instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 len;
UINT32 left;
BYTE value;
left = originalSize;
while (left > 4)
{
value = *in++;
if (left == 5)
{
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
else if (value == *in)
{
in++;
if (*in < 0xFF)
{
len = (UINT32) * in++;
len += 2;
}
else
{
in++;
len = *((UINT32*) in);
in += 4;
}
FillMemory(out, len, value);
out += len;
left -= len;
}
else
{
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
}
*((UINT32*)out) = *((UINT32*)in);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePCXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
*page_table,
scene;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PCXInfo
pcx_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pcx_colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"DCX") == 0) ||
((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(1024UL,
sizeof(*page_table));
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (scene=0; scene < 1024; scene++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
}
scene=0;
do
{
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
page_table[scene]=TellBlob(image);
/*
Initialize PCX raster file header.
*/
pcx_info.identifier=0x0a;
pcx_info.version=5;
pcx_info.encoding=image_info->compression == NoCompression ? 0 : 1;
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
pcx_info.left=0;
pcx_info.top=0;
pcx_info.right=(unsigned short) (image->columns-1);
pcx_info.bottom=(unsigned short) (image->rows-1);
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
default:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short) image->x_resolution;
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short) image->y_resolution;
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->x_resolution+0.5);
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->y_resolution+0.5);
break;
}
}
pcx_info.reserved=0;
pcx_info.planes=1;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
pcx_info.planes=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
pcx_info.planes++;
}
pcx_info.bytes_per_line=(unsigned short) (((size_t) image->columns*
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel+7)/8);
pcx_info.palette_info=1;
pcx_info.colormap_signature=0x0c;
/*
Write PCX header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.identifier);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.encoding);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.left);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.top);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.right);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.horizontal_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.vertical_resolution);
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256UL,
3*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
if (pcx_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pcx_colormap,0,3*256*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
q=pcx_colormap;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors <= 256))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*16,(const unsigned char *) pcx_colormap);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.reserved);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bytes_per_line);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.palette_info);
for (i=0; i < 58; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
length=(size_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,pcx_info.planes*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
q=pixels;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
/*
Convert DirectClass image to PCX raster pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=pixels;
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
for (x=(ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x != 0; x--)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum)
(GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
if (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
register unsigned char
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a PCX monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
*q++=byte << (8-bit);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.colormap_signature);
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*256,pcx_colormap);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcx_colormap);
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
break;
if (scene >= 1023)
break;
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
page_table[scene+1]=0;
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) scene; i++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) page_table[i]);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table);
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WritePCXImage in coders/pcx.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/575
|
Medium
| 167,969
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: icmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int plen, const u_char *bp2,
int fragmented)
{
char *cp;
const struct icmp *dp;
const struct icmp_ext_t *ext_dp;
const struct ip *ip;
const char *str, *fmt;
const struct ip *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
const uint8_t *obj_tptr;
uint32_t raw_label;
const u_char *snapend_save;
const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *icmp_mpls_ext_object_header;
u_int hlen, dport, mtu, obj_tlen, obj_class_num, obj_ctype;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
dp = (const struct icmp *)bp;
ext_dp = (const struct icmp_ext_t *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
str = buf;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_code);
switch (dp->icmp_type) {
case ICMP_ECHO:
case ICMP_ECHOREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "echo %s, id %u, seq %u",
dp->icmp_type == ICMP_ECHO ?
"request" : "reply",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_UNREACH_PROTOCOL:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_PORT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
oip = &dp->icmp_ip;
hlen = IP_HL(oip) * 4;
ouh = (const struct udphdr *)(((const u_char *)oip) + hlen);
ND_TCHECK(ouh->uh_dport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (oip->ip_p) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s tcp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s udp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d port %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
oip->ip_p, dport);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_NEEDFRAG:
{
register const struct mtu_discovery *mp;
mp = (const struct mtu_discovery *)(const u_char *)&dp->icmp_void;
mtu = EXTRACT_16BITS(&mp->nexthopmtu);
if (mtu) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag (mtu %d)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst), mtu);
} else {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
}
}
break;
default:
fmt = tok2str(unreach2str, "#%d %%s unreachable",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
fmt = tok2str(type2str, "redirect-#%d %%s to net %%s",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_gwaddr));
break;
case ICMP_ROUTERADVERT:
{
register const struct ih_rdiscovery *ihp;
register const struct id_rdiscovery *idp;
u_int lifetime, num, size;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "router advertisement");
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
ihp = (const struct ih_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_void;
ND_TCHECK(*ihp);
(void)strncpy(cp, " lifetime ", sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
lifetime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ihp->ird_lifetime);
if (lifetime < 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u",
lifetime);
} else if (lifetime < 60 * 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u:%02u",
lifetime / 60, lifetime % 60);
} else {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
"%u:%02u:%02u",
lifetime / 3600,
(lifetime % 3600) / 60,
lifetime % 60);
}
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
num = ihp->ird_addrnum;
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " %d:", num);
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
size = ihp->ird_addrsiz;
if (size != 2) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
" [size %d]", size);
break;
}
idp = (const struct id_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_data;
while (num-- > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*idp);
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " {%s %u}",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &idp->ird_addr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&idp->ird_pref));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
++idp;
}
}
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_INTRANS:
str = "time exceeded in-transit";
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_REASS:
str = "ip reassembly time exceeded";
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "time exceeded-#%d",
dp->icmp_code);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_PARAMPROB:
if (dp->icmp_code)
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - code %d", dp->icmp_code);
else {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_pptr);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - octet %d", dp->icmp_pptr);
}
break;
case ICMP_MASKREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_mask);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "address mask is 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_mask));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMP:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp query id %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMPREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ttime);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp reply id %u seq %u: org %s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq),
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_otime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", recv %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_rtime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", xmit %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_ttime)));
break;
default:
str = tok2str(icmp2str, "type-#%d", dp->icmp_type);
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ICMP %s, length %u", str, plen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { /* don't attempt checksumming if this is a frag */
uint16_t sum, icmp_sum;
if (ND_TTEST2(*bp, plen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)dp;
vec[0].len = plen;
sum = in_cksum(vec, 1);
if (sum != 0) {
icmp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_cksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (wrong icmp cksum %x (->%x)!)",
icmp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(icmp_sum, sum)));
}
}
}
/*
* print the remnants of the IP packet.
* save the snaplength as this may get overidden in the IP printer.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && ICMP_ERRTYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
bp += 8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
snapend_save = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ip_print(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip->ip_len));
ndo->ndo_snapend = snapend_save;
}
/*
* Attempt to decode the MPLS extensions only for some ICMP types.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && plen > ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN && ICMP_MPLS_EXT_TYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext_dp);
/*
* Check first if the mpls extension header shows a non-zero length.
* If the length field is not set then silently verify the checksum
* to check if an extension header is present. This is expedient,
* however not all implementations set the length field proper.
*/
if (!ext_dp->icmp_length &&
ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1)) {
return;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMPLS extension v%u",
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res))));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res)) !=
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " packet not supported"));
return;
}
hlen = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, hlen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = hlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum 0x%04x (%scorrect), length %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ext_dp->icmp_ext_checksum),
in_cksum(vec, 1) ? "in" : "",
hlen));
}
hlen -= 4; /* subtract common header size */
obj_tptr = (const uint8_t *)ext_dp->icmp_ext_data;
while (hlen > sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t)) {
icmp_mpls_ext_object_header = (const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*icmp_mpls_ext_object_header);
obj_tlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->length);
obj_class_num = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->class_num;
obj_ctype = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->ctype;
obj_tptr += sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %u, length %u",
tok2str(icmp_mpls_ext_obj_values,"unknown",obj_class_num),
obj_class_num,
obj_ctype,
obj_tlen));
hlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t); /* length field includes tlv header */
/* infinite loop protection */
if ((obj_class_num == 0) ||
(obj_tlen < sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t))) {
return;
}
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
switch (obj_class_num) {
case 1:
switch(obj_ctype) {
case 1:
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
raw_label = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t label %u, exp %u", MPLS_LABEL(raw_label), MPLS_EXP(raw_label)));
if (MPLS_STACK(raw_label))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u", MPLS_TTL(raw_label)));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case 2:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
break;
}
if (hlen < obj_tlen)
break;
hlen -= obj_tlen;
obj_tptr += obj_tlen;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp.c:icmp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13012/ICMP: Add a missing bounds check.
Check before fetching the length from the included packet's IPv4 header.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,882
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: }static inline void WriteResourceLong(unsigned char *p,
const unsigned int quantum)
{
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information via vectors involving the q variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
Low
| 169,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __local_bh_enable(unsigned int cnt)
{
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
if (softirq_count() == (cnt & SOFTIRQ_MASK))
trace_softirqs_on(_RET_IP_);
preempt_count_sub(cnt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.2. The filter parsing in kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c could be called with no filter, which is an N=0 case when it expected at least one line to have been read, thus making the N-1 index invalid. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (slab out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted perf_event_open and mmap system calls.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
Low
| 169,184
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
assert((size_t)CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h) == len);
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id), len);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: file before 5.11 and libmagic allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted Composite Document File (CDF) file that triggers (1) an out-of-bounds read or (2) an invalid pointer dereference.
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
|
Medium
| 169,884
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long AudioTrack::GetBitDepth() const
{
return m_bitDepth;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned int ipv6_defrag(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
int err;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK)
/* Previously seen (loopback)? */
if (skb->nfct && !nf_ct_is_template((struct nf_conn *)skb->nfct))
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
err = nf_ct_frag6_gather(state->net, skb,
nf_ct6_defrag_user(state->hook, skb));
/* queued */
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return NF_STOLEN;
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.9 mishandles IPv6 reassembly, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow, out-of-bounds write, and GPF) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that makes socket, connect, and writev system calls, related to net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c and net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c.
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 166,851
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestJavaScriptDialogManager()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
|
Medium
| 172,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool TracingControllerImpl::StartTracing(
const base::trace_event::TraceConfig& trace_config,
StartTracingDoneCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (IsTracing()) {
if (trace_config.process_filter_config().empty() ||
trace_config_->process_filter_config().empty()) {
return false;
}
base::trace_event::TraceConfig old_config_copy(*trace_config_);
base::trace_event::TraceConfig new_config_copy(trace_config);
old_config_copy.SetProcessFilterConfig(
base::trace_event::TraceConfig::ProcessFilterConfig());
new_config_copy.SetProcessFilterConfig(
base::trace_event::TraceConfig::ProcessFilterConfig());
if (old_config_copy.ToString() != new_config_copy.ToString())
return false;
}
trace_config_ =
std::make_unique<base::trace_event::TraceConfig>(trace_config);
start_tracing_done_ = std::move(callback);
ConnectToServiceIfNeeded();
coordinator_->StartTracing(trace_config.ToString());
if (start_tracing_done_ &&
(base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->IsEnabled() ||
!trace_config.process_filter_config().IsEnabled(
base::Process::Current().Pid()))) {
std::move(start_tracing_done_).Run();
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The Web Animations implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, improperly relies on list iteration, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-destruction) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
|
Medium
| 172,056
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AddServiceRequestHandlerOnIoThread(
const std::string& name,
const ServiceRequestHandler& handler) {
DCHECK(io_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
auto result = request_handlers_.insert(std::make_pair(name, handler));
DCHECK(result.second);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
Low
| 171,940
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
int datagram_reply)
{
krb5_context context = r->context;
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
AS_REP rep;
KDCOptions f;
krb5_enctype setype;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
Key *skey;
int found_pa = 0;
int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
METHOD_DATA error_method;
const PA_DATA *pa;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
error_method.len = 0;
error_method.val = NULL;
/*
* Look for FAST armor and unwrap
*/
ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
goto out;
}
b = &req->req_body;
f = b->kdc_options;
if (f.canonicalize)
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->sname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
} else{
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&r->server_princ,
*(b->sname),
b->realm);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
if(b->cname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
} else {
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&r->client_princ,
*(b->cname),
b->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
/*
*
*/
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
if (!_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
} else if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
"anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/*
*
*/
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
&r->clientdb, &r->client);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
r->client_name);
goto out;
} else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client->entry.principal,
&fixed_client_name);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
r->client_name, fixed_client_name);
free(fixed_client_name);
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
&error_method,
r->armor_crypto,
&req->req_body,
KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
NULL,
r->server_princ,
NULL,
&r->client->entry.principal->realm,
NULL, NULL,
reply);
goto out;
} else if(ret){
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
NULL, NULL, &r->server);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
r->server_name);
goto out;
} else if(ret){
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/*
* Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
* supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
* the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
*
* The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
* to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
* enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
* decrypt.
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, r->server_princ) ?
config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
config->svc_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
r->client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &r->sessionetype,
NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
"to use for the session key",
r->client_name, from);
goto out;
}
/*
* Pre-auth processing
*/
if(req->padata){
unsigned int n;
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
/* Check if preauth matching */
for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
continue;
if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
continue;
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
if (pa) {
ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
pat[n].name, r->client_name);
found_pa = 1;
r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
}
}
}
if (found_pa == 0) {
Key *ckey = NULL;
size_t n;
for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
continue;
ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
r->client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* RFC4120 requires:
* - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
* both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
* - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
* enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
*
* Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
* the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
* that instead.
*/
if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
&error_method, ckey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
&error_method, ckey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
* anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
*/
if (require_preauth_p(r) || _kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
goto out;
}
if (ckey == NULL) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
goto out;
}
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
HDB_AUTH_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
* with in a preauth mech.
*/
ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
r->server, r->server_name,
req, &error_method);
if(ret)
goto out;
/*
* Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
* the client since the client never needs to read that data.
*/
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
r->server, r->server_name,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
|| (_kdc_is_anon_request(b) && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
goto out;
}
/*
* Build reply
*/
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
Realm anon_realm=KRB5_ANON_REALM;
ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep.crealm);
} else
ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
if (ret)
goto out;
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
r->server->entry.principal);
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
* uncomplicated name-types. */
#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
#undef CNT
r->et.flags.initial = 1;
if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
else if (f.forwardable) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
else if (f.allow_postdate){
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &r->et.cname);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &r->et.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
}
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
t = *b->till;
/* be careful not overflowing */
if(r->client->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
if(r->server->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
#endif
r->et.endtime = t;
if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
f.renewable = 1;
if(b->rtime == NULL){
ALLOC(b->rtime);
*b->rtime = 0;
}
if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
*b->rtime = *b->till;
}
if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
t = *b->rtime;
if(t == 0)
t = MAX_TIME;
if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
#endif
ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
*r->et.renew_till = t;
r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
}
}
if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b))
r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(r->et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
}
r->et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
* incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
*
* To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
*
* If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
*/
r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
if (r->client->entry.pw_end
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
|| kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
*r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
*r->client->entry.pw_end);
else
*r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
} else
*r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
} else
r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
if (r->et.starttime) {
ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
*r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
}
r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
if (r->et.renew_till) {
ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
*r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
}
ret = copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
if (ret)
goto out;
if(r->et.caddr){
ALLOC(r->ek.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
}
/*
* Check and session and reply keys
*/
if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (r->outpadata.len) {
ALLOC(rep.padata);
if (rep.padata == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* Add the PAC */
if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
generate_pac(r, skey);
}
_kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime, r->et.starttime,
r->et.endtime, r->et.renew_till);
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
r->server,
setype,
r->client->entry.principal,
NULL,
NULL,
&r->et);
if (ret)
goto out;
log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
/*
* We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
*/
r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
/*
* Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
*/
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
if (pa) {
ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
_kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
}
/*
*
*/
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
&rep, &r->et, &r->ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
&skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
&r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Check if message too large
*/
if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(reply);
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
}
out:
free_AS_REP(&rep);
/*
* In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
*/
if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
&error_method,
r->armor_crypto,
&req->req_body,
ret, r->e_text,
r->server_princ,
&r->client_princ->name,
&r->client_princ->realm,
NULL, NULL,
reply);
if (ret)
goto out2;
}
out2:
free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
free_KDCFastState(&r->fast);
if (error_method.len)
free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
if (r->outpadata.len)
free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
if (r->client_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
r->client_princ = NULL;
}
if (r->client_name) {
free(r->client_name);
r->client_name = NULL;
}
if (r->server_princ){
krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
r->server_princ = NULL;
}
if (r->server_name) {
free(r->server_name);
r->server_name = NULL;
}
if (r->client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
if (r->server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
if (r->armor_crypto) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
r->armor_crypto = NULL;
}
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In Heimdal through 7.4, remote unauthenticated attackers are able to crash the KDC by sending a crafted UDP packet containing empty data fields for client name or realm. The parser would unconditionally dereference NULL pointers in that case, leading to a segmentation fault. This is related to the _kdc_as_rep function in kdc/kerberos5.c and the der_length_visible_string function in lib/asn1/der_length.c.
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
|
Low
| 167,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebRunnerBrowserMainParts::PreMainMessageLoopRun() {
DCHECK(!screen_);
auto platform_screen = ui::OzonePlatform::GetInstance()->CreateScreen();
if (platform_screen) {
screen_ = std::make_unique<aura::ScreenOzone>(std::move(platform_screen));
} else {
screen_ = std::make_unique<WebRunnerScreen>();
}
display::Screen::SetScreenInstance(screen_.get());
DCHECK(!browser_context_);
browser_context_ =
std::make_unique<WebRunnerBrowserContext>(GetWebContextDataDir());
fidl::InterfaceRequest<chromium::web::Context> context_request(
std::move(context_channel_));
context_impl_ = std::make_unique<ContextImpl>(browser_context_.get());
context_binding_ = std::make_unique<fidl::Binding<chromium::web::Context>>(
context_impl_.get(), std::move(context_request));
context_binding_->set_error_handler(
[this]() { std::move(quit_closure_).Run(); });
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,157
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
p2p_stream_->Finish();
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
Medium
| 172,269
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AcpiDsCreateOperands (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *FirstArg)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arg;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arguments[ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS];
UINT32 ArgCount = 0;
UINT32 Index = WalkState->NumOperands;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsCreateOperands, FirstArg);
/* Get all arguments in the list */
Arg = FirstArg;
while (Arg)
{
if (Index >= ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_DATA);
}
Arguments[Index] = Arg;
WalkState->Operands [Index] = NULL;
/* Move on to next argument, if any */
Arg = Arg->Common.Next;
ArgCount++;
Index++;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"NumOperands %d, ArgCount %d, Index %d\n",
WalkState->NumOperands, ArgCount, Index));
/* Create the interpreter arguments, in reverse order */
Index--;
for (i = 0; i < ArgCount; i++)
{
Arg = Arguments[Index];
WalkState->OperandIndex = (UINT8) Index;
Status = AcpiDsCreateOperand (WalkState, Arg, Index);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Created Arg #%u (%p) %u args total\n",
Index, Arg, ArgCount));
Index--;
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
Cleanup:
/*
* We must undo everything done above; meaning that we must
* pop everything off of the operand stack and delete those
* objects
*/
AcpiDsObjStackPopAndDelete (ArgCount, WalkState);
ACPI_EXCEPTION ((AE_INFO, Status, "While creating Arg %u", Index));
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The acpi_ds_create_operands() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/dsutils.c in the Linux kernel through 4.12.9 does not flush the operand cache and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 167,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 16;
fwd_txfm_ref = fdct16x16_ref;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,527
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SetUpCacheMetadata() {
metadata_.reset(new GDataCacheMetadataMap(
NULL, base::SequencedWorkerPool::SequenceToken()));
metadata_->Initialize(cache_paths_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,871
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The FrameLoader::startLoad function in WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79, does not prevent frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
|
Medium
| 172,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcessTCPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
ULONG tcpipDataAt;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(TCPHeader);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
if (len >= tcpipDataAt)
{
TCPHeader *pTcpHeader = (TCPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + TCP_HEADER_LENGTH(pTcpHeader);
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = tcpipDataAt;
}
else
{
DPrintf(2, ("tcp: %d < min headers %d\n", len, tcpipDataAt));
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 168,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SyncManager::Init(
const FilePath& database_location,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const std::string& sync_server_and_path,
int sync_server_port,
bool use_ssl,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& blocking_task_runner,
HttpPostProviderFactory* post_factory,
ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar* registrar,
browser_sync::ExtensionsActivityMonitor* extensions_activity_monitor,
ChangeDelegate* change_delegate,
const std::string& user_agent,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients,
sync_notifier::SyncNotifier* sync_notifier,
const std::string& restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
TestingMode testing_mode,
Encryptor* encryptor,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler,
ReportUnrecoverableErrorFunction report_unrecoverable_error_function) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(post_factory);
DVLOG(1) << "SyncManager starting Init...";
std::string server_string(sync_server_and_path);
return data_->Init(database_location,
event_handler,
server_string,
sync_server_port,
use_ssl,
blocking_task_runner,
post_factory,
registrar,
extensions_activity_monitor,
change_delegate,
user_agent,
credentials,
enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients,
sync_notifier,
restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
testing_mode,
encryptor,
unrecoverable_error_handler,
report_unrecoverable_error_function);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,792
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rtnl_fill_link_ifmap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct rtnl_link_ifmap map = {
.mem_start = dev->mem_start,
.mem_end = dev->mem_end,
.base_addr = dev->base_addr,
.irq = dev->irq,
.dma = dev->dma,
.port = dev->if_port,
};
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MAP, sizeof(map), &map))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The rtnl_fill_link_ifmap function in net/core/rtnetlink.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory by reading a Netlink message.
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: choose_volume(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct file_info *file;
int64_t skipsize;
struct vd *vd;
const void *block;
char seenJoliet;
vd = &(iso9660->primary);
if (!iso9660->opt_support_joliet)
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
if (iso9660->seenJoliet &&
vd->location > iso9660->joliet.location)
/* This condition is unlikely; by way of caution. */
vd = &(iso9660->joliet);
skipsize = LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE * vd->location;
skipsize = __archive_read_consume(a, skipsize);
if (skipsize < 0)
return ((int)skipsize);
iso9660->current_position = skipsize;
block = __archive_read_ahead(a, vd->size, NULL);
if (block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to read full block when scanning "
"ISO9660 directory list");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/*
* While reading Root Directory, flag seenJoliet must be zero to
* avoid converting special name 0x00(Current Directory) and
* next byte to UCS2.
*/
seenJoliet = iso9660->seenJoliet;/* Save flag. */
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block);
if (file == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
iso9660->seenJoliet = seenJoliet;
/*
* If the iso image has both RockRidge and Joliet, we preferentially
* use RockRidge Extensions rather than Joliet ones.
*/
if (vd == &(iso9660->primary) && iso9660->seenRockridge
&& iso9660->seenJoliet)
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
if (vd == &(iso9660->primary) && !iso9660->seenRockridge
&& iso9660->seenJoliet) {
/* Switch reading data from primary to joliet. */
vd = &(iso9660->joliet);
skipsize = LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE * vd->location;
skipsize -= iso9660->current_position;
skipsize = __archive_read_consume(a, skipsize);
if (skipsize < 0)
return ((int)skipsize);
iso9660->current_position += skipsize;
block = __archive_read_ahead(a, vd->size, NULL);
if (block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to read full block when scanning "
"ISO9660 directory list");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block);
if (file == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
iso9660->seenJoliet = seenJoliet;
}
/* Store the root directory in the pending list. */
if (add_entry(a, iso9660, file) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (iso9660->seenRockridge) {
a->archive.archive_format = ARCHIVE_FORMAT_ISO9660_ROCKRIDGE;
a->archive.archive_format_name =
"ISO9660 with Rockridge extensions";
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the ISO parser in libarchive before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted ISO file.
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
|
Medium
| 167,021
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dissect_usb_video_control_interface_descriptor(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint8 descriptor_len, packet_info *pinfo, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
video_conv_info_t *video_conv_info = NULL;
video_entity_t *entity = NULL;
proto_item *item = NULL;
proto_item *subtype_item = NULL;
proto_tree *tree = NULL;
guint8 entity_id = 0;
guint16 terminal_type = 0;
int offset = 0;
guint8 subtype;
subtype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2);
if (parent_tree)
{
const gchar *subtype_str;
subtype_str = val_to_str_ext(subtype, &vc_if_descriptor_subtypes_ext, "Unknown (0x%x)");
tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(parent_tree, tvb, offset, descriptor_len,
ett_descriptor_video_control, &item, "VIDEO CONTROL INTERFACE DESCRIPTOR [%s]",
subtype_str);
}
/* Common fields */
dissect_usb_descriptor_header(tree, tvb, offset, &vid_descriptor_type_vals_ext);
subtype_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_subtype, tvb, offset+2, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
if (subtype == VC_HEADER)
{
guint8 num_vs_interfaces;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_bcdUVC, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_ifdesc_wTotalLength, tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_dwClockFrequency, tvb, offset+4, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
num_vs_interfaces = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+8);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_bInCollection, tvb, offset+8, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
if (num_vs_interfaces > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_baInterfaceNr, tvb, offset+9, num_vs_interfaces, ENC_NA);
}
offset += 9 + num_vs_interfaces;
}
else if ((subtype == VC_INPUT_TERMINAL) || (subtype == VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL))
{
/* Fields common to input and output terminals */
entity_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
terminal_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+1);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_terminal_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_terminal_type, tvb, offset+1, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_assoc_terminal, tvb, offset+3, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
if (subtype == VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_src_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
}
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_iTerminal, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (subtype == VC_INPUT_TERMINAL)
{
if (terminal_type == ITT_CAMERA)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_camera_terminal(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (terminal_type == ITT_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_INPUT)
{
/* @todo */
}
}
if (subtype == VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL)
{
if (terminal_type == OTT_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_OUTPUT)
{
/* @todo */
}
}
}
else
{
/* Field common to extension / processing / selector / encoding units */
entity_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_unit_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (subtype == VC_PROCESSING_UNIT)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_processing_unit(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (subtype == VC_SELECTOR_UNIT)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_selector_unit(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (subtype == VC_EXTENSION_UNIT)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_extension_unit(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (subtype == VC_ENCODING_UNIT)
{
/* @todo UVC 1.5 */
}
else
{
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, subtype_item, &ei_usb_vid_subtype_unknown,
"Unknown VC subtype %u", subtype);
}
}
/* Soak up descriptor bytes beyond those we know how to dissect */
if (offset < descriptor_len)
{
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_descriptor_data, tvb, offset, descriptor_len-offset, ENC_NA);
/* offset = descriptor_len; */
}
if (entity_id != 0)
proto_item_append_text(item, " (Entity %d)", entity_id);
if (subtype != VC_HEADER && usb_conv_info)
{
/* Switch to the usb_conv_info of the Video Control interface */
usb_conv_info = get_usb_iface_conv_info(pinfo, usb_conv_info->interfaceNum);
video_conv_info = (video_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if (!video_conv_info)
{
video_conv_info = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), video_conv_info_t);
video_conv_info->entities = wmem_tree_new(wmem_file_scope());
usb_conv_info->class_data = video_conv_info;
}
entity = (video_entity_t*) wmem_tree_lookup32(video_conv_info->entities, entity_id);
if (!entity)
{
entity = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), video_entity_t);
entity->entityID = entity_id;
entity->subtype = subtype;
entity->terminalType = terminal_type;
wmem_tree_insert32(video_conv_info->entities, entity_id, entity);
}
}
return descriptor_len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The USB subsystem in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles class types, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
|
Medium
| 167,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GenerateMessageSection(
const ExtensionIdSet* extensions,
int template_message_id) {
CHECK(extensions);
CHECK(template_message_id);
string16 message;
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator iter = extensions->begin();
iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* e = extension_service_->GetExtensionById(*iter, true);
message += l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
template_message_id,
string16(ASCIIToUTF16(e->name())),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
}
return message;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,980
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The spectre_v2_select_mitigation function in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c in the Linux kernel before 4.18.1 does not always fill RSB upon a context switch, which makes it easier for attackers to conduct userspace-userspace spectreRSB attacks.
Commit Message: x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
|
Low
| 169,101
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_slice_header(codec_t *ps_codec,
nal_header_t *ps_nal)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 sps_id;
pps_t *ps_pps;
sps_t *ps_sps;
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr;
WORD32 disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
WORD32 idr_pic_flag;
WORD32 pps_id;
WORD32 first_slice_in_pic_flag;
WORD32 no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 0;
WORD8 i1_nal_unit_type = ps_nal->i1_nal_unit_type;
WORD32 num_poc_total_curr = 0;
WORD32 slice_address;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error == 1)
return ret;
idr_pic_flag = (NAL_IDR_W_LP == i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_IDR_N_LP == i1_nal_unit_type);
BITS_PARSE("first_slice_in_pic_flag", first_slice_in_pic_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if((NAL_BLA_W_LP <= i1_nal_unit_type) &&
(NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23 >= i1_nal_unit_type))
{
BITS_PARSE("no_output_of_prior_pics_flag", no_output_of_prior_pics_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
UEV_PARSE("pic_parameter_set_id", pps_id, ps_bitstrm);
pps_id = CLIP3(pps_id, 0, MAX_PPS_CNT - 2);
/* Get the current PPS structure */
ps_pps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps_base + pps_id;
if(0 == ps_pps->i1_pps_valid)
{
pps_t *ps_pps_ref = ps_codec->ps_pps_base;
while(0 == ps_pps_ref->i1_pps_valid)
ps_pps_ref++;
if((ps_pps_ref - ps_codec->ps_pps_base >= MAX_PPS_CNT - 1))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
ihevcd_copy_pps(ps_codec, pps_id, ps_pps_ref->i1_pps_id);
}
/* Get SPS id for the current PPS */
sps_id = ps_pps->i1_sps_id;
/* Get the current SPS structure */
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + sps_id;
/* When the current slice is the first in a pic,
* check whether the previous frame is complete
* If the previous frame is incomplete -
* treat the remaining CTBs as skip */
if((0 != ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt || ps_codec->i4_pic_present) &&
first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
return ret;
}
else
{
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
}
if(first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
}
else
{
/* If the current slice is not the first slice in the pic,
* but the first one to be parsed, set the current slice indx to 1
* Treat the first slice to be missing and copy the current slice header
* to the first one */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 1;
}
ps_slice_hdr = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
if((ps_pps->i1_dependent_slice_enabled_flag) &&
(!first_slice_in_pic_flag))
{
BITS_PARSE("dependent_slice_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
/* If dependendent slice, copy slice header from previous slice */
if(value && (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx > 0))
{
ihevcd_copy_slice_hdr(ps_codec,
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1)),
((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx - 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1)));
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag = value;
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag = 0;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type = i1_nal_unit_type;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_first_slice_in_pic_flag = first_slice_in_pic_flag;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 1;
if((NAL_BLA_W_LP <= i1_nal_unit_type) &&
(NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23 >= i1_nal_unit_type))
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = no_output_of_prior_pics_flag;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
WORD32 num_bits;
/* Use CLZ to compute Ceil( Log2( PicSizeInCtbsY ) ) */
num_bits = 32 - CLZ(ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb - 1);
BITS_PARSE("slice_address", value, ps_bitstrm, num_bits);
slice_address = value;
/* If slice address is greater than the number of CTBs in a picture,
* ignore the slice */
if(value >= ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
else
{
slice_address = 0;
}
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pic_output_flag = 1;
ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_pps->i1_num_extra_slice_header_bits; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_reserved_undetermined_flag[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
UEV_PARSE("slice_type", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type = value;
/* If the picture is IRAP, slice type must be equal to ISLICE */
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type >= NAL_BLA_W_LP) &&
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type <= NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23))
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type = ISLICE;
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type < 0) ||
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type > 2))
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
if(ps_pps->i1_output_flag_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("pic_output_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pic_output_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_colour_plane_id = 0;
if(1 == ps_sps->i1_separate_colour_plane_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("colour_plane_id", value, ps_bitstrm, 2);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_colour_plane_id = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_temporal_mvp_enable_flag = 0;
if(!idr_pic_flag)
{
WORD32 st_rps_idx;
WORD32 num_neg_pics;
WORD32 num_pos_pics;
WORD8 *pi1_used;
BITS_PARSE("pic_order_cnt_lsb", value, ps_bitstrm, ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = value;
BITS_PARSE("short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag = value;
if(1 == ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag)
{
WORD32 numbits;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx = 0;
if(ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets > 1)
{
numbits = 32 - CLZ(ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets - 1);
BITS_PARSE("short_term_ref_pic_set_idx", value, ps_bitstrm, numbits);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx = value;
}
st_rps_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx;
num_neg_pics = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].i1_num_neg_pics;
num_pos_pics = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].i1_num_pos_pics;
pi1_used = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].ai1_used;
}
else
{
ihevcd_short_term_ref_pic_set(ps_bitstrm,
&ps_sps->as_stref_picset[0],
ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets,
ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets,
&ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset);
st_rps_idx = ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets;
num_neg_pics = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.i1_num_neg_pics;
num_pos_pics = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.i1_num_pos_pics;
pi1_used = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.ai1_used;
}
if(ps_sps->i1_long_term_ref_pics_present_flag)
{
if(ps_sps->i1_num_long_term_ref_pics_sps > 0)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_long_term_sps", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps = value;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps,
0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - num_neg_pics - num_pos_pics);
}
UEV_PARSE("num_long_term_pics", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics = value;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics,
0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - num_neg_pics - num_pos_pics -
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps);
for(i = 0; i < (ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps +
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics); i++)
{
if(i < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps)
{
/* Use CLZ to compute Ceil( Log2( num_long_term_ref_pics_sps ) ) */
WORD32 num_bits = 32 - CLZ(ps_sps->i1_num_long_term_ref_pics_sps);
BITS_PARSE("lt_idx_sps[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, num_bits);
ps_slice_hdr->ai4_poc_lsb_lt[i] = ps_sps->ai1_lt_ref_pic_poc_lsb_sps[value];
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i] = ps_sps->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_sps_flag[value];
}
else
{
BITS_PARSE("poc_lsb_lt[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
ps_slice_hdr->ai4_poc_lsb_lt[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i] = value;
}
BITS_PARSE("delta_poc_msb_present_flag[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i] = value;
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
UEV_PARSE("delata_poc_msb_cycle_lt[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] = value;
}
if((i != 0) && (i != ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps))
{
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] += ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i - 1];
}
}
}
for(i = 0; i < num_neg_pics + num_pos_pics; i++)
{
if(pi1_used[i])
{
num_poc_total_curr++;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps + ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics; i++)
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i])
{
num_poc_total_curr++;
}
}
if(ps_sps->i1_sps_temporal_mvp_enable_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("enable_temporal_mvp_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_temporal_mvp_enable_flag = value;
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag = 0;
if(ps_sps->i1_sample_adaptive_offset_enabled_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_sao_luma_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("slice_sao_chroma_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand = 1;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_cabac_init_flag = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cb_qp_offset = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cr_qp_offset = 0;
if((PSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type) ||
(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type))
{
BITS_PARSE("num_ref_idx_active_override_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag = value;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = value + 1;
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = value + 1;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_default_active;
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_default_active;
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
if(0 == num_poc_total_curr)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
if((ps_pps->i1_lists_modification_present_flag) && (num_poc_total_curr > 1))
{
ihevcd_ref_pic_list_modification(ps_bitstrm,
ps_slice_hdr, num_poc_total_curr);
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_ref_pic_list_modification_flag_l0 = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_ref_pic_list_modification_flag_l1 = 0;
}
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
BITS_PARSE("mvd_l1_zero_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_mvd_l1_zero_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_cabac_init_flag = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_cabac_init_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("cabac_init_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_cabac_init_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag = 1;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_temporal_mvp_enable_flag)
{
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
BITS_PARSE("collocated_from_l0_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag = value;
}
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag && (ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active > 1)) ||
(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag && (ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active > 1)))
{
UEV_PARSE("collocated_ref_idx", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx = value;
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
if((ps_pps->i1_weighted_pred_flag && (PSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)) ||
(ps_pps->i1_weighted_bipred_flag && (BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)))
{
ihevcd_parse_pred_wt_ofst(ps_bitstrm, ps_sps, ps_pps, ps_slice_hdr);
}
UEV_PARSE("five_minus_max_num_merge_cand", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand = 5 - value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand, 1, 5);
SEV_PARSE("slice_qp_delta", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_qp_delta = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("slice_cb_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cb_qp_offset = value;
SEV_PARSE("slice_cr_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cr_qp_offset = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_deblocking_filter_override_flag = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_beta_offset_div2 = ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_tc_offset_div2 = ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2;
disable_deblocking_filter_flag = ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag)
{
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_override_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_deblocking_filter_override_flag = value;
}
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_deblocking_filter_override_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = value;
disable_deblocking_filter_flag = ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("beta_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_beta_offset_div2 = value;
SEV_PARSE("tc_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_tc_offset_div2 = value;
}
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag;
if(ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag &&
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag || ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag || !disable_deblocking_filter_flag))
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = value;
}
}
/* Check sanity of slice */
if((!first_slice_in_pic_flag) &&
(ps_codec->i4_pic_present))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_base = ps_codec->ps_slice_hdr_base;
/* According to the standard, the above conditions must be satisfied - But for error resilience,
* only the following conditions are checked */
if((ps_slice_hdr_base->i1_pps_id != ps_slice_hdr->i1_pps_id) ||
(ps_slice_hdr_base->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb != ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb))
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
}
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ihevcd_calc_poc(ps_codec, ps_nal, ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb, ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
}
if(!first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
/* Check if the current slice belongs to the same pic (Pic being parsed) */
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt == ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt)
{
/* If the Next CTB's index is less than the slice address,
* the previous slice is incomplete.
* Indicate slice error, and treat the remaining CTBs as skip */
if(slice_address > ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx)
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
return ret;
}
else
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
}
/* If the slice address is less than the next CTB's index,
* extra CTBs have been decoded in the previous slice.
* Ignore the current slice. Treat it as incomplete */
else if(slice_address < ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx)
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
else
{
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
}
/* The current slice does not belong to the pic that is being parsed */
else
{
/* The previous pic is incomplete.
* Treat the remaining CTBs as skip */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
return ret;
}
/* If the previous pic is complete,
* return if the current slice is dependant
* otherwise, update the parse context's POC */
else
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
}
}
}
/* If the slice is the first slice in the pic, update the parse context's POC */
else
{
/* If the first slice is repeated, ignore the second occurrence
* If any other slice is repeated, the CTB addr will be greater than the slice addr,
* and hence the second occurrence is ignored */
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt == ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets = 0;
if((ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag) ||
(ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag))
{
UEV_PARSE("num_entry_point_offsets", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets = value;
{
WORD32 max_num_entry_point_offsets;
if((ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag) &&
(ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag))
{
max_num_entry_point_offsets = ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns * (ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - 1);
}
else if(ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag)
{
max_num_entry_point_offsets = ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows;
}
else
{
max_num_entry_point_offsets = (ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - 1);
}
ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets,
0, max_num_entry_point_offsets);
}
if(ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets > 0)
{
UEV_PARSE("offset_len_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_offset_len = value + 1;
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("entry_point_offset", value, ps_bitstrm, ps_slice_hdr->i1_offset_len);
/* TODO: pu4_entry_point_offset needs to be initialized */
}
}
}
if(ps_pps->i1_slice_header_extension_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("slice_header_extension_length", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i2_slice_header_extension_length = value;
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i2_slice_header_extension_length; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_header_extension_data_byte", value, ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
}
ihevcd_bits_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_bitstrm);
{
dpb_mgr_t *ps_dpb_mgr = (dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr;
WORD32 r_idx;
if((NAL_IDR_W_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_IDR_N_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_BLA_N_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_BLA_W_DLP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_BLA_W_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(0 == ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt))
{
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DPB_BUFS; i++)
{
if(ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf = ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Long term index is set to MAX_DPB_BUFS to ensure it is not added as LT */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_del_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr, (buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc);
/* Find buffer id of the MV bank corresponding to the buffer being freed (Buffer with POC of u4_abs_poc) */
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)ps_codec->ps_mv_buf;
for(i = 0; i < BUF_MGR_MAX_CNT; i++)
{
if(ps_mv_buf && ps_mv_buf->i4_abs_poc == ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc)
{
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, i, BUF_MGR_REF);
break;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
}
}
/* Initialize the reference lists to NULL
* This is done to take care of the cases where the first pic is not IDR
* but the reference list is not created for the first pic because
* pic count is zero leaving the reference list uninitialised */
for(r_idx = 0; r_idx < MAX_DPB_SIZE; r_idx++)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = NULL;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = NULL;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = NULL;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = NULL;
}
}
else
{
ihevcd_ref_list(ps_codec, ps_pps, ps_sps, ps_slice_hdr);
}
}
/* Fill the remaining entries of the reference lists with the nearest POC
* This is done to handle cases where there is a corruption in the reference index */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf_ref;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf_ref;
WORD32 r_idx;
dpb_mgr_t *ps_dpb_mgr = (dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr;
buf_mgr_t *ps_mv_buf_mgr = (buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr;
ps_pic_buf_ref = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt);
if(NULL == ps_pic_buf_ref)
{
ps_pic_buf_ref = ps_codec->as_process[0].ps_cur_pic;
ps_mv_buf_ref = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_cur_mv_buf;
}
else
{
ps_mv_buf_ref = ihevcd_mv_mgr_get_poc(ps_mv_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf_ref->i4_abs_poc);
}
for(r_idx = 0; r_idx < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active; r_idx++)
{
if(NULL == ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
}
for(r_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active; r_idx < MAX_DPB_SIZE; r_idx++)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
for(r_idx = 0; r_idx < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active; r_idx++)
{
if(NULL == ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
}
for(r_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active; r_idx < MAX_DPB_SIZE; r_idx++)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
}
/* Update slice address in the header */
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x = slice_address % ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y = slice_address / ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_x = ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_y = ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_y = 0;
}
/* If the first slice in the pic is missing, copy the current slice header to
* the first slice's header */
if((!first_slice_in_pic_flag) &&
(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_prev = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base;
ihevcd_copy_slice_hdr(ps_codec, 0, (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1)));
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_slice_hdr_prev->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_prev->i2_ctb_y = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
if((ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x == 0) &&
(ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y == 0))
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x++;
}
}
{
/* If skip B is enabled,
* ignore pictures that are non-reference
* TODO: (i1_nal_unit_type < NAL_BLA_W_LP) && (i1_nal_unit_type % 2 == 0) only says it is
* sub-layer non-reference slice. May need to find a way to detect actual non-reference pictures*/
if((i1_nal_unit_type < NAL_BLA_W_LP) &&
(i1_nal_unit_type % 2 == 0))
{
if(IVD_SKIP_B == ps_codec->e_pic_skip_mode)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
/* If skip PB is enabled,
* decode only I slices */
if((IVD_SKIP_PB == ps_codec->e_pic_skip_mode) &&
(ISLICE != ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type))
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-252
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34672748.
Commit Message: Handle error return from ref list in slice hdr parsing
The error returned by ref_list function was not handled by the
caller parse_slice_header.
Bug: 34672748
Change-Id: I55f6cb0e651746e77f7ff3375115894ec3964203
(cherry picked from commit 25206ffa6eeb25f32103e69f893287425ab1bd10)
|
Medium
| 174,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, const u_char *ep)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
t = p[2];
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int object_custom(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long datalen;
datalen = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (datalen < 0 || (*p) + datalen >= max) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Insufficient data for unserializing - %ld required, %ld present", datalen, (long)(max - (*p)));
return 0;
}
if (ce->unserialize == NULL) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Class %s has no unserializer", ce->name);
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else if (ce->unserialize(rval, ce, (const unsigned char*)*p, datalen, (zend_unserialize_data *)var_hash TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
(*p) += datalen;
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the object_custom function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.c in PHP before 5.4.34, 5.5.x before 5.5.18, and 5.6.x before 5.6.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via an argument to the unserialize function that triggers calculation of a large length value.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_dax_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return dax_mkwrite(vma, vmf, ext4_get_block_dax,
ext4_end_io_unwritten);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Medium
| 167,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _WM_ParseNewMus(uint8_t *mus_data, uint32_t mus_size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint32_t mus_song_ofs = 0;
uint32_t mus_song_len = 0;
uint16_t mus_ch_cnt1 = 0;
uint16_t mus_ch_cnt2 = 0;
uint16_t mus_no_instr = 0;
uint32_t mus_data_ofs = 0;
uint16_t * mus_mid_instr = NULL;
uint16_t mus_instr_cnt = 0;
struct _mdi *mus_mdi;
uint32_t mus_divisions = 60;
float tempo_f = 0.0;
uint16_t mus_freq = 0;
float samples_per_tick_f = 0.0;
uint8_t mus_event[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
uint8_t mus_event_size = 0;
uint8_t mus_prev_vol[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
uint32_t mus_ticks = 0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0.0;
float sample_remainder = 0.0;
uint16_t pitchbend_tmp = 0;
if (mus_size < 17) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MUS, "File too short", 0);
return NULL;
}
if (memcmp(mus_data, mus_hdr, 4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MUS, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
mus_song_len = (mus_data[5] << 8) | mus_data[4];
mus_song_ofs = (mus_data[7] << 8) | mus_data[6];
mus_ch_cnt1 = (mus_data[9] << 8) | mus_data[8];
mus_ch_cnt2 = (mus_data[11] << 8) | mus_data[10];
UNUSED(mus_ch_cnt1);
UNUSED(mus_ch_cnt2);
mus_no_instr = (mus_data[13] << 8) | mus_data[12];
mus_data_ofs = 16;
if (mus_size < (mus_data_ofs + (mus_no_instr << 1) + mus_song_len)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MUS, "File too short", 0);
return NULL;
}
mus_mid_instr = malloc(mus_no_instr * sizeof(uint16_t));
for (mus_instr_cnt = 0; mus_instr_cnt < mus_no_instr; mus_instr_cnt++) {
mus_mid_instr[mus_instr_cnt] = (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] << 8) | mus_data[mus_data_ofs];
mus_data_ofs += 2;
}
mus_data_ofs = mus_song_ofs;
mus_freq = _cvt_get_option(WM_CO_FREQUENCY);
if (mus_freq == 0) mus_freq = 140;
if ((_WM_MixerOptions & WM_MO_ROUNDTEMPO)) {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / mus_freq) + 0.5f;
} else {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / mus_freq);
}
samples_per_tick_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(mus_divisions, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
mus_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(mus_mdi, mus_divisions);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(mus_mdi, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
do {
_mus_build_event:
#if 1
MUS_EVENT_DEBUG("Before", mus_data[mus_data_ofs], 0);
if ((mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f) == 0x0f) {
mus_data[mus_data_ofs] = (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0xf0) | 0x09;
} else if ((mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f) == 0x09) {
mus_data[mus_data_ofs] = (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0xf0) | 0x0f;
}
MUS_EVENT_DEBUG("After", mus_data[mus_data_ofs], 0);
#endif
switch ((mus_data[mus_data_ofs] >> 4) & 0x07) {
case 0: // Note Off
mus_event_size = 2;
mus_event[0] = 0x80 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1];
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 1: // Note On
if (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] & 0x80) {
mus_event_size = 3;
mus_event[0] = 0x90 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] & 0x7f;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
mus_prev_vol[mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f] = mus_event[2];
} else {
mus_event_size = 2;
mus_event[0] = 0x90 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1];
mus_event[2] = mus_prev_vol[mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f];
mus_event[3] = 0;
}
break;
case 2: // Pitch Bend
mus_event_size = 2;
mus_event[0] = 0xe0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
pitchbend_tmp = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] << 6;
mus_event[1] = pitchbend_tmp & 0x7f;
mus_event[2] = (pitchbend_tmp >> 7) & 0x7f;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 3:
mus_event_size = 2;
switch (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1]) {
case 10: // All Sounds Off
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 120;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 11: // All Notes Off
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 123;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 12: // Mono (Not supported by WildMIDI)
/*
**************************
FIXME: Add dummy mdi event
**************************
*/
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 126;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 13: // Poly (Not supported by WildMIDI)
/*
**************************
FIXME: Add dummy mdi event
**************************
*/
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 127;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 14: // Reset All Controllers
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 121;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
default: // Unsupported
goto _mus_next_data;
}
break;
case 4:
mus_event_size = 3;
switch (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1]) {
case 0: // Patch
/*
*************************************************
FIXME: Check if setting is MIDI or MUS instrument
*************************************************
*/
mus_event[0] = 0xc0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 1: // Bank Select
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 0;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 2: // Modulation (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 1;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 3: // Volume
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 7;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 4: // Pan
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 10;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 5: // Expression
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 11;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 6: // Reverb (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 91;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 7: // Chorus (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 93;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 8: // Sustain
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 64;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 9: // Soft Peddle (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 67;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
default: // Unsupported
goto _mus_next_data;
}
break;
case 5:
mus_event_size = 1;
goto _mus_next_data;
break;
case 6:
goto _mus_end_of_song;
break;
case 7:
mus_event_size = 1;
goto _mus_next_data;
break;
}
setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(mus_mdi, (uint8_t *)mus_event, 0);
if (setup_ret == 0) {
goto _mus_end;
}
_mus_next_data:
if (!(mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x80)) {
mus_data_ofs += mus_event_size;
goto _mus_build_event;
}
mus_data_ofs += mus_event_size;
mus_ticks = 0;
do {
mus_ticks = (mus_ticks << 7) | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs++] & 0x7f);
} while (mus_data[mus_data_ofs - 1] & 0x80);
sample_count_f = ((float)mus_ticks * samples_per_tick_f) + sample_remainder;
sample_count = (uint32_t)sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float)sample_count;
mus_mdi->events[mus_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next = sample_count;
mus_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
} while (mus_data_ofs < mus_size);
_mus_end_of_song:
if ((mus_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _mus_end;
}
_WM_midi_setup_endoftrack(mus_mdi);
mus_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
mus_mdi->current_event = &mus_mdi->events[0];
mus_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
mus_mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(mus_mdi);
_mus_end:
free(mus_mid_instr);
if (mus_mdi->reverb) return (mus_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(mus_mdi);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
|
Medium
| 168,005
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PredictorDecodeRow(TIFF* tif, uint8* op0, tmsize_t occ0, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->decoderow != NULL);
assert(sp->decodepfunc != NULL);
if ((*sp->decoderow)(tif, op0, occ0, s)) {
(*sp->decodepfunc)(tif, op0, occ0);
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,876
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas(int dimension, ShareableBitmap::Flags flags)
: m_flags(flags)
{
IntSize size = nextPowerOfTwo(IntSize(dimension, dimension));
m_surface = ShareableSurface::create(size, flags, ShareableSurface::SupportsGraphicsSurface);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to *stale font.*
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long ext4_zero_range(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
loff_t len, int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
handle_t *handle = NULL;
unsigned int max_blocks;
loff_t new_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
int flags;
int credits;
int partial_begin, partial_end;
loff_t start, end;
ext4_lblk_t lblk;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
trace_ext4_zero_range(inode, offset, len, mode);
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + len - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Round up offset. This is not fallocate, we neet to zero out
* blocks, so convert interior block aligned part of the range to
* unwritten and possibly manually zero out unaligned parts of the
* range.
*/
start = round_up(offset, 1 << blkbits);
end = round_down((offset + len), 1 << blkbits);
if (start < offset || end > offset + len)
return -EINVAL;
partial_begin = offset & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
partial_end = (offset + len) & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
lblk = start >> blkbits;
max_blocks = (end >> blkbits);
if (max_blocks < lblk)
max_blocks = 0;
else
max_blocks -= lblk;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* Indirect files do not support unwritten extnets
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
offset + len > i_size_read(inode)) {
new_size = offset + len;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, new_size);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNWRIT_EXT;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
/* Preallocate the range including the unaligned edges */
if (partial_begin || partial_end) {
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file,
round_down(offset, 1 << blkbits) >> blkbits,
(round_up((offset + len), 1 << blkbits) -
round_down(offset, 1 << blkbits)) >> blkbits,
new_size, flags, mode);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Zero range excluding the unaligned edges */
if (max_blocks > 0) {
flags |= (EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN |
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE);
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, start, end - 1);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file, lblk, max_blocks, new_size,
flags, mode);
if (ret)
goto out_dio;
}
if (!partial_begin && !partial_end)
goto out_dio;
/*
* In worst case we have to writeout two nonadjacent unwritten
* blocks and update the inode
*/
credits = (2 * ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks(inode, 2)) + 1;
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode))
credits += 2;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MISC, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
if (new_size) {
ext4_update_inode_size(inode, new_size);
} else {
/*
* Mark that we allocate beyond EOF so the subsequent truncate
* can proceed even if the new size is the same as i_size.
*/
if ((offset + len) > i_size_read(inode))
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
/* Zero out partial block at the edges of the range */
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset, len);
if (file->f_flags & O_SYNC)
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Medium
| 167,485
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void add_param_to_argv(char *parsestart, int line)
{
int quote_open = 0, escaped = 0, param_len = 0;
char param_buffer[1024], *curchar;
/* After fighting with strtok enough, here's now
* a 'real' parser. According to Rusty I'm now no
} else {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
for (curchar = parsestart; *curchar; curchar++) {
if (quote_open) {
if (escaped) {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
escaped = 0;
continue;
} else if (*curchar == '\\') {
}
switch (*curchar) {
quote_open = 0;
*curchar = '"';
} else {
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
continue;
}
} else {
continue;
}
break;
default:
/* regular character, copy to buffer */
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer))
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
if (!param_len) {
/* two spaces? */
continue;
}
break;
default:
/* regular character, copy to buffer */
param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar;
if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer))
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
"Parameter too long!");
continue;
}
param_buffer[param_len] = '\0';
/* check if table name specified */
if ((param_buffer[0] == '-' &&
param_buffer[1] != '-' &&
strchr(param_buffer, 't')) ||
(!strncmp(param_buffer, "--t", 3) &&
!strncmp(param_buffer, "--table", strlen(param_buffer)))) {
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
"The -t option (seen in line %u) cannot be used in %s.\n",
line, xt_params->program_name);
}
add_argv(param_buffer, 0);
param_len = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A buffer overflow in iptables-restore in netfilter iptables 1.8.2 allows an attacker to (at least) crash the program or potentially gain code execution via a specially crafted iptables-save file. This is related to add_param_to_argv in xshared.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,750
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref,
Stream *str, int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr, int maskWidth,
int maskHeight, GBool maskInvert)
{
ImageStream *maskImgStr;
maskImgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth, 1, 1);
maskImgStr->reset();
int row_stride = (maskWidth + 3) & ~3;
unsigned char *maskBuffer;
maskBuffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (row_stride * maskHeight);
unsigned char *maskDest;
cairo_surface_t *maskImage;
cairo_pattern_t *maskPattern;
Guchar *pix;
int x, y;
int invert_bit;
invert_bit = maskInvert ? 1 : 0;
for (y = 0; y < maskHeight; y++) {
pix = maskImgStr->getLine();
maskDest = maskBuffer + y * row_stride;
for (x = 0; x < maskWidth; x++) {
if (pix[x] ^ invert_bit)
*maskDest++ = 0;
else
*maskDest++ = 255;
}
}
maskImage = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (maskBuffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_A8,
maskWidth, maskHeight, row_stride);
delete maskImgStr;
maskStr->close();
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
cairo_surface_t *image;
cairo_pattern_t *pattern;
ImageStream *imgStr;
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24,
width, height, width * 4);
if (image == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
pattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (image);
maskPattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (maskImage);
if (pattern == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
LOG (printf ("drawMaskedImage %dx%d\n", width, height));
cairo_matrix_init_translate (&matrix, 0, height);
cairo_matrix_scale (&matrix, width, -height);
/* scale the mask to the size of the image unlike softMask */
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (pattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (maskPattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (pattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BILINEAR);
cairo_set_source (cairo, pattern);
cairo_mask (cairo, maskPattern);
if (cairo_shape) {
#if 0
cairo_rectangle (cairo_shape, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo_shape);
#else
cairo_save (cairo_shape);
/* this should draw a rectangle the size of the image
* we use this instead of rect,fill because of the lack
* of EXTEND_PAD */
/* NOTE: this will multiply the edges of the image twice */
cairo_set_source (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_mask (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_restore (cairo_shape);
#endif
}
cairo_pattern_destroy (maskPattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (maskImage);
cairo_pattern_destroy (pattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (image);
free (buffer);
free (maskBuffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,606
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ip6_append_data_mtu(int *mtu,
int *maxfraglen,
unsigned int fragheaderlen,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (!(rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)) {
if (skb == NULL) {
/* first fragment, reserve header_len */
*mtu = *mtu - rt->dst.header_len;
} else {
/*
* this fragment is not first, the headers
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
*mtu = dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
}
*maxfraglen = ((*mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7)
+ fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ip6_append_data_mtu function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 does not properly maintain information about whether the IPV6_MTU setsockopt option had been specified, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,015
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IsValidSymbolicLink(const FilePath& file_path,
GDataCache::CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type,
const std::vector<FilePath>& cache_paths,
std::string* reason) {
DCHECK(sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PINNED ||
sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_OUTGOING);
FilePath destination;
if (!file_util::ReadSymbolicLink(file_path, &destination)) {
*reason = "failed to read the symlink (maybe not a symlink)";
return false;
}
if (!file_util::PathExists(destination)) {
*reason = "pointing to a non-existent file";
return false;
}
if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PINNED &&
destination == FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(util::kSymLinkToDevNull)) {
return true;
}
if (!cache_paths[GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT].IsParent(destination)) {
*reason = "pointing to a file outside of persistent directory";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,866
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
{
int ret = 1;
int blocksize = 1 << rs->inode->i_blkbits;
const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
if ((unsigned)rs->cont_offset > blocksize - min_de_size ||
(unsigned)rs->cont_size > blocksize ||
(unsigned)(rs->cont_offset + rs->cont_size) > blocksize) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. "
"extent=%d, offset=%d, size=%d\n",
rs->cont_extent, rs->cont_offset, rs->cont_size);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (rs->cont_extent) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
rs->buffer = kmalloc(rs->cont_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rs->buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
rs->cont_size);
put_bh(bh);
rs->chr = rs->buffer;
rs->len = rs->cont_size;
rs->cont_extent = 0;
rs->cont_size = 0;
rs->cont_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
printk("Unable to read rock-ridge attributes\n");
}
out:
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The rock_continue function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 does not restrict the number of Rock Ridge continuation entries, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop, and system crash or hang) via a crafted iso9660 image.
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 166,236
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
CERT *cert;
cert = ctx->cert;
switch (cmd) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
if ((cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
((cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
(EVP_PKEY_size(cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
(512 / 8)))
)
return (1);
else
return (0);
/* break; */
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
{
RSA *rsa;
int i;
rsa = (RSA *)parg;
i = 1;
if (rsa == NULL)
i = 0;
else {
if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
i = 0;
}
if (!i) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return (0);
} else {
if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(cert->rsa_tmp);
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
return (1);
}
}
/* break; */
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
break;
#endif
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(new);
return 0;
}
}
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
cert->dh_tmp = new;
if ((new = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(new);
return 0;
}
}
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
cert->dh_tmp = new;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The DH_check_pub_key function in crypto/dh/dh_check.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2f does not ensure that prime numbers are appropriate for Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, which makes it easier for remote attackers to discover a private DH exponent by making multiple handshakes with a peer that chose an inappropriate number, as demonstrated by a number in an X9.42 file.
Commit Message:
|
High
| 165,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.12, Hisilicon Network Subsystem (HNS) does not consider the ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS case when retrieving sset_count data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact, as demonstrated by incompatibility between hns_get_sset_count and ethtool_get_strings.
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert3Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert3");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(c*, , V8c::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8c::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert3();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,079
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SchedulerObject::remove(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Remove: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!abortJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true // Always perform within a transaction
)) {
text = "Failed to remove job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,834
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
*nextensions = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (list);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c interprets a variable as signed instead of unsigned, resulting in an out-of-bounds write (of up to 128 bytes), leading to DoS or remote code execution.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline struct sem_array *sem_obtain_lock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp;
struct sem_array *sma;
rcu_read_lock();
ipcp = ipc_obtain_object(&sem_ids(ns), id);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp)) {
sma = ERR_CAST(ipcp);
goto err;
}
spin_lock(&ipcp->lock);
/* ipc_rmid() may have already freed the ID while sem_lock
* was spinning: verify that the structure is still valid
*/
if (!ipcp->deleted)
return container_of(ipcp, struct sem_array, sem_perm);
spin_unlock(&ipcp->lock);
sma = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
err:
rcu_read_unlock();
return sma;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,977
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gss_delete_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
status = val_del_sec_ctx_args(minor_status, context_handle, output_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
if (GSSINT_CHK_LOOP(ctx))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
ctx->mech_type,
&ctx->internal_ctx_id,
output_token);
if (status)
return status;
/* now free up the space for the union context structure */
free(ctx->mech_type->elements);
free(ctx->mech_type);
free(*context_handle);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,014
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::ConnectToService() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!interface_factory_ptr_);
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr interfaces;
auto provider = base::MakeUnique<media::MediaInterfaceProvider>(
mojo::MakeRequest(&interfaces));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_CDM)
net::URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter =
BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition(
render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext())
->GetURLRequestContext();
provider->registry()->AddInterface(base::Bind(
&ProvisionFetcherImpl::Create, base::RetainedRef(context_getter)));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_CDM)
GetContentClient()->browser()->ExposeInterfacesToMediaService(
provider->registry(), render_frame_host_);
media_registries_.push_back(std::move(provider));
media::mojom::MediaServicePtr media_service;
service_manager::Connector* connector =
ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector();
connector->BindInterface(media::mojom::kMediaServiceName, &media_service);
media_service->CreateInterfaceFactory(MakeRequest(&interface_factory_ptr_),
std::move(interfaces));
interface_factory_ptr_.set_connection_error_handler(base::Bind(
&MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
Low
| 171,935
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer()));
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,533
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p", size, *buffer_data));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,524
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DataPipeProducerDispatcher::Deserialize(const void* data,
size_t num_bytes,
const ports::PortName* ports,
size_t num_ports,
PlatformHandle* handles,
size_t num_handles) {
if (num_ports != 1 || num_handles != 1 ||
num_bytes != sizeof(SerializedState)) {
return nullptr;
}
const SerializedState* state = static_cast<const SerializedState*>(data);
if (!state->options.capacity_num_bytes || !state->options.element_num_bytes ||
state->options.capacity_num_bytes < state->options.element_num_bytes) {
return nullptr;
}
NodeController* node_controller = Core::Get()->GetNodeController();
ports::PortRef port;
if (node_controller->node()->GetPort(ports[0], &port) != ports::OK)
return nullptr;
auto region_handle = CreateSharedMemoryRegionHandleFromPlatformHandles(
std::move(handles[0]), PlatformHandle());
auto region = base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Take(
std::move(region_handle),
base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Mode::kUnsafe,
state->options.capacity_num_bytes,
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(state->buffer_guid_high,
state->buffer_guid_low));
auto ring_buffer =
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion::Deserialize(std::move(region));
if (!ring_buffer.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to deserialize shared buffer handle.";
return nullptr;
}
scoped_refptr<DataPipeProducerDispatcher> dispatcher =
new DataPipeProducerDispatcher(node_controller, port,
std::move(ring_buffer), state->options,
state->pipe_id);
{
base::AutoLock lock(dispatcher->lock_);
dispatcher->write_offset_ = state->write_offset;
dispatcher->available_capacity_ = state->available_capacity;
dispatcher->peer_closed_ = state->flags & kFlagPeerClosed;
if (!dispatcher->InitializeNoLock())
return nullptr;
dispatcher->UpdateSignalsStateNoLock();
}
return dispatcher;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Missing validation in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
|
Medium
| 173,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltAttributeComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemAttributePtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:attribute
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:attribute>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemAttributePtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style,
XSLT_FUNC_ATTRIBUTE);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ATTRIBUTE);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name",
NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"XSLT-attribute: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
return;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace",
NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:attribute: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(comp->name, BAD_CAST "xmlns")) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:attribute: The attribute name 'xmlns' is not allowed.\n");
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (prefix != NULL) {
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the
* QName is expanded into an expanded-name using the
* namespace declarations in effect for the xsl:element
* element, including any default namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#endif
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:attribute: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the "
"namespace was not specified by the instruction "
"itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,315
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The set_pixel_format function in ui/vnc.c in QEMU allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a small bytes_per_pixel value.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::ExpectingPasskey() const {
return !passkey_callback_.is_null();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,225
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __u8 *lg_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct usb_device_descriptor *udesc;
__u16 bcdDevice, rev_maj, rev_min;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[84] == 0x8c && rdesc[85] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech keyboard report descriptor\n");
rdesc[84] = rdesc[89] = 0x4d;
rdesc[85] = rdesc[90] = 0x10;
}
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 50 &&
rdesc[32] == 0x81 && rdesc[33] == 0x06 &&
rdesc[49] == 0x81 && rdesc[50] == 0x06) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up rel/abs in Logitech report descriptor\n");
rdesc[33] = rdesc[50] = 0x02;
}
switch (hdev->product) {
/* Several wheels report as this id when operating in emulation mode. */
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WHEEL:
udesc = &(hid_to_usb_dev(hdev)->descriptor);
if (!udesc) {
hid_err(hdev, "NULL USB device descriptor\n");
break;
}
bcdDevice = le16_to_cpu(udesc->bcdDevice);
rev_maj = bcdDevice >> 8;
rev_min = bcdDevice & 0xff;
/* Update the report descriptor for only the Driving Force wheel */
if (rev_maj == 1 && rev_min == 2 &&
*rsize == DF_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force report descriptor\n");
rdesc = df_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(df_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == MOMO_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Force (Red) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL2:
if (*rsize == MOMO2_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Racing Force (Black) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo2_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo2_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_VIBRATION_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == FV_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Formula Vibration report descriptor\n");
rdesc = fv_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(fv_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_DFP_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == DFP_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force Pro report descriptor\n");
rdesc = dfp_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(dfp_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WII_WHEEL:
if (*rsize >= 101 && rdesc[41] == 0x95 && rdesc[42] == 0x0B &&
rdesc[47] == 0x05 && rdesc[48] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Logitech Speed Force Wireless report descriptor\n");
rdesc[41] = 0x05;
rdesc[42] = 0x09;
rdesc[47] = 0x95;
rdesc[48] = 0x0B;
}
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,372
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: isis_print_extd_ip_reach(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, const char *ident, uint16_t afi)
{
char ident_buffer[20];
uint8_t prefix[sizeof(struct in6_addr)]; /* shared copy buffer for IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes */
u_int metric, status_byte, bit_length, byte_length, sublen, processed, subtlvtype, subtlvlen;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 4))
return (0);
metric = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
processed=4;
tptr+=4;
if (afi == AF_INET) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length = status_byte&0x3f;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed++;
} else if (afi == AF_INET6) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status & prefix_len byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length=*(tptr++);
if (bit_length > 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed+=2;
} else
return (0); /* somebody is fooling us */
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* prefix has variable length encoding */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, byte_length))
return (0);
memset(prefix, 0, sizeof prefix); /* clear the copy buffer */
memcpy(prefix,tptr,byte_length); /* copy as much as is stored in the TLV */
tptr+=byte_length;
processed+=byte_length;
if (afi == AF_INET)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: %15s/%u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: %s/%u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Distribution: %s, Metric: %u",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_UPDOWN(status_byte) ? "down" : "up",
metric));
if (afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sub-TLVs present"));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s%s",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_IE(status_byte) ? "External" : "Internal",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte) ? ", sub-TLVs present" : ""));
if ((afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
|| (afi == AF_INET6 && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte))
) {
/* assume that one prefix can hold more
than one subTLV - therefore the first byte must reflect
the aggregate bytecount of the subTLVs for this prefix
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1))
return (0);
sublen=*(tptr++);
processed+=sublen+1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%u)", sublen)); /* print out subTLV length */
while (sublen>0) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr,2))
return (0);
subtlvtype=*(tptr++);
subtlvlen=*(tptr++);
/* prepend the indent string */
snprintf(ident_buffer, sizeof(ident_buffer), "%s ",ident);
if (!isis_print_ip_reach_subtlv(ndo, tptr, subtlvtype, subtlvlen, ident_buffer))
return(0);
tptr+=subtlvlen;
sublen-=(subtlvlen+2);
}
}
return (processed);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IS-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isis_print_extd_ip_reach().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12998/IS-IS: Check for 2 bytes if we're going to fetch 2 bytes.
Probably a copy-and-pasteo.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,909
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in json parsing in PostgreSQL before 9.3.x before 9.3.10 and 9.4.x before 9.4.5 allow attackers to cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors, which are not properly handled in (1) json or (2) jsonb values.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,679
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI char *php_escape_shell_arg(char *str)
{
int x, y = 0, l = strlen(str);
char *cmd;
size_t estimate = (4 * l) + 3;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
cmd = safe_emalloc(4, l, 3); /* worst case */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
cmd[y++] = '"';
#else
cmd[y++] = '\'';
#endif
for (x = 0; x < l; x++) {
int mb_len = php_mblen(str + x, (l - x));
/* skip non-valid multibyte characters */
if (mb_len < 0) {
continue;
} else if (mb_len > 1) {
memcpy(cmd + y, str + x, mb_len);
y += mb_len;
x += mb_len - 1;
continue;
}
switch (str[x]) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
case '"':
case '%':
cmd[y++] = ' ';
break;
#else
case '\'':
cmd[y++] = '\'';
cmd[y++] = '\\';
cmd[y++] = '\'';
#endif
/* fall-through */
default:
cmd[y++] = str[x];
}
}
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
cmd[y++] = '"';
#else
cmd[y++] = '\'';
return cmd;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: The escapeshellarg function in ext/standard/exec.c in PHP before 5.4.42, 5.5.x before 5.5.26, and 5.6.x before 5.6.10 on Windows allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted string to an application that accepts command-line arguments for a call to the PHP system function.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,302
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_object)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, *mythis;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ro", &pind, &mythis) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
/* #ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval_add_ref(&parser->object);
#endif */
ALLOC_ZVAL(parser->object);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&mythis, parser->object);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void handle_stdfmna(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long sfar, unsigned long sfsr)
{
unsigned long pc = regs->tpc;
unsigned long tstate = regs->tstate;
u32 insn;
u64 value;
u8 freg;
int flag;
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
if (tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
die_if_kernel("stdfmna from kernel", regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, sfar);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
pc = (u32)pc;
if (get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) pc) != -EFAULT) {
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
value = 0;
flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if ((asi > ASI_SNFL) ||
(asi < ASI_P))
goto daex;
save_and_clear_fpu();
if (current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)
value = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg];
switch (asi) {
case ASI_P:
case ASI_S: break;
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
value = __swab64p(&value); break;
default: goto daex;
}
if (put_user (value >> 32, (u32 __user *) sfar) ||
__put_user ((u32)value, (u32 __user *)(sfar + 4)))
goto daex;
} else {
daex:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, sfar, sfsr);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, sfsr, sfar);
return;
}
advance(regs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pim_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
#ifdef notyet /* currently we see only version and type */
ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv);
#endif
switch (PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever)) {
case 2:
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, %s, length %u",
PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever),
tok2str(pimv2_type_values,"Unknown Type",PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)),
len));
return;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, length %u\n\t%s",
PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever),
len,
tok2str(pimv2_type_values,"Unknown Type",PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever))));
pimv2_print(ndo, bp, len, bp2);
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, length %u",
PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever),
len));
break;
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes.
|
Low
| 167,854
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI php_stream *_php_stream_memory_open(int mode, char *buf, size_t length STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream *stream;
php_stream_memory_data *ms;
if ((stream = php_stream_memory_create_rel(mode)) != NULL) {
ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
if (mode == TEMP_STREAM_READONLY || mode == TEMP_STREAM_TAKE_BUFFER) {
/* use the buffer directly */
ms->data = buf;
ms->fsize = length;
} else {
if (length) {
assert(buf != NULL);
php_stream_write(stream, buf, length);
}
}
}
return stream;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int msg_cache_check(const char *id, struct BodyCache *bcache, void *data)
{
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
if (!ctx)
return -1;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
if (!pop_data)
return -1;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* keep hcache file if hcache == bcache */
if (strcmp(HC_FNAME "." HC_FEXT, id) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
/* if the id we get is known for a header: done (i.e. keep in cache) */
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->data && (mutt_str_strcmp(ctx->hdrs[i]->data, id) == 0))
return 0;
}
/* message not found in context -> remove it from cache
* return the result of bcache, so we stop upon its first error
*/
return mutt_bcache_del(bcache, id);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. newsrc.c does not properly restrict '/' characters that may have unsafe interaction with cache pathnames.
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
|
Low
| 169,120
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent() {
if (render_frame_host_->GetView() &&
render_frame_host_->render_view_host()->GetWidget()->is_hidden() !=
delegate_->IsHidden()) {
if (delegate_->IsHidden()) {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Hide();
} else {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Show();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,321
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTrace(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback) {
auto adapter =
[](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr) { callback.Run(success, dump_guid); };
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, {},
true /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
|
Medium
| 172,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, getSubPath)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.dir.sub_path, intern->u.dir.sub_path_len, 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,046
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
if (ptr[*pos].type == VAL || ptr[*pos].type == VALTRUE)
{
ptr[*pos].left = 0;
(*pos)++;
}
else if (ptr[*pos].val == (int32) '!')
{
ptr[*pos].left = 1;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
else
{
ITEM *curitem = &ptr[*pos];
int32 tmp = *pos;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dev_get_valid_name(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev,
const char *name)
{
BUG_ON(!net);
if (!dev_valid_name(name))
return -EINVAL;
if (strchr(name, '%'))
return dev_alloc_name_ns(net, dev, name);
else if (__dev_get_by_name(net, name))
return -EEXIST;
else if (dev->name != name)
strlcpy(dev->name, name, IFNAMSIZ);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In the tun subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.14, dev_get_valid_name is not called before register_netdevice. This allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via an ioctl(TUNSETIFF) call with a dev name containing a / character. This is similar to CVE-2013-4343.
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,855
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: append_utf8_value (const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
struct stringbuf *sb)
{
unsigned char tmp[6];
const unsigned char *s;
size_t n;
int i, nmore;
if (length && (*value == ' ' || *value == '#'))
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *value;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
value++;
length--;
}
if (length && value[length-1] == ' ')
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = ' ';
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
length--;
}
/* FIXME: check that the invalid encoding handling is correct */
for (s=value, n=0;;)
{
for (value = s; n < length && !(*s & 0x80); n++, s++)
for (value = s; n < length && !(*s & 0x80); n++, s++)
;
append_quoted (sb, value, s-value, 0);
if (n==length)
return; /* ready */
assert ((*s & 0x80));
if ( (*s & 0xe0) == 0xc0 ) /* 110x xxxx */
nmore = 1;
else if ( (*s & 0xf0) == 0xe0 ) /* 1110 xxxx */
nmore = 2;
else if ( (*s & 0xf8) == 0xf0 ) /* 1111 0xxx */
nmore = 3;
else if ( (*s & 0xfc) == 0xf8 ) /* 1111 10xx */
nmore = 4;
else if ( (*s & 0xfe) == 0xfc ) /* 1111 110x */
nmore = 5;
else /* invalid encoding */
nmore = 5; /* we will reduce the check length anyway */
if (n+nmore > length)
nmore = length - n; /* oops, encoding to short */
tmp[0] = *s++; n++;
for (i=1; i <= nmore; i++)
{
if ( (*s & 0xc0) != 0x80)
break; /* invalid encoding - stop */
tmp[i] = *s++;
n++;
}
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, i);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The append_utf8_value function in the DN decoder (dn.c) in Libksba before 1.3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by clearing the high bit of the byte after invalid utf-8 encoded data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,050
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int m_authenticate(struct Client* cptr, struct Client* sptr, int parc, char* parv[])
{
struct Client* acptr;
int first = 0;
char realhost[HOSTLEN + 3];
char *hoststr = (cli_sockhost(cptr) ? cli_sockhost(cptr) : cli_sock_ip(cptr));
if (!CapActive(cptr, CAP_SASL))
return 0;
if (parc < 2) /* have enough parameters? */
return need_more_params(cptr, "AUTHENTICATE");
if (strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
return send_reply(cptr, ERR_SASLTOOLONG);
if (IsSASLComplete(cptr))
return send_reply(cptr, ERR_SASLALREADY);
/* Look up the target server */
if (!(acptr = cli_saslagent(cptr))) {
if (strcmp(feature_str(FEAT_SASL_SERVER), "*"))
acptr = find_match_server((char *)feature_str(FEAT_SASL_SERVER));
else
acptr = NULL;
}
if (!acptr && strcmp(feature_str(FEAT_SASL_SERVER), "*"))
return send_reply(cptr, ERR_SASLFAIL, ": service unavailable");
/* If it's to us, do nothing; otherwise, forward the query */
if (acptr && IsMe(acptr))
return 0;
/* Generate an SASL session cookie if not already generated */
if (!cli_saslcookie(cptr)) {
do {
cli_saslcookie(cptr) = ircrandom() & 0x7fffffff;
} while (!cli_saslcookie(cptr));
first = 1;
}
if (strchr(hoststr, ':') != NULL)
ircd_snprintf(0, realhost, sizeof(realhost), "[%s]", hoststr);
else
ircd_strncpy(realhost, hoststr, sizeof(realhost));
if (acptr) {
if (first) {
if (!EmptyString(cli_sslclifp(cptr)))
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u S %s :%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr),
parv[1], cli_sslclifp(cptr));
else
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u S :%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
if (feature_bool(FEAT_SASL_SENDHOST))
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u H :%s@%s:%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), cli_username(cptr),
realhost, cli_sock_ip(cptr));
} else {
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u C :%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
}
} else {
if (first) {
if (!EmptyString(cli_sslclifp(cptr)))
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u S %s :%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr),
parv[1], cli_sslclifp(cptr));
else
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u S :%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
if (feature_bool(FEAT_SASL_SENDHOST))
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u H :%s@%s:%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), cli_username(cptr),
realhost, cli_sock_ip(cptr));
} else {
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u C :%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
}
}
if (!t_active(&cli_sasltimeout(cptr)))
timer_add(timer_init(&cli_sasltimeout(cptr)), sasl_timeout_callback, (void*) cptr,
TT_RELATIVE, feature_int(FEAT_SASL_TIMEOUT));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The m_authenticate function in ircd/m_authenticate.c in nefarious2 allows remote attackers to spoof certificate fingerprints and consequently log in as another user via a crafted AUTHENTICATE parameter.
Commit Message: Fix to prevent SASL security vulnerability
|
Low
| 168,813
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t o2nm_node_local_store(struct config_item *item, const char *page,
size_t count)
{
struct o2nm_node *node = to_o2nm_node(item);
struct o2nm_cluster *cluster = to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(node);
unsigned long tmp;
char *p = (char *)page;
ssize_t ret;
tmp = simple_strtoul(p, &p, 0);
if (!p || (*p && (*p != '\n')))
return -EINVAL;
tmp = !!tmp; /* boolean of whether this node wants to be local */
/* setting local turns on networking rx for now so we require having
* set everything else first */
if (!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_ADDRESS, &node->nd_set_attributes) ||
!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_NUM, &node->nd_set_attributes) ||
!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_PORT, &node->nd_set_attributes))
return -EINVAL; /* XXX */
/* the only failure case is trying to set a new local node
* when a different one is already set */
if (tmp && tmp == cluster->cl_has_local &&
cluster->cl_local_node != node->nd_num)
return -EBUSY;
/* bring up the rx thread if we're setting the new local node. */
if (tmp && !cluster->cl_has_local) {
ret = o2net_start_listening(node);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (!tmp && cluster->cl_has_local &&
cluster->cl_local_node == node->nd_num) {
o2net_stop_listening(node);
cluster->cl_local_node = O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM;
}
node->nd_local = tmp;
if (node->nd_local) {
cluster->cl_has_local = tmp;
cluster->cl_local_node = node->nd_num;
}
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c in the Linux kernel before 4.15, local users can cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and BUG) because a required mutex is not used.
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::DeviceStopAutoRetry() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.get())
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_->StopAutoRetry();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the Google V8 bindings.
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *subject_cert,
krb5_principal *canon_user)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_preauthtype ptypes[1] = { KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER };
krb5_creds creds;
int use_master = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts = NULL;
krb5_principal_data client;
krb5_s4u_userid userid;
*canon_user = NULL;
if (in_creds->client == NULL && subject_cert == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (in_creds->client != NULL &&
in_creds->client->type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
int anonymous;
anonymous = krb5_principal_compare(context, in_creds->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal());
return krb5_copy_principal(context,
anonymous ? in_creds->server
: in_creds->client,
canon_user);
}
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
memset(&userid, 0, sizeof(userid));
if (subject_cert != NULL)
userid.subject_cert = *subject_cert;
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opts);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opts, 15);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(opts, ptypes, 1);
if (in_creds->client != NULL) {
client = *in_creds->client;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
} else {
client.magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
/* should this be NULL, empty or a fixed string? XXX */
client.data = NULL;
client.length = 0;
client.type = KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
}
code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,
NULL);
if (code == 0 || code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED) {
*canon_user = userid.user;
userid.user = NULL;
code = 0;
}
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (opts != NULL)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opts);
if (userid.user != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, userid.user);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: A Reachable Assertion issue was discovered in the KDC in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.17. If an attacker can obtain a krbtgt ticket using an older encryption type (single-DES, triple-DES, or RC4), the attacker can crash the KDC by making an S4U2Self request.
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
|
Medium
| 168,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0;
else
outpkt.priority = -1;
memcpy(outpkt.data, buffer, len);
receive_packet(c->node, &outpkt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the receive_tcppacket function in net_packet.c in tinc before 1.0.21 and 1.1 before 1.1pre7 allows remote authenticated peers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a large TCP packet.
Commit Message: Drop packets forwarded via TCP if they are too big (CVE-2013-1428).
Normally all requests sent via the meta connections are checked so that they
cannot be larger than the input buffer. However, when packets are forwarded via
meta connections, they are copied into a packet buffer without checking whether
it fits into it. Since the packet buffer is allocated on the stack, this in
effect allows an authenticated remote node to cause a stack overflow.
This issue was found by Martin Schobert.
|
Low
| 166,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InputMethodLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetInputMethodLibrary() {
return input_method_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int perf_swevent_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = this_cpu_ptr(&swevent_htable);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
struct hlist_head *head;
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
perf_swevent_set_period(event);
}
hwc->state = !(flags & PERF_EF_START);
head = find_swevent_head(swhash, event);
if (!head) {
/*
* We can race with cpu hotplug code. Do not
* WARN if the cpu just got unplugged.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(swhash->online);
return -EINVAL;
}
hlist_add_head_rcu(&event->hlist_entry, head);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging incorrect handling of an swevent data structure during a CPU unplug operation.
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
High
| 167,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_syscall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
u64 efer = 0;
/* syscall is not available in real mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
msr_data >>= 32;
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data & 0xfffc);
ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 8);
if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
}
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ctxt->_eip;
if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_R11] = ctxt->eflags & ~EFLG_RF;
ops->get_msr(ctxt,
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ?
MSR_LSTAR : MSR_CSTAR, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = msr_data;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, &msr_data);
ctxt->eflags &= ~(msr_data | EFLG_RF);
#endif
} else {
/* legacy mode */
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = (u32)msr_data;
ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF | EFLG_RF);
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The em_syscall function in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.14 does not properly handle the 0f05 (aka syscall) opcode, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application, as demonstrated by an NASM file.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 165,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the gnutls_session_get_data function in lib/gnutls_session.c in GnuTLS 2.12.x before 2.12.14 and 3.x before 3.0.7, when used on a client that performs nonstandard session resumption, allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a large SessionTicket.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t nr)
{
const unsigned char *b = buf;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
int c;
ssize_t retval = 0;
/* Job control check -- must be done at start (POSIX.1 7.1.1.4). */
if (L_TOSTOP(tty) && file->f_op->write != redirected_tty_write) {
retval = tty_check_change(tty);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
/* Write out any echoed characters that are still pending */
process_echoes(tty);
add_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (tty_hung_up_p(file) || (tty->link && !tty->link->count)) {
retval = -EIO;
break;
}
if (O_OPOST(tty)) {
while (nr > 0) {
ssize_t num = process_output_block(tty, b, nr);
if (num < 0) {
if (num == -EAGAIN)
break;
retval = num;
goto break_out;
}
b += num;
nr -= num;
if (nr == 0)
break;
c = *b;
if (process_output(c, tty) < 0)
break;
b++; nr--;
}
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
} else {
while (nr > 0) {
c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr);
if (c < 0) {
retval = c;
goto break_out;
}
if (!c)
break;
b += c;
nr -= c;
}
}
if (!nr)
break;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
schedule();
down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
}
break_out:
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
if (b - buf != nr && tty->fasync)
set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
return (b - buf) ? b - buf : retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The n_tty_write function in drivers/tty/n_tty.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.3 does not properly manage tty driver access in the *LECHO & !OPOST* case, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or gain privileges by triggering a race condition involving read and write operations with long strings.
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: eigrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct eigrp_common_header *eigrp_com_header;
const struct eigrp_tlv_header *eigrp_tlv_header;
const u_char *tptr,*tlv_tptr;
u_int tlen,eigrp_tlv_len,eigrp_tlv_type,tlv_tlen, byte_length, bit_length;
uint8_t prefix[4];
union {
const struct eigrp_tlv_general_parm_t *eigrp_tlv_general_parm;
const struct eigrp_tlv_sw_version_t *eigrp_tlv_sw_version;
const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_int_t *eigrp_tlv_ip_int;
const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_ext_t *eigrp_tlv_ip_ext;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup_t *eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_int_t *eigrp_tlv_at_int;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_ext_t *eigrp_tlv_at_ext;
} tlv_ptr;
tptr=pptr;
eigrp_com_header = (const struct eigrp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*eigrp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (eigrp_com_header->version != EIGRP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EIGRP version %u packet not supported",eigrp_com_header->version));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EIGRP %s, length: %u",
tok2str(eigrp_opcode_values, "unknown (%u)",eigrp_com_header->opcode),
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tlen=len-sizeof(struct eigrp_common_header);
/* FIXME print other header info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tEIGRP v%u, opcode: %s (%u), chksum: 0x%04x, Flags: [%s]\n\tseq: 0x%08x, ack: 0x%08x, AS: %u, length: %u",
eigrp_com_header->version,
tok2str(eigrp_opcode_values, "unknown, type: %u",eigrp_com_header->opcode),
eigrp_com_header->opcode,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_com_header->checksum),
tok2str(eigrp_common_header_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->flags)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->ack),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->asn),
tlen));
tptr+=sizeof(const struct eigrp_common_header);
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header));
eigrp_tlv_header = (const struct eigrp_tlv_header *)tptr;
eigrp_tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_tlv_header->length);
eigrp_tlv_type=EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_tlv_header->type);
if (eigrp_tlv_len < sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header) ||
eigrp_tlv_len > tlen) {
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header),"\n\t ",tlen);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u",
tok2str(eigrp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
eigrp_tlv_type),
eigrp_tlv_type,
eigrp_tlv_len));
tlv_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header);
tlv_tlen=eigrp_tlv_len-sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, eigrp_tlv_len);
switch(eigrp_tlv_type) {
case EIGRP_TLV_GENERAL_PARM:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm = (const struct eigrp_tlv_general_parm_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t holdtime: %us, k1 %u, k2 %u, k3 %u, k4 %u, k5 %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->holdtime),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k1,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k2,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k3,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k4,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k5));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_SW_VERSION:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version = (const struct eigrp_tlv_sw_version_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IOS version: %u.%u, EIGRP version %u.%u",
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->ios_major,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->ios_minor,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->eigrp_major,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->eigrp_minor));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_IP_INT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int = (const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_int_t *)tlv_tptr;
bit_length = tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->plen;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t illegal prefix length %u",bit_length));
break;
}
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* variable length encoding */
memset(prefix, 0, 4);
memcpy(prefix,&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->destination,byte_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 prefix: %15s/%u, nexthop: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, &tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->nexthop)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_IP_EXT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext = (const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_ext_t *)tlv_tptr;
bit_length = tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->plen;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t illegal prefix length %u",bit_length));
break;
}
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* variable length encoding */
memset(prefix, 0, 4);
memcpy(prefix,&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->destination,byte_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 prefix: %15s/%u, nexthop: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, &tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->nexthop)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t origin-router %s, origin-as %u, origin-proto %s, flags [0x%02x], tag 0x%08x, metric %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->origin_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->origin_as),
tok2str(eigrp_ext_proto_id_values,"unknown",tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->proto_id),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->flags,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->tag),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->metric)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_CABLE_SETUP:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-range: %u-%u, Router-ID %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->cable_end),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->router_id)));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_INT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_int_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-Range: %u-%u, nexthop: ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->cable_end)));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop[2])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_EXT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_ext_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-Range: %u-%u, nexthop: ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->cable_end)));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop[2])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t origin-router %u, origin-as %u, origin-proto %s, flags [0x%02x], tag 0x%08x, metric %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->origin_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->origin_as),
tok2str(eigrp_ext_proto_id_values,"unknown",tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->proto_id),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->flags,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->tag),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->metric)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->load));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case EIGRP_TLV_AUTH:
case EIGRP_TLV_SEQ:
case EIGRP_TLV_MCAST_SEQ:
case EIGRP_TLV_IPX_INT:
case EIGRP_TLV_IPX_EXT:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tlv_tptr,"\n\t ",tlv_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header),"\n\t ",
eigrp_tlv_len-sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header));
tptr+=eigrp_tlv_len;
tlen-=eigrp_tlv_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The EIGRP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-eigrp.c:eigrp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12901/EIGRP: Do more length checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: transform_image_validate(transform_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
/* Constants for the loop below: */
PNG_CONST png_store* PNG_CONST ps = dp->this.ps;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_ct = dp->this.colour_type;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_bd = dp->this.bit_depth;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 w = dp->this.w;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 h = dp->this.h;
PNG_CONST png_byte out_ct = dp->output_colour_type;
PNG_CONST png_byte out_bd = dp->output_bit_depth;
PNG_CONST png_byte sample_depth = (png_byte)(out_ct ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE ? 8 : out_bd);
PNG_CONST png_byte red_sBIT = dp->this.red_sBIT;
PNG_CONST png_byte green_sBIT = dp->this.green_sBIT;
PNG_CONST png_byte blue_sBIT = dp->this.blue_sBIT;
PNG_CONST png_byte alpha_sBIT = dp->this.alpha_sBIT;
PNG_CONST int have_tRNS = dp->this.is_transparent;
double digitization_error;
store_palette out_palette;
png_uint_32 y;
UNUSED(pi)
/* Check for row overwrite errors */
store_image_check(dp->this.ps, pp, 0);
/* Read the palette corresponding to the output if the output colour type
* indicates a palette, othewise set out_palette to garbage.
*/
if (out_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
/* Validate that the palette count itself has not changed - this is not
* expected.
*/
int npalette = (-1);
(void)read_palette(out_palette, &npalette, pp, pi);
if (npalette != dp->this.npalette)
png_error(pp, "unexpected change in palette size");
digitization_error = .5;
}
else
{
png_byte in_sample_depth;
memset(out_palette, 0x5e, sizeof out_palette);
/* use-input-precision means assume that if the input has 8 bit (or less)
* samples and the output has 16 bit samples the calculations will be done
* with 8 bit precision, not 16.
*/
if (in_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE || in_bd < 16)
in_sample_depth = 8;
else
in_sample_depth = in_bd;
if (sample_depth != 16 || in_sample_depth > 8 ||
!dp->pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
digitization_error = .5;
/* Else calculations are at 8 bit precision, and the output actually
* consists of scaled 8-bit values, so scale .5 in 8 bits to the 16 bits:
*/
else
digitization_error = .5 * 257;
}
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep PNG_CONST pRow = store_image_row(ps, pp, 0, y);
png_uint_32 x;
/* The original, standard, row pre-transforms. */
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, std, in_ct, in_bd, y);
/* Go through each original pixel transforming it and comparing with what
* libpng did to the same pixel.
*/
for (x=0; x<w; ++x)
{
image_pixel in_pixel, out_pixel;
unsigned int r, g, b, a;
/* Find out what we think the pixel should be: */
image_pixel_init(&in_pixel, std, in_ct, in_bd, x, dp->this.palette);
in_pixel.red_sBIT = red_sBIT;
in_pixel.green_sBIT = green_sBIT;
in_pixel.blue_sBIT = blue_sBIT;
in_pixel.alpha_sBIT = alpha_sBIT;
in_pixel.have_tRNS = have_tRNS;
/* For error detection, below. */
r = in_pixel.red;
g = in_pixel.green;
b = in_pixel.blue;
a = in_pixel.alpha;
dp->transform_list->mod(dp->transform_list, &in_pixel, pp, dp);
/* Read the output pixel and compare it to what we got, we don't
* use the error field here, so no need to update sBIT.
*/
image_pixel_init(&out_pixel, pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, out_palette);
/* We don't expect changes to the index here even if the bit depth is
* changed.
*/
if (in_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
out_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (in_pixel.palette_index != out_pixel.palette_index)
png_error(pp, "unexpected transformed palette index");
}
/* Check the colours for palette images too - in fact the palette could
* be separately verified itself in most cases.
*/
if (in_pixel.red != out_pixel.red)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.red, in_pixel.redf,
out_pixel.red, sample_depth, in_pixel.rede,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.red_sBIT)-1)), "red/gray",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0 &&
in_pixel.green != out_pixel.green)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.green,
in_pixel.greenf, out_pixel.green, sample_depth, in_pixel.greene,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.green_sBIT)-1)), "green",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0 &&
in_pixel.blue != out_pixel.blue)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.blue, in_pixel.bluef,
out_pixel.blue, sample_depth, in_pixel.bluee,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.blue_sBIT)-1)), "blue",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 &&
in_pixel.alpha != out_pixel.alpha)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.alpha,
in_pixel.alphaf, out_pixel.alpha, sample_depth, in_pixel.alphae,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.alpha_sBIT)-1)), "alpha",
digitization_error);
} /* pixel (x) loop */
} /* row (y) loop */
/* Record that something was actually checked to avoid a false positive. */
dp->this.ps->validated = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StartSync(const StartSyncArgs& args,
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::StartSyncMode start_mode) {
if (start_mode == OneClickSigninSyncStarter::UNDO_SYNC) {
LogOneClickHistogramValue(one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_UNDO);
return;
}
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::ConfirmationRequired confirmation =
args.confirmation_required;
if (start_mode == OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST &&
confirmation == OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_UNTRUSTED_SIGNIN) {
confirmation = OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_AFTER_SIGNIN;
}
new OneClickSigninSyncStarter(args.profile, args.browser, args.session_index,
args.email, args.password, start_mode,
args.force_same_tab_navigation,
confirmation);
int action = one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX;
switch (args.auto_accept) {
case OneClickSigninHelper::AUTO_ACCEPT_EXPLICIT:
break;
case OneClickSigninHelper::AUTO_ACCEPT_ACCEPTED:
action =
start_mode == OneClickSigninSyncStarter::SYNC_WITH_DEFAULT_SETTINGS ?
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_AUTO_WITH_DEFAULTS :
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_AUTO_WITH_ADVANCED;
break;
action = one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_AUTO_WITH_DEFAULTS;
break;
case OneClickSigninHelper::AUTO_ACCEPT_CONFIGURE:
DCHECK(start_mode == OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST);
action = one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_AUTO_WITH_ADVANCED;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid auto_accept: " << args.auto_accept;
break;
}
if (action != one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX)
LogOneClickHistogramValue(action);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly determine the circumstances in which a renderer process can be considered a trusted process for sign-in and subsequent sync operations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct phishing attacks via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,244
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWindow(
RenderFrameHost* opener,
int32_t render_view_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_widget_route_id,
const mojom::CreateNewWindowParams& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
DCHECK_EQ((render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
(main_frame_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
DCHECK_EQ((render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
(main_frame_widget_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
DCHECK(opener);
int render_process_id = opener->GetProcess()->GetID();
SiteInstance* source_site_instance = opener->GetSiteInstance();
DCHECK(!RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id));
bool is_guest = BrowserPluginGuest::IsGuest(this);
DCHECK(!params.opener_suppressed || render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> site_instance =
params.opener_suppressed && !is_guest
? SiteInstance::CreateForURL(GetBrowserContext(), params.target_url)
: source_site_instance;
const std::string& partition_id =
GetContentClient()->browser()->
GetStoragePartitionIdForSite(GetBrowserContext(),
site_instance->GetSiteURL());
StoragePartition* partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetBrowserContext(), site_instance.get());
DOMStorageContextWrapper* dom_storage_context =
static_cast<DOMStorageContextWrapper*>(partition->GetDOMStorageContext());
SessionStorageNamespaceImpl* session_storage_namespace_impl =
static_cast<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl*>(session_storage_namespace);
CHECK(session_storage_namespace_impl->IsFromContext(dom_storage_context));
if (delegate_ &&
!delegate_->ShouldCreateWebContents(
this, opener, source_site_instance, render_view_route_id,
main_frame_route_id, main_frame_widget_route_id,
params.window_container_type, opener->GetLastCommittedURL(),
params.frame_name, params.target_url, partition_id,
session_storage_namespace)) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id);
if (rfh) {
DCHECK(rfh->IsRenderFrameLive());
rfh->Init();
}
return;
}
CreateParams create_params(GetBrowserContext(), site_instance.get());
create_params.routing_id = render_view_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_routing_id = main_frame_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_widget_routing_id = main_frame_widget_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_name = params.frame_name;
create_params.opener_render_process_id = render_process_id;
create_params.opener_render_frame_id = opener->GetRoutingID();
create_params.opener_suppressed = params.opener_suppressed;
if (params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB)
create_params.initially_hidden = true;
create_params.renderer_initiated_creation =
main_frame_route_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
WebContentsImpl* new_contents = NULL;
if (!is_guest) {
create_params.context = view_->GetNativeView();
create_params.initial_size = GetContainerBounds().size();
new_contents = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(
WebContents::Create(create_params));
} else {
new_contents = GetBrowserPluginGuest()->CreateNewGuestWindow(create_params);
}
new_contents->GetController().SetSessionStorageNamespace(
partition_id,
session_storage_namespace);
if (!params.frame_name.empty())
new_contents->GetRenderManager()->CreateProxiesForNewNamedFrame();
if (!params.opener_suppressed) {
if (!is_guest) {
WebContentsView* new_view = new_contents->view_.get();
new_view->CreateViewForWidget(
new_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget(), false);
}
DCHECK_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, main_frame_widget_route_id);
pending_contents_[std::make_pair(
render_process_id, main_frame_widget_route_id)] = new_contents;
AddDestructionObserver(new_contents);
}
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->WebContentsCreated(this, render_process_id,
opener->GetRoutingID(), params.frame_name,
params.target_url, new_contents);
}
if (opener) {
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
observer.DidOpenRequestedURL(new_contents, opener, params.target_url,
params.referrer, params.disposition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
false, // started_from_context_menu
true); // renderer_initiated
}
}
if (params.opener_suppressed) {
bool was_blocked = false;
if (delegate_) {
gfx::Rect initial_rect;
base::WeakPtr<WebContentsImpl> weak_new_contents =
new_contents->weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
delegate_->AddNewContents(
this, new_contents, params.disposition, initial_rect,
params.user_gesture, &was_blocked);
if (!weak_new_contents)
return; // The delegate deleted |new_contents| during AddNewContents().
}
if (!was_blocked) {
OpenURLParams open_params(params.target_url, params.referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */);
open_params.user_gesture = params.user_gesture;
if (delegate_ && !is_guest &&
!delegate_->ShouldResumeRequestsForCreatedWindow()) {
new_contents->delayed_open_url_params_.reset(
new OpenURLParams(open_params));
} else {
new_contents->OpenURL(open_params);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
|
Medium
| 172,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_png(FILE *fp)
{
png_structp png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,0,0,0);
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return 0;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return 0;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, fp);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS, NULL, 0);
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
row = malloc(rowbytes);
display = malloc(rowbytes);
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free(row);
free(display);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,719
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
{
/* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
do {
while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
&p[s->init_num],
SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
return 0;
}
if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
* in the middle of a handshake message.
*/
if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
s->init_num = i - 1;
s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
return 1;
} else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
s->init_num += i;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/*
* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
* their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
* MAC.
*/
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
s->init_num = 0;
skip_message = 1;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
} while (skip_message);
/* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
*mt = *p;
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
/*
* Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
* ClientHello
*
* Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
* plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
*/
l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The state-machine implementation in OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0a allocates memory before checking for an excessive length, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via crafted TLS messages, related to statem/statem.c and statem/statem_lib.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,963
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
|
Low
| 169,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Strgrow(Str x)
{
char *old = x->ptr;
int newlen;
newlen = x->length * 6 / 5;
if (newlen == x->length)
newlen += 2;
x->ptr = GC_MALLOC_ATOMIC(newlen);
x->area_size = newlen;
bcopy((void *)old, (void *)x->ptr, x->length);
GC_free(old);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Tatsuya Kinoshita w3m fork before 0.5.3-31. w3m allows remote attackers to cause memory corruption in certain conditions via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #27 from kcwu/fix-strgrow
Fix potential heap buffer corruption due to Strgrow
|
Medium
| 166,892
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 174,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Document::SetFocusedElement(Element* new_focused_element,
const FocusParams& params) {
DCHECK(!lifecycle_.InDetach());
clear_focused_element_timer_.Stop();
if (new_focused_element && (new_focused_element->GetDocument() != this))
return true;
if (NodeChildRemovalTracker::IsBeingRemoved(new_focused_element))
return true;
if (focused_element_ == new_focused_element)
return true;
bool focus_change_blocked = false;
Element* old_focused_element = focused_element_;
focused_element_ = nullptr;
UpdateDistributionForFlatTreeTraversal();
Node* ancestor = (old_focused_element && old_focused_element->isConnected() &&
new_focused_element)
? FlatTreeTraversal::CommonAncestor(*old_focused_element,
*new_focused_element)
: nullptr;
if (old_focused_element) {
old_focused_element->SetFocused(false, params.type);
old_focused_element->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(false, ancestor);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
old_focused_element->DispatchBlurEvent(new_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(event_type_names::kFocusout,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(event_type_names::kDOMFocusOut,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
}
}
if (new_focused_element)
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTreeForNode(new_focused_element);
if (new_focused_element && new_focused_element->IsFocusable()) {
if (IsRootEditableElement(*new_focused_element) &&
!AcceptsEditingFocus(*new_focused_element)) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_ = new_focused_element;
SetSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(focused_element_.Get());
if (params.type != kWebFocusTypeNone)
last_focus_type_ = params.type;
focused_element_->SetFocused(true, params.type);
focused_element_->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(true, ancestor);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
CancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
EnsurePaintLocationDataValidForNode(focused_element_);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->UpdateFocusAppearanceWithOptions(
params.selection_behavior, params.options);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
focused_element_->DispatchFocusEvent(old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(event_type_names::kFocusin,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(event_type_names::kDOMFocusIn,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && focused_element_) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = ExistingAXObjectCache()) {
cache->HandleFocusedUIElementChanged(old_focused_element,
new_focused_element);
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && GetPage()) {
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().FocusedNodeChanged(old_focused_element,
focused_element_.Get());
}
SetFocusedElementDone:
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
if (LocalFrame* frame = GetFrame())
frame->Selection().DidChangeFocus();
return !focus_change_blocked;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: WebKit/Source/bindings/modules/v8/V8BindingForModules.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.113, does not properly consider getter side effects during array key conversion, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Indexed Database (aka IndexedDB) API calls.
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
Medium
| 172,046
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderProcessImpl::RenderProcessImpl()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(shared_mem_cache_cleaner_(
FROM_HERE, base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(5),
this, &RenderProcessImpl::ClearTransportDIBCache)),
transport_dib_next_sequence_number_(0) {
in_process_plugins_ = InProcessPlugins();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(shared_mem_cache_); ++i)
shared_mem_cache_[i] = NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (GetModuleHandle(L"LPK.DLL") == NULL) {
typedef BOOL (__stdcall *GdiInitializeLanguagePack)(int LoadedShapingDLLs);
GdiInitializeLanguagePack gdi_init_lpk =
reinterpret_cast<GdiInitializeLanguagePack>(GetProcAddress(
GetModuleHandle(L"GDI32.DLL"),
"GdiInitializeLanguagePack"));
DCHECK(gdi_init_lpk);
if (gdi_init_lpk) {
gdi_init_lpk(0);
}
}
#endif
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(
"--debugger-auto-break"
" --prof --prof-lazy");
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kJavaScriptFlags)) {
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kJavaScriptFlags));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,017
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_sei_message(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD32 ui4_payload_type, ui4_payload_size;
UWORD32 u4_bits;
WORD32 i4_status = 0;
do
{
ui4_payload_type = 0;
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
while(0xff == u4_bits)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
ui4_payload_type += 255;
}
ui4_payload_type += u4_bits;
ui4_payload_size = 0;
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
while(0xff == u4_bits)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
ui4_payload_size += 255;
}
ui4_payload_size += u4_bits;
i4_status = ih264d_parse_sei_payload(ps_bitstrm, ui4_payload_type,
ui4_payload_size, ps_dec);
if(i4_status == -1)
{
i4_status = 0;
break;
}
if(i4_status != OK)
return i4_status;
if(ih264d_check_byte_aligned(ps_bitstrm) == 0)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(0 == u4_bits)
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nError in parsing SEI message");
}
while(0 == ih264d_check_byte_aligned(ps_bitstrm))
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(u4_bits)
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nError in parsing SEI message");
}
}
}
}
while(ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst < ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst);
return (i4_status);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libavc). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-63122634.
Commit Message: Decoder: Increased allocation and added checks in sei parsing.
This prevents heap overflow while parsing sei_message.
Bug: 63122634
Test: ran PoC on unpatched/patched
Change-Id: I61c1ff4ac053a060be8c24da4671db985cac628c
(cherry picked from commit f2b70d353768af8d4ead7f32497be05f197925ef)
|
Low
| 174,107
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadRLEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SkipLinesOp 0x01
#define SetColorOp 0x02
#define SkipPixelsOp 0x03
#define ByteDataOp 0x05
#define RunDataOp 0x06
#define EOFOp 0x07
char
magick[12];
Image
*image;
int
opcode,
operand,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
map_length,
number_colormaps,
number_planes,
one,
offset,
pixel_info_length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
background_color[256],
*colormap,
pixel,
plane,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Determine if this a RLE file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 2) || (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->page.x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->page.y=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flags=(MagickStatusType) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->alpha_trait=flags & 0x04 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
number_planes=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
number_colormaps=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
map_length=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (map_length >= 64)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
map_length=one << map_length;
if ((number_planes == 0) || (number_planes == 2) || (bits_per_pixel != 8) ||
(image->columns == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (flags & 0x02)
{
/*
No background color-- initialize to black.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
background_color[i]=0;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize background color.
*/
p=background_color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((number_planes & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
/*
Read image colormaps.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_colormaps,
3*map_length*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colormaps; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) map_length; x++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
}
if ((flags & 0x08) != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
Read image comment.
*/
length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (length != 0)
{
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length-1,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length-1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if ((length & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate RLE pixels.
*/
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
number_planes++;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*number_planes) != (size_t) (number_pixels*number_planes))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info_length=image->columns*image->rows*MagickMax(number_planes,4);
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(pixel_info_length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((flags & 0x01) && !(flags & 0x02))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Set background color.
*/
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_planes; j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
else
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (number_planes-1); j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
*p++=0; /* initialize matte channel */
}
}
}
/*
Read runlength-encoded image.
*/
plane=0;
x=0;
y=0;
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
do
{
switch (opcode & 0x3f)
{
case SkipLinesOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
x=0;
y+=operand;
break;
}
case SetColorOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
plane=(unsigned char) operand;
if (plane == 255)
plane=(unsigned char) (number_planes-1);
x=0;
break;
}
case SkipPixelsOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case ByteDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if (offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length)
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
if (operand & 0x01)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case RunDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if (offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length)
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
x+=operand;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (((opcode & 0x3f) != EOFOp) && (opcode != EOF));
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
MagickStatusType
mask;
/*
Apply colormap affineation to image.
*/
mask=(MagickStatusType) (map_length-1);
p=pixels;
x=(ssize_t) number_planes;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,*p & mask,&index,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
break;
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
else
if ((number_planes >= 3) && (number_colormaps >= 3))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_planes; x++)
{
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (x*map_length+
(*p & mask)),&index,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
if ((i < (ssize_t) number_pixels) || (x < (ssize_t) number_planes))
{
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (number_planes >= 3)
{
/*
Convert raster image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (number_colormaps == 0)
map_length=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,map_length,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Pseudocolor.
*/
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
else
if (number_colormaps > 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*p);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length));
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length*2));
p++;
}
p=pixels;
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
/*
Convert raster image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
else
{
/*
Image has a matte channel-- promote to DirectClass.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,
exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].red),q);
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,
exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].green),q);
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,
exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->colors=0;
}
}
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadRLEImage function in coders/rle.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors related to the number of pixels.
Commit Message: Fixed check for the number of pixels that will be allocated.
|
Medium
| 168,808
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, __construct)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
char *path;
int len;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &path, &len) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, path, len, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
/* intern->type = SPL_FS_INFO; already set */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,038
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WindowOpenDisposition TestBrowserWindow::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
return WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A missing check for popup window handling in Fullscreen in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
Medium
| 173,208
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplChromeOs::Speak(
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& locale,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
chromeos::CrosLibrary* cros_library = chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get();
if (!cros_library->EnsureLoaded()) {
set_error(kCrosLibraryNotLoadedError);
return false;
}
std::string options;
if (!locale.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyLocale,
locale,
&options);
}
if (!gender.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyGender,
gender,
&options);
}
if (rate >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyRate,
DoubleToString(rate * 5),
&options);
}
if (pitch >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyPitch,
DoubleToString(pitch * 2),
&options);
}
if (volume >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyVolume,
DoubleToString(volume * 5),
&options);
}
if (!options.empty()) {
cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->SetSpeakProperties(
options.c_str());
}
return cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->Speak(utterance.c_str());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,399
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gamma_component_validate(PNG_CONST char *name, PNG_CONST validate_info *vi,
PNG_CONST unsigned int id, PNG_CONST unsigned int od,
PNG_CONST double alpha /* <0 for the alpha channel itself */,
PNG_CONST double background /* component background value */)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int isbit = id >> vi->isbit_shift;
PNG_CONST unsigned int sbit_max = vi->sbit_max;
PNG_CONST unsigned int outmax = vi->outmax;
PNG_CONST int do_background = vi->do_background;
double i;
/* First check on the 'perfect' result obtained from the digitized input
* value, id, and compare this against the actual digitized result, 'od'.
* 'i' is the input result in the range 0..1:
*/
i = isbit; i /= sbit_max;
/* Check for the fast route: if we don't do any background composition or if
* this is the alpha channel ('alpha' < 0) or if the pixel is opaque then
* just use the gamma_correction field to correct to the final output gamma.
*/
if (alpha == 1 /* opaque pixel component */ || !do_background
#ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
|| do_background == ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_PNG
#endif
|| (alpha < 0 /* alpha channel */
#ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
&& do_background != ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_BROKEN
#endif
))
{
/* Then get the gamma corrected version of 'i' and compare to 'od', any
* error less than .5 is insignificant - just quantization of the output
* value to the nearest digital value (nevertheless the error is still
* recorded - it's interesting ;-)
*/
double encoded_sample = i;
double encoded_error;
/* alpha less than 0 indicates the alpha channel, which is always linear
*/
if (alpha >= 0 && vi->gamma_correction > 0)
encoded_sample = pow(encoded_sample, vi->gamma_correction);
encoded_sample *= outmax;
encoded_error = fabs(od-encoded_sample);
if (encoded_error > vi->dp->maxerrout)
vi->dp->maxerrout = encoded_error;
if (encoded_error < vi->maxout_total && encoded_error < vi->outlog)
return i;
}
/* The slow route - attempt to do linear calculations. */
/* There may be an error, or background processing is required, so calculate
* the actual sample values - unencoded light intensity values. Note that in
* practice these are not completely unencoded because they include a
* 'viewing correction' to decrease or (normally) increase the perceptual
* contrast of the image. There's nothing we can do about this - we don't
* know what it is - so assume the unencoded value is perceptually linear.
*/
{
double input_sample = i; /* In range 0..1 */
double output, error, encoded_sample, encoded_error;
double es_lo, es_hi;
int compose = 0; /* Set to one if composition done */
int output_is_encoded; /* Set if encoded to screen gamma */
int log_max_error = 1; /* Check maximum error values */
png_const_charp pass = 0; /* Reason test passes (or 0 for fail) */
/* Convert to linear light (with the above caveat.) The alpha channel is
* already linear.
*/
if (alpha >= 0)
{
int tcompose;
if (vi->file_inverse > 0)
input_sample = pow(input_sample, vi->file_inverse);
/* Handle the compose processing: */
tcompose = 0;
input_sample = gamma_component_compose(do_background, input_sample,
alpha, background, &tcompose);
if (tcompose)
compose = 1;
}
/* And similarly for the output value, but we need to check the background
* handling to linearize it correctly.
*/
output = od;
output /= outmax;
output_is_encoded = vi->screen_gamma > 0;
if (alpha < 0) /* The alpha channel */
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
if (do_background != ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_BROKEN)
#endif
{
/* In all other cases the output alpha channel is linear already,
* don't log errors here, they are much larger in linear data.
*/
output_is_encoded = 0;
log_max_error = 0;
}
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
else /* A component */
{
if (do_background == ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED &&
alpha < 1) /* the optimized case - linear output */
{
if (alpha > 0) log_max_error = 0;
output_is_encoded = 0;
}
}
#endif
if (output_is_encoded)
output = pow(output, vi->screen_gamma);
/* Calculate (or recalculate) the encoded_sample value and repeat the
* check above (unnecessary if we took the fast route, but harmless.)
*/
encoded_sample = input_sample;
if (output_is_encoded)
encoded_sample = pow(encoded_sample, vi->screen_inverse);
encoded_sample *= outmax;
encoded_error = fabs(od-encoded_sample);
/* Don't log errors in the alpha channel, or the 'optimized' case,
* neither are significant to the overall perception.
*/
if (log_max_error && encoded_error > vi->dp->maxerrout)
vi->dp->maxerrout = encoded_error;
if (encoded_error < vi->maxout_total)
{
if (encoded_error < vi->outlog)
return i;
/* Test passed but error is bigger than the log limit, record why the
* test passed:
*/
pass = "less than maxout:\n";
}
/* i: the original input value in the range 0..1
*
* pngvalid calculations:
* input_sample: linear result; i linearized and composed, range 0..1
* encoded_sample: encoded result; input_sample scaled to ouput bit depth
*
* libpng calculations:
* output: linear result; od scaled to 0..1 and linearized
* od: encoded result from libpng
*/
/* Now we have the numbers for real errors, both absolute values as as a
* percentage of the correct value (output):
*/
error = fabs(input_sample-output);
if (log_max_error && error > vi->dp->maxerrabs)
vi->dp->maxerrabs = error;
/* The following is an attempt to ignore the tendency of quantization to
* dominate the percentage errors for lower result values:
*/
if (log_max_error && input_sample > .5)
{
double percentage_error = error/input_sample;
if (percentage_error > vi->dp->maxerrpc)
vi->dp->maxerrpc = percentage_error;
}
/* Now calculate the digitization limits for 'encoded_sample' using the
* 'max' values. Note that maxout is in the encoded space but maxpc and
* maxabs are in linear light space.
*
* First find the maximum error in linear light space, range 0..1:
*/
{
double tmp = input_sample * vi->maxpc;
if (tmp < vi->maxabs) tmp = vi->maxabs;
/* If 'compose' is true the composition was done in linear space using
* integer arithmetic. This introduces an extra error of +/- 0.5 (at
* least) in the integer space used. 'maxcalc' records this, taking
* into account the possibility that even for 16 bit output 8 bit space
* may have been used.
*/
if (compose && tmp < vi->maxcalc) tmp = vi->maxcalc;
/* The 'maxout' value refers to the encoded result, to compare with
* this encode input_sample adjusted by the maximum error (tmp) above.
*/
es_lo = encoded_sample - vi->maxout;
if (es_lo > 0 && input_sample-tmp > 0)
{
double low_value = input_sample-tmp;
if (output_is_encoded)
low_value = pow(low_value, vi->screen_inverse);
low_value *= outmax;
if (low_value < es_lo) es_lo = low_value;
/* Quantize this appropriately: */
es_lo = ceil(es_lo / vi->outquant - .5) * vi->outquant;
}
else
es_lo = 0;
es_hi = encoded_sample + vi->maxout;
if (es_hi < outmax && input_sample+tmp < 1)
{
double high_value = input_sample+tmp;
if (output_is_encoded)
high_value = pow(high_value, vi->screen_inverse);
high_value *= outmax;
if (high_value > es_hi) es_hi = high_value;
es_hi = floor(es_hi / vi->outquant + .5) * vi->outquant;
}
else
es_hi = outmax;
}
/* The primary test is that the final encoded value returned by the
* library should be between the two limits (inclusive) that were
* calculated above.
*/
if (od >= es_lo && od <= es_hi)
{
/* The value passes, but we may need to log the information anyway. */
if (encoded_error < vi->outlog)
return i;
if (pass == 0)
pass = "within digitization limits:\n";
}
{
/* There has been an error in processing, or we need to log this
* value.
*/
double is_lo, is_hi;
/* pass is set at this point if either of the tests above would have
* passed. Don't do these additional tests here - just log the
* original [es_lo..es_hi] values.
*/
if (pass == 0 && vi->use_input_precision && vi->dp->sbit)
{
/* Ok, something is wrong - this actually happens in current libpng
* 16-to-8 processing. Assume that the input value (id, adjusted
* for sbit) can be anywhere between value-.5 and value+.5 - quite a
* large range if sbit is low.
*
* NOTE: at present because the libpng gamma table stuff has been
* changed to use a rounding algorithm to correct errors in 8-bit
* calculations the precise sbit calculation (a shift) has been
* lost. This can result in up to a +/-1 error in the presence of
* an sbit less than the bit depth.
*/
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
# define SBIT_ERROR .5
# else
# define SBIT_ERROR 1.
# endif
double tmp = (isbit - SBIT_ERROR)/sbit_max;
if (tmp <= 0)
tmp = 0;
else if (alpha >= 0 && vi->file_inverse > 0 && tmp < 1)
tmp = pow(tmp, vi->file_inverse);
tmp = gamma_component_compose(do_background, tmp, alpha, background,
NULL);
if (output_is_encoded && tmp > 0 && tmp < 1)
tmp = pow(tmp, vi->screen_inverse);
is_lo = ceil(outmax * tmp - vi->maxout_total);
if (is_lo < 0)
is_lo = 0;
tmp = (isbit + SBIT_ERROR)/sbit_max;
if (tmp >= 1)
tmp = 1;
else if (alpha >= 0 && vi->file_inverse > 0 && tmp < 1)
tmp = pow(tmp, vi->file_inverse);
tmp = gamma_component_compose(do_background, tmp, alpha, background,
NULL);
if (output_is_encoded && tmp > 0 && tmp < 1)
tmp = pow(tmp, vi->screen_inverse);
is_hi = floor(outmax * tmp + vi->maxout_total);
if (is_hi > outmax)
is_hi = outmax;
if (!(od < is_lo || od > is_hi))
{
if (encoded_error < vi->outlog)
return i;
pass = "within input precision limits:\n";
}
/* One last chance. If this is an alpha channel and the 16to8
* option has been used and 'inaccurate' scaling is used then the
* bit reduction is obtained by simply using the top 8 bits of the
* value.
*
* This is only done for older libpng versions when the 'inaccurate'
* (chop) method of scaling was used.
*/
# ifndef PNG_READ_16_TO_8_ACCURATE_SCALE_SUPPORTED
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10504
/* This may be required for other components in the future,
* but at present the presence of gamma correction effectively
* prevents the errors in the component scaling (I don't quite
* understand why, but since it's better this way I care not
* to ask, JB 20110419.)
*/
if (pass == 0 && alpha < 0 && vi->scale16 && vi->sbit > 8 &&
vi->sbit + vi->isbit_shift == 16)
{
tmp = ((id >> 8) - .5)/255;
if (tmp > 0)
{
is_lo = ceil(outmax * tmp - vi->maxout_total);
if (is_lo < 0) is_lo = 0;
}
else
is_lo = 0;
tmp = ((id >> 8) + .5)/255;
if (tmp < 1)
{
is_hi = floor(outmax * tmp + vi->maxout_total);
if (is_hi > outmax) is_hi = outmax;
}
else
is_hi = outmax;
if (!(od < is_lo || od > is_hi))
{
if (encoded_error < vi->outlog)
return i;
pass = "within 8 bit limits:\n";
}
}
# endif
# endif
}
else /* !use_input_precision */
is_lo = es_lo, is_hi = es_hi;
/* Attempt to output a meaningful error/warning message: the message
* output depends on the background/composite operation being performed
* because this changes what parameters were actually used above.
*/
{
size_t pos = 0;
/* Need either 1/255 or 1/65535 precision here; 3 or 6 decimal
* places. Just use outmax to work out which.
*/
int precision = (outmax >= 1000 ? 6 : 3);
int use_input=1, use_background=0, do_compose=0;
char msg[256];
if (pass != 0)
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "\n\t");
/* Set up the various flags, the output_is_encoded flag above
* is also used below. do_compose is just a double check.
*/
switch (do_background)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_SCREEN:
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE:
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_UNIQUE:
use_background = (alpha >= 0 && alpha < 1);
/*FALL THROUGH*/
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_STANDARD:
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_BROKEN:
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED:
# endif /* ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED */
do_compose = (alpha > 0 && alpha < 1);
use_input = (alpha != 0);
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Check the 'compose' flag */
if (compose != do_compose)
png_error(vi->pp, "internal error (compose)");
/* 'name' is the component name */
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, name);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "(");
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, id);
if (use_input || pass != 0/*logging*/)
{
if (isbit != id)
{
/* sBIT has reduced the precision of the input: */
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ", sbit(");
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, vi->sbit);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "): ");
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, isbit);
}
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "/");
/* The output is either "id/max" or "id sbit(sbit): isbit/max" */
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, vi->sbit_max);
}
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ")");
/* A component may have been multiplied (in linear space) by the
* alpha value, 'compose' says whether this is relevant.
*/
if (compose || pass != 0)
{
/* If any form of composition is being done report our
* calculated linear value here (the code above doesn't record
* the input value before composition is performed, so what
* gets reported is the value after composition.)
*/
if (use_input || pass != 0)
{
if (vi->file_inverse > 0)
{
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "^");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, vi->file_inverse, 2);
}
else
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "[linear]");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "*(alpha)");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, alpha, precision);
}
/* Now record the *linear* background value if it was used
* (this function is not passed the original, non-linear,
* value but it is contained in the test name.)
*/
if (use_background)
{
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, use_input ? "+" : " ");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "(background)");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, background, precision);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "*");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, 1-alpha, precision);
}
}
/* Report the calculated value (input_sample) and the linearized
* libpng value (output) unless this is just a component gamma
* correction.
*/
if (compose || alpha < 0 || pass != 0)
{
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos,
pass != 0 ? " =\n\t" : " = ");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, input_sample, precision);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " (libpng: ");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, output, precision);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ")");
/* Finally report the output gamma encoding, if any. */
if (output_is_encoded)
{
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " ^");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, vi->screen_inverse, 2);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "(to screen) =");
}
else
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " [screen is linear] =");
}
if ((!compose && alpha >= 0) || pass != 0)
{
if (pass != 0) /* logging */
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "\n\t[overall:");
/* This is the non-composition case, the internal linear
* values are irrelevant (though the log below will reveal
* them.) Output a much shorter warning/error message and report
* the overall gamma correction.
*/
if (vi->gamma_correction > 0)
{
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " ^");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, vi->gamma_correction, 2);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "(gamma correction) =");
}
else
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos,
" [no gamma correction] =");
if (pass != 0)
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "]");
}
/* This is our calculated encoded_sample which should (but does
* not) match od:
*/
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, pass != 0 ? "\n\t" : " ");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, is_lo, 1);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " < ");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, encoded_sample, 1);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " (libpng: ");
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, od);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ")");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "/");
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, outmax);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, " < ");
pos = safecatd(msg, sizeof msg, pos, is_hi, 1);
if (pass == 0) /* The error condition */
{
# ifdef PNG_WARNINGS_SUPPORTED
png_warning(vi->pp, msg);
# else
store_warning(vi->pp, msg);
# endif
}
else /* logging this value */
store_verbose(&vi->dp->pm->this, vi->pp, pass, msg);
}
}
}
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,609
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AppControllerImpl::AppControllerImpl(Profile* profile)
//// static
: profile_(profile),
app_service_proxy_(apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile)),
url_prefix_(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
chromeos::switches::kKioskNextHomeUrlPrefix)) {
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().AddObserver(this);
if (profile) {
content::URLDataSource::Add(profile,
std::make_unique<apps::AppIconSource>(profile));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
|
Medium
| 172,079
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long tmp;
struct vm_area_struct * vma, *prev;
int unmapped_error = 0;
int error = -EINVAL;
/*
* If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address
* ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end.
* - this matches the handling in madvise.
*/
vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
if (vma && start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
for (;;) {
/* Still start < end. */
error = -ENOMEM;
if (!vma)
return error;
/* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */
if (start < vma->vm_start) {
unmapped_error = -ENOMEM;
start = vma->vm_start;
if (start >= end)
return error;
}
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (end < tmp)
tmp = end;
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */
error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, end,
(const char __user *)arg);
if (error)
return error;
start = tmp;
if (prev && start < prev->vm_end)
start = prev->vm_end;
error = unmapped_error;
if (start >= end)
return error;
if (prev)
vma = prev->vm_next;
else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The prctl_set_vma_anon_name function in kernel/sys.c in Android before 5.1.1 LMY49F and 6.0 before 2016-01-01 does not ensure that only one vma is accessed in a certain update action, which allows attackers to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (vma list corruption) via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20017123.
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
|
Medium
| 173,972
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
sprintf(url_address, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request.
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
|
Low
| 166,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_process_tx_queue(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc txd;
uint32_t txd_idx;
uint32_t data_len;
hwaddr data_pa;
for (;;) {
if (!vmxnet3_pop_next_tx_descr(s, qidx, &txd, &txd_idx)) {
break;
}
vmxnet3_dump_tx_descr(&txd);
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
data_len = (txd.len > 0) ? txd.len : VMXNET3_MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE;
data_pa = le64_to_cpu(txd.addr);
if (!vmxnet_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(s->tx_pkt,
data_pa,
data_len)) {
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = true;
}
}
if (s->tx_sop) {
vmxnet3_tx_retrieve_metadata(s, &txd);
s->tx_sop = false;
}
if (txd.eop) {
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse(s->tx_pkt);
if (s->needs_vlan) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet3_send_packet(s, qidx);
} else {
vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(s, qidx,
VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR);
}
vmxnet3_complete_packet(s, qidx, txd_idx);
s->tx_sop = true;
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = false;
vmxnet_tx_pkt_reset(s->tx_pkt);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) built with a VMWARE VMXNET3 paravirtual NIC emulator support is vulnerable to crash issue. It occurs when a guest sends a Layer-2 packet smaller than 22 bytes. A privileged (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) guest user could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process instance resulting in DoS.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,276
|
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