calling getopt_long(), longindex
* is set to a known invalid value */
curind = optind;
while (longindex = -1, (c = getopt_long(argc, argv, ":vhlndu:DRS:f:p:i:mM::g::Gt::"
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
"PC"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
"r:VX"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
"ac:I"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
"Bb:"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
"xA:"
#endif
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
"L"
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
"s:"
#endif
, long_options, &longindex)) != -1) {
/* Check for an empty option argument. For example --use-file= returns
* a 0 length option, which we don't want */
if (longindex >= 0 && long_options[longindex].has_arg == required_argument && optarg && !optarg[0]) {
c = ':';
optarg = NULL;
}
switch (c) {
case 'v':
fprintf(stderr, "%s", version_string);
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
fprintf(stderr, ", git commit %s", GIT_COMMIT);
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "\n\n%s\n\n", COPYRIGHT_STRING);
fprintf(stderr, "Built with kernel headers for Linux %d.%d.%d\n",
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff);
uname(&uname_buf);
fprintf(stderr, "Running on %s %s %s\n\n", uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version);
fprintf(stderr, "configure options: %s\n\n", KEEPALIVED_CONFIGURE_OPTIONS);
fprintf(stderr, "Config options: %s\n\n", CONFIGURATION_OPTIONS);
fprintf(stderr, "System options: %s\n", SYSTEM_OPTIONS);
exit(0);
break;
case 'h':
usage(argv[0]);
exit(0);
break;
case 'l':
__set_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug);
reopen_log = true;
break;
case 'n':
__set_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug);
break;
case 'd':
__set_bit(DUMP_CONF_BIT, &debug);
break;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'V':
__set_bit(DONT_RELEASE_VRRP_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
case 'I':
__set_bit(DONT_RELEASE_IPVS_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
case 'D':
if (__test_bit(LOG_DETAIL_BIT, &debug))
__set_bit(LOG_EXTRA_DETAIL_BIT, &debug);
else
__set_bit(LOG_DETAIL_BIT, &debug);
break;
case 'R':
__set_bit(DONT_RESPAWN_BIT, &debug);
break;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'X':
__set_bit(RELEASE_VIPS_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
case 'S':
if (!read_unsigned(optarg, &facility, 0, LOG_FACILITY_MAX, false))
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid log facility '%s'\n", optarg);
else {
log_facility = LOG_FACILITY[facility].facility;
reopen_log = true;
}
break;
case 'g':
if (optarg && optarg[0])
log_file_name = optarg;
else
log_file_name = "/tmp/keepalived.log";
open_log_file(log_file_name, NULL, NULL, NULL);
break;
case 'G':
__set_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug);
reopen_log = true;
break;
case 'u':
new_umask_val = set_umask(optarg);
if (umask_cmdline)
umask_val = new_umask_val;
break;
case 't':
__set_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(DONT_RESPAWN_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug);
if (optarg && optarg[0]) {
int fd = open(optarg, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
if (fd == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open config-test log file %s\n", optarg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
close(fd);
}
break;
case 'f':
conf_file = optarg;
break;
case 2: /* --flush-log-file */
set_flush_log_file();
break;
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
case 'P':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
break;
case 'C':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
case 'B':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
break;
#endif
case 'p':
main_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
case 'c':
checkers_pidfile = optarg;
break;
case 'a':
__set_bit(LOG_ADDRESS_CHANGES, &debug);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'r':
vrrp_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
case 'b':
bfd_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
case 'x':
snmp = 1;
break;
case 'A':
snmp_socket = optarg;
break;
#endif
case 'M':
set_core_dump_pattern = true;
if (optarg && optarg[0])
core_dump_pattern = optarg;
/* ... falls through ... */
case 'm':
create_core_dump = true;
break;
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
case 'L':
__set_bit(MEM_CHECK_LOG_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
case 's':
override_namespace = MALLOC(strlen(optarg) + 1);
strcpy(override_namespace, optarg);
break;
#endif
case 'i':
FREE_PTR(config_id);
config_id = MALLOC(strlen(optarg) + 1);
strcpy(config_id, optarg);
break;
case 4: /* --signum */
signum = get_signum(optarg);
if (signum == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown sigfunc %s\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
printf("%d\n", signum);
exit(0);
break;
case 3: /* --all */
__set_bit(RUN_ALL_CHILDREN, &daemon_mode);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
__set_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
__set_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
__set_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
#endif
break;
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
case 5:
if (optarg && optarg[0]) {
if (!strcmp(optarg, "run"))
perf_run = PERF_RUN;
else if (!strcmp(optarg, "all"))
perf_run = PERF_ALL;
else if (!strcmp(optarg, "end"))
perf_run = PERF_END;
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unknown perf start point %s", optarg);
}
else
perf_run = PERF_RUN;
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
case 6:
set_debug_options(optarg && optarg[0] ? optarg : NULL);
break;
#endif
case '?':
if (optopt && argv[curind][1] != '-')
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option -%c\n", optopt);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option %s\n", argv[curind]);
bad_option = true;
break;
case ':':
if (optopt && argv[curind][1] != '-')
fprintf(stderr, "Missing parameter for option -%c\n", optopt);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Missing parameter for option --%s\n", long_options[longindex].name);
bad_option = true;
break;
default:
exit(1);
break;
}
curind = optind;
}
if (optind < argc) {
printf("Unexpected argument(s): ");
while (optind < argc)
printf("%s ", argv[optind++]);
printf("\n");
}
if (bad_option)
exit(1);
return reopen_log;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,985
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOL pnm2png (FILE *pnm_file, FILE *png_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL interlace, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
char type_token[16];
char width_token[16];
char height_token[16];
char maxval_token[16];
int color_type;
unsigned long ul_width=0, ul_alpha_width=0;
unsigned long ul_height=0, ul_alpha_height=0;
unsigned long ul_maxval=0;
png_uint_32 width, alpha_width;
png_uint_32 height, alpha_height;
png_uint_32 maxval;
int bit_depth = 0;
int channels;
int alpha_depth = 0;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
BOOL raw, alpha_raw = FALSE;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
BOOL packed_bitmap = FALSE;
#endif
png_uint_32 tmp16;
int i;
/* read header of PNM file */
get_token(pnm_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '1') || (type_token[1] == '4'))
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
raw = (type_token[1] == '4');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
bit_depth = 1;
packed_bitmap = TRUE;
#else
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG built without PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED and \n");
fprintf (stderr, "PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED can't read PBM (P1,P4) files\n");
#endif
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '3') || (type_token[1] == '6'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '6');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
/* read header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if (alpha)
{
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
get_token(alpha_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
alpha_raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
get_token(alpha_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_width);
alpha_width=(png_uint_32) ul_alpha_width;
if (alpha_width != width)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_height);
alpha_height = (png_uint_32) ul_alpha_height;
if (alpha_height != height)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
alpha_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
alpha_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
alpha_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
alpha_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
alpha_depth = 16;
if (alpha_depth != bit_depth)
return FALSE;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
} /* end if alpha */
/* calculate the number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should not happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap)
/* row data is as many bytes as can fit width x channels x bit_depth */
row_bytes = (width * channels * bit_depth + 7) / 8;
else
#endif
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = width * channels * ((bit_depth <= 8) ? 1 : 2);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *) malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL)
return FALSE;
/* read data from PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < height; row++)
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap) {
for (i = 0; i < row_bytes; i++)
/* png supports this format natively so no conversion is needed */
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, 8);
} else
#endif
{
for (col = 0; col < width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
if (bit_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
}
}
if (alpha) /* read alpha-channel from pgm file */
{
if (alpha_raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (alpha_file, alpha_depth);
else
if (alpha_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
}
} /* if alpha */
} /* if packed_bitmap */
} /* end for col */
} /* end for row */
/* prepare the standard PNG structures */
png_ptr = png_create_write_struct (PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
{
return FALSE;
}
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap == TRUE)
{
png_set_packing (png_ptr);
png_set_invert_mono (png_ptr);
}
#endif
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading libpng function */
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* initialize the png structure */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
/* we're going to write more or less the same PNG as the input file */
png_set_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, width, height, bit_depth, color_type,
(!interlace) ? PNG_INTERLACE_NONE : PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
/* write the file header information */
png_write_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* if needed we will allocate memory for an new array of row-pointers */
if (row_pointers == (unsigned char**) NULL)
{
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **) malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* write out the entire image data in one call */
png_write_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* write the additional chuncks to the PNG file (not really needed) */
png_write_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the write, and free any memory allocated */
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of pnm2png */
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOverflowClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsOverflowClip(object_) && !CanOmitOverflowClip(object_)) {
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled() &&
object_.IsSVGForeignObject()) {
state.clip_rect = ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).FrameRect());
} else if (object_.IsBox()) {
state.clip_rect = ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).OverflowClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset));
state.clip_rect_excluding_overlay_scrollbars =
ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).OverflowClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset,
kExcludeOverlayScrollbarSizeForHitTesting));
} else {
DCHECK(object_.IsSVGViewportContainer());
const auto& viewport_container = ToLayoutSVGViewportContainer(object_);
state.clip_rect = FloatRoundedRect(
viewport_container.LocalToSVGParentTransform().Inverse().MapRect(
viewport_container.Viewport()));
}
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* existing = properties_->OverflowClip();
bool equal_ignoring_hit_test_rects =
!!existing &&
existing->EqualIgnoringHitTestRects(context_.current.clip, state);
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateOverflowClip(context_.current.clip,
std::move(state)),
equal_ignoring_hit_test_rects);
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearOverflowClip());
}
}
if (auto* overflow_clip = properties_->OverflowClip())
context_.current.clip = overflow_clip;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,800
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: QuicConnectionHelperTest()
: framer_(QuicDecrypter::Create(kNULL), QuicEncrypter::Create(kNULL)),
creator_(guid_, &framer_),
net_log_(BoundNetLog()),
scheduler_(new MockScheduler()),
socket_(&empty_data_, net_log_.net_log()),
runner_(new TestTaskRunner(&clock_)),
helper_(new TestConnectionHelper(runner_.get(), &clock_, &socket_)),
connection_(guid_, IPEndPoint(), helper_),
frame1_(1, false, 0, data1) {
connection_.set_visitor(&visitor_);
connection_.SetScheduler(scheduler_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly manage memory during message handling for plug-ins, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr;
UWORD16 u2_total_len;
UWORD16 u2_len;
UWORD16 u2_mb_type;
UWORD32 u4_next_word;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
else
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(ps_stream);
if(ps_dec->u2_first_mb)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* Section 6.3.17 */
/* The first MB of a slice cannot be skipped */
/* But the mb_addr_incr can be > 1, because at the beginning of */
/* a slice, it indicates the offset from the last MB in the */
/* previous row. Hence for the first slice in a row, the */
/* mb_addr_incr needs to be 1. */
/****************************************************************/
/* MB_x is set to zero whenever MB_y changes. */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = u2_mb_addr_incr - 1;
/* For error resilience */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = MIN(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, (ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - 1));
/****************************************************************/
/* mb_addr_incr is forced to 1 because in this decoder it is used */
/* more as an indicator of the number of MBs skipped than the */
/* as defined by the standard (Section 6.3.17) */
/****************************************************************/
u2_mb_addr_incr = 1;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
}
else
{
/****************************************************************/
/* In MPEG-2, the last MB of the row cannot be skipped and the */
/* mb_addr_incr cannot be such that it will take the current MB */
/* beyond the current row */
/* In MPEG-1, the slice could start and end anywhere and is not */
/* restricted to a row like in MPEG-2. Hence this check should */
/* not be done for MPEG-1 streams. */
/****************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 &&
((ps_dec->u2_mb_x + u2_mb_addr_incr) > ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb))
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - ps_dec->u2_mb_x;
}
impeg2d_dec_skip_mbs(ps_dec, (UWORD16)(u2_mb_addr_incr - 1));
}
}
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,16);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* MB type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
u2_mb_type = ps_dec->pu2_mb_type[BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,10)];
u2_len = BITS(u2_mb_type,15,8);
u2_total_len = u2_len;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << u2_len);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* motion type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
WORD32 i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
if((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) && ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,14);
u2_total_len += MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN);
i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
}
if ((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) &&
((i4_motion_type == 0) ||
(i4_motion_type == 3) ||
(i4_motion_type == 4) ||
(i4_motion_type >= 7)))
{
i4_motion_type = 1;
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dct type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_CODED) && ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = BIT((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15);
u2_total_len += MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN);
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u2_mb_type & MB_QUANT)
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,11);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
u2_total_len += MB_QUANT_SCALE_CODE_LEN;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,u2_total_len);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Set the function pointers */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_coded_mb = (UWORD16)(u2_mb_type & MB_CODED);
if(u2_mb_type & MB_BIDRECT)
{
UWORD16 u2_index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = BIDIRECT;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[u2_index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK)
{
UWORD16 u2_refPic = !(u2_mb_type & MB_MV_FORW);
UWORD16 u2_index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = (e_pred_direction_t)u2_refPic;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[u2_index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA)
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
impeg2d_dec_intra_mb(ps_dec);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb =0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = FORW;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 0;
impeg2d_dec_0mv_coded_mb(ps_dec);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* decode cbp */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if((u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA))
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0x3f;
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
if((ps_dec->u2_coded_mb))
{
UWORD16 cbpValue;
cbpValue = gau2_impeg2d_cbp_code[impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_CBP_LEN)];
ps_dec->u2_cbp = cbpValue & 0xFF;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,(cbpValue >> 8) & 0x0FF);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: decoder/impeg2d_dec_hdr.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a certain negative value, aka internal bug 26070014.
Commit Message: Return error for wrong mb_type
If mb_type decoded returns an invalid type of MB, then return error
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: I66abcad5de1352dd42d05b1a13bb4176153b133c
|
Low
| 174,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep :
JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep :
JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability was found in the jpc_pi_nextpcrl() function of jasper before 2.0.6 when processing crafted input.
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
|
Medium
| 169,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback) {
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
callback.Run(false, nullptr);
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND, {},
false /* addToTrace */, pid);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
|
Medium
| 172,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mem_check_range(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, size_t length)
{
switch (mem->type) {
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA:
return 0;
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_MR:
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_FMR:
return ((iova < mem->iova) ||
((iova + length) > (mem->iova + mem->length))) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr. +Info
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the mem_check_range function in drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.10 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption), obtain sensitive information from kernel memory, or possibly have unspecified other impact via a write or read request involving the *RDMA protocol over infiniband* (aka Soft RoCE) technology.
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SensorCreated(scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> sensor) {
if (!result_callback_) {
return;
}
if (!sensor) {
std::move(result_callback_).Run(nullptr);
return;
}
mojom::SensorType type = sensor->GetType();
sources_map_[type] = std::move(sensor);
if (sources_map_.size() == fusion_algorithm_->source_types().size()) {
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> fusion_sensor(new PlatformSensorFusion(
std::move(mapping_), provider_, std::move(fusion_algorithm_),
std::move(sources_map_)));
std::move(result_callback_).Run(fusion_sensor);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,831
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnAuthTokenFetchComplete(
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
request_.reset();
if (!status.is_success()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
return;
}
if (response_code == net::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gaia response: response code=net::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST.";
delegate_->OnOAuthError();
return;
}
if (response_code == net::HTTP_OK) {
scoped_ptr<Value> message_value(base::JSONReader::Read(response));
if (message_value.get() &&
message_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> response_dict(
static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(message_value.release()));
response_dict->GetString(kAccessTokenValue, &access_token_);
response_dict->GetInteger(kExpiresInValue, &expires_in_seconds_);
}
VLOG(1) << "Gaia response: acess_token='" << access_token_
<< "', expires in " << expires_in_seconds_ << " second(s)";
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gaia response: response code=" << response_code;
}
if (access_token_.empty()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
} else {
FetchUserInfoAndInvokeCallback();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,807
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int picolcd_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *raw_data, int size)
{
struct picolcd_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (!data)
return 1;
if (report->id == REPORT_KEY_STATE) {
if (data->input_keys)
ret = picolcd_raw_keypad(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
} else if (report->id == REPORT_IR_DATA) {
ret = picolcd_raw_cir(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave(&data->lock, flags);
/*
* We let the caller of picolcd_send_and_wait() check if the
* report we got is one of the expected ones or not.
*/
if (data->pending) {
memcpy(data->pending->raw_data, raw_data+1, size-1);
data->pending->raw_size = size-1;
data->pending->in_report = report;
complete(&data->pending->ready);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data->lock, flags);
}
picolcd_debug_raw_event(data, hdev, report, raw_data, size);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the picolcd_raw_event function in devices/hid/hid-picolcd_core.c in the PicoLCD HID device driver in the Linux kernel through 3.16.3, as used in Android on Nexus 7 devices, allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted device that sends a large report.
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,368
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::ScrollHitTest(
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset) {
return ScrollHitTest(NewClient(), scroll_offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int BrowserMainLoop::PreCreateThreads() {
if (parts_) {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup",
"BrowserMainLoop::CreateThreads:PreCreateThreads");
result_code_ = parts_->PreCreateThreads();
}
if (!base::SequencedWorkerPool::IsEnabled())
base::SequencedWorkerPool::EnableForProcess();
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
base::FeatureList::InitializeInstance(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kEnableFeatures),
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kDisableFeatures));
InitializeMemoryManagementComponent();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::CommandLine::InitializedForCurrentProcess() &&
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableHeapProfiling)) {
base::allocator::PeriodicallyShimNewMallocZones();
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "BrowserMainLoop::CreateThreads:PluginService");
PluginService::GetInstance()->Init();
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_LIBRARY_CDMS)
CdmRegistry::GetInstance()->Init();
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
ui::WindowResizeHelperMac::Get()->Init(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
#endif
GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
#if defined(USE_X11)
gpu_data_manager_visual_proxy_.reset(
new internal::GpuDataManagerVisualProxy(gpu_data_manager));
#endif
gpu_data_manager->Initialize();
#if !defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (parsed_command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess))
RenderProcessHost::SetRunRendererInProcess(true);
#endif
std::vector<url::Origin> origins =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetOriginsRequiringDedicatedProcess();
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
for (auto origin : origins)
policy->AddIsolatedOrigin(origin);
EVP_set_buggy_rsa_parser(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBuggyRSAParser));
return result_code_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in BoringSSL SPAKE2 in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to leak the low-order bits of SHA512(password) by inspecting protocol traffic.
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
Low
| 172,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition between permission prompts and navigations in Prompts in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
|
High
| 173,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadLABELImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*property;
const char
*label;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
width;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
label=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
draw_info->text=ConstantString(label);
metrics.width=0;
metrics.ascent=0.0;
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
image->columns=(size_t) (metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
image->rows=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
}
else
if (((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) ||
(fabs(image_info->pointsize) < MagickEpsilon))
{
double
high,
low;
/*
Auto fit text into bounding box.
*/
for ( ; ; draw_info->pointsize*=2.0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width >= image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height >= image->rows)))
break;
}
high=draw_info->pointsize;
for (low=1.0; (high-low) > 0.5; )
{
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0;
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width < image->columns) && (height < image->rows))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width < image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height < image->rows)))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0-0.5;
}
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=(size_t) (metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=(size_t) (draw_info->pointsize+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=(size_t) (metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=(size_t) (draw_info->pointsize+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Draw label.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection ? image->columns-
metrics.bounds.x2 : 0.0,draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity ?
metrics.ascent : 0.0);
draw_info->geometry=AcquireString(geometry);
status=AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (image_info->pointsize == 0.0)
{
char
pointsize[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pointsize,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
draw_info->pointsize);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label:pointsize",pointsize);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: magick/memory.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via vectors involving *too many exceptions,* which trigger a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
|
Low
| 168,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_packet(int fd, gss_buffer_t buf, int timeout, int first)
{
int ret;
static uint32_t len = 0;
static char len_buf[4];
static int len_buf_pos = 0;
static char * tmpbuf = 0;
static int tmpbuf_pos = 0;
if (first) {
len_buf_pos = 0;
return -2;
}
if (len_buf_pos < 4) {
ret = timed_read(fd, &len_buf[len_buf_pos], 4 - len_buf_pos,
timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) { /* EOF */
/* Failure to read ANY length just means we're done */
if (len_buf_pos == 0)
return 0;
/*
* Otherwise, we got EOF mid-length, and that's
* a protocol error.
*/
LOG(LOG_INFO, ("EOF reading packet len"));
return -1;
}
len_buf_pos += ret;
}
/* Not done reading the length? */
if (len_buf_pos != 4)
return -2;
/* We have the complete length */
len = ntohl(*(uint32_t *)len_buf);
/*
* We make sure recvd length is reasonable, allowing for some
* slop in enc overhead, beyond the actual maximum number of
* bytes of decrypted payload.
*/
if (len > GSTD_MAXPACKETCONTENTS + 512) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("ridiculous length, %ld", len));
return -1;
}
if (!tmpbuf) {
if ((tmpbuf = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_CRIT, ("malloc failure, %ld bytes", len));
return -1;
}
}
ret = timed_read(fd, tmpbuf + tmpbuf_pos, len - tmpbuf_pos, timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("EOF while reading packet (len=%d)", len));
return -1;
}
tmpbuf_pos += ret;
if (tmpbuf_pos == len) {
buf->length = len;
buf->value = tmpbuf;
len = len_buf_pos = tmpbuf_pos = 0;
tmpbuf = NULL;
LOG(LOG_DEBUG, ("read packet of length %d", buf->length));
return 1;
}
return -2;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The read_packet function in knc (Kerberised NetCat) before 1.11-1 is vulnerable to denial of service (memory exhaustion) that can be exploited remotely without authentication, possibly affecting another services running on the targeted host.
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 169,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PermissionsData::CanRunOnPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
int process_id,
const URLPatternSet& permitted_url_patterns,
std::string* error) const {
if (g_policy_delegate &&
!g_policy_delegate->CanExecuteScriptOnPage(
extension, document_url, top_frame_url, tab_id, process_id, error)) {
return false;
}
bool can_execute_everywhere = CanExecuteScriptEverywhere(extension);
if (!can_execute_everywhere &&
!ExtensionsClient::Get()->IsScriptableURL(document_url, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kExtensionsOnChromeURLs)) {
if (document_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessChromeUrl;
return false;
}
}
if (top_frame_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) &&
top_frame_url.GetOrigin() !=
Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(extension->id()).GetOrigin() &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessExtensionUrl;
return false;
}
if (HasTabSpecificPermissionToExecuteScript(tab_id, top_frame_url))
return true;
bool can_access = permitted_url_patterns.MatchesURL(document_url);
if (!can_access && error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(manifest_errors::kCannotAccessPage,
document_url.spec());
}
return can_access;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Debugger extension API in browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger_api.cc in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not validate a tab's URL before an attach operation, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access limitations via an extension that uses a restricted URL, as demonstrated by a chrome:// URL.
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: safecat_current_encoding(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, bufsize, pos, pm->current_encoding,
pm->current_gamma);
if (pm->encoding_ignored)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[overridden]");
return pos;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->pos + count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FT_Stream_EnterFrame function in base/ftstream.c in FreeType before 2.4.2 does not properly validate certain position values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: JSValue JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Node* target = toNode(exec->argument(0));
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
JSObject* optionsObject = exec->argument(1).getObject();
if (!optionsObject) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return jsUndefined();
}
JSDictionary dictionary(exec, optionsObject);
MutationObserverOptions options = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < numBooleanOptions; ++i) {
bool option = false;
if (!dictionary.tryGetProperty(booleanOptions[i].name, option))
return jsUndefined();
if (option)
options |= booleanOptions[i].value;
}
HashSet<AtomicString> attributeFilter;
if (!dictionary.tryGetProperty("attributeFilter", attributeFilter))
return jsUndefined();
if (!attributeFilter.isEmpty())
options |= WebKitMutationObserver::AttributeFilter;
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
impl()->observe(target, options, attributeFilter, ec);
if (ec)
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return jsUndefined();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::SubmitFrameMetadata(
const H264SPS* sps,
const H264PPS* pps,
const H264DPB& dpb,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_listp0,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_listb0,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_listb1,
const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic) {
VAPictureParameterBufferH264 pic_param;
memset(&pic_param, 0, sizeof(pic_param));
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP(a) pic_param.a = sps->a
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP2(a, b) pic_param.b = sps->a
FROM_SPS_TO_PP2(pic_width_in_mbs_minus1, picture_width_in_mbs_minus1);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP2(pic_height_in_map_units_minus1, picture_height_in_mbs_minus1);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP(bit_depth_luma_minus8);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP(bit_depth_chroma_minus8);
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP2
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(a) pic_param.seq_fields.bits.a = sps->a
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF2(a, b) pic_param.seq_fields.bits.b = sps->a
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(chroma_format_idc);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF2(separate_colour_plane_flag,
residual_colour_transform_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(frame_mbs_only_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(mb_adaptive_frame_field_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(direct_8x8_inference_flag);
pic_param.seq_fields.bits.MinLumaBiPredSize8x8 = (sps->level_idc >= 31);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(log2_max_frame_num_minus4);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(pic_order_cnt_type);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag);
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF2
#define FROM_PPS_TO_PP(a) pic_param.a = pps->a
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(pic_init_qp_minus26);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(pic_init_qs_minus26);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(chroma_qp_index_offset);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(second_chroma_qp_index_offset);
#undef FROM_PPS_TO_PP
#define FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(a) pic_param.pic_fields.bits.a = pps->a
#define FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF2(a, b) pic_param.pic_fields.bits.b = pps->a
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(entropy_coding_mode_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(weighted_pred_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(weighted_bipred_idc);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(transform_8x8_mode_flag);
pic_param.pic_fields.bits.field_pic_flag = 0;
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(constrained_intra_pred_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF2(bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag,
pic_order_present_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(deblocking_filter_control_present_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag);
pic_param.pic_fields.bits.reference_pic_flag = pic->ref;
#undef FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF
#undef FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF2
pic_param.frame_num = pic->frame_num;
InitVAPicture(&pic_param.CurrPic);
FillVAPicture(&pic_param.CurrPic, pic);
for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
InitVAPicture(&pic_param.ReferenceFrames[i]);
FillVARefFramesFromDPB(dpb, pic_param.ReferenceFrames,
arraysize(pic_param.ReferenceFrames));
pic_param.num_ref_frames = sps->max_num_ref_frames;
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VAPictureParameterBufferType,
sizeof(pic_param), &pic_param))
return false;
VAIQMatrixBufferH264 iq_matrix_buf;
memset(&iq_matrix_buf, 0, sizeof(iq_matrix_buf));
if (pps->pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag) {
for (int i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList4x4[i][kZigzagScan4x4[j]] =
pps->scaling_list4x4[i][j];
}
for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList8x8[i][kZigzagScan8x8[j]] =
pps->scaling_list8x8[i][j];
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList4x4[i][kZigzagScan4x4[j]] =
sps->scaling_list4x4[i][j];
}
for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList8x8[i][kZigzagScan8x8[j]] =
sps->scaling_list8x8[i][j];
}
}
return vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VAIQMatrixBufferType,
sizeof(iq_matrix_buf), &iq_matrix_buf);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void spl_filesystem_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)object;
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->dtor) {
intern->oth_handler->dtor(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->_path) {
efree(intern->_path);
}
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
}
switch(intern->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_close(intern->u.dir.dirp);
intern->u.dir.dirp = NULL;
}
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
efree(intern->u.dir.sub_path);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
if (intern->u.file.stream) {
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
/* zend_list_delref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->zcontext));*/
}
if (!intern->u.file.stream->is_persistent) {
php_stream_free(intern->u.file.stream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
} else {
php_stream_free(intern->u.file.stream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE_PERSISTENT);
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode) {
efree(intern->u.file.open_mode);
}
if (intern->orig_path) {
efree(intern->orig_path);
}
}
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
{
zend_object_iterator *iterator;
iterator = (zend_object_iterator*)
spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(intern);
if (iterator->data != NULL) {
iterator->data = NULL;
iterator->funcs->dtor(iterator TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
efree(object);
} /* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,083
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(s->avctx->level > 0 && s->avctx->level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
}
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An inconsistent bits-per-sample value in the ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header function in libavcodec/mpeg4videodec.c in FFmpeg 4.0 may trigger an assertion violation while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Clear bits_per_raw_sample if it has originated from a previous instance
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_5.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SelectionInDOMTree ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree) {
return SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetAffinity(selection_in_flat_tree.Affinity())
.SetBaseAndExtent(ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Base()),
ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Extent()))
.SetIsDirectional(selection_in_flat_tree.IsDirectional())
.SetIsHandleVisible(selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
Low
| 171,762
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static base::Callback<void(const gfx::Image&)> Wrap(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback) {
auto* handler = new ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(image_decoded_callback);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout::OnImageDecoded,
handler->weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), gfx::Image()),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(kDecodeLogoTimeoutSeconds));
return base::Bind(&ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout::OnImageDecoded,
handler->weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
|
Medium
| 171,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::ConfirmPairing() {
if (!agent_.get() || confirmation_callback_.is_null())
return;
confirmation_callback_.Run(SUCCESS);
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpPacketStateSynSent(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt received: %s", ssn, PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) ?
"toclient":"toserver");
/* RST */
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateRst(ssn, p))
return -1;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
if (SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_WINDOW(p), 0) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), (ssn->client.isn + 1)))
{
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
}
} else {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
}
/* FIN */
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_FIN) {
/** \todo */
/* SYN/ACK */
} else if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) && PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK received on 4WHS session", ssn);
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet ack's the earlier
* received SYN packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.isn + 1))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ACK mismatch, packet ACK %"PRIu32""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.isn + 1);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet SEQ's the *FIRST* received SYN
* packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_SYN);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %"PRIu32""
" != %" PRIu32 " from *first* SYN pkt", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn);
return -1;
}
/* update state */
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_SYN_RECV);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ 4WHS ssn state is now TCP_SYN_RECV", ssn);
/* sequence number & window */
ssn->client.isn = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->client, ssn->client.isn);
ssn->client.next_seq = ssn->client.isn + 1;
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS window %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.window);
/* Set the timestamp values used to validate the timestamp of
* received packets. */
if ((TCP_HAS_TS(p)) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP))
{
ssn->client.last_ts = TCP_GET_TSVAL(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.last_ts %" PRIu32" "
"ssn->server.last_ts %" PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.last_ts, ssn->server.last_ts);
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
if (ssn->client.last_ts == 0)
ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
} else {
ssn->server.last_ts = 0;
ssn->client.last_ts = 0;
ssn->server.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
}
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
ssn->client.last_ack = ssn->client.isn + 1;
/** check for the presense of the ws ptr to determine if we
* support wscale at all */
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE) &&
(TCP_HAS_WSCALE(p)))
{
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_GET_WSCALE(p);
} else {
ssn->server.wscale = 0;
}
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK) &&
TCP_GET_SACKOK(p) == 1) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SACK permitted for 4WHS session", ssn);
}
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.next_win %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.next_win);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->server.next_win %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->server.next_win);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %" PRIu32 " "
"(ssn->server.last_ack %" PRIu32 ")", ssn,
ssn->client.isn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack, ssn->server.last_ack);
/* done here */
return 0;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_IN_WRONG_DIRECTION);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK received in the wrong direction", ssn);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet ack's the earlier
* received SYN packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.isn + 1))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK mismatch, packet ACK %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_ACK(p),
ssn->client.isn + 1);
return -1;
}
StreamTcp3whsSynAckUpdate(ssn, p, /* no queue override */NULL);
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_SENT... resent", ssn);
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_SENT... resent of "
"4WHS SYN", ssn);
}
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
/** a SYN only packet in the opposite direction could be:
* http://www.breakingpointsystems.com/community/blog/tcp-
* portals-the-three-way-handshake-is-a-lie
*
* \todo improve resetting the session */
/* indicate that we're dealing with 4WHS here */
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS flag set", ssn);
/* set the sequence numbers and window for server
* We leave the ssn->client.isn in place as we will
* check the SYN/ACK pkt with that.
*/
ssn->server.isn = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->server, ssn->server.isn);
ssn->server.next_seq = ssn->server.isn + 1;
/* Set the stream timestamp value, if packet has timestamp
* option enabled. */
if (TCP_HAS_TS(p)) {
ssn->server.last_ts = TCP_GET_TSVAL(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: %02x", ssn, ssn->server.last_ts);
if (ssn->server.last_ts == 0)
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->server.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
}
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
if (TCP_HAS_WSCALE(p)) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE;
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_GET_WSCALE(p);
} else {
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE;
ssn->server.wscale = 0;
}
if (TCP_GET_SACKOK(p) == 1) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK;
} else {
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->server.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->server.isn, ssn->server.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.isn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack);
}
/** \todo check if it's correct or set event */
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) {
/* Handle the asynchronous stream, when we receive a SYN packet
and now istead of receving a SYN/ACK we receive a ACK from the
same host, which sent the SYN, this suggests the ASNYC streams.*/
if (stream_config.async_oneside == FALSE)
return 0;
/* we are in AYNC (one side) mode now. */
/* one side async means we won't see a SYN/ACK, so we can
* only check the SYN. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_ASYNC_WRONG_SEQ);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream",ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
ssn->client.next_seq);
return -1;
}
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
/* Set the server side parameters */
ssn->server.isn = TCP_GET_ACK(p) - 1;
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->server, ssn->server.isn);
ssn->server.next_seq = ssn->server.isn + 1;
ssn->server.last_ack = ssn->server.next_seq;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: synsent => Asynchronous stream, packet SEQ"
" %" PRIu32 ", payload size %" PRIu32 " (%" PRIu32 "), "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ""
,ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p), p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)
+ p->payload_len, ssn->client.next_seq);
/* if SYN had wscale, assume it to be supported. Otherwise
* we know it not to be supported. */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE) {
ssn->client.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
}
/* Set the timestamp values used to validate the timestamp of
* received packets.*/
if (TCP_HAS_TS(p) &&
(ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP))
{
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
} else {
ssn->client.last_ts = 0;
ssn->client.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: default case", ssn);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Suricata before 4.0.5 stops TCP stream inspection upon a TCP RST from a server. This allows detection bypass because Windows TCP clients proceed with normal processing of TCP data that arrives shortly after an RST (i.e., they act as if the RST had not yet been received).
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
|
Low
| 169,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sp<IMemory> MetadataRetrieverClient::getFrameAtTime(int64_t timeUs, int option)
{
ALOGV("getFrameAtTime: time(%lld us) option(%d)", timeUs, option);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
Mutex::Autolock glock(sLock);
mThumbnail.clear();
if (mRetriever == NULL) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frame = mRetriever->getFrameAtTime(timeUs, option);
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to capture a video frame");
return NULL;
}
size_t size = sizeof(VideoFrame) + frame->mSize;
sp<MemoryHeapBase> heap = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, "MetadataRetrieverClient");
if (heap == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to create MemoryDealer");
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
mThumbnail = new MemoryBase(heap, 0, size);
if (mThumbnail == NULL) {
ALOGE("not enough memory for VideoFrame size=%u", size);
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frameCopy = static_cast<VideoFrame *>(mThumbnail->pointer());
frameCopy->mWidth = frame->mWidth;
frameCopy->mHeight = frame->mHeight;
frameCopy->mDisplayWidth = frame->mDisplayWidth;
frameCopy->mDisplayHeight = frame->mDisplayHeight;
frameCopy->mSize = frame->mSize;
frameCopy->mRotationAngle = frame->mRotationAngle;
ALOGV("rotation: %d", frameCopy->mRotationAngle);
frameCopy->mData = (uint8_t *)frameCopy + sizeof(VideoFrame);
memcpy(frameCopy->mData, frame->mData, frame->mSize);
delete frame; // Fix memory leakage
return mThumbnail;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/MetadataRetrieverClient.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive pointer information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28377502.
Commit Message: Clear unused pointer field when sending across binder
Bug: 28377502
Change-Id: Iad5ebfb0a9ef89f09755bb332579dbd3534f9c98
|
Low
| 173,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_gray_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
PassRefPtr<IDBKey> key(createIDBKeyFromValue(exec, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->idbKey(key);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,588
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
{
struct assegment *seg = as->segments;
size_t bytes = 0;
if (!seg || seg->length == 0)
return 0;
if (seg)
{
/*
* Hey, what do we do when we have > STREAM_WRITABLE(s) here?
* At the moment, we would write out a partial aspath, and our peer
* will complain and drop the session :-/
*
* The general assumption here is that many things tested will
* never happen. And, in real live, up to now, they have not.
*/
while (seg && (ASSEGMENT_LEN(seg, use32bit) <= STREAM_WRITEABLE(s)))
{
struct assegment *next = seg->next;
int written = 0;
int asns_packed = 0;
size_t lenp;
/* Overlength segments have to be split up */
while ( (seg->length - written) > AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
{
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
lenp = assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, seg->length - written);
assegment_data_put (s, (seg->as + written), seg->length - written,
use32bit);
/* Sequence-type segments can be 'packed' together
* Case of a segment which was overlength and split up
* will be missed here, but that doesn't matter.
*/
while (next && ASSEGMENTS_PACKABLE (seg, next))
{
/* NB: We should never normally get here given we
* normalise aspath data when parse them. However, better
* safe than sorry. We potentially could call
* assegment_normalise here instead, but it's cheaper and
* easier to do it on the fly here rather than go through
* the segment list twice every time we write out
* aspath's.
*/
/* Next segment's data can fit in this one */
assegment_data_put (s, next->as, next->length, use32bit);
/* update the length of the segment header */
stream_putc_at (s, lenp, seg->length - written + next->length);
asns_packed += next->length;
next = next->next;
}
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (seg->length - written + asns_packed,
use32bit);
seg = next;
}
}
return bytes;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The aspath_put function in bgpd/bgp_aspath.c in Quagga before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (session drop) via BGP UPDATE messages, because AS_PATH size calculation for long paths counts certain bytes twice and consequently constructs an invalid message.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,639
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVorbis::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioVorbis:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *vorbisParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *)params;
if (vorbisParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
vorbisParams->nBitRate = 0;
vorbisParams->nMinBitRate = 0;
vorbisParams->nMaxBitRate = 0;
vorbisParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
vorbisParams->nQuality = 3;
vorbisParams->bManaged = OMX_FALSE;
vorbisParams->bDownmix = OMX_FALSE;
if (!isConfigured()) {
vorbisParams->nChannels = 1;
vorbisParams->nSampleRate = 44100;
} else {
vorbisParams->nChannels = mVi->channels;
vorbisParams->nSampleRate = mVi->rate;
vorbisParams->nBitRate = mVi->bitrate_nominal;
vorbisParams->nMinBitRate = mVi->bitrate_lower;
vorbisParams->nMaxBitRate = mVi->bitrate_upper;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 44100;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mVi->channels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mVi->rate;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_ahash_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_hash rhash;
snprintf(rhash.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "ahash");
rhash.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rhash.digestsize = __crypto_hash_alg_common(alg)->digestsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_HASH,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_hash), &rhash))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct cypress_private *priv;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cypress_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->comm_is_ok = !0;
spin_lock_init(&priv->lock);
if (kfifo_alloc(&priv->write_fifo, CYPRESS_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) {
kfree(priv);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Skip reset for FRWD device. It is a workaound:
device hangs if it receives SET_CONFIGURE in Configured
state. */
if (!is_frwd(serial->dev))
usb_reset_configuration(serial->dev);
priv->cmd_ctrl = 0;
priv->line_control = 0;
priv->termios_initialized = 0;
priv->rx_flags = 0;
/* Default packet format setting is determined by packet size.
Anything with a size larger then 9 must have a separate
count field since the 3 bit count field is otherwise too
small. Otherwise we can use the slightly more compact
format. This is in accordance with the cypress_m8 serial
converter app note. */
if (port->interrupt_out_size > 9)
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_1;
else
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_2;
if (interval > 0) {
priv->write_urb_interval = interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - read & write intervals forced to %d\n",
__func__, interval);
} else {
priv->write_urb_interval = port->interrupt_out_urb->interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = port->interrupt_in_urb->interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - intervals: read=%d write=%d\n",
__func__, priv->read_urb_interval,
priv->write_urb_interval);
}
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
port->port.drain_delay = 256;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a USB device without both an interrupt-in and an interrupt-out endpoint descriptor, related to the cypress_generic_port_probe and cypress_open functions.
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: size_t CancelableFileOperation(Function operation,
HANDLE file,
BufferType* buffer,
size_t length,
WaitableEvent* io_event,
WaitableEvent* cancel_event,
CancelableSyncSocket* socket,
DWORD timeout_in_ms) {
ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(buffer[0]) == sizeof(char), incorrect_buffer_type);
DCHECK_GT(length, 0u);
DCHECK_LE(length, kMaxMessageLength);
DCHECK_NE(file, SyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
TimeTicks current_time, finish_time;
if (timeout_in_ms != INFINITE) {
current_time = TimeTicks::Now();
finish_time =
current_time + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(timeout_in_ms);
}
size_t count = 0;
do {
OVERLAPPED ol = { 0 };
ol.hEvent = io_event->handle();
const DWORD chunk = GetNextChunkSize(count, length);
DWORD len = 0;
const BOOL operation_ok = operation(
file, static_cast<BufferType*>(buffer) + count, chunk, &len, &ol);
if (!operation_ok) {
if (::GetLastError() == ERROR_IO_PENDING) {
HANDLE events[] = { io_event->handle(), cancel_event->handle() };
const int wait_result = WaitForMultipleObjects(
ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(events), events, FALSE,
timeout_in_ms == INFINITE ?
timeout_in_ms :
static_cast<DWORD>(
(finish_time - current_time).InMilliseconds()));
if (wait_result != WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 0) {
CancelIo(file);
}
if (!GetOverlappedResult(file, &ol, &len, TRUE))
len = 0;
if (wait_result == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 1) {
DVLOG(1) << "Shutdown was signaled. Closing socket.";
socket->Close();
return count;
}
DCHECK(wait_result == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 0 || wait_result == WAIT_TIMEOUT);
} else {
break;
}
}
count += len;
if (len != chunk)
break;
if (timeout_in_ms != INFINITE && count < length)
current_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
} while (count < length &&
(timeout_in_ms == INFINITE || current_time < finish_time));
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The get_dht function in jdmarker.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.3.0, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 and other products, does not set all elements of a certain Huffman value array during the reading of segments that follow Define Huffman Table (DHT) JPEG markers, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from uninitialized memory locations via a crafted JPEG image.
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
|
Low
| 171,163
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CompositedLayerRasterInvalidator::ChunkPropertiesChanged(
const RefCountedPropertyTreeState& new_chunk_state,
const PaintChunkInfo& new_chunk,
const PaintChunkInfo& old_chunk,
const PropertyTreeState& layer_state) const {
if (!ApproximatelyEqual(new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_transform,
old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_transform))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kPaintProperty;
if (new_chunk_state.Effect() != old_chunk.effect_state ||
new_chunk_state.Effect()->Changed(*layer_state.Effect()))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kPaintProperty;
if (new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.IsTight() &&
old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.IsTight()) {
if (new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip == old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip)
return PaintInvalidationReason::kNone;
if (ClipByLayerBounds(new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.Rect()) ==
ClipByLayerBounds(old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.Rect()))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kNone;
return PaintInvalidationReason::kIncremental;
}
if (new_chunk_state.Clip() != old_chunk.clip_state ||
new_chunk_state.Clip()->Changed(*layer_state.Clip()))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kPaintProperty;
return PaintInvalidationReason::kNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,810
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _WM_ParseNewHmi(uint8_t *hmi_data, uint32_t hmi_size) {
uint32_t hmi_tmp = 0;
uint8_t *hmi_base = hmi_data;
uint16_t hmi_bpm = 0;
uint16_t hmi_division = 0;
uint32_t *hmi_track_offset = NULL;
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t j = 0;
uint8_t *hmi_addr = NULL;
uint32_t *hmi_track_header_length = NULL;
struct _mdi *hmi_mdi = NULL;
uint32_t tempo_f = 5000000.0;
uint32_t *hmi_track_end = NULL;
uint8_t hmi_tracks_ended = 0;
uint8_t *hmi_running_event = NULL;
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
uint32_t *hmi_delta = NULL;
uint32_t smallest_delta = 0;
uint32_t subtract_delta = 0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0;
float sample_remainder = 0;
float samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
struct _note {
uint32_t length;
uint8_t channel;
} *note;
UNUSED(hmi_size);
if (memcmp(hmi_data, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
hmi_bpm = hmi_data[212];
hmi_division = 60;
hmi_track_cnt = hmi_data[228];
hmi_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(hmi_mdi, hmi_division);
if ((_WM_MixerOptions & WM_MO_ROUNDTEMPO)) {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / hmi_bpm) + 0.5f;
} else {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / hmi_bpm);
}
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(hmi_division, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(hmi_mdi, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
hmi_track_offset = (uint32_t *)malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_track_header_length = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_track_end = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_delta = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
note = malloc(sizeof(struct _note) * 128 * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_running_event = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * 128 * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_data += 370;
smallest_delta = 0xffffffff;
if (hmi_size < (370 + (hmi_track_cnt * 17))) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, "file too short", 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_track_offset[0] = *hmi_data; // To keep Xcode happy
for (i = 0; i < hmi_track_cnt; i++) {
hmi_track_offset[i] = *hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i] += (*hmi_data++ << 8);
hmi_track_offset[i] += (*hmi_data++ << 16);
hmi_track_offset[i] += (*hmi_data++ << 24);
if (hmi_size < (hmi_track_offset[i] + 0x5a + 4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, "file too short", 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_addr = hmi_base + hmi_track_offset[i];
if (memcmp(hmi_addr, "HMI-MIDITRACK", 13)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, NULL, 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_track_header_length[i] = hmi_addr[0x57];
hmi_track_header_length[i] += (hmi_addr[0x58] << 8);
hmi_track_header_length[i] += (hmi_addr[0x59] << 16);
hmi_track_header_length[i] += (hmi_addr[0x5a] << 24);
hmi_addr += hmi_track_header_length[i];
hmi_track_offset[i] += hmi_track_header_length[i];
hmi_delta[i] = 0;
if (*hmi_addr > 0x7f) {
do {
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) + (*hmi_addr & 0x7f);
hmi_addr++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (*hmi_addr > 0x7f);
}
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) + (*hmi_addr & 0x7f);
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
hmi_addr++;
if (hmi_delta[i] < smallest_delta) {
smallest_delta = hmi_delta[i];
}
hmi_track_end[i] = 0;
hmi_running_event[i] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 128; j++) {
hmi_tmp = (128 * i) + j;
note[hmi_tmp].length = 0;
note[hmi_tmp].channel = 0;
}
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f= (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
hmi_mdi->events[hmi_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
hmi_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
while (hmi_tracks_ended < hmi_track_cnt) {
smallest_delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < hmi_track_cnt; i++) {
if (hmi_track_end[i]) continue;
for (j = 0; j < 128; j++) {
hmi_tmp = (128 * i) + j;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
note[hmi_tmp].length -= subtract_delta;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > note[hmi_tmp].length)) {
smallest_delta = note[hmi_tmp].length;
}
} else {
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(hmi_mdi, note[hmi_tmp].channel, j, 0);
}
}
}
if (hmi_delta[i]) {
hmi_delta[i] -= subtract_delta;
if (hmi_delta[i]) {
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > hmi_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = hmi_delta[i];
}
continue;
}
}
do {
hmi_data = hmi_base + hmi_track_offset[i];
hmi_delta[i] = 0;
if (hmi_data[0] == 0xfe) {
if (hmi_data[1] == 0x10) {
hmi_tmp = (hmi_data[4] + 5);
hmi_data += hmi_tmp;
hmi_track_offset[i] += hmi_tmp;
} else if (hmi_data[1] == 0x15) {
hmi_data += 4;
hmi_track_offset[i] += 4;
}
hmi_data += 4;
hmi_track_offset[i] += 4;
} else {
if ((setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(hmi_mdi,hmi_data,hmi_running_event[i])) == 0) {
goto _hmi_end;
}
if ((hmi_data[0] == 0xff) && (hmi_data[1] == 0x2f) && (hmi_data[2] == 0x00)) {
hmi_track_end[i] = 1;
hmi_tracks_ended++;
for(j = 0; j < 128; j++) {
hmi_tmp = (128 * i) + j;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(hmi_mdi, note[hmi_tmp].channel, j, 0);
note[hmi_tmp].length = 0;
}
}
goto _hmi_next_track;
}
if ((*hmi_data == 0xF0) || (*hmi_data == 0xF7)) {
hmi_running_event[i] = 0;
} else if (*hmi_data < 0xF0) {
if (*hmi_data >= 0x80) {
hmi_running_event[i] = *hmi_data;
}
}
if ((hmi_running_event[i] & 0xf0) == 0x90) {
if (*hmi_data > 127) {
hmi_tmp = hmi_data[1];
} else {
hmi_tmp = *hmi_data;
}
hmi_tmp += (i * 128);
note[hmi_tmp].channel = hmi_running_event[i] & 0xf;
hmi_data += setup_ret;
hmi_track_offset[i] += setup_ret;
note[hmi_tmp].length = 0;
if (*hmi_data > 0x7f) {
do {
note[hmi_tmp].length = (note[hmi_tmp].length << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (*hmi_data > 0x7F);
}
note[hmi_tmp].length = (note[hmi_tmp].length << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > note[hmi_tmp].length)) {
smallest_delta = note[hmi_tmp].length;
}
} else {
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(hmi_mdi, note[hmi_tmp].channel, j, 0);
}
} else {
hmi_data += setup_ret;
hmi_track_offset[i] += setup_ret;
}
}
if (*hmi_data > 0x7f) {
do {
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (*hmi_data > 0x7F);
}
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (!hmi_delta[i]);
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > hmi_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = hmi_delta[i];
}
_hmi_next_track:
hmi_tmp = 0;
UNUSED(hmi_tmp);
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f= (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
hmi_mdi->events[hmi_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
hmi_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
}
if ((hmi_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
hmi_mdi->current_event = &hmi_mdi->events[0];
hmi_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
hmi_mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(hmi_mdi);
_hmi_end:
free(hmi_track_offset);
free(hmi_track_header_length);
free(hmi_track_end);
free(hmi_delta);
free(note);
free(hmi_running_event);
if (hmi_mdi->reverb) return (hmi_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(hmi_mdi);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
|
Medium
| 168,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_anonymous_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *page_table, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
struct page *page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t entry;
pte_unmap(page_table);
/* Check if we need to add a guard page to the stack */
if (check_stack_guard_page(vma, address) < 0)
return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV;
/* Use the zero-page for reads */
if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !mm_forbids_zeropage(mm)) {
entry = pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(my_zero_pfn(address),
vma->vm_page_prot));
page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
if (!pte_none(*page_table))
goto unlock;
goto setpte;
}
/* Allocate our own private page. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
goto oom;
page = alloc_zeroed_user_highpage_movable(vma, address);
if (!page)
goto oom;
if (mem_cgroup_try_charge(page, mm, GFP_KERNEL, &memcg))
goto oom_free_page;
/*
* The memory barrier inside __SetPageUptodate makes sure that
* preceeding stores to the page contents become visible before
* the set_pte_at() write.
*/
__SetPageUptodate(page);
entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
if (!pte_none(*page_table))
goto release;
inc_mm_counter_fast(mm, MM_ANONPAGES);
page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, false);
lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable(page, vma);
setpte:
set_pte_at(mm, address, page_table, entry);
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, page_table);
unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
return 0;
release:
mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(page, memcg);
page_cache_release(page);
goto unlock;
oom_free_page:
page_cache_release(page);
oom:
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm/memory.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.4 mishandles anonymous pages, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (page tainting) via a crafted application that triggers writing to page zero.
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,567
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gss_init_sec_context (minor_status,
claimant_cred_handle,
context_handle,
target_name,
req_mech_type,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_name_t target_name;
gss_OID req_mech_type;
OM_uint32 req_flags;
OM_uint32 time_req;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_buffer_t input_token;
gss_OID * actual_mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_minor_status;
gss_union_name_t union_name;
gss_union_cred_t union_cred;
gss_name_t internal_name;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id;
gss_OID selected_mech;
gss_mechanism mech;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle;
status = val_init_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
claimant_cred_handle,
context_handle,
target_name,
req_mech_type,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, req_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
union_name = (gss_union_name_t)target_name;
/*
* obtain the gss mechanism information for the requested
* mechanism. If mech_type is NULL, set it to the resultant
* mechanism
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech == NULL)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
if (mech->gss_init_sec_context == NULL)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
/*
* If target_name is mechanism_specific, then it must match the
* mech_type that we're about to use. Otherwise, do an import on
* the external_name form of the target name.
*/
if (union_name->mech_type &&
g_OID_equal(union_name->mech_type, selected_mech)) {
internal_name = union_name->mech_name;
} else {
if ((status = gssint_import_internal_name(minor_status, selected_mech,
union_name,
&internal_name)) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
}
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (union_ctx_id == NULL)
goto end;
if (generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
goto end;
}
/* copy the supplied context handle */
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
} else
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
* defaults to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL if there is no cred, which will
* use the default credential.
*/
union_cred = (gss_union_cred_t) claimant_cred_handle;
input_cred_handle = gssint_get_mechanism_cred(union_cred, selected_mech);
/*
* now call the approprate underlying mechanism routine
*/
status = mech->gss_init_sec_context(
minor_status,
input_cred_handle,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
internal_name,
gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech),
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
/*
* The spec says the preferred method is to delete all context info on
* the first call to init, and on all subsequent calls make the caller
* responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context. However, if the
* mechanism decided to delete the internal context, we should also
* delete the union context.
*/
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
free(union_ctx_id);
}
} else if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
end:
if (union_name->mech_name == NULL ||
union_name->mech_name != internal_name) {
(void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech, &internal_name);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,016
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: HostCache::HostCache(size_t max_entries)
: max_entries_(max_entries), network_changes_(0) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
|
Low
| 172,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error)
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case SEQ_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_seq_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case SEQ_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABILITIY_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
|
Low
| 173,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::OnDecode(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle, int32 id, int32 size) {
DCHECK(video_decode_accelerator_.get());
video_decode_accelerator_->Decode(media::BitstreamBuffer(id, handle, size));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,407
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format);
uint32_t plane_checksum[4] = {0}, checksum = 0;
int i, plane, vsub = desc->log2_chroma_h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
int64_t linesize = av_image_get_linesize(frame->format, frame->width, plane);
uint8_t *data = frame->data[plane];
int h = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub) : inlink->h;
if (linesize < 0)
return linesize;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
plane_checksum[plane] = av_adler32_update(plane_checksum[plane], data, linesize);
checksum = av_adler32_update(checksum, data, linesize);
data += frame->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO,
"n:%"PRId64" pts:%s pts_time:%s pos:%"PRId64" "
"fmt:%s sar:%d/%d s:%dx%d i:%c iskey:%d type:%c "
"checksum:%08X plane_checksum:[%08X",
inlink->frame_count,
av_ts2str(frame->pts), av_ts2timestr(frame->pts, &inlink->time_base), av_frame_get_pkt_pos(frame),
desc->name,
frame->sample_aspect_ratio.num, frame->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
frame->width, frame->height,
!frame->interlaced_frame ? 'P' : /* Progressive */
frame->top_field_first ? 'T' : 'B', /* Top / Bottom */
frame->key_frame,
av_get_picture_type_char(frame->pict_type),
checksum, plane_checksum[0]);
for (plane = 1; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++)
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO, " %08X", plane_checksum[plane]);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "]\n");
return ff_filter_frame(inlink->dst->outputs[0], frame);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Low
| 166,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DefragVlanQinQTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(1, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(1, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
/* With no VLAN IDs set, packets should re-assemble. */
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) == NULL)
goto end;
SCFree(r);
/* With mismatched VLANs, packets should not re-assemble. */
p1->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p1->vlan_id[1] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[1] = 2;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
/* Pass. */
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,305
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hook_print (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, struct t_gui_buffer *buffer,
const char *tags, const char *message, int strip_colors,
t_hook_callback_print *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_print *new_hook_print;
if (!callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_print = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_print));
if (!new_hook_print)
{
rc = (int) (HOOK_CONNECT(ptr_hook, gnutls_cb))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, tls_session, req_ca, nreq,
pk_algos, pk_algos_len, answer);
break;
}
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_print;
new_hook_print->callback = callback;
new_hook_print->buffer = buffer;
if (tags)
{
new_hook_print->tags_array = string_split (tags, ",", 0, 0,
&new_hook_print->tags_count);
}
else
{
new_hook_print->tags_count = 0;
new_hook_print->tags_array = NULL;
}
new_hook_print->message = (message) ? strdup (message) : NULL;
new_hook_print->strip_colors = strip_colors;
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Wee Enhanced Environment for Chat (aka WeeChat) 0.3.4 and earlier does not properly verify that the server hostname matches the domain name of the subject of an X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof an SSL chat server via an arbitrary certificate, related to incorrect use of the GnuTLS API.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool CopyDirectory(const FilePath& from_path,
const FilePath& to_path,
bool recursive) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
DCHECK(to_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
DCHECK(from_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
char top_dir[PATH_MAX];
if (base::strlcpy(top_dir, from_path.value().c_str(),
arraysize(top_dir)) >= arraysize(top_dir)) {
return false;
}
FilePath real_to_path = to_path;
if (PathExists(real_to_path)) {
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
} else {
real_to_path = real_to_path.DirName();
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
}
FilePath real_from_path = from_path;
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_from_path))
return false;
if (real_to_path.value().size() >= real_from_path.value().size() &&
real_to_path.value().compare(0, real_from_path.value().size(),
real_from_path.value()) == 0)
return false;
bool success = true;
int traverse_type = FileEnumerator::FILES | FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS;
if (recursive)
traverse_type |= FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES;
FileEnumerator traversal(from_path, recursive, traverse_type);
FileEnumerator::FindInfo info;
FilePath current = from_path;
if (stat(from_path.value().c_str(), &info.stat) < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't stat source directory: "
<< from_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
struct stat to_path_stat;
FilePath from_path_base = from_path;
if (recursive && stat(to_path.value().c_str(), &to_path_stat) == 0 &&
S_ISDIR(to_path_stat.st_mode)) {
from_path_base = from_path.DirName();
}
DCHECK(recursive || S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode));
while (success && !current.empty()) {
std::string suffix(¤t.value().c_str()[from_path_base.value().size()]);
if (!suffix.empty()) {
DCHECK_EQ('/', suffix[0]);
suffix.erase(0, 1);
}
const FilePath target_path = to_path.Append(suffix);
if (S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (mkdir(target_path.value().c_str(), info.stat.st_mode & 01777) != 0 &&
errno != EEXIST) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create directory: "
<< target_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
} else if (S_ISREG(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (!CopyFile(current, target_path)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create file: "
<< target_path.value();
success = false;
}
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "CopyDirectory() skipping non-regular file: "
<< current.value();
}
current = traversal.Next();
traversal.GetFindInfo(&info);
}
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly handle pathnames during copy operations, which might make it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary programs via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,409
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: INLINE UWORD8 impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD32 u4_bit,u4_offset,u4_temp;
UWORD32 u4_curr_bit;
u4_offset = ps_stream->u4_offset;
u4_curr_bit = u4_offset & 0x1F;
u4_bit = ps_stream->u4_buf;
/* Move the current bit read from the current word to the
least significant bit positions of 'c'.*/
u4_bit >>= BITS_IN_INT - u4_curr_bit - 1;
u4_offset++;
/* If the last bit of the last word of the buffer has been read update
the currrent buf with next, and read next buf from bit stream buffer */
if (u4_curr_bit == 31)
{
ps_stream->u4_buf = ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt;
u4_temp = *(ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)++;
CONV_LE_TO_BE(ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_temp)
}
ps_stream->u4_offset = u4_offset;
return (u4_bit & 0x1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
|
Low
| 173,942
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
return aac_compat_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, (unsigned long)arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The aac_compat_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.8 does not require the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,939
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
struct dw2102_state *state = d->priv;
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x80, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
struct i2c_adapter *i2c_adapter;
struct i2c_client *client;
struct i2c_board_info board_info;
struct m88ds3103_platform_data m88ds3103_pdata = {};
struct ts2020_config ts2020_config = {};
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x02;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(300);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
/* attach demod */
m88ds3103_pdata.clk = 27000000;
m88ds3103_pdata.i2c_wr_max = 33;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_mode = M88DS3103_TS_CI;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_clk = 16000;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_clk_pol = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.spec_inv = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.agc = 0x99;
m88ds3103_pdata.agc_inv = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.clk_out = M88DS3103_CLOCK_OUT_ENABLED;
m88ds3103_pdata.envelope_mode = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.lnb_hv_pol = 1;
m88ds3103_pdata.lnb_en_pol = 0;
memset(&board_info, 0, sizeof(board_info));
strlcpy(board_info.type, "m88ds3103", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
board_info.addr = 0x68;
board_info.platform_data = &m88ds3103_pdata;
request_module("m88ds3103");
client = i2c_new_device(&d->i2c_adap, &board_info);
if (client == NULL || client->dev.driver == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (!try_module_get(client->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client);
return -ENODEV;
}
adap->fe_adap[0].fe = m88ds3103_pdata.get_dvb_frontend(client);
i2c_adapter = m88ds3103_pdata.get_i2c_adapter(client);
state->i2c_client_demod = client;
/* attach tuner */
ts2020_config.fe = adap->fe_adap[0].fe;
memset(&board_info, 0, sizeof(board_info));
strlcpy(board_info.type, "ts2022", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
board_info.addr = 0x60;
board_info.platform_data = &ts2020_config;
request_module("ts2020");
client = i2c_new_device(i2c_adapter, &board_info);
if (client == NULL || client->dev.driver == NULL) {
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe_adap[0].fe);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!try_module_get(client->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client);
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe_adap[0].fe);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* delegate signal strength measurement to tuner */
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_signal_strength =
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.tuner_ops.get_rf_strength;
state->i2c_client_tuner = client;
/* hook fe: need to resync the slave fifo when signal locks */
state->fe_read_status = adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status;
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status = tt_s2_4600_read_status;
state->last_lock = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.4 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
|
Low
| 168,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ParseCommon(map_string_t *settings, const char *conf_filename)
{
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "WatchCrashdumpArchiveDir");
if (value)
{
g_settings_sWatchCrashdumpArchiveDir = xstrdup(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "WatchCrashdumpArchiveDir");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MaxCrashReportsSize");
if (value)
{
char *end;
errno = 0;
unsigned long ul = strtoul(value, &end, 10);
if (errno || end == value || *end != '\0' || ul > INT_MAX)
error_msg("Error parsing %s setting: '%s'", "MaxCrashReportsSize", value);
else
g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize = ul;
remove_map_string_item(settings, "MaxCrashReportsSize");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "DumpLocation");
if (value)
{
g_settings_dump_location = xstrdup(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "DumpLocation");
}
else
g_settings_dump_location = xstrdup(DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "DeleteUploaded");
if (value)
{
g_settings_delete_uploaded = string_to_bool(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "DeleteUploaded");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "AutoreportingEnabled");
if (value)
{
g_settings_autoreporting = string_to_bool(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "AutoreportingEnabled");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "AutoreportingEvent");
if (value)
{
g_settings_autoreporting_event = xstrdup(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "AutoreportingEvent");
}
else
g_settings_autoreporting_event = xstrdup("report_uReport");
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "ShortenedReporting");
if (value)
{
g_settings_shortenedreporting = string_to_bool(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "ShortenedReporting");
}
else
g_settings_shortenedreporting = 0;
GHashTableIter iter;
const char *name;
/*char *value; - already declared */
init_map_string_iter(&iter, settings);
while (next_map_string_iter(&iter, &name, &value))
{
error_msg("Unrecognized variable '%s' in '%s'", name, conf_filename);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 170,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int OmniboxViewWin::OnPerformDropImpl(const views::DropTargetEvent& event,
bool in_drag) {
const ui::OSExchangeData& data = event.data();
if (data.HasURL()) {
GURL url;
string16 title;
if (data.GetURLAndTitle(&url, &title)) {
string16 text(StripJavascriptSchemas(UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec())));
SetUserText(text);
if (url.spec().length() == text.length())
model()->AcceptInput(CURRENT_TAB, true);
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
} else if (data.HasString()) {
int string_drop_position = drop_highlight_position();
string16 text;
if ((string_drop_position != -1 || !in_drag) && data.GetString(&text)) {
DCHECK(string_drop_position == -1 ||
((string_drop_position >= 0) &&
(string_drop_position <= GetTextLength())));
if (in_drag) {
if (event.source_operations()== ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE)
MoveSelectedText(string_drop_position);
else
InsertText(string_drop_position, text);
} else {
PasteAndGo(CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
}
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
}
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly implement the drag-and-drop feature, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,973
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CMD_FUNC(m_authenticate)
{
aClient *agent_p = NULL;
/* Failing to use CAP REQ for sasl is a protocol violation. */
if (!SASL_SERVER || !MyConnect(sptr) || BadPtr(parv[1]) || !CHECKPROTO(sptr, PROTO_SASL))
return 0;
if (sptr->local->sasl_complete)
{
sendto_one(sptr, err_str(ERR_SASLALREADY), me.name, BadPtr(sptr->name) ? "*" : sptr->name);
return 0;
}
if (strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
{
sendto_one(sptr, err_str(ERR_SASLTOOLONG), me.name, BadPtr(sptr->name) ? "*" : sptr->name);
return 0;
}
if (*sptr->local->sasl_agent)
agent_p = find_client(sptr->local->sasl_agent, NULL);
if (agent_p == NULL)
{
char *addr = BadPtr(sptr->ip) ? "0" : sptr->ip;
char *certfp = moddata_client_get(sptr, "certfp");
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s H %s %s",
me.name, SASL_SERVER, encode_puid(sptr), addr, addr);
if (certfp)
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s S %s %s",
me.name, SASL_SERVER, encode_puid(sptr), parv[1], certfp);
else
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s S %s",
me.name, SASL_SERVER, encode_puid(sptr), parv[1]);
}
else
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s C %s",
me.name, AGENT_SID(agent_p), encode_puid(sptr), parv[1]);
sptr->local->sasl_out++;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The m_authenticate function in modules/m_sasl.c in UnrealIRCd before 3.2.10.7 and 4.x before 4.0.6 allows remote attackers to spoof certificate fingerprints and consequently log in as another user via a crafted AUTHENTICATE parameter.
Commit Message: Fix AUTHENTICATE bug
|
Medium
| 168,814
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: chpass_principal_2_svc(chpass_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if (ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::GetFrameContext(
const scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>& pic,
Vp9FrameContext* frame_ctx) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "Frame context update not supported";
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,802
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int append_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL ) return ERROR;
if (dst->entry_capacity < src->entry_count + dst->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (dst->data_capacity < src->data_count + dst->data_count) return ERROR;
memcpy(get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count, get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[src->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(dst) + dst->data_count, get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[src->data_count]));
if (dst->data_count != 0) {
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entry = get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count;
for (size_t i = 0; i < src->entry_count; i++, entry++) {
if ( calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry->type,
entry->count) > 0 ) {
entry->data.offset += dst->data_count;
}
}
}
if (dst->entry_count == 0) {
dst->flags |= src->flags & FLAG_SORTED;
} else if (src->entry_count != 0) {
dst->flags &= ~FLAG_SORTED;
} else {
}
dst->entry_count += src->entry_count;
dst->data_count += src->data_count;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: camera/src/camera_metadata.c in the Camera service in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30591838.
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
|
Medium
| 173,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_range(char *str, size_t file_sz, int *nranges)
{
static struct range ranges[MAX_RANGES];
int i = 0;
char *p, *q;
/* Extract range unit */
if ((p = strchr(str, '=')) == NULL)
return (NULL);
*p++ = '\0';
/* Check if it's a bytes range spec */
if (strcmp(str, "bytes") != 0)
return (NULL);
while ((q = strchr(p, ',')) != NULL) {
*q++ = '\0';
/* Extract start and end positions */
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &ranges[i]) == 0)
continue;
i++;
if (i == MAX_RANGES)
return (NULL);
p = q;
}
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &ranges[i]) != 0)
i++;
*nranges = i;
return (i ? ranges : NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: httpd in OpenBSD allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a series of requests for a large file using an HTTP Range header.
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
|
Low
| 168,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, setMaxLineLen)
{
long max_len;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &max_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (max_len < 0) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_DomainException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Maximum line length must be greater than or equal zero");
return;
}
intern->u.file.max_line_len = max_len;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::getMaxLineLen()
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,058
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftHEVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL && (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
if (!setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx)) {
ALOGE("Decoder arg setup failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
ALOGV("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-172
Summary: codecs/hevcdec/SoftHEVC.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 6.0.1 before 2016-08-01 mishandles decoder errors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28816956.
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
|
Medium
| 173,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
struct path *dir, char *type, unsigned long flags)
{
struct path path;
struct file_system_type *fstype = NULL;
const char *requested_type = NULL;
const char *requested_dir_name = NULL;
const char *requested_dev_name = NULL;
struct tomoyo_path_info rtype;
struct tomoyo_path_info rdev;
struct tomoyo_path_info rdir;
int need_dev = 0;
int error = -ENOMEM;
/* Get fstype. */
requested_type = tomoyo_encode(type);
if (!requested_type)
goto out;
rtype.name = requested_type;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rtype);
/* Get mount point. */
requested_dir_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(dir);
if (!requested_dir_name) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rdir.name = requested_dir_name;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdir);
/* Compare fs name. */
if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD)) {
/* dev_name is ignored. */
} else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD)) {
/* dev_name is ignored. */
} else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD)) {
need_dev = -1; /* dev_name is a directory */
} else {
fstype = get_fs_type(type);
if (!fstype) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
if (fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)
/* dev_name is a block device file. */
need_dev = 1;
}
if (need_dev) {
/* Get mount point or device file. */
if (kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
path_put(&path);
if (!requested_dev_name) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
} else {
/* Map dev_name to "<NULL>" if no dev_name given. */
if (!dev_name)
dev_name = "<NULL>";
requested_dev_name = tomoyo_encode(dev_name);
if (!requested_dev_name) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
rdev.name = requested_dev_name;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdev);
r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL;
r->param.mount.need_dev = need_dev;
r->param.mount.dev = &rdev;
r->param.mount.dir = &rdir;
r->param.mount.type = &rtype;
r->param.mount.flags = flags;
do {
tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_mount_acl);
error = tomoyo_audit_mount_log(r);
} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
out:
kfree(requested_dev_name);
kfree(requested_dir_name);
if (fstype)
put_filesystem(fstype);
kfree(requested_type);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The tomoyo_mount_acl function in security/tomoyo/mount.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.2 calls the kern_path function with arguments taken directly from a mount system call, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a NULL value for the device name.
Commit Message: TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
Low
| 165,856
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
buf->ops->release(pipe, buf);
}
if (pipe->tmp_page)
__free_page(pipe->tmp_page);
kfree(pipe->bufs);
kfree(pipe);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,387
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelperTest()
: ppapi_host_(&sink_, ppapi::PpapiPermissions()),
resource_host_(&ppapi_host_, 12345, 67890),
device_enumeration_(&resource_host_,
&delegate_,
PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_AUDIOCAPTURE,
GURL("http://example.com")) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
|
Low
| 171,607
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
int expected_pending_entry_id =
render_frame_host->navigation_handle()
? render_frame_host->navigation_handle()->pending_nav_entry_id()
: 0;
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(expected_pending_entry_id);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,319
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceRelease_Params& params) {
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view = GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(
params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
view->AcceleratedSurfaceRelease(params.identifier);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: start_input_bmp(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
U_CHAR bmpfileheader[14];
U_CHAR bmpinfoheader[64];
#define GET_2B(array, offset) \
((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8))
#define GET_4B(array, offset) \
((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 2])) << 16) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 3])) << 24))
unsigned int bfOffBits;
unsigned int headerSize;
int biWidth;
int biHeight;
unsigned short biPlanes;
unsigned int biCompression;
int biXPelsPerMeter, biYPelsPerMeter;
unsigned int biClrUsed = 0;
int mapentrysize = 0; /* 0 indicates no colormap */
int bPad;
JDIMENSION row_width = 0;
/* Read and verify the bitmap file header */
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpfileheader, 14))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
if (GET_2B(bmpfileheader, 0) != 0x4D42) /* 'BM' */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_NOT);
bfOffBits = GET_4B(bmpfileheader, 10);
/* We ignore the remaining fileheader fields */
/* The infoheader might be 12 bytes (OS/2 1.x), 40 bytes (Windows),
* or 64 bytes (OS/2 2.x). Check the first 4 bytes to find out which.
*/
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader, 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
headerSize = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 0);
if (headerSize < 12 || headerSize > 64)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader + 4, headerSize - 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
switch (headerSize) {
case 12:
/* Decode OS/2 1.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPCOREHEADER) */
biWidth = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 6);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 10);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 3; /* OS/2 uses RGBTRIPLE colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
break;
case 40:
case 64:
/* Decode Windows 3.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPINFOHEADER) */
/* or OS/2 2.x header, which has additional fields that we ignore */
biWidth = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 12);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 14);
biCompression = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 16);
biXPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 24);
biYPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 28);
biClrUsed = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 32);
/* biSizeImage, biClrImportant fields are ignored */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 4; /* Windows uses RGBQUAD colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 32: /* RGB image + Alpha channel */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
if (biCompression != 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_COMPRESSED);
if (biXPelsPerMeter > 0 && biYPelsPerMeter > 0) {
/* Set JFIF density parameters from the BMP data */
cinfo->X_density = (UINT16)(biXPelsPerMeter / 100); /* 100 cm per meter */
cinfo->Y_density = (UINT16)(biYPelsPerMeter / 100);
cinfo->density_unit = 2; /* dots/cm */
}
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
return;
}
if (biWidth <= 0 || biHeight <= 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_EMPTY);
if (biPlanes != 1)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADPLANES);
/* Compute distance to bitmap data --- will adjust for colormap below */
bPad = bfOffBits - (headerSize + 14);
/* Read the colormap, if any */
if (mapentrysize > 0) {
if (biClrUsed <= 0)
biClrUsed = 256; /* assume it's 256 */
else if (biClrUsed > 256)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADCMAP);
/* Allocate space to store the colormap */
source->colormap = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, (JDIMENSION)biClrUsed, (JDIMENSION)3);
/* and read it from the file */
read_colormap(source, (int)biClrUsed, mapentrysize);
/* account for size of colormap */
bPad -= biClrUsed * mapentrysize;
}
/* Skip any remaining pad bytes */
if (bPad < 0) /* incorrect bfOffBits value? */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
while (--bPad >= 0) {
(void)read_byte(source);
}
/* Compute row width in file, including padding to 4-byte boundary */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_RGB;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
cinfo->input_components = 1;
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
break;
case 24:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGR;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 3);
break;
case 32:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGRA;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 4);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
while ((row_width & 3) != 0) row_width++;
source->row_width = row_width;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Allocate space for inversion array, prepare for preload pass */
source->whole_image = (*cinfo->mem->request_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, FALSE,
row_width, (JDIMENSION)biHeight, (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = preload_image;
if (cinfo->progress != NULL) {
cd_progress_ptr progress = (cd_progress_ptr)cinfo->progress;
progress->total_extra_passes++; /* count file input as separate pass */
}
} else {
source->iobuffer = (U_CHAR *)
(*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, row_width);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_8bit_row;
break;
case 24:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_24bit_row;
break;
case 32:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_32bit_row;
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
}
/* Ensure that biWidth * cinfo->input_components doesn't exceed the maximum
value of the JDIMENSION type. This is only a danger with BMP files, since
their width and height fields are 32-bit integers. */
if ((unsigned long long)biWidth *
(unsigned long long)cinfo->input_components > 0xFFFFFFFFULL)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_WIDTH_OVERFLOW);
/* Allocate one-row buffer for returned data */
source->pub.buffer = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
(JDIMENSION)(biWidth * cinfo->input_components), (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.buffer_height = 1;
cinfo->data_precision = 8;
cinfo->image_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
cinfo->image_height = (JDIMENSION)biHeight;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: get_8bit_row in rdbmp.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.5.90 and MozJPEG through 3.3.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted 8-bit BMP in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the number of palette entries.
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
|
Medium
| 169,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_tsquery(char *buf,
PushFunction pushval,
Datum opaque,
bool isplain)
{
struct TSQueryParserStateData state;
int i;
TSQuery query;
int commonlen;
QueryItem *ptr;
ListCell *cell;
/* init state */
state.buffer = buf;
state.buf = buf;
state.state = (isplain) ? WAITSINGLEOPERAND : WAITFIRSTOPERAND;
state.count = 0;
state.polstr = NIL;
/* init value parser's state */
state.valstate = init_tsvector_parser(state.buffer, true, true);
/* init list of operand */
state.sumlen = 0;
state.lenop = 64;
state.curop = state.op = (char *) palloc(state.lenop);
*(state.curop) = '\0';
/* parse query & make polish notation (postfix, but in reverse order) */
makepol(&state, pushval, opaque);
close_tsvector_parser(state.valstate);
if (list_length(state.polstr) == 0)
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("text-search query doesn't contain lexemes: \"%s\"",
state.buffer)));
query = (TSQuery) palloc(HDRSIZETQ);
SET_VARSIZE(query, HDRSIZETQ);
query->size = 0;
return query;
}
/* Pack the QueryItems in the final TSQuery struct to return to caller */
commonlen = COMPUTESIZE(list_length(state.polstr), state.sumlen);
query = (TSQuery) palloc0(commonlen);
SET_VARSIZE(query, commonlen);
query->size = list_length(state.polstr);
ptr = GETQUERY(query);
/* Copy QueryItems to TSQuery */
i = 0;
foreach(cell, state.polstr)
{
QueryItem *item = (QueryItem *) lfirst(cell);
switch (item->type)
{
case QI_VAL:
memcpy(&ptr[i], item, sizeof(QueryOperand));
break;
case QI_VALSTOP:
ptr[i].type = QI_VALSTOP;
break;
case QI_OPR:
memcpy(&ptr[i], item, sizeof(QueryOperator));
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized QueryItem type: %d", item->type);
}
i++;
}
/* Copy all the operand strings to TSQuery */
memcpy((void *) GETOPERAND(query), (void *) state.op, state.sumlen);
pfree(state.op);
/* Set left operand pointers for every operator. */
findoprnd(ptr, query->size);
return query;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,413
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPrintedPagesCount(
int cookie, int number_pages) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->SetPrintedPagesCount(cookie, number_pages);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void dex_parse_debug_item(RBinFile *binfile, RBinDexObj *bin,
RBinDexClass *c, int MI, int MA, int paddr, int ins_size,
int insns_size, char *class_name, int regsz,
int debug_info_off) {
struct r_bin_t *rbin = binfile->rbin;
const ut8 *p4 = r_buf_get_at (binfile->buf, debug_info_off, NULL);
const ut8 *p4_end = p4 + binfile->buf->length - debug_info_off;
ut64 line_start;
ut64 parameters_size;
ut64 param_type_idx;
ut16 argReg = regsz - ins_size;
ut64 source_file_idx = c->source_file;
RList *params, *debug_positions, *emitted_debug_locals = NULL;
bool keep = true;
if (argReg > regsz) {
return; // this return breaks tests
}
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &line_start);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ¶meters_size);
ut32 address = 0;
ut32 line = line_start;
if (!(debug_positions = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return;
}
if (!(emitted_debug_locals = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
return;
}
struct dex_debug_local_t debug_locals[regsz];
memset (debug_locals, 0, sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t) * regsz);
if (!(MA & 0x0008)) {
debug_locals[argReg].name = "this";
debug_locals[argReg].descriptor = r_str_newf("%s;", class_name);
debug_locals[argReg].startAddress = 0;
debug_locals[argReg].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[argReg].live = true;
argReg++;
}
if (!(params = dex_method_signature2 (bin, MI))) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
return;
}
RListIter *iter = r_list_iterator (params);
char *name;
char *type;
int reg;
r_list_foreach (params, iter, type) {
if ((argReg >= regsz) || !type || parameters_size <= 0) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
return;
}
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ¶m_type_idx); // read uleb128p1
param_type_idx -= 1;
name = getstr (bin, param_type_idx);
reg = argReg;
switch (type[0]) {
case 'D':
case 'J':
argReg += 2;
break;
default:
argReg += 1;
break;
}
if (name) {
debug_locals[reg].name = name;
debug_locals[reg].descriptor = type;
debug_locals[reg].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[reg].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[reg].live = true;
}
--parameters_size;
}
ut8 opcode = *(p4++) & 0xff;
while (keep) {
switch (opcode) {
case 0x0: // DBG_END_SEQUENCE
keep = false;
break;
case 0x1: // DBG_ADVANCE_PC
{
ut64 addr_diff;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &addr_diff);
address += addr_diff;
}
break;
case 0x2: // DBG_ADVANCE_LINE
{
st64 line_diff = r_sleb128 (&p4, p4_end);
line += line_diff;
}
break;
case 0x3: // DBG_START_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
ut64 name_idx;
ut64 type_idx;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &name_idx);
name_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &type_idx);
type_idx -= 1;
if (register_num >= regsz) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].name = getstr (bin, name_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].descriptor = dex_type_descriptor (bin, type_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
break;
case 0x4: //DBG_START_LOCAL_EXTENDED
{
ut64 register_num;
ut64 name_idx;
ut64 type_idx;
ut64 sig_idx;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &name_idx);
name_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &type_idx);
type_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &sig_idx);
sig_idx -= 1;
if (register_num >= regsz) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].name = getstr (bin, name_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].descriptor = dex_type_descriptor (bin, type_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].signature = getstr (bin, sig_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
break;
case 0x5: // DBG_END_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].live = false;
}
break;
case 0x6: // DBG_RESTART_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
if (!debug_locals[register_num].live) {
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
}
break;
case 0x7: //DBG_SET_PROLOGUE_END
break;
case 0x8: //DBG_SET_PROLOGUE_BEGIN
break;
case 0x9:
{
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &source_file_idx);
source_file_idx--;
}
break;
default:
{
int adjusted_opcode = opcode - 0x0a;
address += (adjusted_opcode / 15);
line += -4 + (adjusted_opcode % 15);
struct dex_debug_position_t *position =
malloc (sizeof (struct dex_debug_position_t));
if (!position) {
keep = false;
break;
}
position->source_file_idx = source_file_idx;
position->address = address;
position->line = line;
r_list_append (debug_positions, position);
}
break;
}
opcode = *(p4++) & 0xff;
}
if (!binfile->sdb_addrinfo) {
binfile->sdb_addrinfo = sdb_new0 ();
}
char *fileline;
char offset[64];
char *offset_ptr;
RListIter *iter1;
struct dex_debug_position_t *pos;
r_list_foreach (debug_positions, iter1, pos) {
fileline = r_str_newf ("%s|%"PFMT64d, getstr (bin, pos->source_file_idx), pos->line);
offset_ptr = sdb_itoa (pos->address + paddr, offset, 16);
sdb_set (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, offset_ptr, fileline, 0);
sdb_set (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, fileline, offset_ptr, 0);
}
if (!dexdump) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
RListIter *iter2;
struct dex_debug_position_t *position;
rbin->cb_printf (" positions :\n");
r_list_foreach (debug_positions, iter2, position) {
rbin->cb_printf (" 0x%04llx line=%llu\n",
position->address, position->line);
}
rbin->cb_printf (" locals :\n");
RListIter *iter3;
struct dex_debug_local_t *local;
r_list_foreach (emitted_debug_locals, iter3, local) {
if (local->signature) {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s %s\n",
local->startAddress, local->endAddress,
local->reg, local->name, local->descriptor,
local->signature);
} else {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s\n",
local->startAddress, local->endAddress,
local->reg, local->name, local->descriptor);
}
}
for (reg = 0; reg < regsz; reg++) {
if (debug_locals[reg].live) {
if (debug_locals[reg].signature) {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s "
"%s\n",
debug_locals[reg].startAddress,
insns_size, reg, debug_locals[reg].name,
debug_locals[reg].descriptor,
debug_locals[reg].signature);
} else {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s"
"\n",
debug_locals[reg].startAddress,
insns_size, reg, debug_locals[reg].name,
debug_locals[reg].descriptor);
}
}
}
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
r_list_free (params);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The dex_parse_debug_item function in libr/bin/p/bin_dex.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: fix #6872
|
Medium
| 168,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_rng_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_rng rrng;
snprintf(rrng.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "rng");
rrng.seedsize = alg->cra_rng.seedsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_RNG,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_rng), &rrng))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
CreateAbsoluteOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(env, std::move(mapping),
callback);
break;
case mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION:
CreateAbsoluteOrientationQuaternionSensor(env, std::move(mapping),
callback);
break;
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
CreateRelativeOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(env, std::move(mapping),
callback);
break;
default: {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> sensor =
Java_PlatformSensorProvider_createSensor(env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(type));
if (!sensor.obj()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
auto concrete_sensor = base::MakeRefCounted<PlatformSensorAndroid>(
type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor);
callback.Run(concrete_sensor);
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddrlen, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_llc sllc;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
int rc = 0;
memset(&sllc, 0, sizeof(sllc));
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
*uaddrlen = sizeof(sllc);
memset(uaddr, 0, *uaddrlen);
if (peer) {
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
if(llc->dev)
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->daddr.lsap;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, &llc->daddr.mac, IFHWADDRLEN);
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!llc->sap)
goto out;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->sap->laddr.lsap;
if (llc->dev) {
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr,
IFHWADDRLEN);
}
}
rc = 0;
sllc.sllc_family = AF_LLC;
memcpy(uaddr, &sllc, sizeof(sllc));
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The llc_ui_getname function in net/llc/af_llc.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 has an incorrect return value in certain circumstances, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application that leverages an uninitialized pointer argument.
Commit Message: llc: fix info leak via getsockname()
The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.
Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,184
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WallpaperManager::OnDefaultWallpaperDecoded(
const base::FilePath& path,
const wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage>* result_out,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage> user_image) {
if (user_image->image().isNull()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to decode default wallpaper. ";
return;
}
*result_out = std::move(user_image);
WallpaperInfo info(path.value(), layout, wallpaper::DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetWallpaper((*result_out)->image(), info);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
Low
| 171,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MediaHTTP::connect(
const char *uri,
const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers,
off64_t /* offset */) {
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
return mInitCheck;
}
KeyedVector<String8, String8> extHeaders;
if (headers != NULL) {
extHeaders = *headers;
}
if (extHeaders.indexOfKey(String8("User-Agent")) < 0) {
extHeaders.add(String8("User-Agent"), String8(MakeUserAgent().c_str()));
}
bool success = mHTTPConnection->connect(uri, &extHeaders);
mLastHeaders = extHeaders;
mLastURI = uri;
mCachedSizeValid = false;
if (success) {
AString sanitized = uriDebugString(uri);
mName = String8::format("MediaHTTP(%s)", sanitized.c_str());
}
return success ? OK : UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Android ID: A-31373622.
Commit Message: Fix free-after-use for MediaHTTP
fix free-after-use when we reconnect to an HTTP media source.
Change-Id: I96da5a79f5382409a545f8b4e22a24523f287464
Tests: compilation and eyeballs
Bug: 31373622
(cherry picked from commit dd81e1592ffa77812998b05761eb840b70fed121)
|
Medium
| 173,386
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access, related to (1) index values in the snd_ctl_add function and (2) numid values in the snd_ctl_remove_numid_conflict function.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 169,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static plist_t parse_string_node(const char **bnode, uint64_t size)
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_STRING;
data->strval = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char) * (size + 1));
memcpy(data->strval, *bnode, size);
data->strval[size] = '\0';
data->length = strlen(data->strval);
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string_node function in bplist.c in libimobiledevice libplist 1.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted plist file.
Commit Message: bplist: Make sure to bail out if malloc() fails in parse_string_node()
Credit to Wang Junjie <zhunkibatu@gmail.com> (#93)
|
Medium
| 168,335
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Performance::PassesTimingAllowCheck(
const ResourceResponse& response,
const SecurityOrigin& initiator_security_origin,
const AtomicString& original_timing_allow_origin,
ExecutionContext* context) {
scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin> resource_origin =
SecurityOrigin::Create(response.Url());
if (resource_origin->IsSameSchemeHostPort(&initiator_security_origin))
return true;
const AtomicString& timing_allow_origin_string =
original_timing_allow_origin.IsEmpty()
? response.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Timing_Allow_Origin)
: original_timing_allow_origin;
if (timing_allow_origin_string.IsEmpty() ||
EqualIgnoringASCIICase(timing_allow_origin_string, "null"))
return false;
if (timing_allow_origin_string == "*") {
UseCounter::Count(context, WebFeature::kStarInTimingAllowOrigin);
return true;
}
const String& security_origin = initiator_security_origin.ToString();
Vector<String> timing_allow_origins;
timing_allow_origin_string.GetString().Split(',', timing_allow_origins);
if (timing_allow_origins.size() > 1) {
UseCounter::Count(context, WebFeature::kMultipleOriginsInTimingAllowOrigin);
} else if (timing_allow_origins.size() == 1 &&
timing_allow_origin_string != "*") {
UseCounter::Count(context, WebFeature::kSingleOriginInTimingAllowOrigin);
}
for (const String& allow_origin : timing_allow_origins) {
const String allow_origin_stripped = allow_origin.StripWhiteSpace();
if (allow_origin_stripped == security_origin ||
allow_origin_stripped == "*") {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in ServiceWorker in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
|
Medium
| 173,143
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long gfs2_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(inode);
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
unsigned int data_blocks = 0, ind_blocks = 0, rblocks;
loff_t bytes, max_bytes;
struct gfs2_alloc *al;
int error;
loff_t bsize_mask = ~((loff_t)sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize - 1);
loff_t next = (offset + len - 1) >> sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize_shift;
next = (next + 1) << sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize_shift;
/* We only support the FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE mode */
if (mode & ~FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
offset &= bsize_mask;
len = next - offset;
bytes = sdp->sd_max_rg_data * sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize / 2;
if (!bytes)
bytes = UINT_MAX;
bytes &= bsize_mask;
if (bytes == 0)
bytes = sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize;
gfs2_holder_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_EXCLUSIVE, 0, &ip->i_gh);
error = gfs2_glock_nq(&ip->i_gh);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out_uninit;
if (!gfs2_write_alloc_required(ip, offset, len))
goto out_unlock;
while (len > 0) {
if (len < bytes)
bytes = len;
al = gfs2_alloc_get(ip);
if (!al) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
}
error = gfs2_quota_lock_check(ip);
if (error)
goto out_alloc_put;
retry:
gfs2_write_calc_reserv(ip, bytes, &data_blocks, &ind_blocks);
al->al_requested = data_blocks + ind_blocks;
error = gfs2_inplace_reserve(ip);
if (error) {
if (error == -ENOSPC && bytes > sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize) {
bytes >>= 1;
bytes &= bsize_mask;
if (bytes == 0)
bytes = sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize;
goto retry;
}
goto out_qunlock;
}
max_bytes = bytes;
calc_max_reserv(ip, len, &max_bytes, &data_blocks, &ind_blocks);
al->al_requested = data_blocks + ind_blocks;
rblocks = RES_DINODE + ind_blocks + RES_STATFS + RES_QUOTA +
RES_RG_HDR + gfs2_rg_blocks(ip);
if (gfs2_is_jdata(ip))
rblocks += data_blocks ? data_blocks : 1;
error = gfs2_trans_begin(sdp, rblocks,
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE/sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize);
if (error)
goto out_trans_fail;
error = fallocate_chunk(inode, offset, max_bytes, mode);
gfs2_trans_end(sdp);
if (error)
goto out_trans_fail;
len -= max_bytes;
offset += max_bytes;
gfs2_inplace_release(ip);
gfs2_quota_unlock(ip);
gfs2_alloc_put(ip);
}
goto out_unlock;
out_trans_fail:
gfs2_inplace_release(ip);
out_qunlock:
gfs2_quota_unlock(ip);
out_alloc_put:
gfs2_alloc_put(ip);
out_unlock:
gfs2_glock_dq(&ip->i_gh);
out_uninit:
gfs2_holder_uninit(&ip->i_gh);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The fallocate implementation in the GFS2 filesystem in the Linux kernel before 3.2 relies on the page cache, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service by preallocating blocks in certain situations involving insufficient memory.
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static BT_HDR *create_pbuf(UINT16 len, UINT8 *data)
{
BT_HDR* p_buf = GKI_getbuf((UINT16) (len + BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET + sizeof(BT_HDR)));
if (p_buf) {
UINT8* pbuf_data;
p_buf->len = len;
p_buf->offset = BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET;
pbuf_data = (UINT8*) (p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
memcpy(pbuf_data, data, len);
}
return p_buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the create_pbuf function in btif/src/btif_hh.c in Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows remote attackers to gain privileges via a crafted pairing operation, aka internal bug 27930580.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE btif: check overflow on create_pbuf size
Bug: 27930580
Change-Id: Ieb1f23f9a8a937b21f7c5eca92da3b0b821400e6
|
High
| 173,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProcessBackingStore(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsValid());
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsMarked());
header->Unmark();
ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_(this, header->Payload());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
v8::Local<v8::Value> call_with_args[] = {
context()->module_system()->NewInstance()};
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]), 1,
call_with_args);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem function in extensions/renderer/v8_context_native_handler.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML by leveraging the lack of a certain V8 context restriction, aka a Blink *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
R=kalman@chromium.org
TBR=fukino@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663}
|
Medium
| 171,948
|
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