instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sco_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_sco *sa = (struct sockaddr_sco *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->src, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The sco_sock_bind function in net/bluetooth/sco.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.4 does not verify an address length, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
case PACKET_FANOUT_QM:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!po->running)
return -EINVAL;
if (po->fanout)
return -EALREADY;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
po->rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*po->rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!po->rollover)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_huge, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_failed, 0);
}
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
atomic_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
fanout_init_data(match);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
dev_add_pack(&match->prot_hook);
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (atomic_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
atomic_inc(&match->sk_ref);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (err) {
kfree(po->rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.13 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a multithreaded application that makes PACKET_FANOUT setsockopt system calls.
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 168,346
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len, last_len, prefix_len, suffix_len, path_len;
uintmax_t strip_len;
strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr, &varint_len);
last_len = strlen(last);
if (varint_len == 0 || last_len < strip_len)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the index.c:read_entry() function while decompressing a compressed prefix length in libgit2 before v0.26.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: error out on unreasonable prefix-compressed path lengths
When computing the complete path length from the encoded
prefix-compressed path, we end up just allocating the complete path
without ever checking what the encoded path length actually is. This can
easily lead to a denial of service by just encoding an unreasonable long
path name inside of the index. Git already enforces a maximum path
length of 4096 bytes. As we also have that enforcement ready in some
places, just make sure that the resulting path is smaller than
GIT_PATH_MAX.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
|
Medium
| 170,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAAC2::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = 0;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat =
mIsADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
if (!isConfigured()) {
aacParams->nChannels = 1;
aacParams->nSampleRate = 44100;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
} else {
aacParams->nChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = mStreamInfo->frameSize;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[2] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[3] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLFE;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[4] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLS;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[5] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRS;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 44100;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,186
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sk_buff **udp_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct udphdr *uh)
{
struct udp_offload_priv *uo_priv;
struct sk_buff *p, **pp = NULL;
struct udphdr *uh2;
unsigned int off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
int flush = 1;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->udp_mark ||
(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt == 0 &&
!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid))
goto out;
/* mark that this skb passed once through the udp gro layer */
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->udp_mark = 1;
rcu_read_lock();
uo_priv = rcu_dereference(udp_offload_base);
for (; uo_priv != NULL; uo_priv = rcu_dereference(uo_priv->next)) {
if (net_eq(read_pnet(&uo_priv->net), dev_net(skb->dev)) &&
uo_priv->offload->port == uh->dest &&
uo_priv->offload->callbacks.gro_receive)
goto unflush;
}
goto out_unlock;
unflush:
flush = 0;
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
uh2 = (struct udphdr *)(p->data + off);
/* Match ports and either checksums are either both zero
* or nonzero.
*/
if ((*(u32 *)&uh->source != *(u32 *)&uh2->source) ||
(!uh->check ^ !uh2->check)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
}
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)); /* pull encapsulating udp header */
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, uh, sizeof(struct udphdr));
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto = uo_priv->offload->ipproto;
pp = uo_priv->offload->callbacks.gro_receive(head, skb,
uo_priv->offload);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
return pp;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The IP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering use of the GRO path for packets with tunnel stacking, as demonstrated by interleaved IPv4 headers and GRE headers, a related issue to CVE-2016-7039.
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,907
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DictionaryValue* NigoriSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(encrypted, EncryptedDataToValue);
SET_BOOL(using_explicit_passphrase);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_bookmarks);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_preferences);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill_profile);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_themes);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_typed_urls);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extension_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extensions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_sessions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_app_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_apps);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_search_engines);
SET_BOOL(sync_tabs);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_everything);
SET_REP(device_information, DeviceInformationToValue);
SET_BOOL(sync_tab_favicons);
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,800
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!((url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) ||
extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) ||
url.GetOrigin() == extension->url()))) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.75 incorrectly relies on GetOrigin method calls for origin comparisons, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and obtain sensitive information via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
|
Medium
| 172,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
if (!sensor_device_manager_)
sensor_device_manager_.reset(new SensorDeviceManager());
if (IsFusionSensorType(type)) {
CreateFusionSensor(type, std::move(mapping), callback);
return;
}
if (!sensor_nodes_enumerated_) {
if (!sensor_nodes_enumeration_started_) {
sensor_nodes_enumeration_started_ = file_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SensorDeviceManager::Start,
base::Unretained(sensor_device_manager_.get()), this));
}
return;
}
SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device = GetSensorDevice(type);
if (!sensor_device) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
SensorDeviceFound(type, std::move(mapping), callback, sensor_device);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,844
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SetRuntimeFeaturesDefaultsAndUpdateFromArgs(
const base::CommandLine& command_line) {
bool enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures = command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
if (enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures)
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExperimentalFeatures(true);
SetRuntimeFeatureDefaultsForPlatform();
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOriginTrials(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kOriginTrials));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebUsb))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebUsb(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBlinkHeapIncrementalMarking(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBlinkHeapIncrementalMarking));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBlinkHeapUnifiedGarbageCollection(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kBlinkHeapUnifiedGarbageCollection));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBloatedRendererDetection))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBloatedRendererDetection(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableDatabase(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotifications(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePushMessaging(false);
}
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNotificationContentImage))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotificationContentImage(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSharedArrayBuffer(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSharedArrayBuffer) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAssemblyThreads));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSharedWorker(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScriptedSpeech(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFileSystem(false);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedJpegDecoding))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableDecodeToYUV(true);
#if defined(SUPPORT_WEBGL2_COMPUTE_CONTEXT)
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebGL2ComputeContext)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGL2ComputeContext(true);
}
#endif
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebGLDraftExtensions))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGLDraftExtensions(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAutomation) ||
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kHeadless)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAutomationControlled(true);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool enable_canvas_2d_image_chromium =
command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferCompositorResources) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable2dCanvasImageChromium) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpu) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCanvas2DImageChromium);
#else
constexpr bool enable_canvas_2d_image_chromium = false;
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCanvas2dImageChromium(
enable_canvas_2d_image_chromium);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool enable_web_gl_image_chromium =
command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferCompositorResources) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableWebGLImageChromium) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpu) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebGLImageChromium);
#else
const bool enable_web_gl_image_chromium =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebGLImageChromium);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGLImageChromium(enable_web_gl_image_chromium);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceOverlayFullscreenVideo))
WebRuntimeFeatures::ForceOverlayFullscreenVideo(true);
if (ui::IsOverlayScrollbarEnabled())
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOverlayScrollbars(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePreciseMemoryInfo))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePreciseMemoryInfo(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePrintBrowser))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePrintBrowser(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNetworkInformationDownlinkMax) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNetInfoDownlinkMax(true);
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kReducedReferrerGranularity))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableReducedReferrerGranularity(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePermissionsAPI(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableV8IdleTasks))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8IdleTasks(false);
else
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8IdleTasks(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableUnsafeWebGPU))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGPU(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebVR))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebVR(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebXr))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXR(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebXrGamepadSupport))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXRGamepadSupport(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebXrHitTest))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXRHitTest(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePresentationAPI(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableRemotePlaybackAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRemotePlaybackAPI(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSecMetadata(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSecMetadata) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableUserActivationV2(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kUserActivationV2));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kScrollAnchorSerialization))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScrollAnchorSerialization(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBlinkGenPropertyTrees))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("BlinkGenPropertyTrees", true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSlimmingPaintV2))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("SlimmingPaintV2", true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePassiveDocumentEventListeners(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kPassiveDocumentEventListeners));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePassiveDocumentWheelEventListeners(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kPassiveDocumentWheelEventListeners));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"FontCacheScaling",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFontCacheScaling));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"FontSrcLocalMatching",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFontSrcLocalMatching));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"FramebustingNeedsSameOriginOrUserGesture",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kFramebustingNeedsSameOriginOrUserGesture));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableBackgroundTimerThrottling))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableTimerThrottlingForBackgroundTabs(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExpensiveBackgroundTimerThrottling(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kExpensiveBackgroundTimerThrottling));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kHeapCompaction))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableHeapCompaction(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRenderingPipelineThrottling(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRenderingPipelineThrottling));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableTimerThrottlingForHiddenFrames(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kTimerThrottlingForHiddenFrames));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kSendBeaconThrowForBlobWithNonSimpleType))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSendBeaconThrowForBlobWithNonSimpleType(true);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableMediaSessionAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaSession(false);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePaymentRequest(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebPayments));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kServiceWorkerPaymentApps))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePaymentApp(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNetworkService(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGamepadExtensions))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGamepadExtensions(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGamepadVibration))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGamepadVibration(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCompositeOpaqueFixedPosition))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("CompositeOpaqueFixedPosition",
true);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCompositeOpaqueScrollers))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("CompositeOpaqueScrollers",
false);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCompositorTouchAction))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCompositorTouchAction(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCSSFragmentIdentifiers))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCSSFragmentIdentifiers(true);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGenericSensor))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGenericSensor(false);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGenericSensorExtraClasses))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGenericSensorExtraClasses(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kOutOfBlinkCORS))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOutOfBlinkCORS(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaCastOverlayButton(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kMediaCastOverlayButton));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBlockCredentialedSubresources)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("BlockCredentialedSubresources",
false);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRasterInducingScroll))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRasterInducingScroll(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"AllowContentInitiatedDataUrlNavigations",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAllowContentInitiatedDataUrlNavigations));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebNfc(true);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebAuth(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuth));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebAuthGetTransports(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuthGetTransports) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableClientPlaceholdersForServerLoFi(
base::GetFieldTrialParamValue("PreviewsClientLoFi",
"replace_server_placeholders") != "false");
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableResourceLoadScheduler(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kResourceLoadScheduler));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLayeredAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLayeredAPI(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kLayoutNG))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLayoutNG(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyInitializeMediaControls(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyInitializeMediaControls));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPolicies(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
media::kMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPolicies));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOverflowIconsForMediaControls(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kOverflowIconsForMediaControls));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAllowActivationDelegationAttr(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kAllowActivationDelegationAttr));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableModernMediaControls(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kUseModernMediaControls));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWorkStealingInScriptRunner(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWorkStealingInScriptRunner));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScheduledScriptStreaming(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kScheduledScriptStreaming));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMergeBlockingNonBlockingPools(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(base::kMergeBlockingNonBlockingPools));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyFrameLoading))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyFrameLoading(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyFrameVisibleLoadTimeMetrics))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyFrameVisibleLoadTimeMetrics(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyImageLoading))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyImageLoading(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyImageVisibleLoadTimeMetrics))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyImageVisibleLoadTimeMetrics(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8ContextSnapshot(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kV8ContextSnapshot));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRequireCSSExtensionForFile(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRequireCSSExtensionForFile));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePictureInPicture(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kPictureInPicture));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCacheInlineScriptCode(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCacheInlineScriptCode));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableIsolatedCodeCache(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(net::features::kIsolatedCodeCache));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSignedHTTPExchange)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSignedHTTPExchange(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePreloadImageSrcSetEnabled(true);
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNestedWorkers(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kNestedWorkers));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kExperimentalProductivityFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExperimentalProductivityFeatures(true);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kPageLifecycle))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePageLifecycle(true);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDisplayCutoutAPI) &&
base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() >=
base::android::SDK_VERSION_P) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableDisplayCutoutAPI(true);
}
#endif
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibilityObjectModel))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAccessibilityObjectModel(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kWritableFilesAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("WritableFiles", true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableOriginTrialControlledBlinkFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOriginTrialControlledFeatures(false);
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAutoplayIgnoresWebAudio(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kAutoplayIgnoreWebAudio));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaControlsExpandGesture(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kMediaControlsExpandGesture));
#endif
for (const std::string& feature :
FeaturesFromSwitch(command_line, switches::kEnableBlinkFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(feature, true);
}
for (const std::string& feature :
FeaturesFromSwitch(command_line, switches::kDisableBlinkFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(feature, false);
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePortals(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kPortals));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBackgroundFetch))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBackgroundFetch(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBackgroundFetchUploads(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBackgroundFetchUploads));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNoHoverAfterLayoutChange(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNoHoverAfterLayoutChange));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableJankTracking(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kJankTracking) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNoHoverDuringScroll(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNoHoverDuringScroll));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Insufficient file type enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to obtain local file data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
|
High
| 173,185
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TabStrip::ChangeTabGroup(int model_index,
base::Optional<int> old_group,
base::Optional<int> new_group) {
if (new_group.has_value() && !group_headers_[new_group.value()]) {
const TabGroupData* group_data =
controller_->GetDataForGroup(new_group.value());
auto header = std::make_unique<TabGroupHeader>(group_data->title());
header->set_owned_by_client();
AddChildView(header.get());
group_headers_[new_group.value()] = std::move(header);
}
if (old_group.has_value() &&
controller_->ListTabsInGroup(old_group.value()).size() == 0) {
group_headers_.erase(old_group.value());
}
UpdateIdealBounds();
AnimateToIdealBounds();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue(EventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
Text* const textNode = toText(firstChild());
const String newVisibleValue = visibleValue();
ASSERT(newVisibleValue.length() > 0);
if (textNode->wholeText() == newVisibleValue)
return;
textNode->replaceWholeText(newVisibleValue, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
setAttribute(aria_valuetextAttr, hasValue() ? newVisibleValue : AXDateTimeFieldEmptyValueText());
setAttribute(aria_valuenowAttr, newVisibleValue);
if (eventBehavior == DispatchEvent && m_fieldOwner)
m_fieldOwner->fieldValueChanged();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write operation, a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-2874.
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,723
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, getBasename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *suffix = 0, *fname;
int slen = 0;
size_t flen;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &suffix, &slen) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_basename(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name), suffix, slen, &fname, &flen TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(fname, flen, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,034
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return false;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return false;
else if (is_debug(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
return false;
else if (is_breakpoint(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
return false;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return false;
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR: case EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/* apic_write and eoi_induced should exit unconditionally. */
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
/*
* This should never happen, since it is not possible to
* set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-388
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9 mismanages the #BP and #OF exceptions, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) by declining to handle an exception thrown by an L2 guest.
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,856
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: grub_fshelp_read_file (grub_disk_t disk, grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void (*read_hook) (grub_disk_addr_t sector,
unsigned offset,
unsigned length,
void *closure),
void *closure, int flags,
grub_off_t pos, grub_size_t len, char *buf,
grub_disk_addr_t (*get_block) (grub_fshelp_node_t node,
grub_disk_addr_t block),
grub_off_t filesize, int log2blocksize)
{
grub_disk_addr_t i, blockcnt;
int blocksize = 1 << (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
/* Adjust LEN so it we can't read past the end of the file. */
if (pos + len > filesize)
len = filesize - pos;
blockcnt = ((len + pos) + blocksize - 1) >>
(log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
for (i = pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); i < blockcnt; i++)
{
grub_disk_addr_t blknr;
int blockoff = pos & (blocksize - 1);
int blockend = blocksize;
int skipfirst = 0;
blknr = get_block (node, i);
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
blknr = blknr << log2blocksize;
/* Last block. */
if (i == blockcnt - 1)
{
blockend = (len + pos) & (blocksize - 1);
/* The last portion is exactly blocksize. */
if (! blockend)
blockend = blocksize;
}
/* First block. */
if (i == (pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS)))
{
skipfirst = blockoff;
blockend -= skipfirst;
}
/* If the block number is 0 this block is not stored on disk but
is zero filled instead. */
if (blknr)
{
disk->read_hook = read_hook;
disk->closure = closure;
grub_hack_lastoff = blknr * 512;
grub_disk_read_ex (disk, blknr, skipfirst, blockend, buf, flags);
disk->read_hook = 0;
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
}
else if (buf)
grub_memset (buf, 0, blockend);
if (buf)
buf += blocksize - skipfirst;
}
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The grub_memmove function in shlr/grub/kern/misc.c in radare2 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer underflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file, possibly related to a buffer underflow in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB 2.02.
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
|
Medium
| 168,084
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sp<IMemoryHeap> BpMemory::getMemory(ssize_t* offset, size_t* size) const
{
if (mHeap == 0) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IMemory::getInterfaceDescriptor());
if (remote()->transact(GET_MEMORY, data, &reply) == NO_ERROR) {
sp<IBinder> heap = reply.readStrongBinder();
ssize_t o = reply.readInt32();
size_t s = reply.readInt32();
if (heap != 0) {
mHeap = interface_cast<IMemoryHeap>(heap);
if (mHeap != 0) {
mOffset = o;
mSize = s;
}
}
}
}
if (offset) *offset = mOffset;
if (size) *size = mSize;
return mHeap;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/binder/IMemory.cpp in the IMemory Native Interface in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider the heap size, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26877992.
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
|
Low
| 173,906
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaintController::CopyCachedSubsequence(size_t begin_index,
size_t end_index) {
DCHECK(!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled());
base::AutoReset<size_t> subsequence_begin_index(
¤t_cached_subsequence_begin_index_in_new_list_,
new_display_item_list_.size());
DisplayItem* cached_item =
¤t_paint_artifact_.GetDisplayItemList()[begin_index];
Vector<PaintChunk>::const_iterator cached_chunk;
base::Optional<PropertyTreeState> properties_before_subsequence;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
cached_chunk =
current_paint_artifact_.FindChunkByDisplayItemIndex(begin_index);
DCHECK(cached_chunk != current_paint_artifact_.PaintChunks().end());
properties_before_subsequence =
new_paint_chunks_.CurrentPaintChunkProperties();
UpdateCurrentPaintChunkPropertiesUsingIdWithFragment(
cached_chunk->id, cached_chunk->properties.GetPropertyTreeState());
} else {
cached_chunk = current_paint_artifact_.PaintChunks().begin();
}
for (size_t current_index = begin_index; current_index < end_index;
++current_index) {
cached_item = ¤t_paint_artifact_.GetDisplayItemList()[current_index];
SECURITY_CHECK(!cached_item->IsTombstone());
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(cached_item->Client().IsAlive());
#endif
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled() &&
current_index == cached_chunk->end_index) {
++cached_chunk;
DCHECK(cached_chunk != current_paint_artifact_.PaintChunks().end());
new_paint_chunks_.ForceNewChunk();
UpdateCurrentPaintChunkPropertiesUsingIdWithFragment(
cached_chunk->id, cached_chunk->properties.GetPropertyTreeState());
}
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (cached_item->VisualRect() !=
FloatRect(cached_item->Client().VisualRect())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Visual rect changed in a cached subsequence: "
<< cached_item->Client().DebugName()
<< " old=" << cached_item->VisualRect().ToString()
<< " new=" << cached_item->Client().VisualRect().ToString();
}
#endif
ProcessNewItem(MoveItemFromCurrentListToNewList(current_index));
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
DCHECK((!new_paint_chunks_.LastChunk().is_cacheable &&
!cached_chunk->is_cacheable) ||
new_paint_chunks_.LastChunk().Matches(*cached_chunk));
}
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled()) {
under_invalidation_checking_end_ = end_index;
DCHECK(IsCheckingUnderInvalidation());
} else if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
new_paint_chunks_.ForceNewChunk();
UpdateCurrentPaintChunkProperties(base::nullopt,
*properties_before_subsequence);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<OutboundPinholeTimeout>%d</OutboundPinholeTimeout>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * int_ip, * int_port, * rem_host, * rem_port, * protocol;
int opt=0;
/*int proto=0;*/
unsigned short iport, rport;
if (GETFLAG(IPV6FCFWDISABLEDMASK))
{
SoapError(h, 702, "FirewallDisabled");
return;
}
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
rport = (unsigned short)atoi(rem_port);
iport = (unsigned short)atoi(int_port);
/*proto = atoi(protocol);*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: retrieving timeout for outbound pinhole from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu protocol %s", action, int_ip, iport,rem_host, rport, protocol);
/* TODO */
r = -1;/*upnp_check_outbound_pinhole(proto, &opt);*/
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
opt, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -5: /* Protocol not supported */
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A Denial Of Service vulnerability in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPd through 2.1 exists due to a NULL pointer dereference in GetOutboundPinholeTimeout in upnpsoap.c for rem_port.
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
|
Low
| 169,667
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
{
register TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint64 bytecount;
uint64 offset;
uint32 rowblock;
uint64 rowblockbytes;
uint64 stripbytes;
uint32 strip;
uint64 nstrips64;
uint32 nstrips32;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint64* newcounts;
uint64* newoffsets;
bytecount = td->td_stripbytecount[0];
offset = td->td_stripoffset[0];
assert(td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if ((td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR)&&
(!isUpSampled(tif)))
rowblock = td->td_ycbcrsubsampling[1];
else
rowblock = 1;
rowblockbytes = TIFFVTileSize64(tif, rowblock);
/*
* Make the rows hold at least one scanline, but fill specified amount
* of data if possible.
*/
if (rowblockbytes > STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT) {
stripbytes = rowblockbytes;
rowsperstrip = rowblock;
} else if (rowblockbytes > 0 ) {
uint32 rowblocksperstrip;
rowblocksperstrip = (uint32) (STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT / rowblockbytes);
rowsperstrip = rowblocksperstrip * rowblock;
stripbytes = rowblocksperstrip * rowblockbytes;
}
else
return;
/*
* never increase the number of strips in an image
*/
if (rowsperstrip >= td->td_rowsperstrip)
return;
nstrips64 = TIFFhowmany_64(bytecount, stripbytes);
if ((nstrips64==0)||(nstrips64>0xFFFFFFFF)) /* something is wonky, do nothing. */
return;
nstrips32 = (uint32)nstrips64;
newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripByteCounts\" array");
newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripOffsets\" array");
if (newcounts == NULL || newoffsets == NULL) {
/*
* Unable to allocate new strip information, give up and use
* the original one strip information.
*/
if (newcounts != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newcounts);
if (newoffsets != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newoffsets);
return;
}
/*
* Fill the strip information arrays with new bytecounts and offsets
* that reflect the broken-up format.
*/
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips32; strip++) {
if (stripbytes > bytecount)
stripbytes = bytecount;
newcounts[strip] = stripbytes;
newoffsets[strip] = offset;
offset += stripbytes;
bytecount -= stripbytes;
}
/*
* Replace old single strip info with multi-strip info.
*/
td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips32;
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripoffset);
td->td_stripbytecount = newcounts;
td->td_stripoffset = newoffsets;
td->td_stripbytecountsorted = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, related to *READ of size 8* and libtiff/tif_read.c:523:22.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
|
Medium
| 168,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Utterance::~Utterance() {
DCHECK_EQ(completion_task_, static_cast<Task *>(NULL));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,397
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *packet_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
int tnl_hlen;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL |
SKB_GSO_GRE |
SKB_GSO_IPIP |
SKB_GSO_SIT |
SKB_GSO_MPLS) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (skb->encapsulation && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL)
segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features);
else {
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len - offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
if (skb_headroom(skb) < (tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz)) {
if (gso_pskb_expand_head(skb, tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz))
goto out;
}
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) +
unfrag_ip6hlen + tnl_hlen;
packet_start = (u8 *) skb->head + SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset;
memmove(packet_start-frag_hdr_sz, packet_start, unfrag_len);
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr, (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb));
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
}
out:
return segs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The udp6_ufo_fragment function in net/ipv6/udp_offload.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12, when UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) is enabled, does not properly perform a certain size comparison before inserting a fragment header, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via a large IPv6 UDP packet, as demonstrated by use of the Token Bucket Filter (TBF) queueing discipline.
Commit Message: ipv6: fix headroom calculation in udp6_ufo_fragment
Commit 1e2bd517c108816220f262d7954b697af03b5f9c ("udp6: Fix udp
fragmentation for tunnel traffic.") changed the calculation if
there is enough space to include a fragment header in the skb from a
skb->mac_header dervived one to skb_headroom. Because we already peeled
off the skb to transport_header this is wrong. Change this back to check
if we have enough room before the mac_header.
This fixes a panic Saran Neti reported. He used the tbf scheduler which
skb_gso_segments the skb. The offsets get negative and we panic in memcpy
because the skb was erroneously not expanded at the head.
Reported-by: Saran Neti <Saran.Neti@telus.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: construct_mac_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t data_tlv_len, size_t le_tlv_len,
unsigned char *mac_tlv, size_t * mac_tlv_len, const unsigned char key_type)
{
size_t block_size = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 16 : 8);
unsigned char mac[4096] = { 0 };
size_t mac_len;
unsigned char icv[16] = { 0 };
int i = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 15 : 7);
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (0 == data_tlv_len && 0 == le_tlv_len) {
mac_len = block_size;
}
else {
/* padding */
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len) = 0x80;
if ((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) % block_size)
mac_len = (((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) / block_size) +
1) * block_size + block_size;
else
mac_len = data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1 + block_size;
memset((apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1),
0, (mac_len - (data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1)));
}
/* increase icv */
for (; i >= 0; i--) {
if (exdata->icv_mac[i] == 0xff) {
exdata->icv_mac[i] = 0;
}
else {
exdata->icv_mac[i]++;
break;
}
}
/* calculate MAC */
memset(icv, 0, sizeof(icv));
memcpy(icv, exdata->icv_mac, 16);
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type) {
aes128_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 16, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
memcpy(mac_tlv + 2, &mac[mac_len - 16], 8);
}
else {
unsigned char iv[8] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp[8] = { 0 };
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
des_decrypt_cbc(&exdata->sk_mac[8], 8, iv, &mac[mac_len - 8], 8, tmp);
memset(iv, 0x00, 8);
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, iv, tmp, 8, mac_tlv + 2);
}
*mac_tlv_len = 2 + 8;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,053
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg)
{
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl, false);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,341
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int parallels_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVParallelsState *s = bs->opaque;
int i;
struct parallels_header ph;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1; // no write support yet
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &ph, sizeof(ph));
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
if (memcmp(ph.magic, HEADER_MAGIC, 16) ||
(le32_to_cpu(ph.version) != HEADER_VERSION)) {
error_setg(errp, "Image not in Parallels format");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
bs->total_sectors = le32_to_cpu(ph.nb_sectors);
s->tracks = le32_to_cpu(ph.tracks);
s->catalog_size = le32_to_cpu(ph.catalog_entries);
s->catalog_bitmap = g_malloc(s->catalog_size * 4);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 64, s->catalog_bitmap, s->catalog_size * 4);
le32_to_cpus(&s->catalog_bitmap[i]);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(s->catalog_bitmap);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the block drivers in QEMU, possibly before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted catalog size in (1) the parallels_open function in block/parallels.c or (2) bochs_open function in bochs.c, a large L1 table in the (3) qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in qcow2-snapshot.c or (4) qcow2_grow_l1_table function in qcow2-cluster.c, (5) a large request in the bdrv_check_byte_request function in block.c and other block drivers, (6) crafted cluster indexes in the get_refcount function in qcow2-refcount.c, or (7) a large number of blocks in the cloop_open function in cloop.c, which trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, large memory allocations and out-of-bounds read and writes.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,410
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond_dev, struct net_device *slave_dev)
{
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
const struct net_device_ops *slave_ops = slave_dev->netdev_ops;
struct slave *new_slave = NULL;
struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
struct sockaddr addr;
int link_reporting;
int res = 0;
if (!bond->params.use_carrier && slave_dev->ethtool_ops == NULL &&
slave_ops->ndo_do_ioctl == NULL) {
pr_warning("%s: Warning: no link monitoring support for %s\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name);
}
/* already enslaved */
if (slave_dev->flags & IFF_SLAVE) {
pr_debug("Error, Device was already enslaved\n");
return -EBUSY;
}
/* vlan challenged mutual exclusion */
/* no need to lock since we're protected by rtnl_lock */
if (slave_dev->features & NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED) {
pr_debug("%s: NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED\n", slave_dev->name);
if (bond_vlan_used(bond)) {
pr_err("%s: Error: cannot enslave VLAN challenged slave %s on VLAN enabled bond %s\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name, bond_dev->name);
return -EPERM;
} else {
pr_warning("%s: Warning: enslaved VLAN challenged slave %s. Adding VLANs will be blocked as long as %s is part of bond %s\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name,
slave_dev->name, bond_dev->name);
}
} else {
pr_debug("%s: ! NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED\n", slave_dev->name);
}
/*
* Old ifenslave binaries are no longer supported. These can
* be identified with moderate accuracy by the state of the slave:
* the current ifenslave will set the interface down prior to
* enslaving it; the old ifenslave will not.
*/
if ((slave_dev->flags & IFF_UP)) {
pr_err("%s is up. This may be due to an out of date ifenslave.\n",
slave_dev->name);
res = -EPERM;
goto err_undo_flags;
}
/* set bonding device ether type by slave - bonding netdevices are
* created with ether_setup, so when the slave type is not ARPHRD_ETHER
* there is a need to override some of the type dependent attribs/funcs.
*
* bond ether type mutual exclusion - don't allow slaves of dissimilar
* ether type (eg ARPHRD_ETHER and ARPHRD_INFINIBAND) share the same bond
*/
if (bond->slave_cnt == 0) {
if (bond_dev->type != slave_dev->type) {
pr_debug("%s: change device type from %d to %d\n",
bond_dev->name,
bond_dev->type, slave_dev->type);
res = netdev_bonding_change(bond_dev,
NETDEV_PRE_TYPE_CHANGE);
res = notifier_to_errno(res);
if (res) {
pr_err("%s: refused to change device type\n",
bond_dev->name);
res = -EBUSY;
goto err_undo_flags;
}
/* Flush unicast and multicast addresses */
dev_uc_flush(bond_dev);
dev_mc_flush(bond_dev);
if (slave_dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER)
bond_setup_by_slave(bond_dev, slave_dev);
else
ether_setup(bond_dev);
netdev_bonding_change(bond_dev,
NETDEV_POST_TYPE_CHANGE);
}
} else if (bond_dev->type != slave_dev->type) {
pr_err("%s ether type (%d) is different from other slaves (%d), can not enslave it.\n",
slave_dev->name,
slave_dev->type, bond_dev->type);
res = -EINVAL;
goto err_undo_flags;
}
if (slave_ops->ndo_set_mac_address == NULL) {
if (bond->slave_cnt == 0) {
pr_warning("%s: Warning: The first slave device specified does not support setting the MAC address. Setting fail_over_mac to active.",
bond_dev->name);
bond->params.fail_over_mac = BOND_FOM_ACTIVE;
} else if (bond->params.fail_over_mac != BOND_FOM_ACTIVE) {
pr_err("%s: Error: The slave device specified does not support setting the MAC address, but fail_over_mac is not set to active.\n",
bond_dev->name);
res = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err_undo_flags;
}
}
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_JOIN, slave_dev);
/* If this is the first slave, then we need to set the master's hardware
* address to be the same as the slave's. */
if (is_zero_ether_addr(bond->dev->dev_addr))
memcpy(bond->dev->dev_addr, slave_dev->dev_addr,
slave_dev->addr_len);
new_slave = kzalloc(sizeof(struct slave), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_slave) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto err_undo_flags;
}
/*
* Set the new_slave's queue_id to be zero. Queue ID mapping
* is set via sysfs or module option if desired.
*/
new_slave->queue_id = 0;
/* Save slave's original mtu and then set it to match the bond */
new_slave->original_mtu = slave_dev->mtu;
res = dev_set_mtu(slave_dev, bond->dev->mtu);
if (res) {
pr_debug("Error %d calling dev_set_mtu\n", res);
goto err_free;
}
/*
* Save slave's original ("permanent") mac address for modes
* that need it, and for restoring it upon release, and then
* set it to the master's address
*/
memcpy(new_slave->perm_hwaddr, slave_dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
if (!bond->params.fail_over_mac) {
/*
* Set slave to master's mac address. The application already
* set the master's mac address to that of the first slave
*/
memcpy(addr.sa_data, bond_dev->dev_addr, bond_dev->addr_len);
addr.sa_family = slave_dev->type;
res = dev_set_mac_address(slave_dev, &addr);
if (res) {
pr_debug("Error %d calling set_mac_address\n", res);
goto err_restore_mtu;
}
}
res = netdev_set_bond_master(slave_dev, bond_dev);
if (res) {
pr_debug("Error %d calling netdev_set_bond_master\n", res);
goto err_restore_mac;
}
/* open the slave since the application closed it */
res = dev_open(slave_dev);
if (res) {
pr_debug("Opening slave %s failed\n", slave_dev->name);
goto err_unset_master;
}
new_slave->bond = bond;
new_slave->dev = slave_dev;
slave_dev->priv_flags |= IFF_BONDING;
if (bond_is_lb(bond)) {
/* bond_alb_init_slave() must be called before all other stages since
* it might fail and we do not want to have to undo everything
*/
res = bond_alb_init_slave(bond, new_slave);
if (res)
goto err_close;
}
/* If the mode USES_PRIMARY, then the new slave gets the
* master's promisc (and mc) settings only if it becomes the
* curr_active_slave, and that is taken care of later when calling
* bond_change_active()
*/
if (!USES_PRIMARY(bond->params.mode)) {
/* set promiscuity level to new slave */
if (bond_dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
res = dev_set_promiscuity(slave_dev, 1);
if (res)
goto err_close;
}
/* set allmulti level to new slave */
if (bond_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
res = dev_set_allmulti(slave_dev, 1);
if (res)
goto err_close;
}
netif_addr_lock_bh(bond_dev);
/* upload master's mc_list to new slave */
netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, bond_dev)
dev_mc_add(slave_dev, ha->addr);
netif_addr_unlock_bh(bond_dev);
}
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD) {
/* add lacpdu mc addr to mc list */
u8 lacpdu_multicast[ETH_ALEN] = MULTICAST_LACPDU_ADDR;
dev_mc_add(slave_dev, lacpdu_multicast);
}
bond_add_vlans_on_slave(bond, slave_dev);
write_lock_bh(&bond->lock);
bond_attach_slave(bond, new_slave);
new_slave->delay = 0;
new_slave->link_failure_count = 0;
write_unlock_bh(&bond->lock);
bond_compute_features(bond);
read_lock(&bond->lock);
new_slave->last_arp_rx = jiffies;
if (bond->params.miimon && !bond->params.use_carrier) {
link_reporting = bond_check_dev_link(bond, slave_dev, 1);
if ((link_reporting == -1) && !bond->params.arp_interval) {
/*
* miimon is set but a bonded network driver
* does not support ETHTOOL/MII and
* arp_interval is not set. Note: if
* use_carrier is enabled, we will never go
* here (because netif_carrier is always
* supported); thus, we don't need to change
* the messages for netif_carrier.
*/
pr_warning("%s: Warning: MII and ETHTOOL support not available for interface %s, and arp_interval/arp_ip_target module parameters not specified, thus bonding will not detect link failures! see bonding.txt for details.\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name);
} else if (link_reporting == -1) {
/* unable get link status using mii/ethtool */
pr_warning("%s: Warning: can't get link status from interface %s; the network driver associated with this interface does not support MII or ETHTOOL link status reporting, thus miimon has no effect on this interface.\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name);
}
}
/* check for initial state */
if (!bond->params.miimon ||
(bond_check_dev_link(bond, slave_dev, 0) == BMSR_LSTATUS)) {
if (bond->params.updelay) {
pr_debug("Initial state of slave_dev is BOND_LINK_BACK\n");
new_slave->link = BOND_LINK_BACK;
new_slave->delay = bond->params.updelay;
} else {
pr_debug("Initial state of slave_dev is BOND_LINK_UP\n");
new_slave->link = BOND_LINK_UP;
}
new_slave->jiffies = jiffies;
} else {
pr_debug("Initial state of slave_dev is BOND_LINK_DOWN\n");
new_slave->link = BOND_LINK_DOWN;
}
if (bond_update_speed_duplex(new_slave) &&
(new_slave->link != BOND_LINK_DOWN)) {
pr_warning("%s: Warning: failed to get speed and duplex from %s, assumed to be 100Mb/sec and Full.\n",
bond_dev->name, new_slave->dev->name);
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD) {
pr_warning("%s: Warning: Operation of 802.3ad mode requires ETHTOOL support in base driver for proper aggregator selection.\n",
bond_dev->name);
}
}
if (USES_PRIMARY(bond->params.mode) && bond->params.primary[0]) {
/* if there is a primary slave, remember it */
if (strcmp(bond->params.primary, new_slave->dev->name) == 0) {
bond->primary_slave = new_slave;
bond->force_primary = true;
}
}
write_lock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
switch (bond->params.mode) {
case BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP:
bond_set_slave_inactive_flags(new_slave);
bond_select_active_slave(bond);
break;
case BOND_MODE_8023AD:
/* in 802.3ad mode, the internal mechanism
* will activate the slaves in the selected
* aggregator
*/
bond_set_slave_inactive_flags(new_slave);
/* if this is the first slave */
if (bond->slave_cnt == 1) {
SLAVE_AD_INFO(new_slave).id = 1;
/* Initialize AD with the number of times that the AD timer is called in 1 second
* can be called only after the mac address of the bond is set
*/
bond_3ad_initialize(bond, 1000/AD_TIMER_INTERVAL);
} else {
SLAVE_AD_INFO(new_slave).id =
SLAVE_AD_INFO(new_slave->prev).id + 1;
}
bond_3ad_bind_slave(new_slave);
break;
case BOND_MODE_TLB:
case BOND_MODE_ALB:
bond_set_active_slave(new_slave);
bond_set_slave_inactive_flags(new_slave);
bond_select_active_slave(bond);
break;
default:
pr_debug("This slave is always active in trunk mode\n");
/* always active in trunk mode */
bond_set_active_slave(new_slave);
/* In trunking mode there is little meaning to curr_active_slave
* anyway (it holds no special properties of the bond device),
* so we can change it without calling change_active_interface()
*/
if (!bond->curr_active_slave)
bond->curr_active_slave = new_slave;
break;
} /* switch(bond_mode) */
write_unlock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
bond_set_carrier(bond);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_POLL_CONTROLLER
slave_dev->npinfo = bond_netpoll_info(bond);
if (slave_dev->npinfo) {
if (slave_enable_netpoll(new_slave)) {
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
pr_info("Error, %s: master_dev is using netpoll, "
"but new slave device does not support netpoll.\n",
bond_dev->name);
res = -EBUSY;
goto err_close;
}
}
#endif
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
res = bond_create_slave_symlinks(bond_dev, slave_dev);
if (res)
goto err_close;
res = netdev_rx_handler_register(slave_dev, bond_handle_frame,
new_slave);
if (res) {
pr_debug("Error %d calling netdev_rx_handler_register\n", res);
goto err_dest_symlinks;
}
pr_info("%s: enslaving %s as a%s interface with a%s link.\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name,
bond_is_active_slave(new_slave) ? "n active" : " backup",
new_slave->link != BOND_LINK_DOWN ? "n up" : " down");
/* enslave is successful */
return 0;
/* Undo stages on error */
err_dest_symlinks:
bond_destroy_slave_symlinks(bond_dev, slave_dev);
err_close:
dev_close(slave_dev);
err_unset_master:
netdev_set_bond_master(slave_dev, NULL);
err_restore_mac:
if (!bond->params.fail_over_mac) {
/* XXX TODO - fom follow mode needs to change master's
* MAC if this slave's MAC is in use by the bond, or at
* least print a warning.
*/
memcpy(addr.sa_data, new_slave->perm_hwaddr, ETH_ALEN);
addr.sa_family = slave_dev->type;
dev_set_mac_address(slave_dev, &addr);
}
err_restore_mtu:
dev_set_mtu(slave_dev, new_slave->original_mtu);
err_free:
kfree(new_slave);
err_undo_flags:
bond_compute_features(bond);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StopInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
should_launch_ime_ = false;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(ibus_daemon_process_handle_);
if (!chromeos::StopInputMethodProcess(input_method_status_connection_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "StopInputMethodProcess IPC failed. Sending SIGTERM to "
<< "PID " << pid;
base::KillProcess(ibus_daemon_process_handle_, -1, false /* wait */);
}
VLOG(1) << "ibus-daemon (PID=" << pid << ") is terminated";
ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long vbg_misc_device_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int req,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct vbg_session *session = filp->private_data;
size_t returned_size, size;
struct vbg_ioctl_hdr hdr;
bool is_vmmdev_req;
int ret = 0;
void *buf;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, (void *)arg, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.version != VBG_IOCTL_HDR_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.size_in < sizeof(hdr) ||
(hdr.size_out && hdr.size_out < sizeof(hdr)))
return -EINVAL;
size = max(hdr.size_in, hdr.size_out);
if (_IOC_SIZE(req) && _IOC_SIZE(req) != size)
return -EINVAL;
if (size > SZ_16M)
return -E2BIG;
/*
* IOCTL_VMMDEV_REQUEST needs the buffer to be below 4G to avoid
* the need for a bounce-buffer and another copy later on.
*/
is_vmmdev_req = (req & ~IOCSIZE_MASK) == VBG_IOCTL_VMMDEV_REQUEST(0) ||
req == VBG_IOCTL_VMMDEV_REQUEST_BIG;
if (is_vmmdev_req)
buf = vbg_req_alloc(size, VBG_IOCTL_HDR_TYPE_DEFAULT);
else
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(buf, (void *)arg, hdr.size_in)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (hdr.size_in < size)
memset(buf + hdr.size_in, 0, size - hdr.size_in);
ret = vbg_core_ioctl(session, req, buf);
if (ret)
goto out;
returned_size = ((struct vbg_ioctl_hdr *)buf)->size_out;
if (returned_size > size) {
vbg_debug("%s: too much output data %zu > %zu\n",
__func__, returned_size, size);
returned_size = size;
}
if (copy_to_user((void *)arg, buf, returned_size) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
out:
if (is_vmmdev_req)
vbg_req_free(buf, size);
else
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.2. vbg_misc_device_ioctl() in drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_linux.c reads the same user data twice with copy_from_user. The header part of the user data is double-fetched, and a malicious user thread can tamper with the critical variables (hdr.size_in and hdr.size_out) in the header between the two fetches because of a race condition, leading to severe kernel errors, such as buffer over-accesses. This bug can cause a local denial of service and information leakage.
Commit Message: virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
In vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from
the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the
'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.
Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would
be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be
copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace
process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two
copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl
argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header
to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the
remainder of the data from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool adapter_enable_disable() {
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error enabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_ON, "Adapter did not turn on.");
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error disabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_OFF, "Adapter did not turn off.");
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows local users to gain privileges by establishing a pairing that remains present during a session of the primary user, aka internal bug 27410683.
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
|
Medium
| 173,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RemoveInvalidFilesFromPersistentDirectory(
const GDataCacheMetadataMap::ResourceIdToFilePathMap& persistent_file_map,
const GDataCacheMetadataMap::ResourceIdToFilePathMap& outgoing_file_map,
GDataCacheMetadataMap::CacheMap* cache_map) {
for (GDataCacheMetadataMap::ResourceIdToFilePathMap::const_iterator iter =
persistent_file_map.begin();
iter != persistent_file_map.end(); ++iter) {
const std::string& resource_id = iter->first;
const FilePath& file_path = iter->second;
GDataCacheMetadataMap::CacheMap::iterator cache_map_iter =
cache_map->find(resource_id);
if (cache_map_iter != cache_map->end()) {
const GDataCache::CacheEntry& cache_entry = cache_map_iter->second;
if (cache_entry.IsDirty() && outgoing_file_map.count(resource_id) == 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing dirty-but-not-committed file: "
<< file_path.value();
file_util::Delete(file_path, false);
cache_map->erase(cache_map_iter);
}
if (!cache_entry.IsDirty() && !cache_entry.IsPinned()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing persistent-but-dangling file: "
<< file_path.value();
file_util::Delete(file_path, false);
cache_map->erase(cache_map_iter);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,867
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: QualifyIpPacket(IPHeader *pIpHeader, ULONG len)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res;
res.value = 0;
if (len < 4)
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
UCHAR ver_len = pIpHeader->v4.ip_verlen;
UCHAR ip_version = (ver_len & 0xF0) >> 4;
USHORT ipHeaderSize = 0;
USHORT fullLength = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (ip_version == 4)
{
if (len < sizeof(IPv4Header))
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
ipHeaderSize = (ver_len & 0xF) << 2;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v4.ip_length);
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d, L2 payload length %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength, len));
res.ipStatus = (ipHeaderSize >= sizeof(IPv4Header)) ? ppresIPV4 : ppresNotIP;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP)
{
return res;
}
if (ipHeaderSize >= fullLength || len < fullLength)
{
DPrintf(2, ("[%s] - truncated packet - ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d, L2 payload length %d\n", __FUNCTION__,
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength, len));
res.ipCheckSum = ppresIPTooShort;
return res;
}
}
else if (ip_version == 6)
{
if (len < sizeof(IPv6Header))
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
UCHAR nextHeader = pIpHeader->v6.ip6_next_header;
BOOLEAN bParsingDone = FALSE;
ipHeaderSize = sizeof(pIpHeader->v6);
res.ipStatus = ppresIPV6;
res.ipCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v6.ip6_payload_len);
fullLength += ipHeaderSize;
if (len < fullLength)
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
while (nextHeader != 59)
{
IPv6ExtHeader *pExt;
switch (nextHeader)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case 0:
case 60:
case 43:
case 44:
case 51:
case 50:
case 135:
if (len >= ((ULONG)ipHeaderSize + 8))
{
pExt = (IPv6ExtHeader *)((PUCHAR)pIpHeader + ipHeaderSize);
nextHeader = pExt->ip6ext_next_header;
ipHeaderSize += 8;
ipHeaderSize += pExt->ip6ext_hdr_len * 8;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: Break in the middle of ext. headers(len %d, hdr > %d)\n", __FUNCTION__, len, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
break;
}
if (bParsingDone)
break;
}
if (ipHeaderSize <= MAX_SUPPORTED_IPV6_HEADERS)
{
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, nextHeader, fullLength));
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: IP chain is too large (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
}
}
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
res.IsFragment = (pIpHeader->v4.ip_offset & ~0xC0) != 0;
switch (pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
{
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
{
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
break;
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 170,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::GetEntry(long index, const mkvparser::BlockEntry*& pEntry) const
{
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
pEntry = NULL;
if (index < 0)
return -1; //generic error
if (m_entries_count < 0)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (index < m_entries_count)
{
pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
return 1; //found entry
}
if (m_element_size < 0) //we don't know cluster end yet
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; //underflow
const long long element_stop = m_element_start + m_element_size;
if (m_pos >= element_stop)
return 0; //nothing left to parse
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; //underflow, since more remains to be parsed
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,314
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Horizontal_Sweep_Span( RAS_ARGS Short y,
FT_F26Dot6 x1,
FT_F26Dot6 x2,
PProfile left,
PProfile right )
{
FT_UNUSED( left );
FT_UNUSED( right );
if ( x2 - x1 < ras.precision )
{
Long e1, e2;
e1 = CEILING( x1 );
e2 = FLOOR ( x2 );
if ( e1 == e2 )
{
Byte f1;
PByte bits;
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
e1 = TRUNC( e1 );
if ( e1 >= 0 && e1 < ras.target.rows )
{
PByte p;
p = bits - e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
p += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
p[0] |= f1;
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_send_plaintext(int sock, xmlNode * msg)
{
char *xml_text = dump_xml_unformatted(msg);
if (xml_text != NULL) {
int rc = 0;
char *unsent = xml_text;
int len = strlen(xml_text);
len++; /* null char */
crm_trace("Message on socket %d: size=%d", sock, len);
retry:
rc = write(sock, unsent, len);
if (rc < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EINTR:
case EAGAIN:
crm_trace("Retry");
goto retry;
default:
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Could only write %d of the remaining %d bytes", rc, len);
break;
}
} else if (rc < len) {
crm_trace("Only sent %d of %d remaining bytes", rc, len);
len -= rc;
unsent += rc;
goto retry;
} else {
crm_trace("Sent %d bytes: %.100s", rc, xml_text);
}
}
free(xml_text);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ArthurOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg)
{
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
int x, y;
ImageStream *imgStr;
Guchar *pix;
int i;
double *ctm;
QMatrix matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
if (maskColors) {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
for (i = 0; i < colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); ++i) {
if (pix[i] < maskColors[2*i] * 255||
pix[i] > maskColors[2*i+1] * 255) {
*dest = *dest | 0xff000000;
break;
}
}
pix += colorMap->getNumPixelComps();
dest++;
}
}
m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_ARGB32);
}
else {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_RGB32);
}
if (m_image == NULL || m_image->isNull()) {
qDebug() << "Null image";
delete imgStr;
return;
}
ctm = state->getCTM();
matrix.setMatrix(ctm[0] / width, ctm[1] / width, -ctm[2] / height, -ctm[3] / height, ctm[2] + ctm[4], ctm[3] + ctm[5]);
m_painter->setMatrix(matrix, true);
m_painter->drawImage( QPoint(0,0), *m_image );
delete m_image;
m_image = 0;
free (buffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
|
High
| 170,181
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int flv_write_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVCodecParameters *par = s->streams[pkt->stream_index]->codecpar;
FLVContext *flv = s->priv_data;
FLVStreamContext *sc = s->streams[pkt->stream_index]->priv_data;
unsigned ts;
int size = pkt->size;
uint8_t *data = NULL;
int flags = -1, flags_size, ret;
int64_t cur_offset = avio_tell(pb);
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6A ||
par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6 || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC)
flags_size = 2;
else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4)
flags_size = 5;
else
flags_size = 1;
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264
|| par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
int side_size = 0;
uint8_t *side = av_packet_get_side_data(pkt, AV_PKT_DATA_NEW_EXTRADATA, &side_size);
if (side && side_size > 0 && (side_size != par->extradata_size || memcmp(side, par->extradata, side_size))) {
av_free(par->extradata);
par->extradata = av_mallocz(side_size + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!par->extradata) {
par->extradata_size = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memcpy(par->extradata, side, side_size);
par->extradata_size = side_size;
flv_write_codec_header(s, par, pkt->dts);
}
}
if (flv->delay == AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
flv->delay = -pkt->dts;
if (pkt->dts < -flv->delay) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Packets are not in the proper order with respect to DTS\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
ts = pkt->dts;
if (s->event_flags & AVSTREAM_EVENT_FLAG_METADATA_UPDATED) {
write_metadata(s, ts);
s->event_flags &= ~AVSTREAM_EVENT_FLAG_METADATA_UPDATED;
}
avio_write_marker(pb, av_rescale(ts, AV_TIME_BASE, 1000),
pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY && (flv->video_par ? par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO : 1) ? AVIO_DATA_MARKER_SYNC_POINT : AVIO_DATA_MARKER_BOUNDARY_POINT);
switch (par->codec_type) {
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO:
avio_w8(pb, FLV_TAG_TYPE_VIDEO);
flags = ff_codec_get_tag(flv_video_codec_ids, par->codec_id);
flags |= pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY ? FLV_FRAME_KEY : FLV_FRAME_INTER;
break;
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO:
flags = get_audio_flags(s, par);
av_assert0(size);
avio_w8(pb, FLV_TAG_TYPE_AUDIO);
break;
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE:
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA:
avio_w8(pb, FLV_TAG_TYPE_META);
break;
default:
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
/* check if extradata looks like mp4 formatted */
if (par->extradata_size > 0 && *(uint8_t*)par->extradata != 1)
if ((ret = ff_avc_parse_nal_units_buf(pkt->data, &data, &size)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC && pkt->size > 2 &&
(AV_RB16(pkt->data) & 0xfff0) == 0xfff0) {
if (!s->streams[pkt->stream_index]->nb_frames) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Malformed AAC bitstream detected: "
"use the audio bitstream filter 'aac_adtstoasc' to fix it "
"('-bsf:a aac_adtstoasc' option with ffmpeg)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "aac bitstream error\n");
}
/* check Speex packet duration */
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_SPEEX && ts - sc->last_ts > 160)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Speex stream has more than "
"8 frames per packet. Adobe Flash "
"Player cannot handle this!\n");
if (sc->last_ts < ts)
sc->last_ts = ts;
if (size + flags_size >= 1<<24) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too large packet with size %u >= %u\n",
size + flags_size, 1<<24);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
avio_wb24(pb, size + flags_size);
put_timestamp(pb, ts);
avio_wb24(pb, flv->reserved);
if (par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA ||
par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE ) {
int data_size;
int64_t metadata_size_pos = avio_tell(pb);
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_TEXT) {
avio_w8(pb, AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING);
put_amf_string(pb, "onTextData");
avio_w8(pb, AMF_DATA_TYPE_MIXEDARRAY);
avio_wb32(pb, 2);
put_amf_string(pb, "type");
avio_w8(pb, AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING);
put_amf_string(pb, "Text");
put_amf_string(pb, "text");
avio_w8(pb, AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING);
put_amf_string(pb, pkt->data);
put_amf_string(pb, "");
avio_w8(pb, AMF_END_OF_OBJECT);
} else {
avio_write(pb, data ? data : pkt->data, size);
}
/* write total size of tag */
data_size = avio_tell(pb) - metadata_size_pos;
avio_seek(pb, metadata_size_pos - 10, SEEK_SET);
avio_wb24(pb, data_size);
avio_seek(pb, data_size + 10 - 3, SEEK_CUR);
avio_wb32(pb, data_size + 11);
} else {
av_assert1(flags>=0);
avio_w8(pb,flags);
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6)
avio_w8(pb,0);
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6A) {
if (par->extradata_size)
avio_w8(pb, par->extradata[0]);
else
avio_w8(pb, ((FFALIGN(par->width, 16) - par->width) << 4) |
(FFALIGN(par->height, 16) - par->height));
} else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC)
avio_w8(pb, 1); // AAC raw
else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
avio_w8(pb, 1); // AVC NALU
avio_wb24(pb, pkt->pts - pkt->dts);
}
avio_write(pb, data ? data : pkt->data, size);
avio_wb32(pb, size + flags_size + 11); // previous tag size
flv->duration = FFMAX(flv->duration,
pkt->pts + flv->delay + pkt->duration);
}
if (flv->flags & FLV_ADD_KEYFRAME_INDEX) {
switch (par->codec_type) {
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO:
flv->videosize += (avio_tell(pb) - cur_offset);
flv->lasttimestamp = flv->acurframeindex / flv->framerate;
if (pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) {
double ts = flv->acurframeindex / flv->framerate;
int64_t pos = cur_offset;
flv->lastkeyframetimestamp = flv->acurframeindex / flv->framerate;
flv->lastkeyframelocation = pos;
flv_append_keyframe_info(s, flv, ts, pos);
}
flv->acurframeindex++;
break;
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO:
flv->audiosize += (avio_tell(pb) - cur_offset);
break;
default:
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "par->codec_type is type = [%d]\n", par->codec_type);
break;
}
}
av_free(data);
return pb->error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: The flv_write_packet function in libavformat/flvenc.c in FFmpeg through 4.0.2 does not check for an empty audio packet, leading to an assertion failure.
Commit Message: avformat/flvenc: Check audio packet size
Fixes: Assertion failure
Fixes: assert_flvenc.c:941_1.swf
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Low
| 169,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mif_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[MIF_MAGICLEN];
uint_fast32_t magic;
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= MIF_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, MIF_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Was enough data read? */
if (n < MIF_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Compute the signature value. */
magic = (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[0]) << 24) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[1]) << 16) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[2]) << 8) |
buf[3];
/* Ensure that the signature is correct for this format. */
if (magic != MIF_MAGIC) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunMemCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_extreme_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
input_extreme_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : -255;
}
if (i == 0)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = 255;
if (i == 1)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = -255;
fwd_txfm_ref(input_extreme_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_extreme_block,
output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
EXPECT_GE(4 * DCT_MAX_VALUE, abs(output_block[j]))
<< "Error: 16x16 FDCT has coefficient larger than 4*DCT_MAX_VALUE";
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ion_free(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
bool valid_handle;
BUG_ON(client != handle->client);
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
valid_handle = ion_handle_validate(client, handle);
if (!valid_handle) {
WARN(1, "%s: invalid handle passed to free.\n", __func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return;
}
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
ion_handle_put(handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the ion_ioctl function in drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by calling ION_IOC_FREE on two CPUs at the same time.
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,896
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: magiccheck(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t l = m->value.q;
uint64_t v;
float fl, fv;
double dl, dv;
int matched;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = p->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = p->h;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
v = p->l;
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
v = p->q;
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
fl = m->value.f;
fv = p->f;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = fv != fl;
break;
case '=':
matched = fv == fl;
break;
case '>':
matched = fv > fl;
break;
case '<':
matched = fv < fl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with float: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
dl = m->value.d;
dv = p->d;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = dv != dl;
break;
case '=':
matched = dv == dl;
break;
case '>':
matched = dv > dl;
break;
case '<':
matched = dv < dl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with double: invalid relation `%c'", m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
l = 0;
v = 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp16(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_SEARCH: { /* search ms->search.s for the string m->value.s */
size_t slen;
size_t idx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
slen = MIN(m->vallen, sizeof(m->value.s));
l = 0;
v = 0;
for (idx = 0; m->str_range == 0 || idx < m->str_range; idx++) {
if (slen + idx > ms->search.s_len)
break;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, ms->search.s + idx, slen, m->str_flags);
if (v == 0) { /* found match */
ms->search.offset += idx;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case FILE_REGEX: {
int rc;
file_regex_t rx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
l = 0;
rc = file_regcomp(&rx, m->value.s,
REG_EXTENDED|REG_NEWLINE|
((m->str_flags & STRING_IGNORE_CASE) ? REG_ICASE : 0));
if (rc) {
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
} else {
#ifndef REG_STARTEND
char c;
#endif
regmatch_t pmatch[1];
size_t slen = ms->search.s_len;
/* Limit by offset if requested */
if (m->str_range > 0)
slen = MIN(slen, m->str_range);
#ifndef REG_STARTEND
#define REG_STARTEND 0
if (slen != 0)
slen--;
c = ms->search.s[slen];
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[slen] = '\0';
#else
pmatch[0].rm_so = 0;
pmatch[0].rm_eo = slen;
#endif
rc = file_regexec(&rx, (const char *)ms->search.s,
1, pmatch, REG_STARTEND);
#if REG_STARTEND == 0
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[l] = c;
#endif
switch (rc) {
case 0:
ms->search.s += (int)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.offset += (size_t)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.rm_len =
(size_t)(pmatch[0].rm_eo - pmatch[0].rm_so);
v = 0;
break;
case REG_NOMATCH:
v = 1;
break;
default:
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
}
file_regfree(&rx);
if (v == (uint64_t)-1)
return -1;
break;
}
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in magiccheck()", m->type);
return -1;
}
v = file_signextend(ms, m, v);
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u == *any* = 1\n", (unsigned long long)v);
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = v != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u != %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '=':
matched = v == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u == %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '>':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v > l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v > (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '<':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v < l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v < (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '&':
matched = (v & l) == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) == %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
case '^':
matched = (v & l) != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) != %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: file before 5.19 does not properly restrict the amount of data read during a regex search, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted file that triggers backtracking during processing of an awk rule. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2013-7345.
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
|
Low
| 166,357
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *AdaptiveThresholdImage(const Image *image,
const size_t width,const size_t height,const ssize_t offset,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThresholdImageTag "Threshold/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*threshold_view;
Image
*threshold_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
MagickPixelPacket
zero;
MagickRealType
number_pixels;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
threshold_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (threshold_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (width == 0)
return(threshold_image);
if (SetImageStorageClass(threshold_image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&threshold_image->exception);
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Local adaptive threshold.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&zero);
number_pixels=(MagickRealType) (width*height);
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
threshold_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(threshold_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,threshold_image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
MagickPixelPacket
channel_bias,
channel_sum;
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p,
*magick_restrict r;
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict threshold_indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
u,
v;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,-((ssize_t) width/2L),y-(ssize_t)
height/2L,image->columns+width,height,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,0,y,threshold_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
indexes=GetCacheViewVirtualIndexQueue(image_view);
threshold_indexes=GetCacheViewAuthenticIndexQueue(threshold_view);
channel_bias=zero;
channel_sum=zero;
r=p;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
for (u=0; u < (ssize_t) width; u++)
{
if (u == (ssize_t) (width-1))
{
channel_bias.red+=r[u].red;
channel_bias.green+=r[u].green;
channel_bias.blue+=r[u].blue;
channel_bias.opacity+=r[u].opacity;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channel_bias.index=(MagickRealType)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+(r-p)+u);
}
channel_sum.red+=r[u].red;
channel_sum.green+=r[u].green;
channel_sum.blue+=r[u].blue;
channel_sum.opacity+=r[u].opacity;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channel_sum.index=(MagickRealType) GetPixelIndex(indexes+(r-p)+u);
}
r+=image->columns+width;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
MagickPixelPacket
mean;
mean=zero;
r=p;
channel_sum.red-=channel_bias.red;
channel_sum.green-=channel_bias.green;
channel_sum.blue-=channel_bias.blue;
channel_sum.opacity-=channel_bias.opacity;
channel_sum.index-=channel_bias.index;
channel_bias=zero;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
channel_bias.red+=r[0].red;
channel_bias.green+=r[0].green;
channel_bias.blue+=r[0].blue;
channel_bias.opacity+=r[0].opacity;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channel_bias.index=(MagickRealType) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x+(r-p)+0);
channel_sum.red+=r[width-1].red;
channel_sum.green+=r[width-1].green;
channel_sum.blue+=r[width-1].blue;
channel_sum.opacity+=r[width-1].opacity;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channel_sum.index=(MagickRealType) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x+(r-p)+
width-1);
r+=image->columns+width;
}
mean.red=(MagickRealType) (channel_sum.red/number_pixels+offset);
mean.green=(MagickRealType) (channel_sum.green/number_pixels+offset);
mean.blue=(MagickRealType) (channel_sum.blue/number_pixels+offset);
mean.opacity=(MagickRealType) (channel_sum.opacity/number_pixels+offset);
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
mean.index=(MagickRealType) (channel_sum.index/number_pixels+offset);
SetPixelRed(q,((MagickRealType) GetPixelRed(q) <= mean.red) ?
0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,((MagickRealType) GetPixelGreen(q) <= mean.green) ?
0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,((MagickRealType) GetPixelBlue(q) <= mean.blue) ?
0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelOpacity(q,((MagickRealType) GetPixelOpacity(q) <= mean.opacity) ?
0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelIndex(threshold_indexes+x,(((MagickRealType) GetPixelIndex(
threshold_indexes+x) <= mean.index) ? 0 : QuantumRange));
p++;
q++;
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,ThresholdImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
threshold_view=DestroyCacheView(threshold_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return(threshold_image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read at MagickCore/threshold.c in AdaptiveThresholdImage because a height of zero is mishandled.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609
|
Medium
| 169,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool_t xdr_krb5_tl_data(XDR *xdrs, krb5_tl_data **tl_data_head)
{
krb5_tl_data *tl, *tl2;
bool_t more;
unsigned int len;
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_FREE:
tl = tl2 = *tl_data_head;
while (tl) {
tl2 = tl->tl_data_next;
free(tl->tl_data_contents);
free(tl);
tl = tl2;
}
break;
case XDR_ENCODE:
tl = *tl_data_head;
while (1) {
more = (tl != NULL);
if (!xdr_bool(xdrs, &more))
return FALSE;
if (tl == NULL)
break;
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &tl->tl_data_type))
return FALSE;
len = tl->tl_data_length;
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &tl->tl_data_contents, &len, ~0))
return FALSE;
tl = tl->tl_data_next;
}
break;
case XDR_DECODE:
tl = NULL;
while (1) {
if (!xdr_bool(xdrs, &more))
return FALSE;
if (more == FALSE)
break;
tl2 = (krb5_tl_data *) malloc(sizeof(krb5_tl_data));
if (tl2 == NULL)
return FALSE;
memset(tl2, 0, sizeof(krb5_tl_data));
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &tl2->tl_data_type))
return FALSE;
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&tl2->tl_data_contents, &len, ~0))
return FALSE;
tl2->tl_data_length = len;
tl2->tl_data_next = tl;
tl = tl2;
}
*tl_data_head = tl;
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The auth_gssapi_unwrap_data function in lib/rpc/auth_gssapi_misc.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly handle partial XDR deserialization, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via malformed XDR data, as demonstrated by data sent to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,791
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: log2vis_unicode (PyObject * unicode, FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* input string encoded in utf-8 */
PyObject *visual = NULL; /* output string encoded in utf-8 */
PyObject *result = NULL; /* unicode output string */
int length = PyUnicode_GET_SIZE (unicode);
logical = PyUnicode_AsUTF8String (unicode);
if (logical == NULL)
goto cleanup;
visual = log2vis_utf8 (logical, length, base_direction, clean, reordernsm);
if (visual == NULL)
goto cleanup;
result = PyUnicode_DecodeUTF8 (PyString_AS_STRING (visual),
PyString_GET_SIZE (visual), "strict");
cleanup:
Py_XDECREF (logical);
Py_XDECREF (visual);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode function in PyFriBidi before 0.11.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a 4-byte utf-8 sequence.
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
|
Low
| 165,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void cmdloop(void)
{
int c;
int usinguid, havepartition, havenamespace, recursive;
static struct buf tag, cmd, arg1, arg2, arg3;
char *p, shut[MAX_MAILBOX_PATH+1], cmdname[100];
const char *err;
const char * commandmintimer;
double commandmintimerd = 0.0;
struct sync_reserve_list *reserve_list =
sync_reserve_list_create(SYNC_MESSAGE_LIST_HASH_SIZE);
struct applepushserviceargs applepushserviceargs;
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* OK [CAPABILITY ");
capa_response(CAPA_PREAUTH);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "]");
if (config_serverinfo) prot_printf(imapd_out, " %s", config_servername);
if (config_serverinfo == IMAP_ENUM_SERVERINFO_ON) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, " Cyrus IMAP %s", cyrus_version());
}
prot_printf(imapd_out, " server ready\r\n");
/* clear cancelled flag if present before the next command */
cmd_cancelled();
motd_file();
/* Get command timer logging paramater. This string
* is a time in seconds. Any command that takes >=
* this time to execute is logged */
commandmintimer = config_getstring(IMAPOPT_COMMANDMINTIMER);
cmdtime_settimer(commandmintimer ? 1 : 0);
if (commandmintimer) {
commandmintimerd = atof(commandmintimer);
}
for (;;) {
/* Release any held index */
index_release(imapd_index);
/* Flush any buffered output */
prot_flush(imapd_out);
if (backend_current) prot_flush(backend_current->out);
/* command no longer running */
proc_register(config_ident, imapd_clienthost, imapd_userid, index_mboxname(imapd_index), NULL);
/* Check for shutdown file */
if ( !imapd_userisadmin && imapd_userid &&
(shutdown_file(shut, sizeof(shut)) ||
userdeny(imapd_userid, config_ident, shut, sizeof(shut)))) {
for (p = shut; *p == '['; p++); /* can't have [ be first char */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* BYE [ALERT] %s\r\n", p);
telemetry_rusage(imapd_userid);
shut_down(0);
}
signals_poll();
if (!proxy_check_input(protin, imapd_in, imapd_out,
backend_current ? backend_current->in : NULL,
NULL, 0)) {
/* No input from client */
continue;
}
/* Parse tag */
c = getword(imapd_in, &tag);
if (c == EOF) {
if ((err = prot_error(imapd_in))!=NULL
&& strcmp(err, PROT_EOF_STRING)) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s, closing connection", err);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* BYE %s\r\n", err);
}
goto done;
}
if (c != ' ' || !imparse_isatom(tag.s) || (tag.s[0] == '*' && !tag.s[1])) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* BAD Invalid tag\r\n");
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
}
/* Parse command name */
c = getword(imapd_in, &cmd);
if (!cmd.s[0]) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Null command\r\n", tag.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
}
lcase(cmd.s);
xstrncpy(cmdname, cmd.s, 99);
cmd.s[0] = toupper((unsigned char) cmd.s[0]);
if (config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CHATTY))
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "command: %s %s", tag.s, cmd.s);
proc_register(config_ident, imapd_clienthost, imapd_userid, index_mboxname(imapd_index), cmd.s);
/* if we need to force a kick, do so */
if (referral_kick) {
kick_mupdate();
referral_kick = 0;
}
if (plaintextloginalert) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* OK [ALERT] %s\r\n",
plaintextloginalert);
plaintextloginalert = NULL;
}
/* Only Authenticate/Enable/Login/Logout/Noop/Capability/Id/Starttls
allowed when not logged in */
if (!imapd_userid && !strchr("AELNCIS", cmd.s[0])) goto nologin;
/* Start command timer */
cmdtime_starttimer();
/* note that about half the commands (the common ones that don't
hit the mailboxes file) now close the mailboxes file just in
case it was open. */
switch (cmd.s[0]) {
case 'A':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Authenticate")) {
int haveinitresp = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (!imparse_isatom(arg1.s)) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Invalid authenticate mechanism\r\n", tag.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
}
if (c == ' ') {
haveinitresp = 1;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
if (imapd_userid) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Already authenticated\r\n", tag.s);
continue;
}
cmd_authenticate(tag.s, arg1.s, haveinitresp ? arg2.s : NULL);
snmp_increment(AUTHENTICATE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!imapd_userid) goto nologin;
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Append")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_append(tag.s, arg1.s, NULL);
snmp_increment(APPEND_COUNT, 1);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'C':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Capability")) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_capability(tag.s);
snmp_increment(CAPABILITY_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!imapd_userid) goto nologin;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Compress")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_compress(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(COMPRESS_COUNT, 1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_ZLIB */
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Check")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_noop(tag.s, cmd.s);
snmp_increment(CHECK_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Copy")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
copy:
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (c == '\r') goto missingargs;
if (c != ' ' || !imparse_issequence(arg1.s)) goto badsequence;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_copy(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, usinguid, /*ismove*/0);
snmp_increment(COPY_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Create")) {
struct dlist *extargs = NULL;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == ' ') {
c = parsecreateargs(&extargs);
if (c == EOF) goto badpartition;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_create(tag.s, arg1.s, extargs, 0);
dlist_free(&extargs);
snmp_increment(CREATE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Close")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_close(tag.s, cmd.s);
snmp_increment(CLOSE_COUNT, 1);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'D':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Delete")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_delete(tag.s, arg1.s, 0, 0);
snmp_increment(DELETE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Deleteacl")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_setacl(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, NULL);
snmp_increment(DELETEACL_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Dump")) {
int uid_start = 0;
if(c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if(c == ' ') {
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if(!imparse_isnumber(arg2.s)) goto extraargs;
uid_start = atoi(arg2.s);
}
if(c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if(c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_dump(tag.s, arg1.s, uid_start);
/* snmp_increment(DUMP_COUNT, 1);*/
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'E':
if (!imapd_userid) goto nologin;
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Enable")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_enable(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Expunge")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_expunge(tag.s, 0);
snmp_increment(EXPUNGE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Examine")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
cmd_select(tag.s, cmd.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(EXAMINE_COUNT, 1);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'F':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Fetch")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
fetch:
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (c == '\r') goto missingargs;
if (c != ' ' || !imparse_issequence(arg1.s)) goto badsequence;
cmd_fetch(tag.s, arg1.s, usinguid);
snmp_increment(FETCH_COUNT, 1);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'G':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Getacl")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_getacl(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(GETACL_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Getannotation")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_getannotation(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(GETANNOTATION_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Getmetadata")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_getmetadata(tag.s);
snmp_increment(GETANNOTATION_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Getquota")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_getquota(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(GETQUOTA_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Getquotaroot")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_getquotaroot(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(GETQUOTAROOT_COUNT, 1);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Genurlauth")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_genurlauth(tag.s);
/* snmp_increment(GENURLAUTH_COUNT, 1);*/
}
#endif
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'I':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Id")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_id(tag.s);
snmp_increment(ID_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!imapd_userid) goto nologin;
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Idle") && idle_enabled()) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_idle(tag.s);
snmp_increment(IDLE_COUNT, 1);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'L':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Login")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if(c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_login(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(LOGIN_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Logout")) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
snmp_increment(LOGOUT_COUNT, 1);
/* force any responses from our selected backend */
if (backend_current) imapd_check(NULL, 0);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* BYE %s\r\n",
error_message(IMAP_BYE_LOGOUT));
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag.s,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
if (imapd_userid && *imapd_userid) {
telemetry_rusage(imapd_userid);
}
goto done;
}
else if (!imapd_userid) goto nologin;
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "List")) {
struct listargs listargs;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
memset(&listargs, 0, sizeof(struct listargs));
listargs.ret = LIST_RET_CHILDREN;
getlistargs(tag.s, &listargs);
if (listargs.pat.count) cmd_list(tag.s, &listargs);
snmp_increment(LIST_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Lsub")) {
struct listargs listargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
memset(&listargs, 0, sizeof(struct listargs));
listargs.cmd = LIST_CMD_LSUB;
listargs.sel = LIST_SEL_SUBSCRIBED;
if (!strcasecmpsafe(imapd_magicplus, "+dav"))
listargs.sel |= LIST_SEL_DAV;
listargs.ref = arg1.s;
strarray_append(&listargs.pat, arg2.s);
cmd_list(tag.s, &listargs);
snmp_increment(LSUB_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Listrights")) {
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_listrights(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s);
snmp_increment(LISTRIGHTS_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Localappend")) {
/* create a local-only mailbox */
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_append(tag.s, arg1.s, *arg2.s ? arg2.s : NULL);
snmp_increment(APPEND_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Localcreate")) {
/* create a local-only mailbox */
struct dlist *extargs = NULL;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == ' ') {
c = parsecreateargs(&extargs);
if (c == EOF) goto badpartition;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_create(tag.s, arg1.s, extargs, 1);
dlist_free(&extargs);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(CREATE_COUNT, 1); */
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Localdelete")) {
/* delete a mailbox locally only */
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_delete(tag.s, arg1.s, 1, 1);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(DELETE_COUNT, 1); */
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'M':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Myrights")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_myrights(tag.s, arg1.s);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(MYRIGHTS_COUNT, 1); */
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Mupdatepush")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if(c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if(c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if(c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_mupdatepush(tag.s, arg1.s);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(MUPDATEPUSH_COUNT, 1); */
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Move")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
move:
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (c == '\r') goto missingargs;
if (c != ' ' || !imparse_issequence(arg1.s)) goto badsequence;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_copy(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, usinguid, /*ismove*/1);
snmp_increment(COPY_COUNT, 1);
} else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'N':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Noop")) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_noop(tag.s, cmd.s);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(NOOP_COUNT, 1); */
}
else if (!imapd_userid) goto nologin;
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Namespace")) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_namespace(tag.s);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(NAMESPACE_COUNT, 1); */
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'R':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Rename")) {
havepartition = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == ' ') {
havepartition = 1;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg3);
if (!imparse_isatom(arg3.s)) goto badpartition;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_rename(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, havepartition ? arg3.s : 0);
/* xxxx snmp_increment(RENAME_COUNT, 1); */
} else if(!strcmp(cmd.s, "Reconstruct")) {
recursive = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if(c == ' ') {
/* Optional RECURSEIVE argument */
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg2);
if(!imparse_isatom(arg2.s))
goto extraargs;
else if(!strcasecmp(arg2.s, "RECURSIVE"))
recursive = 1;
else
goto extraargs;
}
if(c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if(c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_reconstruct(tag.s, arg1.s, recursive);
/* snmp_increment(RECONSTRUCT_COUNT, 1); */
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Rlist")) {
struct listargs listargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
memset(&listargs, 0, sizeof(struct listargs));
listargs.sel = LIST_SEL_REMOTE;
listargs.ret = LIST_RET_CHILDREN;
listargs.ref = arg1.s;
strarray_append(&listargs.pat, arg2.s);
cmd_list(tag.s, &listargs);
/* snmp_increment(LIST_COUNT, 1); */
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Rlsub")) {
struct listargs listargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
memset(&listargs, 0, sizeof(struct listargs));
listargs.cmd = LIST_CMD_LSUB;
listargs.sel = LIST_SEL_REMOTE | LIST_SEL_SUBSCRIBED;
listargs.ref = arg1.s;
strarray_append(&listargs.pat, arg2.s);
cmd_list(tag.s, &listargs);
/* snmp_increment(LSUB_COUNT, 1); */
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Resetkey")) {
int have_mbox = 0, have_mech = 0;
if (c == ' ') {
have_mbox = 1;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == ' ') {
have_mech = 1;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg2);
}
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_resetkey(tag.s, have_mbox ? arg1.s : 0,
have_mech ? arg2.s : 0);
/* snmp_increment(RESETKEY_COUNT, 1);*/
}
#endif
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'S':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Starttls")) {
if (!tls_enabled()) {
/* we don't support starttls */
goto badcmd;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
/* XXX discard any input pipelined after STARTTLS */
prot_flush(imapd_in);
/* if we've already done SASL fail */
if (imapd_userid != NULL) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Can't Starttls after authentication\r\n", tag.s);
continue;
}
/* if we've already done COMPRESS fail */
if (imapd_compress_done == 1) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Can't Starttls after Compress\r\n", tag.s);
continue;
}
/* check if already did a successful tls */
if (imapd_starttls_done == 1) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Already did a successful Starttls\r\n",
tag.s);
continue;
}
cmd_starttls(tag.s, 0);
snmp_increment(STARTTLS_COUNT, 1);
continue;
}
if (!imapd_userid) {
goto nologin;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Store")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
store:
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (c != ' ' || !imparse_issequence(arg1.s)) goto badsequence;
cmd_store(tag.s, arg1.s, usinguid);
snmp_increment(STORE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Select")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
cmd_select(tag.s, cmd.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(SELECT_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Search")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
search:
cmd_search(tag.s, usinguid);
snmp_increment(SEARCH_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Subscribe")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
havenamespace = 0;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == ' ') {
havenamespace = 1;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
}
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
if (havenamespace) {
cmd_changesub(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, 1);
}
else {
cmd_changesub(tag.s, (char *)0, arg1.s, 1);
}
snmp_increment(SUBSCRIBE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Setacl")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg3);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_setacl(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, arg3.s);
snmp_increment(SETACL_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Setannotation")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_setannotation(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(SETANNOTATION_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Setmetadata")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_setmetadata(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(SETANNOTATION_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Setquota")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_setquota(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(SETQUOTA_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Sort")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
sort:
cmd_sort(tag.s, usinguid);
snmp_increment(SORT_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Status")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_status(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(STATUS_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Scan")) {
struct listargs listargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg3);
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
memset(&listargs, 0, sizeof(struct listargs));
listargs.ref = arg1.s;
strarray_append(&listargs.pat, arg2.s);
listargs.scan = arg3.s;
cmd_list(tag.s, &listargs);
snmp_increment(SCAN_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Syncapply")) {
struct dlist *kl = sync_parseline(imapd_in);
if (kl) {
cmd_syncapply(tag.s, kl, reserve_list);
dlist_free(&kl);
}
else goto extraargs;
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Syncget")) {
struct dlist *kl = sync_parseline(imapd_in);
if (kl) {
cmd_syncget(tag.s, kl);
dlist_free(&kl);
}
else goto extraargs;
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Syncrestart")) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
/* just clear the GUID cache */
cmd_syncrestart(tag.s, &reserve_list, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Syncrestore")) {
struct dlist *kl = sync_parseline(imapd_in);
if (kl) {
cmd_syncrestore(tag.s, kl, reserve_list);
dlist_free(&kl);
}
else goto extraargs;
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'T':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Thread")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
thread:
cmd_thread(tag.s, usinguid);
snmp_increment(THREAD_COUNT, 1);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'U':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Uid")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 1;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
lcase(arg1.s);
xstrncpy(cmdname, arg1.s, 99);
if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "fetch")) {
goto fetch;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "store")) {
goto store;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "search")) {
goto search;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "sort")) {
goto sort;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "thread")) {
goto thread;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "copy")) {
goto copy;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "move")) {
goto move;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "xmove")) {
goto move;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "expunge")) {
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (!imparse_issequence(arg1.s)) goto badsequence;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_expunge(tag.s, arg1.s);
snmp_increment(EXPUNGE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "xrunannotator")) {
goto xrunannotator;
}
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Unrecognized UID subcommand\r\n", tag.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
}
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Unsubscribe")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
havenamespace = 0;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == ' ') {
havenamespace = 1;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
}
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
if (havenamespace) {
cmd_changesub(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s, 0);
}
else {
cmd_changesub(tag.s, (char *)0, arg1.s, 0);
}
snmp_increment(UNSUBSCRIBE_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Unselect")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_close(tag.s, cmd.s);
snmp_increment(UNSELECT_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Undump")) {
if(c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
/* we want to get a list at this point */
if(c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_undump(tag.s, arg1.s);
/* snmp_increment(UNDUMP_COUNT, 1);*/
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Urlfetch")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_urlfetch(tag.s);
/* snmp_increment(URLFETCH_COUNT, 1);*/
}
#endif
else goto badcmd;
break;
case 'X':
if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xbackup")) {
int havechannel = 0;
if (!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_XBACKUP_ENABLED))
goto badcmd;
/* user */
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
/* channel */
if (c == ' ') {
havechannel = 1;
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_xbackup(tag.s, arg1.s, havechannel ? arg2.s : NULL);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xconvfetch")) {
cmd_xconvfetch(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xconvmultisort")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
cmd_xconvmultisort(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xconvsort")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
cmd_xconvsort(tag.s, 0);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xconvupdates")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
cmd_xconvsort(tag.s, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xfer")) {
int havepartition = 0;
/* Mailbox */
if(c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
/* Dest Server */
if(c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if(c == ' ') {
/* Dest Partition */
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg3);
if (!imparse_isatom(arg3.s)) goto badpartition;
havepartition = 1;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_xfer(tag.s, arg1.s, arg2.s,
(havepartition ? arg3.s : NULL));
/* snmp_increment(XFER_COUNT, 1);*/
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xconvmeta")) {
cmd_xconvmeta(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xlist")) {
struct listargs listargs;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
memset(&listargs, 0, sizeof(struct listargs));
listargs.cmd = LIST_CMD_XLIST;
listargs.ret = LIST_RET_CHILDREN | LIST_RET_SPECIALUSE;
getlistargs(tag.s, &listargs);
if (listargs.pat.count) cmd_list(tag.s, &listargs);
snmp_increment(LIST_COUNT, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xmove")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
goto move;
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xrunannotator")) {
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
usinguid = 0;
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
xrunannotator:
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg1);
if (!arg1.len || !imparse_issequence(arg1.s)) goto badsequence;
cmd_xrunannotator(tag.s, arg1.s, usinguid);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xsnippets")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
if (!imapd_index && !backend_current) goto nomailbox;
cmd_xsnippets(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xstats")) {
cmd_xstats(tag.s, c);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xwarmup")) {
/* XWARMUP doesn't need a mailbox to be selected */
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
cmd_xwarmup(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xkillmy")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_xkillmy(tag.s, arg1.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xforever")) {
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_xforever(tag.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd.s, "Xmeid")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto missingargs;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto extraargs;
cmd_xmeid(tag.s, arg1.s);
}
else if (apns_enabled && !strcmp(cmd.s, "Xapplepushservice")) {
if (c != ' ') goto missingargs;
memset(&applepushserviceargs, 0, sizeof(struct applepushserviceargs));
do {
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c == EOF) goto aps_missingargs;
if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "mailboxes")) {
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(')
goto aps_missingargs;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != ')') {
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
do {
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (c == EOF) break;
strarray_push(&applepushserviceargs.mailboxes, arg2.s);
} while (c == ' ');
}
if (c != ')')
goto aps_missingargs;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
else {
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg2);
if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "aps-version")) {
if (!imparse_isnumber(arg2.s)) goto aps_extraargs;
applepushserviceargs.aps_version = atoi(arg2.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "aps-account-id"))
buf_copy(&applepushserviceargs.aps_account_id, &arg2);
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "aps-device-token"))
buf_copy(&applepushserviceargs.aps_device_token, &arg2);
else if (!strcmp(arg1.s, "aps-subtopic"))
buf_copy(&applepushserviceargs.aps_subtopic, &arg2);
else
goto aps_extraargs;
}
} while (c == ' ');
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') goto aps_extraargs;
cmd_xapplepushservice(tag.s, &applepushserviceargs);
}
else goto badcmd;
break;
default:
badcmd:
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Unrecognized command\r\n", tag.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
}
/* End command timer - don't log "idle" commands */
if (commandmintimer && strcmp("idle", cmdname)) {
double cmdtime, nettime;
const char *mboxname = index_mboxname(imapd_index);
if (!mboxname) mboxname = "<none>";
cmdtime_endtimer(&cmdtime, &nettime);
if (cmdtime >= commandmintimerd) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "cmdtimer: '%s' '%s' '%s' '%f' '%f' '%f'",
imapd_userid ? imapd_userid : "<none>", cmdname, mboxname,
cmdtime, nettime, cmdtime + nettime);
}
}
continue;
nologin:
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Please login first\r\n", tag.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
nomailbox:
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Please select a mailbox first\r\n", tag.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
aps_missingargs:
buf_free(&applepushserviceargs.aps_account_id);
buf_free(&applepushserviceargs.aps_device_token);
buf_free(&applepushserviceargs.aps_subtopic);
strarray_fini(&applepushserviceargs.mailboxes);
missingargs:
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing required argument to %s\r\n", tag.s, cmd.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
aps_extraargs:
buf_free(&applepushserviceargs.aps_account_id);
buf_free(&applepushserviceargs.aps_device_token);
buf_free(&applepushserviceargs.aps_subtopic);
strarray_fini(&applepushserviceargs.mailboxes);
extraargs:
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to %s\r\n", tag.s, cmd.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
badsequence:
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid sequence in %s\r\n", tag.s, cmd.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
badpartition:
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid partition name in %s\r\n", tag.s, cmd.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
continue;
}
done:
cmd_syncrestart(NULL, &reserve_list, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Cyrus IMAP before 3.0.3 allows remote authenticated users to write to arbitrary files via a crafted (1) SYNCAPPLY, (2) SYNCGET or (3) SYNCRESTORE command.
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
|
Low
| 170,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int perf_output_begin(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
struct perf_event *event, unsigned int size,
int nmi, int sample)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb;
unsigned long tail, offset, head;
int have_lost;
struct perf_sample_data sample_data;
struct {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 id;
u64 lost;
} lost_event;
rcu_read_lock();
/*
* For inherited events we send all the output towards the parent.
*/
if (event->parent)
event = event->parent;
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (!rb)
goto out;
handle->rb = rb;
handle->event = event;
handle->nmi = nmi;
handle->sample = sample;
if (!rb->nr_pages)
goto out;
have_lost = local_read(&rb->lost);
if (have_lost) {
lost_event.header.size = sizeof(lost_event);
perf_event_header__init_id(&lost_event.header, &sample_data,
event);
size += lost_event.header.size;
}
perf_output_get_handle(handle);
do {
/*
* Userspace could choose to issue a mb() before updating the
* tail pointer. So that all reads will be completed before the
* write is issued.
*/
tail = ACCESS_ONCE(rb->user_page->data_tail);
smp_rmb();
offset = head = local_read(&rb->head);
head += size;
if (unlikely(!perf_output_space(rb, tail, offset, head)))
goto fail;
} while (local_cmpxchg(&rb->head, offset, head) != offset);
if (head - local_read(&rb->wakeup) > rb->watermark)
local_add(rb->watermark, &rb->wakeup);
handle->page = offset >> (PAGE_SHIFT + page_order(rb));
handle->page &= rb->nr_pages - 1;
handle->size = offset & ((PAGE_SIZE << page_order(rb)) - 1);
handle->addr = rb->data_pages[handle->page];
handle->addr += handle->size;
handle->size = (PAGE_SIZE << page_order(rb)) - handle->size;
if (have_lost) {
lost_event.header.type = PERF_RECORD_LOST;
lost_event.header.misc = 0;
lost_event.id = event->id;
lost_event.lost = local_xchg(&rb->lost, 0);
perf_output_put(handle, lost_event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, handle, &sample_data);
}
return 0;
fail:
local_inc(&rb->lost);
perf_output_put_handle(handle);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return -ENOSPC;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,841
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mwifiex_set_wmm_params(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *params)
{
const u8 *vendor_ie;
const u8 *wmm_ie;
u8 wmm_oui[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02};
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(WLAN_OUI_MICROSOFT,
WLAN_OUI_TYPE_MICROSOFT_WMM,
params->beacon.tail,
params->beacon.tail_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
wmm_ie = vendor_ie;
memcpy(&bss_cfg->wmm_info, wmm_ie +
sizeof(struct ieee_types_header), *(wmm_ie + 1));
priv->wmm_enabled = 1;
} else {
memset(&bss_cfg->wmm_info, 0, sizeof(bss_cfg->wmm_info));
memcpy(&bss_cfg->wmm_info.oui, wmm_oui, sizeof(wmm_oui));
bss_cfg->wmm_info.subtype = MWIFIEX_WMM_SUBTYPE;
bss_cfg->wmm_info.version = MWIFIEX_WMM_VERSION;
priv->wmm_enabled = 0;
}
bss_cfg->qos_info = 0x00;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-120
Summary: There is heap-based buffer overflow in kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
|
Low
| 169,577
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_OpenBuffer(uint8_t *midibuffer, uint32_t size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midibuffer == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL midi data buffer)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size > WM_MAXFILESIZE) {
/* don't bother loading suspiciously long files */
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_LONGFIL, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(midibuffer,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(midibuffer, size);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(midibuffer, size);
}
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WildMidi_Open function in WildMIDI since commit d8a466829c67cacbb1700beded25c448d99514e5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
|
Medium
| 169,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
{
static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
u32 hash, id;
net_get_random_once(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)iph->daddr,
(__force u32)iph->saddr,
iph->protocol,
ip_idents_hashrnd);
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
iph->id = htons(id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.7, a device can be tracked by an attacker using the IP ID values the kernel produces for connection-less protocols (e.g., UDP and ICMP). When such traffic is sent to multiple destination IP addresses, it is possible to obtain hash collisions (of indices to the counter array) and thereby obtain the hashing key (via enumeration). An attack may be conducted by hosting a crafted web page that uses WebRTC or gQUIC to force UDP traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses.
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 170,237
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t value_len, int flags)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_header *header = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *here, *last;
size_t name_len, free, min_offs = sb->s_blocksize;
int not_found = 1, error;
char *end;
/*
* header -- Points either into bh, or to a temporarily
* allocated buffer.
* here -- The named entry found, or the place for inserting, within
* the block pointed to by header.
* last -- Points right after the last named entry within the block
* pointed to by header.
* min_offs -- The offset of the first value (values are aligned
* towards the end of the block).
* end -- Points right after the block pointed to by header.
*/
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, value=%p, value_len=%ld",
name_index, name, value, (long)value_len);
if (value == NULL)
value_len = 0;
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255 || value_len > sb->s_blocksize)
return -ERANGE;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl) {
/* The inode already has an extended attribute block. */
bh = sb_bread(sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)),
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
header = HDR(bh);
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (header->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
header->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(sb, "ext2_xattr_set",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Find the named attribute. */
here = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(here)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(here);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
if (offs < min_offs)
min_offs = offs;
}
not_found = name_index - here->e_name_index;
if (!not_found)
not_found = name_len - here->e_name_len;
if (!not_found)
not_found = memcmp(name, here->e_name,name_len);
if (not_found <= 0)
break;
here = next;
}
last = here;
/* We still need to compute min_offs and last. */
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(last);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (!last->e_value_block && last->e_value_size) {
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
if (offs < min_offs)
min_offs = offs;
}
last = next;
}
/* Check whether we have enough space left. */
free = min_offs - ((char*)last - (char*)header) - sizeof(__u32);
} else {
/* We will use a new extended attribute block. */
free = sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct ext2_xattr_header) - sizeof(__u32);
here = last = NULL; /* avoid gcc uninitialized warning. */
}
if (not_found) {
/* Request to remove a nonexistent attribute? */
error = -ENODATA;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE)
goto cleanup;
error = 0;
if (value == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* Request to create an existing attribute? */
error = -EEXIST;
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto cleanup;
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
size_t size = le32_to_cpu(here->e_value_size);
if (le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs) + size >
sb->s_blocksize || size > sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
free += EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(size);
}
free += EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
}
error = -ENOSPC;
if (free < EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len) + EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len))
goto cleanup;
/* Here we know that we can set the new attribute. */
if (header) {
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
/* assert(header == HDR(bh)); */
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev,
bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (header->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "modifying in-place");
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
/* keep the buffer locked while modifying it. */
} else {
int offset;
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ea_bdebug(bh, "cloning");
header = kmalloc(bh->b_size, GFP_KERNEL);
error = -ENOMEM;
if (header == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(header, HDR(bh), bh->b_size);
header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
offset = (char *)here - bh->b_data;
here = ENTRY((char *)header + offset);
offset = (char *)last - bh->b_data;
last = ENTRY((char *)header + offset);
}
} else {
/* Allocate a buffer where we construct the new block. */
header = kzalloc(sb->s_blocksize, GFP_KERNEL);
error = -ENOMEM;
if (header == NULL)
goto cleanup;
end = (char *)header + sb->s_blocksize;
header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC);
header->h_blocks = header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
last = here = ENTRY(header+1);
}
/* Iff we are modifying the block in-place, bh is locked here. */
if (not_found) {
/* Insert the new name. */
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
size_t rest = (char *)last - (char *)here;
memmove((char *)here + size, here, rest);
memset(here, 0, size);
here->e_name_index = name_index;
here->e_name_len = name_len;
memcpy(here->e_name, name, name_len);
} else {
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
char *first_val = (char *)header + min_offs;
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
char *val = (char *)header + offs;
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(
le32_to_cpu(here->e_value_size));
if (size == EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len)) {
/* The old and the new value have the same
size. Just replace. */
here->e_value_size = cpu_to_le32(value_len);
memset(val + size - EXT2_XATTR_PAD, 0,
EXT2_XATTR_PAD); /* Clear pad bytes. */
memcpy(val, value, value_len);
goto skip_replace;
}
/* Remove the old value. */
memmove(first_val + size, first_val, val - first_val);
memset(first_val, 0, size);
here->e_value_offs = 0;
min_offs += size;
/* Adjust all value offsets. */
last = ENTRY(header+1);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
size_t o = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
if (!last->e_value_block && o < offs)
last->e_value_offs =
cpu_to_le16(o + size);
last = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(last);
}
}
if (value == NULL) {
/* Remove the old name. */
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
last = ENTRY((char *)last - size);
memmove(here, (char*)here + size,
(char*)last - (char*)here);
memset(last, 0, size);
}
}
if (value != NULL) {
/* Insert the new value. */
here->e_value_size = cpu_to_le32(value_len);
if (value_len) {
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len);
char *val = (char *)header + min_offs - size;
here->e_value_offs =
cpu_to_le16((char *)val - (char *)header);
memset(val + size - EXT2_XATTR_PAD, 0,
EXT2_XATTR_PAD); /* Clear the pad bytes. */
memcpy(val, value, value_len);
}
}
skip_replace:
if (IS_LAST_ENTRY(ENTRY(header+1))) {
/* This block is now empty. */
if (bh && header == HDR(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh); /* we were modifying in-place. */
error = ext2_xattr_set2(inode, bh, NULL);
} else {
ext2_xattr_rehash(header, here);
if (bh && header == HDR(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh); /* we were modifying in-place. */
error = ext2_xattr_set2(inode, bh, header);
}
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
if (!(bh && header == HDR(bh)))
kfree(header);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,983
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( array, which ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::SetDownloadStatusAndNotifyImpl(
DownloadStatus status,
ContentSetting setting) {
DCHECK((GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status) == setting) ||
(GetDownloadStatusFromSetting(setting) == status))
<< "status " << status << " and setting " << setting
<< " do not correspond to each other";
ContentSetting last_setting = GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status_);
DownloadUiStatus last_ui_status = ui_status_;
status_ = status;
ui_status_ = GetUiStatusFromDownloadStatus(status_, download_seen_);
if (!web_contents())
return;
if (last_setting == setting && last_ui_status == ui_status_)
return;
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENT_SETTINGS_CHANGED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(web_contents()),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Lack of proper state tracking in Permissions in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
|
???
| 173,190
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::GetEntryCount() const
{
return m_entries_count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_prefetch_tables (const void *gcmM, size_t gcmM_size)
{
prefetch_table(gcmM, gcmM_size);
prefetch_table(gcmR, sizeof(gcmR));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
|
Medium
| 169,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void i2c_deblock_gpio_cfg(void)
{
/* set I2C bus 1 deblocking GPIOs input, but 0 value for open drain */
qrio_gpio_direction_input(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1);
qrio_gpio_direction_input(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1);
qrio_set_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1, 0);
qrio_set_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
Medium
| 169,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int32 CommandBufferProxyImpl::CreateTransferBuffer(
size_t size, int32 id_request) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return -1;
scoped_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shm(
channel_->factory()->AllocateSharedMemory(size));
if (!shm.get())
return -1;
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle = shm->handle();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
DCHECK(!handle.auto_close);
#endif
int32 id;
if (!Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer(route_id_,
handle,
size,
id_request,
&id))) {
return -1;
}
return id;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::abortError()
{
genericError();
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().abortEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().abortEvent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger multiple conflicting uses of the same XMLHttpRequest object.
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,164
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSyslogsLibrary(
SyslogsLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->syslogs_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::AbortAndDelete() {
if (signin_aborted_mode_ == SigninAbortedMode::REMOVE_ACCOUNT) {
token_service_->RevokeCredentials(account_info_.account_id);
}
delete this;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
Medium
| 172,574
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> unPremulSkImageToPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPrintPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage_Params& params) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->PrintPage(params);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jas_memdump(FILE *out, void *data, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
size_t j;
uchar *dp;
dp = data;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
fprintf(out, "%04zx:", i);
for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) {
if (i + j < len) {
fprintf(out, " %02x", dp[i + j]);
}
}
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,682
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ogg_uint32_t decpack(long entry,long used_entry,long quantvals,
codebook *b,oggpack_buffer *opb,int maptype){
ogg_uint32_t ret=0;
int j;
switch(b->dec_type){
case 0:
return (ogg_uint32_t)entry;
case 1:
if(maptype==1){
/* vals are already read into temporary column vector here */
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=((ogg_uint16_t *)(b->q_val))[off]<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
}else{
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++)
ret|=oggpack_read(opb,b->q_bits)<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
return ret;
case 2:
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=off<<(b->q_pack*j);
}
return ret;
case 3:
return (ogg_uint32_t)used_entry;
}
return 0; /* silence compiler */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
|
Low
| 173,985
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(&ctx->path, state->owner, 0, NULL);
if (opendata == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
opendata->state = state;
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return opendata;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::FindEnabledPlugin(
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& top_origin_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status* status,
WebPluginInfo* plugin,
std::string* actual_mime_type,
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata>* plugin_metadata) const {
bool allow_wildcard = true;
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> matching_plugins;
std::vector<std::string> mime_types;
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetPluginInfoArray(
url, mime_type, allow_wildcard, &matching_plugins, &mime_types);
if (matching_plugins.empty()) {
status->value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound;
return false;
}
content::PluginServiceFilter* filter =
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetFilter();
size_t i = 0;
for (; i < matching_plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (!filter || filter->IsPluginEnabled(render_process_id_,
render_view_id,
resource_context_,
url,
top_origin_url,
&matching_plugins[i])) {
break;
}
}
bool enabled = i < matching_plugins.size();
if (!enabled) {
i = 0;
status->value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kDisabled;
}
*plugin = matching_plugins[i];
*actual_mime_type = mime_types[i];
if (plugin_metadata)
*plugin_metadata = PluginFinder::GetInstance()->GetPluginMetadata(*plugin);
return enabled;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage the interaction between the browser process and renderer processes during authorization of the loading of a plug-in, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via vectors involving a blocked plug-in.
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,471
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::handleAction(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(ctcptype)
emit displayMsg(Message::Action, typeByTarget(target), target, param, prefix);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ctcphandler.cpp in Quassel before 0.6.3 and 0.7.x before 0.7.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (unresponsive IRC) via multiple Client-To-Client Protocol (CTCP) requests in a PRIVMSG message.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long follow_hugetlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas,
unsigned long *position, unsigned long *nr_pages,
long i, unsigned int flags, int *nonblocking)
{
unsigned long pfn_offset;
unsigned long vaddr = *position;
unsigned long remainder = *nr_pages;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
int err = -EFAULT;
while (vaddr < vma->vm_end && remainder) {
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl = NULL;
int absent;
struct page *page;
/*
* If we have a pending SIGKILL, don't keep faulting pages and
* potentially allocating memory.
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
remainder = 0;
break;
}
/*
* Some archs (sparc64, sh*) have multiple pte_ts to
* each hugepage. We have to make sure we get the
* first, for the page indexing below to work.
*
* Note that page table lock is not held when pte is null.
*/
pte = huge_pte_offset(mm, vaddr & huge_page_mask(h),
huge_page_size(h));
if (pte)
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, pte);
absent = !pte || huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(pte));
/*
* When coredumping, it suits get_dump_page if we just return
* an error where there's an empty slot with no huge pagecache
* to back it. This way, we avoid allocating a hugepage, and
* the sparse dumpfile avoids allocating disk blocks, but its
* huge holes still show up with zeroes where they need to be.
*/
if (absent && (flags & FOLL_DUMP) &&
!hugetlbfs_pagecache_present(h, vma, vaddr)) {
if (pte)
spin_unlock(ptl);
remainder = 0;
break;
}
/*
* We need call hugetlb_fault for both hugepages under migration
* (in which case hugetlb_fault waits for the migration,) and
* hwpoisoned hugepages (in which case we need to prevent the
* caller from accessing to them.) In order to do this, we use
* here is_swap_pte instead of is_hugetlb_entry_migration and
* is_hugetlb_entry_hwpoisoned. This is because it simply covers
* both cases, and because we can't follow correct pages
* directly from any kind of swap entries.
*/
if (absent || is_swap_pte(huge_ptep_get(pte)) ||
((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!huge_pte_write(huge_ptep_get(pte)))) {
vm_fault_t ret;
unsigned int fault_flags = 0;
if (pte)
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (flags & FOLL_WRITE)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (nonblocking)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (flags & FOLL_NOWAIT)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY |
FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
if (flags & FOLL_TRIED) {
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_flags &
FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY);
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
}
ret = hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, vaddr, fault_flags);
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
err = vm_fault_to_errno(ret, flags);
remainder = 0;
break;
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
if (nonblocking &&
!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT))
*nonblocking = 0;
*nr_pages = 0;
/*
* VM_FAULT_RETRY must not return an
* error, it will return zero
* instead.
*
* No need to update "position" as the
* caller will not check it after
* *nr_pages is set to 0.
*/
return i;
}
continue;
}
pfn_offset = (vaddr & ~huge_page_mask(h)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
page = pte_page(huge_ptep_get(pte));
same_page:
if (pages) {
pages[i] = mem_map_offset(page, pfn_offset);
get_page(pages[i]);
}
if (vmas)
vmas[i] = vma;
vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
++pfn_offset;
--remainder;
++i;
if (vaddr < vma->vm_end && remainder &&
pfn_offset < pages_per_huge_page(h)) {
/*
* We use pfn_offset to avoid touching the pageframes
* of this compound page.
*/
goto same_page;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
*nr_pages = remainder;
/*
* setting position is actually required only if remainder is
* not zero but it's faster not to add a "if (remainder)"
* branch.
*/
*position = vaddr;
return i ? i : err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
Low
| 170,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string GetDMToken() {
std::string dm_token = *GetTestingDMToken();
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (dm_token.empty() &&
policy::ChromeBrowserCloudManagementController::IsEnabled()) {
dm_token = policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken();
}
#endif
return dm_token;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
|
Medium
| 172,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ip_optprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int option_len;
const char *sep = "";
for (; length > 0; cp += option_len, length -= option_len) {
u_int option_code;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", sep));
sep = ",";
ND_TCHECK(*cp);
option_code = *cp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",
tok2str(ip_option_values,"unknown %u",option_code)));
if (option_code == IPOPT_NOP ||
option_code == IPOPT_EOL)
option_len = 1;
else {
ND_TCHECK(cp[1]);
option_len = cp[1];
if (option_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
}
if (option_len > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, option_len);
switch (option_code) {
case IPOPT_EOL:
return;
case IPOPT_TS:
ip_printts(ndo, cp, option_len);
break;
case IPOPT_RR: /* fall through */
case IPOPT_SSRR:
case IPOPT_LSRR:
ip_printroute(ndo, cp, option_len);
break;
case IPOPT_RA:
if (option_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(cp[3]);
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2]) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " value %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2])));
break;
case IPOPT_NOP: /* nothing to print - fall through */
case IPOPT_SECURITY:
default:
break;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip.c:ip_printroute().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13022/IP: Add bounds checks to ip_printroute().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,869
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_map_xdr(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct xdr_buf *xdr,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec,
bool write_chunk_present)
{
int sge_no;
u32 sge_bytes;
u32 page_bytes;
u32 page_off;
int page_no;
if (xdr->len !=
(xdr->head[0].iov_len + xdr->page_len + xdr->tail[0].iov_len)) {
pr_err("svcrdma: %s: XDR buffer length error\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
/* Skip the first sge, this is for the RPCRDMA header */
sge_no = 1;
/* Head SGE */
vec->sge[sge_no].iov_base = xdr->head[0].iov_base;
vec->sge[sge_no].iov_len = xdr->head[0].iov_len;
sge_no++;
/* pages SGE */
page_no = 0;
page_bytes = xdr->page_len;
page_off = xdr->page_base;
while (page_bytes) {
vec->sge[sge_no].iov_base =
page_address(xdr->pages[page_no]) + page_off;
sge_bytes = min_t(u32, page_bytes, (PAGE_SIZE - page_off));
page_bytes -= sge_bytes;
vec->sge[sge_no].iov_len = sge_bytes;
sge_no++;
page_no++;
page_off = 0; /* reset for next time through loop */
}
/* Tail SGE */
if (xdr->tail[0].iov_len) {
unsigned char *base = xdr->tail[0].iov_base;
size_t len = xdr->tail[0].iov_len;
u32 xdr_pad = xdr_padsize(xdr->page_len);
if (write_chunk_present && xdr_pad) {
base += xdr_pad;
len -= xdr_pad;
}
if (len) {
vec->sge[sge_no].iov_base = base;
vec->sge[sge_no].iov_len = len;
sge_no++;
}
}
dprintk("svcrdma: %s: sge_no %d page_no %d "
"page_base %u page_len %u head_len %zu tail_len %zu\n",
__func__, sge_no, page_no, xdr->page_base, xdr->page_len,
xdr->head[0].iov_len, xdr->tail[0].iov_len);
vec->count = sge_no;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,173
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Segment::ParseCues(long long off, long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pCues)
return 0; // success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) // weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; // done
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues =
new (std::nothrow) Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
assert(m_pCues); // TODO
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
{
RSA *rsa=NULL;
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
bitsq=bits-bitsp;
rsa=RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) goto err;
/* set e */
rsa->e=BN_new();
if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;
#if 1
/* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
* unsigned long can be larger */
for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
{
if (e_value & (1<<i))
BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i);
}
#else
if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
#endif
/* generate p and q */
for (;;)
{
rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->p);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
for (;;)
{
rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->q);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
{
tmp=rsa->p;
rsa->p=rsa->q;
rsa->q=tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
rsa->n=BN_new();
if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
/* for (;;)
{
if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;
if (1)
{
if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
continue;
}
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
goto err;
}
*/
rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */
if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
rsa->dmp1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
rsa->dmq1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2);
if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,ERR_LIB_BN);
ok=0;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
if (!ok)
{
if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa);
return(NULL);
}
else
return(rsa);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.6 mishandles C bitwise-shift operations that exceed the size of an expression, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging improper RSA key generation on 64-bit HP-UX platforms.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,345
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
const struct in6_addr *force_saddr)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sock *sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
const struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct icmp6hdr tmp_hdr;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct icmpv6_msg msg;
struct sockcm_cookie sockc_unused = {0};
struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
int iif = 0;
int addr_type = 0;
int len;
int err = 0;
u32 mark = IP6_REPLY_MARK(net, skb->mark);
if ((u8 *)hdr < skb->head ||
(skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(*hdr)) > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return;
/*
* Make sure we respect the rules
* i.e. RFC 1885 2.4(e)
* Rule (e.1) is enforced by not using icmp6_send
* in any code that processes icmp errors.
*/
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&hdr->daddr);
if (ipv6_chk_addr(net, &hdr->daddr, skb->dev, 0) ||
ipv6_chk_acast_addr_src(net, skb->dev, &hdr->daddr))
saddr = &hdr->daddr;
/*
* Dest addr check
*/
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST || skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST) {
if (type != ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG &&
!(type == ICMPV6_PARAMPROB &&
code == ICMPV6_UNK_OPTION &&
(opt_unrec(skb, info))))
return;
saddr = NULL;
}
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&hdr->saddr);
/*
* Source addr check
*/
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type))
iif = skb->dev->ifindex;
else
iif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
/*
* Must not send error if the source does not uniquely
* identify a single node (RFC2463 Section 2.4).
* We check unspecified / multicast addresses here,
* and anycast addresses will be checked later.
*/
if ((addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) || (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp6_send: addr_any/mcast source [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
&hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
return;
}
/*
* Never answer to a ICMP packet.
*/
if (is_ineligible(skb)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp6_send: no reply to icmp error [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
&hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
return;
}
mip6_addr_swap(skb);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
fl6.daddr = hdr->saddr;
if (force_saddr)
saddr = force_saddr;
if (saddr)
fl6.saddr = *saddr;
fl6.flowi6_mark = mark;
fl6.flowi6_oif = iif;
fl6.fl6_icmp_type = type;
fl6.fl6_icmp_code = code;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
sk = icmpv6_xmit_lock(net);
if (!sk)
return;
sk->sk_mark = mark;
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (!icmpv6_xrlim_allow(sk, type, &fl6))
goto out;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_type = type;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_code = code;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_cksum = 0;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_pointer = htonl(info);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
ipc6.tclass = np->tclass;
fl6.flowlabel = ip6_make_flowinfo(ipc6.tclass, fl6.flowlabel);
dst = icmpv6_route_lookup(net, skb, sk, &fl6);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
goto out;
ipc6.hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
ipc6.dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
ipc6.opt = NULL;
msg.skb = skb;
msg.offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
msg.type = type;
len = skb->len - msg.offset;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(struct icmp6hdr));
if (len < 0) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp: len problem [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
&hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
goto out_dst_release;
}
rcu_read_lock();
idev = __in6_dev_get(skb->dev);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, icmpv6_getfrag, &msg,
len + sizeof(struct icmp6hdr),
sizeof(struct icmp6hdr),
&ipc6, &fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
MSG_DONTWAIT, &sockc_unused);
if (err) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
} else {
err = icmpv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, &tmp_hdr,
len + sizeof(struct icmp6hdr));
}
rcu_read_unlock();
out_dst_release:
dst_release(dst);
out:
icmpv6_xmit_unlock(sk);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The icmp6_send function in net/ipv6/icmp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.8.12 omits a certain check of the dst data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via a fragmented IPv6 packet.
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_seal)
{
zval *pubkeys, *pubkey, *sealdata, *ekeys, *iv = NULL;
HashTable *pubkeysht;
EVP_PKEY **pkeys;
zend_resource ** key_resources; /* so we know what to cleanup */
int i, len1, len2, *eksl, nkeys, iv_len;
unsigned char iv_buf[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1], *buf = NULL, **eks;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
char *method =NULL;
size_t method_len = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z/a/|sz/", &data, &data_len,
&sealdata, &ekeys, &pubkeys, &method, &method_len, &iv) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pubkeysht = Z_ARRVAL_P(pubkeys);
nkeys = pubkeysht ? zend_hash_num_elements(pubkeysht) : 0;
if (!nkeys) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Fourth argument to openssl_seal() must be a non-empty array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_SIZE_T_TO_INT(data_len, data);
if (method) {
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
cipher = EVP_rc4();
}
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (!iv && iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,
"Cipher algorithm requires an IV to be supplied as a sixth parameter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pkeys = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*pkeys), 0);
eksl = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*eksl), 0);
eks = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*eks), 0);
memset(eks, 0, sizeof(*eks) * nkeys);
key_resources = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(zend_resource*), 0);
memset(key_resources, 0, sizeof(zend_resource*) * nkeys);
memset(pkeys, 0, sizeof(*pkeys) * nkeys);
/* get the public keys we are using to seal this data */
i = 0;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(pubkeysht, pubkey) {
pkeys[i] = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(pubkey, 1, NULL, 0, 0, &key_resources[i]);
if (pkeys[i] == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "not a public key (%dth member of pubkeys)", i+1);
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
eks[i] = emalloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkeys[i]) + 1);
i++;
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_EncryptInit(ctx,cipher,NULL,NULL)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
php_openssl_store_errors();
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
/* allocate one byte extra to make room for \0 */
buf = emalloc(data_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
if (!EVP_SealInit(ctx, cipher, eks, eksl, &iv_buf[0], pkeys, nkeys) ||
!EVP_SealUpdate(ctx, buf, &len1, (unsigned char *)data, (int)data_len) ||
!EVP_SealFinal(ctx, buf + len1, &len2)) {
efree(buf);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
php_openssl_store_errors();
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
if (len1 + len2 > 0) {
zval_dtor(sealdata);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(sealdata, zend_string_init((char*)buf, len1 + len2, 0));
efree(buf);
zval_dtor(ekeys);
array_init(ekeys);
for (i=0; i<nkeys; i++) {
eks[i][eksl[i]] = '\0';
add_next_index_stringl(ekeys, (const char*)eks[i], eksl[i]);
efree(eks[i]);
eks[i] = NULL;
}
if (iv) {
zval_dtor(iv);
iv_buf[iv_len] = '\0';
ZVAL_NEW_STR(iv, zend_string_init((char*)iv_buf, iv_len, 0));
}
} else {
efree(buf);
}
RETVAL_LONG(len1 + len2);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
clean_exit:
for (i=0; i<nkeys; i++) {
if (key_resources[i] == NULL && pkeys[i] != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkeys[i]);
}
if (eks[i]) {
efree(eks[i]);
}
}
efree(eks);
efree(eksl);
efree(pkeys);
efree(key_resources);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Summary: In PHP before 5.6.31, 7.x before 7.0.21, and 7.1.x before 7.1.7, the openssl extension PEM sealing code did not check the return value of the OpenSSL sealing function, which could lead to a crash of the PHP interpreter, related to an interpretation conflict for a negative number in ext/openssl/openssl.c, and an OpenSSL documentation omission.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_cmdline(int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
bool reopen_log = false;
int signum;
struct utsname uname_buf;
int longindex;
int curind;
bool bad_option = false;
unsigned facility;
struct option long_options[] = {
{"use-file", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
{"vrrp", no_argument, NULL, 'P'},
{"check", no_argument, NULL, 'C'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
{"no_bfd", no_argument, NULL, 'B'},
#endif
{"all", no_argument, NULL, 3 },
{"log-console", no_argument, NULL, 'l'},
{"log-detail", no_argument, NULL, 'D'},
{"log-facility", required_argument, NULL, 'S'},
{"log-file", optional_argument, NULL, 'g'},
{"flush-log-file", no_argument, NULL, 2 },
{"no-syslog", no_argument, NULL, 'G'},
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
{"release-vips", no_argument, NULL, 'X'},
{"dont-release-vrrp", no_argument, NULL, 'V'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
{"dont-release-ipvs", no_argument, NULL, 'I'},
#endif
{"dont-respawn", no_argument, NULL, 'R'},
{"dont-fork", no_argument, NULL, 'n'},
{"dump-conf", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
{"pid", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
{"vrrp_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
{"checkers_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
{"address-monitoring", no_argument, NULL, 'a'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
{"bfd_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'b'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
{"snmp", no_argument, NULL, 'x'},
{"snmp-agent-socket", required_argument, NULL, 'A'},
#endif
{"core-dump", no_argument, NULL, 'm'},
{"core-dump-pattern", optional_argument, NULL, 'M'},
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
{"mem-check-log", no_argument, NULL, 'L'},
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
{"namespace", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
#endif
{"config-id", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
{"signum", required_argument, NULL, 4 },
{"config-test", optional_argument, NULL, 't'},
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
{"perf", optional_argument, NULL, 5 },
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
{"debug", optional_argument, NULL, 6 },
#endif
{"version", no_argument, NULL, 'v'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
/* Unfortunately, if a short option is used, getopt_long() doesn't change the value
* of longindex, so we need to ensure that before calling getopt_long(), longindex
* is set to a known invalid value */
curind = optind;
while (longindex = -1, (c = getopt_long(argc, argv, ":vhlndDRS:f:p:i:mM::g::Gt::"
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
"PC"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
"r:VX"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
"ac:I"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
"Bb:"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
"xA:"
#endif
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
"L"
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
"s:"
#endif
, long_options, &longindex)) != -1) {
/* Check for an empty option argument. For example --use-file= returns
* a 0 length option, which we don't want */
if (longindex >= 0 && long_options[longindex].has_arg == required_argument && optarg && !optarg[0]) {
c = ':';
optarg = NULL;
}
switch (c) {
case 'v':
fprintf(stderr, "%s", version_string);
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
fprintf(stderr, ", git commit %s", GIT_COMMIT);
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "\n\n%s\n\n", COPYRIGHT_STRING);
fprintf(stderr, "Built with kernel headers for Linux %d.%d.%d\n",
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff);
uname(&uname_buf);
fprintf(stderr, "Running on %s %s %s\n\n", uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version);
fprintf(stderr, "configure options: %s\n\n", KEEPALIVED_CONFIGURE_OPTIONS);
fprintf(stderr, "Config options: %s\n\n", CONFIGURATION_OPTIONS);
fprintf(stderr, "System options: %s\n", SYSTEM_OPTIONS);
exit(0);
break;
case 'h':
usage(argv[0]);
exit(0);
break;
case 'l':
__set_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug);
reopen_log = true;
break;
case 'n':
__set_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug);
break;
case 'd':
__set_bit(DUMP_CONF_BIT, &debug);
break;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'V':
__set_bit(DONT_RELEASE_VRRP_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
case 'I':
__set_bit(DONT_RELEASE_IPVS_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
case 'D':
if (__test_bit(LOG_DETAIL_BIT, &debug))
__set_bit(LOG_EXTRA_DETAIL_BIT, &debug);
else
__set_bit(LOG_DETAIL_BIT, &debug);
break;
case 'R':
__set_bit(DONT_RESPAWN_BIT, &debug);
break;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'X':
__set_bit(RELEASE_VIPS_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
case 'S':
if (!read_unsigned(optarg, &facility, 0, LOG_FACILITY_MAX, false))
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid log facility '%s'\n", optarg);
else {
log_facility = LOG_FACILITY[facility].facility;
reopen_log = true;
}
break;
case 'g':
if (optarg && optarg[0])
log_file_name = optarg;
else
log_file_name = "/tmp/keepalived.log";
open_log_file(log_file_name, NULL, NULL, NULL);
break;
case 'G':
__set_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug);
reopen_log = true;
break;
case 't':
__set_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(DONT_RESPAWN_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug);
if (optarg && optarg[0]) {
int fd = open(optarg, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
if (fd == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open config-test log file %s\n", optarg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
close(fd);
}
break;
case 'f':
conf_file = optarg;
break;
case 2: /* --flush-log-file */
set_flush_log_file();
break;
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
case 'P':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
break;
case 'C':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
case 'B':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
break;
#endif
case 'p':
main_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
case 'c':
checkers_pidfile = optarg;
break;
case 'a':
__set_bit(LOG_ADDRESS_CHANGES, &debug);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'r':
vrrp_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
case 'b':
bfd_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
case 'x':
snmp = 1;
break;
case 'A':
snmp_socket = optarg;
break;
#endif
case 'M':
set_core_dump_pattern = true;
if (optarg && optarg[0])
core_dump_pattern = optarg;
/* ... falls through ... */
case 'm':
create_core_dump = true;
break;
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
case 'L':
__set_bit(MEM_CHECK_LOG_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
case 's':
override_namespace = MALLOC(strlen(optarg) + 1);
strcpy(override_namespace, optarg);
break;
#endif
case 'i':
FREE_PTR(config_id);
config_id = MALLOC(strlen(optarg) + 1);
strcpy(config_id, optarg);
break;
case 4: /* --signum */
signum = get_signum(optarg);
if (signum == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown sigfunc %s\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
printf("%d\n", signum);
exit(0);
break;
case 3: /* --all */
__set_bit(RUN_ALL_CHILDREN, &daemon_mode);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
__set_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
__set_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
__set_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
#endif
break;
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
case 5:
if (optarg && optarg[0]) {
if (!strcmp(optarg, "run"))
perf_run = PERF_RUN;
else if (!strcmp(optarg, "all"))
perf_run = PERF_ALL;
else if (!strcmp(optarg, "end"))
perf_run = PERF_END;
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unknown perf start point %s", optarg);
}
else
perf_run = PERF_RUN;
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
case 6:
set_debug_options(optarg && optarg[0] ? optarg : NULL);
break;
#endif
case '?':
if (optopt && argv[curind][1] != '-')
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option -%c\n", optopt);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option %s\n", argv[curind]);
bad_option = true;
break;
case ':':
if (optopt && argv[curind][1] != '-')
fprintf(stderr, "Missing parameter for option -%c\n", optopt);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Missing parameter for option --%s\n", long_options[longindex].name);
bad_option = true;
break;
default:
exit(1);
break;
}
curind = optind;
}
if (optind < argc) {
printf("Unexpected argument(s): ");
while (optind < argc)
printf("%s ", argv[optind++]);
printf("\n");
}
if (bad_option)
exit(1);
return reopen_log;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 used mode 0666 when creating new temporary files upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats, potentially leaking sensitive information.
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Low
| 168,983
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltProcessUserParamInternal(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
const xmlChar * name,
const xmlChar * value,
int eval) {
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
const xmlChar *prefix;
const xmlChar *href;
xmlXPathCompExprPtr xpExpr;
xmlXPathObjectPtr result;
xsltStackElemPtr elem;
int res;
void *res_ptr;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(-1);
if (name == NULL)
return(0);
if (value == NULL)
return(0);
style = ctxt->style;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Evaluating user parameter %s=%s\n", name, value));
#endif
/*
* Name lookup
*/
name = xsltSplitQName(ctxt->dict, name, &prefix);
href = NULL;
if (prefix != NULL) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
ns = xmlSearchNs(style->doc, xmlDocGetRootElement(style->doc),
prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"user param : no namespace bound to prefix %s\n", prefix);
href = NULL;
} else {
href = ns->href;
}
}
if (name == NULL)
return (-1);
res_ptr = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->globalVars, name, href);
if (res_ptr != 0) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"Global parameter %s already defined\n", name);
}
if (ctxt->globalVars == NULL)
ctxt->globalVars = xmlHashCreate(20);
/*
* do not overwrite variables with parameters from the command line
*/
while (style != NULL) {
elem = ctxt->style->variables;
while (elem != NULL) {
if ((elem->comp != NULL) &&
(elem->comp->type == XSLT_FUNC_VARIABLE) &&
(xmlStrEqual(elem->name, name)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(elem->nameURI, href))) {
return(0);
}
elem = elem->next;
}
style = xsltNextImport(style);
}
style = ctxt->style;
elem = NULL;
/*
* Do the evaluation if @eval is non-zero.
*/
result = NULL;
if (eval != 0) {
xpExpr = xmlXPathCompile(value);
if (xpExpr != NULL) {
xmlDocPtr oldXPDoc;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
/*
* Save context states.
*/
oldXPDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "At top-level, the expression or template specifying the
* variable value is evaluated with the same context as that used
* to process the root node of the source document: the current
* node is the root node of the source document and the current
* node list is a list containing just the root node of the source
* document."
*/
xpctxt->doc = ctxt->initialContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = ctxt->initialContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = 1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = 1;
/*
* There is really no in scope namespace for parameters on the
* command line.
*/
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
result = xmlXPathCompiledEval(xpExpr, xpctxt);
/*
* Restore Context states.
*/
xpctxt->doc = oldXPDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xmlXPathFreeCompExpr(xpExpr);
}
if (result == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"Evaluating user parameter %s failed\n", name);
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
return(-1);
}
}
/*
* If @eval is 0 then @value is to be taken literally and result is NULL
*
* If @eval is not 0, then @value is an XPath expression and has been
* successfully evaluated and result contains the resulting value and
* is not NULL.
*
* Now create an xsltStackElemPtr for insertion into the context's
* global variable/parameter hash table.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED
if ((xsltGenericDebugContext == stdout) ||
(xsltGenericDebugContext == stderr))
xmlXPathDebugDumpObject((FILE *)xsltGenericDebugContext,
result, 0);
#endif
#endif
elem = xsltNewStackElem(NULL);
if (elem != NULL) {
elem->name = name;
elem->select = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, value, -1);
if (href != NULL)
elem->nameURI = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, href, -1);
elem->tree = NULL;
elem->computed = 1;
if (eval == 0) {
elem->value = xmlXPathNewString(value);
}
else {
elem->value = result;
}
}
/*
* Global parameters are stored in the XPath context variables pool.
*/
res = xmlHashAddEntry2(ctxt->globalVars, name, href, elem);
if (res != 0) {
xsltFreeStackElem(elem);
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"Global parameter %s already defined\n", name);
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,332
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadYCBCRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
if (image_info->interlace != PartitionInterlace)
{
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.rgb[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod,
exception);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"YCbCrA") == 0)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) NULL;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
count=0;
length=0;
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
/*
No interlacing: YCbCrYCbCrYCbCrYCbCrYCbCrYCbCr...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
break;
}
case LineInterlace:
{
static QuantumType
quantum_types[4] =
{
RedQuantum,
GreenQuantum,
BlueQuantum,
OpacityQuantum
};
/*
Line interlacing: YYY...CbCbCb...CrCrCr...YYY...CbCbCb...CrCrCr...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,RedQuantum);
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
for (i=0; i < (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3); i++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
quantum_type=quantum_types[i];
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,
0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case RedQuantum:
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
case GreenQuantum:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
case BlueQuantum:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
case OpacityQuantum:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: YYYYYY...CbCbCbCbCbCb...CrCrCrCrCrCr...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,RedQuantum);
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,
canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Partition interlacing: YYYYYY..., CbCbCbCbCbCb..., CrCrCrCrCrCr...
*/
AppendImageFormat("Y",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,RedQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Cb",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,GreenQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Cr",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,BlueQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("A",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,AlphaQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,
canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick version 7.0.7-2 contains a memory leak in ReadYCBCRImage in coders/ycbcr.c.
Commit Message: fix memory leak in ReadYCBCRImage as SetImageExtent failure
|
Low
| 167,739
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[300];
u8 sbuf[4],*p;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* MSE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x01, 0xB8);
apdu.lc=0x04;
sbuf[0]=0x83;
sbuf[1]=0x02;
sbuf[2]=data->key_id;
sbuf[3]=0x2A;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen=4;
apdu.lc=4;
apdu.le=0;
r=entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu, 0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe set MSE failed");
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.le = 0;
sbuf[0] = (u8)(data->key_length >> 8);
sbuf[1] = (u8)(data->key_length);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
data->modulus = malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p=rbuf;
assert(*p=='E');
p+=2+p[1];
/* N */
assert(*p=='N');
++p;
if(*p++>0x80)
{
u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
size_t module_len=0;
while(len_bytes!=0)
{
module_len=module_len<<8;
module_len+=*p++;
--len_bytes;
}
}
entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,052
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int saa7164_bus_get(struct saa7164_dev *dev, struct tmComResInfo* msg,
void *buf, int peekonly)
{
struct tmComResBusInfo *bus = &dev->bus;
u32 bytes_to_read, write_distance, curr_grp, curr_gwp,
new_grp, buf_size, space_rem;
struct tmComResInfo msg_tmp;
int ret = SAA_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
saa7164_bus_verify(dev);
if (msg == NULL)
return ret;
if (msg->size > dev->bus.m_wMaxReqSize) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() Exceeded dev->bus.m_wMaxReqSize\n",
__func__);
return ret;
}
if ((peekonly == 0) && (msg->size > 0) && (buf == NULL)) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"%s() Missing msg buf, size should be %d bytes\n",
__func__, msg->size);
return ret;
}
mutex_lock(&bus->lock);
/* Peek the bus to see if a msg exists, if it's not what we're expecting
* then return cleanly else read the message from the bus.
*/
curr_gwp = saa7164_readl(bus->m_dwGetWritePos);
curr_grp = saa7164_readl(bus->m_dwGetReadPos);
if (curr_gwp == curr_grp) {
ret = SAA_ERR_EMPTY;
goto out;
}
bytes_to_read = sizeof(*msg);
/* Calculate write distance to current read position */
write_distance = 0;
if (curr_gwp >= curr_grp)
/* Write doesn't wrap around the ring */
write_distance = curr_gwp - curr_grp;
else
/* Write wraps around the ring */
write_distance = curr_gwp + bus->m_dwSizeGetRing - curr_grp;
if (bytes_to_read > write_distance) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() No message/response found\n", __func__);
ret = SAA_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND;
goto out;
}
/* Calculate the new read position */
new_grp = curr_grp + bytes_to_read;
if (new_grp > bus->m_dwSizeGetRing) {
/* Ring wraps */
new_grp -= bus->m_dwSizeGetRing;
space_rem = bus->m_dwSizeGetRing - curr_grp;
memcpy_fromio(&msg_tmp, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, space_rem);
memcpy_fromio((u8 *)&msg_tmp + space_rem, bus->m_pdwGetRing,
bytes_to_read - space_rem);
} else {
/* No wrapping */
memcpy_fromio(&msg_tmp, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, bytes_to_read);
}
/* Convert from little endian to CPU */
msg_tmp.size = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg_tmp.size);
msg_tmp.command = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)msg_tmp.command);
msg_tmp.controlselector = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg_tmp.controlselector);
/* No need to update the read positions, because this was a peek */
/* If the caller specifically want to peek, return */
if (peekonly) {
memcpy(msg, &msg_tmp, sizeof(*msg));
goto peekout;
}
/* Check if the command/response matches what is expected */
if ((msg_tmp.id != msg->id) || (msg_tmp.command != msg->command) ||
(msg_tmp.controlselector != msg->controlselector) ||
(msg_tmp.seqno != msg->seqno) || (msg_tmp.size != msg->size)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() Unexpected msg miss-match\n", __func__);
saa7164_bus_dumpmsg(dev, msg, buf);
saa7164_bus_dumpmsg(dev, &msg_tmp, NULL);
ret = SAA_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND;
goto out;
}
/* Get the actual command and response from the bus */
buf_size = msg->size;
bytes_to_read = sizeof(*msg) + msg->size;
/* Calculate write distance to current read position */
write_distance = 0;
if (curr_gwp >= curr_grp)
/* Write doesn't wrap around the ring */
write_distance = curr_gwp - curr_grp;
else
/* Write wraps around the ring */
write_distance = curr_gwp + bus->m_dwSizeGetRing - curr_grp;
if (bytes_to_read > write_distance) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() Invalid bus state, missing msg or mangled ring, faulty H/W / bad code?\n",
__func__);
ret = SAA_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND;
goto out;
}
/* Calculate the new read position */
new_grp = curr_grp + bytes_to_read;
if (new_grp > bus->m_dwSizeGetRing) {
/* Ring wraps */
new_grp -= bus->m_dwSizeGetRing;
space_rem = bus->m_dwSizeGetRing - curr_grp;
if (space_rem < sizeof(*msg)) {
/* msg wraps around the ring */
memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, space_rem);
memcpy_fromio((u8 *)msg + space_rem, bus->m_pdwGetRing,
sizeof(*msg) - space_rem);
if (buf)
memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing + sizeof(*msg) -
space_rem, buf_size);
} else if (space_rem == sizeof(*msg)) {
memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, sizeof(*msg));
if (buf)
memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing, buf_size);
} else {
/* Additional data wraps around the ring */
memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, sizeof(*msg));
if (buf) {
memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp +
sizeof(*msg), space_rem - sizeof(*msg));
memcpy_fromio(buf + space_rem - sizeof(*msg),
bus->m_pdwGetRing, bytes_to_read -
space_rem);
}
}
} else {
/* No wrapping */
memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, sizeof(*msg));
if (buf)
memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp + sizeof(*msg),
buf_size);
}
/* Convert from little endian to CPU */
msg->size = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg->size);
msg->command = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)msg->command);
msg->controlselector = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg->controlselector);
/* Update the read positions, adjusting the ring */
saa7164_writel(bus->m_dwGetReadPos, new_grp);
peekout:
ret = SAA_OK;
out:
mutex_unlock(&bus->lock);
saa7164_bus_verify(dev);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The saa7164_bus_get function in drivers/media/pci/saa7164/saa7164-bus.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact by changing a certain sequence-number value, aka a *double fetch* vulnerability.
Commit Message: [PATCH] saa7164: Bug - Double fetch PCIe access condition
Avoid a double fetch by reusing the values from the prior transfer.
Originally reported via https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195559
Thanks to Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com> for reporting.
Signed-off-by: Steven Toth <stoth@kernellabs.com>
|
Low
| 168,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned char *cmd)
{
int res;
struct request *rq;
Sg_fd *sfp = srp->parentfp;
sg_io_hdr_t *hp = &srp->header;
int dxfer_len = (int) hp->dxfer_len;
int dxfer_dir = hp->dxfer_direction;
unsigned int iov_count = hp->iovec_count;
Sg_scatter_hold *req_schp = &srp->data;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
struct request_queue *q = sfp->parentdp->device->request_queue;
struct rq_map_data *md, map_data;
int rw = hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_DEV ? WRITE : READ;
unsigned char *long_cmdp = NULL;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_start_req: dxfer_len=%d\n",
dxfer_len));
if (hp->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB) {
long_cmdp = kzalloc(hp->cmd_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!long_cmdp)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* NOTE
*
* With scsi-mq enabled, there are a fixed number of preallocated
* requests equal in number to shost->can_queue. If all of the
* preallocated requests are already in use, then using GFP_ATOMIC with
* blk_get_request() will return -EWOULDBLOCK, whereas using GFP_KERNEL
* will cause blk_get_request() to sleep until an active command
* completes, freeing up a request. Neither option is ideal, but
* GFP_KERNEL is the better choice to prevent userspace from getting an
* unexpected EWOULDBLOCK.
*
* With scsi-mq disabled, blk_get_request() with GFP_KERNEL usually
* does not sleep except under memory pressure.
*/
rq = blk_get_request(q, rw, GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(rq)) {
kfree(long_cmdp);
return PTR_ERR(rq);
}
blk_rq_set_block_pc(rq);
if (hp->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB)
rq->cmd = long_cmdp;
memcpy(rq->cmd, cmd, hp->cmd_len);
rq->cmd_len = hp->cmd_len;
srp->rq = rq;
rq->end_io_data = srp;
rq->sense = srp->sense_b;
rq->retries = SG_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
if ((dxfer_len <= 0) || (dxfer_dir == SG_DXFER_NONE))
return 0;
if (sg_allow_dio && hp->flags & SG_FLAG_DIRECT_IO &&
dxfer_dir != SG_DXFER_UNKNOWN && !iov_count &&
!sfp->parentdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma &&
blk_rq_aligned(q, (unsigned long)hp->dxferp, dxfer_len))
md = NULL;
else
md = &map_data;
if (md) {
if (!sg_res_in_use(sfp) && dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen)
sg_link_reserve(sfp, srp, dxfer_len);
else {
res = sg_build_indirect(req_schp, sfp, dxfer_len);
if (res)
return res;
}
md->pages = req_schp->pages;
md->page_order = req_schp->page_order;
md->nr_entries = req_schp->k_use_sg;
md->offset = 0;
md->null_mapped = hp->dxferp ? 0 : 1;
if (dxfer_dir == SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV)
md->from_user = 1;
else
md->from_user = 0;
}
if (iov_count) {
int size = sizeof(struct iovec) * iov_count;
struct iovec *iov;
struct iov_iter i;
iov = memdup_user(hp->dxferp, size);
if (IS_ERR(iov))
return PTR_ERR(iov);
iov_iter_init(&i, rw, iov, iov_count,
min_t(size_t, hp->dxfer_len,
iov_length(iov, iov_count)));
res = blk_rq_map_user_iov(q, rq, md, &i, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree(iov);
} else
res = blk_rq_map_user(q, rq, md, hp->dxferp,
hp->dxfer_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!res) {
srp->bio = rq->bio;
if (!md) {
req_schp->dio_in_use = 1;
hp->info |= SG_INFO_DIRECT_IO;
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the sg_start_req function in drivers/scsi/sg.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.x through 4.x before 4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large iov_count value in a write request.
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return;
if ((algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if ((algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/mcryptd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.15 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by using an AF_ALG socket with an incompatible algorithm, as demonstrated by mcryptd(md5).
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 168,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
colorspace[MagickPathExtent],
tuple[MagickPathExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
PixelInfo
pixel;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
do
{
ComplianceType
compliance;
const char
*value;
(void) CopyMagickString(colorspace,CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickColorspaceOptions,(ssize_t) image->colorspace),MagickPathExtent);
LocaleLower(colorspace);
image->depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(colorspace,"a",MagickPathExtent);
compliance=NoCompliance;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"txt:compliance");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
compliance=(ComplianceType) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplianceOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"SPARSE-COLOR") != 0)
{
size_t
depth;
depth=compliance == SVGCompliance ? image->depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"# ImageMagick pixel enumeration: %.20g,%.20g,%.20g,%s\n",(double)
image->columns,(double) image->rows,(double) ((MagickOffsetType)
GetQuantumRange(depth)),colorspace);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&pixel);
if (pixel.colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
pixel.green-=(QuantumRange+1)/2.0;
pixel.blue-=(QuantumRange+1)/2.0;
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"SPARSE-COLOR") == 0)
{
/*
Sparse-color format.
*/
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,p) == (Quantum) OpaqueAlpha)
{
GetColorTuple(&pixel,MagickFalse,tuple);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g,%.20g,",(double) x,(double) y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g,%.20g: ",
(double) x,(double) y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(tuple,"(",MagickPathExtent);
if (pixel.colorspace == GRAYColorspace)
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,GrayPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
else
{
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,RedPixelChannel,compliance,tuple);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,GreenPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,BluePixelChannel,compliance,tuple);
}
if (pixel.colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,BlackPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
}
if (pixel.alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,AlphaPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
}
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,")",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
GetColorTuple(&pixel,MagickTrue,tuple);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s",tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
(void) QueryColorname(image,&pixel,SVGCompliance,tuple,exception);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n");
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
|
Medium
| 168,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_set_station_nickname");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
wl_lock(lp, &flags);
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);
/* Commit the adapter parameters */
wl_apply(lp);
wl_unlock(lp, &flags);
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ret;
} /* wvlan_set_station_nickname */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allow local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a long station-name string, related to the (1) wvlan_uil_put_info and (2) wvlan_set_station_nickname functions.
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,963
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport void GetDrawInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
const char
*option;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
/*
Initialize draw attributes.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(draw_info,0,sizeof(*draw_info));
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
GetAffineMatrix(&draw_info->affine);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#000F",AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#0000",AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
draw_info->stroke_width=1.0;
draw_info->alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
draw_info->fill_rule=EvenOddRule;
draw_info->linecap=ButtCap;
draw_info->linejoin=MiterJoin;
draw_info->miterlimit=10;
draw_info->decorate=NoDecoration;
draw_info->pointsize=12.0;
draw_info->undercolor.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
draw_info->compose=OverCompositeOp;
draw_info->render=MagickTrue;
draw_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
draw_info->stroke_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (clone_info->font != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->font=AcquireString(clone_info->font);
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->density=AcquireString(clone_info->density);
draw_info->text_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (clone_info->pointsize != 0.0)
draw_info->pointsize=clone_info->pointsize;
draw_info->border_color=clone_info->border_color;
if (clone_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->server_name=AcquireString(clone_info->server_name);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"direction");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->direction=(DirectionType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDirectionOptions,MagickFalse,option);
else
draw_info->direction=UndefinedDirection;
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"encoding");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"family");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->family,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"fill");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"gravity");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interline-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interline_spacing=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interword-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interword_spacing=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"kerning");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->kerning=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"stroke");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"strokewidth");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"style");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->style=(StyleType) ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"undercolor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"weight");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
ssize_t
weight;
weight=ParseCommandOption(MagickWeightOptions,MagickFalse,option);
if (weight == -1)
weight=StringToUnsignedLong(option);
draw_info->weight=(size_t) weight;
}
exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
draw_info->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DrawImage function in MagickCore/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 and 7.x before 7.0.1-2 makes an incorrect function call in attempting to locate the next token, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
|
Low
| 167,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ip_options_get(struct net *net, struct ip_options **optp,
unsigned char *data, int optlen)
{
struct ip_options *opt = ip_options_get_alloc(optlen);
if (!opt)
return -ENOMEM;
if (optlen)
memcpy(opt->__data, data, optlen);
return ip_options_get_finish(net, optp, opt, optlen);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,558
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *ewq)
{
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->flags & PF_EXITING))
goto out;
ewq->ctx = ctx;
init_waitqueue_entry(&ewq->wq, current);
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
/*
* After the __add_wait_queue the uwq is visible to userland
* through poll/read().
*/
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
if (ewq->msg.event == 0)
break;
if (ACCESS_ONCE(ctx->released) ||
fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq);
if (ewq->msg.event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
struct userfaultfd_ctx *new;
new = (struct userfaultfd_ctx *)
(unsigned long)
ewq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1;
userfaultfd_ctx_put(new);
}
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
wake_up_poll(&ctx->fd_wqh, POLLIN);
schedule();
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
/*
* ctx may go away after this if the userfault pseudo fd is
* already released.
*/
out:
userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free flaw was found in fs/userfaultfd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6. The issue is related to the handling of fork failure when dealing with event messages. Failure to fork correctly can lead to a situation where a fork event will be removed from an already freed list of events with userfaultfd_ctx_put().
Commit Message: userfaultfd: non-cooperative: fix fork use after free
When reading the event from the uffd, we put it on a temporary
fork_event list to detect if we can still access it after releasing and
retaking the event_wqh.lock.
If fork aborts and removes the event from the fork_event all is fine as
long as we're still in the userfault read context and fork_event head is
still alive.
We've to put the event allocated in the fork kernel stack, back from
fork_event list-head to the event_wqh head, before returning from
userfaultfd_ctx_read, because the fork_event head lifetime is limited to
the userfaultfd_ctx_read stack lifetime.
Forgetting to move the event back to its event_wqh place then results in
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq); in
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to remove it from a head that has been
already freed from the reader stack.
This could only happen if resolve_userfault_fork failed (for example if
there are no file descriptors available to allocate the fork uffd). If
it succeeded it was put back correctly.
Furthermore, after find_userfault_evt receives a fork event, the forked
userfault context in fork_nctx and uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 can
be released by the fork thread as soon as the event_wqh.lock is
released. Taking a reference on the fork_nctx before dropping the lock
prevents an use after free in resolve_userfault_fork().
If the fork side aborted and it already released everything, we still
try to succeed resolve_userfault_fork(), if possible.
Fixes: 893e26e61d04eac9 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170920180413.26713-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,431
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg, strArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,600
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ClassicScript* ClassicPendingScript::GetSource(const KURL& document_url,
bool& error_occurred) const {
CheckState();
DCHECK(IsReady());
error_occurred = ErrorOccurred();
if (!is_external_) {
ScriptSourceCode source_code(
GetElement()->TextFromChildren(), source_location_type_,
nullptr /* cache_handler */, document_url, StartingPosition());
return ClassicScript::Create(source_code, base_url_for_inline_script_,
options_, kSharableCrossOrigin);
}
DCHECK(GetResource()->IsLoaded());
ScriptResource* resource = ToScriptResource(GetResource());
bool streamer_ready = (ready_state_ == kReady) && streamer_ &&
!streamer_->StreamingSuppressed();
ScriptSourceCode source_code(streamer_ready ? streamer_ : nullptr, resource);
const KURL& base_url = source_code.Url();
return ClassicScript::Create(source_code, base_url, options_,
resource->CalculateAccessControlStatus());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Lack of CORS checking by ResourceFetcher/ResourceLoader in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
|
Medium
| 172,890
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_set_filter_heuristics(png_structp png_ptr, int heuristic_method,
int num_weights, png_doublep filter_weights,
png_doublep filter_costs)
{
int i;
png_debug(1, "in png_set_filter_heuristics");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (heuristic_method >= PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_LAST)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Unknown filter heuristic method");
return;
}
if (heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_DEFAULT)
{
heuristic_method = PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_UNWEIGHTED;
}
if (num_weights < 0 || filter_weights == NULL ||
heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_UNWEIGHTED)
{
num_weights = 0;
}
png_ptr->num_prev_filters = (png_byte)num_weights;
png_ptr->heuristic_method = (png_byte)heuristic_method;
if (num_weights > 0)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters == NULL)
{
png_ptr->prev_filters = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_sizeof(png_byte) * num_weights));
/* To make sure that the weighting starts out fairly */
for (i = 0; i < num_weights; i++)
{
png_ptr->prev_filters[i] = 255;
}
}
if (png_ptr->filter_weights == NULL)
{
png_ptr->filter_weights = (png_uint_16p)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_sizeof(png_uint_16) * num_weights));
png_ptr->inv_filter_weights = (png_uint_16p)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_sizeof(png_uint_16) * num_weights));
for (i = 0; i < num_weights; i++)
{
png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[i] =
png_ptr->filter_weights[i] = PNG_WEIGHT_FACTOR;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_weights; i++)
{
if (filter_weights[i] < 0.0)
{
png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[i] =
png_ptr->filter_weights[i] = PNG_WEIGHT_FACTOR;
}
else
{
png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[i] =
(png_uint_16)((double)PNG_WEIGHT_FACTOR*filter_weights[i]+0.5);
png_ptr->filter_weights[i] =
(png_uint_16)((double)PNG_WEIGHT_FACTOR/filter_weights[i]+0.5);
}
}
}
/* If, in the future, there are other filter methods, this would
* need to be based on png_ptr->filter.
*/
if (png_ptr->filter_costs == NULL)
{
png_ptr->filter_costs = (png_uint_16p)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_sizeof(png_uint_16) * PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST));
png_ptr->inv_filter_costs = (png_uint_16p)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_sizeof(png_uint_16) * PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST));
for (i = 0; i < PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST; i++)
{
png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[i] =
png_ptr->filter_costs[i] = PNG_COST_FACTOR;
}
}
/* Here is where we set the relative costs of the different filters. We
* should take the desired compression level into account when setting
* the costs, so that Paeth, for instance, has a high relative cost at low
* compression levels, while it has a lower relative cost at higher
* compression settings. The filter types are in order of increasing
* relative cost, so it would be possible to do this with an algorithm.
*/
for (i = 0; i < PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST; i++)
{
if (filter_costs == NULL || filter_costs[i] < 0.0)
{
png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[i] =
png_ptr->filter_costs[i] = PNG_COST_FACTOR;
}
else if (filter_costs[i] >= 1.0)
{
png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[i] =
(png_uint_16)((double)PNG_COST_FACTOR / filter_costs[i] + 0.5);
png_ptr->filter_costs[i] =
(png_uint_16)((double)PNG_COST_FACTOR * filter_costs[i] + 0.5);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
unsigned int target_offset,
unsigned int next_offset)
{
const struct compat_xt_entry_target *t;
const char *e = base;
if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
return -EINVAL;
if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
target_offset + sizeof(struct compat_xt_standard_target) != next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,222
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: base::string16 IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(
base::StringPiece host, base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
if (adjustments)
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 input16;
input16.reserve(host.length());
input16.insert(input16.end(), host.begin(), host.end());
base::string16 out16;
for (size_t component_start = 0, component_end;
component_start < input16.length();
component_start = component_end + 1) {
component_end = input16.find('.', component_start);
if (component_end == base::string16::npos)
component_end = input16.length(); // For getting the last component.
size_t component_length = component_end - component_start;
size_t new_component_start = out16.length();
bool converted_idn = false;
if (component_end > component_start) {
converted_idn =
IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(input16.data() + component_start,
component_length, &out16);
}
size_t new_component_length = out16.length() - new_component_start;
if (converted_idn && adjustments) {
adjustments->push_back(base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustment(
component_start, component_length, new_component_length));
}
if (component_end < input16.length())
out16.push_back('.');
}
return out16;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 58.0.3029.83 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
|
Medium
| 172,391
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int bzrtp_packetParser(bzrtpContext_t *zrtpContext, bzrtpChannelContext_t *zrtpChannelContext, const uint8_t * input, uint16_t inputLength, bzrtpPacket_t *zrtpPacket) {
int i;
/* now allocate and fill the correct message structure according to the message type */
/* messageContent points to the begining of the ZRTP message */
uint8_t *messageContent = (uint8_t *)(input+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH+ZRTP_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH);
switch (zrtpPacket->messageType) {
case MSGTYPE_HELLO :
{
/* allocate a Hello message structure */
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *messageData;
messageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpHelloMessage_t));
/* fill it */
memcpy(messageData->version, messageContent, 4);
messageContent +=4;
memcpy(messageData->clientIdentifier, messageContent, 16);
messageContent +=16;
memcpy(messageData->H3, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
memcpy(messageData->ZID, messageContent, 12);
messageContent +=12;
messageData->S = ((*messageContent)>>6)&0x01;
messageData->M = ((*messageContent)>>5)&0x01;
messageData->P = ((*messageContent)>>4)&0x01;
messageContent +=1;
messageData->hc = MIN((*messageContent)&0x0F, 7);
messageContent +=1;
messageData->cc = MIN(((*messageContent)>>4)&0x0F, 7);
messageData->ac = MIN((*messageContent)&0x0F, 7);
messageContent +=1;
messageData->kc = MIN(((*messageContent)>>4)&0x0F, 7);
messageData->sc = MIN((*messageContent)&0x0F, 7);
messageContent +=1;
/* Check message length according to value in hc, cc, ac, kc and sc */
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_HELLOMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH + 4*((uint16_t)(messageData->hc)+(uint16_t)(messageData->cc)+(uint16_t)(messageData->ac)+(uint16_t)(messageData->kc)+(uint16_t)(messageData->sc))) {
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
/* parse the variable length part: algorithms types */
for (i=0; i<messageData->hc; i++) {
messageData->supportedHash[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_HASH_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->cc; i++) {
messageData->supportedCipher[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_CIPHERBLOCK_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->ac; i++) {
messageData->supportedAuthTag[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_AUTHTAG_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->kc; i++) {
messageData->supportedKeyAgreement[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->sc; i++) {
messageData->supportedSas[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_SAS_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_HASH_TYPE, messageData->supportedHash, &messageData->hc);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_CIPHERBLOCK_TYPE, messageData->supportedCipher, &messageData->cc);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_AUTHTAG_TYPE, messageData->supportedAuthTag, &messageData->ac);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_TYPE, messageData->supportedKeyAgreement, &messageData->kc);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_SAS_TYPE, messageData->supportedSas, &messageData->sc);
memcpy(messageData->MAC, messageContent, 8);
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
/* the parsed Hello packet must be saved as it may be used to generate commit message or the total_hash */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_HELLO */
case MSGTYPE_HELLOACK :
{
/* check message length */
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_HELLOACKMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_HELLOACK */
case MSGTYPE_COMMIT:
{
uint8_t checkH3[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *peerHelloMessageData;
uint16_t variableLength = 0;
/* allocate a commit message structure */
bzrtpCommitMessage_t *messageData;
messageData = (bzrtpCommitMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpCommitMessage_t));
/* fill the structure */
memcpy(messageData->H2, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
/* We have now H2, check it matches the H3 we had in the hello message H3=SHA256(H2) and that the Hello message MAC is correct */
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Hello message in this channel, this commit shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerHelloMessageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H3 = SHA256(H2) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H2, 32, 32, checkH3);
if (memcmp(checkH3, peerHelloMessageData->H3, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the hello MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(messageData->H2, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerHelloMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
memcpy(messageData->ZID, messageContent, 12);
messageContent +=12;
messageData->hashAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_HASH_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
messageData->cipherAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_CIPHERBLOCK_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
messageData->authTagAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_AUTHTAG_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
messageData->keyAgreementAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
/* commit message length depends on the key agreement type choosen (and set in the zrtpContext->keyAgreementAlgo) */
switch(messageData->keyAgreementAlgo) {
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_DH2k :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_EC25 :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_DH3k :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_EC38 :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_EC52 :
variableLength = 32; /* hvi is 32 bytes length in DH Commit message format */
break;
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh :
variableLength = 24; /* nonce (16 bytes) and keyID(8 bytes) are 24 bytes length in preshared Commit message format */
break;
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Mult :
variableLength = 16; /* nonce is 24 bytes length in multistream Commit message format */
break;
default:
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_COMMITMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH + variableLength) {
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
messageData->sasAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_SAS_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
/* if it is a multistream or preshared commit, get the 16 bytes nonce */
if ((messageData->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh) || (messageData->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Mult)) {
memcpy(messageData->nonce, messageContent, 16);
messageContent +=16;
/* and the keyID for preshared commit only */
if (messageData->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh) {
memcpy(messageData->keyID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
}
} else { /* it's a DH commit message, get the hvi */
memcpy(messageData->hvi, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
}
/* get the MAC and attach the message data to the packet structure */
memcpy(messageData->MAC, messageContent, 8);
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
/* the parsed commit packet must be saved as it is used to generate the total_hash */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_COMMIT */
case MSGTYPE_DHPART1 :
case MSGTYPE_DHPART2 :
{
bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *messageData;
/*check message length, depends on the selected key agreement algo set in zrtpContext */
uint16_t pvLength = computeKeyAgreementPrivateValueLength(zrtpChannelContext->keyAgreementAlgo);
if (pvLength == 0) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDCONTEXT;
}
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_DHPARTMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH+pvLength) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
/* allocate a DHPart message structure and pv */
messageData = (bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpDHPartMessage_t));
messageData->pv = (uint8_t *)malloc(pvLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
/* fill the structure */
memcpy(messageData->H1, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
/* We have now H1, check it matches the H2 we had in the commit message H2=SHA256(H1) and that the Commit message MAC is correct */
if ( zrtpChannelContext->role == RESPONDER) { /* do it only if we are responder (we received a commit packet) */
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpCommitMessage_t *peerCommitMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Commit message in this channel, this DHPart2 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerCommitMessageData = (bzrtpCommitMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H2 = SHA256(H1) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H1, 32, 32, checkH2);
if (memcmp(checkH2, peerCommitMessageData->H2, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the Commit MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(messageData->H1, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerCommitMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
} else { /* if we are initiator(we didn't received any commit message and then no H2), we must check that H3=SHA256(SHA256(H1)) and the Hello message MAC */
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkH3[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *peerHelloMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Hello message in this channel, this DHPart1 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerHelloMessageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H3 = SHA256(SHA256(H1)) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H1, 32, 32, checkH2);
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH2, 32, 32, checkH3);
if (memcmp(checkH3, peerHelloMessageData->H3, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the hello MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(checkH2, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerHelloMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
}
memcpy(messageData->rs1ID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->rs2ID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->auxsecretID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->pbxsecretID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->pv, messageContent, pvLength);
messageContent +=pvLength;
memcpy(messageData->MAC, messageContent, 8);
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
/* the parsed commit packet must be saved as it is used to generate the total_hash */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_DHPART1 and MSGTYPE_DHPART2 */
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM1:
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM2:
{
uint8_t *confirmMessageKey = NULL;
uint8_t *confirmMessageMacKey = NULL;
bzrtpConfirmMessage_t *messageData;
uint16_t cipherTextLength;
uint8_t computedHmac[8];
uint8_t *confirmPlainMessageBuffer;
uint8_t *confirmPlainMessage;
/* we shall first decrypt and validate the message, check we have the keys to do it */
if (zrtpChannelContext->role == RESPONDER) { /* responder uses initiator's keys to decrypt */
if ((zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyi == NULL) || (zrtpChannelContext->mackeyi == NULL)) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDCONTEXT;
}
confirmMessageKey = zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyi;
confirmMessageMacKey = zrtpChannelContext->mackeyi;
}
if (zrtpChannelContext->role == INITIATOR) { /* the iniator uses responder's keys to decrypt */
if ((zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyr == NULL) || (zrtpChannelContext->mackeyr == NULL)) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDCONTEXT;
}
confirmMessageKey = zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyr;
confirmMessageMacKey = zrtpChannelContext->mackeyr;
}
/* allocate a confirm message structure */
messageData = (bzrtpConfirmMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpConfirmMessage_t));
/* get the mac and the IV */
memcpy(messageData->confirm_mac, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->CFBIV, messageContent, 16);
messageContent +=16;
/* get the cipher text length */
cipherTextLength = zrtpPacket->messageLength - ZRTP_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH - 24; /* confirm message is header, confirm_mac(8 bytes), CFB IV(16 bytes), encrypted part */
/* validate the mac over the cipher text */
zrtpChannelContext->hmacFunction(confirmMessageMacKey, zrtpChannelContext->hashLength, messageContent, cipherTextLength, 8, computedHmac);
if (memcmp(computedHmac, messageData->confirm_mac, 8) != 0) { /* confirm_mac doesn't match */
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGCONFIRMMAC;
}
/* get plain message */
confirmPlainMessageBuffer = (uint8_t *)malloc(cipherTextLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
zrtpChannelContext->cipherDecryptionFunction(confirmMessageKey, messageData->CFBIV, messageContent, cipherTextLength, confirmPlainMessageBuffer);
confirmPlainMessage = confirmPlainMessageBuffer; /* point into the allocated buffer */
/* parse it */
memcpy(messageData->H0, confirmPlainMessage, 32);
confirmPlainMessage +=33; /* +33 because next 8 bits are unused */
/* Hash chain checking: if we are in multichannel or shared mode, we had not DHPart and then no H1 */
if (zrtpChannelContext->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh || zrtpChannelContext->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Mult) {
/* compute the H1=SHA256(H0) we never received */
uint8_t checkH1[32];
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H0, 32, 32, checkH1);
/* if we are responder, we received a commit packet with H2 then check that H2=SHA256(H1) and that the commit message MAC keyed with H1 match */
if ( zrtpChannelContext->role == RESPONDER) {
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpCommitMessage_t *peerCommitMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Commit message in this channel, this Confirm2 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerCommitMessageData = (bzrtpCommitMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H2 = SHA256(H1) */
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH1, 32, 32, checkH2);
if (memcmp(checkH2, peerCommitMessageData->H2, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the Commit MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(checkH1, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerCommitMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
} else { /* if we are initiator(we didn't received any commit message and then no H2), we must check that H3=SHA256(SHA256(H1)) and the Hello message MAC */
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkH3[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *peerHelloMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Hello message in this channel, this Confirm1 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerHelloMessageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H3 = SHA256(SHA256(H1)) */
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH1, 32, 32, checkH2);
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH2, 32, 32, checkH3);
if (memcmp(checkH3, peerHelloMessageData->H3, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the hello MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(checkH2, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerHelloMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
}
} else { /* we are in DHM mode */
/* We have now H0, check it matches the H1 we had in the DHPart message H1=SHA256(H0) and that the DHPart message MAC is correct */
uint8_t checkH1[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *peerDHPartMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no DHPART message in this channel, this confirm shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerDHPartMessageData = (bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H1 = SHA256(H0) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H0, 32, 32, checkH1);
if (memcmp(checkH1, peerDHPartMessageData->H1, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the DHPart message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(messageData->H0, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerDHPartMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
}
messageData->sig_len = ((uint16_t)(confirmPlainMessage[0]&0x01))<<8 | (((uint16_t)confirmPlainMessage[1])&0x00FF);
confirmPlainMessage += 2;
messageData->E = ((*confirmPlainMessage)&0x08)>>3;
messageData->V = ((*confirmPlainMessage)&0x04)>>2;
messageData->A = ((*confirmPlainMessage)&0x02)>>1;
messageData->D = (*confirmPlainMessage)&0x01;
confirmPlainMessage += 1;
messageData->cacheExpirationInterval = (((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[0])<<24) | (((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[1])<<16) | (((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[2])<<8) | ((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[3]);
confirmPlainMessage += 4;
/* if sig_len indicate a signature, parse it */
if (messageData->sig_len>0) {
memcpy(messageData->signatureBlockType, confirmPlainMessage, 4);
confirmPlainMessage += 4;
/* allocate memory for the signature block, sig_len is in words(32 bits) and includes the signature block type word */
messageData->signatureBlock = (uint8_t *)malloc(4*(messageData->sig_len-1)*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(messageData->signatureBlock, confirmPlainMessage, 4*(messageData->sig_len-1));
} else {
messageData->signatureBlock = NULL;
}
/* free plain buffer */
free(confirmPlainMessageBuffer);
/* the parsed commit packet must be saved as it is used to check correct packet repetition */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_CONFIRM1 and MSGTYPE_CONFIRM2 */
case MSGTYPE_CONF2ACK:
/* nothing to do for this one */
break; /* MSGTYPE_CONF2ACK */
case MSGTYPE_PING:
{
/* allocate a ping message structure */
bzrtpPingMessage_t *messageData;
messageData = (bzrtpPingMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpPingMessage_t));
/* fill the structure */
memcpy(messageData->version, messageContent, 4);
messageContent +=4;
memcpy(messageData->endpointHash, messageContent, 8);
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_PING */
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The Bzrtp library (aka libbzrtp) 1.0.x before 1.0.4 allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct spoofing attacks by leveraging a missing HVI check on DHPart2 packet reception.
Commit Message: Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception
|
Low
| 168,828
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.clear();
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.insert(
input_method_library->current_config_values_.begin(),
input_method_library->current_config_values_.end());
input_method_library->FlushImeConfig();
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->previous_input_method().id);
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->current_input_method().id);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MultibufferDataSource::StartCallback() {
DCHECK(render_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!init_cb_) {
SetReader(nullptr);
return;
}
bool success = reader_ && reader_->Available() > 0 && url_data() &&
(!assume_fully_buffered() ||
url_data()->length() != kPositionNotSpecified);
if (success) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
total_bytes_ = url_data()->length();
}
streaming_ =
!assume_fully_buffered() && (total_bytes_ == kPositionNotSpecified ||
!url_data()->range_supported());
media_log_->SetDoubleProperty("total_bytes",
static_cast<double>(total_bytes_));
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("streaming", streaming_);
} else {
SetReader(nullptr);
}
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (stop_signal_received_)
return;
if (success) {
if (total_bytes_ != kPositionNotSpecified) {
host_->SetTotalBytes(total_bytes_);
if (assume_fully_buffered())
host_->AddBufferedByteRange(0, total_bytes_);
}
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("single_origin", single_origin_);
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("passed_cors_access_check",
DidPassCORSAccessCheck());
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("range_header_supported",
url_data()->range_supported());
}
render_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(std::move(init_cb_), success));
UpdateBufferSizes();
UpdateLoadingState_Locked(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,625
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_end_io_nolock(ext4_io_end_t *io)
{
struct inode *inode = io->inode;
loff_t offset = io->offset;
ssize_t size = io->size;
int ret = 0;
ext4_debug("ext4_end_io_nolock: io 0x%p from inode %lu,list->next 0x%p,"
"list->prev 0x%p\n",
io, inode->i_ino, io->list.next, io->list.prev);
if (list_empty(&io->list))
return ret;
if (io->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN)
return ret;
if (offset + size <= i_size_read(inode))
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(inode, offset, size);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "%s: failed to convert unwritten"
"extents to written extents, error is %d"
" io is still on inode %lu aio dio list\n",
__func__, ret, inode->i_ino);
return ret;
}
/* clear the DIO AIO unwritten flag */
io->flag = 0;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
/* May we inspect the given task?
* This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
* and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
*
* ptrace_attach denies several cases that /proc allows
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)
dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
rcu_read_lock();
if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.12.2 does not properly use the get_dumpable function, which allows local users to bypass intended ptrace restrictions or obtain sensitive information from IA64 scratch registers via a crafted application, related to kernel/ptrace.c and arch/ia64/include/asm/processor.h.
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + offset + 3, tim.length - 3);
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c:parse_elements().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
|
Low
| 167,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux(MYSQLND_MEMORY_POOL_CHUNK * row_buffer, zval ** fields,
unsigned int field_count, const MYSQLND_FIELD * fields_metadata,
zend_bool as_int_or_float, zend_bool copy_data, MYSQLND_STATS * stats TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned int i;
zend_bool last_field_was_string = FALSE;
zval **current_field, **end_field, **start_field;
zend_uchar * p = row_buffer->ptr;
size_t data_size = row_buffer->app;
zend_uchar * bit_area = (zend_uchar*) row_buffer->ptr + data_size + 1; /* we allocate from here */
DBG_ENTER("php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux");
if (!fields) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
end_field = (start_field = fields) + field_count;
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
DBG_INF("Directly creating zval");
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(*current_field);
if (!*current_field) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
}
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
/* Don't reverse the order. It is significant!*/
zend_uchar *this_field_len_pos = p;
/* php_mysqlnd_net_field_length() call should be after *this_field_len_pos = p; */
unsigned long len = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length(&p);
if (copy_data == FALSE && current_field > start_field && last_field_was_string) {
/*
Normal queries:
We have to put \0 now to the end of the previous field, if it was
a string. IS_NULL doesn't matter. Because we have already read our
length, then we can overwrite it in the row buffer.
This statement terminates the previous field, not the current one.
NULL_LENGTH is encoded in one byte, so we can stick a \0 there.
Any string's length is encoded in at least one byte, so we can stick
a \0 there.
*/
*this_field_len_pos = '\0';
}
/* NULL or NOT NULL, this is the question! */
if (len == MYSQLND_NULL_LENGTH) {
ZVAL_NULL(*current_field);
last_field_was_string = FALSE;
} else {
#if defined(MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION)
struct st_mysqlnd_perm_bind perm_bind =
mysqlnd_ps_fetch_functions[fields_metadata[i].type];
#endif
if (MYSQLND_G(collect_statistics)) {
enum_mysqlnd_collected_stats statistic;
switch (fields_metadata[i].type) {
case MYSQL_TYPE_DECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT8; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SHORT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT16; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT32; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_FLOAT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_FLOAT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DOUBLE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DOUBLE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NULL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_NULL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIMESTAMP: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIMESTAMP; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT64; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_INT24: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT24; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATETIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATETIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_YEAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_YEAR; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VARCHAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BIT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BIT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_ENUM: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_ENUM; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SET: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_SET; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_JSON: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_JSON; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_MEDIUM_BLOB:statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VAR_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_GEOMETRY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_GEOMETRY; break;
default: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_OTHER; break;
}
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC_W_VALUE2(stats, statistic, 1, STAT_BYTES_RECEIVED_PURE_DATA_TEXT, len);
}
#ifdef MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION
if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_LONG) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
if (perm_bind.pack_len < SIZEOF_LONG) {
/* direct conversion */
int64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
atoll((char *) p);
#else
_atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
} else {
uint64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
(uint64_t) atoll((char *) p);
#else
(uint64_t) _atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
zend_bool uns = fields_metadata[i].flags & UNSIGNED_FLAG? TRUE:FALSE;
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
#if SIZEOF_LONG==8
if (uns == TRUE && v > 9223372036854775807L)
#elif SIZEOF_LONG==4
if ((uns == TRUE && v > L64(2147483647)) ||
(uns == FALSE && (( L64(2147483647) < (int64_t) v) ||
(L64(-2147483648) > (int64_t) v))))
#else
#error Need fix for this architecture
#endif /* SIZEOF */
{
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, 0);
} else {
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
}
}
*(p + len) = save;
} else if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_DOUBLE) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*current_field, atof((char *) p));
*(p + len) = save;
} else
#endif /* MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION */
if (fields_metadata[i].type == MYSQL_TYPE_BIT) {
/*
BIT fields are specially handled. As they come as bit mask, we have
to convert it to human-readable representation. As the bits take
less space in the protocol than the numbers they represent, we don't
have enough space in the packet buffer to overwrite inside.
Thus, a bit more space is pre-allocated at the end of the buffer,
see php_mysqlnd_rowp_read(). And we add the strings at the end.
Definitely not nice, _hackish_ :(, but works.
*/
zend_uchar *start = bit_area;
ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes(*current_field, &(fields_metadata[i]), 0, &p, len TSRMLS_CC);
/*
We have advanced in ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes. We should go back because
later in this function there will be an advancement.
*/
p -= len;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_LONG) {
bit_area += 1 + sprintf((char *)start, "%ld", Z_LVAL_PP(current_field));
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_STRING){
memcpy(bit_area, Z_STRVAL_PP(current_field), Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field));
bit_area += Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field);
*bit_area++ = '\0';
zval_dtor(*current_field);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
}
} else {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, copy_data);
}
p += len;
last_field_was_string = TRUE;
}
}
if (copy_data == FALSE && last_field_was_string) {
/* Normal queries: The buffer has one more byte at the end, because we need it */
row_buffer->ptr[data_size] = '\0';
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/mysqlnd/mysqlnd_wireprotocol.c in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 does not verify that a BIT field has the UNSIGNED_FLAG flag, which allows remote MySQL servers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted field metadata.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
|
Medium
| 166,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
int* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int encoded_pixels;
int rle_size;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (int*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
rle_size = gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx);
if (rle_size <= 0) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < rle_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & ~TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The read_image_tga function in gd_tga.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted TGA file, related to the decompression buffer.
Commit Message: Fix OOB reads of the TGA decompression buffer
It is possible to craft TGA files which will overflow the decompression
buffer, but not the image's bitmap. Therefore we augment the check for the
bitmap's overflow with a check for the buffer's overflow.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6906
|
Medium
| 168,823
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(get_html_translation_table)
{
long all = HTML_SPECIALCHARS,
flags = ENT_COMPAT;
int doctype;
entity_table_opt entity_table;
const enc_to_uni *to_uni_table = NULL;
char *charset_hint = NULL;
int charset_hint_len;
enum entity_charset charset;
/* in this function we have to jump through some loops because we're
* getting the translated table from data structures that are optimized for
* random access, not traversal */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|lls",
&all, &flags, &charset_hint, &charset_hint_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
charset = determine_charset(charset_hint TSRMLS_CC);
doctype = flags & ENT_HTML_DOC_TYPE_MASK;
LIMIT_ALL(all, doctype, charset);
array_init(return_value);
entity_table = determine_entity_table(all, doctype);
if (all && !CHARSET_UNICODE_COMPAT(charset)) {
to_uni_table = enc_to_uni_index[charset];
}
if (all) { /* HTML_ENTITIES (actually, any non-zero value for 1st param) */
const entity_stage1_row *ms_table = entity_table.ms_table;
if (CHARSET_UNICODE_COMPAT(charset)) {
unsigned i, j, k,
max_i, max_j, max_k;
/* no mapping to unicode required */
if (CHARSET_SINGLE_BYTE(charset)) { /* ISO-8859-1 */
max_i = 1; max_j = 4; max_k = 64;
} else {
max_i = 0x1E; max_j = 64; max_k = 64;
}
for (i = 0; i < max_i; i++) {
if (ms_table[i] == empty_stage2_table)
continue;
for (j = 0; j < max_j; j++) {
if (ms_table[i][j] == empty_stage3_table)
continue;
for (k = 0; k < max_k; k++) {
const entity_stage3_row *r = &ms_table[i][j][k];
unsigned code;
if (r->data.ent.entity == NULL)
continue;
code = ENT_CODE_POINT_FROM_STAGES(i, j, k);
if (((code == '\'' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_SINGLE)) ||
(code == '"' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_DOUBLE))))
continue;
write_s3row_data(r, code, charset, return_value);
}
}
}
} else {
/* we have to iterate through the set of code points for this
* encoding and map them to unicode code points */
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i <= 0xFF; i++) {
const entity_stage3_row *r;
unsigned uni_cp;
/* can be done before mapping, they're invariant */
if (((i == '\'' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_SINGLE)) ||
(i == '"' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_DOUBLE))))
continue;
map_to_unicode(i, to_uni_table, &uni_cp);
r = &ms_table[ENT_STAGE1_INDEX(uni_cp)][ENT_STAGE2_INDEX(uni_cp)][ENT_STAGE3_INDEX(uni_cp)];
if (r->data.ent.entity == NULL)
continue;
write_s3row_data(r, i, charset, return_value);
}
}
} else {
/* we could use sizeof(stage3_table_be_apos_00000) as well */
unsigned j,
numelems = sizeof(stage3_table_be_noapos_00000) /
sizeof(*stage3_table_be_noapos_00000);
for (j = 0; j < numelems; j++) {
const entity_stage3_row *r = &entity_table.table[j];
if (r->data.ent.entity == NULL)
continue;
if (((j == '\'' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_SINGLE)) ||
(j == '"' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_DOUBLE))))
continue;
/* charset is indifferent, used cs_8859_1 for efficiency */
write_s3row_data(r, j, cs_8859_1, return_value);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,168
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
VMW_CFPRN("MTU is %u", s->mtu);
s->max_rx_frags =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED16(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.maxNumRxSG);
if (s->max_rx_frags == 0) {
s->max_rx_frags = 1;
}
VMW_CFPRN("Max RX fragments is %u", s->max_rx_frags);
s->event_int_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.eventIntrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->event_int_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("Events interrupt line is %u", s->event_int_idx);
s->auto_int_masking =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.autoMask);
VMW_CFPRN("Automatic interrupt masking is %d", (int)s->auto_int_masking);
s->txq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numTxQueues);
s->rxq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
assert(s->txq_num <= VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX queues descriptors table is at 0x%" PRIx64, qdescr_table_pa);
/*
* Worst-case scenario is a packet that holds all TX rings space so
* we calculate total size of all TX rings for max TX fragments number
*/
s->max_tx_frags = 0;
/* TX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->txq_num; i++) {
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
assert(s->txq_num <= VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations for TX queues */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qdescr_pa, conf.txRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa, conf.txRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc), false);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TX", i, &s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring);
s->max_tx_frags += size;
/* TXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qdescr_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc), true);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TXC", i, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring);
s->txq_descr[i].tx_stats_pa =
qdescr_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats));
/* Fill device-managed parameters for queues */
VMXNET3_WRITE_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa,
ctrl.txThreshold,
VMXNET3_DEF_TX_THRESHOLD);
}
/* Preallocate TX packet wrapper */
VMW_CFPRN("Max TX fragments is %u", s->max_tx_frags);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
/* Read rings memory locations for RX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->rxq_num; i++) {
int j;
hwaddr qd_pa =
qdescr_table_pa + s->txq_num * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc) +
i * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc);
/* Read interrupt number for this RX queue */
s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR8(qd_pa, conf.intrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("RX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations */
for (j = 0; j < VMXNET3_RX_RINGS_PER_QUEUE; j++) {
/* RX rings */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qd_pa, conf.rxRingBasePA[j]);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qd_pa, conf.rxRingSize[j]);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->rxq_descr[i].rx_ring[j], pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc), false);
VMW_CFPRN("RX queue %d:%d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d",
i, j, pa, size);
}
/* RXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qd_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qd_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->rxq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc), true);
VMW_CFPRN("RXC queue %d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d", i, pa, size);
s->rxq_descr[i].rx_stats_pa =
qd_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats));
}
vmxnet3_validate_interrupts(s);
/* Make sure everything is in place before device activation */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_reset_mac(s);
s->device_active = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: hw/net/vmxnet3.c in QEMU 2.0.0-rc0, 1.7.1, and earlier allows local guest users to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors related to (1) RX or (2) TX queue numbers or (3) interrupt indices. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,355
|
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