instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: yyparse (void *YYPARSE_PARAM)
#else
int
yyparse (YYPARSE_PARAM)
void *YYPARSE_PARAM;
#endif
#else /* ! YYPARSE_PARAM */
#if (defined __STDC__ || defined __C99__FUNC__ \
|| defined __cplusplus || defined _MSC_VER)
int
yyparse (void)
#else
int
yyparse ()
#endif
#endif
{
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
`yyss': related to states.
`yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks thru separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yytoken = 0;
yyss = yyssa;
yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
/* Initialize stack pointers.
Waste one element of value and location stack
so that they stay on the same level as the state stack.
The wasted elements are never initialized. */
yyssp = yyss;
yyvsp = yyvs;
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yyn == YYPACT_NINF)
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = YYLEX;
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yyn == 0 || yyn == YYTABLE_NINF)
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
*++yyvsp = yylval;
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
`$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 5:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 320 "ntp_parser.y"
{
/* I will need to incorporate much more fine grained
* error messages. The following should suffice for
* the time being.
*/
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"syntax error in %s line %d, column %d",
ip_file->fname,
ip_file->err_line_no,
ip_file->err_col_no);
}
break;
case 19:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 354 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct peer_node *my_node = create_peer_node((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue));
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.peers, my_node);
}
break;
case 20:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 360 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct peer_node *my_node = create_peer_node((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node), NULL);
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.peers, my_node);
}
break;
case 27:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 377 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String), AF_INET); }
break;
case 28:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 378 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String), AF_INET6); }
break;
case 29:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 382 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String), 0); }
break;
case 30:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 386 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 31:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 387 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 32:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 391 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 33:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 392 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 34:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 393 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 35:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 394 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 36:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 395 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 37:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 396 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 38:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 397 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 39:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 398 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 40:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 399 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 41:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 400 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 42:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 401 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 43:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 402 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 44:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 403 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 45:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 404 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 46:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 405 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 47:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 415 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct unpeer_node *my_node = create_unpeer_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node));
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.unpeers, my_node);
}
break;
case 50:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 434 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.broadcastclient = 1; }
break;
case 51:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 436 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.manycastserver, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 52:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 438 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.multicastclient, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 53:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 449 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 54:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 451 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.control_key = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 55:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 453 "ntp_parser.y"
{
cfgt.auth.cryptosw++;
append_queue(cfgt.auth.crypto_cmd_list, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 56:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 458 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.keys = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 57:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 460 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.keysdir = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 58:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 462 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.request_key = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 59:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 464 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.revoke = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 60:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 466 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.trusted_key_list = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue); }
break;
case 61:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 468 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.ntp_signd_socket = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 63:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 474 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = create_queue(); }
break;
case 64:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 479 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 65:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 486 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 66:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 496 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 67:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 498 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 68:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 500 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 69:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 502 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 70:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 504 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 71:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 506 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 72:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 508 "ntp_parser.y"
{
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
cfgt.auth.revoke = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer);
msyslog(LOG_WARNING,
"'crypto revoke %d' is deprecated, "
"please use 'revoke %d' instead.",
cfgt.auth.revoke, cfgt.auth.revoke);
}
break;
case 73:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 525 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.orphan_cmds,(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 74:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 529 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 75:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 530 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 76:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 535 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 77:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 537 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 78:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 539 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 79:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 541 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 80:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 543 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 81:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 545 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 82:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 547 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 83:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 549 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 84:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 551 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 85:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 553 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 86:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 555 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 87:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 565 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.stats_list, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 88:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 567 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
cfgt.stats_dir = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String);
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("statsdir remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 89:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 576 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.filegen_opts,
create_filegen_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue)));
}
break;
case 90:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 583 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 91:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 584 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer))); }
break;
case 100:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 600 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 101:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 607 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 102:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 617 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("filegen file remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 103:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 627 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen type remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 104:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 636 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen link remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 105:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 645 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen nolink remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 106:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 653 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 107:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 654 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 115:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 674 "ntp_parser.y"
{
append_queue(cfgt.discard_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 116:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 678 "ntp_parser.y"
{
append_queue(cfgt.mru_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 117:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 682 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), NULL, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 118:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 687 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node((yyvsp[(2) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(5) - (5)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 119:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 692 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(NULL, NULL, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 120:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 697 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
create_address_node(
estrdup("0.0.0.0"),
AF_INET),
create_address_node(
estrdup("0.0.0.0"),
AF_INET),
(yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Queue),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 121:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 710 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
create_address_node(
estrdup("::"),
AF_INET6),
create_address_node(
estrdup("::"),
AF_INET6),
(yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Queue),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 122:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 723 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
NULL, NULL,
enqueue((yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer))),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 123:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 734 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = create_queue(); }
break;
case 124:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 736 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 139:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 758 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 140:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 760 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 141:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 764 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 142:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 765 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 143:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 766 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 144:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 771 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 145:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 773 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 146:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 777 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 147:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 778 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 148:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 779 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 149:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 780 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 150:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 781 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 151:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 782 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 152:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 783 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 153:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 784 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 154:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 793 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.fudge, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue))); }
break;
case 155:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 798 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 156:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 800 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 157:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 804 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 158:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 805 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 159:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 806 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 160:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 807 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 161:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 808 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 162:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 809 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 163:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 810 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 164:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 811 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 165:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 820 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.enable_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 166:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 822 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.disable_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 167:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 827 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 168:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 834 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 169:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 843 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 170:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 844 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 171:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 845 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 172:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 846 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 173:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 847 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 174:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 848 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 175:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 850 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("enable/disable stats remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 176:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 865 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.tinker, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 177:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 869 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 178:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 870 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 179:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 874 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 180:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 875 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 181:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 876 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 182:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 877 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 183:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 878 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 184:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 879 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 185:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 880 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 187:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 891 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (curr_include_level >= MAXINCLUDELEVEL) {
fprintf(stderr, "getconfig: Maximum include file level exceeded.\n");
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "getconfig: Maximum include file level exceeded.");
}
else {
fp[curr_include_level + 1] = F_OPEN(FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)), "r");
if (fp[curr_include_level + 1] == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>\n", FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)));
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)));
}
else
ip_file = fp[++curr_include_level];
}
}
break;
case 188:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 907 "ntp_parser.y"
{
while (curr_include_level != -1)
FCLOSE(fp[curr_include_level--]);
}
break;
case 189:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 913 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double))); }
break;
case 190:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 915 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 191:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 917 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double))); }
break;
case 192:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 919 "ntp_parser.y"
{ /* Null action, possibly all null parms */ }
break;
case 193:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 921 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 194:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 924 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 195:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 926 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
enqueue(cfgt.vars,
create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)));
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("logfile remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 196:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 937 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.logconfig, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 197:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 939 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.phone, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 198:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 941 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
enqueue(cfgt.vars,
create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)));
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("saveconfigdir remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 199:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 951 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.setvar, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Set_var)); }
break;
case 200:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 953 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.trap, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node), NULL)); }
break;
case 201:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 955 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.trap, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue))); }
break;
case 202:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 957 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.ttl, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 203:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 959 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.qos, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 204:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 964 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String))); }
break;
case 205:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 966 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval(T_WanderThreshold, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)));
enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 206:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 969 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, "\0")); }
break;
case 207:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 974 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Set_var) = create_setvar_node((yyvsp[(1) - (4)].String), (yyvsp[(3) - (4)].String), (yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Integer)); }
break;
case 208:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 976 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Set_var) = create_setvar_node((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].String), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].String), 0); }
break;
case 209:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 981 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 210:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 982 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 211:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 986 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 212:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 987 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_pval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 213:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 991 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 214:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 992 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 215:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 997 "ntp_parser.y"
{
char prefix = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String)[0];
char *type = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String) + 1;
if (prefix != '+' && prefix != '-' && prefix != '=') {
yyerror("Logconfig prefix is not '+', '-' or '='\n");
}
else
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval(prefix, estrdup(type));
YYFREE((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String));
}
break;
case 216:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1012 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.nic_rules,
create_nic_rule_node((yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Integer), NULL, (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer)));
}
break;
case 217:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1017 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.nic_rules,
create_nic_rule_node(0, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].String), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer)));
}
break;
case 227:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1048 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 228:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1049 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer))); }
break;
case 229:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1054 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 230:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1056 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 231:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1061 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival('i', (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 233:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1067 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_shorts('-', (yyvsp[(2) - (5)].Integer), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Integer)); }
break;
case 234:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1071 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_pval((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 235:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1072 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_pval((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String))); }
break;
case 236:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1076 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 237:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1077 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 238:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1082 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer) != 0 && (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer) != 1) {
yyerror("Integer value is not boolean (0 or 1). Assuming 1");
(yyval.Integer) = 1;
}
else
(yyval.Integer) = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer);
}
break;
case 239:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1090 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Integer) = 1; }
break;
case 240:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1091 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Integer) = 0; }
break;
case 241:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1095 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Double) = (double)(yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer); }
break;
case 243:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1106 "ntp_parser.y"
{
cfgt.sim_details = create_sim_node((yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Queue), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Queue));
/* Reset the old_config_style variable */
old_config_style = 1;
}
break;
case 244:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1120 "ntp_parser.y"
{ old_config_style = 0; }
break;
case 245:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1124 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 246:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1125 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 247:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1129 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 248:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1130 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 249:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1134 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Sim_server)); }
break;
case 250:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1135 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Sim_server)); }
break;
case 251:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1140 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Sim_server) = create_sim_server((yyvsp[(1) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Double), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Queue)); }
break;
case 252:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1144 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Double) = (yyvsp[(3) - (4)].Double); }
break;
case 253:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1148 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Address_node); }
break;
case 254:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1152 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Sim_script)); }
break;
case 255:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1153 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Sim_script)); }
break;
case 256:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1158 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Sim_script) = create_sim_script_info((yyvsp[(3) - (6)].Double), (yyvsp[(5) - (6)].Queue)); }
break;
case 257:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1162 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 258:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1163 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 259:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1168 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 260:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1170 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 261:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1172 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 262:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1174 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 263:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1176 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 3826 "ntp_parser.c"
default: break;
}
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now `shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error |
`------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (YY_("syntax error"));
#else
{
YYSIZE_T yysize = yysyntax_error (0, yystate, yychar);
if (yymsg_alloc < yysize && yymsg_alloc < YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM)
{
YYSIZE_T yyalloc = 2 * yysize;
if (! (yysize <= yyalloc && yyalloc <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
yyalloc = YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM;
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yyalloc);
if (yymsg)
yymsg_alloc = yyalloc;
else
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
}
}
if (0 < yysize && yysize <= yymsg_alloc)
{
(void) yysyntax_error (yymsg, yystate, yychar);
yyerror (yymsg);
}
else
{
yyerror (YY_("syntax error"));
if (yysize != 0)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
}
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule which action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yyn != YYPACT_NINF)
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
*++yyvsp = yylval;
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined(yyoverflow) || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval);
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule which action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
/* Make sure YYID is used. */
return YYID (yyresult);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The log_config_command function in ntp_parser.y in ntpd in NTP before 4.2.7p42 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (ntpd crash) via crafted logconfig commands.
Commit Message: [Bug 1593] ntpd abort in free() with logconfig syntax error.
|
Low
| 168,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned bs = crypto_ablkcipher_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(
&ctx->req));
struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned long iovlen;
struct iovec *iov;
int err = -EAGAIN;
int used;
long copied = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
iovlen--, iov++) {
unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
while (seglen) {
sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
sg = sgl->sg;
while (!sg->length)
sg++;
used = ctx->used;
if (!used) {
err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
used = min_t(unsigned long, used, seglen);
used = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl, from, used, 1);
err = used;
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
if (ctx->more || used < ctx->used)
used -= used % bs;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!used)
goto free;
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, sg,
ctx->rsgl.sg, used,
ctx->iv);
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(
ctx->enc ?
crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(&ctx->req) :
crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(&ctx->req),
&ctx->completion);
free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl);
if (err)
goto unlock;
copied += used;
from += used;
seglen -= used;
skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used);
}
}
err = 0;
unlock:
skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The crypto API in the Linux kernel through 3.9-rc8 does not initialize certain length variables, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call, related to the hash_recvmsg function in crypto/algif_hash.c and the skcipher_recvmsg function in crypto/algif_skcipher.c.
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,047
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& !mTimeToSample.empty();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
|
Medium
| 173,772
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UsbDeviceImpl::OnPathAccessRequestComplete(const OpenCallback& callback,
bool success) {
if (success) {
blocking_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UsbDeviceImpl::OpenOnBlockingThread, this, callback));
} else {
chromeos::PermissionBrokerClient* client =
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPermissionBrokerClient();
DCHECK(client) << "Could not get permission broker client.";
client->OpenPath(
device_path_,
base::Bind(&UsbDeviceImpl::OnOpenRequestComplete, this, callback));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the WebSocketDispatcherHost::SendOrDrop function in content/browser/renderer_host/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc in the Web Sockets implementation in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149 might allow remote attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism by leveraging an incorrect deletion in a certain failure case.
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
|
Low
| 171,701
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init big_key_init(void)
{
return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: security/keys/big_key.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.7 mishandles unsuccessful crypto registration in conjunction with successful key-type registration, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that uses the big_key data type.
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
Medium
| 166,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MediaStreamDevicesController::IsRequestAllowedByDefault() const {
if (ShouldAlwaysAllowOrigin())
return true;
struct {
bool has_capability;
const char* policy_name;
const char* list_policy_name;
ContentSettingsType settings_type;
} device_checks[] = {
{ microphone_requested_, prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowedUrls, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC },
{ webcam_requested_, prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowedUrls,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(device_checks); ++i) {
if (!device_checks[i].has_capability)
continue;
DevicePolicy policy = GetDevicePolicy(device_checks[i].policy_name,
device_checks[i].list_policy_name);
if (policy == ALWAYS_DENY ||
(policy == POLICY_NOT_SET &&
profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->GetContentSetting(
request_.security_origin, request_.security_origin,
device_checks[i].settings_type, NO_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER) !=
CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Flash plug-in in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.116, as used on Google Chrome OS before 27.0.1453.116 and separately, does not properly determine whether a user wishes to permit camera or microphone access by a Flash application, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from a machine's physical environment via a clickjacking attack, as demonstrated by an attack using a crafted Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) opacity property.
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
R=xians@chromium.org, yzshen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash).
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
|
Medium
| 169,767
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
char password[SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
time_t ltime;
time(<ime);
RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
(unsigned char *)password, link->tiTicketing.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
"please set a ticket first");
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (expired || strncmp(password, taTicket.password, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) != 0) {
if (expired) {
spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
} else {
spice_warning("Invalid password");
}
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
}
reds_handle_link(link);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the reds_handle_ticket function in server/reds.c in SPICE 0.12.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a long password in a SPICE ticket.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,661
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t socket_write_and_transfer_fd(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count, int fd) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD)
return socket_write(socket, buf, count);
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
iov.iov_base = (void *)buf;
iov.iov_len = count;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
struct cmsghdr *header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
header->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
header->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(header) = fd;
ssize_t ret = sendmsg(socket->fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 used mode 0666 when creating new temporary files upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats, potentially leaking sensitive information.
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Low
| 168,984
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ikev2parent_inI1outR1 function in pluto/ikev2_parent.c in libreswan before 3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via an IKEv2 I1 notification without a KE payload.
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
|
Low
| 166,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *name = d->name;
struct device dev = d->udev->dev;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->exit(d);
dvb_usbv2_exit(d);
dev_info(&dev, "%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.12 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
|
Low
| 168,222
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xps_select_best_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font)
{
static struct { int pid, eid; } xps_cmap_list[] =
{
{ 3, 10 }, /* Unicode with surrogates */
{ 3, 1 }, /* Unicode without surrogates */
{ 3, 5 }, /* Wansung */
{ 3, 4 }, /* Big5 */
{ 3, 3 }, /* Prc */
{ 3, 2 }, /* ShiftJis */
{ 3, 0 }, /* Symbol */
{ 1, 0 },
{ -1, -1 },
};
int i, k, n, pid, eid;
n = xps_count_font_encodings(font);
for (k = 0; xps_cmap_list[k].pid != -1; k++)
{
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
xps_identify_font_encoding(font, i, &pid, &eid);
if (pid == xps_cmap_list[k].pid && eid == xps_cmap_list[k].eid)
{
xps_select_font_encoding(font, i);
return;
}
}
}
gs_warn("could not find a suitable cmap");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_select_font_encoding function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document, related to the xps_encode_font_char_imp function.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_read_row(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep row, png_bytep dsp_row)
{
PNG_CONST PNG_IDAT;
PNG_CONST int png_pass_dsp_mask[7] = {0xff, 0x0f, 0xff, 0x33, 0xff, 0x55,
0xff};
PNG_CONST int png_pass_mask[7] = {0x80, 0x08, 0x88, 0x22, 0xaa, 0x55, 0xff};
int ret;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_debug2(1, "in png_read_row (row %lu, pass %d)",
png_ptr->row_number, png_ptr->pass);
if (!(png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_ROW_INIT))
png_read_start_row(png_ptr);
if (png_ptr->row_number == 0 && png_ptr->pass == 0)
{
/* Check for transforms that have been set but were defined out */
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_INVERT_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INVERT_MONO)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_INVERT_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_FILLER_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_FILLER)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED) && \
!defined(PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACK)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_PACK_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_SHIFT_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_SHIFT_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_SHIFT)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_SHIFT_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_BGR_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_BGR_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_BGR)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_BGR_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_SWAP_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_SWAP_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_SWAP_BYTES)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_SWAP_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced and we do not need a new row, combine row and return */
if (png_ptr->interlaced && (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
switch (png_ptr->pass)
{
case 0:
if (png_ptr->row_number & 0x07)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 1:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 0x07) || png_ptr->width < 5)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 2:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 0x07) != 4)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL && (png_ptr->row_number & 4))
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 3:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 3) || png_ptr->width < 3)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 4:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 3) != 2)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL && (png_ptr->row_number & 2))
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 5:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 1) || png_ptr->width < 2)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 6:
if (!(png_ptr->row_number & 1))
{
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT))
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid attempt to read row data");
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->row_buf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out =
(uInt)(PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth,
png_ptr->iwidth) + 1);
do
{
if (!(png_ptr->zstream.avail_in))
{
while (!png_ptr->idat_size)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0);
png_ptr->idat_size = png_read_chunk_header(png_ptr);
if (png_memcmp(png_ptr->chunk_name, png_IDAT, 4))
png_error(png_ptr, "Not enough image data");
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = png_ptr->zbuf;
if (png_ptr->zbuf_size > png_ptr->idat_size)
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = (uInt)png_ptr->idat_size;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, png_ptr->zbuf,
(png_size_t)png_ptr->zstream.avail_in);
png_ptr->idat_size -= png_ptr->zstream.avail_in;
}
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
{
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out || png_ptr->zstream.avail_in ||
png_ptr->idat_size)
png_error(png_ptr, "Extra compressed data");
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED;
break;
}
if (ret != Z_OK)
png_error(png_ptr, png_ptr->zstream.msg ? png_ptr->zstream.msg :
"Decompression error");
} while (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out);
png_ptr->row_info.color_type = png_ptr->color_type;
png_ptr->row_info.width = png_ptr->iwidth;
png_ptr->row_info.channels = png_ptr->channels;
png_ptr->row_info.bit_depth = png_ptr->bit_depth;
png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth = png_ptr->pixel_depth;
png_ptr->row_info.rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth,
png_ptr->row_info.width);
if (png_ptr->row_buf[0])
png_read_filter_row(png_ptr, &(png_ptr->row_info),
png_ptr->row_buf + 1, png_ptr->prev_row + 1,
(int)(png_ptr->row_buf[0]));
png_memcpy_check(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row, png_ptr->row_buf,
png_ptr->rowbytes + 1);
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_FILTER_64) &&
(png_ptr->filter_type == PNG_INTRAPIXEL_DIFFERENCING))
{
/* Intrapixel differencing */
png_do_read_intrapixel(&(png_ptr->row_info), png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
}
#endif
if (png_ptr->transformations || (png_ptr->flags&PNG_FLAG_STRIP_ALPHA))
png_do_read_transformations(png_ptr);
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Blow up interlaced rows to full size */
if (png_ptr->interlaced &&
(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
if (png_ptr->pass < 6)
/* Old interface (pre-1.0.9):
* png_do_read_interlace(&(png_ptr->row_info),
* png_ptr->row_buf + 1, png_ptr->pass, png_ptr->transformations);
*/
png_do_read_interlace(png_ptr);
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
if (row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, row,
png_pass_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
}
else
#endif
{
if (row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, row, 0xff);
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row, 0xff);
}
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
if (png_ptr->read_row_fn != NULL)
(*(png_ptr->read_row_fn))(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_number, png_ptr->pass);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Browser::CanCloseContentsAt(int index) {
if (!CanCloseTab())
return false;
if (tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->count() > 1)
return true;
return CanCloseWithInProgressDownloads();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows user-assisted remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via vectors related to *unusual user interaction.*
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,303
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int exif_process_IFD_TAG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_entry, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index, int ReadNextIFD, tag_table_type tag_table TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t length;
int tag, format, components;
char *value_ptr, tagname[64], cbuf[32], *outside=NULL;
size_t byte_count, offset_val, fpos, fgot;
int64_t byte_count_signed;
xp_field_type *tmp_xp;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
char *dump_data;
int dump_free;
#endif /* EXIF_DEBUG */
/* Protect against corrupt headers */
if (ImageInfo->ifd_nesting_level > MAX_IFD_NESTING_LEVEL) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "corrupt EXIF header: maximum directory nesting level reached");
return FALSE;
}
ImageInfo->ifd_nesting_level++;
tag = php_ifd_get16u(dir_entry, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
format = php_ifd_get16u(dir_entry+2, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
components = php_ifd_get32u(dir_entry+4, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (!format || format > NUM_FORMATS) {
/* (-1) catches illegal zero case as unsigned underflows to positive large. */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal format code 0x%04X, suppose BYTE", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), format);
format = TAG_FMT_BYTE;
/*return TRUE;*/
}
if (components < 0) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal components(%ld)", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), components);
return FALSE;
}
byte_count_signed = (int64_t)components * php_tiff_bytes_per_format[format];
if (byte_count_signed < 0 || (byte_count_signed > INT32_MAX)) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal byte_count", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC));
return FALSE;
}
byte_count = (size_t)byte_count_signed;
if (byte_count > 4) {
offset_val = php_ifd_get32u(dir_entry+8, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
/* If its bigger than 4 bytes, the dir entry contains an offset. */
value_ptr = offset_base+offset_val;
/*
dir_entry is ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data+2+i*12
offset_base is ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data-dir_offset
dir_entry - offset_base is dir_offset+2+i*12
*/
if (byte_count > IFDlength || offset_val > IFDlength-byte_count || value_ptr < dir_entry || offset_val < (size_t)(dir_entry-offset_base)) {
/* It is important to check for IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF
* JPEG does not use absolute pointers instead its pointers are
* relative to the start of the TIFF header in APP1 section. */
if (byte_count > ImageInfo->FileSize || offset_val>ImageInfo->FileSize-byte_count || (ImageInfo->FileType!=IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II && ImageInfo->FileType!=IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM && ImageInfo->FileType!=IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG)) {
if (value_ptr < dir_entry) {
/* we can read this if offset_val > 0 */
/* some files have their values in other parts of the file */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal pointer offset(x%04X < x%04X)", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), offset_val, dir_entry);
} else {
/* this is for sure not allowed */
/* exception are IFD pointers */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Process tag(x%04X=%s): Illegal pointer offset(x%04X + x%04X = x%04X > x%04X)", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), offset_val, byte_count, offset_val+byte_count, IFDlength);
}
return FALSE;
}
if (byte_count>sizeof(cbuf)) {
/* mark as outside range and get buffer */
value_ptr = safe_emalloc(byte_count, 1, 0);
outside = value_ptr;
} else {
/* In most cases we only access a small range so
* it is faster to use a static buffer there
* BUT it offers also the possibility to have
* pointers read without the need to free them
* explicitley before returning. */
memset(&cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
value_ptr = cbuf;
}
fpos = php_stream_tell(ImageInfo->infile);
php_stream_seek(ImageInfo->infile, offset_val, SEEK_SET);
fgot = php_stream_tell(ImageInfo->infile);
if (fgot!=offset_val) {
EFREE_IF(outside);
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Wrong file pointer: 0x%08X != 0x%08X", fgot, offset_val);
return FALSE;
}
fgot = php_stream_read(ImageInfo->infile, value_ptr, byte_count);
php_stream_seek(ImageInfo->infile, fpos, SEEK_SET);
if (fgot<byte_count) {
EFREE_IF(outside);
EXIF_ERRLOG_FILEEOF(ImageInfo)
return FALSE;
}
}
} else {
/* 4 bytes or less and value is in the dir entry itself */
value_ptr = dir_entry+8;
offset_val= value_ptr-offset_base;
}
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_ANY_TAG;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
dump_data = exif_dump_data(&dump_free, format, components, length, ImageInfo->motorola_intel, value_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process tag(x%04X=%s,@x%04X + x%04X(=%d)): %s%s %s", tag, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, -12, tag_table TSRMLS_CC), offset_val+displacement, byte_count, byte_count, (components>1)&&format!=TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED&&format!=TAG_FMT_STRING?"ARRAY OF ":"", exif_get_tagformat(format), dump_data);
if (dump_free) {
efree(dump_data);
}
#endif
if (section_index==SECTION_THUMBNAIL) {
if (!ImageInfo->Thumbnail.data) {
switch(tag) {
case TAG_IMAGEWIDTH:
case TAG_COMP_IMAGE_WIDTH:
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.width = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_IMAGEHEIGHT:
case TAG_COMP_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.height = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_STRIP_OFFSETS:
case TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
/* accept both formats */
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_STRIP_BYTE_COUNTS:
if (ImageInfo->FileType == IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_II || ImageInfo->FileType == IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM) {
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype = ImageInfo->FileType;
} else {
/* motorola is easier to read */
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype = IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF_MM;
}
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT_LEN:
if (ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype == IMAGE_FILETYPE_UNKNOWN) {
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype = IMAGE_FILETYPE_JPEG;
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
}
break;
}
}
} else {
if (section_index==SECTION_IFD0 || section_index==SECTION_EXIF)
switch(tag) {
case TAG_COPYRIGHT:
/* check for "<photographer> NUL <editor> NUL" */
if (byte_count>1 && (length=php_strnlen(value_ptr, byte_count)) > 0) {
if (length<byte_count-1) {
/* When there are any characters after the first NUL */
ImageInfo->CopyrightPhotographer = estrdup(value_ptr);
ImageInfo->CopyrightEditor = estrndup(value_ptr+length+1, byte_count-length-1);
spprintf(&ImageInfo->Copyright, 0, "%s, %s", value_ptr, value_ptr+length+1);
/* format = TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED; this musn't be ASCII */
/* but we are not supposed to change this */
/* keep in mind that image_info does not store editor value */
} else {
ImageInfo->Copyright = estrndup(value_ptr, byte_count);
}
}
break;
case TAG_USERCOMMENT:
ImageInfo->UserCommentLength = exif_process_user_comment(ImageInfo, &(ImageInfo->UserComment), &(ImageInfo->UserCommentEncoding), value_ptr, byte_count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_XP_TITLE:
case TAG_XP_COMMENTS:
case TAG_XP_AUTHOR:
case TAG_XP_KEYWORDS:
case TAG_XP_SUBJECT:
tmp_xp = (xp_field_type*)safe_erealloc(ImageInfo->xp_fields.list, (ImageInfo->xp_fields.count+1), sizeof(xp_field_type), 0);
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_WINXP;
ImageInfo->xp_fields.list = tmp_xp;
ImageInfo->xp_fields.count++;
exif_process_unicode(ImageInfo, &(ImageInfo->xp_fields.list[ImageInfo->xp_fields.count-1]), tag, value_ptr, byte_count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_FNUMBER:
/* Simplest way of expressing aperture, so I trust it the most.
(overwrite previously computed value if there is one) */
ImageInfo->ApertureFNumber = (float)exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_APERTURE:
case TAG_MAX_APERTURE:
/* More relevant info always comes earlier, so only use this field if we don't
have appropriate aperture information yet. */
if (ImageInfo->ApertureFNumber == 0) {
ImageInfo->ApertureFNumber
= (float)exp(exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC)*log(2)*0.5);
}
break;
case TAG_SHUTTERSPEED:
/* More complicated way of expressing exposure time, so only use
this value if we don't already have it from somewhere else.
SHUTTERSPEED comes after EXPOSURE TIME
*/
if (ImageInfo->ExposureTime == 0) {
ImageInfo->ExposureTime
= (float)(1/exp(exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC)*log(2)));
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURETIME:
ImageInfo->ExposureTime = -1;
break;
case TAG_COMP_IMAGE_WIDTH:
ImageInfo->ExifImageWidth = exif_convert_any_to_int(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_FOCALPLANE_X_RES:
ImageInfo->FocalplaneXRes = exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_SUBJECT_DISTANCE:
/* Inidcates the distacne the autofocus camera is focused to.
Tends to be less accurate as distance increases. */
ImageInfo->Distance = (float)exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_FOCALPLANE_RESOLUTION_UNIT:
switch((int)exif_convert_any_format(value_ptr, format, ImageInfo->motorola_intel TSRMLS_CC)) {
case 1: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 25.4; break; /* inch */
case 2:
/* According to the information I was using, 2 measn meters.
But looking at the Cannon powershot's files, inches is the only
sensible value. */
ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 25.4;
break;
case 3: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 10; break; /* centimeter */
case 4: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = 1; break; /* milimeter */
case 5: ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits = .001; break; /* micrometer */
}
break;
case TAG_SUB_IFD:
if (format==TAG_FMT_IFD) {
/* If this is called we are either in a TIFFs thumbnail or a JPEG where we cannot handle it */
/* TIFF thumbnail: our data structure cannot store a thumbnail of a thumbnail */
/* JPEG do we have the data area and what to do with it */
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Skip SUB IFD");
}
break;
case TAG_MAKE:
ImageInfo->make = estrndup(value_ptr, byte_count);
break;
case TAG_MODEL:
ImageInfo->model = estrndup(value_ptr, byte_count);
break;
case TAG_MAKER_NOTE:
exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(ImageInfo, value_ptr, byte_count, offset_base, IFDlength, displacement TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
case TAG_GPS_IFD_POINTER:
case TAG_INTEROP_IFD_POINTER:
if (ReadNextIFD) {
char *Subdir_start;
int sub_section_index = 0;
switch(tag) {
case TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Found EXIF");
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_EXIF;
sub_section_index = SECTION_EXIF;
break;
case TAG_GPS_IFD_POINTER:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Found GPS");
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_GPS;
sub_section_index = SECTION_GPS;
break;
case TAG_INTEROP_IFD_POINTER:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Found INTEROPERABILITY");
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_INTEROP;
sub_section_index = SECTION_INTEROP;
break;
}
Subdir_start = offset_base + php_ifd_get32u(value_ptr, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (Subdir_start < offset_base || Subdir_start > offset_base+IFDlength) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal IFD Pointer");
return FALSE;
}
if (!exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG(ImageInfo, Subdir_start, offset_base, IFDlength, displacement, sub_section_index TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FALSE;
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Subsection %s done", exif_get_sectionname(sub_section_index));
#endif
}
}
}
exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, section_index, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, sizeof(tagname), tag_table TSRMLS_CC), tag, format, components, value_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
EFREE_IF(outside);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG function in ext/exif/exif.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 does not validate TIFF start data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted header data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rtmp_packet_read_one_chunk(URLContext *h, RTMPPacket *p,
int chunk_size, RTMPPacket **prev_pkt_ptr,
int *nb_prev_pkt, uint8_t hdr)
{
uint8_t buf[16];
int channel_id, timestamp, size;
uint32_t ts_field; // non-extended timestamp or delta field
uint32_t extra = 0;
enum RTMPPacketType type;
int written = 0;
int ret, toread;
RTMPPacket *prev_pkt;
written++;
channel_id = hdr & 0x3F;
if (channel_id < 2) { //special case for channel number >= 64
buf[1] = 0;
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, channel_id + 1) != channel_id + 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += channel_id + 1;
channel_id = AV_RL16(buf) + 64;
}
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_check_alloc_array(prev_pkt_ptr, nb_prev_pkt,
channel_id)) < 0)
return ret;
prev_pkt = *prev_pkt_ptr;
size = prev_pkt[channel_id].size;
type = prev_pkt[channel_id].type;
extra = prev_pkt[channel_id].extra;
hdr >>= 6; // header size indicator
if (hdr == RTMP_PS_ONEBYTE) {
ts_field = prev_pkt[channel_id].ts_field;
} else {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 3) != 3)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 3;
ts_field = AV_RB24(buf);
if (hdr != RTMP_PS_FOURBYTES) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 3) != 3)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 3;
size = AV_RB24(buf);
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 1) != 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written++;
type = buf[0];
if (hdr == RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 4) != 4)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 4;
extra = AV_RL32(buf);
}
}
}
if (ts_field == 0xFFFFFF) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 4) != 4)
return AVERROR(EIO);
timestamp = AV_RB32(buf);
} else {
timestamp = ts_field;
}
if (hdr != RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES)
timestamp += prev_pkt[channel_id].timestamp;
if (!prev_pkt[channel_id].read) {
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_packet_create(p, channel_id, type, timestamp,
size)) < 0)
return ret;
p->read = written;
p->offset = 0;
prev_pkt[channel_id].ts_field = ts_field;
prev_pkt[channel_id].timestamp = timestamp;
} else {
RTMPPacket *prev = &prev_pkt[channel_id];
p->data = prev->data;
p->size = prev->size;
p->channel_id = prev->channel_id;
p->type = prev->type;
p->ts_field = prev->ts_field;
p->extra = prev->extra;
p->offset = prev->offset;
p->read = prev->read + written;
p->timestamp = prev->timestamp;
prev->data = NULL;
}
p->extra = extra;
prev_pkt[channel_id].channel_id = channel_id;
prev_pkt[channel_id].type = type;
prev_pkt[channel_id].size = size;
prev_pkt[channel_id].extra = extra;
size = size - p->offset;
toread = FFMIN(size, chunk_size);
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, p->data + p->offset, toread) != toread) {
ff_rtmp_packet_destroy(p);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
size -= toread;
p->read += toread;
p->offset += toread;
if (size > 0) {
RTMPPacket *prev = &prev_pkt[channel_id];
prev->data = p->data;
prev->read = p->read;
prev->offset = p->offset;
p->data = NULL;
return AVERROR(EAGAIN);
}
prev_pkt[channel_id].read = 0; // read complete; reset if needed
return p->read;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/rtmppkt.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging failure to check for RTMP packet size mismatches.
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Check for packet size mismatches
Fixes out of array access
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Low
| 168,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GDataFileError GDataWapiFeedProcessor::FeedToFileResourceMap(
const std::vector<DocumentFeed*>& feed_list,
FileResourceIdMap* file_map,
int64* feed_changestamp,
FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats* uma_stats) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(uma_stats);
GDataFileError error = GDATA_FILE_OK;
uma_stats->num_regular_files = 0;
uma_stats->num_hosted_documents = 0;
uma_stats->num_files_with_entry_kind.clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < feed_list.size(); ++i) {
const DocumentFeed* feed = feed_list[i];
if (i == 0) {
const Link* root_feed_upload_link =
feed->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (root_feed_upload_link)
directory_service_->root()->set_upload_url(
root_feed_upload_link->href());
*feed_changestamp = feed->largest_changestamp();
DCHECK_GE(*feed_changestamp, 0);
}
for (ScopedVector<DocumentEntry>::const_iterator iter =
feed->entries().begin();
iter != feed->entries().end(); ++iter) {
DocumentEntry* doc = *iter;
GDataEntry* entry = GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(
NULL, doc, directory_service_);
if (!entry)
continue;
GDataFile* as_file = entry->AsGDataFile();
if (as_file) {
if (as_file->is_hosted_document())
++uma_stats->num_hosted_documents;
else
++uma_stats->num_regular_files;
++uma_stats->num_files_with_entry_kind[as_file->kind()];
}
FileResourceIdMap::iterator map_entry =
file_map->find(entry->resource_id());
if (map_entry != file_map->end()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Found duplicate file "
<< map_entry->second->base_name();
delete map_entry->second;
file_map->erase(map_entry);
}
file_map->insert(
std::pair<std::string, GDataEntry*>(entry->resource_id(), entry));
}
}
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
STLDeleteValues(file_map);
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,496
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int nonOpt(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int opt1(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
if (argsCount <= 2) {
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt, opt1);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int opt2(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt, opt1, opt2);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cifs_iovec_write(struct file *file, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t *poffset)
{
unsigned long nr_pages, i;
size_t copied, len, cur_len;
ssize_t total_written = 0;
loff_t offset;
struct iov_iter it;
struct cifsFileInfo *open_file;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb;
struct cifs_writedata *wdata, *tmp;
struct list_head wdata_list;
int rc;
pid_t pid;
len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
if (!len)
return 0;
rc = generic_write_checks(file, poffset, &len, 0);
if (rc)
return rc;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&wdata_list);
cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(file->f_path.dentry->d_sb);
open_file = file->private_data;
tcon = tlink_tcon(open_file->tlink);
if (!tcon->ses->server->ops->async_writev)
return -ENOSYS;
offset = *poffset;
if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_RWPIDFORWARD)
pid = open_file->pid;
else
pid = current->tgid;
iov_iter_init(&it, iov, nr_segs, len, 0);
do {
size_t save_len;
nr_pages = get_numpages(cifs_sb->wsize, len, &cur_len);
wdata = cifs_writedata_alloc(nr_pages,
cifs_uncached_writev_complete);
if (!wdata) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
rc = cifs_write_allocate_pages(wdata->pages, nr_pages);
if (rc) {
kfree(wdata);
break;
}
save_len = cur_len;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
copied = min_t(const size_t, cur_len, PAGE_SIZE);
copied = iov_iter_copy_from_user(wdata->pages[i], &it,
0, copied);
cur_len -= copied;
iov_iter_advance(&it, copied);
}
cur_len = save_len - cur_len;
wdata->sync_mode = WB_SYNC_ALL;
wdata->nr_pages = nr_pages;
wdata->offset = (__u64)offset;
wdata->cfile = cifsFileInfo_get(open_file);
wdata->pid = pid;
wdata->bytes = cur_len;
wdata->pagesz = PAGE_SIZE;
wdata->tailsz = cur_len - ((nr_pages - 1) * PAGE_SIZE);
rc = cifs_uncached_retry_writev(wdata);
if (rc) {
kref_put(&wdata->refcount,
cifs_uncached_writedata_release);
break;
}
list_add_tail(&wdata->list, &wdata_list);
offset += cur_len;
len -= cur_len;
} while (len > 0);
/*
* If at least one write was successfully sent, then discard any rc
* value from the later writes. If the other write succeeds, then
* we'll end up returning whatever was written. If it fails, then
* we'll get a new rc value from that.
*/
if (!list_empty(&wdata_list))
rc = 0;
/*
* Wait for and collect replies for any successful sends in order of
* increasing offset. Once an error is hit or we get a fatal signal
* while waiting, then return without waiting for any more replies.
*/
restart_loop:
list_for_each_entry_safe(wdata, tmp, &wdata_list, list) {
if (!rc) {
/* FIXME: freezable too? */
rc = wait_for_completion_killable(&wdata->done);
if (rc)
rc = -EINTR;
else if (wdata->result)
rc = wdata->result;
else
total_written += wdata->bytes;
/* resend call if it's a retryable error */
if (rc == -EAGAIN) {
rc = cifs_uncached_retry_writev(wdata);
goto restart_loop;
}
}
list_del_init(&wdata->list);
kref_put(&wdata->refcount, cifs_uncached_writedata_release);
}
if (total_written > 0)
*poffset += total_written;
cifs_stats_bytes_written(tcon, total_written);
return total_written ? total_written : (ssize_t)rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr. +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cifs_iovec_write function in fs/cifs/file.c in the Linux kernel through 3.13.5 does not properly handle uncached write operations that copy fewer than the requested number of bytes, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory, cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash), or possibly gain privileges via a writev system call with a crafted pointer.
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
|
High
| 166,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ScriptProcessorHandler::Process(size_t frames_to_process) {
AudioBus* input_bus = Input(0).Bus();
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
unsigned double_buffer_index = this->DoubleBufferIndex();
bool is_double_buffer_index_good =
double_buffer_index < 2 && double_buffer_index < input_buffers_.size() &&
double_buffer_index < output_buffers_.size();
DCHECK(is_double_buffer_index_good);
if (!is_double_buffer_index_good)
return;
AudioBuffer* input_buffer = input_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
AudioBuffer* output_buffer = output_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
unsigned number_of_input_channels = internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels();
bool buffers_are_good =
output_buffer && BufferSize() == output_buffer->length() &&
buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process <= BufferSize();
if (internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels())
buffers_are_good = buffers_are_good && input_buffer &&
BufferSize() == input_buffer->length();
DCHECK(buffers_are_good);
if (!buffers_are_good)
return;
bool is_frames_to_process_good = frames_to_process &&
BufferSize() >= frames_to_process &&
!(BufferSize() % frames_to_process);
DCHECK(is_frames_to_process_good);
if (!is_frames_to_process_good)
return;
unsigned number_of_output_channels = output_bus->NumberOfChannels();
bool channels_are_good =
(number_of_input_channels == number_of_input_channels_) &&
(number_of_output_channels == number_of_output_channels_);
DCHECK(channels_are_good);
if (!channels_are_good)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_input_channels; ++i)
internal_input_bus_->SetChannelMemory(
i,
input_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
frames_to_process);
if (number_of_input_channels)
internal_input_bus_->CopyFrom(*input_bus);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_output_channels; ++i) {
memcpy(output_bus->Channel(i)->MutableData(),
output_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
sizeof(float) * frames_to_process);
}
buffer_read_write_index_ =
(buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process) % BufferSize();
if (!buffer_read_write_index_) {
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_event_lock_);
if (!try_locker.Locked()) {
output_buffer->Zero();
} else if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
if (Context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::FireProcessEvent,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_));
} else {
std::unique_ptr<WaitableEvent> waitable_event =
WTF::MakeUnique<WaitableEvent>();
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::
FireProcessEventForOfflineAudioContext,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_,
CrossThreadUnretained(waitable_event.get())));
waitable_event->Wait();
}
}
SwapBuffers();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in WebAudio in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
|
Medium
| 172,943
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: qedi_dbg_err(struct qedi_dbg_ctx *qedi, const char *func, u32 line,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list va;
struct va_format vaf;
char nfunc[32];
memset(nfunc, 0, sizeof(nfunc));
memcpy(nfunc, func, sizeof(nfunc) - 1);
va_start(va, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &va;
if (likely(qedi) && likely(qedi->pdev))
pr_err("[%s]:[%s:%d]:%d: %pV", dev_name(&qedi->pdev->dev),
nfunc, line, qedi->host_no, &vaf);
else
pr_err("[0000:00:00.0]:[%s:%d]: %pV", nfunc, line, &vaf);
va_end(va);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_dbg.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.12. In the qedi_dbg_* family of functions, there is an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: scsi: qedi: remove memset/memcpy to nfunc and use func instead
KASAN reports this:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
Read of size 31 at addr ffffffffc12b0ae0 by task syz-executor.0/2429
CPU: 0 PID: 2429 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x1c4/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
qedi_init+0x118/0x1000 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2d57e55c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f2d57e55c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2d57e566bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
__func__.67584+0x0/0xffffffffffffd520 [qedi]
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffffc12b0980: fa fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 05 fa
ffffffffc12b0a00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa
> ffffffffc12b0a80: fa fa fa fa 00 06 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa
^
ffffffffc12b0b00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 03 fa
ffffffffc12b0b80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa
Currently the qedi_dbg_* family of functions can overrun the end of the
source string if it is less than the destination buffer length because of
the use of a fixed sized memcpy. Remove the memset/memcpy calls to nfunc
and just use func instead as it is always a null terminated string.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: ace7f46ba5fd ("scsi: qedi: Add QLogic FastLinQ offload iSCSI driver framework.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,558
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Block::IsKey() const
{
return ((m_flags & static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7)) != 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long start;
addr &= PAGE_MASK;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (!vma)
return NULL;
if (vma->vm_start <= addr)
return vma;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
return NULL;
start = vma->vm_start;
if (expand_stack(vma, addr))
return NULL;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
populate_vma_page_range(vma, addr, start, NULL);
return vma;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t SampleTable::setSampleToChunkParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSampleToChunkOffset = data_offset;
if (data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (data_size < 8 + mNumSampleToChunkOffsets * 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSampleToChunkEntries =
new SampleToChunkEntry[mNumSampleToChunkOffsets];
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumSampleToChunkOffsets; ++i) {
uint8_t buffer[12];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
mSampleToChunkOffset + 8 + i * 12, buffer, sizeof(buffer))
!= (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(U32_AT(buffer) >= 1); // chunk index is 1 based in the spec.
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].startChunk = U32_AT(buffer) - 1;
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].samplesPerChunk = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].chunkDesc = U32_AT(&buffer[8]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the SampleTable::setSampleToChunkParams function in SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted atoms in MP4 data that trigger an unchecked multiplication, aka internal bug 20139950, a related issue to CVE-2015-4496.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow during MP4 atom processing
A few sample table related FourCC values are handled by the
setSampleToChunkParams function. An integer overflow exists within this
function. Validate that mNumSampleToChunkOffets will not cause an integer
overflow.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit c24607c29c96f939aed9e33bfa702b1dd79da4b7)
Change-Id: I49086952451b09a234d8b82669251ab9f1ef58d9
|
Low
| 173,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int qcow2_grow_l1_table(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t min_size,
bool exact_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int new_l1_size2, ret, i;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int64_t old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size;
int64_t new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size;
uint8_t data[12];
if (min_size <= s->l1_size)
return 0;
if (exact_size) {
new_l1_size = min_size;
} else {
/* Bump size up to reduce the number of times we have to grow */
new_l1_size = s->l1_size;
if (new_l1_size == 0) {
new_l1_size = 1;
}
while (min_size > new_l1_size) {
new_l1_size = (new_l1_size * 3 + 1) / 2;
}
}
if (new_l1_size > INT_MAX) {
return -EFBIG;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC2
fprintf(stderr, "grow l1_table from %d to %" PRId64 "\n",
s->l1_size, new_l1_size);
#endif
new_l1_size2 = sizeof(uint64_t) * new_l1_size;
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_size2, 512));
memcpy(new_l1_table, s->l1_table, s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
/* write new table (align to cluster) */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ALLOC_TABLE);
new_l1_table_offset = qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, new_l1_size2);
if (new_l1_table_offset < 0) {
g_free(new_l1_table);
return new_l1_table_offset;
}
ret = qcow2_cache_flush(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* the L1 position has not yet been updated, so these clusters must
* indeed be completely free */
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0, new_l1_table_offset,
new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_WRITE_TABLE);
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = cpu_to_be64(new_l1_table[i]);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = be64_to_cpu(new_l1_table[i]);
/* set new table */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ACTIVATE_TABLE);
cpu_to_be32w((uint32_t*)data, new_l1_size);
stq_be_p(data + 4, new_l1_table_offset);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, offsetof(QCowHeader, l1_size), data,sizeof(data));
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
g_free(s->l1_table);
old_l1_table_offset = s->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table_offset = new_l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
old_l1_size = s->l1_size;
s->l1_size = new_l1_size;
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t),
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(new_l1_table);
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size2,
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the block drivers in QEMU, possibly before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted catalog size in (1) the parallels_open function in block/parallels.c or (2) bochs_open function in bochs.c, a large L1 table in the (3) qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in qcow2-snapshot.c or (4) qcow2_grow_l1_table function in qcow2-cluster.c, (5) a large request in the bdrv_check_byte_request function in block.c and other block drivers, (6) crafted cluster indexes in the get_refcount function in qcow2-refcount.c, or (7) a large number of blocks in the cloop_open function in cloop.c, which trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, large memory allocations and out-of-bounds read and writes.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,409
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* LIBPNG BUG: this always forces palette images to RGB. */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
/* This effectively does an 'expand' only if there is some transparency to
* convert to an alpha channel.
*/
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
/* LIBPNG BUG: otherwise libpng still expands to 8 bits! */
else
{
if (that->bit_depth < 8)
that->bit_depth =8;
if (that->sample_depth < 8)
that->sample_depth = 8;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static boolean parse_identifier( const char **pcur, char *ret )
{
const char *cur = *pcur;
int i = 0;
if (is_alpha_underscore( cur )) {
ret[i++] = *cur++;
while (is_alpha_underscore( cur ) || is_digit( cur ))
ret[i++] = *cur++;
ret[i++] = '\0';
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
/* Parse floating point.
*/
static boolean parse_float( const char **pcur, float *val )
{
const char *cur = *pcur;
boolean integral_part = FALSE;
boolean fractional_part = FALSE;
if (*cur == '0' && *(cur + 1) == 'x') {
union fi fi;
fi.ui = strtoul(cur, NULL, 16);
*val = fi.f;
cur += 10;
goto out;
}
*val = (float) atof( cur );
if (*cur == '-' || *cur == '+')
cur++;
if (is_digit( cur )) {
cur++;
integral_part = TRUE;
while (is_digit( cur ))
cur++;
}
if (*cur == '.') {
cur++;
if (is_digit( cur )) {
cur++;
fractional_part = TRUE;
while (is_digit( cur ))
cur++;
}
}
if (!integral_part && !fractional_part)
return FALSE;
if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'E') {
cur++;
if (*cur == '-' || *cur == '+')
cur++;
if (is_digit( cur )) {
cur++;
while (is_digit( cur ))
cur++;
}
else
return FALSE;
}
out:
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
static boolean parse_double( const char **pcur, uint32_t *val0, uint32_t *val1)
{
const char *cur = *pcur;
union {
double dval;
uint32_t uval[2];
} v;
v.dval = strtod(cur, (char**)pcur);
if (*pcur == cur)
return FALSE;
*val0 = v.uval[0];
*val1 = v.uval[1];
return TRUE;
}
struct translate_ctx
{
const char *text;
const char *cur;
struct tgsi_token *tokens;
struct tgsi_token *tokens_cur;
struct tgsi_token *tokens_end;
struct tgsi_header *header;
unsigned processor : 4;
unsigned implied_array_size : 6;
unsigned num_immediates;
};
static void report_error(struct translate_ctx *ctx, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
int line = 1;
int column = 1;
const char *itr = ctx->text;
debug_printf("\nTGSI asm error: ");
va_start(args, format);
_debug_vprintf(format, args);
va_end(args);
while (itr != ctx->cur) {
if (*itr == '\n') {
column = 1;
++line;
}
++column;
++itr;
}
debug_printf(" [%d : %d] \n", line, column);
}
/* Parse shader header.
* Return TRUE for one of the following headers.
* FRAG
* GEOM
* VERT
*/
static boolean parse_header( struct translate_ctx *ctx )
{
uint processor;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, "FRAG" ))
processor = TGSI_PROCESSOR_FRAGMENT;
else if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, "VERT" ))
processor = TGSI_PROCESSOR_VERTEX;
else if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, "GEOM" ))
processor = TGSI_PROCESSOR_GEOMETRY;
else if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, "TESS_CTRL" ))
processor = TGSI_PROCESSOR_TESS_CTRL;
else if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, "TESS_EVAL" ))
processor = TGSI_PROCESSOR_TESS_EVAL;
else if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, "COMP" ))
processor = TGSI_PROCESSOR_COMPUTE;
else {
report_error( ctx, "Unknown header" );
return FALSE;
}
if (ctx->tokens_cur >= ctx->tokens_end)
return FALSE;
ctx->header = (struct tgsi_header *) ctx->tokens_cur++;
*ctx->header = tgsi_build_header();
if (ctx->tokens_cur >= ctx->tokens_end)
return FALSE;
*(struct tgsi_processor *) ctx->tokens_cur++ = tgsi_build_processor( processor, ctx->header );
ctx->processor = processor;
return TRUE;
}
static boolean parse_label( struct translate_ctx *ctx, uint *val )
{
const char *cur = ctx->cur;
if (parse_uint( &cur, val )) {
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ':') {
cur++;
ctx->cur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static boolean
parse_file( const char **pcur, uint *file )
{
uint i;
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_FILE_COUNT; i++) {
const char *cur = *pcur;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_file_name(i) )) {
*pcur = cur;
*file = i;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static boolean
parse_opt_writemask(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *writemask )
{
const char *cur;
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == '.') {
cur++;
*writemask = TGSI_WRITEMASK_NONE;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'X') {
cur++;
*writemask |= TGSI_WRITEMASK_X;
}
if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'Y') {
cur++;
*writemask |= TGSI_WRITEMASK_Y;
}
if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'Z') {
cur++;
*writemask |= TGSI_WRITEMASK_Z;
}
if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'W') {
cur++;
*writemask |= TGSI_WRITEMASK_W;
}
if (*writemask == TGSI_WRITEMASK_NONE) {
report_error( ctx, "Writemask expected" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur = cur;
}
else {
*writemask = TGSI_WRITEMASK_XYZW;
}
return TRUE;
}
/* <register_file_bracket> ::= <file> `['
*/
static boolean
parse_register_file_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file )
{
if (!parse_file( &ctx->cur, file )) {
report_error( ctx, "Unknown register file" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != '[') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `['" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
/* <register_file_bracket_index> ::= <register_file_bracket> <uint>
*/
static boolean
parse_register_file_bracket_index(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file,
int *index )
{
uint uindex;
if (!parse_register_file_bracket( ctx, file ))
return FALSE;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
*index = (int) uindex;
return TRUE;
}
/* Parse simple 1d register operand.
* <register_dst> ::= <register_file_bracket_index> `]'
*/
static boolean
parse_register_1d(struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file,
int *index )
{
if (!parse_register_file_bracket_index( ctx, file, index ))
return FALSE;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
struct parsed_bracket {
int index;
uint ind_file;
int ind_index;
uint ind_comp;
uint ind_array;
};
static boolean
parse_register_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct parsed_bracket *brackets)
{
const char *cur;
uint uindex;
memset(brackets, 0, sizeof(struct parsed_bracket));
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
cur = ctx->cur;
if (parse_file( &cur, &brackets->ind_file )) {
if (!parse_register_1d( ctx, &brackets->ind_file,
&brackets->ind_index ))
return FALSE;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur == '.') {
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white(&ctx->cur);
switch (uprcase(*ctx->cur)) {
case 'X':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_X;
break;
case 'Y':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_Y;
break;
case 'Z':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_Z;
break;
case 'W':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_W;
break;
default:
report_error(ctx, "Expected indirect register swizzle component `x', `y', `z' or `w'");
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white(&ctx->cur);
}
if (*ctx->cur == '+' || *ctx->cur == '-')
parse_int( &ctx->cur, &brackets->index );
else
brackets->index = 0;
}
else {
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
brackets->index = (int) uindex;
brackets->ind_file = TGSI_FILE_NULL;
brackets->ind_index = 0;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
if (*ctx->cur == '(') {
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &brackets->ind_array )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ')') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `)'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
}
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
parse_opt_register_src_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct parsed_bracket *brackets,
int *parsed_brackets)
{
const char *cur = ctx->cur;
*parsed_brackets = 0;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (cur[0] == '[') {
++cur;
ctx->cur = cur;
if (!parse_register_bracket(ctx, brackets))
return FALSE;
*parsed_brackets = 1;
}
return TRUE;
}
/* Parse source register operand.
* <register_src> ::= <register_file_bracket_index> `]' |
* <register_file_bracket> <register_dst> [`.' (`x' | `y' | `z' | `w')] `]' |
* <register_file_bracket> <register_dst> [`.' (`x' | `y' | `z' | `w')] `+' <uint> `]' |
* <register_file_bracket> <register_dst> [`.' (`x' | `y' | `z' | `w')] `-' <uint> `]'
*/
static boolean
parse_register_src(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file,
struct parsed_bracket *brackets)
{
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_X;
if (!parse_register_file_bracket( ctx, file ))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_register_bracket( ctx, brackets ))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
struct parsed_dcl_bracket {
uint first;
uint last;
};
static boolean
parse_register_dcl_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct parsed_dcl_bracket *bracket)
{
uint uindex;
memset(bracket, 0, sizeof(struct parsed_dcl_bracket));
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
/* it can be an empty bracket [] which means its range
* is from 0 to some implied size */
if (ctx->cur[0] == ']' && ctx->implied_array_size != 0) {
bracket->first = 0;
bracket->last = ctx->implied_array_size - 1;
goto cleanup;
}
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
bracket->first = uindex;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (ctx->cur[0] == '.' && ctx->cur[1] == '.') {
uint uindex;
ctx->cur += 2;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal integer" );
return FALSE;
}
bracket->last = (int) uindex;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
}
else {
bracket->last = bracket->first;
}
cleanup:
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]' or `..'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
/* Parse register declaration.
* <register_dcl> ::= <register_file_bracket_index> `]' |
* <register_file_bracket_index> `..' <index> `]'
*/
static boolean
parse_register_dcl(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file,
struct parsed_dcl_bracket *brackets,
int *num_brackets)
{
const char *cur;
*num_brackets = 0;
if (!parse_register_file_bracket( ctx, file ))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_register_dcl_bracket( ctx, &brackets[0] ))
return FALSE;
*num_brackets = 1;
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (cur[0] == '[') {
bool is_in = *file == TGSI_FILE_INPUT;
bool is_out = *file == TGSI_FILE_OUTPUT;
++cur;
ctx->cur = cur;
if (!parse_register_dcl_bracket( ctx, &brackets[1] ))
return FALSE;
/* for geometry shader we don't really care about
* the first brackets it's always the size of the
* input primitive. so we want to declare just
* the index relevant to the semantics which is in
* the second bracket */
/* tessellation has similar constraints to geometry shader */
if ((ctx->processor == TGSI_PROCESSOR_GEOMETRY && is_in) ||
(ctx->processor == TGSI_PROCESSOR_TESS_EVAL && is_in) ||
(ctx->processor == TGSI_PROCESSOR_TESS_CTRL && (is_in || is_out))) {
brackets[0] = brackets[1];
*num_brackets = 1;
} else {
*num_brackets = 2;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
/* Parse destination register operand.*/
static boolean
parse_register_dst(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *file,
struct parsed_bracket *brackets)
{
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_X;
if (!parse_register_file_bracket( ctx, file ))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_register_bracket( ctx, brackets ))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
parse_dst_operand(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct tgsi_full_dst_register *dst )
{
uint file;
uint writemask;
const char *cur;
struct parsed_bracket bracket[2];
int parsed_opt_brackets;
if (!parse_register_dst( ctx, &file, &bracket[0] ))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_opt_register_src_bracket(ctx, &bracket[1], &parsed_opt_brackets))
return FALSE;
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (!parse_opt_writemask( ctx, &writemask ))
return FALSE;
dst->Register.File = file;
if (parsed_opt_brackets) {
dst->Register.Dimension = 1;
dst->Dimension.Indirect = 0;
dst->Dimension.Dimension = 0;
dst->Dimension.Index = bracket[0].index;
if (bracket[0].ind_file != TGSI_FILE_NULL) {
dst->Dimension.Indirect = 1;
dst->DimIndirect.File = bracket[0].ind_file;
dst->DimIndirect.Index = bracket[0].ind_index;
dst->DimIndirect.Swizzle = bracket[0].ind_comp;
dst->DimIndirect.ArrayID = bracket[0].ind_array;
}
bracket[0] = bracket[1];
}
dst->Register.Index = bracket[0].index;
dst->Register.WriteMask = writemask;
if (bracket[0].ind_file != TGSI_FILE_NULL) {
dst->Register.Indirect = 1;
dst->Indirect.File = bracket[0].ind_file;
dst->Indirect.Index = bracket[0].ind_index;
dst->Indirect.Swizzle = bracket[0].ind_comp;
dst->Indirect.ArrayID = bracket[0].ind_array;
}
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
parse_optional_swizzle(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
uint *swizzle,
boolean *parsed_swizzle,
int components)
{
const char *cur = ctx->cur;
*parsed_swizzle = FALSE;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == '.') {
uint i;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < components; i++) {
if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'X')
swizzle[i] = TGSI_SWIZZLE_X;
else if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'Y')
swizzle[i] = TGSI_SWIZZLE_Y;
else if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'Z')
swizzle[i] = TGSI_SWIZZLE_Z;
else if (uprcase( *cur ) == 'W')
swizzle[i] = TGSI_SWIZZLE_W;
else {
report_error( ctx, "Expected register swizzle component `x', `y', `z' or `w'" );
return FALSE;
}
cur++;
}
*parsed_swizzle = TRUE;
ctx->cur = cur;
}
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
parse_src_operand(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct tgsi_full_src_register *src )
{
uint file;
uint swizzle[4];
boolean parsed_swizzle;
struct parsed_bracket bracket[2];
int parsed_opt_brackets;
if (*ctx->cur == '-') {
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
src->Register.Negate = 1;
}
if (*ctx->cur == '|') {
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
src->Register.Absolute = 1;
}
if (!parse_register_src(ctx, &file, &bracket[0]))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_opt_register_src_bracket(ctx, &bracket[1], &parsed_opt_brackets))
return FALSE;
src->Register.File = file;
if (parsed_opt_brackets) {
src->Register.Dimension = 1;
src->Dimension.Indirect = 0;
src->Dimension.Dimension = 0;
src->Dimension.Index = bracket[0].index;
if (bracket[0].ind_file != TGSI_FILE_NULL) {
src->Dimension.Indirect = 1;
src->DimIndirect.File = bracket[0].ind_file;
src->DimIndirect.Index = bracket[0].ind_index;
src->DimIndirect.Swizzle = bracket[0].ind_comp;
src->DimIndirect.ArrayID = bracket[0].ind_array;
}
bracket[0] = bracket[1];
}
src->Register.Index = bracket[0].index;
if (bracket[0].ind_file != TGSI_FILE_NULL) {
src->Register.Indirect = 1;
src->Indirect.File = bracket[0].ind_file;
src->Indirect.Index = bracket[0].ind_index;
src->Indirect.Swizzle = bracket[0].ind_comp;
src->Indirect.ArrayID = bracket[0].ind_array;
}
/* Parse optional swizzle.
*/
if (parse_optional_swizzle( ctx, swizzle, &parsed_swizzle, 4 )) {
if (parsed_swizzle) {
src->Register.SwizzleX = swizzle[0];
src->Register.SwizzleY = swizzle[1];
src->Register.SwizzleZ = swizzle[2];
src->Register.SwizzleW = swizzle[3];
}
}
if (src->Register.Absolute) {
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != '|') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `|'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
}
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
parse_texoffset_operand(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct tgsi_texture_offset *src )
{
uint file;
uint swizzle[3];
boolean parsed_swizzle;
struct parsed_bracket bracket;
if (!parse_register_src(ctx, &file, &bracket))
return FALSE;
src->File = file;
src->Index = bracket.index;
/* Parse optional swizzle.
*/
if (parse_optional_swizzle( ctx, swizzle, &parsed_swizzle, 3 )) {
if (parsed_swizzle) {
src->SwizzleX = swizzle[0];
src->SwizzleY = swizzle[1];
src->SwizzleZ = swizzle[2];
}
}
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
match_inst(const char **pcur,
unsigned *saturate,
const struct tgsi_opcode_info *info)
{
const char *cur = *pcur;
/* simple case: the whole string matches the instruction name */
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, info->mnemonic)) {
*pcur = cur;
*saturate = 0;
return TRUE;
}
if (str_match_no_case(&cur, info->mnemonic)) {
/* the instruction has a suffix, figure it out */
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, "_SAT")) {
*pcur = cur;
*saturate = 1;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static boolean
parse_instruction(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
boolean has_label )
{
uint i;
uint saturate = 0;
const struct tgsi_opcode_info *info;
struct tgsi_full_instruction inst;
const char *cur;
uint advance;
inst = tgsi_default_full_instruction();
/* Parse predicate.
*/
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur == '(') {
uint file;
int index;
uint swizzle[4];
boolean parsed_swizzle;
inst.Instruction.Predicate = 1;
ctx->cur++;
if (*ctx->cur == '!') {
ctx->cur++;
inst.Predicate.Negate = 1;
}
if (!parse_register_1d( ctx, &file, &index ))
return FALSE;
if (parse_optional_swizzle( ctx, swizzle, &parsed_swizzle, 4 )) {
if (parsed_swizzle) {
inst.Predicate.SwizzleX = swizzle[0];
inst.Predicate.SwizzleY = swizzle[1];
inst.Predicate.SwizzleZ = swizzle[2];
inst.Predicate.SwizzleW = swizzle[3];
}
}
if (*ctx->cur != ')') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `)'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
}
/* Parse instruction name.
*/
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_OPCODE_LAST; i++) {
cur = ctx->cur;
info = tgsi_get_opcode_info( i );
if (match_inst(&cur, &saturate, info)) {
if (info->num_dst + info->num_src + info->is_tex == 0) {
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
else if (*cur == '\0' || eat_white( &cur )) {
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
}
if (i == TGSI_OPCODE_LAST) {
if (has_label)
report_error( ctx, "Unknown opcode" );
else
report_error( ctx, "Expected `DCL', `IMM' or a label" );
return FALSE;
}
inst.Instruction.Opcode = i;
inst.Instruction.Saturate = saturate;
inst.Instruction.NumDstRegs = info->num_dst;
inst.Instruction.NumSrcRegs = info->num_src;
if (i >= TGSI_OPCODE_SAMPLE && i <= TGSI_OPCODE_GATHER4) {
/*
* These are not considered tex opcodes here (no additional
* target argument) however we're required to set the Texture
* bit so we can set the number of tex offsets.
*/
inst.Instruction.Texture = 1;
inst.Texture.Texture = TGSI_TEXTURE_UNKNOWN;
}
/* Parse instruction operands.
*/
for (i = 0; i < info->num_dst + info->num_src + info->is_tex; i++) {
if (i > 0) {
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ',') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `,'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
}
if (i < info->num_dst) {
if (!parse_dst_operand( ctx, &inst.Dst[i] ))
return FALSE;
}
else if (i < info->num_dst + info->num_src) {
if (!parse_src_operand( ctx, &inst.Src[i - info->num_dst] ))
return FALSE;
}
else {
uint j;
for (j = 0; j < TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT; j++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &ctx->cur, tgsi_texture_names[j] )) {
inst.Instruction.Texture = 1;
inst.Texture.Texture = j;
break;
}
}
if (j == TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected texture target" );
return FALSE;
}
}
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; inst.Instruction.Texture && *cur == ','; i++) {
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
ctx->cur = cur;
if (!parse_texoffset_operand( ctx, &inst.TexOffsets[i] ))
return FALSE;
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
}
inst.Texture.NumOffsets = i;
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (info->is_branch && *cur == ':') {
uint target;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (!parse_uint( &cur, &target )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected a label" );
return FALSE;
}
inst.Instruction.Label = 1;
inst.Label.Label = target;
ctx->cur = cur;
}
advance = tgsi_build_full_instruction(
&inst,
ctx->tokens_cur,
ctx->header,
(uint) (ctx->tokens_end - ctx->tokens_cur) );
if (advance == 0)
return FALSE;
ctx->tokens_cur += advance;
return TRUE;
}
/* parses a 4-touple of the form {x, y, z, w}
* where x, y, z, w are numbers */
static boolean parse_immediate_data(struct translate_ctx *ctx, unsigned type,
union tgsi_immediate_data *values)
{
unsigned i;
int ret;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != '{') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `{'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (i > 0) {
if (*ctx->cur != ',') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `,'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
}
switch (type) {
case TGSI_IMM_FLOAT64:
ret = parse_double(&ctx->cur, &values[i].Uint, &values[i+1].Uint);
i++;
break;
case TGSI_IMM_FLOAT32:
ret = parse_float(&ctx->cur, &values[i].Float);
break;
case TGSI_IMM_UINT32:
ret = parse_uint(&ctx->cur, &values[i].Uint);
break;
case TGSI_IMM_INT32:
ret = parse_int(&ctx->cur, &values[i].Int);
break;
default:
assert(0);
ret = FALSE;
break;
}
if (!ret) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected immediate constant" );
return FALSE;
}
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != '}') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `}'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
static boolean parse_declaration( struct translate_ctx *ctx )
{
struct tgsi_full_declaration decl;
uint file;
struct parsed_dcl_bracket brackets[2];
int num_brackets;
uint writemask;
const char *cur, *cur2;
uint advance;
boolean is_vs_input;
if (!eat_white( &ctx->cur )) {
report_error( ctx, "Syntax error" );
return FALSE;
}
if (!parse_register_dcl( ctx, &file, brackets, &num_brackets))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_opt_writemask( ctx, &writemask ))
return FALSE;
decl = tgsi_default_full_declaration();
decl.Declaration.File = file;
decl.Declaration.UsageMask = writemask;
if (num_brackets == 1) {
decl.Range.First = brackets[0].first;
decl.Range.Last = brackets[0].last;
} else {
decl.Range.First = brackets[1].first;
decl.Range.Last = brackets[1].last;
decl.Declaration.Dimension = 1;
decl.Dim.Index2D = brackets[0].first;
}
is_vs_input = (file == TGSI_FILE_INPUT &&
ctx->processor == TGSI_PROCESSOR_VERTEX);
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',') {
cur2 = cur;
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur2, "ARRAY" )) {
int arrayid;
if (*cur2 != '(') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `('" );
return FALSE;
}
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (!parse_int( &cur2, &arrayid )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `,'" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 != ')') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `)'" );
return FALSE;
}
cur2++;
decl.Declaration.Array = 1;
decl.Array.ArrayID = arrayid;
ctx->cur = cur = cur2;
}
}
if (*cur == ',' && !is_vs_input) {
uint i, j;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (file == TGSI_FILE_RESOURCE) {
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_texture_names[i])) {
decl.Resource.Resource = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT) {
report_error(ctx, "Expected texture target");
return FALSE;
}
cur2 = cur;
eat_opt_white(&cur2);
while (*cur2 == ',') {
cur2++;
eat_opt_white(&cur2);
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur2, "RAW")) {
decl.Resource.Raw = 1;
} else if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur2, "WR")) {
decl.Resource.Writable = 1;
} else {
break;
}
cur = cur2;
eat_opt_white(&cur2);
}
ctx->cur = cur;
} else if (file == TGSI_FILE_SAMPLER_VIEW) {
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_texture_names[i])) {
decl.SamplerView.Resource = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT) {
report_error(ctx, "Expected texture target");
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur != ',') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `,'" );
return FALSE;
}
++cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (j = 0; j < 4; ++j) {
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_RETURN_TYPE_COUNT; ++i) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_return_type_names[i])) {
switch (j) {
case 0:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeX = i;
break;
case 1:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeY = i;
break;
case 2:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeZ = i;
break;
case 3:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeW = i;
break;
default:
assert(0);
}
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_RETURN_TYPE_COUNT) {
if (j == 0 || j > 2) {
report_error(ctx, "Expected type name");
return FALSE;
}
break;
} else {
cur2 = cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 == ',') {
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
cur = cur2;
continue;
} else
break;
}
}
if (j < 4) {
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeY =
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeZ =
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeW =
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeX;
}
ctx->cur = cur;
} else {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, "LOCAL")) {
decl.Declaration.Local = 1;
ctx->cur = cur;
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',') {
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_SEMANTIC_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_semantic_names[i])) {
uint index;
cur2 = cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 == '[') {
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (!parse_uint( &cur2, &index )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal integer" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]'" );
return FALSE;
}
cur2++;
decl.Semantic.Index = index;
cur = cur2;
}
decl.Declaration.Semantic = 1;
decl.Semantic.Name = i;
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',' && !is_vs_input) {
uint i;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_INTERPOLATE_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_interpolate_names[i] )) {
decl.Declaration.Interpolate = 1;
decl.Interp.Interpolate = i;
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_INTERPOLATE_COUNT) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected semantic or interpolate attribute" );
return FALSE;
}
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',' && !is_vs_input) {
uint i;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_INTERPOLATE_LOC_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_interpolate_locations[i] )) {
decl.Interp.Location = i;
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
}
advance = tgsi_build_full_declaration(
&decl,
ctx->tokens_cur,
ctx->header,
(uint) (ctx->tokens_end - ctx->tokens_cur) );
if (advance == 0)
return FALSE;
ctx->tokens_cur += advance;
return TRUE;
}
static boolean parse_immediate( struct translate_ctx *ctx )
{
struct tgsi_full_immediate imm;
uint advance;
int type;
if (*ctx->cur == '[') {
uint uindex;
++ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
if (uindex != ctx->num_immediates) {
report_error( ctx, "Immediates must be sorted" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
}
if (!eat_white( &ctx->cur )) {
report_error( ctx, "Syntax error" );
return FALSE;
}
for (type = 0; type < Elements(tgsi_immediate_type_names); ++type) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&ctx->cur, tgsi_immediate_type_names[type]))
break;
}
if (type == Elements(tgsi_immediate_type_names)) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected immediate type" );
return FALSE;
}
imm = tgsi_default_full_immediate();
imm.Immediate.NrTokens += 4;
imm.Immediate.DataType = type;
parse_immediate_data(ctx, type, imm.u);
advance = tgsi_build_full_immediate(
&imm,
ctx->tokens_cur,
ctx->header,
(uint) (ctx->tokens_end - ctx->tokens_cur) );
if (advance == 0)
return FALSE;
ctx->tokens_cur += advance;
ctx->num_immediates++;
return TRUE;
}
static boolean
parse_primitive( const char **pcur, uint *primitive )
{
uint i;
for (i = 0; i < PIPE_PRIM_MAX; i++) {
const char *cur = *pcur;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_primitive_names[i])) {
*primitive = i;
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static boolean
parse_fs_coord_origin( const char **pcur, uint *fs_coord_origin )
{
uint i;
for (i = 0; i < Elements(tgsi_fs_coord_origin_names); i++) {
const char *cur = *pcur;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_fs_coord_origin_names[i])) {
*fs_coord_origin = i;
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static boolean
parse_fs_coord_pixel_center( const char **pcur, uint *fs_coord_pixel_center )
{
uint i;
for (i = 0; i < Elements(tgsi_fs_coord_pixel_center_names); i++) {
const char *cur = *pcur;
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_fs_coord_pixel_center_names[i])) {
*fs_coord_pixel_center = i;
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static boolean parse_property( struct translate_ctx *ctx )
{
struct tgsi_full_property prop;
uint property_name;
uint values[8];
uint advance;
char id[64];
if (!eat_white( &ctx->cur )) {
report_error( ctx, "Syntax error" );
return FALSE;
}
report_error( ctx, "Syntax error" );
return FALSE;
}
if (!parse_identifier( &ctx->cur, id )) {
report_error( ctx, "Syntax error" );
return FALSE;
}
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the parse_identifier function in tgsi_text.c in the TGSI auxiliary module in the Gallium driver in virglrenderer before 0.6.0 allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access and QEMU process crash) via vectors related to parsing properties.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: append_quoted (struct stringbuf *sb, const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
int skip)
{
unsigned char tmp[4];
const unsigned char *s = value;
size_t n = 0;
for (;;)
{
for (value = s; n+skip < length; n++, s++)
{
s += skip;
n += skip;
if (*s < ' ' || *s > 126 || strchr (",+\"\\<>;", *s) )
break;
}
if (s != value)
put_stringbuf_mem_skip (sb, value, s-value, skip);
if (n+skip >= length)
return; /* ready */
s += skip;
n += skip;
if ( *s < ' ' || *s > 126 )
{
sprintf (tmp, "\\%02X", *s);
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 3);
}
else
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *s;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
}
n++; s++;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The append_utf8_value function in the DN decoder (dn.c) in Libksba before 1.3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by clearing the high bit of the byte after invalid utf-8 encoded data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoundPool::doLoad(sp<Sample>& sample)
{
ALOGV("doLoad: loading sample sampleID=%d", sample->sampleID());
sample->startLoad();
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sample->sampleID());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: media/libmedia/SoundPool.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G, and 6.x before 2016-02-01 mishandles locking requirements, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25781119.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
|
Medium
| 173,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::DidInstallNewDocument(Document* document) {
document->SetReadyState(Document::kLoading);
if (content_security_policy_) {
document->InitContentSecurityPolicy(content_security_policy_.Release());
}
if (history_item_ && IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type_))
document->SetStateForNewFormElements(history_item_->GetDocumentState());
DCHECK(document->GetFrame());
document->GetFrame()->GetClientHintsPreferences().UpdateFrom(
client_hints_preferences_);
Settings* settings = document->GetSettings();
fetcher_->SetImagesEnabled(settings->GetImagesEnabled());
fetcher_->SetAutoLoadImages(settings->GetLoadsImagesAutomatically());
const AtomicString& dns_prefetch_control =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::X_DNS_Prefetch_Control);
if (!dns_prefetch_control.IsEmpty())
document->ParseDNSPrefetchControlHeader(dns_prefetch_control);
String header_content_language =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Content_Language);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty()) {
size_t comma_index = header_content_language.find(',');
header_content_language.Truncate(comma_index);
header_content_language =
header_content_language.StripWhiteSpace(IsHTMLSpace<UChar>);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty())
document->SetContentLanguage(AtomicString(header_content_language));
}
String referrer_policy_header =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Referrer_Policy);
if (!referrer_policy_header.IsNull()) {
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReferrerPolicyHeader);
document->ParseAndSetReferrerPolicy(referrer_policy_header);
}
if (response_.IsSignedExchangeInnerResponse())
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponse);
GetLocalFrameClient().DidCreateNewDocument();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of CSP enforcement during navigations in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
|
Medium
| 172,617
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst;
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EBMLHeader::EBMLHeader() :
m_docType(NULL)
{
Init();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,269
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Navigate(NavigateParams* params) {
Browser* source_browser = params->browser;
if (source_browser)
params->initiating_profile = source_browser->profile();
DCHECK(params->initiating_profile);
if (!AdjustNavigateParamsForURL(params))
return;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(params->initiating_profile)->
enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(params->url);
if (extension && extension->is_platform_app())
params->url = GURL(chrome::kExtensionInvalidRequestURL);
#endif
if (params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP &&
source_browser && source_browser->window()) {
params->disposition =
source_browser->window()->GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
params->window_bounds);
}
if (source_browser && source_browser->is_app() &&
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB) {
params->disposition = WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
}
if (!params->source_contents && params->browser) {
params->source_contents =
params->browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
}
WebContents* contents_to_navigate_or_insert =
params->contents_to_insert.get();
if (params->switch_to_singleton_tab) {
DCHECK_EQ(params->disposition, WindowOpenDisposition::SINGLETON_TAB);
contents_to_navigate_or_insert = params->switch_to_singleton_tab;
}
int singleton_index;
std::tie(params->browser, singleton_index) =
GetBrowserAndTabForDisposition(*params);
if (!params->browser)
return;
if (singleton_index != -1) {
contents_to_navigate_or_insert =
params->browser->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(singleton_index);
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (source_browser && source_browser != params->browser) {
MultiUserWindowManager* manager = MultiUserWindowManager::GetInstance();
if (manager) {
aura::Window* src_window = source_browser->window()->GetNativeWindow();
aura::Window* new_window = params->browser->window()->GetNativeWindow();
const AccountId& src_account_id =
manager->GetUserPresentingWindow(src_window);
if (src_account_id != manager->GetUserPresentingWindow(new_window)) {
manager->ShowWindowForUser(new_window, src_account_id);
}
}
}
#endif
if (GetSourceProfile(params) != params->browser->profile()) {
params->opener = nullptr;
params->source_contents = nullptr;
params->source_site_instance = nullptr;
params->referrer = content::Referrer();
}
ScopedBrowserShower shower(params, &contents_to_navigate_or_insert);
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> contents_to_insert =
std::move(params->contents_to_insert);
NormalizeDisposition(params);
if (params->window_action == NavigateParams::NO_ACTION &&
source_browser != params->browser &&
params->browser->tab_strip_model()->empty()) {
params->window_action = NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
}
if (params->window_action == NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW &&
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP &&
params->user_gesture == false) {
params->window_action = NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW_INACTIVE;
}
bool user_initiated =
params->transition & ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR ||
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params->transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED) ||
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params->transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_BOOKMARK) ||
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params->transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED) ||
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params->transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL) ||
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params->transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD) ||
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params->transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_KEYWORD);
bool swapped_in_prerender = false;
if (!contents_to_navigate_or_insert) {
DCHECK(!params->url.is_empty());
if (params->disposition != WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB) {
contents_to_insert = CreateTargetContents(*params, params->url);
contents_to_navigate_or_insert = contents_to_insert.get();
} else {
DCHECK(params->source_contents);
contents_to_navigate_or_insert = params->source_contents;
prerender::PrerenderManager::Params prerender_params(
params, params->source_contents);
swapped_in_prerender = SwapInPrerender(params->url, &prerender_params);
if (swapped_in_prerender)
contents_to_navigate_or_insert = prerender_params.replaced_contents;
}
if (user_initiated)
contents_to_navigate_or_insert->NavigatedByUser();
if (!swapped_in_prerender) {
if (!HandleNonNavigationAboutURL(params->url)) {
LoadURLInContents(contents_to_navigate_or_insert, params->url, params);
}
}
} else {
}
if (params->source_contents &&
(params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB ||
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_WINDOW) &&
(params->tabstrip_add_types & TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_OPENER))
params->source_contents->Focus();
if (params->source_contents == contents_to_navigate_or_insert ||
(swapped_in_prerender &&
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB)) {
params->browser->UpdateUIForNavigationInTab(
contents_to_navigate_or_insert, params->transition,
params->window_action, user_initiated);
} else if (singleton_index == -1) {
if (params->tabstrip_index != -1)
params->tabstrip_add_types |= TabStripModel::ADD_FORCE_INDEX;
DCHECK(contents_to_insert);
params->browser->tab_strip_model()->AddWebContents(
std::move(contents_to_insert), params->tabstrip_index,
params->transition, params->tabstrip_add_types);
}
if (singleton_index >= 0) {
if (params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::SWITCH_TO_TAB &&
params->browser != source_browser)
params->window_action = NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
if (contents_to_navigate_or_insert->IsCrashed()) {
contents_to_navigate_or_insert->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, true);
} else if (params->path_behavior == NavigateParams::IGNORE_AND_NAVIGATE &&
contents_to_navigate_or_insert->GetURL() != params->url) {
LoadURLInContents(contents_to_navigate_or_insert, params->url, params);
}
if (params->source_contents != contents_to_navigate_or_insert) {
params->browser->tab_strip_model()->ActivateTabAt(singleton_index,
user_initiated);
if (params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::SWITCH_TO_TAB) {
if (params->source_contents->GetController().CanGoBack() ||
(params->source_contents->GetLastCommittedURL().spec() !=
chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL &&
params->source_contents->GetLastCommittedURL().spec() !=
chrome::kChromeSearchLocalNtpUrl &&
params->source_contents->GetLastCommittedURL().spec() !=
url::kAboutBlankURL))
params->source_contents->Focus();
else
params->source_contents->Close();
}
}
}
if (params->disposition != WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB) {
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_ADDED,
content::Source<content::WebContentsDelegate>(params->browser),
content::Details<WebContents>(contents_to_navigate_or_insert));
}
params->navigated_or_inserted_contents = contents_to_navigate_or_insert;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A missing check for popup window handling in Fullscreen in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
Medium
| 173,206
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->data;
const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname;
if(connssl->obj_clicert) {
/* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname);
if(NULL == slot) {
failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
return SECFailure;
}
if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, connssl->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
&cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
if(NULL == cert) {
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if(NULL == key) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
display_cert_info(data, cert);
*pRetCert = cert;
*pRetKey = key;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* use the default NSS hook */
if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
pRetCert, pRetKey)
|| NULL == *pRetCert) {
if(NULL == nickname)
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
"specified)");
else
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
/* get certificate nickname if any */
nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
if(NULL == nickname)
nickname = "[unknown]";
if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
return SECSuccess;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: curl and libcurl before 7.50.2, when built with NSS and the libnsspem.so library is available at runtime, allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of a TLS connection by leveraging reuse of a previously loaded client certificate from file for a connection for which no certificate has been set, a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-5420.
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
|
Low
| 166,945
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CopyToOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy(header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
(const OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 174,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, context_handle, time_rec)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
OM_uint32 *time_rec;
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5_context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) <= 0) {
*time_rec = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
} else {
*time_rec = lifetime;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,813
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebDriverCommand::Init(Response* const response) {
std::string session_id = GetPathVariable(2);
if (session_id.length() == 0) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kBadRequest, "No session ID specified"));
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Fetching session: " << session_id;
session_ = SessionManager::GetInstance()->GetSession(session_id);
if (session_ == NULL) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kSessionNotFound, "Session not found: " + session_id));
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Error> error(session_->WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading());
if (error.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << error->ToString();
}
error.reset(session_->SwitchToTopFrameIfCurrentFrameInvalid());
if (error.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << error->ToString();
}
response->SetField("sessionId", Value::CreateStringValue(session_id));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getMaxLineLen)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG((long)intern->u.file.max_line_len);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::hasChildren()
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,059
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ipc_rcu_putref(void *ptr)
{
if (--container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount > 0)
return;
if (container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc) {
call_rcu(&container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_grace, data)->rcu,
ipc_schedule_free);
} else {
kfree_rcu(container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_grace, data), rcu);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,985
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StorageHandler::GetUsageAndQuota(
const String& origin,
std::unique_ptr<GetUsageAndQuotaCallback> callback) {
if (!process_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid()) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::Error(origin + " is not a valid URL"));
}
storage::QuotaManager* manager =
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetQuotaManager();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetUsageAndQuotaOnIOThread, base::RetainedRef(manager),
origin_url, base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ipc_rcu_getref(void *ptr)
{
container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount++;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,984
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Tracks::Tracks(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_trackEntries(NULL),
m_trackEntriesEnd(NULL)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,446
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cp2112_gpio_direction_output(struct gpio_chip *chip,
unsigned offset, int value)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto fail;
}
buf[1] |= 1 << offset;
buf[2] = gpio_push_pull;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto fail;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
/*
* Set gpio value when output direction is already set,
* as specified in AN495, Rev. 0.2, cpt. 4.4
*/
cp2112_gpio_set(chip, offset, value);
return 0;
fail:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.9 uses a spinlock without considering that sleeping is possible in a USB HID request callback, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 168,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnMsgOpenChannelToExtension(
int routing_id, const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name, int* port_id) {
*port_id = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::InitializeEmbeddedTestServer() {
if (!embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen())
return false;
test_config_->SetInteger(kEmbeddedTestServerPort,
embedded_test_server()->port());
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak user local file data via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
|
Medium
| 172,669
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static HB_Error Lookup_MarkMarkPos( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_GPOS_SubTable* st,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort flags,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_UShort i, j, mark1_index, mark2_index, property, class;
HB_Fixed x_mark1_value, y_mark1_value,
x_mark2_value, y_mark2_value;
HB_Error error;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_MarkMarkPos* mmp = &st->markmark;
HB_MarkArray* ma1;
HB_Mark2Array* ma2;
HB_Mark2Record* m2r;
HB_Anchor* mark1_anchor;
HB_Anchor* mark2_anchor;
HB_Position o;
HB_UNUSED(nesting_level);
if ( context_length != 0xFFFF && context_length < 1 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_MARKS )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( CHECK_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_CURITEM(),
flags, &property ) )
return error;
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark1Coverage, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&mark1_index );
if ( error )
return error;
/* now we search backwards for a suitable mark glyph until a non-mark
glyph */
if ( buffer->in_pos == 0 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
i = 1;
j = buffer->in_pos - 1;
while ( i <= buffer->in_pos )
{
error = HB_GDEF_Get_Glyph_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&property );
if ( error )
return error;
if ( !( property == HB_GDEF_MARK || property & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS ) )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS )
{
if ( property == (flags & 0xFF00) )
break;
}
else
break;
i++;
j--;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark2Coverage, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&mark2_index );
if ( error )
if ( mark1_index >= ma1->MarkCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
class = ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].Class;
mark1_anchor = &ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].MarkAnchor;
if ( class >= mmp->ClassCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
ma2 = &mmp->Mark2Array;
if ( mark2_index >= ma2->Mark2Count )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
m2r = &ma2->Mark2Record[mark2_index];
mark2_anchor = &m2r->Mark2Anchor[class];
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark1_anchor, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&x_mark1_value, &y_mark1_value );
if ( error )
return error;
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark2_anchor, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&x_mark2_value, &y_mark2_value );
if ( error )
return error;
/* anchor points are not cumulative */
o = POSITION( buffer->in_pos );
o->x_pos = x_mark2_value - x_mark1_value;
o->y_pos = y_mark2_value - y_mark1_value;
o->x_advance = 0;
o->y_advance = 0;
o->back = 1;
(buffer->in_pos)++;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the Lookup_MarkMarkPos function in the HarfBuzz module (harfbuzz-gpos.c), as used by Qt before 4.7.4 and Pango, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t md_size;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
: (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
int t;
if (send) {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
} else {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->read_hash;
}
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
md_size = t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
if (stream_mac) {
mac_ctx = hash;
} else {
hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
return -1;
mac_ctx = hmac;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
} else
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
header[8] = rec->type;
header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
/*
* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
} else {
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
mac_ctx, rec->input,
rec->length, rec->orig_len)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
++seq[i];
if (seq[i] != 0)
break;
}
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
return (md_size);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 168,424
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderView::RenderView(RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name)
: RenderWidget(render_thread, WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone),
webkit_preferences_(webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(pepper_delegate_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(accessibility_method_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_input_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
accessibility_ack_pending_(false),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(NULL),
session_storage_namespace_id_(session_storage_namespace_id) {
routing_id_ = routing_id;
if (opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
opener_id_ = opener_id;
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
if (counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = counter;
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
render_thread_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit(parent_hwnd);
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (!frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(renderer_prefs);
host_window_ = parent_hwnd;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibility))
WebAccessibilityCache::enableAccessibility();
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
RenderThread::current()->video_capture_impl_manager());
}
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle strings in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted document that triggers an incorrect read operation.
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void mp_encode_lua_table_as_map(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
size_t len = 0;
/* First step: count keys into table. No other way to do it with the
* Lua API, we need to iterate a first time. Note that an alternative
* would be to do a single run, and then hack the buffer to insert the
* map opcodes for message pack. Too hackish for this lib. */
lua_pushnil(L);
while(lua_next(L,-2)) {
lua_pop(L,1); /* remove value, keep key for next iteration. */
len++;
}
/* Step two: actually encoding of the map. */
mp_encode_map(L,buf,len);
lua_pushnil(L);
while(lua_next(L,-2)) {
/* Stack: ... key value */
lua_pushvalue(L,-2); /* Stack: ... key value key */
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1); /* encode key */
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1); /* encode val */
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
|
Low
| 169,240
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPANGOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
cairo_font_options_t
*font_options;
cairo_surface_t
*surface;
char
*caption,
*property;
cairo_t
*cairo_image;
const char
*option;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PangoAlignment
align;
PangoContext
*context;
PangoFontMap
*fontmap;
PangoGravity
gravity;
PangoLayout
*layout;
PangoRectangle
extent;
PixelPacket
fill_color;
RectangleInfo
page;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
stride;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
/*
Format caption.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
else
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"pango:",6) == 0)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option+6);
else
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
caption=ConstantString(GetImageProperty(image,"caption"));
/*
Get context.
*/
fontmap=pango_cairo_font_map_new();
pango_cairo_font_map_set_resolution(PANGO_CAIRO_FONT_MAP(fontmap),
image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution);
font_options=cairo_font_options_create();
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:hinting");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"none") != 0)
cairo_font_options_set_hint_style(font_options,CAIRO_HINT_STYLE_NONE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"full") != 0)
cairo_font_options_set_hint_style(font_options,CAIRO_HINT_STYLE_FULL);
}
context=pango_font_map_create_context(fontmap);
pango_cairo_context_set_font_options(context,font_options);
cairo_font_options_destroy(font_options);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:language");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_context_set_language(context,pango_language_from_string(option));
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
pango_context_set_base_dir(context,draw_info->direction ==
RightToLeftDirection ? PANGO_DIRECTION_RTL : PANGO_DIRECTION_LTR);
switch (draw_info->gravity)
{
case NorthGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_NORTH;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
case WestGravity:
case SouthWestGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_WEST;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
case EastGravity:
case SouthEastGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_EAST;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_SOUTH;
break;
}
default:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_AUTO;
break;
}
}
pango_context_set_base_gravity(context,gravity);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:gravity-hint");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"line") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_LINE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"natural") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_NATURAL);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"strong") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_STRONG);
}
/*
Configure layout.
*/
layout=pango_layout_new(context);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:auto-dir");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_layout_set_auto_dir(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:ellipsize");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"end") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_END);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"middle") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_MIDDLE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"none") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_NONE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"start") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_START);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:justify");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_justify(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:single-paragraph");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_single_paragraph_mode(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:wrap");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"char") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_CHAR);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"word") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_WORD);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"word-char") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_WORD_CHAR);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:indent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_layout_set_indent(layout,(int) ((StringToLong(option)*
(image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution)*PANGO_SCALE+45)/
90.0+0.5));
switch (draw_info->align)
{
case CenterAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER; break;
case RightAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_RIGHT; break;
case LeftAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT; break;
default:
{
if (draw_info->gravity == CenterGravity)
{
align=PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER;
break;
}
align=PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT;
break;
}
}
if ((align != PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER) &&
(draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection))
align=(PangoAlignment) (PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT+PANGO_ALIGN_RIGHT-align);
pango_layout_set_alignment(layout,align);
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
{
PangoFontDescription
*description;
/*
Set font.
*/
description=pango_font_description_from_string(draw_info->font);
pango_font_description_set_size(description,(int) (PANGO_SCALE*
draw_info->pointsize+0.5));
pango_layout_set_font_description(layout,description);
pango_font_description_free(description);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:markup");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) == MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_text(layout,caption,-1);
else
{
GError
*error;
error=(GError *) NULL;
if (pango_parse_markup(caption,-1,0,NULL,NULL,NULL,&error) == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
error->message,"`%s'",image_info->filename);
pango_layout_set_markup(layout,caption,-1);
}
pango_layout_context_changed(layout);
page.x=0;
page.y=0;
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
if (image->columns == 0)
{
pango_layout_get_extents(layout,NULL,&extent);
image->columns=(extent.x+extent.width+PANGO_SCALE/2)/PANGO_SCALE+2*page.x;
}
else
{
image->columns-=2*page.x;
pango_layout_set_width(layout,(int) ((PANGO_SCALE*image->columns*
(image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution)+45.0)/90.0+
0.5));
}
if (image->rows == 0)
{
pango_layout_get_extents(layout,NULL,&extent);
image->rows=(extent.y+extent.height+PANGO_SCALE/2)/PANGO_SCALE+2*page.y;
}
else
{
image->rows-=2*page.y;
pango_layout_set_height(layout,(int) ((PANGO_SCALE*image->rows*
(image->y_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->y_resolution)+45.0)/90.0+
0.5));
}
/*
Render markup.
*/
stride=(size_t) cairo_format_stride_for_width(CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns);
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,stride*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
surface=cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(pixels,CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,(int) stride);
cairo_image=cairo_create(surface);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_CLEAR);
cairo_paint(cairo_image);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_OVER);
cairo_translate(cairo_image,page.x,page.y);
pango_cairo_show_layout(cairo_image,layout);
cairo_destroy(cairo_image);
cairo_surface_destroy(surface);
g_object_unref(layout);
g_object_unref(fontmap);
/*
Convert surface to image.
*/
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
gamma;
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.opacity=QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
/*
Disassociate alpha.
*/
gamma=1.0-QuantumScale*fill_color.opacity;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
fill_color.blue*=gamma;
fill_color.green*=gamma;
fill_color.red*=gamma;
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,fill_color.opacity,q,(MagickRealType)
q->opacity,q);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,589
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,630
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2))
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
if((0 == u1_is_idr_slice) && ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
if(u1_is_idr_slice || ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag)
{
ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(ps_dec, u2_frame_num);
}
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = ps_cur_poc->u2_frame_num;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field;
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
}
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* First slice of a picture is always considered as part of new picture */
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 2)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
if(i1_is_end_of_poc)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
if((ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 0) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice++;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
|
Medium
| 174,040
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Update(scoped_refptr<ClipPaintPropertyNode> node,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> new_parent,
const FloatRoundedRect& new_clip_rect) {
node->Update(std::move(new_parent),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{nullptr, new_clip_rect});
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,838
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Status XvMCGetDRInfo(Display *dpy, XvPortID port,
char **name, char **busID,
int *major, int *minor,
int *patchLevel,
int *isLocal)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = xvmc_find_display(dpy);
xvmcGetDRInfoReply rep;
xvmcGetDRInfoReq *req;
CARD32 magic;
#ifdef HAVE_SHMAT
volatile CARD32 *shMem;
struct timezone here;
struct timeval now;
here.tz_minuteswest = 0;
here.tz_dsttime = 0;
#endif
*name = NULL;
*busID = NULL;
XvMCCheckExtension (dpy, info, BadImplementation);
LockDisplay (dpy);
XvMCGetReq (GetDRInfo, req);
req->port = port;
magic = 0;
req->magic = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_SHMAT
req->shmKey = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 1024, IPC_CREAT | 0600);
/*
* We fill a shared memory page with a repetitive pattern. If the
* X server can read this pattern, we probably have a local connection.
* Note that we can trigger the remote X server to read any shared
* page on the remote machine, so we shouldn't be able to guess and verify
* any complicated data on those pages. Thats the explanation of this
* otherwise stupid-looking pattern algorithm.
*/
if (req->shmKey >= 0) {
shMem = (CARD32 *) shmat(req->shmKey, NULL, 0);
shmctl( req->shmKey, IPC_RMID, NULL);
if ( shMem ) {
register volatile CARD32 *shMemC = shMem;
register int i;
gettimeofday( &now, &here);
magic = now.tv_usec & 0x000FFFFF;
req->magic = magic;
i = 1024 / sizeof(CARD32);
while(i--) {
*shMemC++ = magic;
magic = ~magic;
}
} else {
req->shmKey = -1;
}
}
#else
req->shmKey = 0;
#endif
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
#ifdef HAVE_SHMAT
if ( req->shmKey >= 0) {
shmdt( (const void *) shMem );
}
#endif
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SHMAT
shmdt( (const void *) shMem );
#endif
if (rep.length > 0) {
unsigned long realSize = 0;
char *tmpBuf = NULL;
if ((rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) &&
/* protect against overflow in strncpy below */
(rep.nameLen + rep.busIDLen > rep.nameLen)) {
realSize = rep.length << 2;
if (realSize >= (rep.nameLen + rep.busIDLen)) {
tmpBuf = Xmalloc(realSize);
*name = Xmalloc(rep.nameLen);
*busID = Xmalloc(rep.busIDLen);
}
}
if (*name && *busID && tmpBuf) {
_XRead(dpy, tmpBuf, realSize);
strncpy(*name,tmpBuf,rep.nameLen);
(*name)[rep.nameLen - 1] = '\0';
strncpy(*busID,tmpBuf+rep.nameLen,rep.busIDLen);
(*busID)[rep.busIDLen - 1] = '\0';
XFree(tmpBuf);
} else {
XFree(*name);
*name = NULL;
XFree(*busID);
*busID = NULL;
XFree(tmpBuf);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return -1;
}
}
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
*major = rep.major;
*minor = rep.minor;
*patchLevel = rep.patchLevel;
*isLocal = (req->shmKey > 0) ? rep.isLocal : 1;
return (rep.length > 0) ? Success : BadImplementation;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer underflow in X.org libXvMC before 1.0.10 allows remote X servers to have unspecified impact via an empty string.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void mca_ccb_hdl_req(tMCA_CCB* p_ccb, tMCA_CCB_EVT* p_data) {
BT_HDR* p_pkt = &p_data->hdr;
uint8_t *p, *p_start;
tMCA_DCB* p_dcb;
tMCA_CTRL evt_data;
tMCA_CCB_MSG* p_rx_msg = NULL;
uint8_t reject_code = MCA_RSP_NO_RESOURCE;
bool send_rsp = false;
bool check_req = false;
uint8_t reject_opcode;
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("mca_ccb_hdl_req status:%d", p_ccb->status);
p_rx_msg = (tMCA_CCB_MSG*)p_pkt;
p = (uint8_t*)(p_pkt + 1) + p_pkt->offset;
evt_data.hdr.op_code = *p++;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(evt_data.hdr.mdl_id, p);
reject_opcode = evt_data.hdr.op_code + 1;
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("received mdl id: %d ", evt_data.hdr.mdl_id);
if (p_ccb->status == MCA_CCB_STAT_PENDING) {
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("received req inpending state");
/* allow abort in pending state */
if ((p_ccb->status == MCA_CCB_STAT_PENDING) &&
(evt_data.hdr.op_code == MCA_OP_MDL_ABORT_REQ)) {
reject_code = MCA_RSP_SUCCESS;
send_rsp = true;
/* clear the pending status */
p_ccb->status = MCA_CCB_STAT_NORM;
if (p_ccb->p_tx_req &&
((p_dcb = mca_dcb_by_hdl(p_ccb->p_tx_req->dcb_idx)) != NULL)) {
mca_dcb_dealloc(p_dcb, NULL);
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_ccb->p_tx_req);
}
} else
reject_code = MCA_RSP_BAD_OP;
} else if (p_ccb->p_rx_msg) {
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("still handling prev req");
/* still holding previous message, reject this new one ?? */
} else if (p_ccb->p_tx_req) {
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("still waiting for a response ctrl_vpsm:0x%x",
p_ccb->ctrl_vpsm);
/* sent a request; waiting for response */
if (p_ccb->ctrl_vpsm == 0) {
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("local is ACP. accept the cmd from INT");
/* local is acceptor, need to handle the request */
check_req = true;
reject_code = MCA_RSP_SUCCESS;
/* drop the previous request */
if ((p_ccb->p_tx_req->op_code == MCA_OP_MDL_CREATE_REQ) &&
((p_dcb = mca_dcb_by_hdl(p_ccb->p_tx_req->dcb_idx)) != NULL)) {
mca_dcb_dealloc(p_dcb, NULL);
}
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_ccb->p_tx_req);
mca_stop_timer(p_ccb);
} else {
/* local is initiator, ignore the req */
osi_free(p_pkt);
return;
}
} else if (p_pkt->layer_specific != MCA_RSP_SUCCESS) {
reject_code = (uint8_t)p_pkt->layer_specific;
if (((evt_data.hdr.op_code >= MCA_NUM_STANDARD_OPCODE) &&
(evt_data.hdr.op_code < MCA_FIRST_SYNC_OP)) ||
(evt_data.hdr.op_code > MCA_LAST_SYNC_OP)) {
/* invalid op code */
reject_opcode = MCA_OP_ERROR_RSP;
evt_data.hdr.mdl_id = 0;
}
} else {
check_req = true;
reject_code = MCA_RSP_SUCCESS;
}
if (check_req) {
if (reject_code == MCA_RSP_SUCCESS) {
reject_code = MCA_RSP_BAD_MDL;
if (MCA_IS_VALID_MDL_ID(evt_data.hdr.mdl_id) ||
((evt_data.hdr.mdl_id == MCA_ALL_MDL_ID) &&
(evt_data.hdr.op_code == MCA_OP_MDL_DELETE_REQ))) {
reject_code = MCA_RSP_SUCCESS;
/* mdl_id is valid according to the spec */
switch (evt_data.hdr.op_code) {
case MCA_OP_MDL_CREATE_REQ:
evt_data.create_ind.dep_id = *p++;
evt_data.create_ind.cfg = *p++;
p_rx_msg->mdep_id = evt_data.create_ind.dep_id;
if (!mca_is_valid_dep_id(p_ccb->p_rcb, p_rx_msg->mdep_id)) {
MCA_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid local MDEP ID %d", __func__,
p_rx_msg->mdep_id);
reject_code = MCA_RSP_BAD_MDEP;
} else if (mca_ccb_uses_mdl_id(p_ccb, evt_data.hdr.mdl_id)) {
MCA_TRACE_DEBUG("the mdl_id is currently used in the CL(create)");
mca_dcb_close_by_mdl_id(p_ccb, evt_data.hdr.mdl_id);
} else {
/* check if this dep still have MDL available */
if (mca_dep_free_mdl(p_ccb, evt_data.create_ind.dep_id) == 0) {
MCA_TRACE_ERROR("%s: MAX_MDL is used by MDEP %d", __func__,
evt_data.create_ind.dep_id);
reject_code = MCA_RSP_MDEP_BUSY;
}
}
break;
case MCA_OP_MDL_RECONNECT_REQ:
if (mca_ccb_uses_mdl_id(p_ccb, evt_data.hdr.mdl_id)) {
MCA_TRACE_ERROR("%s: MDL_ID %d busy, in CL(reconn)", __func__,
evt_data.hdr.mdl_id);
reject_code = MCA_RSP_MDL_BUSY;
}
break;
case MCA_OP_MDL_ABORT_REQ:
reject_code = MCA_RSP_BAD_OP;
break;
case MCA_OP_MDL_DELETE_REQ:
/* delete the associated mdl */
mca_dcb_close_by_mdl_id(p_ccb, evt_data.hdr.mdl_id);
send_rsp = true;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (((reject_code != MCA_RSP_SUCCESS) &&
(evt_data.hdr.op_code != MCA_OP_SYNC_INFO_IND)) ||
send_rsp) {
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(MCA_CTRL_MTU + sizeof(BT_HDR));
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p = p_start = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
*p++ = reject_opcode;
*p++ = reject_code;
bool valid_response = true;
switch (reject_opcode) {
case MCA_OP_ERROR_RSP:
case MCA_OP_MDL_CREATE_RSP:
case MCA_OP_MDL_RECONNECT_RSP:
case MCA_OP_MDL_ABORT_RSP:
case MCA_OP_MDL_DELETE_RSP:
UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, evt_data.hdr.mdl_id);
break;
case MCA_OP_SYNC_CAP_RSP:
memset(p, 0, 7);
p += 7;
break;
case MCA_OP_SYNC_SET_RSP:
memset(p, 0, 14);
p += 14;
break;
default:
MCA_TRACE_ERROR("%s: reject_opcode 0x%02x not recognized", __func__,
reject_opcode);
valid_response = false;
break;
}
if (valid_response) {
p_buf->len = p - p_start;
MCA_TRACE_ERROR("%s: reject_opcode=0x%02x, reject_code=0x%02x, length=%d",
__func__, reject_opcode, reject_code, p_buf->len);
L2CA_DataWrite(p_ccb->lcid, p_buf);
} else {
osi_free(p_buf);
}
}
if (reject_code == MCA_RSP_SUCCESS) {
/* use the received GKI buffer to store information to double check response
* API */
p_rx_msg->op_code = evt_data.hdr.op_code;
p_rx_msg->mdl_id = evt_data.hdr.mdl_id;
p_ccb->p_rx_msg = p_rx_msg;
if (send_rsp) {
osi_free(p_pkt);
p_ccb->p_rx_msg = NULL;
}
mca_ccb_report_event(p_ccb, evt_data.hdr.op_code, &evt_data);
} else
osi_free(p_pkt);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In mca_ccb_hdl_req of mca_cact.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote information disclosure over Bluetooth with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110791536
Commit Message: Add packet length checks in mca_ccb_hdl_req
Bug: 110791536
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ica5d8037246682fdb190b2747a86ed8d44c2869a
(cherry picked from commit 4de7ccdd914b7a178df9180d15f675b257ea6e02)
|
Low
| 174,080
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PrintingContext::Result PrintingContextCairo::UpdatePrinterSettings(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings, const PageRanges& ranges) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool landscape = false;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(kSettingLandscape, &landscape))
return OnError();
settings_.SetOrientation(landscape);
settings_.ranges = ranges;
return OK;
#else
DCHECK(!in_print_job_);
if (!print_dialog_->UpdateSettings(job_settings, ranges))
return OnError();
return OK;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,267
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int recv_msg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t buf_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
long timeout;
unsigned int sz;
u32 err;
int res;
/* Catch invalid receive requests */
if (unlikely(!buf_len))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED)) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
/* will be updated in set_orig_addr() if needed */
m->msg_namelen = 0;
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
/* Look for a message in receive queue; wait if necessary */
while (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
if (timeout <= 0L) {
res = timeout ? timeout : -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto exit;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeout = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
tipc_rx_ready(sock),
timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
}
/* Look at first message in receive queue */
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
msg = buf_msg(buf);
sz = msg_data_sz(msg);
err = msg_errcode(msg);
/* Discard an empty non-errored message & try again */
if ((!sz) && (!err)) {
advance_rx_queue(sk);
goto restart;
}
/* Capture sender's address (optional) */
set_orig_addr(m, msg);
/* Capture ancillary data (optional) */
res = anc_data_recv(m, msg, tport);
if (res)
goto exit;
/* Capture message data (if valid) & compute return value (always) */
if (!err) {
if (unlikely(buf_len < sz)) {
sz = buf_len;
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
res = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(buf, msg_hdr_sz(msg),
m->msg_iov, sz);
if (res)
goto exit;
res = sz;
} else {
if ((sock->state == SS_READY) ||
((err == TIPC_CONN_SHUTDOWN) || m->msg_control))
res = 0;
else
res = -ECONNRESET;
}
/* Consume received message (optional) */
if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
if ((sock->state != SS_READY) &&
(++tport->conn_unacked >= TIPC_FLOW_CONTROL_WIN))
tipc_acknowledge(tport->ref, tport->conn_unacked);
advance_rx_queue(sk);
}
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fr_add_pvc(struct net_device *frad, unsigned int dlci, int type)
{
hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(frad);
pvc_device *pvc;
struct net_device *dev;
int used;
if ((pvc = add_pvc(frad, dlci)) == NULL) {
netdev_warn(frad, "Memory squeeze on fr_add_pvc()\n");
return -ENOBUFS;
}
if (*get_dev_p(pvc, type))
return -EEXIST;
used = pvc_is_used(pvc);
if (type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
dev = alloc_netdev(0, "pvceth%d", ether_setup);
else
dev = alloc_netdev(0, "pvc%d", pvc_setup);
if (!dev) {
netdev_warn(frad, "Memory squeeze on fr_pvc()\n");
delete_unused_pvcs(hdlc);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
if (type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
random_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr);
else {
*(__be16*)dev->dev_addr = htons(dlci);
dlci_to_q922(dev->broadcast, dlci);
}
dev->netdev_ops = &pvc_ops;
dev->mtu = HDLC_MAX_MTU;
dev->tx_queue_len = 0;
dev->ml_priv = pvc;
if (register_netdevice(dev) != 0) {
free_netdev(dev);
delete_unused_pvcs(hdlc);
return -EIO;
}
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
*get_dev_p(pvc, type) = dev;
if (!used) {
state(hdlc)->dce_changed = 1;
state(hdlc)->dce_pvc_count++;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void check_preempt_curr(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
const struct sched_class *class;
if (p->sched_class == rq->curr->sched_class) {
rq->curr->sched_class->check_preempt_curr(rq, p, flags);
} else {
for_each_class(class) {
if (class == rq->curr->sched_class)
break;
if (class == p->sched_class) {
resched_task(rq->curr);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* A queue event has occurred, and we're going to schedule. In
* this case, we can save a useless back to back clock update.
*/
if (test_tsk_need_resched(rq->curr))
rq->skip_clock_update = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a certain clock-update optimization, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an application that executes code in a loop.
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned int oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *mem,
const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages)
{
int points;
if (oom_unkillable_task(p, mem, nodemask))
return 0;
p = find_lock_task_mm(p);
if (!p)
return 0;
/*
* Shortcut check for a thread sharing p->mm that is OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN
* so the entire heuristic doesn't need to be executed for something
* that cannot be killed.
*/
if (atomic_read(&p->mm->oom_disable_count)) {
task_unlock(p);
return 0;
}
/*
* The memory controller may have a limit of 0 bytes, so avoid a divide
* by zero, if necessary.
*/
if (!totalpages)
totalpages = 1;
/*
* The baseline for the badness score is the proportion of RAM that each
* task's rss, pagetable and swap space use.
*/
points = get_mm_rss(p->mm) + p->mm->nr_ptes;
points += get_mm_counter(p->mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
points *= 1000;
points /= totalpages;
task_unlock(p);
/*
* Root processes get 3% bonus, just like the __vm_enough_memory()
* implementation used by LSMs.
*/
if (has_capability_noaudit(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
points -= 30;
/*
* /proc/pid/oom_score_adj ranges from -1000 to +1000 such that it may
* either completely disable oom killing or always prefer a certain
* task.
*/
points += p->signal->oom_score_adj;
/*
* Never return 0 for an eligible task that may be killed since it's
* possible that no single user task uses more than 0.1% of memory and
* no single admin tasks uses more than 3.0%.
*/
if (points <= 0)
return 1;
return (points < 1000) ? points : 1000;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the oom_badness function in mm/oom_kill.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1.8 on 64-bit platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or process termination) by using a certain large amount of memory.
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
Low
| 165,740
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void prefetch_table(const volatile byte *tab, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8 * 32)
{
(void)tab[i + 0 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 1 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 2 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 3 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 4 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 5 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 6 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 7 * 32];
}
(void)tab[len - 1];
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
|
Medium
| 170,215
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥ] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Add Lao/Thai spoofable entries
U+0E1E (พ) => w
U+0E9E (ພ) => w
U+0E9F (ຟ) => w
U+0EA3 (ຣ) => s
U+0EAE (ຮ) => s
U+0E1A (บ) => u
U+0E9A (ບ) => u
Note that U+0E1F(ฟ) and U+0E23 (ร) were added a while ago.
BUG=833143
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I882e7d272cdca1d80aa23be94b4d7906ff8653c1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1058710
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#562565}
|
Medium
| 173,158
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
host_ = frame_host;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ZSTD_encodeSequences_body(
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_MatchLength, BYTE const* mlCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_OffsetBits, BYTE const* ofCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_LitLength, BYTE const* llCodeTable,
seqDef const* sequences, size_t nbSeq, int longOffsets)
{
BIT_CStream_t blockStream;
FSE_CState_t stateMatchLength;
FSE_CState_t stateOffsetBits;
FSE_CState_t stateLitLength;
CHECK_E(BIT_initCStream(&blockStream, dst, dstCapacity), dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space remaining */
/* first symbols */
FSE_initCState2(&stateMatchLength, CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
FSE_initCState2(&stateOffsetBits, CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
FSE_initCState2(&stateLitLength, CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].litLength, LL_bits[llCodeTable[nbSeq-1]]);
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].matchLength, ML_bits[mlCodeTable[nbSeq-1]]);
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
if (longOffsets) {
U32 const ofBits = ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1];
int const extraBits = ofBits - MIN(ofBits, STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN-1);
if (extraBits) {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset, extraBits);
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
}
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset >> extraBits,
ofBits - extraBits);
} else {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[nbSeq-1].offset, ofCodeTable[nbSeq-1]);
}
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
{ size_t n;
for (n=nbSeq-2 ; n<nbSeq ; n--) { /* intentional underflow */
BYTE const llCode = llCodeTable[n];
BYTE const ofCode = ofCodeTable[n];
BYTE const mlCode = mlCodeTable[n];
U32 const llBits = LL_bits[llCode];
U32 const ofBits = ofCode;
U32 const mlBits = ML_bits[mlCode];
DEBUGLOG(6, "encoding: litlen:%2u - matchlen:%2u - offCode:%7u",
sequences[n].litLength,
sequences[n].matchLength + MINMATCH,
sequences[n].offset);
/* 32b*/ /* 64b*/
/* (7)*/ /* (7)*/
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateOffsetBits, ofCode); /* 15 */ /* 15 */
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateMatchLength, mlCode); /* 24 */ /* 24 */
if (MEM_32bits()) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
FSE_encodeSymbol(&blockStream, &stateLitLength, llCode); /* 16 */ /* 33 */
if (MEM_32bits() || (ofBits+mlBits+llBits >= 64-7-(LLFSELog+MLFSELog+OffFSELog)))
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].litLength, llBits);
if (MEM_32bits() && ((llBits+mlBits)>24)) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].matchLength, mlBits);
if (MEM_32bits() || (ofBits+mlBits+llBits > 56)) BIT_flushBits(&blockStream);
if (longOffsets) {
int const extraBits = ofBits - MIN(ofBits, STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN-1);
if (extraBits) {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset, extraBits);
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
}
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset >> extraBits,
ofBits - extraBits); /* 31 */
} else {
BIT_addBits(&blockStream, sequences[n].offset, ofBits); /* 31 */
}
BIT_flushBits(&blockStream); /* (7)*/
} }
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing ML state with %u bits", stateMatchLength.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateMatchLength);
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing Off state with %u bits", stateOffsetBits.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateOffsetBits);
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: flushing LL state with %u bits", stateLitLength.stateLog);
FSE_flushCState(&blockStream, &stateLitLength);
{ size_t const streamSize = BIT_closeCStream(&blockStream);
if (streamSize==0) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space */
return streamSize;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in the one-pass compression functions of Zstandard prior to version 1.3.8 could allow an attacker to write bytes out of bounds if an output buffer smaller than the recommended size was used.
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
|
Medium
| 169,674
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = __video_do_ioctl(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The video_usercopy function in drivers/media/video/v4l2-ioctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 relies on the count value of a v4l2_ext_controls data structure to determine a kmalloc size, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large value.
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,915
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_default_root(pool *p, int allow_symlinks, const char **root) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
const char *dir = NULL;
int res;
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
while (c != NULL) {
pr_signals_handle();
/* Check the groups acl */
if (c->argc < 2) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
res = pr_expr_eval_group_and(((char **) c->argv)+1);
if (res) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
c = find_config_next(c, c->next, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
}
if (dir != NULL) {
const char *new_dir;
/* Check for any expandable variables. */
new_dir = path_subst_uservar(p, &dir);
if (new_dir != NULL) {
dir = new_dir;
}
if (strncmp(dir, "/", 2) == 0) {
dir = NULL;
} else {
char *realdir;
int xerrno = 0;
if (allow_symlinks == FALSE) {
char *path, target_path[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
struct stat st;
size_t pathlen;
/* First, deal with any possible interpolation. dir_realpath() will
* do this for us, but dir_realpath() ALSO automatically follows
* symlinks, which is what we do NOT want to do here.
*/
path = pstrdup(p, dir);
if (*path != '/') {
if (*path == '~') {
if (pr_fs_interpolate(dir, target_path,
sizeof(target_path)-1) < 0) {
return -1;
}
path = target_path;
}
}
/* Note: lstat(2) is sensitive to the presence of a trailing slash on
* the path, particularly in the case of a symlink to a directory.
* Thus to get the correct test, we need to remove any trailing slash
* that might be present. Subtle.
*/
pathlen = strlen(path);
if (pathlen > 1 &&
path[pathlen-1] == '/') {
path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
}
pr_fs_clear_cache2(path);
res = pr_fsio_lstat(path, &st);
if (res < 0) {
xerrno = errno;
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, "error: unable to check %s: %s", path,
strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
return -1;
}
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING,
"error: DefaultRoot %s is a symlink (denied by AllowChrootSymlinks "
"config)", path);
errno = EPERM;
return -1;
}
}
/* We need to be the final user here so that if the user has their home
* directory with a mode the user proftpd is running (i.e. the User
* directive) as can not traverse down, we can still have the default
* root.
*/
pr_fs_clear_cache2(dir);
PRIVS_USER
realdir = dir_realpath(p, dir);
xerrno = errno;
PRIVS_RELINQUISH
if (realdir) {
dir = realdir;
} else {
/* Try to provide a more informative message. */
char interp_dir[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
memset(interp_dir, '\0', sizeof(interp_dir));
(void) pr_fs_interpolate(dir, interp_dir, sizeof(interp_dir)-1);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"notice: unable to use DefaultRoot '%s' [resolved to '%s']: %s",
dir, interp_dir, strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
}
}
}
*root = dir;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: ProFTPD before 1.3.5e and 1.3.6 before 1.3.6rc5 controls whether the home directory of a user could contain a symbolic link through the AllowChrootSymlinks configuration option, but checks only the last path component when enforcing AllowChrootSymlinks. Attackers with local access could bypass the AllowChrootSymlinks control by replacing a path component (other than the last one) with a symbolic link. The threat model includes an attacker who is not granted full filesystem access by a hosting provider, but can reconfigure the home directory of an FTP user.
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
|
Low
| 168,278
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void uv__process_child_init(const uv_process_options_t* options,
int stdio_count,
int (*pipes)[2],
int error_fd) {
int close_fd;
int use_fd;
int fd;
if (options->flags & UV_PROCESS_DETACHED)
setsid();
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
close_fd = pipes[fd][0];
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd < 0) {
if (fd >= 3)
continue;
else {
/* redirect stdin, stdout and stderr to /dev/null even if UV_IGNORE is
* set
*/
use_fd = open("/dev/null", fd == 0 ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
close_fd = use_fd;
if (use_fd == -1) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("failed to open stdio");
_exit(127);
}
}
}
if (fd == use_fd)
uv__cloexec(use_fd, 0);
else
dup2(use_fd, fd);
if (fd <= 2)
uv__nonblock(fd, 0);
if (close_fd != -1)
uv__close(close_fd);
}
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd >= 0 && fd != use_fd)
close(use_fd);
}
if (options->cwd != NULL && chdir(options->cwd)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("chdir()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETGID) && setgid(options->gid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setgid()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETUID) && setuid(options->uid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setuid()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->env != NULL) {
environ = options->env;
}
execvp(options->file, options->args);
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("execvp()");
_exit(127);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libuv before 0.10.34 does not properly drop group privileges, which allows context-dependent attackers to gain privileges via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
|
Low
| 166,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionSettingsHandler::GetLocalizedValues(
DictionaryValue* localized_strings) {
RegisterTitle(localized_strings, "extensionSettings",
IDS_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS_SETTING_WINDOWS_TITLE);
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsVisitWebsite",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_VISIT_WEBSITE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsDeveloperMode",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_DEVELOPER_MODE_LINK));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsNoExtensions",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_NONE_INSTALLED));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsSuggestGallery",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_NONE_INSTALLED_SUGGEST_GALLERY,
ASCIIToUTF16(google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(
GURL(extension_urls::GetWebstoreLaunchURL())).spec())));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsGetMoreExtensions",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_GET_MORE_EXTENSIONS,
ASCIIToUTF16(google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(
GURL(extension_urls::GetWebstoreLaunchURL())).spec())));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsExtensionId",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ID));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsExtensionPath",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_PATH));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsInspectViews",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_INSPECT_VIEWS));
localized_strings->SetString("viewIncognito",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_VIEW_INCOGNITO));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsEnable",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ENABLE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsEnabled",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ENABLED));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsRemove",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_REMOVE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsEnableIncognito",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ENABLE_INCOGNITO));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsAllowFileAccess",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsIncognitoWarning",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PRODUCT_NAME)));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsReload",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_RELOAD));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsOptions",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_OPTIONS));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsPolicyControlled",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_POLICY_CONTROLLED));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsShowButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_SHOW_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsLoadUnpackedButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_LOAD_UNPACKED_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsPackButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_PACK_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsUpdateButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_UPDATE_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsCrashMessage",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_CRASHED_EXTENSION));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsInDevelopment",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_IN_DEVELOPMENT));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsWarningsTitle",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_WARNINGS_TITLE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsShowDetails",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_SHOW_DETAILS));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsHideDetails",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_HIDE_DETAILS));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromeOSChangeInputMethod(
InputMethodStatusConnection* connection, const char* name) {
DCHECK(name);
DLOG(INFO) << "ChangeInputMethod: " << name;
g_return_val_if_fail(connection, false);
return connection->ChangeInputMethod(name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PersistentHistogramAllocator::RecordCreateHistogramResult(
CreateHistogramResultType result) {
HistogramBase* result_histogram = GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
if (result_histogram)
result_histogram->Add(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
Medium
| 172,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto exit_nonewsk;
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newinet->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = newinet->opt->optlen;
newinet->inet_id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss &&
tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss < newtp->advmss)
newtp->advmss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v4_md5_do_lookup(sk, newinet->inet_daddr);
if (key != NULL) {
/*
* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v4_md5_do_add(newsk, newinet->inet_daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
sk_nocaps_add(newsk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,572
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::GetExitCode() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
return exit_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext4_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct mb_cache_entry **pce)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
again:
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_first(ext4_mb_cache, inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
if (IS_ERR(ce)) {
if (PTR_ERR(ce) == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
break;
}
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %lu read error",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else if (le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount) >=
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %lu refcount %d>=%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (ext4_xattr_cmp(header, BHDR(bh)) == 0) {
*pce = ce;
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_next(ce, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, hash);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,991
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
ASSERT_TRUE(0) << "Encode/Decode mismatch found";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,539
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
stellaris_enet_state *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int n;
uint8_t *p;
uint32_t crc;
if ((s->rctl & SE_RCTL_RXEN) == 0)
return -1;
if (s->np >= 31) {
return 0;
}
DPRINTF("Received packet len=%zu\n", size);
n = s->next_packet + s->np;
if (n >= 31)
n -= 31;
s->np++;
s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
p = s->rx[n].data;
*(p++) = (size + 6);
memset(p, 0, (6 - size) & 3);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Buffer overflow in the stellaris_enet_receive function in hw/net/stellaris_enet.c in QEMU, when the Stellaris ethernet controller is configured to accept large packets, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (QEMU crash) via a large packet.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,078
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Segment::ParseHeaders()
{
long long total, available;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (total < 0) || (segment_stop <= total));
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
break;
long long pos = m_pos;
const long long element_start = pos;
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return id;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return size;
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
const long long element_size = size + pos - element_start;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
if (id == 0x0549A966) //Segment Info ID
{
if (m_pInfo)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pInfo = new (std::nothrow) SegmentInfo(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pInfo == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pInfo->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x0654AE6B) //Tracks ID
{
if (m_pTracks)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pTracks = new (std::nothrow) Tracks(this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pTracks->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
{
if (m_pCues == NULL)
{
m_pCues = new (std::nothrow) Cues(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pCues == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
else if (id == 0x014D9B74) //SeekHead ID
{
if (m_pSeekHead == NULL)
{
m_pSeekHead = new (std::nothrow) SeekHead(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pSeekHead == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pSeekHead->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
}
else if (id == 0x0043A770) //Chapters ID
{
if (m_pChapters == NULL)
{
m_pChapters = new (std::nothrow) Chapters(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pChapters == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pChapters->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
}
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
}
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
if (m_pInfo == NULL) //TODO: liberalize this behavior
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,427
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int test(char *URL)
{
int errors = 0;
(void)URL; /* not used */
errors += test_weird_arguments();
errors += test_unsigned_short_formatting();
errors += test_signed_short_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_int_formatting();
errors += test_signed_int_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_long_formatting();
errors += test_signed_long_formatting();
errors += test_curl_off_t_formatting();
errors += test_string_formatting();
if(errors)
return TEST_ERR_MAJOR_BAD;
else
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: curl before version 7.52.0 is vulnerable to a buffer overflow when doing a large floating point output in libcurl's implementation of the printf() functions. If there are any application that accepts a format string from the outside without necessary input filtering, it could allow remote attacks.
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
|
Medium
| 169,438
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
* to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask.
*/
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct arpt_entry *e
= (struct arpt_entry *)(entry0 + pos);
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)arpt_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS)) {
pr_notice("arptables: loop hook %u pos %u %08X.\n",
hook, pos, e->comefrom);
return 0;
}
e->comefrom
|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
"negative verdict (%i)\n",
t->verdict);
return 0;
}
/* Return: backtrack through the last
* big jump.
*/
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS);
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos);
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
if (newpos > newinfo->size -
sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
"bad verdict (%i)\n",
newpos);
return 0;
}
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
}
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next:
duprintf("Finished chain %u\n", hook);
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,365
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmalloc (size_t size)
{
void *ptr = malloc (size);
if (!ptr
&& (size != 0)) /* some libc don't like size == 0 */
{
perror ("xmalloc: Memory allocation failure");
abort();
}
return ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Several Integer Overflows, which can lead to Heap Overflows, have been identified in the functions that wrap memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
|
Medium
| 168,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile> <N-M|N/M>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
PolkitSubject *caller,
PolkitSubject *subject,
const gchar *action_id,
PolkitDetails *details,
PolkitCheckAuthorizationFlags flags,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
gpointer user_data)
{
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *interactive_authority;
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthorityPrivate *priv;
gchar *caller_str;
gchar *subject_str;
PolkitIdentity *user_of_caller;
PolkitIdentity *user_of_subject;
gchar *user_of_caller_str;
gchar *user_of_subject_str;
PolkitAuthorizationResult *result;
GError *error;
GSimpleAsyncResult *simple;
gboolean has_details;
gchar **detail_keys;
interactive_authority = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY (authority);
priv = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY_GET_PRIVATE (interactive_authority);
error = NULL;
caller_str = NULL;
subject_str = NULL;
user_of_caller = NULL;
user_of_subject = NULL;
user_of_caller_str = NULL;
user_of_subject_str = NULL;
result = NULL;
simple = g_simple_async_result_new (G_OBJECT (authority),
callback,
user_data,
polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization);
/* handle being called from ourselves */
if (caller == NULL)
{
/* TODO: this is kind of a hack */
GDBusConnection *system_bus;
system_bus = g_bus_get_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM, NULL, NULL);
caller = polkit_system_bus_name_new (g_dbus_connection_get_unique_name (system_bus));
g_object_unref (system_bus);
}
caller_str = polkit_subject_to_string (caller);
subject_str = polkit_subject_to_string (subject);
g_debug ("%s is inquiring whether %s is authorized for %s",
caller_str,
subject_str,
action_id);
action_id);
user_of_caller = polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (priv->session_monitor,
caller,
&error);
if (error != NULL)
{
g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
g_object_unref (simple);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
user_of_caller_str = polkit_identity_to_string (user_of_caller);
g_debug (" user of caller is %s", user_of_caller_str);
g_debug (" user of caller is %s", user_of_caller_str);
user_of_subject = polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (priv->session_monitor,
subject,
&error);
if (error != NULL)
{
g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
g_object_unref (simple);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
user_of_subject_str = polkit_identity_to_string (user_of_subject);
g_debug (" user of subject is %s", user_of_subject_str);
has_details = FALSE;
if (details != NULL)
{
detail_keys = polkit_details_get_keys (details);
if (detail_keys != NULL)
{
if (g_strv_length (detail_keys) > 0)
has_details = TRUE;
g_strfreev (detail_keys);
}
}
/* Not anyone is allowed to check that process XYZ is allowed to do ABC.
* We only allow this if, and only if,
* We only allow this if, and only if,
*
* - processes may check for another process owned by the *same* user but not
* if details are passed (otherwise you'd be able to spoof the dialog)
*
* - processes running as uid 0 may check anything and pass any details
*
if (!polkit_identity_equal (user_of_caller, user_of_subject) || has_details)
* then any uid referenced by that annotation is also allowed to check
* to check anything and pass any details
*/
if (!polkit_identity_equal (user_of_caller, user_of_subject) || has_details)
{
if (!may_identity_check_authorization (interactive_authority, action_id, user_of_caller))
{
"pass details");
}
else
{
g_simple_async_result_set_error (simple,
POLKIT_ERROR,
POLKIT_ERROR_NOT_AUTHORIZED,
"Only trusted callers (e.g. uid 0 or an action owner) can use CheckAuthorization() for "
"subjects belonging to other identities");
}
g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
g_object_unref (simple);
goto out;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A flaw was found in polkit before version 0.116. The implementation of the polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization function in polkitd allows to test for authentication and trigger authentication of unrelated processes owned by other users. This may result in a local DoS and information disclosure.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize;
char **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* The Windows environment contains some setting which are
* important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
*/
{
char **p;
p = fetch_windows_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_windows_environment(p);
}
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the childs environment as they see fit
*/
ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
if (!options.use_login) {
/* Set basic environment. */
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
s->env[i].val);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
#ifdef _AIX
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
else
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
* important components pointing to the system directories,
* needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
* remains intact here.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
_PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
}
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
/* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
if (!options.use_login) {
while (custom_environment) {
struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
char *str = ce->s;
for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
;
if (str[i] == '=') {
str[i] = 0;
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
}
custom_environment = ce->next;
free(ce->s);
free(ce);
}
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
if (s->term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
if (s->display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
if (original_command)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
original_command);
#ifdef _UNICOS
if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
#endif /* _UNICOS */
/*
* Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
* must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
* SIA), so copy it to the child.
*/
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
}
#ifdef _AIX
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
char **p;
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_sock_name);
/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
}
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
return env;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The do_setup_env function in session.c in sshd in OpenSSH through 7.2p2, when the UseLogin feature is enabled and PAM is configured to read .pam_environment files in user home directories, allows local users to gain privileges by triggering a crafted environment for the /bin/login program, as demonstrated by an LD_PRELOAD environment variable.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::UpdateProgress(int64 bytes_so_far,
int64 bytes_per_sec,
const std::string& hash_state) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!IsInProgress()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
bytes_per_sec_ = bytes_per_sec;
UpdateProgress(bytes_so_far, hash_state);
UpdateObservers();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rfcomm_dlc *d = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc;
int len;
if (test_and_clear_bit(RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP, &d->flags)) {
rfcomm_dlc_accept(d);
return 0;
}
len = bt_sock_stream_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, size, flags);
lock_sock(sk);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK) && len > 0)
atomic_sub(len, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= (sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 2))
rfcomm_dlc_unthrottle(rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc);
release_sock(sk);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The rfcomm_sock_recvmsg function in net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,042
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_open)
{
long options = MAGIC_NONE;
char *file = NULL;
int file_len = 0;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|lp", &options, &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (object) {
struct finfo_object *finfo_obj = (struct finfo_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (finfo_obj->ptr) {
magic_close(finfo_obj->ptr->magic);
efree(finfo_obj->ptr);
finfo_obj->ptr = NULL;
}
}
if (file_len == 0) {
file = NULL;
} else if (file && *file) { /* user specified file, perform open_basedir checks */
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if ((PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(file, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR))) || php_check_open_basedir(file TSRMLS_CC)) {
#else
if (php_check_open_basedir(file TSRMLS_CC)) {
#endif
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!expand_filepath_with_mode(file, resolved_path, NULL, 0, CWD_EXPAND TSRMLS_CC)) {
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
file = resolved_path;
}
finfo = emalloc(sizeof(struct php_fileinfo));
finfo->options = options;
finfo->magic = magic_open(options);
if (finfo->magic == NULL) {
efree(finfo);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid mode '%ld'.", options);
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (magic_load(finfo->magic, file) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to load magic database at '%s'.", file);
magic_close(finfo->magic);
efree(finfo);
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (object) {
FILEINFO_REGISTER_OBJECT(object, finfo);
} else {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, finfo, le_fileinfo);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto resource finfo_close(resource finfo)
Close fileinfo resource. */
PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_close)
{
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &zfinfo) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
zend_list_delete(Z_RESVAL_P(zfinfo));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool finfo_set_flags(resource finfo, int options)
Set libmagic configuration options. */
PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_set_flags)
{
long options;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
if (object) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
FILEINFO_FROM_OBJECT(finfo, object);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &zfinfo, &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
}
FINFO_SET_OPTION(finfo->magic, options)
finfo->options = options;
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
#define FILEINFO_MODE_BUFFER 0
#define FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM 1
#define FILEINFO_MODE_FILE 2
static void _php_finfo_get_type(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode, int mimetype_emu) /* {{{ */
{
long options = 0;
char *ret_val = NULL, *buffer = NULL;
int buffer_len;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo = NULL;
zval *zfinfo, *zcontext = NULL;
zval *what;
char mime_directory[] = "directory";
struct magic_set *magic = NULL;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
if (mimetype_emu) {
/* mime_content_type(..) emulation */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &what) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(what)) {
case IS_STRING:
buffer = Z_STRVAL_P(what);
buffer_len = Z_STRLEN_P(what);
mode = FILEINFO_MODE_FILE;
break;
case IS_RESOURCE:
mode = FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can only process string or stream arguments");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
magic = magic_open(MAGIC_MIME_TYPE);
if (magic_load(magic, NULL) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to load magic database.");
goto common;
}
} else if (object) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|lr", &buffer, &buffer_len, &options, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
FILEINFO_FROM_OBJECT(finfo, object);
magic = finfo->magic;
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|lr", &zfinfo, &buffer, &buffer_len, &options, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
magic = finfo->magic;
}
/* Set options for the current file/buffer. */
if (options) {
FINFO_SET_OPTION(magic, options)
}
switch (mode) {
case FILEINFO_MODE_BUFFER:
{
ret_val = (char *) magic_buffer(magic, buffer, buffer_len);
break;
}
case FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM:
{
php_stream *stream;
off_t streampos;
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream, &what);
if (!stream) {
goto common;
}
streampos = php_stream_tell(stream); /* remember stream position for restoration */
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_SET);
ret_val = (char *) magic_stream(magic, stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, streampos, SEEK_SET);
break;
}
case FILEINFO_MODE_FILE:
{
/* determine if the file is a local file or remote URL */
char *tmp2;
php_stream_wrapper *wrap;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (buffer == NULL || !*buffer) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty filename or path");
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean;
}
wrap = php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(buffer, &tmp2, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_stat_path_ex(buffer, 0, &ssb, context) == SUCCESS) {
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
ret_val = mime_directory;
goto common;
}
}
#endif
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(buffer, "rb", ENFORCE_SAFE_MODE | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
#else
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(buffer, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
#endif
if (!stream) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean;
}
if (php_stream_stat(stream, &ssb) == SUCCESS) {
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
ret_val = mime_directory;
} else {
ret_val = (char *)magic_stream(magic, stream);
}
}
php_stream_close(stream);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can only process string or stream arguments");
}
common:
if (ret_val) {
RETVAL_STRING(ret_val, 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed identify data %d:%s", magic_errno(magic), magic_error(magic));
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
clean:
if (mimetype_emu) {
magic_close(magic);
}
/* Restore options */
if (options) {
FINFO_SET_OPTION(magic, finfo->options)
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: lha_read_file_header_1(struct archive_read *a, struct lha *lha)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t extdsize;
int i, err, err2;
int namelen, padding;
unsigned char headersum, sum_calculated;
err = ARCHIVE_OK;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, H1_FIXED_SIZE, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
lha->header_size = p[H1_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET] + 2;
headersum = p[H1_HEADER_SUM_OFFSET];
/* Note: An extended header size is included in a compsize. */
lha->compsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_COMP_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->origsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_ORIG_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->mtime = lha_dos_time(p + H1_DOS_TIME_OFFSET);
namelen = p[H1_NAME_LEN_OFFSET];
/* Calculate a padding size. The result will be normally 0 only(?) */
padding = ((int)lha->header_size) - H1_FIXED_SIZE - namelen;
if (namelen > 230 || padding < 0)
goto invalid;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, lha->header_size, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) {
if (p[i + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET] == 0xff)
goto invalid;/* Invalid filename. */
}
archive_strncpy(&lha->filename, p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET, namelen);
lha->crc = archive_le16dec(p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET + namelen);
lha->setflag |= CRC_IS_SET;
sum_calculated = lha_calcsum(0, p, 2, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Consume used bytes but not include `next header size' data
* since it will be consumed in lha_read_file_extended_header(). */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Read extended headers */
err2 = lha_read_file_extended_header(a, lha, NULL, 2,
(size_t)(lha->compsize + 2), &extdsize);
if (err2 < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (err2);
if (err2 < err)
err = err2;
/* Get a real compressed file size. */
lha->compsize -= extdsize - 2;
if (sum_calculated != headersum) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"LHa header sum error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (err);
invalid:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An error in the lha_read_file_header_1() function (archive_read_support_format_lha.c) in libarchive 3.2.2 allows remote attackers to trigger an out-of-bounds read memory access and subsequently cause a crash via a specially crafted archive.
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
|
Low
| 168,381
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start,
long long size_,
Entry* pEntry)
{
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) //SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); //payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; //consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) //SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; //consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdatePerspective() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsPerspective(object_)) {
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.matrix.ApplyPerspective(style.Perspective());
state.origin = PerspectiveOrigin(ToLayoutBox(object_)) +
ToLayoutSize(context_.current.paint_offset);
state.flattens_inherited_transform =
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled())
state.rendering_context_id = context_.current.rendering_context_id;
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdatePerspective(context_.current.transform,
std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearPerspective());
}
}
if (properties_->Perspective()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->Perspective();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,803
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int index) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,518
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker(ExecState* exec)
{
JSWorkerConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSWorkerConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (!exec->argumentCount())
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
UString scriptURL = exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
DOMWindow* window = asJSDOMWindow(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->impl();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Worker> worker = Worker::create(window->document(), ustringToString(scriptURL), ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), worker.release())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,565
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
int flags)
{
ext4_lblk_t eof_block;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
unsigned int ee_len;
int split_flag = 0, depth;
ext_debug("ext4_split_unwritten_extents: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map->m_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map->m_len;
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully insde i_size or new_size.
*/
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2;
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO;
return ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, path, map, split_flag, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from a deleted file by reading an extent that was not properly marked as uninitialized.
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
Medium
| 165,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
struct sk_buff *skb, int hdrlen,
int frag_threshold)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = tx->local;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct sk_buff *tmp;
int per_fragm = frag_threshold - hdrlen - FCS_LEN;
int pos = hdrlen + per_fragm;
int rem = skb->len - hdrlen - per_fragm;
if (WARN_ON(rem < 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* first fragment was already added to queue by caller */
while (rem) {
int fraglen = per_fragm;
if (fraglen > rem)
fraglen = rem;
rem -= fraglen;
tmp = dev_alloc_skb(local->tx_headroom +
frag_threshold +
tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom +
IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM);
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
__skb_queue_tail(&tx->skbs, tmp);
skb_reserve(tmp,
local->tx_headroom + tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom);
/* copy control information */
memcpy(tmp->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(tmp->cb));
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tmp);
info->flags &= ~(IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT |
IEEE80211_TX_CTL_FIRST_FRAGMENT);
if (rem)
info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_MORE_FRAMES;
skb_copy_queue_mapping(tmp, skb);
tmp->priority = skb->priority;
tmp->dev = skb->dev;
/* copy header and data */
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, hdrlen), skb->data, hdrlen);
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, fraglen), skb->data + pos, fraglen);
pos += fraglen;
}
/* adjust first fragment's length */
skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The ieee80211_fragment function in net/mac80211/tx.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.5 does not properly maintain a certain tail pointer, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive cleartext information by reading packets.
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
|
Low
| 166,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> "
"<keyframe-interval> [<error-resilient>]\nSee comments in "
"simple_encoder.c for more information.\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,490
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ff_mov_write_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
{
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
MOVTrack *trk = &mov->tracks[pkt->stream_index];
AVCodecParameters *par = trk->par;
unsigned int samples_in_chunk = 0;
int size = pkt->size, ret = 0;
uint8_t *reformatted_data = NULL;
ret = check_pkt(s, pkt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT) {
int ret;
if (mov->moov_written || mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_EMPTY_MOOV) {
if (mov->frag_interleave && mov->fragments > 0) {
if (trk->entry - trk->entries_flushed >= mov->frag_interleave) {
if ((ret = mov_flush_fragment_interleaving(s, trk)) < 0)
return ret;
}
}
if (!trk->mdat_buf) {
if ((ret = avio_open_dyn_buf(&trk->mdat_buf)) < 0)
return ret;
}
pb = trk->mdat_buf;
} else {
if (!mov->mdat_buf) {
if ((ret = avio_open_dyn_buf(&mov->mdat_buf)) < 0)
return ret;
}
pb = mov->mdat_buf;
}
}
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AMR_NB) {
/* We must find out how many AMR blocks there are in one packet */
static const uint16_t packed_size[16] =
{13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 27, 32, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1};
int len = 0;
while (len < size && samples_in_chunk < 100) {
len += packed_size[(pkt->data[len] >> 3) & 0x0F];
samples_in_chunk++;
}
if (samples_in_chunk > 1) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "fatal error, input is not a single packet, implement a AVParser for it\n");
return -1;
}
} else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_MS ||
par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_WAV) {
samples_in_chunk = trk->par->frame_size;
} else if (trk->sample_size)
samples_in_chunk = size / trk->sample_size;
else
samples_in_chunk = 1;
/* copy extradata if it exists */
if (trk->vos_len == 0 && par->extradata_size > 0 &&
!TAG_IS_AVCI(trk->tag) &&
(par->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_DNXHD)) {
trk->vos_len = par->extradata_size;
trk->vos_data = av_malloc(trk->vos_len);
if (!trk->vos_data) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto err;
}
memcpy(trk->vos_data, par->extradata, trk->vos_len);
}
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC && pkt->size > 2 &&
(AV_RB16(pkt->data) & 0xfff0) == 0xfff0) {
if (!s->streams[pkt->stream_index]->nb_frames) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Malformed AAC bitstream detected: "
"use the audio bitstream filter 'aac_adtstoasc' to fix it "
"('-bsf:a aac_adtstoasc' option with ffmpeg)\n");
return -1;
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "aac bitstream error\n");
}
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 && trk->vos_len > 0 && *(uint8_t *)trk->vos_data != 1 && !TAG_IS_AVCI(trk->tag)) {
/* from x264 or from bytestream H.264 */
/* NAL reformatting needed */
if (trk->hint_track >= 0 && trk->hint_track < mov->nb_streams) {
ff_avc_parse_nal_units_buf(pkt->data, &reformatted_data,
&size);
avio_write(pb, reformatted_data, size);
} else {
if (trk->cenc.aes_ctr) {
size = ff_mov_cenc_avc_parse_nal_units(&trk->cenc, pb, pkt->data, size);
if (size < 0) {
ret = size;
goto err;
}
} else {
size = ff_avc_parse_nal_units(pb, pkt->data, pkt->size);
}
}
} else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC && trk->vos_len > 6 &&
(AV_RB24(trk->vos_data) == 1 || AV_RB32(trk->vos_data) == 1)) {
/* extradata is Annex B, assume the bitstream is too and convert it */
if (trk->hint_track >= 0 && trk->hint_track < mov->nb_streams) {
ff_hevc_annexb2mp4_buf(pkt->data, &reformatted_data, &size, 0, NULL);
avio_write(pb, reformatted_data, size);
} else {
size = ff_hevc_annexb2mp4(pb, pkt->data, pkt->size, 0, NULL);
}
#if CONFIG_AC3_PARSER
} else if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_EAC3) {
size = handle_eac3(mov, pkt, trk);
if (size < 0)
return size;
else if (!size)
goto end;
avio_write(pb, pkt->data, size);
#endif
} else {
if (trk->cenc.aes_ctr) {
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 && par->extradata_size > 4) {
int nal_size_length = (par->extradata[4] & 0x3) + 1;
ret = ff_mov_cenc_avc_write_nal_units(s, &trk->cenc, nal_size_length, pb, pkt->data, size);
} else {
ret = ff_mov_cenc_write_packet(&trk->cenc, pb, pkt->data, size);
}
if (ret) {
goto err;
}
} else {
avio_write(pb, pkt->data, size);
}
}
if ((par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DNXHD ||
par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AC3) && !trk->vos_len) {
/* copy frame to create needed atoms */
trk->vos_len = size;
trk->vos_data = av_malloc(size);
if (!trk->vos_data) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto err;
}
memcpy(trk->vos_data, pkt->data, size);
}
if (trk->entry >= trk->cluster_capacity) {
unsigned new_capacity = 2 * (trk->entry + MOV_INDEX_CLUSTER_SIZE);
if (av_reallocp_array(&trk->cluster, new_capacity,
sizeof(*trk->cluster))) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto err;
}
trk->cluster_capacity = new_capacity;
}
trk->cluster[trk->entry].pos = avio_tell(pb) - size;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].samples_in_chunk = samples_in_chunk;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].chunkNum = 0;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].size = size;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].entries = samples_in_chunk;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].dts = pkt->dts;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].pts = pkt->pts;
if (!trk->entry && trk->start_dts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (!trk->frag_discont) {
/* First packet of a new fragment. We already wrote the duration
* of the last packet of the previous fragment based on track_duration,
* which might not exactly match our dts. Therefore adjust the dts
* of this packet to be what the previous packets duration implies. */
trk->cluster[trk->entry].dts = trk->start_dts + trk->track_duration;
/* We also may have written the pts and the corresponding duration
* in sidx/tfrf/tfxd tags; make sure the sidx pts and duration match up with
* the next fragment. This means the cts of the first sample must
* be the same in all fragments, unless end_pts was updated by
* the packet causing the fragment to be written. */
if ((mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DASH && !(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX)) ||
mov->mode == MODE_ISM)
pkt->pts = pkt->dts + trk->end_pts - trk->cluster[trk->entry].dts;
} else {
/* New fragment, but discontinuous from previous fragments.
* Pretend the duration sum of the earlier fragments is
* pkt->dts - trk->start_dts. */
trk->frag_start = pkt->dts - trk->start_dts;
trk->end_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
trk->frag_discont = 0;
}
}
if (!trk->entry && trk->start_dts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE && !mov->use_editlist &&
s->avoid_negative_ts == AVFMT_AVOID_NEG_TS_MAKE_ZERO) {
/* Not using edit lists and shifting the first track to start from zero.
* If the other streams start from a later timestamp, we won't be able
* to signal the difference in starting time without an edit list.
* Thus move the timestamp for this first sample to 0, increasing
* its duration instead. */
trk->cluster[trk->entry].dts = trk->start_dts = 0;
}
if (trk->start_dts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
trk->start_dts = pkt->dts;
if (trk->frag_discont) {
if (mov->use_editlist) {
/* Pretend the whole stream started at pts=0, with earlier fragments
* already written. If the stream started at pts=0, the duration sum
* of earlier fragments would have been pkt->pts. */
trk->frag_start = pkt->pts;
trk->start_dts = pkt->dts - pkt->pts;
} else {
/* Pretend the whole stream started at dts=0, with earlier fragments
* already written, with a duration summing up to pkt->dts. */
trk->frag_start = pkt->dts;
trk->start_dts = 0;
}
trk->frag_discont = 0;
} else if (pkt->dts && mov->moov_written)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Track %d starts with a nonzero dts %"PRId64", while the moov "
"already has been written. Set the delay_moov flag to handle "
"this case.\n",
pkt->stream_index, pkt->dts);
}
trk->track_duration = pkt->dts - trk->start_dts + pkt->duration;
trk->last_sample_is_subtitle_end = 0;
if (pkt->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "pts has no value\n");
pkt->pts = pkt->dts;
}
if (pkt->dts != pkt->pts)
trk->flags |= MOV_TRACK_CTTS;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].cts = pkt->pts - pkt->dts;
trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags = 0;
if (trk->start_cts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
trk->start_cts = pkt->pts - pkt->dts;
if (trk->end_pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
trk->end_pts = trk->cluster[trk->entry].dts +
trk->cluster[trk->entry].cts + pkt->duration;
else
trk->end_pts = FFMAX(trk->end_pts, trk->cluster[trk->entry].dts +
trk->cluster[trk->entry].cts +
pkt->duration);
if (par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VC1) {
mov_parse_vc1_frame(pkt, trk);
} else if (pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) {
if (mov->mode == MODE_MOV && par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG2VIDEO &&
trk->entry > 0) { // force sync sample for the first key frame
mov_parse_mpeg2_frame(pkt, &trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags);
if (trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags & MOV_PARTIAL_SYNC_SAMPLE)
trk->flags |= MOV_TRACK_STPS;
} else {
trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags = MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE;
}
if (trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags & MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE)
trk->has_keyframes++;
}
if (pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_DISPOSABLE) {
trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags |= MOV_DISPOSABLE_SAMPLE;
trk->has_disposable++;
}
trk->entry++;
trk->sample_count += samples_in_chunk;
mov->mdat_size += size;
if (trk->hint_track >= 0 && trk->hint_track < mov->nb_streams)
ff_mov_add_hinted_packet(s, pkt, trk->hint_track, trk->entry,
reformatted_data, size);
end:
err:
av_free(reformatted_data);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: libavformat/movenc.c in FFmpeg before 4.0.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash caused by a divide-by-zero error) with a user crafted Waveform audio file.
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Check input sample count
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_1.wav
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_2.wav
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_3.wav
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_4.wav
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_5.wav
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_6.wav
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_199_7.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StackDumpSignalHandler(int signal, siginfo_t* info, void* void_context) {
in_signal_handler = 1;
if (BeingDebugged())
BreakDebugger();
PrintToStderr("Received signal ");
char buf[1024] = { 0 };
internal::itoa_r(signal, buf, sizeof(buf), 10, 0);
PrintToStderr(buf);
if (signal == SIGBUS) {
if (info->si_code == BUS_ADRALN)
PrintToStderr(" BUS_ADRALN ");
else if (info->si_code == BUS_ADRERR)
PrintToStderr(" BUS_ADRERR ");
else if (info->si_code == BUS_OBJERR)
PrintToStderr(" BUS_OBJERR ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
} else if (signal == SIGFPE) {
if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTDIV)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTDIV ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTINV)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTINV ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTOVF)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTOVF ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTRES)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTRES ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTSUB)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTSUB ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTUND)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTUND ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_INTDIV)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_INTDIV ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_INTOVF)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_INTOVF ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
} else if (signal == SIGILL) {
if (info->si_code == ILL_BADSTK)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_BADSTK ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_COPROC)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_COPROC ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_ILLOPN)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_ILLOPN ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_ILLADR)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_ILLADR ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_ILLTRP)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_ILLTRP ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_PRVOPC)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_PRVOPC ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_PRVREG)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_PRVREG ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
} else if (signal == SIGSEGV) {
if (info->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR)
PrintToStderr(" SEGV_MAPERR ");
else if (info->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR)
PrintToStderr(" SEGV_ACCERR ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
}
if (signal == SIGBUS || signal == SIGFPE ||
signal == SIGILL || signal == SIGSEGV) {
internal::itoa_r(reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(info->si_addr),
buf, sizeof(buf), 16, 12);
PrintToStderr(buf);
}
PrintToStderr("\n");
debug::StackTrace().Print();
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
#if ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY
ucontext_t* context = reinterpret_cast<ucontext_t*>(void_context);
const struct {
const char* label;
greg_t value;
} registers[] = {
#if ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
{ " gs: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_GS] },
{ " fs: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_FS] },
{ " es: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ES] },
{ " ds: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_DS] },
{ " edi: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EDI] },
{ " esi: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ESI] },
{ " ebp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EBP] },
{ " esp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ESP] },
{ " ebx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EBX] },
{ " edx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EDX] },
{ " ecx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ECX] },
{ " eax: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EAX] },
{ " trp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO] },
{ " err: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR] },
{ " ip: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EIP] },
{ " cs: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CS] },
{ " efl: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL] },
{ " usp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_UESP] },
{ " ss: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SS] },
#elif ARCH_CPU_64_BITS
{ " r8: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R8] },
{ " r9: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R9] },
{ " r10: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R10] },
{ " r11: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R11] },
{ " r12: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R12] },
{ " r13: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R13] },
{ " r14: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R14] },
{ " r15: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R15] },
{ " di: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RDI] },
{ " si: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RSI] },
{ " bp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RBP] },
{ " bx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RBX] },
{ " dx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RDX] },
{ " ax: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RAX] },
{ " cx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RCX] },
{ " sp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RSP] },
{ " ip: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] },
{ " efl: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL] },
{ " cgf: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CSGSFS] },
{ " erf: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR] },
{ " trp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO] },
{ " msk: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_OLDMASK] },
{ " cr2: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CR2] },
#endif
};
#if ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
const int kRegisterPadding = 8;
#elif ARCH_CPU_64_BITS
const int kRegisterPadding = 16;
#endif
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(registers); i++) {
PrintToStderr(registers[i].label);
internal::itoa_r(registers[i].value, buf, sizeof(buf),
16, kRegisterPadding);
PrintToStderr(buf);
if ((i + 1) % 4 == 0)
PrintToStderr("\n");
}
PrintToStderr("\n");
#endif
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
#if ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY && ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
ucontext_t* context = reinterpret_cast<ucontext_t*>(void_context);
size_t len;
len = static_cast<size_t>(
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"ax: %x, bx: %x, cx: %x, dx: %x\n",
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__eax,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ebx,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ecx,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__edx));
write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, std::min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
len = static_cast<size_t>(
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"di: %x, si: %x, bp: %x, sp: %x, ss: %x, flags: %x\n",
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__edi,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__esi,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ebp,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__esp,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ss,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__eflags));
write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, std::min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
len = static_cast<size_t>(
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"ip: %x, cs: %x, ds: %x, es: %x, fs: %x, gs: %x\n",
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__eip,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__cs,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ds,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__es,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__fs,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__gs));
write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, std::min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
#endif // ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
_exit(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The get_dht function in jdmarker.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.3.0, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 and other products, does not set all elements of a certain Huffman value array during the reading of segments that follow Define Huffman Table (DHT) JPEG markers, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from uninitialized memory locations via a crafted JPEG image.
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
|
Low
| 171,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t StreamingProcessor::processRecordingFrame() {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
sp<Camera2Heap> recordingHeap;
size_t heapIdx = 0;
nsecs_t timestamp;
sp<Camera2Client> client = mClient.promote();
if (client == 0) {
BufferItem imgBuffer;
res = mRecordingConsumer->acquireBuffer(&imgBuffer, 0);
if (res != OK) {
if (res != BufferItemConsumer::NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't acquire recording buffer: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
}
return res;
}
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return OK;
}
{
/* acquire SharedParameters before mMutex so we don't dead lock
with Camera2Client code calling into StreamingProcessor */
SharedParameters::Lock l(client->getParameters());
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
BufferItem imgBuffer;
res = mRecordingConsumer->acquireBuffer(&imgBuffer, 0);
if (res != OK) {
if (res != BufferItemConsumer::NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't acquire recording buffer: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
}
return res;
}
timestamp = imgBuffer.mTimestamp;
mRecordingFrameCount++;
ALOGVV("OnRecordingFrame: Frame %d", mRecordingFrameCount);
if (l.mParameters.state != Parameters::RECORD &&
l.mParameters.state != Parameters::VIDEO_SNAPSHOT) {
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Discarding recording image buffers "
"received after recording done", __FUNCTION__,
mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mRecordingHeap == 0) {
size_t payloadSize = sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata);
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Creating recording heap with %zu buffers of "
"size %zu bytes", __FUNCTION__, mId,
mRecordingHeapCount, payloadSize);
mRecordingHeap = new Camera2Heap(payloadSize, mRecordingHeapCount,
"Camera2Client::RecordingHeap");
if (mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getSize() == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to allocate memory for recording",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return NO_MEMORY;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mRecordingBuffers.size(); i++) {
if (mRecordingBuffers[i].mBuf !=
BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Non-empty recording buffers list!",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
}
}
mRecordingBuffers.clear();
mRecordingBuffers.setCapacity(mRecordingHeapCount);
mRecordingBuffers.insertAt(0, mRecordingHeapCount);
mRecordingHeapHead = 0;
mRecordingHeapFree = mRecordingHeapCount;
}
if (mRecordingHeapFree == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: No free recording buffers, dropping frame",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return NO_MEMORY;
}
heapIdx = mRecordingHeapHead;
mRecordingHeapHead = (mRecordingHeapHead + 1) % mRecordingHeapCount;
mRecordingHeapFree--;
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Timestamp %lld",
__FUNCTION__, mId, timestamp);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap =
mRecordingHeap->mBuffers[heapIdx]->getMemory(&offset,
&size);
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
payload->eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
payload->pBuffer = imgBuffer.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
payload->nFenceFd = -1;
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Sending out ANWBuffer %p",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->pBuffer);
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(imgBuffer, heapIdx);
recordingHeap = mRecordingHeap;
}
Camera2Client::SharedCameraCallbacks::Lock l(client->mSharedCameraCallbacks);
if (l.mRemoteCallback != 0) {
l.mRemoteCallback->dataCallbackTimestamp(timestamp,
CAMERA_MSG_VIDEO_FRAME,
recordingHeap->mBuffers[heapIdx]);
} else {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Remote callback gone", __FUNCTION__, mId);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The camera APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allow attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and obtain sensitive information about ANW buffer addresses via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28466701.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
Medium
| 173,511
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: call_bind_status(struct rpc_task *task)
{
int status = -EIO;
if (task->tk_status >= 0) {
dprint_status(task);
task->tk_status = 0;
task->tk_action = call_connect;
return;
}
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -ENOMEM:
dprintk("RPC: %5u rpcbind out of memory\n", task->tk_pid);
rpc_delay(task, HZ >> 2);
goto retry_timeout;
case -EACCES:
dprintk("RPC: %5u remote rpcbind: RPC program/version "
"unavailable\n", task->tk_pid);
/* fail immediately if this is an RPC ping */
if (task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc == 0) {
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
rpc_delay(task, 3*HZ);
goto retry_timeout;
case -ETIMEDOUT:
dprintk("RPC: %5u rpcbind request timed out\n",
task->tk_pid);
goto retry_timeout;
case -EPFNOSUPPORT:
/* server doesn't support any rpcbind version we know of */
dprintk("RPC: %5u unrecognized remote rpcbind service\n",
task->tk_pid);
break;
case -EPROTONOSUPPORT:
dprintk("RPC: %5u remote rpcbind version unavailable, retrying\n",
task->tk_pid);
task->tk_status = 0;
task->tk_action = call_bind;
return;
case -ECONNREFUSED: /* connection problems */
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOTCONN:
case -EHOSTDOWN:
case -EHOSTUNREACH:
case -ENETUNREACH:
case -EPIPE:
dprintk("RPC: %5u remote rpcbind unreachable: %d\n",
task->tk_pid, task->tk_status);
if (!RPC_IS_SOFTCONN(task)) {
rpc_delay(task, 5*HZ);
goto retry_timeout;
}
status = task->tk_status;
break;
default:
dprintk("RPC: %5u unrecognized rpcbind error (%d)\n",
task->tk_pid, -task->tk_status);
}
rpc_exit(task, status);
return;
retry_timeout:
task->tk_action = call_timeout;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Network Lock Manager (NLM) protocol implementation in the NFS client functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a LOCK_UN flock system call.
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
Low
| 166,222
|
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