instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void mark_object(struct object *obj, struct strbuf *path,
const char *name, void *data)
{
update_progress(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 167,425
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Response StorageHandler::TrackCacheStorageForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CacheStorageObserver::TrackOriginOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(GetCacheStorageObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,776
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Segment::AppendCluster(Cluster* pCluster)
{
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index >= 0);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
const long idx = pCluster->m_index;
assert(idx == m_clusterCount);
if (count >= size)
{
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2*size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster*[n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
assert(*p);
assert((*p)->m_index < 0);
Cluster** q = p + m_clusterPreloadCount;
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
for (;;)
{
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
if (q == p)
break;
}
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterCount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,237
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SimulateOnBufferCreated(int buffer_id, const base::SharedMemory& shm) {
auto handle = base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(shm.handle());
video_capture_impl_->OnBufferCreated(
buffer_id, mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, shm.mapped_size(),
true /* read_only */));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,866
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::CreateSensorAndNotify(
mojom::SensorType type,
SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensorLinux> sensor;
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping = MapSharedBufferForType(type);
if (sensor_device && mapping && StartPollingThread()) {
sensor =
new PlatformSensorLinux(type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor_device,
polling_thread_->task_runner());
}
NotifySensorCreated(type, sensor);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,843
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline bool elementCanUseSimpleDefaultStyle(Element* e)
{
return isHTMLHtmlElement(e) || e->hasTagName(headTag) || e->hasTagName(bodyTag) || e->hasTagName(divTag) || e->hasTagName(spanTag) || e->hasTagName(brTag) || isHTMLAnchorElement(e);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,578
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int append_key_value(smart_str* loc_name, HashTable* hash_arr, char* key_name)
{
zval** ele_value = NULL;
if(zend_hash_find(hash_arr , key_name , strlen(key_name) + 1 ,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ) {
if(Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value)!= IS_STRING ){
/* element value is not a string */
return FAILURE;
}
if(strcmp(key_name, LOC_LANG_TAG) != 0 &&
strcmp(key_name, LOC_GRANDFATHERED_LANG_TAG)!=0 ) {
/* not lang or grandfathered tag */
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
return SUCCESS;
}
return LOC_NOT_FOUND;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tgs_make_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
krb5_const_principal tgt_name,
const EncTicketPart *tgt,
const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
int rk_is_subkey,
const EncryptionKey *serverkey,
const krb5_keyblock *sessionkey,
krb5_kvno kvno,
AuthorizationData *auth_data,
hdb_entry_ex *server,
krb5_principal server_principal,
const char *server_name,
hdb_entry_ex *client,
krb5_principal client_principal,
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
krb5_principals spp,
const krb5_data *rspac,
const METHOD_DATA *enc_pa_data,
const char **e_text,
krb5_data *reply)
{
KDC_REP rep;
EncKDCRepPart ek;
EncTicketPart et;
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
krb5_error_code ret;
int is_weak = 0;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep;
et.authtime = tgt->authtime;
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till);
ALLOC(et.starttime);
*et.starttime = kdc_time;
ret = check_tgs_flags(context, config, b, tgt, &et);
if(ret)
goto out;
/* We should check the transited encoding if:
1) the request doesn't ask not to be checked
2) globally enforcing a check
3) principal requires checking
4) we allow non-check per-principal, but principal isn't marked as allowing this
5) we don't globally allow this
*/
#define GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
(config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK)
#define GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL \
(config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL)
#define GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
(config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST)
/* these will consult the database in future release */
#define PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
#define PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
ret = fix_transited_encoding(context, config,
!f.disable_transited_check ||
GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK ||
PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server) ||
!((GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL &&
PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server)) ||
GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK),
&tgt->transited, &et,
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client_principal),
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt->entry.principal));
if(ret)
goto out;
copy_Realm(&server_principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server_principal);
copy_Realm(&tgt_name->realm, &rep.crealm);
/*
if (f.request_anonymous)
_kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
else */
copy_PrincipalName(&tgt_name->name, &rep.cname);
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
ek.caddr = et.caddr;
{
time_t life;
life = et.endtime - *et.starttime;
if(client && client->entry.max_life)
life = min(life, *client->entry.max_life);
if(server->entry.max_life)
life = min(life, *server->entry.max_life);
et.endtime = *et.starttime + life;
}
if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable &&
et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till &&
tgt->renew_till != NULL)
{
et.flags.renewable = 1;
ALLOC(et.renew_till);
*et.renew_till = *b->till;
}
if(et.renew_till){
time_t renew;
renew = *et.renew_till - *et.starttime;
if(client && client->entry.max_renew)
renew = min(renew, *client->entry.max_renew);
if(server->entry.max_renew)
renew = min(renew, *server->entry.max_renew);
*et.renew_till = *et.starttime + renew;
}
if(et.renew_till){
*et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till);
*et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till);
et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till);
}
*et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime);
if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID;
goto out;
}
if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){
free(et.renew_till);
et.renew_till = NULL;
et.flags.renewable = 0;
}
et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent;
et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent;
et.flags.anonymous = tgt->flags.anonymous;
et.flags.ok_as_delegate = server->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate;
if(rspac->length) {
/*
* No not need to filter out the any PAC from the
* auth_data since it's signed by the KDC.
*/
ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, rspac);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (auth_data) {
unsigned int i = 0;
/* XXX check authdata */
if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
et.authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*et.authorization_data));
if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < auth_data->len ; i++) {
ret = add_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data, &auth_data->val[i]);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
}
/* Filter out type KRB5SignedPath */
ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, et.authorization_data, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
if (et.authorization_data->len == 1) {
free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
free(et.authorization_data);
et.authorization_data = NULL;
} else {
AuthorizationData *ad = et.authorization_data;
free_AuthorizationDataElement(&ad->val[ad->len - 1]);
ad->len--;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, sessionkey, &et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
et.crealm = tgt_name->realm;
et.cname = tgt_name->name;
ek.key = et.key;
/* MIT must have at least one last_req */
ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ek.last_req.len = 1; /* set after alloc to avoid null deref on cleanup */
ek.nonce = b->nonce;
ek.flags = et.flags;
ek.authtime = et.authtime;
ek.starttime = et.starttime;
ek.endtime = et.endtime;
ek.renew_till = et.renew_till;
ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm;
ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname;
_kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "TGS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
/* Don't sign cross realm tickets, they can't be checked anyway */
{
char *r = get_krbtgt_realm(&ek.sname);
if (r == NULL || strcmp(r, ek.srealm) == 0) {
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
krbtgt_etype,
client_principal,
NULL,
spp,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
if (enc_pa_data->len) {
rep.padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*rep.padata));
if (rep.padata == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(enc_pa_data, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, serverkey->keytype) != 0
&& _kdc_is_weak_exception(server->entry.principal, serverkey->keytype))
{
krb5_enctype_enable(context, serverkey->keytype);
is_weak = 1;
}
/* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following
encryption should come from. What we have is a session
key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes
*for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible
etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look
at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt
session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say)
CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the
etype list, even if we don't want a session key with
DES3? */
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config, NULL, 0,
&rep, &et, &ek, serverkey->keytype,
kvno,
serverkey, 0, replykey, rk_is_subkey,
e_text, reply);
if (is_weak)
krb5_enctype_disable(context, serverkey->keytype);
out:
free_TGS_REP(&rep);
free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited);
if(et.starttime)
free(et.starttime);
if(et.renew_till)
free(et.renew_till);
if(et.authorization_data) {
free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
free(et.authorization_data);
}
free_LastReq(&ek.last_req);
memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length);
free_EncryptionKey(&et.key);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-295
Summary: The transit path validation code in Heimdal before 7.3 might allow attackers to bypass the capath policy protection mechanism by leveraging failure to add the previous hop realm to the transit path of issued tickets.
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
|
Low
| 168,327
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ubik_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp)
{
int ubik_op;
int32_t temp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from ubik/ubik_int.xg
*/
ubik_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ubik call %s", tok2str(ubik_req, "op#%d", ubik_op)));
/*
* Decode some of the arguments to the Ubik calls
*/
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
switch (ubik_op) {
case 10000: /* Beacon */
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
temp = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " syncsite %s", temp ? "yes" : "no"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " votestart"));
DATEOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dbversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
case 10003: /* Get sync site */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " site"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 20000: /* Begin */
case 20001: /* Commit */
case 20007: /* Abort */
case 20008: /* Release locks */
case 20010: /* Writev */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
case 20002: /* Lock */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pos"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
INTOUT();
temp = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
tok2str(ubik_lock_types, "type %d", temp);
break;
case 20003: /* Write */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pos"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 20005: /* Get file */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 20006: /* Send file */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dbversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
case 20009: /* Truncate */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 20012: /* Set version */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " oldversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|ubik]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Rx protocol parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-rx.c:ubik_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,826
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void l2tp_eth_dev_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &l2tp_eth_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp;
int ret = 0;
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(p);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p))
goto err;
if (BN_is_zero(u))
goto err;
if (!BN_copy(v, p))
goto err;
# if 0
if (!BN_one(b))
goto err;
while (1) {
while (!BN_is_odd(u)) {
if (BN_is_zero(u))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
goto err;
}
if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1))
break;
if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) {
tmp = u;
u = v;
v = tmp;
tmp = b;
b = c;
c = tmp;
}
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c))
goto err;
}
# else
{
int i, ubits = BN_num_bits(u), vbits = BN_num_bits(v), /* v is copy
* of p */
top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
udp = u->d;
for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
udp[i] = 0;
u->top = top;
bn_wexpand(b, top);
bdp = b->d;
bdp[0] = 1;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bdp[i] = 0;
b->top = top;
bn_wexpand(c, top);
cdp = c->d;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
cdp[i] = 0;
c->top = top;
vdp = v->d; /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers,
* because it allows optimizer to be more
* aggressive. But we don't have to "cache"
* p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */
while (1) {
while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) {
BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask;
u0 = udp[0];
b0 = bdp[0];
mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1);
b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask;
for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) {
u1 = udp[i + 1];
udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
u0 = u1;
b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask);
bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
b0 = b1;
}
udp[i] = u0 >> 1;
bdp[i] = b0 >> 1;
ubits--;
}
if (ubits <= BN_BITS2 && udp[0] == 1)
break;
if (ubits < vbits) {
i = ubits;
ubits = vbits;
vbits = i;
tmp = u;
u = v;
v = tmp;
tmp = b;
b = c;
c = tmp;
udp = vdp;
vdp = v->d;
bdp = cdp;
cdp = c->d;
}
for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
udp[i] ^= vdp[i];
bdp[i] ^= cdp[i];
}
if (ubits == vbits) {
BN_ULONG ul;
int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop)
utop--;
ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
}
}
bn_correct_top(b);
}
# endif
if (!BN_copy(r, b))
goto err;
bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
# ifdef BN_DEBUG /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the
* expanded form */
bn_correct_top(c);
bn_correct_top(u);
bn_correct_top(v);
# endif
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The BN_GF2m_mod_inv function in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8s, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0e, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b does not properly handle ECParameters structures in which the curve is over a malformed binary polynomial field, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a session that uses an Elliptic Curve algorithm, as demonstrated by an attack against a server that supports client authentication.
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
Medium
| 166,694
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSpeechSynthesisLibrary(
SpeechSynthesisLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->speech_synthesis_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UpdateLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetUpdateLibrary() {
return update_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,634
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: set_text_distance(gs_point *pdist, double dx, double dy, const gs_matrix *pmat)
{
int code = gs_distance_transform_inverse(dx, dy, pmat, pdist);
double rounded;
if (code == gs_error_undefinedresult) {
/* The CTM is degenerate.
Can't know the distance in user space.
} else if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If the distance is very close to integers, round it. */
if (fabs(pdist->x - (rounded = floor(pdist->x + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->x = rounded;
if (fabs(pdist->y - (rounded = floor(pdist->y + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->y = rounded;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The set_text_distance function in devices/vector/gdevpdts.c in the pdfwrite component in Artifex Ghostscript through 9.22 does not prevent overflows in text-positioning calculation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,898
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void rpc_init_task(struct rpc_task *task, const struct rpc_task_setup *task_setup_data)
{
memset(task, 0, sizeof(*task));
atomic_set(&task->tk_count, 1);
task->tk_flags = task_setup_data->flags;
task->tk_ops = task_setup_data->callback_ops;
task->tk_calldata = task_setup_data->callback_data;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&task->tk_task);
/* Initialize retry counters */
task->tk_garb_retry = 2;
task->tk_cred_retry = 2;
task->tk_priority = task_setup_data->priority - RPC_PRIORITY_LOW;
task->tk_owner = current->tgid;
/* Initialize workqueue for async tasks */
task->tk_workqueue = task_setup_data->workqueue;
if (task->tk_ops->rpc_call_prepare != NULL)
task->tk_action = rpc_prepare_task;
/* starting timestamp */
task->tk_start = ktime_get();
dprintk("RPC: new task initialized, procpid %u\n",
task_pid_nr(current));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Network Lock Manager (NLM) protocol implementation in the NFS client functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a LOCK_UN flock system call.
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
Low
| 166,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zrestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
alloc_save_t *asave;
bool last;
vm_save_t *vmsave;
int code = restore_check_operand(op, &asave, idmemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if_debug2m('u', imemory, "[u]vmrestore 0x%lx, id = %lu\n",
(ulong) alloc_save_client_data(asave),
(ulong) op->value.saveid);
if (I_VALIDATE_BEFORE_RESTORE)
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
/* Check the contents of the stacks. */
{
int code;
if ((code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false)) < 0 ||
(code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, asave, true)) < 0 ||
(code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, asave, false)) < 0
) {
osp++;
return code;
}
}
/* Reset l_new in all stack entries if the new save level is zero. */
/* Also do some special fixing on the e-stack. */
restore_fix_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,688
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
app_controller_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
|
Medium
| 172,090
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6)
{
static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond;
return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int may_ptrace_stop(void)
{
if (!likely(current->ptrace))
return 0;
/*
* Are we in the middle of do_coredump?
* If so and our tracer is also part of the coredump stopping
* is a deadlock situation, and pointless because our tracer
* is dead so don't allow us to stop.
* If SIGKILL was already sent before the caller unlocked
* ->siglock we must see ->core_state != NULL. Otherwise it
* is safe to enter schedule().
*/
if (unlikely(current->mm->core_state) &&
unlikely(current->mm == current->parent->mm))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PasswordAutofillAgent::PasswordAutofillAgent(content::RenderFrame* render_frame)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(render_frame),
logging_state_active_(false),
was_username_autofilled_(false),
was_password_autofilled_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
Send(new AutofillHostMsg_PasswordAutofillAgentConstructed(routing_id()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Autofill implementation in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 mishandles the interaction between field updates and JavaScript code that triggers a frame deletion, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site, a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-1701.
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
|
High
| 173,334
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MessageLoop::NestableTasksAllowed() const {
return nestable_tasks_allowed_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
Low
| 171,865
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nfs4_xdr_dec_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_getaclres *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_getacl(xdr, rqstp, &res->acl_len);
out:
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly handle bitmap sizes in GETACL replies, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words.
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
High
| 165,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XRRGetProviderResources(Display *dpy, Window window)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetProvidersReply rep;
xRRGetProvidersReq *req;
XRRProviderResources *xrpr;
long nbytes, nbytesRead;
int rbytes;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq(RRGetProviders, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetProviders;
req->window = window;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2;
nbytesRead = (long) (rep.nProviders * 4);
rbytes = (sizeof(XRRProviderResources) + rep.nProviders * sizeof(RRProvider));
xrpr = (XRRProviderResources *) Xmalloc(rbytes);
if (xrpr == NULL) {
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xrpr->providers, rep.nProviders << 2);
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XRRProviderResources *) xrpr;
}
void
XRRFreeProviderResources(XRRProviderResources *provider_resources)
{
free(provider_resources);
}
#define ProviderInfoExtra (SIZEOF(xRRGetProviderInfoReply) - 32)
XRRProviderInfo *
XRRGetProviderInfo(Display *dpy, XRRScreenResources *resources, RRProvider provider)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetProviderInfoReply rep;
xRRGetProviderInfoReq *req;
int nbytes, nbytesRead, rbytes;
XRRProviderInfo *xpi;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (RRGetProviderInfo, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetProviderInfo;
req->provider = provider;
req->configTimestamp = resources->configTimestamp;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, ProviderInfoExtra >> 2, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) rep.length << 2) - ProviderInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long)(rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
rep.nOutputs * 4 +
rep.nAssociatedProviders * 8 +
((rep.nameLength + 3) & ~3));
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) rep.length << 2) - ProviderInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long)(rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
xpi->noutputs = rep.nOutputs;
xpi->nassociatedproviders = rep.nAssociatedProviders;
xpi->crtcs = (RRCrtc *)(xpi + 1);
xpi->outputs = (RROutput *)(xpi->crtcs + rep.nCrtcs);
xpi->associated_providers = (RRProvider *)(xpi->outputs + rep.nOutputs);
xpi->associated_capability = (unsigned int *)(xpi->associated_providers + rep.nAssociatedProviders);
xpi->name = (char *)(xpi->associated_capability + rep.nAssociatedProviders);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->crtcs, rep.nCrtcs << 2);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->outputs, rep.nOutputs << 2);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->associated_providers, rep.nAssociatedProviders << 2);
/*
* _XRead32 reads a series of 32-bit values from the protocol and writes
* them out as a series of "long int" values, but associated_capability
* is defined as unsigned int *, so that won't work for this array.
* Instead we assume for now that "unsigned int" is also 32-bits, so
* the values can be read without any conversion.
*/
_XRead(dpy, (char *) xpi->associated_capability,
rep.nAssociatedProviders << 2);
_XReadPad(dpy, xpi->name, rep.nameLength);
xpi->name[rep.nameLength] = '\0';
/*
* Skip any extra data
*/
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return (XRRProviderInfo *) xpi;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: X.org libXrandr before 1.5.1 allows remote X servers to trigger out-of-bounds write operations by leveraging mishandling of reply data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ras_getcmap(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap)
{
int i;
int j;
int x;
int c;
int numcolors;
int actualnumcolors;
switch (hdr->maptype) {
case RAS_MT_NONE:
break;
case RAS_MT_EQUALRGB:
{
jas_eprintf("warning: palettized images not fully supported\n");
numcolors = 1 << hdr->depth;
assert(numcolors <= RAS_CMAP_MAXSIZ);
actualnumcolors = hdr->maplength / 3;
for (i = 0; i < numcolors; i++) {
cmap->data[i] = 0;
}
if ((hdr->maplength % 3) || hdr->maplength < 0 ||
hdr->maplength > 3 * numcolors) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < actualnumcolors; j++) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
x = 0;
switch (i) {
case 0:
x = RAS_RED(c);
break;
case 1:
x = RAS_GREEN(c);
break;
case 2:
x = RAS_BLUE(c);
break;
}
cmap->data[j] |= x;
}
}
}
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
|
Medium
| 168,739
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_init_video_state(dec_state_t *ps_dec, e_video_type_t e_video_type)
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-1 <ISO/IEC 11172-2> standard */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(e_video_type == MPEG_1_VIDEO)
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 0;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* force MPEG-1 parameters for proper decoder behavior */
/* see ISO/IEC 13818-2 section D.9.14 */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_progressive_sequence = 1;
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision = 0;
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure = FRAME_PICTURE;
ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct = 1;
ps_dec->u2_concealment_motion_vectors = 0;
ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format = 0;
ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan = 0;
ps_dec->u2_repeat_first_field = 0;
ps_dec->u2_progressive_frame = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d = 0;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Setting of parameters other than those mentioned in MPEG2 standard*/
/* but used in decoding process. */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-2 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
else
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 1;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg2;
}
impeg2d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
/* Set the frame Width and frame Height */
ps_dec->u2_frame_height = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
ps_dec->u2_frame_width = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size);
ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb = (ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size + 15) >> 4;
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height || ps_dec->u2_frame_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
{
return IMPEG2D_PIC_SIZE_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded = 0;
/* Calculate the frame period */
{
UWORD32 numer;
UWORD32 denom;
numer = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][1] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d + 1);
denom = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][0] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n + 1);
ps_dec->u2_framePeriod = (numer * 1000 * 100) / denom;
}
if(VERTICAL_SCAN == ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_vertical;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag;
}
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libmpeg2). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-64550583.
Commit Message: Adding Error Check for f_code Parameters
In MPEG1, the valid range for the forward and backward f_code parameters
is [1, 7]. Adding a check to enforce this. Without the check, the value
could be 0. We read (f_code - 1) bits from the stream and reading a
negative number of bits from the stream is undefined.
Bug: 64550583
Test: monitored temp ALOGD() output
Change-Id: Ia452cd43a28e9d566401f515947164635361782f
(cherry picked from commit 71d734b83d72e8a59f73f1230982da97615d2689)
|
Low
| 174,104
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
int ret;
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!key->type->update)
goto error;
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
up_write(&key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
out:
return key_ref;
error:
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadARTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
Image
*image;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=1;
image->endian=MSBEndian;
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) ReadBlobStream(image,(size_t) (-(ssize_t) length) & 0x01,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.0.5-5, the ReadARTImage function in coders/art.c allows attackers to cause a denial of service (memory leak) via a crafted .art file.
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak reported in #456.
|
Medium
| 168,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int hns_nic_net_xmit_hw(struct net_device *ndev,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct hns_nic_ring_data *ring_data)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct hnae_ring *ring = ring_data->ring;
struct device *dev = ring_to_dev(ring);
struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
struct skb_frag_struct *frag;
int buf_num;
int seg_num;
dma_addr_t dma;
int size, next_to_use;
int i;
switch (priv->ops.maybe_stop_tx(&skb, &buf_num, ring)) {
case -EBUSY:
ring->stats.tx_busy++;
goto out_net_tx_busy;
case -ENOMEM:
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
netdev_err(ndev, "no memory to xmit!\n");
goto out_err_tx_ok;
default:
break;
}
/* no. of segments (plus a header) */
seg_num = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1;
next_to_use = ring->next_to_use;
/* fill the first part */
size = skb_headlen(skb);
dma = dma_map_single(dev, skb->data, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma)) {
netdev_err(ndev, "TX head DMA map failed\n");
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
goto out_err_tx_ok;
}
priv->ops.fill_desc(ring, skb, size, dma, seg_num == 1 ? 1 : 0,
buf_num, DESC_TYPE_SKB, ndev->mtu);
/* fill the fragments */
for (i = 1; i < seg_num; i++) {
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1];
size = skb_frag_size(frag);
dma = skb_frag_dma_map(dev, frag, 0, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma)) {
netdev_err(ndev, "TX frag(%d) DMA map failed\n", i);
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
goto out_map_frag_fail;
}
priv->ops.fill_desc(ring, skb_frag_page(frag), size, dma,
seg_num - 1 == i ? 1 : 0, buf_num,
DESC_TYPE_PAGE, ndev->mtu);
}
/*complete translate all packets*/
dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(ndev, skb->queue_mapping);
netdev_tx_sent_queue(dev_queue, skb->len);
wmb(); /* commit all data before submit */
assert(skb->queue_mapping < priv->ae_handle->q_num);
hnae_queue_xmit(priv->ae_handle->qs[skb->queue_mapping], buf_num);
ring->stats.tx_pkts++;
ring->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
out_map_frag_fail:
while (ring->next_to_use != next_to_use) {
unfill_desc(ring);
if (ring->next_to_use != next_to_use)
dma_unmap_page(dev,
ring->desc_cb[ring->next_to_use].dma,
ring->desc_cb[ring->next_to_use].length,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else
dma_unmap_single(dev,
ring->desc_cb[next_to_use].dma,
ring->desc_cb[next_to_use].length,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
out_err_tx_ok:
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
out_net_tx_busy:
netif_stop_subqueue(ndev, skb->queue_mapping);
/* Herbert's original patch had:
* smp_mb__after_netif_stop_queue();
* but since that doesn't exist yet, just open code it.
*/
smp_mb();
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13, local users can cause a denial of service (use-after-free and BUG) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging differences in skb handling between hns_nic_net_xmit_hw and hns_nic_net_xmit.
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,404
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rio_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
{
int phy_addr;
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
struct mii_data *miidata = (struct mii_data *) &rq->ifr_ifru;
struct netdev_desc *desc;
int i;
phy_addr = np->phy_addr;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 1:
miidata->out_value = mii_read (dev, phy_addr, miidata->reg_num);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 2:
mii_write (dev, phy_addr, miidata->reg_num, miidata->in_value);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 3:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 4:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 5:
netif_stop_queue (dev);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 6:
netif_wake_queue (dev);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 7:
printk
("tx_full=%x cur_tx=%lx old_tx=%lx cur_rx=%lx old_rx=%lx\n",
netif_queue_stopped(dev), np->cur_tx, np->old_tx, np->cur_rx,
np->old_rx);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 8:
printk("TX ring:\n");
for (i = 0; i < TX_RING_SIZE; i++) {
desc = &np->tx_ring[i];
printk
("%02x:cur:%08x next:%08x status:%08x frag1:%08x frag0:%08x",
i,
(u32) (np->tx_ring_dma + i * sizeof (*desc)),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->next_desc),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->status),
(u32)(le64_to_cpu(desc->fraginfo) >> 32),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->fraginfo));
printk ("\n");
}
printk ("\n");
break;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The rio_ioctl function in drivers/net/ethernet/dlink/dl2k.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.7 does not restrict access to the SIOCSMIIREG command, which allows local users to write data to an Ethernet adapter via an ioctl call.
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLStyleElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
return kInsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
|
Medium
| 173,172
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
Medium
| 172,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void removeElementPreservingChildren(PassRefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment, HTMLElement* element)
{
ExceptionCode ignoredExceptionCode;
RefPtr<Node> nextChild;
for (RefPtr<Node> child = element->firstChild(); child; child = nextChild) {
nextChild = child->nextSibling();
element->removeChild(child.get(), ignoredExceptionCode);
ASSERT(!ignoredExceptionCode);
fragment->insertBefore(child, element, ignoredExceptionCode);
ASSERT(!ignoredExceptionCode);
}
fragment->removeChild(element, ignoredExceptionCode);
ASSERT(!ignoredExceptionCode);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,436
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool FrameFetchContext::UpdateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation(
ResourceTimingInfo* info) {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
if (!GetFrame()->Owner())
return false;
if (!GetFrame()->should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent())
return false;
if (MasterDocumentLoader()->LoadType() == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Incorrect handling of timer information during navigation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obtain cross origin URLs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
Medium
| 172,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa);
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
"Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
return 1;
}
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-129
Summary: The sanity_check_ckpt function in fs/f2fs/super.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.4 does not validate the blkoff and segno arrays, which allows local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 168,064
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _handle_carbons(xmpp_stanza_t *const stanza)
{
xmpp_stanza_t *carbons = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(stanza, STANZA_NS_CARBONS);
if (!carbons) {
return FALSE;
}
const char *name = xmpp_stanza_get_name(carbons);
if (!name) {
log_error("Unable to retrieve stanza name for Carbon");
return TRUE;
}
if (g_strcmp0(name, "private") == 0) {
log_info("Carbon received with private element.");
return FALSE;
}
if ((g_strcmp0(name, "received") != 0) && (g_strcmp0(name, "sent") != 0)) {
log_warning("Carbon received with unrecognised stanza name: %s", name);
return TRUE;
}
xmpp_stanza_t *forwarded = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(carbons, STANZA_NS_FORWARD);
if (!forwarded) {
log_warning("Carbon received with no forwarded element");
return TRUE;
}
xmpp_stanza_t *message = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(forwarded, STANZA_NAME_MESSAGE);
if (!message) {
log_warning("Carbon received with no message element");
return TRUE;
}
char *message_txt = xmpp_message_get_body(message);
if (!message_txt) {
log_warning("Carbon received with no message.");
return TRUE;
}
const gchar *to = xmpp_stanza_get_to(message);
const gchar *from = xmpp_stanza_get_from(message);
if (!to) to = from;
Jid *jid_from = jid_create(from);
Jid *jid_to = jid_create(to);
Jid *my_jid = jid_create(connection_get_fulljid());
char *enc_message = NULL;
xmpp_stanza_t *x = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(message, STANZA_NS_ENCRYPTED);
if (x) {
enc_message = xmpp_stanza_get_text(x);
}
if (g_strcmp0(my_jid->barejid, jid_to->barejid) == 0) {
sv_ev_incoming_carbon(jid_from->barejid, jid_from->resourcepart, message_txt, enc_message);
} else {
sv_ev_outgoing_carbon(jid_to->barejid, message_txt, enc_message);
}
xmpp_ctx_t *ctx = connection_get_ctx();
xmpp_free(ctx, message_txt);
xmpp_free(ctx, enc_message);
jid_destroy(jid_from);
jid_destroy(jid_to);
jid_destroy(my_jid);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-346
Summary: An incorrect implementation of *XEP-0280: Message Carbons* in multiple XMPP clients allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application's display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks. This CVE is for profanity (0.4.7 - 0.5.0).
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
|
Medium
| 168,382
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableAppWindowLaunch", true);
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the movement of a media element between documents.
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void commitCompleteOnCCThread(CCLayerTreeHostImpl*)
{
m_numCommits++;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,291
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::CanSubframeSwapProcess(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance,
bool was_server_redirect) {
DCHECK(!source_instance || !dest_instance);
GURL resolved_url = dest_url;
if (url::Origin::Create(resolved_url).unique()) {
if (source_instance) {
resolved_url = source_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else if (dest_instance) {
resolved_url = dest_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else {
if (!was_server_redirect)
return false;
}
}
if (!IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
resolved_url)) {
DCHECK(!dest_instance ||
dest_instance == render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in site isolation in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
|
Medium
| 173,181
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DebuggerDetachFunction::RunAsync() {
std::unique_ptr<Detach::Params> params(Detach::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, params->target);
if (!InitClientHost())
return false;
client_host_->Close();
SendResponse(true);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,240
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int key_verify(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, PKCS11_KEY *authkey)
{
int ok = 0;
unsigned char challenge[30];
unsigned char signature[256];
unsigned int siglen = sizeof signature;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY *privkey = PKCS11_get_private_key(authkey);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = PKCS11_get_public_key(authkey);
/* Verify a SHA-1 hash of random data, signed by the key.
*
* Note that this will not work keys that aren't eligible for signing.
* Unfortunately, libp11 currently has no way of checking
* C_GetAttributeValue(CKA_SIGN), see
* https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/219. Since we don't want to
* implement try and error, we live with this limitation */
if (1 != randomize(pamh, challenge, sizeof challenge)) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL == pubkey || NULL == privkey || NULL == md_ctx || NULL == md
|| !EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &siglen, privkey)
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx)
|| !EVP_VerifyInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| 1 != EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, signature, siglen, pubkey)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Error verifying key: %s\n",
ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error()));
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Error verifying key"));
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (NULL != pubkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
if (NULL != privkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
if (NULL != md_ctx) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
}
return ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in the pam_p11 component 0.2.0 and 0.3.0 for OpenSC. If a smart card creates a signature with a length longer than 256 bytes, this triggers a buffer overflow. This may be the case for RSA keys with 4096 bits depending on the signature scheme.
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
|
Low
| 169,513
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::HandlePauseSync(const base::ListValue* args) {
DCHECK(AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsDiceEnabledForProfile(profile_));
SigninManager* signin_manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
DCHECK(signin_manager->IsAuthenticated());
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->UpdateCredentials(
signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedAccountId(),
OAuth2TokenServiceDelegate::kInvalidRefreshToken);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
Medium
| 172,572
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BrowserContextDestroyer::BrowserContextDestroyer(
BrowserContext* context,
const std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>& hosts)
: context_(context),
pending_hosts_(0) {
for (std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>::iterator it = hosts.begin();
it != hosts.end(); ++it) {
(*it)->AddObserver(this);
++pending_hosts_;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,418
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zend_op_array *compile_string(zval *source_string, char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_lex_state original_lex_state;
zend_op_array *op_array = (zend_op_array *) emalloc(sizeof(zend_op_array));
zend_op_array *original_active_op_array = CG(active_op_array);
zend_op_array *retval;
zval tmp;
int compiler_result;
zend_bool original_in_compilation = CG(in_compilation);
if (source_string->value.str.len==0) {
efree(op_array);
return NULL;
}
CG(in_compilation) = 1;
tmp = *source_string;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
source_string = &tmp;
zend_save_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_prepare_string_for_scanning(source_string, filename TSRMLS_CC)==FAILURE) {
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_bool orig_interactive = CG(interactive);
CG(interactive) = 0;
init_op_array(op_array, ZEND_EVAL_CODE, INITIAL_OP_ARRAY_SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
CG(interactive) = orig_interactive;
CG(active_op_array) = op_array;
zend_stack_push(&CG(context_stack), (void *) &CG(context), sizeof(CG(context)));
zend_init_compiler_context(TSRMLS_C);
BEGIN(ST_IN_SCRIPTING);
compiler_result = zendparse(TSRMLS_C);
if (SCNG(script_filtered)) {
efree(SCNG(script_filtered));
SCNG(script_filtered) = NULL;
}
if (compiler_result==1) {
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
CG(unclean_shutdown)=1;
destroy_op_array(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_do_return(NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
pass_two(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
zend_release_labels(0 TSRMLS_CC);
retval = op_array;
}
}
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(&tmp);
CG(in_compilation) = original_in_compilation;
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** The Zend Engine in PHP before 5.4.16 RC1, and 5.5.0 before RC2, does not properly determine whether a parser error occurred, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and application crash) via a crafted function definition, as demonstrated by an attack within a shared web-hosting environment. NOTE: the vendor's http://php.net/security-note.php page says *for critical security situations you should be using OS-level security by running multiple web servers each as their own user id.*
Commit Message: fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1
|
Low
| 166,024
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i, al, ok;
long n;
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
size_t j;
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
/*
* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
*/
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
n2s(p, i);
if (n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
} else
p -= 2;
} else
n = i;
}
/*
* Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
* that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
* size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
* actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
* bound is sufficient to be safe.
*/
if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
/*
* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
*/
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len =
RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
* be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
*/
decrypt_good =
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
/*
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
* clients.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good =
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
/*
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
* remain non-zero (0xff).
*/
decrypt_good &= version_good;
/*
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p,
sizeof
(rand_premaster_secret));
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
if (n > 1) {
n2s(p, i);
} else {
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
i = 0;
}
if (n && n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
} else {
p -= 2;
i = (int)n;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
if (idx >= 0) {
skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
if ((skey == NULL) ||
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
} else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
if (n == 0L) {
/* Get pubkey from cert */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (clkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
}
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
} else
pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
if (pub == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
if (dh_clnt)
DH_free(dh_clnt);
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
if (dh_clnt)
return 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
int kerr = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
if (!kssl_ctx)
kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p, i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p += enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p, i);
authenticator.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p += authenticator.length;
n2s(p, i);
enc_pms.length = i;
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p += enc_pms.length;
/*
* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
*/
if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0) {
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/*
* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
* return authtime == 0.
*/
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
&& (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
* the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
* the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
* ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
* bytes instead of the protocol version. If
* SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
* cipher)
*/
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
pms, outl);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
len);
}
}
/*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
* but it caused problems for apache.
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
kclean:
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
if (kerr)
goto err;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
/* use the certificate */
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
} else {
/*
* use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
* ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (n == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
* using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
* code is never executed. When that support is added, we
* ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
* authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
*/
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
} else {
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
i = *p;
p += 1;
if (n != 1 + i) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
* to the start
*/
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
NULL);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
/* Compute the master secret */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
return (ret);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p, i);
if (n != i + 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto psk_err;
}
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
goto psk_err;
}
/*
* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
*/
memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
psk_or_pre_ms,
sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms,
pre_ms_len);
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
int param_len;
n2s(p, i);
param_len = i + 2;
if (param_len > n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length =
SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += i;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
* client certificate for authorization only.
*/
client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
if (ASN1_get_object
((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
start = p;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
premaster_secret, 32);
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
ret = 2;
else
ret = 1;
gerr:
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
else
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: ssl/s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0t, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1p, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2d, when used for a multi-threaded client, writes the PSK identity hint to an incorrect data structure, which allows remote servers to cause a denial of service (race condition and double free) via a crafted ServerKeyExchange message.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ip_printts(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
int hoplen;
const char *type;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[bad length %u]", length));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TS{"));
hoplen = ((cp[3]&0xF) != IPOPT_TS_TSONLY) ? 8 : 4;
if ((length - 4) & (hoplen-1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[bad length %u]", length));
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
len = 0;
if (ptr < 4 || ((ptr - 4) & (hoplen-1)) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
switch (cp[3]&0xF) {
case IPOPT_TS_TSONLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "TSONLY"));
break;
case IPOPT_TS_TSANDADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "TS+ADDR"));
break;
/*
* prespecified should really be 3, but some ones might send 2
* instead, and the IPOPT_TS_PRESPEC constant can apparently
* have both values, so we have to hard-code it here.
*/
case 2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PRESPEC2.0"));
break;
case 3: /* IPOPT_TS_PRESPEC */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PRESPEC"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[bad ts type %d]", cp[3]&0xF));
goto done;
}
type = " ";
for (len = 4; len < length; len += hoplen) {
if (ptr == len)
type = " ^ ";
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%d@%s", type, EXTRACT_32BITS(&cp[len+hoplen-4]),
hoplen!=8 ? "" : ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
type = " ";
}
done:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ptr == len ? " ^ " : ""));
if (cp[3]>>4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%d hops not recorded]} ", cp[3]>>4));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "}"));
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip.c:ip_printts().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13037/IP: Add bounds checks when printing time stamp options.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,846
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPDBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
unsigned char
attributes,
tag[3];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PDBImage
pdb_image;
PDBInfo
pdb_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
num_pad_bytes,
one,
packets;
ssize_t
count,
img_offset,
comment_offset = 0,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a PDB image file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_info.name),(unsigned char *) pdb_info.name);
if (count != sizeof(pdb_info.name))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pdb_info.attributes=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_info.version=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_info.create_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.modify_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.archive_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.modify_number=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.application_info=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.sort_info=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.id);
pdb_info.seed=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.next_record=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.number_records=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((memcmp(pdb_info.type,"vIMG",4) != 0) ||
(memcmp(pdb_info.id,"View",4) != 0))
if (pdb_info.next_record != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MultipleRecordListNotSupported");
/*
Read record header.
*/
img_offset=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image));
attributes=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) attributes;
count=ReadBlob(image,3,(unsigned char *) tag);
if (count != 3 || memcmp(tag,"\x6f\x80\x00",3) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
comment_offset=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image));
attributes=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobByte(image));
count=ReadBlob(image,3,(unsigned char *) tag);
if (count != 3 || memcmp(tag,"\x6f\x80\x01",3) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
num_pad_bytes = (size_t) (img_offset - TellBlob( image ));
while (num_pad_bytes-- != 0)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_image.name),(unsigned char *) pdb_image.name);
if (count != sizeof(pdb_image.name))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pdb_image.version=ReadBlobByte(image);
pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
pdb_image.reserved_1=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.note=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.x_last=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.y_last=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.reserved_2=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.x_anchor=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.y_anchor=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.width=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.height=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) pdb_image.width;
image->rows=(size_t) pdb_image.height;
image->depth=8;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
bits_per_pixel=pdb_image.type == 0 ? 2UL : pdb_image.type == 2 ? 4UL : 1UL;
one=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,one << bits_per_pixel) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
packets=(bits_per_pixel*image->columns+7)/8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(packets+256UL,image->rows*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
switch (pdb_image.version & 0x07)
{
case 0:
{
image->compression=NoCompression;
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image, packets * image -> rows, pixels);
break;
}
case 1:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (!DecodeImage(image, pixels, packets * image -> rows))
ThrowReaderException( CorruptImageError, "RLEDecoderError" );
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompressionType" );
}
p=pixels;
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
int
bit;
/*
Read 1-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) (*p & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 2:
{
/*
Read 2-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns-3; x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 6) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 4) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 2) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+2,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+3,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Read 4-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns-1; x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,15UL-((*p >> 4) & 0x0f));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,15UL-((*p) & 0x0f));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
char
*comment;
int
c;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
num_pad_bytes = (size_t) (comment_offset - TellBlob( image ));
while (num_pad_bytes--) ReadBlobByte( image );
/*
Read comment.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; c != EOF; p++)
{
if ((size_t) (p-comment+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
length+=MaxTextExtent;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/memory.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access) via a crafted PDB file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/143
|
Medium
| 168,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
if (value)
kfree(value);
if (!IS_ERR(acl)) {
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access, acl);
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default, acl);
break;
}
}
return acl;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: JFFS2, as used on One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) build 542 and possibly other Linux systems, when POSIX ACL support is enabled, does not properly store permissions during (1) inode creation or (2) ACL setting, which might allow local users to access restricted files or directories after a remount of a filesystem, related to "legacy modes" and an inconsistency between dentry permissions and inode permissions.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost");
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
false,
0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,365
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadCUTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowCUTReaderException(severity,tag) \
{ \
if (palette != NULL) \
palette=DestroyImage(palette); \
if (clone_info != NULL) \
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info); \
ThrowReaderException(severity,tag); \
}
Image *image,*palette;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
MagickBooleanType status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t EncodedByte;
unsigned char RunCount,RunValue,RunCountMasked;
CUTHeader Header;
CUTPalHeader PalHeader;
ssize_t depth;
ssize_t i,j;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff=NULL,*ptrB;
PixelPacket *q;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read CUT image.
*/
palette=NULL;
clone_info=NULL;
Header.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.Width==0 || Header.Height==0 || Header.Reserved!=0)
CUT_KO: ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*---This code checks first line of image---*/
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
ldblk=0;
while((int) RunCountMasked!=0) /*end of line?*/
{
i=1;
if((int) RunCount<0x80) i=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
offset=SeekBlob(image,TellBlob(image)+i,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data*/
EncodedByte-=i+1;
ldblk+=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: unexpected eof in line*/
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
if(EncodedByte!=1) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: size incorrect*/
i=0; /*guess a number of bit planes*/
if(ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=8;
if(2*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=4;
if(8*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=1;
if(i==0) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: incorrect bit planes*/
depth=i;
image->columns=Header.Width;
image->rows=Header.Height;
image->depth=8;
image->colors=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(1UL*i)+1);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse) goto Finish;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/* ----- Do something with palette ----- */
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL) goto NoPalette;
i=(ssize_t) strlen(clone_info->filename);
j=i;
while(--i>0)
{
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='.')
{
break;
}
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='/' || clone_info->filename[i]=='\\' ||
clone_info->filename[i]==':' )
{
i=j;
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".PAL",(size_t)
(MaxTextExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".pal",(size_t)
(MaxTextExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info->filename[i]='\0';
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
}
}
if( (palette=AcquireImage(clone_info))==NULL ) goto NoPalette;
status=OpenBlob(clone_info,palette,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ErasePalette:
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
palette=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
if(palette!=NULL)
{
(void) ReadBlob(palette,2,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.FileId);
if(strncmp(PalHeader.FileId,"AH",2) != 0) goto ErasePalette;
PalHeader.Version=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.Size=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.FileType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.SubType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.BoardID=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.GraphicsMode=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxRed=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxGreen=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxBlue=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
(void) ReadBlob(palette,20,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.PaletteId);
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
if(PalHeader.MaxIndex<1) goto ErasePalette;
image->colors=PalHeader.MaxIndex+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse) goto NoMemory;
if(PalHeader.MaxRed==0) PalHeader.MaxRed=(unsigned int) QuantumRange; /*avoid division by 0*/
if(PalHeader.MaxGreen==0) PalHeader.MaxGreen=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
if(PalHeader.MaxBlue==0) PalHeader.MaxBlue=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
for(i=0;i<=(int) PalHeader.MaxIndex;i++)
{ /*this may be wrong- I don't know why is palette such strange*/
j=(ssize_t) TellBlob(palette);
if((j % 512)>512-6)
{
j=((j / 512)+1)*512;
offset=SeekBlob(palette,j,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxRed)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
image->colormap[i].red*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxRed>>1))/
PalHeader.MaxRed);
}
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxGreen)
{
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum
(((double) image->colormap[i].green*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxGreen>>1))/PalHeader.MaxGreen);
}
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxBlue)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum
(((double)image->colormap[i].blue*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxBlue>>1))/PalHeader.MaxBlue);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
NoPalette:
if(palette==NULL)
{
image->colors=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
NoMemory:
ThrowCUTReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
}
/* ----- Load RLE compressed raster ----- */
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk,
sizeof(*BImgBuff)); /*Ldblk was set in the check phase*/
if(BImgBuff==NULL) goto NoMemory;
offset=SeekBlob(image,6 /*sizeof(Header)*/,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
for (i=0; i < (int) Header.Height; i++)
{
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
ptrB=BImgBuff;
j=ldblk;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
while ((int) RunCountMasked != 0)
{
if((ssize_t) RunCountMasked>j)
{ /*Wrong Data*/
RunCountMasked=(unsigned char) j;
if(j==0)
{
break;
}
}
if((int) RunCount>0x80)
{
RunValue=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) memset(ptrB,(int) RunValue,(size_t) RunCountMasked);
}
else {
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) RunCountMasked,ptrB);
}
ptrB+=(int) RunCountMasked;
j-=(int) RunCountMasked;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto Finish; /* wrong data: unexpected eof in line */
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
InsertRow(depth,BImgBuff,i,image);
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
/*detect monochrome image*/
if(palette==NULL)
{ /*attempt to detect binary (black&white) images*/
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if(GetCutColors(image)==2)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
register Quantum
sample;
sample=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
if(image->colormap[i].red!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].green!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].blue!=sample) goto Finish;
}
image->colormap[1].red=image->colormap[1].green=
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->rows; i++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t)image->columns; j++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(q) == ScaleCharToQuantum(1))
{
SetPixelRed(q,QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,QuantumRange);
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) goto Finish;
}
}
}
}
Finish:
if (BImgBuff != NULL)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a *use of uninitialized value* vulnerability in the function ReadCUTImage in coders/cut.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599
|
Medium
| 170,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8InjectedScriptHost::create(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, V8InspectorImpl* inspector)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = inspector->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> injectedScriptHost = v8::Object::New(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::External> debuggerExternal = v8::External::New(isolate, inspector);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "internalConstructorName", V8InjectedScriptHost::internalConstructorNameCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "formatAccessorsAsProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::formatAccessorsAsProperties, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "subtype", V8InjectedScriptHost::subtypeCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "getInternalProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::getInternalPropertiesCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "objectHasOwnProperty", V8InjectedScriptHost::objectHasOwnPropertyCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "bind", V8InjectedScriptHost::bindCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "proxyTargetValue", V8InjectedScriptHost::proxyTargetValueCallback, debuggerExternal);
return injectedScriptHost;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
|
Medium
| 172,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int _c2s_sx_sasl_callback(int cb, void *arg, void **res, sx_t s, void *cbarg) {
c2s_t c2s = (c2s_t) cbarg;
const char *my_realm, *mech;
sx_sasl_creds_t creds;
static char buf[3072];
char mechbuf[256];
struct jid_st jid;
jid_static_buf jid_buf;
int i, r;
sess_t sess;
char skey[44];
host_t host;
/* init static jid */
jid_static(&jid,&jid_buf);
/* retrieve our session */
assert(s != NULL);
sprintf(skey, "%d", s->tag);
/*
* Retrieve the session, note that depending on the operation,
* session may be null.
*/
sess = xhash_get(c2s->sessions, skey);
switch(cb) {
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_REALM:
if(s->req_to == NULL) /* this shouldn't happen */
my_realm = "";
else {
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
*res = (void *)NULL;
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
my_realm = host->realm;
if(my_realm == NULL)
my_realm = s->req_to;
}
strncpy(buf, my_realm, 256);
*res = (void *)buf;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get realm: realm is '%s'", buf);
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->get_password && (sess->host->ar->get_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm: "", buf) == 0) {
*res = buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: check pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->check_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->check_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", (char *)creds->pass) == 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
if(sess->host->ar->get_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->get_password)(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", buf) != 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if (strcmp(creds->pass, buf)==0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_AUTHZID:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
/* we need authzid to validate */
if(creds->authzid == NULL || creds->authzid[0] == '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* authzid must be a valid jid */
if(jid_reset(&jid, creds->authzid, -1) == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have domain == stream to addr */
if(!s->req_to || (strcmp(jid.domain, s->req_to) != 0))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have no resource */
if(jid.resource[0] != '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and user has right to authorize as */
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed) {
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (char *)creds->realm, (char *)creds->authzid))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
} else {
if (strcmp(creds->authnid, jid.node) == 0 &&
(sess->host->ar->user_exists)(sess->host->ar, sess, jid.node, jid.domain))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_GEN_AUTHZID:
/* generate a jid for SASL ANONYMOUS */
jid_reset(&jid, s->req_to, -1);
/* make node a random string */
jid_random_part(&jid, jid_NODE);
strcpy(buf, jid.node);
*res = (void *)buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_MECH:
mech = (char *)arg;
strncpy(mechbuf, mech, sizeof(mechbuf));
mechbuf[sizeof(mechbuf)-1]='\0';
for(i = 0; mechbuf[i]; i++) mechbuf[i] = tolower(mechbuf[i]);
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_WARNING, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Determine if our configuration will let us use this mechanism.
* We support different mechanisms for both SSL and normal use */
if (strcmp(mechbuf, "digest-md5") == 0) {
/* digest-md5 requires that our authreg support get_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
} else if (strcmp(mechbuf, "plain") == 0) {
/* plain requires either get_password or check_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL && host->ar->check_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Using SSF is potentially dangerous, as SASL can also set the
* SSF of the connection. However, SASL shouldn't do so until after
* we've finished mechanism establishment
*/
if (s->ssf>0) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.ssl-mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* Work out if our configuration will let us use this mechanism */
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
default:
break;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: JabberD 2.x (aka jabberd2) before 2.6.1 allows anyone to authenticate using SASL ANONYMOUS, even when the sasl.anonymous c2s.xml option is not enabled.
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
|
Low
| 168,061
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType OpenPixelCache(Image *image,const MapMode mode,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info,
source_info;
char
format[MagickPathExtent],
message[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*type;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
length,
number_pixels;
size_t
columns,
packet_size;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowBinaryException(CacheError,"NoPixelsDefinedInCache",image->filename);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((AcquireMagickResource(WidthResource,image->columns) == MagickFalse) ||
(AcquireMagickResource(HeightResource,image->rows) == MagickFalse))
ThrowBinaryException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit",
image->filename);
source_info=(*cache_info);
source_info.file=(-1);
(void) FormatLocaleString(cache_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s[%.20g]",
image->filename,(double) GetImageIndexInList(image));
cache_info->storage_class=image->storage_class;
cache_info->colorspace=image->colorspace;
cache_info->alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
cache_info->read_mask=image->read_mask;
cache_info->write_mask=image->write_mask;
cache_info->rows=image->rows;
cache_info->columns=image->columns;
InitializePixelChannelMap(image);
cache_info->number_channels=GetPixelChannels(image);
(void) memcpy(cache_info->channel_map,image->channel_map,MaxPixelChannels*
sizeof(*image->channel_map));
cache_info->metacontent_extent=image->metacontent_extent;
cache_info->mode=mode;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) cache_info->columns*cache_info->rows;
packet_size=cache_info->number_channels*sizeof(Quantum);
if (image->metacontent_extent != 0)
packet_size+=cache_info->metacontent_extent;
length=number_pixels*packet_size;
columns=(size_t) (length/cache_info->rows/packet_size);
if ((cache_info->columns != columns) || ((ssize_t) cache_info->columns < 0) ||
((ssize_t) cache_info->rows < 0))
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"PixelCacheAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
cache_info->length=length;
if (image->ping != MagickFalse)
{
cache_info->storage_class=image->storage_class;
cache_info->colorspace=image->colorspace;
cache_info->type=PingCache;
return(MagickTrue);
}
status=AcquireMagickResource(AreaResource,cache_info->length);
length=number_pixels*(cache_info->number_channels*sizeof(Quantum)+
cache_info->metacontent_extent);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (length == (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) length)))
{
status=AcquireMagickResource(MemoryResource,cache_info->length);
if (((cache_info->type == UndefinedCache) && (status != MagickFalse)) ||
(cache_info->type == MemoryCache))
{
cache_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
cache_info->pixels=(Quantum *) MagickAssumeAligned(
AcquireAlignedMemory(1,(size_t) cache_info->length));
if (cache_info->pixels == (Quantum *) NULL)
cache_info->pixels=source_info.pixels;
else
{
/*
Create memory pixel cache.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
cache_info->type=MemoryCache;
cache_info->metacontent=(void *) NULL;
if (cache_info->metacontent_extent != 0)
cache_info->metacontent=(void *) (cache_info->pixels+
number_pixels*cache_info->number_channels);
if ((source_info.storage_class != UndefinedClass) &&
(mode != ReadMode))
{
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(cache_info,&source_info,
exception);
RelinquishPixelCachePixels(&source_info);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatMagickSize(cache_info->length,MagickTrue,"B",
MagickPathExtent,format);
type=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickCacheOptions,(ssize_t)
cache_info->type);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"open %s (%s %s, %.20gx%.20gx%.20g %s)",
cache_info->filename,cache_info->mapped != MagickFalse ?
"Anonymous" : "Heap",type,(double) cache_info->columns,
(double) cache_info->rows,(double)
cache_info->number_channels,format);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
message);
}
return(status);
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,cache_info->length);
}
/*
Create pixel cache on disk.
*/
status=AcquireMagickResource(DiskResource,cache_info->length);
if ((status == MagickFalse) || (cache_info->type == DistributedCache))
{
DistributeCacheInfo
*server_info;
if (cache_info->type == DistributedCache)
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,cache_info->length);
server_info=AcquireDistributeCacheInfo(exception);
if (server_info != (DistributeCacheInfo *) NULL)
{
status=OpenDistributePixelCache(server_info,image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CacheError,"UnableToOpenPixelCache",
GetDistributeCacheHostname(server_info));
server_info=DestroyDistributeCacheInfo(server_info);
}
else
{
/*
Create a distributed pixel cache.
*/
cache_info->type=DistributedCache;
cache_info->server_info=server_info;
(void) FormatLocaleString(cache_info->cache_filename,
MagickPathExtent,"%s:%d",GetDistributeCacheHostname(
(DistributeCacheInfo *) cache_info->server_info),
GetDistributeCachePort((DistributeCacheInfo *)
cache_info->server_info));
if ((source_info.storage_class != UndefinedClass) &&
(mode != ReadMode))
{
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(cache_info,&source_info,
exception);
RelinquishPixelCachePixels(&source_info);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatMagickSize(cache_info->length,MagickFalse,"B",
MagickPathExtent,format);
type=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickCacheOptions,(ssize_t)
cache_info->type);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"open %s (%s[%d], %s, %.20gx%.20gx%.20g %s)",
cache_info->filename,cache_info->cache_filename,
GetDistributeCacheFile((DistributeCacheInfo *)
cache_info->server_info),type,(double) cache_info->columns,
(double) cache_info->rows,(double)
cache_info->number_channels,format);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
message);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,cache_info->length);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CacheError,
"CacheResourcesExhausted","`%s'",image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((source_info.storage_class != UndefinedClass) && (mode != ReadMode))
{
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
*cache_info->cache_filename='\0';
}
if (OpenPixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info,mode) == MagickFalse)
{
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,cache_info->length);
ThrowFileException(exception,CacheError,"UnableToOpenPixelCache",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
status=SetPixelCacheExtent(image,(MagickSizeType) cache_info->offset+
cache_info->length);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CacheError,"UnableToExtendCache",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
length=number_pixels*(cache_info->number_channels*sizeof(Quantum)+
cache_info->metacontent_extent);
if (length != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) length))
cache_info->type=DiskCache;
else
{
status=AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,cache_info->length);
if ((status == MagickFalse) && (cache_info->type != MapCache) &&
(cache_info->type != MemoryCache))
cache_info->type=DiskCache;
else
{
cache_info->pixels=(Quantum *) MapBlob(cache_info->file,mode,
cache_info->offset,(size_t) cache_info->length);
if (cache_info->pixels == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
cache_info->type=DiskCache;
cache_info->pixels=source_info.pixels;
}
else
{
/*
Create file-backed memory-mapped pixel cache.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
cache_info->type=MapCache;
cache_info->mapped=MagickTrue;
cache_info->metacontent=(void *) NULL;
if (cache_info->metacontent_extent != 0)
cache_info->metacontent=(void *) (cache_info->pixels+
number_pixels*cache_info->number_channels);
if ((source_info.storage_class != UndefinedClass) &&
(mode != ReadMode))
{
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(cache_info,&source_info,
exception);
RelinquishPixelCachePixels(&source_info);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatMagickSize(cache_info->length,MagickTrue,"B",
MagickPathExtent,format);
type=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickCacheOptions,(ssize_t)
cache_info->type);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"open %s (%s[%d], %s, %.20gx%.20gx%.20g %s)",
cache_info->filename,cache_info->cache_filename,
cache_info->file,type,(double) cache_info->columns,(double)
cache_info->rows,(double) cache_info->number_channels,
format);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
message);
}
return(status);
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,cache_info->length);
}
status=MagickTrue;
if ((source_info.storage_class != UndefinedClass) && (mode != ReadMode))
{
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(cache_info,&source_info,exception);
RelinquishPixelCachePixels(&source_info);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatMagickSize(cache_info->length,MagickFalse,"B",
MagickPathExtent,format);
type=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickCacheOptions,(ssize_t)
cache_info->type);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"open %s (%s[%d], %s, %.20gx%.20gx%.20g %s)",cache_info->filename,
cache_info->cache_filename,cache_info->file,type,(double)
cache_info->columns,(double) cache_info->rows,(double)
cache_info->number_channels,format);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",message);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions.
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
|
Medium
| 169,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParsePEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else if (ctxt->input->free != deallocblankswrapper) {
input = xmlNewBlanksWrapperInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
} else {
/*
* TODO !!!
* handle the extra spaces added before and after
* c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#as-PE
*/
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo ==
XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing
* right here
*/
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: A flaw in libxml2 allows remote XML entity inclusion with default parser flags (i.e., when the caller did not request entity substitution, DTD validation, external DTD subset loading, or default DTD attributes). Depending on the context, this may expose a higher-risk attack surface in libxml2 not usually reachable with default parser flags, and expose content from local files, HTTP, or FTP servers (which might be otherwise unreachable).
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
|
Low
| 174,120
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PlatformSensorAccelerometerMac::PlatformSensorAccelerometerMac(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider)
: PlatformSensor(SensorType::ACCELEROMETER, std::move(mapping), provider),
sudden_motion_sensor_(SuddenMotionSensor::Create()) {}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,824
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_VoiceFilter (S_FILTER_CONTROL *pFilter, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pAudioBuffer;
EAS_I32 k;
EAS_I32 b1;
EAS_I32 b2;
EAS_I32 z1;
EAS_I32 z2;
EAS_I32 acc0;
EAS_I32 acc1;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pAudioBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
z1 = pFilter->z1;
z2 = pFilter->z2;
b1 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
b2 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b2 >> 1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
k = pWTIntFrame->frame.k >> 1;
while (numSamples--)
{
/* do filter calculations */
acc0 = *pAudioBuffer;
acc1 = z1 * b1;
acc1 += z2 * b2;
acc0 = acc1 + k * acc0;
z2 = z1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
z1 = acc0 >> 14;
*pAudioBuffer++ = (EAS_I16) z1;
}
/* save delay values */
pFilter->z1 = (EAS_I16) z1;
pFilter->z2 = (EAS_I16) z2;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
|
Low
| 173,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int ret;
/*
* Do the basic permission checks.
*/
ret = acl_permission_check(inode, mask);
if (ret != -EACCES)
return ret;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
/*
* Read/write DACs are always overridable.
* Executable DACs are overridable when there is
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
/*
* Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The capabilities implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.14.8 does not properly consider that namespaces are inapplicable to inodes, which allows local users to bypass intended chmod restrictions by first creating a user namespace, as demonstrated by setting the setgid bit on a file with group ownership of root.
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 166,321
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGContainer::layout()
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
LayoutAnalyzer::Scope analyzer(*this);
calcViewport();
bool updatedTransform = calculateLocalTransform();
m_didScreenScaleFactorChange = updatedTransform || SVGLayoutSupport::screenScaleFactorChanged(parent());
determineIfLayoutSizeChanged();
bool layoutSizeChanged = element()->hasRelativeLengths()
&& SVGLayoutSupport::layoutSizeOfNearestViewportChanged(this);
SVGLayoutSupport::layoutChildren(firstChild(), false, m_didScreenScaleFactorChange, layoutSizeChanged);
if (everHadLayout() && needsLayout())
SVGResourcesCache::clientLayoutChanged(this);
if (m_needsBoundariesUpdate || updatedTransform) {
updateCachedBoundaries();
m_needsBoundariesUpdate = false;
LayoutSVGModelObject::setNeedsBoundariesUpdate();
}
ASSERT(!m_needsBoundariesUpdate);
clearNeedsLayout();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 36.0.1985.143 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
|
Low
| 171,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_read)
{
zval * zip_entry;
zend_long len = 0;
zip_read_rsrc * zr_rsrc;
zend_string *buffer;
int n = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r|l", &zip_entry, &len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((zr_rsrc = (zip_read_rsrc *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zip_entry), le_zip_entry_name, le_zip_entry)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (len <= 0) {
len = 1024;
}
if (zr_rsrc->zf) {
buffer = zend_string_alloc(len, 0);
n = zip_fread(zr_rsrc->zf, ZSTR_VAL(buffer), ZSTR_LEN(buffer));
if (n > 0) {
ZSTR_VAL(buffer)[n] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(buffer) = n;
RETURN_NEW_STR(buffer);
} else {
zend_string_free(buffer);
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING()
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in php_zip.c in the zip extension in PHP before 7.0.6 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted call to (1) getFromIndex or (2) getFromName in the ZipArchive class.
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
|
Low
| 167,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver::RecordTimingMetrics(
const page_load_metrics::mojom::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
ukm::builders::PageLoad builder(info.source_id);
bool is_user_initiated_navigation =
info.user_initiated_info.browser_initiated ||
timing.input_to_navigation_start;
builder.SetExperimental_Navigation_UserInitiated(
is_user_initiated_navigation);
if (timing.input_to_navigation_start) {
builder.SetExperimental_InputToNavigationStart(
timing.input_to_navigation_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.parse_timing->parse_start) {
builder.SetParseTiming_NavigationToParseStart(
timing.parse_timing->parse_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.document_timing->dom_content_loaded_event_start) {
builder.SetDocumentTiming_NavigationToDOMContentLoadedEventFired(
timing.document_timing->dom_content_loaded_event_start.value()
.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.document_timing->load_event_start) {
builder.SetDocumentTiming_NavigationToLoadEventFired(
timing.document_timing->load_event_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_paint) {
builder.SetPaintTiming_NavigationToFirstPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_contentful_paint) {
builder.SetPaintTiming_NavigationToFirstContentfulPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_contentful_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_meaningful_paint) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToFirstMeaningfulPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_meaningful_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestImagePaint(
timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLastImagePaint(
timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestTextPaint(
timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLastTextPaint(
timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> largest_content_paint_time;
uint64_t largest_content_paint_size;
AssignTimeAndSizeForLargestContentfulPaint(largest_content_paint_time,
largest_content_paint_size,
timing.paint_timing);
if (largest_content_paint_size > 0 &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
largest_content_paint_time, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestContentPaint(
largest_content_paint_time.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->interactive) {
base::TimeDelta time_to_interactive =
timing.interactive_timing->interactive.value();
if (!timing.interactive_timing->first_invalidating_input ||
timing.interactive_timing->first_invalidating_input.value() >
time_to_interactive) {
builder.SetExperimental_NavigationToInteractive(
time_to_interactive.InMilliseconds());
}
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->first_input_delay) {
base::TimeDelta first_input_delay =
timing.interactive_timing->first_input_delay.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_FirstInputDelay2(
first_input_delay.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->first_input_timestamp) {
base::TimeDelta first_input_timestamp =
timing.interactive_timing->first_input_timestamp.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_FirstInputTimestamp2(
first_input_timestamp.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_delay) {
base::TimeDelta longest_input_delay =
timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_delay.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_LongestInputDelay2(
longest_input_delay.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_timestamp) {
base::TimeDelta longest_input_timestamp =
timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_timestamp.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_LongestInputTimestamp2(
longest_input_timestamp.InMilliseconds());
}
builder.SetNet_CacheBytes(ukm::GetExponentialBucketMin(cache_bytes_, 1.3));
builder.SetNet_NetworkBytes(
ukm::GetExponentialBucketMin(network_bytes_, 1.3));
if (main_frame_timing_)
ReportMainResourceTimingMetrics(timing, &builder);
builder.Record(ukm::UkmRecorder::Get());
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Leaking of an SVG shadow tree leading to corruption of the DOM tree in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
|
Medium
| 172,497
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
*/
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))) {
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || /* !start */
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == 0xB7) || /* !start */
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x300) && (c <= 0x36F)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x203F) && (c <= 0x2040)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))
)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
} else {
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!IS_LETTER(c) && (c != '_') &&
(c != ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
(IS_EXTENDER(c)))) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
if ((*ctxt->input->cur == '\n') && (ctxt->input->cur[-1] == '\r'))
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - (len + 1), len));
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,297
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ServerWrapper::OnHttpRequest(int connection_id,
const net::HttpServerRequestInfo& info) {
server_->SetSendBufferSize(connection_id, kSendBufferSizeForDevTools);
if (base::StartsWith(info.path, "/json", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnJsonRequest,
handler_, connection_id, info));
return;
}
if (info.path.empty() || info.path == "/") {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnDiscoveryPageRequest, handler_,
connection_id));
return;
}
if (!base::StartsWith(info.path, "/devtools/",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
std::string filename = PathWithoutParams(info.path.substr(10));
std::string mime_type = GetMimeType(filename);
if (!debug_frontend_dir_.empty()) {
base::FilePath path = debug_frontend_dir_.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string data;
base::ReadFileToString(path, &data);
server_->Send200(connection_id, data, mime_type,
kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
if (bundles_resources_) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnFrontendResourceRequest,
handler_, connection_id, filename));
return;
}
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A lack of host validation in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page, if the user is running a remote DevTools debugging server.
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
|
High
| 172,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::InitializeVizLayerTreeFrameSink(
scoped_refptr<ws::ContextProviderCommandBuffer> context_provider) {
DCHECK(enable_viz_);
pending_frames_ = 0;
gpu_capabilities_ = context_provider->ContextCapabilities();
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner =
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
auto root_params = viz::mojom::RootCompositorFrameSinkParams::New();
root_params->send_swap_size_notifications = true;
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkAssociatedPtrInfo sink_info;
root_params->compositor_frame_sink = mojo::MakeRequest(&sink_info);
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkClientRequest client_request =
mojo::MakeRequest(&root_params->compositor_frame_sink_client);
root_params->display_private = mojo::MakeRequest(&display_private_);
display_client_ = std::make_unique<AndroidHostDisplayClient>(
base::BindRepeating(&CompositorImpl::DidSwapBuffers,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::BindRepeating(
&CompositorImpl::OnFatalOrSurfaceContextCreationFailure,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
root_params->display_client =
display_client_->GetBoundPtr(task_runner).PassInterface();
viz::RendererSettings renderer_settings;
renderer_settings.allow_antialiasing = false;
renderer_settings.highp_threshold_min = 2048;
renderer_settings.requires_alpha_channel = requires_alpha_channel_;
renderer_settings.initial_screen_size =
display::Screen::GetScreen()
->GetDisplayNearestWindow(root_window_)
.GetSizeInPixel();
renderer_settings.use_skia_renderer = features::IsUsingSkiaRenderer();
renderer_settings.color_space = display_color_space_;
root_params->frame_sink_id = frame_sink_id_;
root_params->widget = surface_handle_;
root_params->gpu_compositing = true;
root_params->renderer_settings = renderer_settings;
GetHostFrameSinkManager()->CreateRootCompositorFrameSink(
std::move(root_params));
cc::mojo_embedder::AsyncLayerTreeFrameSink::InitParams params;
params.compositor_task_runner = task_runner;
params.gpu_memory_buffer_manager = BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()
->gpu_channel_establish_factory()
->GetGpuMemoryBufferManager();
params.pipes.compositor_frame_sink_associated_info = std::move(sink_info);
params.pipes.client_request = std::move(client_request);
params.enable_surface_synchronization = true;
params.hit_test_data_provider =
std::make_unique<viz::HitTestDataProviderDrawQuad>(
false /* should_ask_for_child_region */,
true /* root_accepts_events */);
params.client_name = kBrowser;
auto layer_tree_frame_sink =
std::make_unique<cc::mojo_embedder::AsyncLayerTreeFrameSink>(
std::move(context_provider), nullptr, ¶ms);
host_->SetLayerTreeFrameSink(std::move(layer_tree_frame_sink));
display_private_->SetDisplayVisible(true);
display_private_->Resize(size_);
display_private_->SetDisplayColorSpace(display_color_space_,
display_color_space_);
display_private_->SetVSyncPaused(vsync_paused_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
Medium
| 172,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
if (!ci)
return;
key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
|
Low
| 168,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageloadfont)
{
char *file;
int file_name, hdr_size = sizeof(gdFont) - sizeof(char *);
int ind, body_size, n = 0, b, i, body_size_check;
gdFontPtr font;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_name) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", IGNORE_PATH | IGNORE_URL_WIN | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Only supports a architecture-dependent binary dump format
* at the moment.
* The file format is like this on machines with 32-byte integers:
*
* byte 0-3: (int) number of characters in the font
* byte 4-7: (int) value of first character in the font (often 32, space)
* byte 8-11: (int) pixel width of each character
* byte 12-15: (int) pixel height of each character
* bytes 16-: (char) array with character data, one byte per pixel
* in each character, for a total of
* (nchars*width*height) bytes.
*/
font = (gdFontPtr) emalloc(sizeof(gdFont));
b = 0;
while (b < hdr_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, (char*)&font[b], hdr_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading header");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading header");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
i = php_stream_tell(stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_END);
body_size_check = php_stream_tell(stream) - hdr_size;
php_stream_seek(stream, i, SEEK_SET);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
font->w = FLIPWORD(font->w);
font->h = FLIPWORD(font->h);
font->nchars = FLIPWORD(font->nchars);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars, font->h)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars * font->h, font->w )) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
font->data = emalloc(body_size);
b = 0;
while (b < body_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, &font->data[b], body_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font->data);
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading body");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading body");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_close(stream);
/* Adding 5 to the font index so we will never have font indices
* that overlap with the old fonts (with indices 1-5). The first
* list index given out is always 1.
*/
ind = 5 + zend_list_insert(font, le_gd_font TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ind);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void vrend_renderer_init_blit_ctx(struct vrend_blitter_ctx *blit_ctx)
{
struct virgl_gl_ctx_param ctx_params;
int i;
if (blit_ctx->initialised) {
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, blit_ctx->gl_context);
return;
}
ctx_params.shared = true;
ctx_params.major_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MAJOR;
ctx_params.minor_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MINOR;
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, blit_ctx->gl_context);
glGenVertexArrays(1, &blit_ctx->vaoid);
glGenFramebuffers(1, &blit_ctx->fb_id);
glGenBuffers(1, &blit_ctx->vbo_id);
blit_build_vs_passthrough(blit_ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
blit_ctx->vertices[i][0][3] = 1; /*v.w*/
glBindVertexArray(blit_ctx->vaoid);
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, blit_ctx->vbo_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the vrend_renderer_init_blit_ctx function in vrend_blitter.c in virglrenderer before 0.6.0 allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host memory consumption) via a large number of VIRGL_CCMD_BLIT commands.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,955
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AddMainWebResources(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router.js", IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_common.css",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_COMMON_CSS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router.css",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_CSS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_data.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_DATA_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_ui_interface.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_UI_INTERFACE_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("polymer_config.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_POLYMER_CONFIG_JS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVGImage::setContainerSize function in core/svg/graphics/SVGImage.cpp in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the resizing of a view.
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
|
Low
| 171,708
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gdImageScaleTwoPass(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width,
const unsigned int new_height)
{
const unsigned int src_width = src->sx;
const unsigned int src_height = src->sy;
gdImagePtr tmp_im = NULL;
gdImagePtr dst = NULL;
/* First, handle the trivial case. */
if (src_width == new_width && src_height == new_height) {
return gdImageClone(src);
}/* if */
/* Convert to truecolor if it isn't; this code requires it. */
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}/* if */
/* Scale horizontally unless sizes are the same. */
if (src_width == new_width) {
tmp_im = src;
} else {
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScalePass(src, src_width, tmp_im, new_width, src_height, HORIZONTAL);
}/* if .. else*/
/* If vertical sizes match, we're done. */
if (src_height == new_height) {
assert(tmp_im != src);
return tmp_im;
}/* if */
/* Otherwise, we need to scale vertically. */
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst != NULL) {
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(dst, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScalePass(tmp_im, src_height, dst, new_height, new_width, VERTICAL);
}/* if */
if (src != tmp_im) {
gdFree(tmp_im);
}/* if */
return dst;
}/* gdImageScaleTwoPass*/
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The gdImageScaleTwoPass function in gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.0, as used in PHP before 5.6.12, uses inconsistent allocate and free approaches, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted call, as demonstrated by a call to the PHP imagescale function.
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
|
Low
| 167,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GF_Err dinf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, dinf_AddBox);
if (e) {
return e;
}
if (!((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing dref box in dinf\n"));
((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref = (GF_DataReferenceBox *)gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DREF);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: GPAC 0.7.1 has a memory leak in dinf_Read in isomedia/box_code_base.c.
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
|
Medium
| 169,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SocketStream::set_context(URLRequestContext* context) {
const URLRequestContext* prev_context = context_.get();
if (context) {
context_ = context->AsWeakPtr();
} else {
context_.reset();
}
if (prev_context != context) {
if (prev_context && pac_request_) {
prev_context->proxy_service()->CancelPacRequest(pac_request_);
pac_request_ = NULL;
}
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_REQUEST_ALIVE);
net_log_ = BoundNetLog();
if (context) {
net_log_ = BoundNetLog::Make(
context->net_log(),
NetLog::SOURCE_SOCKET_STREAM);
net_log_.BeginEvent(NetLog::TYPE_REQUEST_ALIVE);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote servers to execute arbitrary code via crafted response traffic after a URL request.
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleReadPixels(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::ReadPixels& c) {
GLint x = c.x;
GLint y = c.y;
GLsizei width = c.width;
GLsizei height = c.height;
GLenum format = c.format;
GLenum type = c.type;
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
typedef gles2::ReadPixels::Result Result;
uint32 pixels_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, height, format, type, pack_alignment_, &pixels_size, NULL, NULL)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
void* pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<void*>(
c.pixels_shm_id, c.pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!pixels || !result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (!validators_->read_pixel_format.IsValid(format)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glReadPixels", format, "format");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->pixel_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glReadPixels", type, "type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
gfx::Size max_size = GetBoundReadFrameBufferSize();
GLint max_x;
GLint max_y;
if (!SafeAdd(x, width, &max_x) || !SafeAdd(y, height, &max_y)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckBoundFramebuffersValid("glReadPixels")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
if (x < 0 || y < 0 || max_x > max_size.width() || max_y > max_size.height()) {
uint32 temp_size;
uint32 unpadded_row_size;
uint32 padded_row_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, 2, format, type, pack_alignment_, &temp_size,
&unpadded_row_size, &padded_row_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint dest_x_offset = std::max(-x, 0);
uint32 dest_row_offset;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
dest_x_offset, 1, format, type, pack_alignment_, &dest_row_offset, NULL,
NULL)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
int8* dst = static_cast<int8*>(pixels);
GLint read_x = std::max(0, x);
GLint read_end_x = std::max(0, std::min(max_size.width(), max_x));
GLint read_width = read_end_x - read_x;
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
GLint ry = y + yy;
memset(dst, 0, unpadded_row_size);
if (ry >= 0 && ry < max_size.height() && read_width > 0) {
glReadPixels(
read_x, ry, read_width, 1, format, type, dst + dest_row_offset);
}
dst += padded_row_size;
}
} else {
glReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
GLenum error = PeekGLError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
*result = true;
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFrameBufferInternalFormat();
uint32 channels_exist = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(read_format);
if ((channels_exist & 0x0008) == 0 &&
!feature_info_->feature_flags().disable_workarounds) {
uint32 temp_size;
uint32 unpadded_row_size;
uint32 padded_row_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, 2, format, type, pack_alignment_, &temp_size,
&unpadded_row_size, &padded_row_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (type != GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glReadPixels",
"unsupported readPixel format");
return error::kNoError;
}
switch (format) {
case GL_RGBA:
case GL_BGRA_EXT:
case GL_ALPHA: {
int offset = (format == GL_ALPHA) ? 0 : 3;
int step = (format == GL_ALPHA) ? 1 : 4;
uint8* dst = static_cast<uint8*>(pixels) + offset;
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
uint8* end = dst + unpadded_row_size;
for (uint8* d = dst; d < end; d += step) {
*d = 255;
}
dst += padded_row_size;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 on Mac OS X allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,749
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::DestroyOnRenderFrameGone() {
scoped_refptr<RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost> protect(this);
if (IsAttached())
RevokePolicy();
ForceDetachAllClients();
frame_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
SetFrameTreeNode(nullptr);
Release();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,249
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int DefragTrackerReuseTest(void)
{
int ret = 0;
int id = 1;
Packet *p1 = NULL;
DefragTracker *tracker1 = NULL, *tracker2 = NULL;
DefragInit();
/* Build a packet, its not a fragment but shouldn't matter for
* this test. */
p1 = BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 0, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Get a tracker. It shouldn't look like its already in use. */
tracker1 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker1 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker1->seen_last) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker1->remove) {
goto end;
}
DefragTrackerRelease(tracker1);
/* Get a tracker again, it should be the same one. */
tracker2 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker2 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2 != tracker1) {
goto end;
}
DefragTrackerRelease(tracker1);
/* Now mark the tracker for removal. It should not be returned
* when we get a tracker for a packet that may have the same
* attributes. */
tracker1->remove = 1;
tracker2 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker2 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2 == tracker1) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2->remove) {
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int64 GetOriginalListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*original_update_, index);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak referrer information via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
|
Medium
| 172,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void *atomic_thread(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
usleep(1);
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,490
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SQLRETURN SQLSetDescField( SQLHDESC descriptor_handle,
SQLSMALLINT rec_number,
SQLSMALLINT field_identifier,
SQLPOINTER value,
SQLINTEGER buffer_length )
{
/*
* not quite sure how the descriptor can be
* allocated to a statement, all the documentation talks
* about state transitions on statement states, but the
* descriptor may be allocated with more than one statement
* at one time. Which one should I check ?
*/
DMHDESC descriptor = (DMHDESC) descriptor_handle;
SQLRETURN ret;
SQLCHAR s1[ 100 + LOG_MESSAGE_LEN ];
int isStrField = 0;
/*
* check descriptor
*/
if ( !__validate_desc( descriptor ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: SQL_INVALID_HANDLE" );
return SQL_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
function_entry( descriptor );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg, "\n\t\tEntry:\
\n\t\t\tDescriptor = %p\
\n\t\t\tRec Number = %d\
\n\t\t\tField Ident = %s\
\n\t\t\tValue = %p\
\n\t\t\tBuffer Length = %d",
descriptor,
rec_number,
__desc_attr_as_string( s1, field_identifier ),
value,
(int)buffer_length );
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
thread_protect( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor );
if ( descriptor -> connection -> state < STATE_C4 )
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
/*
* check status of statements associated with this descriptor
*/
if( __check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S8 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S9 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S10 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S11 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S12 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S13 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S14 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S15 )) {
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( rec_number < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
switch ( field_identifier )
{
/* Fixed-length fields: buffer_length is ignored */
case SQL_DESC_ALLOC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_STATUS_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_OFFSET_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_COUNT:
case SQL_DESC_ROWS_PROCESSED_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_AUTO_UNIQUE_VALUE:
case SQL_DESC_CASE_SENSITIVE:
case SQL_DESC_CONCISE_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_DATA_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_CODE:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_DISPLAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_FIXED_PREC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_INDICATOR_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_NULLABLE:
case SQL_DESC_NUM_PREC_RADIX:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_ROWVER:
case SQL_DESC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_SEARCHABLE:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_UNNAMED:
case SQL_DESC_UNSIGNED:
case SQL_DESC_UPDATABLE:
isStrField = 0;
break;
/* Pointer to data: buffer_length must be valid */
case SQL_DESC_BASE_COLUMN_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_BASE_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_CATALOG_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_LABEL:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_PREFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_SUFFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LOCAL_TYPE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_SCHEMA_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE_NAME:
isStrField = 1;
break;
default:
isStrField = buffer_length != SQL_IS_POINTER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_INTEGER
&& buffer_length != SQL_IS_UINTEGER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_SMALLINT &&
buffer_length != SQL_IS_USMALLINT;
}
if ( isStrField && buffer_length < 0 && buffer_length != SQL_NTS)
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY090, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_COUNT && (SQLINTEGER)value < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT
&& value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT_STREAM && value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT_STREAM )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY105, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection ))
{
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
}
else if ( CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection ))
{
SQLWCHAR *s1 = NULL;
if (isStrField)
{
s1 = ansi_to_unicode_alloc( value, buffer_length, descriptor -> connection, NULL );
if (SQL_NTS != buffer_length)
{
buffer_length *= sizeof(SQLWCHAR);
}
}
else
{
s1 = value;
}
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
s1,
buffer_length );
if (isStrField)
{
if (s1)
free(s1);
}
}
else
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: IM001" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_IM001, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg,
"\n\t\tExit:[%s]",
__get_return_status( ret, s1 ));
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
return function_return( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source
|
Low
| 169,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FFmpegVideoDecodeEngine::Initialize(
MessageLoop* message_loop,
VideoDecodeEngine::EventHandler* event_handler,
VideoDecodeContext* context,
const VideoDecoderConfig& config) {
static const int kDecodeThreads = 2;
static const int kMaxDecodeThreads = 16;
codec_context_ = avcodec_alloc_context();
codec_context_->pix_fmt = PIX_FMT_YUV420P;
codec_context_->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
codec_context_->codec_id = VideoCodecToCodecID(config.codec());
codec_context_->coded_width = config.width();
codec_context_->coded_height = config.height();
frame_rate_numerator_ = config.frame_rate_numerator();
frame_rate_denominator_ = config.frame_rate_denominator();
if (config.extra_data() != NULL) {
codec_context_->extradata_size = config.extra_data_size();
codec_context_->extradata =
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(av_malloc(config.extra_data_size()));
memcpy(codec_context_->extradata, config.extra_data(),
config.extra_data_size());
}
codec_context_->error_concealment = FF_EC_GUESS_MVS | FF_EC_DEBLOCK;
codec_context_->error_recognition = FF_ER_CAREFUL;
AVCodec* codec = avcodec_find_decoder(codec_context_->codec_id);
int decode_threads = (codec_context_->codec_id == CODEC_ID_THEORA) ?
1 : kDecodeThreads;
const CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
std::string threads(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kVideoThreads));
if ((!threads.empty() &&
!base::StringToInt(threads, &decode_threads)) ||
decode_threads < 0 || decode_threads > kMaxDecodeThreads) {
decode_threads = kDecodeThreads;
}
av_frame_.reset(avcodec_alloc_frame());
VideoCodecInfo info;
info.success = false;
info.provides_buffers = true;
info.stream_info.surface_type = VideoFrame::TYPE_SYSTEM_MEMORY;
info.stream_info.surface_format = GetSurfaceFormat();
info.stream_info.surface_width = config.surface_width();
info.stream_info.surface_height = config.surface_height();
bool buffer_allocated = true;
frame_queue_available_.clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < Limits::kMaxVideoFrames; ++i) {
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> video_frame;
VideoFrame::CreateFrame(VideoFrame::YV12,
config.width(),
config.height(),
kNoTimestamp,
kNoTimestamp,
&video_frame);
if (!video_frame.get()) {
buffer_allocated = false;
break;
}
frame_queue_available_.push_back(video_frame);
}
if (codec &&
avcodec_thread_init(codec_context_, decode_threads) >= 0 &&
avcodec_open(codec_context_, codec) >= 0 &&
av_frame_.get() &&
buffer_allocated) {
info.success = true;
}
event_handler_ = event_handler;
event_handler_->OnInitializeComplete(info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle media buffers, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Don't forget the ffmpeg input buffer padding when allocating a codec's
extradata buffer.
BUG=82438
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7137002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: telnet_parse(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *sp, u_int length, int print)
{
int i, x;
u_int c;
const u_char *osp, *p;
#define FETCH(c, sp, length) \
do { \
if (length < 1) \
goto pktend; \
ND_TCHECK(*sp); \
c = *sp++; \
length--; \
} while (0)
osp = sp;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (c != IAC)
goto pktend;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (c == IAC) { /* <IAC><IAC>! */
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IAC IAC"));
goto done;
}
i = c - TELCMD_FIRST;
if (i < 0 || i > IAC - TELCMD_FIRST)
goto pktend;
switch (c) {
case DONT:
case DO:
case WONT:
case WILL:
case SB:
/* DONT/DO/WONT/WILL x */
FETCH(x, sp, length);
if (x >= 0 && x < NTELOPTS) {
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s", telcmds[i], telopts[x]));
} else {
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %#x", telcmds[i], x));
}
if (c != SB)
break;
/* IAC SB .... IAC SE */
p = sp;
while (length > (u_int)(p + 1 - sp)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
if (p[0] == IAC && p[1] == SE)
break;
p++;
}
if (*p != IAC)
goto pktend;
switch (x) {
case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, authcmd)));
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, authtype)));
break;
case TELOPT_ENCRYPT:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, enccmd)));
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, enctype)));
break;
default:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, cmds)));
break;
}
while (p > sp) {
FETCH(x, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %#x", x));
}
/* terminating IAC SE */
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SE"));
sp += 2;
break;
default:
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", telcmds[i]));
goto done;
}
done:
return sp - osp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
pktend:
return -1;
#undef FETCH
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The telnet parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-telnet.c:telnet_parse().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12988/TELNET: Add a missing bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nfc_genl_deactivate_target(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nfc_dev *dev;
u32 device_idx, target_idx;
int rc;
if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX])
return -EINVAL;
device_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
dev = nfc_get_device(device_idx);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
target_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX]);
rc = nfc_deactivate_target(dev, target_idx, NFC_TARGET_MODE_SLEEP);
nfc_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in the function nfc_genl_deactivate_target() in net/nfc/netlink.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.13 can be triggered by a malicious user-mode program that omits certain NFC attributes, leading to denial of service.
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 169,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestObj::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
if (args.Length() <= 0 || !args[0]->IsFunction())
return throwError(TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<TestCallback> testCallback = V8TestCallback::create(args[0], getScriptExecutionContext());
RefPtr<TestObj> impl = TestObj::create(testCallback);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,076
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s,
int flags, int hashalgo)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc = 0;
int extraloops = 0;
gcry_mpi_t k, dr, sum, k_1, x;
mpi_point_struct I;
gcry_mpi_t hash;
const void *abuf;
unsigned int abits, qbits;
mpi_ec_t ctx;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_mpidump ("ecdsa sign hash ", input );
/* Convert the INPUT into an MPI if needed. */
rc = _gcry_dsa_normalize_hash (input, &hash, qbits);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (rc)
return rc;
k = NULL;
dr = mpi_alloc (0);
sum = mpi_alloc (0);
{
do
{
mpi_free (k);
k = NULL;
if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979) && hashalgo)
{
/* Use Pornin's method for deterministic DSA. If this
flag is set, it is expected that HASH is an opaque
MPI with the to be signed hash. That hash is also
used as h1 from 3.2.a. */
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_CONFLICT;
goto leave;
}
abuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &abits);
rc = _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (&k, skey->E.n, skey->d,
abuf, (abits+7)/8,
hashalgo, extraloops);
if (rc)
goto leave;
extraloops++;
}
else
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("ecc sign: Failed to get affine coordinates\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
goto leave;
}
mpi_mod (r, x, skey->E.n); /* r = x mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (r, 0));
mpi_mulm (dr, skey->d, r, skey->E.n); /* dr = d*r mod n */
mpi_addm (sum, hash, dr, skey->E.n); /* sum = hash + (d*r) mod n */
mpi_invm (k_1, k, skey->E.n); /* k_1 = k^(-1) mod n */
mpi_mulm (s, k_1, sum, skey->E.n); /* s = k^(-1)*(hash+(d*r)) mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (s, 0));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Libgcrypt before 1.7.10 and 1.8.x before 1.8.3 allows a memory-cache side-channel attack on ECDSA signatures that can be mitigated through the use of blinding during the signing process in the _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign function in cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c, aka the Return Of the Hidden Number Problem or ROHNP. To discover an ECDSA key, the attacker needs access to either the local machine or a different virtual machine on the same physical host.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask)
{
int ret, ret2, i;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_orig;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if(entry == (kadm5_principal_ent_t) NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data;
while (tl_data_orig) {
if (tl_data_orig->tl_data_type < 256)
return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE;
tl_data_orig = tl_data_orig->tl_data_next;
}
}
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
return(ret);
/*
* This is pretty much the same as create ...
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* set us up to use the new policy */
adb.aux_attributes |= KADM5_POLICY;
if (adb.policy)
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = strdup(entry->policy);
}
if (have_pol) {
/* set pw_max_life based on new policy */
if (pol.pw_max_life) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb,
&(kdb->pw_expiration));
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->pw_expiration += pol.pw_max_life;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
}
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = NULL;
adb.aux_attributes &= ~KADM5_POLICY;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
if((mask & KADM5_KVNO)) {
for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++)
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = entry->kvno;
}
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
krb5_tl_data *tl;
/* may have to change the version number of the API. Updates the list with the given tl_data rather than over-writting */
for (tl = entry->tl_data; tl;
tl = tl->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl);
if( ret )
{
goto done;
}
}
}
/*
* Setting entry->fail_auth_count to 0 can be used to manually unlock
* an account. It is not possible to set fail_auth_count to any other
* value using kadmin.
*/
if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
if (entry->fail_auth_count != 0) {
ret = KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS;
goto done;
}
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
}
/* let the mask propagate to the database provider */
kdb->mask = mask;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (ret) goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
if (have_pol) {
ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
ret = ret ? ret : ret2;
}
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) kadm5_create_principal_3 and (2) kadm5_modify_principal functions in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by specifying KADM5_POLICY with a NULL policy name.
Commit Message: Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630]
In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for
entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask.
CVE-2015-8630:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in
the mask.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8342 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,529
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static enum hrtimer_restart posix_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct k_itimer *timr;
unsigned long flags;
int si_private = 0;
enum hrtimer_restart ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART;
timr = container_of(timer, struct k_itimer, it.real.timer);
spin_lock_irqsave(&timr->it_lock, flags);
timr->it_active = 0;
if (timr->it_interval != 0)
si_private = ++timr->it_requeue_pending;
if (posix_timer_event(timr, si_private)) {
/*
* signal was not sent because of sig_ignor
* we will not get a call back to restart it AND
* it should be restarted.
*/
if (timr->it_interval != 0) {
ktime_t now = hrtimer_cb_get_time(timer);
/*
* FIXME: What we really want, is to stop this
* timer completely and restart it in case the
* SIG_IGN is removed. This is a non trivial
* change which involves sighand locking
* (sigh !), which we don't want to do late in
* the release cycle.
*
* For now we just let timers with an interval
* less than a jiffie expire every jiffie to
* avoid softirq starvation in case of SIG_IGN
* and a very small interval, which would put
* the timer right back on the softirq pending
* list. By moving now ahead of time we trick
* hrtimer_forward() to expire the timer
* later, while we still maintain the overrun
* accuracy, but have some inconsistency in
* the timer_gettime() case. This is at least
* better than a starved softirq. A more
* complex fix which solves also another related
* inconsistency is already in the pipeline.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS
{
ktime_t kj = NSEC_PER_SEC / HZ;
if (timr->it_interval < kj)
now = ktime_add(now, kj);
}
#endif
timr->it_overrun += (unsigned int)
hrtimer_forward(timer, now,
timr->it_interval);
ret = HRTIMER_RESTART;
++timr->it_requeue_pending;
timr->it_active = 1;
}
}
unlock_timer(timr, flags);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An Integer Overflow in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the POSIX timer code is caused by the way the overrun accounting works. Depending on interval and expiry time values, the overrun can be larger than INT_MAX, but the accounting is int based. This basically makes the accounting values, which are visible to user space via timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun, random. For example, a local user can cause a denial of service (signed integer overflow) via crafted mmap, futex, timer_create, and timer_settime system calls.
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
|
Low
| 169,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: create_tls_session(int csock, int type /* GNUTLS_SERVER, GNUTLS_CLIENT */ )
{
int rc = 0;
gnutls_session *session = gnutls_malloc(sizeof(gnutls_session));
gnutls_init(session, type);
# ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PRIORITY_SET_DIRECT
/* http://www.manpagez.com/info/gnutls/gnutls-2.10.4/gnutls_81.php#Echo-Server-with-anonymous-authentication */
gnutls_priority_set_direct(*session, "NORMAL:+ANON-DH", NULL);
/* gnutls_priority_set_direct (*session, "NONE:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+COMP-ALL:+ANON-DH", NULL); */
# else
gnutls_set_default_priority(*session);
gnutls_kx_set_priority(*session, tls_kx_order);
# endif
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(*session, (gnutls_transport_ptr) GINT_TO_POINTER(csock));
switch (type) {
case GNUTLS_SERVER:
gnutls_credentials_set(*session, GNUTLS_CRD_ANON, anon_cred_s);
break;
case GNUTLS_CLIENT:
gnutls_credentials_set(*session, GNUTLS_CRD_ANON, anon_cred_c);
break;
}
do {
rc = gnutls_handshake(*session);
} while (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED || rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN);
if (rc < 0) {
crm_err("Handshake failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
gnutls_deinit(*session);
gnutls_free(session);
return NULL;
}
return session;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t infilesize, total_samples;
DFFFileHeader dff_file_header;
DFFChunkHeader dff_chunk_header;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&dff_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &dff_file_header) + 4, sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4) || strncmp (dff_file_header.formType, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_file_header, sizeof (DFFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_file_header, DFFFileHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
dff_file_header.ckDataSize && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 1 && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 12 != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file (by total size)!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("file header indicated length = %lld", dff_file_header.ckDataSize);
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chunk header indicated length = %lld", dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FVER", 4)) {
uint32_t version;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize != sizeof (version) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &version, sizeof (version), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (version)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &version, sizeof (version))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&version, "L");
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
char *prop_chunk;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!strncmp (prop_chunk, "SND ", 4)) {
char *cptr = prop_chunk + 4, *eptr = prop_chunk + dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
uint16_t numChannels, chansSpecified, chanMask = 0;
uint32_t sampleRate;
while (eptr - cptr >= sizeof (dff_chunk_header)) {
memcpy (&dff_chunk_header, cptr, sizeof (dff_chunk_header));
cptr += sizeof (dff_chunk_header);
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (eptr - cptr >= dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FS ", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize == 4) {
memcpy (&sampleRate, cptr, sizeof (sampleRate));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&sampleRate, "L");
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got sample rate of %u Hz", sampleRate);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CHNL", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 2) {
memcpy (&numChannels, cptr, sizeof (numChannels));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&numChannels, "S");
cptr += sizeof (numChannels);
chansSpecified = (int)(dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize - sizeof (numChannels)) / 4;
while (chansSpecified--) {
if (!strncmp (cptr, "SLFT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MLFT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x1;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "SRGT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MRGT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x2;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x10;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "RS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x20;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "C ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x4;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LFE ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x8;
else
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("undefined channel ID %c%c%c%c", cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
cptr += 4;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("%d channels, mask = 0x%08x", numChannels, chanMask);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CMPR", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 4) {
if (strncmp (cptr, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("DSDIFF files must be uncompressed, not \"%c%c%c%c\"!",
cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
else {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP/SND chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes", dff_chunk_header.ckID [0],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2], dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
}
else {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
if (chanMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this DSDIFF file already has channel order information!");
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (chanMask)
config->channel_mask = chanMask;
config->bits_per_sample = 8;
config->bytes_per_sample = 1;
config->num_channels = numChannels;
config->sample_rate = sampleRate / 8;
config->qmode |= QMODE_DSD_MSB_FIRST;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got unknown PROP chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
prop_chunk [0], prop_chunk [1], prop_chunk [2], prop_chunk [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
free (prop_chunk);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "DSD ", 4)) {
total_samples = dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize / config->num_channels;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (int)(((dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
char *buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
dff_chunk_header.ckID [0], dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("setting configuration with %lld samples", total_samples);
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in WavPack 5.1.0 and earlier for W64 input. Out-of-bounds writes can occur because ParseWave64HeaderConfig in wave64.c does not validate the sizes of unknown chunks before attempting memory allocation, related to a lack of integer-overflow protection within a bytes_to_copy calculation and subsequent malloc call, leading to insufficient memory allocation.
Commit Message: issue #33, sanitize size of unknown chunks before malloc()
|
Medium
| 169,249
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnStreamReset(const quic::QuicRstStreamFrame& frame) {
quic::QuicStream::OnStreamReset(frame);
delegate_->OnRemoteReset();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
Medium
| 172,262
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ManifestManager::FetchManifest() {
manifest_url_ = render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->GetDocument().ManifestURL();
if (manifest_url_.is_empty()) {
ManifestUmaUtil::FetchFailed(ManifestUmaUtil::FETCH_EMPTY_URL);
ResolveCallbacks(ResolveStateFailure);
return;
}
fetcher_.reset(new ManifestFetcher(manifest_url_));
fetcher_->Start(
render_frame()->GetWebFrame(),
render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->GetDocument().ManifestUseCredentials(),
base::Bind(&ManifestManager::OnManifestFetchComplete,
base::Unretained(this),
render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->GetDocument().Url()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Failure to disallow PWA installation from CSP sandboxed pages in AppManifest in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to access privileged APIs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
|
Medium
| 172,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
scoped_ptr<CloudPolicyStore> store,
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager,
const base::FilePath& component_policy_cache_path,
bool wait_for_policy_fetch,
base::TimeDelta initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& file_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& io_task_runner)
: CloudPolicyManager(
PolicyNamespaceKey(dm_protocol::kChromeUserPolicyType, std::string()),
store.get(),
task_runner,
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner),
store_(store.Pass()),
external_data_manager_(external_data_manager.Pass()),
component_policy_cache_path_(component_policy_cache_path),
wait_for_policy_fetch_(wait_for_policy_fetch),
policy_fetch_timeout_(false, false) {
time_init_started_ = base::Time::Now();
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_) {
policy_fetch_timeout_.Start(
FROM_HERE,
initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging the use of tree order, rather than transitive dependency order, for layout.
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries;
p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries;
pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k;
pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul )
goto mul;
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn )
goto modn;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
*p_sign_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
* and set r = xR mod n
*/
*p_key_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul;
mul:
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn;
modn:
#endif
/*
* Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop
* (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t)
*/
ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr );
#endif
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig );
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
|
High
| 169,506
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: VP9PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(const scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>& pic) {
VaapiVP9Picture* vaapi_pic = pic->AsVaapiVP9Picture();
CHECK(vaapi_pic);
return vaapi_pic->dec_surface();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,814
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quantization)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quantization == -1) {
quantization = 80;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quantization, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageWebpCtx function in gd_webp.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) through 2.2.3, as used in PHP through 7.0.11, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted imagewebp and imagedestroy calls.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'PHP-5.6' into PHP-7.0
|
Low
| 169,940
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The scm_check_creds function in net/core/scm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not properly enforce capability requirements for controlling the PID value associated with a UNIX domain socket, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions by leveraging the time interval during which a user namespace has been created but a PID namespace has not been created.
Commit Message: scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Medium
| 166,093
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawPrimitive(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickStatusType
status;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-primitive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" affine: %g %g %g %g %g %g",draw_info->affine.sx,
draw_info->affine.rx,draw_info->affine.ry,draw_info->affine.sy,
draw_info->affine.tx,draw_info->affine.ty);
}
if ((IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((IsPixelInfoGray(&draw_info->fill) == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPixelInfoGray(&draw_info->stroke) == MagickFalse)))
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
x=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.x-0.5);
y=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.y-0.5);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
switch (primitive_info->primitive)
{
case AlphaPrimitive:
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel,exception);
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
register Quantum
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
(void) SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel,
target;
(void) GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(image_view,x,y,&target,
exception);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,q,&pixel);
if (IsFuzzyEquivalencePixelInfo(&pixel,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
ChannelType
channel_mask;
PixelInfo
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixelInfo(image,TileVirtualPixelMethod,x,y,
&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(double) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(double) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(double) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,AlphaChannel);
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,draw_info,&target,x,y,
primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ColorPrimitive:
{
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
register Quantum
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
(void) SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel,
target;
(void) GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(image_view,x,y,&target,
exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,q,&pixel);
if (IsFuzzyEquivalencePixelInfo(&pixel,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
PixelInfo
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixelInfo(image,TileVirtualPixelMethod,x,y,
&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(double) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(double) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(double) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,draw_info,&target,x,y,
primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue,exception);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel;
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ImagePrimitive:
{
AffineMatrix
affine;
char
composite_geometry[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*composite_image;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
ssize_t
x1,
y1;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=AcquireImageInfo();
if (LocaleNCompare(primitive_info->text,"data:",5) == 0)
composite_image=ReadInlineImage(clone_info,primitive_info->text,
exception);
else
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename,primitive_info->text,
MagickPathExtent);
composite_image=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(composite_image,(MagickProgressMonitor)
NULL,(void *) NULL);
x1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.x-0.5);
y1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.y-0.5);
if (((x1 != 0L) && (x1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->columns)) ||
((y1 != 0L) && (y1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->rows)))
{
/*
Resize image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%gx%g!",primitive_info[1].point.x,primitive_info[1].point.y);
composite_image->filter=image->filter;
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,
composite_geometry,exception);
}
if (composite_image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(composite_image,OpaqueAlphaChannel,
exception);
if (draw_info->alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
(void) SetImageAlpha(composite_image,draw_info->alpha,exception);
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
image->gravity=draw_info->gravity;
geometry.x=x;
geometry.y=y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) composite_image->columns,(double)
composite_image->rows,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,composite_geometry,&geometry,exception);
affine=draw_info->affine;
affine.tx=(double) geometry.x;
affine.ty=(double) geometry.y;
composite_image->interpolate=image->interpolate;
if (draw_info->compose == OverCompositeOp)
(void) DrawAffineImage(image,composite_image,&affine,exception);
else
(void) CompositeImage(image,composite_image,draw_info->compose,
MagickTrue,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
break;
}
case PointPrimitive:
{
PixelInfo
fill_color;
register Quantum
*q;
if ((y < 0) || (y >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
break;
if ((x < 0) || (x >= (ssize_t) image->columns))
break;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&fill_color,exception);
CompositePixelOver(image,&fill_color,(double) fill_color.alpha,q,
(double) GetPixelAlpha(image,q),q);
(void) SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case TextPrimitive:
{
char
geometry[MagickPathExtent];
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->text,primitive_info->text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+f%+f",
primitive_info->point.x,primitive_info->point.y);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->geometry,geometry);
status&=AnnotateImage(image,clone_info,exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
break;
}
default:
{
double
mid,
scale;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (IsEventLogging() != MagickFalse)
LogPrimitiveInfo(primitive_info);
scale=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine);
if ((draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL) &&
(draw_info->dash_pattern[0] != 0.0) &&
((scale*draw_info->stroke_width) >= MagickEpsilon) &&
(draw_info->stroke.alpha != (Quantum) TransparentAlpha))
{
/*
Draw dash polygon.
*/
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info,
exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
(void) DrawDashPolygon(draw_info,primitive_info,image,exception);
break;
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
if ((mid > 1.0) &&
((draw_info->stroke.alpha != (Quantum) TransparentAlpha) ||
(draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)))
{
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
/*
Draw strokes while respecting line cap/join attributes.
*/
for (i=0; primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; i++) ;
closed_path=
(primitive_info[i-1].point.x == primitive_info[0].point.x) &&
(primitive_info[i-1].point.y == primitive_info[0].point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
if ((((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) ||
(closed_path != MagickFalse)) &&
(draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin)) ||
(primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive))
{
(void) DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info,
exception);
break;
}
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info,
exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
status&=DrawStrokePolygon(image,draw_info,primitive_info,exception);
break;
}
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info,exception);
break;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," end draw-primitive");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DrawImage function in MagickCore/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 and 7.x before 7.0.1-2 makes an incorrect function call in attempting to locate the next token, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
|
Low
| 167,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MakeCacheAndGroup(const GURL& manifest_url,
int64_t group_id,
int64_t cache_id,
bool add_to_database) {
AppCacheEntry default_entry(AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT,
cache_id + kDefaultEntryIdOffset,
kDefaultEntrySize);
group_ = new AppCacheGroup(storage(), manifest_url, group_id);
cache_ = new AppCache(storage(), cache_id);
cache_->AddEntry(kDefaultEntryUrl, default_entry);
cache_->set_complete(true);
group_->AddCache(cache_.get());
url::Origin manifest_origin(url::Origin::Create(manifest_url));
if (add_to_database) {
AppCacheDatabase::GroupRecord group_record;
group_record.group_id = group_id;
group_record.manifest_url = manifest_url;
group_record.origin = manifest_origin;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertGroup(&group_record));
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord cache_record;
cache_record.cache_id = cache_id;
cache_record.group_id = group_id;
cache_record.online_wildcard = false;
cache_record.update_time = kZeroTime;
cache_record.cache_size = kDefaultEntrySize;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertCache(&cache_record));
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record;
entry_record.cache_id = cache_id;
entry_record.url = kDefaultEntryUrl;
entry_record.flags = default_entry.types();
entry_record.response_id = default_entry.response_id();
entry_record.response_size = default_entry.response_size();
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertEntry(&entry_record));
storage()->usage_map_[manifest_origin] = default_entry.response_size();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (page_data_map_.find(printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX) !=
page_data_map_.end()) {
page_data_map_size--;
}
return page_data_map_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MimeHandlerViewGuestCreatedCallback(
int element_instance_id,
int embedder_render_process_id,
int embedder_render_frame_id,
int32_t plugin_frame_routing_id,
const gfx::Size& element_size,
mime_handler::BeforeUnloadControlPtrInfo before_unload_control,
bool is_full_page_plugin,
WebContents* web_contents) {
auto* guest_view = MimeHandlerViewGuest::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!guest_view)
return;
guest_view->SetBeforeUnloadController(std::move(before_unload_control));
int guest_instance_id = guest_view->guest_instance_id();
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(embedder_render_process_id,
embedder_render_frame_id);
if (!rfh)
return;
guest_view->SetEmbedderFrame(embedder_render_process_id,
embedder_render_frame_id);
base::DictionaryValue attach_params;
attach_params.SetInteger(guest_view::kElementWidth, element_size.width());
attach_params.SetInteger(guest_view::kElementHeight, element_size.height());
auto* manager = GuestViewManager::FromBrowserContext(browser_context_);
if (!manager) {
guest_view::bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
this,
guest_view::bad_message::GVMF_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE_BEFORE_GVM_CREATION);
guest_view->Destroy(true);
return;
}
manager->AttachGuest(embedder_render_process_id, element_instance_id,
guest_instance_id, attach_params);
if (!content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame()) {
rfh->Send(new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_CreateMimeHandlerViewGuestACK(
element_instance_id));
return;
}
auto* plugin_rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(embedder_render_process_id,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
if (!plugin_rfh) {
plugin_rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromPlaceholderId(embedder_render_process_id,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
}
if (!plugin_rfh) {
guest_view->GetEmbedderFrame()->Send(
new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_RetryCreatingMimeHandlerViewGuest(
element_instance_id));
guest_view->Destroy(true);
return;
}
if (guest_view->web_contents()->CanAttachToOuterContentsFrame(plugin_rfh)) {
guest_view->AttachToOuterWebContentsFrame(plugin_rfh, element_instance_id,
is_full_page_plugin);
} else {
frame_navigation_helpers_[element_instance_id] =
std::make_unique<FrameNavigationHelper>(
plugin_rfh, guest_view->guest_instance_id(), element_instance_id,
is_full_page_plugin, this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,045
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes ( const MOOV_Manager & moovMgr )
{
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo udtaInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef udtaRef = moovMgr.GetBox ( "moov/udta", &udtaInfo );
if ( udtaRef == 0 ) return false;
for ( XMP_Uns32 i = 0; i < udtaInfo.childCount; ++i ) {
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo currInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef currRef = moovMgr.GetNthChild ( udtaRef, i, &currInfo );
if ( currRef == 0 ) break; // Sanity check, should not happen.
if ( (currInfo.boxType >> 24) != 0xA9 ) continue;
if ( currInfo.contentSize < 2+2+1 ) continue; // Want enough for a non-empty value.
InfoMapPos newInfo = this->parsedBoxes.insert ( this->parsedBoxes.end(),
InfoMap::value_type ( currInfo.boxType, ParsedBoxInfo ( currInfo.boxType ) ) );
std::vector<ValueInfo> * newValues = &newInfo->second.values;
XMP_Uns8 * boxPtr = (XMP_Uns8*) currInfo.content;
XMP_Uns8 * boxEnd = boxPtr + currInfo.contentSize;
XMP_Uns16 miniLen, macLang;
for ( ; boxPtr < boxEnd-4; boxPtr += miniLen ) {
miniLen = 4 + GetUns16BE ( boxPtr ); // ! Include header in local miniLen.
macLang = GetUns16BE ( boxPtr+2);
if ( (miniLen <= 4) || (miniLen > (boxEnd - boxPtr)) ) continue; // Ignore bad or empty values.
XMP_StringPtr valuePtr = (char*)(boxPtr+4);
size_t valueLen = miniLen - 4;
newValues->push_back ( ValueInfo() );
ValueInfo * newValue = &newValues->back();
newValue->macLang = macLang;
if ( IsMacLangKnown ( macLang ) ) newValue->xmpLang = GetXMPLang ( macLang );
newValue->macValue.assign ( valuePtr, valueLen );
}
}
return (! this->parsedBoxes.empty());
} // TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi before 2.4.4. The TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes function in XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/QuickTime_Support.cpp allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via crafted XMP data in a .qt file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
page_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
volatile int
first_mng_object,
object_id,
term_chunk_found,
skip_to_iend;
volatile ssize_t
image_count=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MngBox
default_fb,
fb,
previous_fb;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
PixelPacket
mng_background_color;
#endif
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count;
ssize_t
loop_level;
volatile short
skipping_loop;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
unsigned int
mandatory_back=0;
#endif
volatile unsigned int
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
mng_background_object=0,
#endif
mng_type=0; /* 0: PNG or JNG; 1: MNG; 2: MNG-LC; 3: MNG-VLC */
size_t
default_frame_timeout,
frame_timeout,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
image_height,
image_width,
#endif
length;
/* These delays are all measured in image ticks_per_second,
* not in MNG ticks_per_second
*/
volatile size_t
default_frame_delay,
final_delay,
final_image_delay,
frame_delay,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers,
#endif
mng_iterations=1,
simplicity=0,
subframe_height=0,
subframe_width=0;
previous_fb.top=0;
previous_fb.bottom=0;
previous_fb.left=0;
previous_fb.right=0;
default_fb.top=0;
default_fb.bottom=0;
default_fb.left=0;
default_fb.right=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneMNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
/* Verify MNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (memcmp(magic_number,"\212MNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Initialize some nonzero members of the MngInfo structure. */
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
{
mng_info->object_clip[i].right=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
mng_info->object_clip[i].bottom=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
}
mng_info->exists[0]=MagickTrue;
}
skipping_loop=(-1);
first_mng_object=MagickTrue;
mng_type=0;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers=MagickFalse; /* should be False when converting or mogrifying */
#endif
default_frame_delay=0;
default_frame_timeout=0;
frame_delay=0;
final_delay=1;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=1UL*image->ticks_per_second;
object_id=0;
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
mng_info->framing_mode=1;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mandatory_back=MagickFalse;
#endif
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mng_background_color=image->background_color;
#endif
default_fb=mng_info->frame;
previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
do
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
unsigned char
*chunk;
/*
Read a new chunk.
*/
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading MNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
#if !defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->jhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"JNGCompressNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->jhdr_warning++;
}
#endif
if (memcmp(type,mng_DHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->dhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DeltaPNGNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->dhdr_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MEND,4) == 0)
break;
if (skip_to_iend)
{
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4) == 0)
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skip to IEND.");
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length != 28)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
mng_info->mng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
mng_info->mng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG width: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG height: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
p+=8;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second == 0)
default_frame_delay=0;
else
default_frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second/
mng_info->ticks_per_second;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
simplicity=0;
/* Skip nominal layer count, frame count, and play time */
p+=16;
simplicity=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_type=1; /* Full MNG */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 11) == 11))
mng_type=2; /* LC */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 9) == 9))
mng_type=3; /* VLC */
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (mng_type != 3)
insert_layers=MagickTrue;
#endif
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
mng_info->image=image;
}
if ((mng_info->mng_width > 65535L) ||
(mng_info->mng_height > 65535L))
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g+0+0",(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double)
mng_info->mng_height);
mng_info->frame.left=0;
mng_info->frame.right=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width;
mng_info->frame.top=0;
mng_info->frame.bottom=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height;
mng_info->clip=default_fb=previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
mng_info->object_clip[i]=mng_info->frame;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_TERM,4) == 0)
{
int
repeat=0;
if (length != 0)
repeat=p[0];
if (repeat == 3 && length > 8)
{
final_delay=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[2]);
mng_iterations=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[6]);
if (mng_iterations == PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
mng_iterations=0;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickTrue;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" repeat=%d, final_delay=%.20g, iterations=%.20g",
repeat,(double) final_delay, (double) image->iterations);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_DEFI,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DEFI chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (length > 1)
{
object_id=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (mng_type == 2 && object_id != 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Nonzero object_id in MNG-LC datastream",
"`%s'", image->filename);
if (object_id > MNG_MAX_OBJECTS)
{
/*
Instead of using a warning we should allocate a larger
MngInfo structure and continue.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(), CoderError,
"object id too large","`%s'",image->filename);
object_id=MNG_MAX_OBJECTS;
}
if (mng_info->exists[object_id])
if (mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"DEFI cannot redefine a frozen MNG object","`%s'",
image->filename);
continue;
}
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (length > 2)
mng_info->invisible[object_id]=p[2];
/*
Extract object offset info.
*/
if (length > 11)
{
mng_info->x_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[4] << 24) |
(p[5] << 16) | (p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
mng_info->y_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[8] << 24) |
(p[9] << 16) | (p[10] << 8) | p[11]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" x_off[%d]: %.20g, y_off[%d]: %.20g",
object_id,(double) mng_info->x_off[object_id],
object_id,(double) mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
}
}
/*
Extract object clipping info.
*/
if (length > 27)
mng_info->object_clip[object_id]=
mng_read_box(mng_info->frame,0, &p[12]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickFalse;
if (length > 5)
{
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickTrue;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BACK,4) == 0)
{
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length > 6)
mandatory_back=p[6];
else
mandatory_back=0;
if (mandatory_back && length > 5)
{
mng_background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (length > 8)
mng_background_object=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
#endif
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PLTE,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global PLTE. */
if (length && (length < 769))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte == (png_colorp) NULL)
mng_info->global_plte=(png_colorp) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,
sizeof(*mng_info->global_plte));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length/3); i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=p[3*i];
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=p[3*i+1];
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=p[3*i+2];
}
mng_info->global_plte_length=(unsigned int) (length/3);
}
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=i;
}
if (length != 0)
mng_info->global_plte_length=256;
#endif
else
mng_info->global_plte_length=0;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_tRNS,4) == 0)
{
/* read global tRNS */
if (length > 0 && length < 257)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=p[i];
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=255;
#endif
mng_info->global_trns_length=(unsigned int) length;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
{
ssize_t
igamma;
igamma=mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_gamma=((float) igamma)*0.00001;
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global cHRM */
if (length == 32)
{
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[12]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[16]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[20]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[24]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[28]);
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
/*
Read global sRGB.
*/
if (length != 0)
{
mng_info->global_srgb_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
/*
Read global iCCP.
*/
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_FRAM,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"FRAM chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if ((mng_info->framing_mode == 2) || (mng_info->framing_mode == 4))
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
frame_timeout=default_frame_timeout;
fb=default_fb;
if (length > 0)
if (p[0])
mng_info->framing_mode=p[0];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_mode=%d",mng_info->framing_mode);
if (length > 6)
{
/* Note the delay and frame clipping boundaries. */
p++; /* framing mode */
while (*p && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) length))
p++; /* frame name */
p++; /* frame name terminator */
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
int
change_delay,
change_timeout,
change_clipping;
change_delay=(*p++);
change_timeout=(*p++);
change_clipping=(*p++);
p++; /* change_sync */
if (change_delay && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_delay/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_delay=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_delay == 2)
default_frame_delay=frame_delay;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_delay=%.20g",(double) frame_delay);
}
if (change_timeout && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_timeout=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_timeout/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_timeout=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_timeout == 2)
default_frame_timeout=frame_timeout;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_timeout=%.20g",(double) frame_timeout);
}
if (change_clipping && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
{
fb=mng_read_box(previous_fb,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
p+=17;
previous_fb=fb;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Frame_clip: L=%.20g R=%.20g T=%.20g B=%.20g",
(double) fb.left,(double) fb.right,(double) fb.top,
(double) fb.bottom);
if (change_clipping == 2)
default_fb=fb;
}
}
}
mng_info->clip=fb;
mng_info->clip=mng_minimum_box(fb,mng_info->frame);
subframe_width=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.right
-mng_info->clip.left);
subframe_height=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.bottom
-mng_info->clip.top);
/*
Insert a background layer behind the frame if framing_mode is 4.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" subframe_width=%.20g, subframe_height=%.20g",(double)
subframe_width,(double) subframe_height);
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 4) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height))
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert backgd layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLIP,4) == 0)
{
unsigned int
first_object,
last_object;
/*
Read CLIP.
*/
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(int) first_object; i <= (int) last_object; i++)
{
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i])
{
MngBox
box;
box=mng_info->object_clip[i];
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
mng_info->object_clip[i]=
mng_read_box(box,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SAVE,4) == 0)
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
if (mng_info->exists[i])
{
mng_info->frozen[i]=MagickTrue;
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (mng_info->ob[i] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[i]->frozen=MagickTrue;
#endif
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_DISC,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4) == 0))
{
/* Read DISC or SEEK. */
if ((length == 0) || !memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4))
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
else
{
register ssize_t
j;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=2)
{
i=p[j-1] << 8 | p[j];
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MOVE,4) == 0)
{
size_t
first_object,
last_object;
/* read MOVE */
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(ssize_t) first_object; i <= (ssize_t) last_object; i++)
{
if ((i < 0) || (i >= MNG_MAX_OBJECTS))
continue;
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i] &&
(p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-8))
{
MngPair
new_pair;
MngPair
old_pair;
old_pair.a=mng_info->x_off[i];
old_pair.b=mng_info->y_off[i];
new_pair=mng_read_pair(old_pair,(int) p[0],&p[1]);
mng_info->x_off[i]=new_pair.a;
mng_info->y_off[i]=new_pair.b;
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_LOOP,4) == 0)
{
ssize_t loop_iters=1;
if (length > 4)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=1; /* mark loop active */
/* Record starting point. */
loop_iters=mng_get_long(&chunk[1]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" LOOP level %.20g has %.20g iterations ",
(double) loop_level, (double) loop_iters);
if (loop_iters == 0)
skipping_loop=loop_level;
else
{
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level]=TellBlob(image);
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]=loop_iters;
}
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]=0;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_ENDL,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 0)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
if (skipping_loop > 0)
{
if (skipping_loop == loop_level)
{
/*
Found end of zero-iteration loop.
*/
skipping_loop=(-1);
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
}
}
else
{
if (mng_info->loop_active[loop_level] == 1)
{
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]--;
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ENDL: LOOP level %.20g has %.20g remaining iters ",
(double) loop_level,(double)
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]);
if (mng_info->loop_count[loop_level] != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level], SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
else
{
short
last_level;
/*
Finished loop.
*/
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
last_level=(-1);
for (i=0; i < loop_level; i++)
if (mng_info->loop_active[i] == 1)
last_level=(short) i;
loop_level=last_level;
}
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLON,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->clon_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CLON is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->clon_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0)
{
png_uint_16
magn_first,
magn_last,
magn_mb,
magn_ml,
magn_mr,
magn_mt,
magn_mx,
magn_my,
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
if (length > 1)
magn_first=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
else
magn_first=0;
if (length > 3)
magn_last=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
else
magn_last=magn_first;
#ifndef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (magn_first || magn_last)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"MAGN is not implemented yet for nonzero objects",
"`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#endif
if (length > 4)
magn_methx=p[4];
else
magn_methx=0;
if (length > 6)
magn_mx=(p[5] << 8) | p[6];
else
magn_mx=1;
if (magn_mx == 0)
magn_mx=1;
if (length > 8)
magn_my=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
else
magn_my=magn_mx;
if (magn_my == 0)
magn_my=1;
if (length > 10)
magn_ml=(p[9] << 8) | p[10];
else
magn_ml=magn_mx;
if (magn_ml == 0)
magn_ml=1;
if (length > 12)
magn_mr=(p[11] << 8) | p[12];
else
magn_mr=magn_mx;
if (magn_mr == 0)
magn_mr=1;
if (length > 14)
magn_mt=(p[13] << 8) | p[14];
else
magn_mt=magn_my;
if (magn_mt == 0)
magn_mt=1;
if (length > 16)
magn_mb=(p[15] << 8) | p[16];
else
magn_mb=magn_my;
if (magn_mb == 0)
magn_mb=1;
if (length > 17)
magn_methy=p[17];
else
magn_methy=magn_methx;
if (magn_methx > 5 || magn_methy > 5)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"Unknown MAGN method in MNG datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/* Magnify existing objects in the range magn_first to magn_last */
#endif
if (magn_first == 0 || magn_last == 0)
{
/* Save the magnification factors for object 0 */
mng_info->magn_mb=magn_mb;
mng_info->magn_ml=magn_ml;
mng_info->magn_mr=magn_mr;
mng_info->magn_mt=magn_mt;
mng_info->magn_mx=magn_mx;
mng_info->magn_my=magn_my;
mng_info->magn_methx=magn_methx;
mng_info->magn_methy=magn_methy;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PAST,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->past_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"PAST is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->past_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SHOW,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->show_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"SHOW is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->show_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sBIT,4) == 0)
{
if (length < 4)
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickFalse;
else
{
mng_info->global_sbit.gray=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.red=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.green=p[1];
mng_info->global_sbit.blue=p[2];
mng_info->global_sbit.alpha=p[3];
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type=p[8];
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickFalse;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYg,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->phyg_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"pHYg is not implemented.","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->phyg_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BASI,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->basi_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"BASI is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->basi_warning++;
#ifdef MNG_BASI_SUPPORTED
if (length > 11)
{
basi_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
basi_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
basi_color_type=p[8];
basi_compression_method=p[9];
basi_filter_type=p[10];
basi_interlace_method=p[11];
}
if (length > 13)
basi_red=(p[12] << 8) & p[13];
else
basi_red=0;
if (length > 15)
basi_green=(p[14] << 8) & p[15];
else
basi_green=0;
if (length > 17)
basi_blue=(p[16] << 8) & p[17];
else
basi_blue=0;
if (length > 19)
basi_alpha=(p[18] << 8) & p[19];
else
{
if (basi_sample_depth == 16)
basi_alpha=65535L;
else
basi_alpha=255;
}
if (length > 20)
basi_viewable=p[20];
else
basi_viewable=0;
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4)
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
&& memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4)
#endif
)
{
/* Not an IHDR or JHDR chunk */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
/* Process IHDR */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3]);
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
mng_info->viewable[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->invisible[object_id])
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping invisible object");
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length < 8)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image_width=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
image_height=(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
/*
Insert a transparent background layer behind the entire animation
if it is not full screen.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && mng_type && first_mng_object)
{
if ((mng_info->clip.left > 0) || (mng_info->clip.top > 0) ||
(image_width < mng_info->mng_width) ||
(mng_info->clip.right < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width) ||
(image_height < mng_info->mng_height) ||
(mng_info->clip.bottom < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
/* Make a background rectangle. */
image->delay=0;
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Inserted transparent background layer, W=%.20g, H=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
}
/*
Insert a background layer behind the upcoming image if
framing_mode is 3, and we haven't already inserted one.
*/
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 3) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height) && (simplicity == 0 ||
(simplicity & 0x08)))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert background layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif /* MNG_INSERT_LAYERS */
first_mng_object=MagickFalse;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->framing_mode == 1 || mng_info->framing_mode == 3)
{
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
}
else
image->delay=0;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[object_id];
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
/*
Seek back to the beginning of the IHDR or JHDR chunk's length field.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Seeking back to beginning of %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],
type[2],type[3]);
offset=SeekBlob(image,-((ssize_t) length+12),SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->mng_type=mng_type;
mng_info->object_id=object_id;
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4) == 0)
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
else
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#endif
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (mng_type)
{
MngBox
crop_box;
if (mng_info->magn_methx || mng_info->magn_methy)
{
png_uint_32
magnified_height,
magnified_width;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing MNG MAGN chunk");
if (mng_info->magn_methx == 1)
{
magnified_width=mng_info->magn_ml;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-2)*(mng_info->magn_mx));
}
else
{
magnified_width=(png_uint_32) image->columns;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_ml-1;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr-1;
if (image->columns > 3)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-3)*(mng_info->magn_mx-1));
}
if (mng_info->magn_methy == 1)
{
magnified_height=mng_info->magn_mt;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-2)*(mng_info->magn_my));
}
else
{
magnified_height=(png_uint_32) image->rows;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mt-1;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb-1;
if (image->rows > 3)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-3)*(mng_info->magn_my-1));
}
if (magnified_height > image->rows ||
magnified_width > image->columns)
{
Image
*large_image;
int
yy;
ssize_t
m,
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*n,
*q;
PixelPacket
*next,
*prev;
png_uint_16
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocate magnified image");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
large_image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
large_image->columns=magnified_width;
large_image->rows=magnified_height;
magn_methx=mng_info->magn_methx;
magn_methy=mng_info->magn_methy;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
#define QM unsigned short
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Scale pixels to unsigned shorts to prevent
overflow of intermediate values of interpolations
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#else
#define QM Quantum
#endif
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
else
{
large_image->background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
if (magn_methx == 4)
magn_methx=2;
if (magn_methx == 5)
magn_methx=3;
if (magn_methy == 4)
magn_methy=2;
if (magn_methy == 5)
magn_methy=3;
}
/* magnify the rows into the right side of the large image */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the rows to %.20g",(double) large_image->rows);
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
yy=0;
length=(size_t) image->columns;
next=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*next));
prev=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*prev));
if ((prev == (PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(next == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (y == 0)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy <= 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_my;
n=prev;
prev=next;
next=n;
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
{
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y+1,image->columns,1,
exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
}
for (i=0; i < m; i++, yy++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
assert(yy < (ssize_t) large_image->rows);
pixels=prev;
n=next;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(large_image,0,yy,large_image->columns,
1,exception);
q+=(large_image->columns-image->columns);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
/* To do: get color as function of indexes[x] */
/*
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
}
*/
if (magn_methy <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methy == 2 || magn_methy == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelRed(pixels)))));
SetPixelGreen(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelGreen(pixels)))));
SetPixelBlue(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelBlue(pixels)))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+m))
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)))));
}
if (magn_methy == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*pixels).opacity+0);
else
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*n).opacity+0);
}
}
else /* if (magn_methy == 3 || magn_methy == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methy == 5)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) (((ssize_t) (2*i*
(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))
+m))/((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
n++;
q++;
pixels++;
} /* x */
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(large_image,exception) == 0)
break;
} /* i */
} /* y */
prev=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(prev);
next=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(next);
length=image->columns;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Delete original image");
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
image=large_image;
mng_info->image=image;
/* magnify the columns */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the columns to %.20g",(double) image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
pixels=q+(image->columns-length);
n=pixels+1;
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns-length);
x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
if (x == (ssize_t) (image->columns-length))
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_ml;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx <= 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mx;
for (i=0; i < m; i++)
{
if (magn_methx <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methx == 2 || magn_methx == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelRed(pixels)));
SetPixelGreen(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelGreen(pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelBlue(pixels)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
if (magn_methx == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+0);
}
else
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(n)+0);
}
}
}
else /* if (magn_methx == 3 || magn_methx == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methx == 5)
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*( GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
q++;
}
n++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Rescale pixels to Quantum
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished MAGN processing");
}
}
/*
Crop_box is with respect to the upper left corner of the MNG.
*/
crop_box.left=mng_info->image_box.left+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.right=mng_info->image_box.right+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.top=mng_info->image_box.top+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box.bottom=mng_info->image_box.bottom+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->clip);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->frame);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->object_clip[object_id]);
if ((crop_box.left != (mng_info->image_box.left
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.right != (mng_info->image_box.right
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.top != (mng_info->image_box.top
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.bottom != (mng_info->image_box.bottom
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Crop the PNG image");
if ((crop_box.left < crop_box.right) &&
(crop_box.top < crop_box.bottom))
{
Image
*im;
RectangleInfo
crop_info;
/*
Crop_info is with respect to the upper left corner of
the image.
*/
crop_info.x=(crop_box.left-mng_info->x_off[object_id]);
crop_info.y=(crop_box.top-mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
crop_info.width=(size_t) (crop_box.right-crop_box.left);
crop_info.height=(size_t) (crop_box.bottom-crop_box.top);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
im=CropImage(image,&crop_info,exception);
if (im != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->columns=im->columns;
image->rows=im->rows;
im=DestroyImage(im);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=crop_box.left;
image->page.y=crop_box.top;
}
}
else
{
/*
No pixels in crop area. The MNG spec still requires
a layer, though, so make a single transparent pixel in
the top left corner.
*/
image->columns=1;
image->rows=1;
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
image->page.width=1;
image->page.height=1;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
}
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
image=mng_info->image;
#endif
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
/* PNG does not handle depths greater than 16 so reduce it even
* if lossy, and promote any depths > 8 to 16.
*/
if (image->depth > 16)
image->depth=16;
#endif
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
/* To do: fill low byte properly */
image->depth=16;
}
if (LosslessReduceDepthOK(image) != MagickFalse)
image->depth = 8;
#endif
GetImageException(image,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (mng_info->scenes_found >
(ssize_t) (image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))
break;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading image datastream.");
} while (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading all image datastreams.");
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && !mng_info->image_found && (mng_info->mng_width) &&
(mng_info->mng_height))
{
/*
Insert a background layer if nothing else was found.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No images found. Inserting a background layer.");
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocation failed, returning NULL.");
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
mng_info->image_found++;
}
#endif
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
if (mng_iterations == 1)
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
while (GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image_count++;
if (image_count > 10*mng_info->image_found)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," No beginning");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted, beginning of list not found",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=GetPreviousImageInList(image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Corrupt list");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted; next_image is NULL","`%s'",
image_info->filename);
}
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second && mng_info->image_found > 1 &&
GetNextImageInList(image) ==
(Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" First image null");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"image->next for first image is NULL but shouldn't be.",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
}
if (mng_info->image_found == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No visible images found.");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"No visible images in file","`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second)
final_delay=1UL*MagickMax(image->ticks_per_second,1L)*
final_delay/mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
/* Find final nonzero image delay */
final_image_delay=0;
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (image->delay)
final_image_delay=image->delay;
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (final_delay < final_image_delay)
final_delay=final_image_delay;
image->delay=final_delay;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->delay=%.20g, final_delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) final_delay);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g",(double) scene++,(double) image->delay);
}
}
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
#ifdef MNG_COALESCE_LAYERS
if (insert_layers)
{
Image
*next_image,
*next;
size_t
scene;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Coalesce Images");
scene=image->scene;
next_image=CoalesceImages(image,&image->exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=next_image;
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next_image)
{
next->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
next->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
next->page.x=0;
next->page.y=0;
next->scene=scene++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (next->delay == 0)
{
scene--;
next_image->previous=GetPreviousImageInList(next);
if (GetPreviousImageInList(next) == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
next->previous->next=next_image;
next=DestroyImage(next);
}
}
}
#endif
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
image->dispose=BackgroundDispose;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" After coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) image->dispose);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) scene++,
(double) image->delay,(double) image->dispose);
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage();");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 has a memory exhaustion vulnerability in ReadOneJNGImage in coderspng.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/549
|
Medium
| 167,980
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GestureProviderAura::OnTouchEvent(const TouchEvent& event) {
last_touch_event_flags_ = event.flags();
bool pointer_id_is_active = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pointer_state_.GetPointerCount(); ++i) {
if (event.touch_id() != pointer_state_.GetPointerId(i))
continue;
pointer_id_is_active = true;
break;
}
if (event.type() == ET_TOUCH_PRESSED && pointer_id_is_active) {
return false;
} else if (event.type() != ET_TOUCH_PRESSED && !pointer_id_is_active) {
return false;
}
pointer_state_.OnTouch(event);
bool result = filtered_gesture_provider_.OnTouchEvent(pointer_state_);
pointer_state_.CleanupRemovedTouchPoints(event);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType Get8BIMProperty(const Image *image,const char *key,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*attribute,
format[MagickPathExtent],
name[MagickPathExtent],
*resource;
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*info;
long
start,
stop;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
id,
sub_number;
/*
There are no newlines in path names, so it's safe as terminator.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(key,"8BIM:%ld,%ld:%1024[^\n]\n%1024[^\n]",&start,&stop,
name,format);
if ((count != 2) && (count != 3) && (count != 4))
return(MagickFalse);
if (count < 4)
(void) CopyMagickString(format,"SVG",MagickPathExtent);
if (count < 3)
*name='\0';
sub_number=1;
if (*name == '#')
sub_number=(ssize_t) StringToLong(&name[1]);
sub_number=MagickMax(sub_number,1L);
resource=(char *) NULL;
status=MagickFalse;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while ((length > 0) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) '8')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'B')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'I')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'M')
continue;
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&info,&length);
if (id < (ssize_t) start)
continue;
if (id > (ssize_t) stop)
continue;
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
if ((count != 0) && ((size_t) count <= length))
{
resource=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
resource=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*resource));
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
resource[i]=(char) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
resource[count]='\0';
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&info,&length);
if ((*name != '\0') && (*name != '#'))
if ((resource == (char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,resource) != 0))
{
/*
No name match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
if ((*name == '#') && (sub_number != 1))
{
/*
No numbered match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
sub_number--;
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
/*
We have the resource of interest.
*/
attribute=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
attribute=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*attribute));
if (attribute != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(attribute,(char *) info,(size_t) count);
attribute[count]='\0';
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
if ((id <= 1999) || (id >= 2999))
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *)
attribute,exception);
else
{
char
*path;
if (LocaleCompare(format,"svg") == 0)
path=TraceSVGClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count,
image->columns,image->rows);
else
path=TracePSClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count);
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *) path,
exception);
path=DestroyString(path);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Buffer overflow in the Get8BIMProperty function in MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-4 and 7.x before 7.0.2-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read, memory leak, and crash) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
Medium
| 166,999
|
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