instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j;
unsigned int total = 0;
*outl = 0;
if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
ctx->num += inl;
return;
}
if (ctx->num != 0) {
i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
in += i;
inl -= i;
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
ctx->num = 0;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total = j + 1;
}
while (inl >= ctx->length) {
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
in += ctx->length;
inl -= ctx->length;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total += j + 1;
}
if (inl != 0)
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
ctx->num = inl;
*outl = total;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function in crypto/evp/encode.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.1t and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via a large amount of binary data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_wbxml_attribute_list (proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint32 offset, guint32 str_tbl, guint8 level, guint8 *codepage_attr)
{
guint32 tvb_len = tvb_reported_length (tvb);
guint32 off = offset;
guint32 len;
guint str_len;
guint32 ent;
guint32 idx;
guint8 peek;
DebugLog(("parse_wbxml_attr (level = %u, offset = %u)\n", level, offset));
/* Parse attributes */
while (off < tvb_len) {
peek = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off);
DebugLog(("ATTR: (top of while) level = %3u, peek = 0x%02X, "
"off = %u, tvb_len = %u\n", level, peek, off, tvb_len));
if ((peek & 0x3F) < 5) switch (peek) { /* Global tokens
in state = ATTR */
case 0x00: /* SWITCH_PAGE */
*codepage_attr = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 2,
" | Attr | A -->%3d "
"| SWITCH_PAGE (Attr code page) |",
*codepage_attr);
off += 2;
break;
case 0x01: /* END */
/* BEWARE
* The Attribute END token means either ">" or "/>"
* and as a consequence both must be treated separately.
* This is done in the TAG state parser.
*/
off++;
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
case 0x02: /* ENTITY */
ent = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| ENTITY "
"| %s'&#%u;'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level), ent);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x03: /* STR_I */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| STR_I (Inline string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x04: /* LITERAL */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| LITERAL (Literal Attribute) "
"| %s<%s />",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, str_tbl+idx, str_len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x40: /* EXT_I_0 */
case 0x41: /* EXT_I_1 */
case 0x42: /* EXT_I_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_I_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(Inline string extension: \'%s\')",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
/* 0x43 impossible in ATTR state */
/* 0x44 impossible in ATTR state */
case 0x80: /* EXT_T_0 */
case 0x81: /* EXT_T_1 */
case 0x82: /* EXT_T_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_T_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(Extension Token, integer value: %u)",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
idx);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x83: /* STR_T */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| STR_T (Tableref string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, str_tbl+idx, str_len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
/* 0x84 impossible in ATTR state */
case 0xC0: /* EXT_0 */
case 0xC1: /* EXT_1 */
case 0xC2: /* EXT_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(Single-byte extension)",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level));
off++;
break;
case 0xC3: /* OPAQUE - WBXML 1.1 and newer */
if (tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, 0)) { /* WBXML 1.x (x > 0) */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1 + len + idx,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| OPAQUE (Opaque data) "
"| %s(%d bytes of opaque data)",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level), idx);
off += 1+len+idx;
} else { /* WBXML 1.0 - RESERVED_2 token (invalid) */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| RESERVED_2 (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML 1.0 parsing stops here.",
level, *codepage_attr);
/* Stop processing as it is impossible to parse now */
off = tvb_len;
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
break;
/* 0xC4 impossible in ATTR state */
default:
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| %-10s (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML parsing stops here.",
level, *codepage_attr,
val_to_str_ext (peek, &vals_wbxml1x_global_tokens_ext, "(unknown 0x%x)"));
/* Move to end of buffer */
off = tvb_len;
break;
} else { /* Known atribute token */
if (peek & 0x80) { /* attrValue */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| Known attrValue 0x%02X "
"| %sattrValue_0x%02X",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x7f, Indent (level),
peek);
off++;
} else { /* attrStart */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| Known attrStart 0x%02X "
"| %sattrStart_0x%02X",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x7f, Indent (level),
peek);
off++;
}
}
} /* End WHILE */
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u (end of function body)\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-wbxml.c in the WBXML dissector in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 mishandles offsets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and infinite loop) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
|
Medium
| 167,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetFirst() const
{
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[0];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
format,
magick[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*value;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumAny
pixel;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register unsigned char
*pixels,
*q;
size_t
extent,
imageListLength,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
QuantumAny
max_value;
/*
Write PNM file header.
*/
max_value=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
packet_size=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image_info->magick,MaxTextExtent);
switch (magick[1])
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
format='7';
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
format='F';
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
format='f';
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
format='6';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='3';
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"P%c\n",format);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Write comments to file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p);
if ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r'))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (format != '7')
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
/*
PAM header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"WIDTH %.20g\nHEIGHT %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_type=GetQuantumType(image,&image->exception);
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
packet_size=4;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"CMYK",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
packet_size=1;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"GRAYSCALE",MaxTextExtent);
if (IdentifyImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"BLACKANDWHITE",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
packet_size=3;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"RGB",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
packet_size++;
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"_ALPHA",MaxTextExtent);
}
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"DEPTH %.20g\nMAXVAL %.20g\n",(double) packet_size,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"TUPLTYPE %s\nENDHDR\n",
type);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
/*
Convert to PNM raster pixels.
*/
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0) ?
'0' : '1');
*q++=' ';
if ((q-pixels+1) >= (ssize_t) sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '2':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToChar(index));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToShort(index));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToLong(index));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+2) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '3':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(p)));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelBlue(p)));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+2) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
image->depth=1;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '5':
{
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,GrayQuantum);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 8)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 32)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '6':
{
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
/*
Convert image to a PAM.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,image->endian == LSBEndian ? "-1.0\n" :
"1.0\n");
image->depth=32;
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo((const ImageInfo *) NULL,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of a misplaced strncpy and an off-by-one error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1613
|
Medium
| 169,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on)
{
unsigned long debugctl;
/*
* Ensure irq/preemption can't change debugctl in between.
* Note also that both TIF_BLOCKSTEP and debugctl should
* be changed atomically wrt preemption.
* FIXME: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is simply
* wrong if task != current, SIGKILL can wakeup the stopped
* tracee and set/clear can play with the running task, this
* can confuse the next __switch_to_xtra().
*/
local_irq_disable();
debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
if (on) {
debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
} else {
debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
}
if (task == current)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
local_irq_enable();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::get_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_INOUT OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int height=0,width = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter:");
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
switch ((int)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition");
if (portDefn->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_IN) {
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sInPortDef.nPortIndex);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("m_sInPortDef: size = %u, min cnt = %u, actual cnt = %u",
(unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
memcpy(portDefn, &m_sInPortDef, sizeof(m_sInPortDef));
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable) {
portDefn->nBufferSize = sizeof(encoder_media_buffer_type);
}
if (mUseProxyColorFormat) {
portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat =
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque;
}
#endif
} else if (portDefn->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (m_state != OMX_StateExecuting) {
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("m_sOutPortDef: size = %u, min cnt = %u, actual cnt = %u",
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
memcpy(portDefn, &m_sOutPortDef, sizeof(m_sOutPortDef));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: GetParameter called on Bad Port Index");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit:
{
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *portParamType =
(OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoInit");
memcpy(portParamType, &m_sPortParam, sizeof(m_sPortParam));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat");
if (portFmt->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_IN) {
unsigned index = portFmt->nIndex;
int supportedFormats[] = {
[0] = QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m,
[1] = QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque,
[2] = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar,
};
if (index > (sizeof(supportedFormats)/sizeof(*supportedFormats) - 1))
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
else {
memcpy(portFmt, &m_sInPortFormat, sizeof(m_sInPortFormat));
portFmt->nIndex = index; //restore index set from client
portFmt->eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)supportedFormats[index];
}
} else if (portFmt->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
memcpy(portFmt, &m_sOutPortFormat, sizeof(m_sOutPortFormat));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: GetParameter called on Bad Port Index");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamBitrate, sizeof(m_sParamBitrate));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: GetParameter called on Bad Port Index");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamMPEG4, sizeof(m_sParamMPEG4));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamH263, sizeof(m_sParamH263));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamAVC, sizeof(m_sParamAVC));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamVP8, sizeof(m_sParamVP8));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamHEVC, sizeof(m_sParamHEVC));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported");
eRet = get_supported_profile_level(pParam);
if (eRet && eRet != OMX_ErrorNoMore)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid entry returned from get_supported_profile_level %u, %u",
(unsigned int)pParam->eProfile, (unsigned int)pParam->eLevel);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamProfileLevel, sizeof(m_sParamProfileLevel));
break;
}
/*Component should support this port definition*/
case OMX_IndexParamAudioInit:
{
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *audioPortParamType = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamAudioInit");
memcpy(audioPortParamType, &m_sPortParam_audio, sizeof(m_sPortParam_audio));
break;
}
/*Component should support this port definition*/
case OMX_IndexParamImageInit:
{
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *imagePortParamType = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamImageInit");
memcpy(imagePortParamType, &m_sPortParam_img, sizeof(m_sPortParam_img));
break;
}
/*Component should support this port definition*/
case OMX_IndexParamOtherInit:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamOtherInit %08x", paramIndex);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
comp_role->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
comp_role->nSize = sizeof(*comp_role);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Getparameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %d",paramIndex);
strlcpy((char*)comp_role->cRole,(const char*)m_cRole,OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
break;
}
/* Added for parameter test */
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt:
{
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmType = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
memcpy(priorityMgmType, &m_sPriorityMgmt, sizeof(m_sPriorityMgmt));
break;
}
/* Added for parameter test */
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier:
{
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==(OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_IN) {
memcpy(bufferSupplierType, &m_sInBufSupplier, sizeof(m_sInBufSupplier));
} else if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==(OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
memcpy(bufferSupplierType, &m_sOutBufSupplier, sizeof(m_sOutBufSupplier));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: GetParameter called on Bad Port Index");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
memcpy(session_qp, &m_sSessionQuantization, sizeof(m_sSessionQuantization));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *qp_range = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
memcpy(qp_range, &m_sSessionQPRange, sizeof(m_sSessionQPRange));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* errorresilience = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
errorresilience->bEnableHEC = m_sErrorCorrection.bEnableHEC;
errorresilience->bEnableResync = m_sErrorCorrection.bEnableResync;
errorresilience->nResynchMarkerSpacing = m_sErrorCorrection.nResynchMarkerSpacing;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE* intrarefresh = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh GET");
intrarefresh->eRefreshMode = m_sIntraRefresh.eRefreshMode;
intrarefresh->nCirMBs = m_sIntraRefresh.nCirMBs;
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn:
break;
case OMX_COMPONENT_CAPABILITY_TYPE_INDEX:
{
OMXComponentCapabilityFlagsType *pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMXComponentCapabilityFlagsType*>(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_COMPONENT_CAPABILITY_TYPE_INDEX");
pParam->iIsOMXComponentMultiThreaded = OMX_TRUE;
pParam->iOMXComponentSupportsExternalOutputBufferAlloc = OMX_FALSE;
pParam->iOMXComponentSupportsExternalInputBufferAlloc = OMX_TRUE;
pParam->iOMXComponentSupportsMovableInputBuffers = OMX_TRUE;
pParam->iOMXComponentUsesNALStartCodes = OMX_TRUE;
pParam->iOMXComponentSupportsPartialFrames = OMX_FALSE;
pParam->iOMXComponentCanHandleIncompleteFrames = OMX_FALSE;
pParam->iOMXComponentUsesFullAVCFrames = OMX_FALSE;
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Supporting capability index in encoder node");
break;
}
#if !defined(MAX_RES_720P) || defined(_MSM8974_)
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType");
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *pParam = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *)paramData;
if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
pParam->bEnabled =
(OMX_BOOL)(m_sExtraData & VEN_EXTRADATA_SLICEINFO);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Slice Info extradata %d", pParam->bEnabled);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: slice information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
} else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
pParam->bEnabled =
(OMX_BOOL)(m_sExtraData & VEN_EXTRADATA_MBINFO);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MB Info extradata %d", pParam->bEnabled);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: MB information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
#ifndef _MSM8974_
else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoLTRInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
pParam->bEnabled =
(OMX_BOOL)(m_sExtraData & VEN_EXTRADATA_LTRINFO);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("LTR Info extradata %d", pParam->bEnabled);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: LTR information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: unsupported extradata index (0x%x)",
pParam->nIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCountRangeSupported:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("get_parameter: QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCountRangeSupported");
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_RANGETYPE *pParam = (QOMX_EXTNINDEX_RANGETYPE *)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
OMX_U32 min = 0, max = 0, step_size = 0;
if (dev_get_capability_ltrcount(&min, &max, &step_size)) {
pParam->nMin = min;
pParam->nMax = max;
pParam->nStepSize = step_size;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: get_capability_ltrcount failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("LTR count range is valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoLTRCount");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*>(paramData);
memcpy(pParam, &m_sParamLTRCount, sizeof(m_sParamLTRCount));
break;
}
#endif
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoSyntaxHdr:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("QOMX_IndexParamVideoSyntaxHdr");
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*>(paramData);
if (pParam->pData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: Data buffer is NULL");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (get_syntaxhdr_enable == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: get_parameter: Get syntax header disabled");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_LOADED_START_PENDING);
if (dev_loaded_start()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("device start successful");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("device start failed");
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_LOADED_START_PENDING);
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (dev_get_seq_hdr(pParam->pData,
(unsigned)(pParam->nSize - sizeof(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE)),
(unsigned *)(void *)&pParam->nDataSize)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("get syntax header successful (hdrlen = %u)",
(unsigned int)pParam->nDataSize);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pParam->nDataSize; i++) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Header[%d] = %x", i, *((char *)pParam->pData + i));
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error returned from GetSyntaxHeader()");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_LOADED_STOP_PENDING);
if (dev_loaded_stop()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("device stop successful");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("device stop failed");
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_LOADED_STOP_PENDING);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* hierp = (QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure");
memcpy(hierp, &m_sHierLayers, sizeof(m_sHierLayers));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
OMX_U32 perflevel;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL*>(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel");
if (!dev_get_performance_level(&perflevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid entry returned from get_performance_level %d",
pParam->ePerfLevel);
} else {
pParam->ePerfLevel = (QOMX_VIDEO_PERF_LEVEL)perflevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
OMX_U32 enabled;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO*>(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo");
if (!dev_get_vui_timing_info(&enabled)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid entry returned from get_vui_Timing_info %d",
pParam->bEnable);
} else {
pParam->bEnable = (OMX_BOOL)enabled;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
OMX_U32 peakbitrate;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE*>(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate");
if (!dev_get_peak_bitrate(&peakbitrate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid entry returned from get_peak_bitrate %u",
(unsigned int)pParam->nPeakBitrate);
} else {
pParam->nPeakBitrate = peakbitrate;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP* initqp =
reinterpret_cast<QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP *>(paramData);
memcpy(initqp, &m_sParamInitqp, sizeof(m_sParamInitqp));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR: get_parameter: unknown param %08x", paramIndex);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
|
Medium
| 173,794
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: videobuf_vm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct videobuf_mapping *map = vma->vm_private_data;
dprintk(2,"vm_open %p [count=%d,vma=%08lx-%08lx]\n",map,
map->count,vma->vm_start,vma->vm_end);
map->count++;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/video/videobuf-vmalloc.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.24 does not initialize videobuf_mapping data structures, which allows local users to trigger an incorrect count value and videobuf leak via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-5321.
Commit Message: V4L/DVB (6751): V4L: Memory leak! Fix count in videobuf-vmalloc mmap
This is pretty serious bug. map->count is never initialized after the
call to kmalloc making the count start at some random trash value. The
end result is leaking videobufs.
Also, fix up the debug statements to print unsigned values.
Pushed to http://ifup.org/hg/v4l-dvb too
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
|
Low
| 168,919
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
const GURL& resource_url,
const GURL& frame_url,
const ExtensionSet* loaded_extensions) {
CHECK(resource_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
const Extension* extension =
loaded_extensions->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(resource_url));
if (!extension) {
return true;
}
std::string resource_root_relative_path =
resource_url.path().empty() ? "" : resource_url.path().substr(1);
if (extension->is_hosted_app() &&
!extension->icons().ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " from "
<< "hosted app.";
return false;
}
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableExtensionsResourceWhitelist) &&
!frame_url.is_empty() &&
!frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!extension->IsResourceWebAccessible(resource_url.path())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " which "
<< "is not a web accessible resource.";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateClipPathClip(
bool spv1_compositing_specific_pass) {
bool is_spv1_composited =
object_.HasLayer() &&
ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object_).Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping();
if (is_spv1_composited != spv1_compositing_specific_pass)
return;
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (!NeedsClipPathClip(object_)) {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearClipPathClip());
} else {
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
state.clip_rect =
FloatRoundedRect(FloatRect(*fragment_data_.ClipPathBoundingBox()));
state.clip_path = fragment_data_.ClipPathPath();
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateClipPathClip(context_.current.clip,
std::move(state)));
}
}
if (properties_->ClipPathClip() && !spv1_compositing_specific_pass) {
context_.current.clip = context_.absolute_position.clip =
context_.fixed_position.clip = properties_->ClipPathClip();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int kill_something_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, pid_t pid)
{
int ret;
if (pid > 0) {
rcu_read_lock();
ret = kill_pid_info(sig, info, find_vpid(pid));
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (pid != -1) {
ret = __kill_pgrp_info(sig, info,
pid ? find_vpid(-pid) : task_pgrp(current));
} else {
int retval = 0, count = 0;
struct task_struct * p;
for_each_process(p) {
if (task_pid_vnr(p) > 1 &&
!same_thread_group(p, current)) {
int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++count;
if (err != -EPERM)
retval = err;
}
}
ret = count ? retval : -ESRCH;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The kill_something_info function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13, when an unspecified architecture and compiler is used, might allow local users to cause a denial of service via an INT_MIN argument.
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOL transport_accept_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = transport->TlsIn;
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS;
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (tls_accept(transport->TlsIn, transport->settings->CertificateFile, transport->settings->PrivateKeyFile) != TRUE)
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "client authentication failure\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return FALSE;
}
/* don't free credssp module yet, we need to copy the credentials from it first */
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta+2013071101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by disconnecting before authentication has finished.
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
Low
| 167,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __init acpi_initrd_override(void *data, size_t size)
{
int sig, no, table_nr = 0, total_offset = 0;
long offset = 0;
struct acpi_table_header *table;
char cpio_path[32] = "kernel/firmware/acpi/";
struct cpio_data file;
if (data == NULL || size == 0)
return;
for (no = 0; no < ACPI_OVERRIDE_TABLES; no++) {
file = find_cpio_data(cpio_path, data, size, &offset);
if (!file.data)
break;
data += offset;
size -= offset;
if (file.size < sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Table smaller than ACPI header [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
table = file.data;
for (sig = 0; table_sigs[sig]; sig++)
if (!memcmp(table->signature, table_sigs[sig], 4))
break;
if (!table_sigs[sig]) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Unknown signature [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (file.size != table->length) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: File length does not match table length [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (acpi_table_checksum(file.data, table->length)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Bad table checksum [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
pr_info("%4.4s ACPI table found in initrd [%s%s][0x%x]\n",
table->signature, cpio_path, file.name, table->length);
all_tables_size += table->length;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].data = file.data;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].size = file.size;
table_nr++;
}
if (table_nr == 0)
return;
acpi_tables_addr =
memblock_find_in_range(0, max_low_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT,
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!acpi_tables_addr) {
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
/*
* Only calling e820_add_reserve does not work and the
* tables are invalid (memory got used) later.
* memblock_reserve works as expected and the tables won't get modified.
* But it's not enough on X86 because ioremap will
* complain later (used by acpi_os_map_memory) that the pages
* that should get mapped are not marked "reserved".
* Both memblock_reserve and e820_add_region (via arch_reserve_mem_area)
* works fine.
*/
memblock_reserve(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
/*
* early_ioremap only can remap 256k one time. If we map all
* tables one time, we will hit the limit. Need to map chunks
* one by one during copying the same as that in relocate_initrd().
*/
for (no = 0; no < table_nr; no++) {
unsigned char *src_p = acpi_initrd_files[no].data;
phys_addr_t size = acpi_initrd_files[no].size;
phys_addr_t dest_addr = acpi_tables_addr + total_offset;
phys_addr_t slop, clen;
char *dest_p;
total_offset += size;
while (size) {
slop = dest_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
clen = size;
if (clen > MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop)
clen = MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop;
dest_p = early_ioremap(dest_addr & PAGE_MASK,
clen + slop);
memcpy(dest_p + slop, src_p, clen);
early_iounmap(dest_p, clen + slop);
src_p += clen;
dest_addr += clen;
size -= clen;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel, as used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.2 and Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2 and when booted with UEFI Secure Boot enabled, allows local users to bypass intended Secure Boot restrictions and execute untrusted code by appending ACPI tables to the initrd.
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
Medium
| 167,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS) // OS_WIN
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#elif defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
gfx::GLContextGLX* glx_context =
static_cast<gfx::GLContextGLX*>(stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext());
GLXContext glx_context_handle =
static_cast<GLXContext>(glx_context->GetHandle());
video_decoder->SetGlxState(glx_context->display(), glx_context_handle);
#endif // ARCH_CPU_ARMEL
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || defined(OS_WIN)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.92, does not properly render text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,702
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.1.1, as used in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image that is mishandled by the imagescale function.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
|
Medium
| 170,004
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
if (print_web_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
WebFrame* pdf_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, &prepare)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize print page settings";
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(job_settings, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int MSG_ReadBits( msg_t *msg, int bits ) {
int value;
int get;
qboolean sgn;
int i, nbits;
value = 0;
if ( bits < 0 ) {
bits = -bits;
sgn = qtrue;
} else {
sgn = qfalse;
}
if (msg->oob) {
if(bits==8)
{
value = msg->data[msg->readcount];
msg->readcount += 1;
msg->bit += 8;
}
else if(bits==16)
{
short temp;
CopyLittleShort(&temp, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
value = temp;
msg->readcount += 2;
msg->bit += 16;
}
else if(bits==32)
{
CopyLittleLong(&value, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
msg->readcount += 4;
msg->bit += 32;
}
else
Com_Error(ERR_DROP, "can't read %d bits", bits);
} else {
nbits = 0;
if (bits&7) {
nbits = bits&7;
for(i=0;i<nbits;i++) {
value |= (Huff_getBit(msg->data, &msg->bit)<<i);
}
bits = bits - nbits;
}
if (bits) {
for(i=0;i<bits;i+=8) {
Huff_offsetReceive (msgHuff.decompressor.tree, &get, msg->data, &msg->bit);
value |= (get<<(i+nbits));
}
}
msg->readcount = (msg->bit>>3)+1;
}
if ( sgn && bits > 0 && bits < 32 ) {
if ( value & ( 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) ) {
value |= -1 ^ ( ( 1 << bits ) - 1 );
}
}
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ioquake3 before 2017-08-02 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
|
Low
| 167,998
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PageInfo::RecordPasswordReuseEvent() {
if (!password_protection_service_) {
return;
}
if (safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE) {
safe_browsing::LogWarningAction(
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::SHOWN,
safe_browsing::LoginReputationClientRequest::PasswordReuseEvent::
SIGN_IN_PASSWORD,
password_protection_service_->GetSyncAccountType());
} else {
safe_browsing::LogWarningAction(
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::SHOWN,
safe_browsing::LoginReputationClientRequest::PasswordReuseEvent::
ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD,
password_protection_service_->GetSyncAccountType());
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
|
Low
| 172,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jpc_pi_nextcprl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno < pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
pirlvl = pi->picomp->pirlvls;
pi->xstep = pi->picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
pi->ystep = pi->picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
for (rlvlno = 1, pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[1];
rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
pi->xstep = JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, pi->picomp->hsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
pi->ystep = JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, pi->picomp->vsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcheightexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend;
pi->y += pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend;
pi->x += pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls && pi->rlvlno <
pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno, ++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind *
pi->pirlvl->numhprcs +
prchind;
assert(pi->prcno <
pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability was found in the jpc_pi_nextpcrl() function of jasper before 2.0.6 when processing crafted input.
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
|
Medium
| 169,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidReceiveResourceResponse(
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceResponse& response,
Resource* cached_resource) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
bool is_not_modified = response.HttpStatusCode() == 304;
bool resource_is_empty = true;
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Response> resource_response =
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(response, cached_resource,
&resource_is_empty);
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type =
cached_resource ? InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceType(*cached_resource)
: InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType saved_type =
resources_data_->GetResourceType(request_id);
if (saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kScriptResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kFetchResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kEventSourceResource) {
type = saved_type;
}
if (type == InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource && loader &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
if (cached_resource)
resources_data_->AddResource(request_id, cached_resource);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResponseReceived(request_id, frame_id, response);
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
if (response.GetSecurityStyle() != ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnknown &&
response.GetSecurityStyle() !=
ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnauthenticated) {
const ResourceResponse::SecurityDetails* response_security_details =
response.GetSecurityDetails();
resources_data_->SetCertificate(request_id,
response_security_details->certificate);
}
if (resource_response && !resource_is_empty) {
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->responseReceived(
request_id, loader_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type),
std::move(resource_response), std::move(maybe_frame_id));
}
if (is_not_modified && cached_resource && cached_resource->EncodedSize())
DidReceiveData(identifier, loader, 0, cached_resource->EncodedSize());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
Medium
| 172,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnCheckForCancel(const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
int preview_request_id,
bool* cancel) {
PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(preview_ui_addr,
preview_request_id,
cancel);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,826
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _gd2GetHeader (gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy,
int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy,
t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading gd2 header info\n"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC (in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
};
id[i] = ch;
};
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Got file code: %s\n", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp (id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Not a valid gd2 file\n"));
goto fail1;
};
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord (vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Version: %d\n", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad version: %d\n", *vers));
goto fail1;
};
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord (sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get x-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord (sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get y-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG (printf ("Image is %dx%d\n", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord (cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("ChunkSize: %d\n", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad chunk size: %d\n", *cs));
goto fail1;
};
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord (fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Format: %d\n", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad data format: %d\n", *fmt));
goto fail1;
};
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord (ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks Wide\n", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord (ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks vertically\n", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed (*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading %d chunk index entries\n", nc));
sidx = sizeof (t_chunk_info) * nc;
cidx = gdCalloc (sidx, 1);
if (!cidx) {
goto fail1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
};
*chunkIdx = cidx;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("gd2 header complete\n"));
return 1;
fail2:
gdFree(cidx);
fail1:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in GD Graphics Library 2.1.1 (aka libgd or libgd2) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or potentially execute arbitrary code via crafted compressed gd2 data, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
|
Low
| 167,382
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: magiccheck(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t l = m->value.q;
uint64_t v;
float fl, fv;
double dl, dv;
int matched;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = p->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = p->h;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
v = p->l;
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
v = p->q;
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
fl = m->value.f;
fv = p->f;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = fv != fl;
break;
case '=':
matched = fv == fl;
break;
case '>':
matched = fv > fl;
break;
case '<':
matched = fv < fl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with float: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
dl = m->value.d;
dv = p->d;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = dv != dl;
break;
case '=':
matched = dv == dl;
break;
case '>':
matched = dv > dl;
break;
case '<':
matched = dv < dl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with double: invalid relation `%c'", m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
l = 0;
v = 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp16(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_SEARCH: { /* search ms->search.s for the string m->value.s */
size_t slen;
size_t idx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
slen = MIN(m->vallen, sizeof(m->value.s));
l = 0;
v = 0;
for (idx = 0; m->str_range == 0 || idx < m->str_range; idx++) {
if (slen + idx > ms->search.s_len)
break;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, ms->search.s + idx, slen, m->str_flags);
if (v == 0) { /* found match */
ms->search.offset += idx;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case FILE_REGEX: {
int rc;
file_regex_t rx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
l = 0;
rc = file_regcomp(&rx, m->value.s,
REG_EXTENDED|REG_NEWLINE|
((m->str_flags & STRING_IGNORE_CASE) ? REG_ICASE : 0));
if (rc) {
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
} else {
regmatch_t pmatch[1];
#ifndef REG_STARTEND
#define REG_STARTEND 0
size_t l = ms->search.s_len - 1;
char c = ms->search.s[l];
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[l] = '\0';
#else
pmatch[0].rm_so = 0;
pmatch[0].rm_eo = ms->search.s_len;
#endif
rc = file_regexec(&rx, (const char *)ms->search.s,
1, pmatch, REG_STARTEND);
#if REG_STARTEND == 0
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[l] = c;
#endif
switch (rc) {
case 0:
ms->search.s += (int)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.offset += (size_t)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.rm_len =
(size_t)(pmatch[0].rm_eo - pmatch[0].rm_so);
v = 0;
break;
case REG_NOMATCH:
v = 1;
break;
default:
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
}
file_regfree(&rx);
if (v == (uint64_t)-1)
return -1;
break;
}
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in magiccheck()", m->type);
return -1;
}
v = file_signextend(ms, m, v);
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u == *any* = 1\n", (unsigned long long)v);
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = v != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u != %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '=':
matched = v == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u == %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '>':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v > l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v > (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '<':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v < l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v < (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '&':
matched = (v & l) == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) == %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
case '^':
matched = (v & l) != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) != %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: file before 5.19 does not properly restrict the amount of data read during a regex search, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted file that triggers backtracking during processing of an awk rule. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2013-7345.
Commit Message: If requested, limit search length.
|
Low
| 169,919
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* plugin, const Platform::TouchEvent& event)
{
if (!event.neverHadMultiTouch())
return false;
if (event.isDoubleTap() || event.isTouchHold() || event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel) {
NPTouchEvent npTouchEvent;
if (event.isDoubleTap())
npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_DOUBLETAP;
else if (event.isTouchHold())
npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_TOUCHHOLD;
else if (event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel)
npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_CANCEL;
npTouchEvent.points = 0;
npTouchEvent.size = event.m_points.size();
if (npTouchEvent.size) {
npTouchEvent.points = new NPTouchPoint[npTouchEvent.size];
for (int i = 0; i < npTouchEvent.size; i++) {
npTouchEvent.points[i].touchId = event.m_points[i].m_id;
npTouchEvent.points[i].clientX = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.x();
npTouchEvent.points[i].clientY = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.y();
npTouchEvent.points[i].screenX = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.x();
npTouchEvent.points[i].screenY = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.y();
npTouchEvent.points[i].pageX = event.m_points[i].m_pos.x();
npTouchEvent.points[i].pageY = event.m_points[i].m_pos.y();
}
}
NPEvent npEvent;
npEvent.type = NP_TouchEvent;
npEvent.data = &npTouchEvent;
plugin->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent);
delete[] npTouchEvent.points;
return true;
}
dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(plugin, event.m_points[0]);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,764
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int StreamTcpPacket (ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p, StreamTcpThread *stt,
PacketQueue *pq)
{
SCEnter();
DEBUG_ASSERT_FLOW_LOCKED(p->flow);
SCLogDebug("p->pcap_cnt %"PRIu64, p->pcap_cnt);
/* assign the thread id to the flow */
if (unlikely(p->flow->thread_id == 0)) {
p->flow->thread_id = (FlowThreadId)tv->id;
#ifdef DEBUG
} else if (unlikely((FlowThreadId)tv->id != p->flow->thread_id)) {
SCLogDebug("wrong thread: flow has %u, we are %d", p->flow->thread_id, tv->id);
#endif
}
TcpSession *ssn = (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx;
/* track TCP flags */
if (ssn != NULL) {
ssn->tcp_packet_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p))
ssn->client.tcp_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
else if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p))
ssn->server.tcp_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
/* check if we need to unset the ASYNC flag */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC &&
ssn->client.tcp_flags != 0 &&
ssn->server.tcp_flags != 0)
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: removing ASYNC flag as we have packets on both sides", ssn);
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
}
}
/* update counters */
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_synack);
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_syn);
}
if (p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_RST)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_rst);
}
/* broken TCP http://ask.wireshark.org/questions/3183/acknowledgment-number-broken-tcp-the-acknowledge-field-is-nonzero-while-the-ack-flag-is-not-set */
if (!(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && TCP_GET_ACK(p) != 0) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_PKT_BROKEN_ACK);
}
/* If we are on IPS mode, and got a drop action triggered from
* the IP only module, or from a reassembled msg and/or from an
* applayer detection, then drop the rest of the packets of the
* same stream and avoid inspecting it any further */
if (StreamTcpCheckFlowDrops(p) == 1) {
SCLogDebug("This flow/stream triggered a drop rule");
FlowSetNoPacketInspectionFlag(p->flow);
DecodeSetNoPacketInspectionFlag(p);
StreamTcpDisableAppLayer(p->flow);
PACKET_DROP(p);
/* return the segments to the pool */
StreamTcpSessionPktFree(p);
SCReturnInt(0);
}
if (ssn == NULL || ssn->state == TCP_NONE) {
if (StreamTcpPacketStateNone(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue) == -1) {
goto error;
}
if (ssn != NULL)
SCLogDebug("ssn->alproto %"PRIu16"", p->flow->alproto);
} else {
/* special case for PKT_PSEUDO_STREAM_END packets:
* bypass the state handling and various packet checks,
* we care about reassembly here. */
if (p->flags & PKT_PSEUDO_STREAM_END) {
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
} else {
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
}
/* straight to 'skip' as we already handled reassembly */
goto skip;
}
/* check if the packet is in right direction, when we missed the
SYN packet and picked up midstream session. */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM_SYNACK)
StreamTcpPacketSwitchDir(ssn, p);
if (StreamTcpPacketIsKeepAlive(ssn, p) == 1) {
goto skip;
}
if (StreamTcpPacketIsKeepAliveACK(ssn, p) == 1) {
StreamTcpClearKeepAliveFlag(ssn, p);
goto skip;
}
StreamTcpClearKeepAliveFlag(ssn, p);
/* if packet is not a valid window update, check if it is perhaps
* a bad window update that we should ignore (and alert on) */
if (StreamTcpPacketIsFinShutdownAck(ssn, p) == 0)
if (StreamTcpPacketIsWindowUpdate(ssn, p) == 0)
if (StreamTcpPacketIsBadWindowUpdate(ssn,p))
goto skip;
switch (ssn->state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateSynSent(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateSynRecv(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateEstablished(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait1(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait2(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSING:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateClosing(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateCloseWait(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateLastAck(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_TIME_WAIT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateTimeWait(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSED:
/* TCP session memory is not returned to pool until timeout. */
SCLogDebug("packet received on closed state");
break;
default:
SCLogDebug("packet received on default state");
break;
}
skip:
if (ssn->state >= TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_EST;
}
}
/* deal with a pseudo packet that is created upon receiving a RST
* segment. To be sure we process both sides of the connection, we
* inject a fake packet into the system, forcing reassembly of the
* opposing direction.
* There should be only one, but to be sure we do a while loop. */
if (ssn != NULL) {
while (stt->pseudo_queue.len > 0) {
SCLogDebug("processing pseudo packet / stream end");
Packet *np = PacketDequeue(&stt->pseudo_queue);
if (np != NULL) {
/* process the opposing direction of the original packet */
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(np)) {
SCLogDebug("pseudo packet is to server");
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, np, NULL);
} else {
SCLogDebug("pseudo packet is to client");
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, np, NULL);
}
/* enqueue this packet so we inspect it in detect etc */
PacketEnqueue(pq, np);
}
SCLogDebug("processing pseudo packet / stream end done");
}
/* recalc the csum on the packet if it was modified */
if (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_MODIFIED) {
ReCalculateChecksum(p);
}
/* check for conditions that may make us not want to log this packet */
/* streams that hit depth */
if ((ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED))
{
/* we can call bypass callback, if enabled */
if (StreamTcpBypassEnabled()) {
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
}
if ((ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED) ||
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED))
{
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_NOPCAPLOG;
}
/* encrypted packets */
if ((PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p) && (ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY)) ||
(PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) && (ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY)))
{
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_NOPCAPLOG;
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_BYPASS) {
/* we can call bypass callback, if enabled */
if (StreamTcpBypassEnabled()) {
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
/* if stream is dead and we have no detect engine at all, bypass. */
} else if (g_detect_disabled &&
(ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY) &&
StreamTcpBypassEnabled())
{
SCLogDebug("bypass as stream is dead and we have no rules");
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
}
SCReturnInt(0);
error:
/* make sure we don't leave packets in our pseudo queue */
while (stt->pseudo_queue.len > 0) {
Packet *np = PacketDequeue(&stt->pseudo_queue);
if (np != NULL) {
PacketEnqueue(pq, np);
}
}
/* recalc the csum on the packet if it was modified */
if (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_MODIFIED) {
ReCalculateChecksum(p);
}
if (StreamTcpInlineDropInvalid()) {
PACKET_DROP(p);
}
SCReturnInt(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-693
Summary: Suricata before 4.0.4 is prone to an HTTP detection bypass vulnerability in detect.c and stream-tcp.c. If a malicious server breaks a normal TCP flow and sends data before the 3-way handshake is complete, then the data sent by the malicious server will be accepted by web clients such as a web browser or Linux CLI utilities, but ignored by Suricata IDS signatures. This mostly affects IDS signatures for the HTTP protocol and TCP stream content; signatures for TCP packets will inspect such network traffic as usual.
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
|
Low
| 169,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copyIPv6IfDifferent(void * dest, const void * src)
{
if(dest != src) {
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A Denial Of Service vulnerability in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPd through 2.1 exists due to a NULL pointer dereference in copyIPv6IfDifferent in pcpserver.c.
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument
|
Low
| 169,665
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int flush_completed_IO(struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
if (list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list))
return ret;
dump_completed_IO(inode);
while (!list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list)){
io = list_entry(EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list.next,
ext4_io_end_t, list);
/*
* Calling ext4_end_io_nolock() to convert completed
* IO to written.
*
* When ext4_sync_file() is called, run_queue() may already
* about to flush the work corresponding to this io structure.
* It will be upset if it founds the io structure related
* to the work-to-be schedule is freed.
*
* Thus we need to keep the io structure still valid here after
* convertion finished. The io structure has a flag to
* avoid double converting from both fsync and background work
* queue work.
*/
ret = ext4_end_io_nolock(io);
if (ret < 0)
ret2 = ret;
else
list_del_init(&io->list);
}
return (ret2 < 0) ? ret2 : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tight_fill_palette(VncState *vs, int x, int y,
size_t count, uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,
VncPalette **palette)
{
int max;
max = count / tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].idx_max_colors_divisor;
if (max < 2 &&
count >= tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].mono_min_rect_size) {
max = 2;
}
if (max >= 256) {
max = 256;
}
switch(vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
case 4:
return tight_fill_palette32(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
case 2:
return tight_fill_palette16(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
default:
max = 2;
return tight_fill_palette8(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadICONImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
IconFile
icon_file;
IconInfo
icon_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
byte,
bytes_per_line,
one,
scanline_pad;
ssize_t
count,
offset,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
icon_file.reserved=(short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.resource_type=(short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.count=(short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((icon_file.reserved != 0) ||
((icon_file.resource_type != 1) && (icon_file.resource_type != 2)) ||
(icon_file.count > MaxIcons))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (i=0; i < icon_file.count; i++)
{
icon_file.directory[i].width=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].height=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].colors=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].reserved=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].planes=(unsigned short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.directory[i].bits_per_pixel=(unsigned short)
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.directory[i].size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_file.directory[i].offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
}
one=1;
for (i=0; i < icon_file.count; i++)
{
/*
Verify Icon identifier.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
icon_file.directory[i].offset,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
icon_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.width=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
icon_info.height=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/2);
icon_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (((icon_info.planes == 18505) && (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 21060)) ||
(icon_info.size == 0x474e5089))
{
Image
*icon_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*png;
/*
Icon image encoded as a compressed PNG image.
*/
length=icon_file.directory[i].size;
png=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+16,sizeof(*png));
if (png == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(png,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n\000\000\000\015",12);
png[12]=(unsigned char) icon_info.planes;
png[13]=(unsigned char) (icon_info.planes >> 8);
png[14]=(unsigned char) icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
png[15]=(unsigned char) (icon_info.bits_per_pixel >> 8);
count=ReadBlob(image,length-16,png+16);
icon_image=(Image *) NULL;
if (count > 0)
{
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->magick,"PNG",MaxTextExtent);
icon_image=BlobToImage(read_info,png,length+16,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
}
png=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(png);
if (icon_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) (length-16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
DestroyBlob(icon_image);
icon_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,icon_image);
icon_image->scene=i;
}
else
{
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
icon_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
image->matte=MagickTrue;
image->columns=(size_t) icon_file.directory[i].width;
if ((ssize_t) image->columns > icon_info.width)
image->columns=(size_t) icon_info.width;
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=256;
image->rows=(size_t) icon_file.directory[i].height;
if ((ssize_t) image->rows > icon_info.height)
image->rows=(size_t) icon_info.height;
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=256;
image->depth=icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene = %.20g",(double) i);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" size = %.20g",(double) icon_info.size);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" width = %.20g",(double) icon_file.directory[i].width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" height = %.20g",(double) icon_file.directory[i].height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" colors = %.20g",(double ) icon_info.number_colors);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" planes = %.20g",(double) icon_info.planes);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" bpp = %.20g",(double) icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
if ((icon_info.number_colors != 0) || (icon_info.bits_per_pixel <= 16U))
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=icon_info.number_colors;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
*icon_colormap;
/*
Read Icon raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
icon_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4UL*sizeof(*icon_colormap));
if (icon_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (4*image->colors),icon_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=icon_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
p++;
}
icon_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(icon_colormap);
}
/*
Convert Icon raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) &&
(image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
bytes_per_line=(((image->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)+31) &
~31) >> 3;
(void) bytes_per_line;
scanline_pad=((((image->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)+31) & ~31)-
(image->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)) >> 3;
switch (icon_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ?
0x01 : 0x00));
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ?
0x01 : 0x00));
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Read 4-bit Icon scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte >> 4) & 0xf));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,((byte) & 0xf));
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte >> 4) & 0xf));
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,byte);
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
byte|=(size_t) (ReadBlobByte(image) << 8);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,byte);
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 32)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
q++;
}
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 24)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel != 32)
{
/*
Read the ICON alpha mask.
*/
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
SetPixelOpacity(q+x+bit,(((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0) ?
TransparentOpacity : OpaqueOpacity));
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
SetPixelOpacity(q+x+bit,(((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0) ?
TransparentOpacity : OpaqueOpacity));
}
if ((image->columns % 32) != 0)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) ((32-(image->columns % 32))/8); x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (i < (ssize_t) (icon_file.count-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,572
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InitializePrinting(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
printing::PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
printing::PrintPreviewMessageHandler::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#else
printing::PrintViewManagerBasic::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
Low
| 171,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AccessType GetExtensionAccess(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& url,
int tab_id) {
bool allowed_script = IsAllowedScript(extension, url, tab_id);
bool allowed_capture =
extension->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(tab_id, nullptr);
if (allowed_script && allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_AND_CAPTURE;
if (allowed_script)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_ONLY;
if (allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_CAPTURE_ONLY;
return DISALLOWED;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
|
Medium
| 173,232
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void gatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& init,
ExecutionContext* context,
const String& directiveText,
const ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType& effectiveType,
const KURL& blockedURL,
const String& header,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType headerType,
ContentSecurityPolicy::ViolationType violationType,
int contextLine,
const String& scriptSource) {
if (effectiveType == ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType::FrameAncestors) {
init.setDocumentURI(blockedURL.getString());
init.setBlockedURI(blockedURL.getString());
} else {
init.setDocumentURI(context->url().getString());
switch (violationType) {
case ContentSecurityPolicy::InlineViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("inline");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::EvalViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("eval");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::URLViolation:
init.setBlockedURI(stripURLForUseInReport(
context, blockedURL, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
break;
}
}
String effectiveDirective =
ContentSecurityPolicy::getDirectiveName(effectiveType);
init.setViolatedDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setEffectiveDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setOriginalPolicy(header);
init.setDisposition(headerType == ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce
? "enforce"
: "report");
init.setSourceFile(String());
init.setLineNumber(contextLine);
init.setColumnNumber(0);
init.setStatusCode(0);
if (context->isDocument()) {
Document* document = toDocument(context);
DCHECK(document);
init.setReferrer(document->referrer());
if (!SecurityOrigin::isSecure(context->url()) && document->loader())
init.setStatusCode(document->loader()->response().httpStatusCode());
}
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> location = SourceLocation::capture(context);
if (location->lineNumber()) {
KURL source = KURL(ParsedURLString, location->url());
init.setSourceFile(
stripURLForUseInReport(context, source, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
init.setLineNumber(location->lineNumber());
init.setColumnNumber(location->columnNumber());
}
if (!scriptSource.isEmpty())
init.setSample(scriptSource.stripWhiteSpace().left(40));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in CSP reporting in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to obtain the value of url fragments via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
|
Medium
| 172,361
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
struct idpair *idmap)
{
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
return true;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
return true;
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
/* explored state can't have used this */
return true;
if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
return false;
switch (rold->type) {
case SCALAR_VALUE:
if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
} else {
/* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
* equal, because we can't know anything about the
* scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
*/
return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
}
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
* everything else matches, we are OK.
* We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
* uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
*/
return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
/* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
* However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
* checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
* id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
* we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
*/
if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
return false;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
return false;
/* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
if (rcur->type != rold->type)
return false;
/* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
* did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
* still safe. This is true even if old range < old off,
* since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
* even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
*/
if (rold->range > rcur->range)
return false;
/* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
* nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
*/
if (rold->off != rcur->off)
return false;
/* id relations must be preserved */
if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
return false;
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
* would have accepted
*/
default:
/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
return false;
}
/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper use of pointers in place of scalars.
Commit Message: bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer
This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetLast() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return NULL;
if (m_count <= 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
const size_t index = count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#else
const long index = m_count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pCP;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Effect_command(effect_handle_t self,
uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData){
EffectContext * pContext = (EffectContext *) self;
int retsize;
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_BASS_BOOST){
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VIRTUALIZER){
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_EQUALIZER){
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VOLUME){
}
if (pContext == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command ERROR pContext == NULL");
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode){
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR, EFFECT_CMD_INIT: ERROR for effect type %d",
pContext->EffectType);
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = 0;
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_BASS_BOOST){
android::BassSetStrength(pContext, 0);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VIRTUALIZER){
android::VirtualizerSetStrength(pContext, 0);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_EQUALIZER){
android::EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, 0);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VOLUME){
*(int *) pReplyData = android::VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, 0);
}
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = android::Effect_setConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
android::Effect_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
android::Effect_setConfig(pContext, &pContext->config);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM:{
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize);
p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
int voffset = ((p->psize - 1) / sizeof(int32_t) + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_BASS_BOOST){
p->status = android::BassBoost_getParameter(pContext,
p->data,
(size_t *)&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VIRTUALIZER){
p->status = android::Virtualizer_getParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
(size_t *)&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_EQUALIZER){
p->status = android::Equalizer_getParameter(pContext,
p->data,
&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VOLUME){
p->status = android::Volume_getParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
(size_t *)&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
}
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + voffset + p->vsize;
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM:{
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_BASS_BOOST){
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t) +sizeof(int16_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : BassBoost_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : BassBoost_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR, psize is not sizeof(int32_t)");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = android::BassBoost_setParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VIRTUALIZER){
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize > (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t) +sizeof(int32_t)) ||
cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t) +sizeof(int16_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Virtualizer_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Virtualizer_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR, psize is not sizeof(int32_t)");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Virtualizer_setParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_EQUALIZER){
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Equalizer_setParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
}
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VOLUME){
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Volume_setParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
ALOGV("\tEffect_command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE start");
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Effect_setEnabled(pContext, LVM_TRUE);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Effect_setEnabled(pContext, LVM_FALSE);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
{
ALOGV("\tEffect_command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE start");
if (pCmdData == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
uint32_t device = *(uint32_t *)pCmdData;
if (pContext->EffectType == LVM_BASS_BOOST) {
if((device == AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPEAKER) ||
(device == AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_SCO_CARKIT) ||
(device == AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_A2DP_SPEAKER)){
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE device is invalid for LVM_BASS_BOOST %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE temporary disable LVM_BAS_BOOST");
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE disable LVM_BASS_BOOST %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
android::LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled = LVM_TRUE;
} else {
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE device is valid for LVM_BASS_BOOST %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE re-enable LVM_BASS_BOOST %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
android::LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled = LVM_FALSE;
}
}
if (pContext->EffectType == LVM_VIRTUALIZER) {
if((device == AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPEAKER)||
(device == AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_SCO_CARKIT)||
(device == AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_A2DP_SPEAKER)){
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE device is invalid for LVM_VIRTUALIZER %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE temporary disable LVM_VIRTUALIZER");
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE disable LVM_VIRTUALIZER %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
android::LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled = LVM_TRUE;
} else {
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE device is valid for LVM_VIRTUALIZER %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
if(pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE){
ALOGV("\tEFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE re-enable LVM_VIRTUALIZER %d",
*(int32_t *)pCmdData);
android::LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled = LVM_FALSE;
}
}
ALOGV("\tEffect_command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE end");
break;
}
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
{
uint32_t leftVolume, rightVolume;
int16_t leftdB, rightdB;
int16_t maxdB, pandB;
int32_t vol_ret[2] = {1<<24,1<<24}; // Apply no volume
int status = 0;
LVM_ControlParams_t ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVM_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
if(pReplyData == LVM_NULL){
break;
}
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != 2 * sizeof(uint32_t) || pReplyData == NULL ||
replySize == NULL || *replySize < 2*sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Effect_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
leftVolume = ((*(uint32_t *)pCmdData));
rightVolume = ((*((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 1)));
if(leftVolume == 0x1000000){
leftVolume -= 1;
}
if(rightVolume == 0x1000000){
rightVolume -= 1;
}
leftdB = android::LVC_Convert_VolToDb(leftVolume);
rightdB = android::LVC_Convert_VolToDb(rightVolume);
pandB = rightdB - leftdB;
maxdB = leftdB;
if(rightdB > maxdB){
maxdB = rightdB;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, vol_ret, sizeof(int32_t)*2);
android::VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t)(maxdB*100));
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus =LVM_GetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance,&ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetControlParameters", "VolumeSetStereoPosition")
if(LvmStatus != LVM_SUCCESS) return -EINVAL;
/* Volume parameters */
ActiveParams.VC_Balance = pandB;
ALOGV("\t\tVolumeSetStereoPosition() (-96dB -> +96dB)-> %d\n", ActiveParams.VC_Balance );
/* Activate the initial settings */
LvmStatus =LVM_SetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance,&ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_SetControlParameters", "VolumeSetStereoPosition")
if(LvmStatus != LVM_SUCCESS) return -EINVAL;
break;
}
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
} /* end Effect_command */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in libeffects in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, related to EffectBundle.cpp and EffectReverb.cpp, aka internal bug 26347509.
Commit Message: fix possible overflow in effect wrappers.
Add checks on parameter size field in effect command handlers
to avoid overflow leading to invalid comparison with min allowed
size for command and reply buffers.
Bug: 26347509.
Change-Id: I20e6a9b6de8e5172b957caa1ac9410b9752efa4d
(cherry picked from commit ad1bd92a49d78df6bc6e75bee68c517c1326f3cf)
|
Medium
| 173,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FindBarController::Show() {
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
if (!find_manager->find_ui_active()) {
MaybeSetPrepopulateText();
find_manager->set_find_ui_active(true);
find_bar_->Show(true);
}
find_bar_->SetFocusAndSelection();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,661
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureImpl::OnBufferCreated(int32_t buffer_id,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << " buffer_id: " << buffer_id;
DCHECK(io_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(handle.is_valid());
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
size_t memory_size = 0;
bool read_only_flag = false;
const MojoResult result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(
std::move(handle), &memory_handle, &memory_size, &read_only_flag);
DCHECK_EQ(MOJO_RESULT_OK, result);
DCHECK_GT(memory_size, 0u);
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shm(
new base::SharedMemory(memory_handle, true /* read_only */));
if (!shm->Map(memory_size)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "OnBufferCreated: Map failed.";
return;
}
const bool inserted =
client_buffers_
.insert(std::make_pair(buffer_id,
new ClientBuffer(std::move(shm), memory_size)))
.second;
DCHECK(inserted);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,865
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _zip_read_eocd64(zip_source_t *src, zip_buffer_t *buffer, zip_uint64_t buf_offset, unsigned int flags, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_cdir_t *cd;
zip_uint64_t offset;
zip_uint8_t eocd[EOCD64LEN];
zip_uint64_t eocd_offset;
zip_uint64_t size, nentry, i, eocdloc_offset;
bool free_buffer;
zip_uint32_t num_disks, num_disks64, eocd_disk, eocd_disk64;
eocdloc_offset = _zip_buffer_offset(buffer);
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* magic already verified */
num_disks = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
eocd_disk = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
eocd_offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (eocd_offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX || eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN < eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN > eocdloc_offset + buf_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset >= buf_offset && eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN <= buf_offset + _zip_buffer_size(buffer)) {
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset - buf_offset);
free_buffer = false;
}
else {
if (zip_source_seek(src, (zip_int64_t)eocd_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(error, src);
return NULL;
}
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new_from_source(src, EOCD64LEN, eocd, error)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
free_buffer = true;
}
if (memcmp(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4), EOCD64_MAGIC, 4) != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && size + eocd_offset + 12 != buf_offset + eocdloc_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* skip version made by/needed */
num_disks64 = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
eocd_disk64 = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
/* if eocd values are 0xffff, we have to use eocd64 values.
otherwise, if the values are not the same, it's inconsistent;
in any case, if the value is not 0, we don't support it */
if (num_disks == 0xffff) {
num_disks = num_disks64;
}
if (eocd_disk == 0xffff) {
eocd_disk = eocd_disk64;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && (eocd_disk != eocd_disk64 || num_disks != num_disks64)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
if (num_disks != 0 || eocd_disk != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
nentry = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
i = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (nentry != i) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (!_zip_buffer_ok(buffer)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
if (offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX || offset+size < offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && offset+size != eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd=_zip_cdir_new(nentry, error)) == NULL)
return NULL;
cd->is_zip64 = true;
cd->size = size;
cd->offset = offset;
return cd;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The _zip_read_eocd64 function in zip_open.c in libzip before 1.3.0 mishandles EOCD records, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory allocation failure in _zip_cdir_grow in zip_dirent.c) via a crafted ZIP archive.
Commit Message: Make eocd checks more consistent between zip and zip64 cases.
|
Medium
| 167,771
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
GradFunContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
int p, direct;
if (av_frame_is_writable(in)) {
direct = 1;
out = in;
} else {
direct = 0;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
}
for (p = 0; p < 4 && in->data[p]; p++) {
int w = inlink->w;
int h = inlink->h;
int r = s->radius;
if (p) {
w = s->chroma_w;
h = s->chroma_h;
r = s->chroma_r;
}
if (FFMIN(w, h) > 2 * r)
filter(s, out->data[p], in->data[p], w, h, out->linesize[p], in->linesize[p], r);
else if (out->data[p] != in->data[p])
av_image_copy_plane(out->data[p], out->linesize[p], in->data[p], in->linesize[p], w, h);
}
if (!direct)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Low
| 166,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static size_t optsize (lua_State *L, char opt, const char **fmt) {
switch (opt) {
case 'B': case 'b': return sizeof(char);
case 'H': case 'h': return sizeof(short);
case 'L': case 'l': return sizeof(long);
case 'T': return sizeof(size_t);
case 'f': return sizeof(float);
case 'd': return sizeof(double);
case 'x': return 1;
case 'c': return getnum(L, fmt, 1);
case 'i': case 'I': {
int sz = getnum(L, fmt, sizeof(int));
if (sz > MAXINTSIZE)
luaL_error(L, "integral size %d is larger than limit of %d",
sz, MAXINTSIZE);
return sz;
}
default: return 0; /* other cases do not need alignment */
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An Integer Overflow issue was discovered in the struct library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2, leading to a failure of bounds checking.
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
|
Low
| 170,166
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(fread)
{
zval *arg1;
long len;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &arg1, &len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
if (len <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), len);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the fread function in ext/standard/file.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer in the second argument.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
|
Low
| 167,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int sequencer_write(int dev, struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int count)
{
unsigned char event_rec[EV_SZ], ev_code;
int p = 0, c, ev_size;
int mode = translate_mode(file);
dev = dev >> 4;
DEB(printk("sequencer_write(dev=%d, count=%d)\n", dev, count));
if (mode == OPEN_READ)
return -EIO;
c = count;
while (c >= 4)
{
if (copy_from_user((char *) event_rec, &(buf)[p], 4))
goto out;
ev_code = event_rec[0];
if (ev_code == SEQ_FULLSIZE)
{
int err, fmt;
dev = *(unsigned short *) &event_rec[2];
if (dev < 0 || dev >= max_synthdev || synth_devs[dev] == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(synth_open_mask & (1 << dev)))
return -ENXIO;
fmt = (*(short *) &event_rec[0]) & 0xffff;
err = synth_devs[dev]->load_patch(dev, fmt, buf, p + 4, c, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return err;
}
if (ev_code >= 128)
{
if (seq_mode == SEQ_2 && ev_code == SEQ_EXTENDED)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "Sequencer: Invalid level 2 event %x\n", ev_code);
return -EINVAL;
}
ev_size = 8;
if (c < ev_size)
{
if (!seq_playing)
seq_startplay();
return count - c;
}
if (copy_from_user((char *)&event_rec[4],
&(buf)[p + 4], 4))
goto out;
}
else
{
if (seq_mode == SEQ_2)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "Sequencer: 4 byte event in level 2 mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ev_size = 4;
if (event_rec[0] != SEQ_MIDIPUTC)
obsolete_api_used = 1;
}
if (event_rec[0] == SEQ_MIDIPUTC)
{
if (!midi_opened[event_rec[2]])
{
int err, mode;
int dev = event_rec[2];
if (dev >= max_mididev || midi_devs[dev]==NULL)
{
/*printk("Sequencer Error: Nonexistent MIDI device %d\n", dev);*/
return -ENXIO;
}
mode = translate_mode(file);
if ((err = midi_devs[dev]->open(dev, mode,
sequencer_midi_input, sequencer_midi_output)) < 0)
{
seq_reset();
printk(KERN_WARNING "Sequencer Error: Unable to open Midi #%d\n", dev);
return err;
}
midi_opened[dev] = 1;
}
}
if (!seq_queue(event_rec, (file->f_flags & (O_NONBLOCK) ? 1 : 0)))
{
int processed = count - c;
if (!seq_playing)
seq_startplay();
if (!processed && (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))
return -EAGAIN;
else
return processed;
}
p += ev_size;
c -= ev_size;
}
if (!seq_playing)
seq_startplay();
out:
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer underflow in the Open Sound System (OSS) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on unspecified non-x86 platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging write access to /dev/sequencer.
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
High
| 165,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::Load(long long& pos, long& len) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
if (m_timecode >= 0) // at least partially loaded
return 0;
assert(m_pos == m_element_start);
assert(m_element_size < 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
const int status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
assert((total < 0) || (m_pos <= total)); // TODO: verify this
pos = m_pos;
long long cluster_size = -1;
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error or underflow
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id_ < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id_);
if (id_ != 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(cluster_size);
if (size == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: verify this
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
}
#if 0
len = static_cast<long>(size_);
if (cluster_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
long long timecode = -1;
long long new_pos = -1;
bool bBlock = false;
long long cluster_stop = (cluster_size < 0) ? -1 : pos + cluster_size;
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x67) { // TimeCode ID
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (timecode < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(timecode);
new_pos = pos + size;
if (bBlock)
break;
} else if (id == 0x20) { // BlockGroup ID
bBlock = true;
break;
} else if (id == 0x23) { // SimpleBlock ID
bBlock = true;
break;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
if (timecode < 0) // no timecode found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (!bBlock)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pos = new_pos; // designates position just beyond timecode payload
m_timecode = timecode; // m_timecode >= 0 means we're partially loaded
if (cluster_size >= 0)
m_element_size = cluster_stop - m_element_start;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,830
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::CommitNavigation(const AtomicString& mime_type,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
if (state_ != kProvisional)
return;
if (!GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CreatingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
SetHistoryItemStateForCommit(
GetFrameLoader().GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem(), load_type_,
HistoryNavigationType::kDifferentDocument);
}
DCHECK_EQ(state_, kProvisional);
GetFrameLoader().CommitProvisionalLoad();
if (!frame_)
return;
const AtomicString& encoding = GetResponse().TextEncodingName();
Document* owner_document = nullptr;
if (Document::ShouldInheritSecurityOriginFromOwner(Url())) {
Frame* owner_frame = frame_->Tree().Parent();
if (!owner_frame)
owner_frame = frame_->Loader().Opener();
if (owner_frame && owner_frame->IsLocalFrame())
owner_document = ToLocalFrame(owner_frame)->GetDocument();
}
DCHECK(frame_->GetPage());
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy = kAllowAsynchronousParsing;
if (!Document::ThreadedParsingEnabledForTesting())
parsing_policy = kForceSynchronousParsing;
InstallNewDocument(Url(), owner_document,
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(Url())
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew,
mime_type, encoding, InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation,
parsing_policy, overriding_url);
parser_->SetDocumentWasLoadedAsPartOfNavigation();
if (request_.WasDiscarded())
frame_->GetDocument()->SetWasDiscarded(true);
frame_->GetDocument()->MaybeHandleHttpRefresh(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Refresh),
Document::kHttpRefreshFromHeader);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Object lifecycle issue in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
Medium
| 173,197
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
if (!nd->root.mnt)
set_root_rcu(nd);
while (1) {
if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
break;
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
unsigned seq;
inode = parent->d_inode;
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&parent->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&old->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return -ECHILD;
nd->path.dentry = parent;
nd->seq = seq;
break;
} else {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(nd->path.mnt);
struct mount *mparent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
struct inode *inode2 = mountpoint->d_inode;
unsigned seq = read_seqcount_begin(&mountpoint->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
break;
/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
inode = inode2;
nd->seq = seq;
}
}
while (unlikely(d_mountpoint(nd->path.dentry))) {
struct mount *mounted;
mounted = __lookup_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->path.dentry);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (!mounted)
break;
nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
}
nd->inode = inode;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The prepend_path function in fs/dcache.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.4 does not properly handle rename actions inside a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism by renaming a directory, related to a *double-chroot attack.*
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 166,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct sk_buff *frag;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info*)skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk ? inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *tmp_hdr;
struct frag_hdr *fh;
unsigned int mtu, hlen, left, len;
__be32 frag_id = 0;
int ptr, offset = 0, err=0;
u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb);
/* We must not fragment if the socket is set to force MTU discovery
* or if the skb it not generated by a local socket.
*/
if (!skb->local_df && skb->len > mtu) {
skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (np && np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
mtu -= hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb)) {
int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag2;
if (first_len - hlen > mtu ||
((first_len - hlen) & 7) ||
skb_cloned(skb))
goto slow_path;
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag) {
/* Correct geometry. */
if (frag->len > mtu ||
((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) ||
skb_headroom(frag) < hlen)
goto slow_path_clean;
/* Partially cloned skb? */
if (skb_shared(frag))
goto slow_path_clean;
BUG_ON(frag->sk);
if (skb->sk) {
frag->sk = skb->sk;
frag->destructor = sock_wfree;
}
skb->truesize -= frag->truesize;
}
err = 0;
offset = 0;
frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(skb);
/* BUILD HEADER */
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb_network_header(skb), hlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_hdr) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
return -ENOMEM;
}
__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
fh = (struct frag_hdr*)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
memcpy(skb_network_header(skb), tmp_hdr, hlen);
ipv6_select_ident(fh);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(IP6_MF);
frag_id = fh->identification;
first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb);
skb->len = first_len;
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(first_len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
for (;;) {
/* Prepare header of the next frame,
* before previous one went down. */
if (frag) {
frag->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_reset_transport_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr*)__skb_push(frag, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(frag, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
memcpy(skb_network_header(frag), tmp_hdr,
hlen);
offset += skb->len - hlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (frag->next != NULL)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len =
htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
}
err = output(skb);
if(!err)
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
if (err || !frag)
break;
skb = frag;
frag = skb->next;
skb->next = NULL;
}
kfree(tmp_hdr);
if (err == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return 0;
}
while (frag) {
skb = frag->next;
kfree_skb(frag);
frag = skb;
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return err;
slow_path_clean:
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) {
if (frag2 == frag)
break;
frag2->sk = NULL;
frag2->destructor = NULL;
skb->truesize += frag2->truesize;
}
}
slow_path:
left = skb->len - hlen; /* Space per frame */
ptr = hlen; /* Where to start from */
/*
* Fragment the datagram.
*/
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
/*
* Keep copying data until we run out.
*/
while(left > 0) {
len = left;
/* IF: it doesn't fit, use 'mtu' - the data space left */
if (len > mtu)
len = mtu;
/* IF: we are not sending up to and including the packet end
then align the next start on an eight byte boundary */
if (len < left) {
len &= ~7;
}
/*
* Allocate buffer.
*/
if ((frag = alloc_skb(len+hlen+sizeof(struct frag_hdr)+LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev), GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "IPv6: frag: no memory for new fragment!\n");
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/*
* Set up data on packet
*/
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
skb_reserve(frag, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev));
skb_put(frag, len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(frag) + hlen);
frag->transport_header = (frag->network_header + hlen +
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
/*
* Charge the memory for the fragment to any owner
* it might possess
*/
if (skb->sk)
skb_set_owner_w(frag, skb->sk);
/*
* Copy the packet header into the new buffer.
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_network_header(frag), hlen);
/*
* Build fragment header.
*/
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
if (!frag_id) {
ipv6_select_ident(fh);
frag_id = fh->identification;
} else
fh->identification = frag_id;
/*
* Copy a block of the IP datagram.
*/
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, ptr, skb_transport_header(frag), len))
BUG();
left -= len;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (left > 0)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len = htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ptr += len;
offset += len;
/*
* Put this fragment into the sending queue.
*/
err = output(frag);
if (err)
goto fail;
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
fail:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not generate Fragment Identification values separately for each destination, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
struct path path;
int opened = 0;
int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_flags = op->open_flag;
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
goto out;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path link = path;
void *cookie;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) {
path_put_conditional(&path, nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
error = -ELOOP;
break;
}
error = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
}
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
error = -ECHILD;
else
error = -ESTALE;
}
file = ERR_PTR(error);
}
return file;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the path_openat function in fs/namei.c in the Linux kernel 3.x and 4.x before 4.0.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via O_TMPFILE filesystem operations that leverage a duplicate cleanup operation.
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MarkingVisitor::ConservativelyMarkHeader(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
const GCInfo* gc_info = ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex());
if (gc_info->HasVTable() && !VTableInitialized(header->Payload())) {
MarkHeaderNoTracing(header);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(IsUninitializedMemory(header->Payload(), header->PayloadSize()));
#endif
} else {
MarkHeader(header, gc_info->trace_);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,141
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags,
int *peeked, int *off, int *err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
/*
* Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before skb_recv_datagram()
*/
int error = sock_error(sk);
if (error)
goto no_packet;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
do {
/* Again only user level code calls this function, so nothing
* interrupt level will suddenly eat the receive_queue.
*
* Look at current nfs client by the way...
* However, this function was correct in any case. 8)
*/
unsigned long cpu_flags;
struct sk_buff_head *queue = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
skb_queue_walk(queue, skb) {
*peeked = skb->peeked;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
if (*off >= skb->len) {
*off -= skb->len;
continue;
}
skb->peeked = 1;
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
} else
__skb_unlink(skb, queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
return skb;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
/* User doesn't want to wait */
error = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto no_packet;
} while (!wait_for_packet(sk, err, &timeo));
return NULL;
no_packet:
*err = error;
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The __skb_recv_datagram function in net/core/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8 does not properly handle the MSG_PEEK flag with zero-length data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,144
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback)
: image_decoded_callback_(image_decoded_callback),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
|
Medium
| 171,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NTSTATUS ProcessMainDeviceControlIrp (PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, PEXTENSION Extension, PIRP Irp)
{
PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpSp = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation (Irp);
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
switch (irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode)
{
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVER_VERSION:
case TC_IOCTL_LEGACY_GET_DRIVER_VERSION:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (LONG), ValidateOutput))
{
LONG tmp = VERSION_NUM;
memcpy (Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer, &tmp, 4);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (LONG);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DEVICE_REFCOUNT:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (int), ValidateOutput))
{
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = DeviceObject->ReferenceCount;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (int);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_IS_DRIVER_UNLOAD_DISABLED:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (int), ValidateOutput))
{
LONG deviceObjectCount = 0;
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = DriverUnloadDisabled;
if (IoEnumerateDeviceObjectList (TCDriverObject, NULL, 0, &deviceObjectCount) == STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && deviceObjectCount > 1)
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = TRUE;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (int);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_IS_ANY_VOLUME_MOUNTED:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (int), ValidateOutput))
{
int drive;
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = 0;
for (drive = MIN_MOUNTED_VOLUME_DRIVE_NUMBER; drive <= MAX_MOUNTED_VOLUME_DRIVE_NUMBER; ++drive)
{
if (GetVirtualVolumeDeviceObject (drive))
{
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = 1;
break;
}
}
if (IsBootDriveMounted())
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = 1;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (int);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_OPEN_TEST:
{
OPEN_TEST_STRUCT *opentest = (OPEN_TEST_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
HANDLE NtFileHandle;
UNICODE_STRING FullFileName;
IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatus;
LARGE_INTEGER offset;
ACCESS_MASK access = FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (!ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (OPEN_TEST_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
break;
EnsureNullTerminatedString (opentest->wszFileName, sizeof (opentest->wszFileName));
RtlInitUnicodeString (&FullFileName, opentest->wszFileName);
InitializeObjectAttributes (&ObjectAttributes, &FullFileName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
if (opentest->bDetectTCBootLoader || opentest->DetectFilesystem || opentest->bComputeVolumeIDs)
access |= FILE_READ_DATA;
ntStatus = ZwCreateFile (&NtFileHandle,
SYNCHRONIZE | access, &ObjectAttributes, &IoStatus, NULL,
0, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL, 0);
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
opentest->TCBootLoaderDetected = FALSE;
opentest->FilesystemDetected = FALSE;
memset (opentest->VolumeIDComputed, 0, sizeof (opentest->VolumeIDComputed));
memset (opentest->volumeIDs, 0, sizeof (opentest->volumeIDs));
if (opentest->bDetectTCBootLoader || opentest->DetectFilesystem || opentest->bComputeVolumeIDs)
{
byte *readBuffer = TCalloc (TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE);
if (!readBuffer)
{
ntStatus = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
}
else
{
if (opentest->bDetectTCBootLoader || opentest->DetectFilesystem)
{
offset.QuadPart = 0;
ntStatus = ZwReadFile (NtFileHandle,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&IoStatus,
readBuffer,
TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE,
&offset,
NULL);
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
size_t i;
if (opentest->bDetectTCBootLoader && IoStatus.Information >= TC_SECTOR_SIZE_BIOS)
{
for (i = 0; i < TC_SECTOR_SIZE_BIOS - strlen (TC_APP_NAME); ++i)
{
if (memcmp (readBuffer + i, TC_APP_NAME, strlen (TC_APP_NAME)) == 0)
{
opentest->TCBootLoaderDetected = TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
if (opentest->DetectFilesystem && IoStatus.Information >= sizeof (int64))
{
switch (BE64 (*(uint64 *) readBuffer))
{
case 0xEB52904E54465320ULL: // NTFS
case 0xEB3C904D53444F53ULL: // FAT16/FAT32
case 0xEB58904D53444F53ULL: // FAT32
case 0xEB76904558464154ULL: // exFAT
case 0x0000005265465300ULL: // ReFS
case 0xEB58906D6B66732EULL: // FAT32 mkfs.fat
case 0xEB58906D6B646F73ULL: // FAT32 mkfs.vfat/mkdosfs
case 0xEB3C906D6B66732EULL: // FAT16/FAT12 mkfs.fat
case 0xEB3C906D6B646F73ULL: // FAT16/FAT12 mkfs.vfat/mkdosfs
opentest->FilesystemDetected = TRUE;
break;
case 0x0000000000000000ULL:
if (IsAllZeroes (readBuffer + 8, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE - 8))
opentest->FilesystemDetected = TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (opentest->bComputeVolumeIDs && (!opentest->DetectFilesystem || !opentest->FilesystemDetected))
{
int volumeType;
for (volumeType = TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL;
volumeType < TC_VOLUME_TYPE_COUNT;
volumeType++)
{
/* Read the volume header */
switch (volumeType)
{
case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL:
offset.QuadPart = TC_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
break;
case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN:
offset.QuadPart = TC_HIDDEN_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
break;
}
ntStatus = ZwReadFile (NtFileHandle,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&IoStatus,
readBuffer,
TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE,
&offset,
NULL);
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
/* compute the ID of this volume: SHA-256 of the effective header */
sha256 (opentest->volumeIDs[volumeType], readBuffer, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE);
opentest->VolumeIDComputed[volumeType] = TRUE;
}
}
}
TCfree (readBuffer);
}
}
ZwClose (NtFileHandle);
Dump ("Open test on file %ls success.\n", opentest->wszFileName);
}
else
{
#if 0
Dump ("Open test on file %ls failed NTSTATUS 0x%08x\n", opentest->wszFileName, ntStatus);
#endif
}
Irp->IoStatus.Information = NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus) ? sizeof (OPEN_TEST_STRUCT) : 0;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_SYSTEM_DRIVE_CONFIG:
{
GetSystemDriveConfigurationRequest *request = (GetSystemDriveConfigurationRequest *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
HANDLE NtFileHandle;
UNICODE_STRING FullFileName;
IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatus;
LARGE_INTEGER offset;
byte readBuffer [TC_SECTOR_SIZE_BIOS];
if (!ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (GetSystemDriveConfigurationRequest), ValidateInputOutput))
break;
EnsureNullTerminatedString (request->DevicePath, sizeof (request->DevicePath));
RtlInitUnicodeString (&FullFileName, request->DevicePath);
InitializeObjectAttributes (&ObjectAttributes, &FullFileName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
ntStatus = ZwCreateFile (&NtFileHandle,
SYNCHRONIZE | GENERIC_READ, &ObjectAttributes, &IoStatus, NULL,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT | FILE_RANDOM_ACCESS, NULL, 0);
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
offset.QuadPart = 0; // MBR
ntStatus = ZwReadFile (NtFileHandle,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&IoStatus,
readBuffer,
sizeof(readBuffer),
&offset,
NULL);
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
size_t i;
request->DriveIsDynamic = FALSE;
if (readBuffer[510] == 0x55 && readBuffer[511] == 0xaa)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
{
if (readBuffer[446 + i * 16 + 4] == PARTITION_LDM)
{
request->DriveIsDynamic = TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
request->BootLoaderVersion = 0;
request->Configuration = 0;
request->UserConfiguration = 0;
request->CustomUserMessage[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof (readBuffer) - strlen (TC_APP_NAME); ++i)
{
if (memcmp (readBuffer + i, TC_APP_NAME, strlen (TC_APP_NAME)) == 0)
{
request->BootLoaderVersion = BE16 (*(uint16 *) (readBuffer + TC_BOOT_SECTOR_VERSION_OFFSET));
request->Configuration = readBuffer[TC_BOOT_SECTOR_CONFIG_OFFSET];
if (request->BootLoaderVersion != 0 && request->BootLoaderVersion <= VERSION_NUM)
{
request->UserConfiguration = readBuffer[TC_BOOT_SECTOR_USER_CONFIG_OFFSET];
memcpy (request->CustomUserMessage, readBuffer + TC_BOOT_SECTOR_USER_MESSAGE_OFFSET, TC_BOOT_SECTOR_USER_MESSAGE_MAX_LENGTH);
}
break;
}
}
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (*request);
}
else
{
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
}
ZwClose (NtFileHandle);
}
else
{
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
}
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_WIPE_PASSWORD_CACHE:
WipeCache ();
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_PASSWORD_CACHE_STATUS:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = cacheEmpty ? STATUS_PIPE_EMPTY : STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_SET_PORTABLE_MODE_STATUS:
if (!UserCanAccessDriveDevice())
{
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
}
else
{
PortableMode = TRUE;
Dump ("Setting portable mode\n");
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_PORTABLE_MODE_STATUS:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = PortableMode ? STATUS_SUCCESS : STATUS_PIPE_EMPTY;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_MOUNTED_VOLUMES:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (MOUNT_LIST_STRUCT), ValidateOutput))
{
MOUNT_LIST_STRUCT *list = (MOUNT_LIST_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
PDEVICE_OBJECT ListDevice;
int drive;
list->ulMountedDrives = 0;
for (drive = MIN_MOUNTED_VOLUME_DRIVE_NUMBER; drive <= MAX_MOUNTED_VOLUME_DRIVE_NUMBER; ++drive)
{
PEXTENSION ListExtension;
ListDevice = GetVirtualVolumeDeviceObject (drive);
if (!ListDevice)
continue;
ListExtension = (PEXTENSION) ListDevice->DeviceExtension;
if (IsVolumeAccessibleByCurrentUser (ListExtension))
{
list->ulMountedDrives |= (1 << ListExtension->nDosDriveNo);
RtlStringCbCopyW (list->wszVolume[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo], sizeof(list->wszVolume[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo]),ListExtension->wszVolume);
RtlStringCbCopyW (list->wszLabel[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo], sizeof(list->wszLabel[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo]),ListExtension->wszLabel);
memcpy (list->volumeID[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo], ListExtension->volumeID, VOLUME_ID_SIZE);
list->diskLength[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = ListExtension->DiskLength;
list->ea[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->ea;
if (ListExtension->cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume)
list->volumeType[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = PROP_VOL_TYPE_HIDDEN; // Hidden volume
else if (ListExtension->cryptoInfo->bHiddenVolProtectionAction)
list->volumeType[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = PROP_VOL_TYPE_OUTER_VOL_WRITE_PREVENTED; // Normal/outer volume (hidden volume protected AND write already prevented)
else if (ListExtension->cryptoInfo->bProtectHiddenVolume)
list->volumeType[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = PROP_VOL_TYPE_OUTER; // Normal/outer volume (hidden volume protected)
else
list->volumeType[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = PROP_VOL_TYPE_NORMAL; // Normal volume
list->truecryptMode[ListExtension->nDosDriveNo] = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->bTrueCryptMode;
}
}
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (MOUNT_LIST_STRUCT);
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_LEGACY_GET_MOUNTED_VOLUMES:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (uint32), ValidateOutput))
{
memset (Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer, 0, irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.OutputBufferLength);
*(uint32 *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = 0xffffFFFF;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.OutputBufferLength;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_VOLUME_PROPERTIES:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (VOLUME_PROPERTIES_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
VOLUME_PROPERTIES_STRUCT *prop = (VOLUME_PROPERTIES_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
PDEVICE_OBJECT ListDevice = GetVirtualVolumeDeviceObject (prop->driveNo);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
if (ListDevice)
{
PEXTENSION ListExtension = (PEXTENSION) ListDevice->DeviceExtension;
if (IsVolumeAccessibleByCurrentUser (ListExtension))
{
prop->uniqueId = ListExtension->UniqueVolumeId;
RtlStringCbCopyW (prop->wszVolume, sizeof(prop->wszVolume),ListExtension->wszVolume);
RtlStringCbCopyW (prop->wszLabel, sizeof(prop->wszLabel),ListExtension->wszLabel);
memcpy (prop->volumeID, ListExtension->volumeID, VOLUME_ID_SIZE);
prop->bDriverSetLabel = ListExtension->bDriverSetLabel;
prop->diskLength = ListExtension->DiskLength;
prop->ea = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->ea;
prop->mode = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->mode;
prop->pkcs5 = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->pkcs5;
prop->pkcs5Iterations = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->noIterations;
prop->volumePim = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->volumePim;
#if 0
prop->volumeCreationTime = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->volume_creation_time;
prop->headerCreationTime = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->header_creation_time;
#endif
prop->volumeHeaderFlags = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags;
prop->readOnly = ListExtension->bReadOnly;
prop->removable = ListExtension->bRemovable;
prop->partitionInInactiveSysEncScope = ListExtension->PartitionInInactiveSysEncScope;
prop->hiddenVolume = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume;
if (ListExtension->cryptoInfo->bProtectHiddenVolume)
prop->hiddenVolProtection = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->bHiddenVolProtectionAction ? HIDVOL_PROT_STATUS_ACTION_TAKEN : HIDVOL_PROT_STATUS_ACTIVE;
else
prop->hiddenVolProtection = HIDVOL_PROT_STATUS_NONE;
prop->totalBytesRead = ListExtension->Queue.TotalBytesRead;
prop->totalBytesWritten = ListExtension->Queue.TotalBytesWritten;
prop->volFormatVersion = ListExtension->cryptoInfo->LegacyVolume ? TC_VOLUME_FORMAT_VERSION_PRE_6_0 : TC_VOLUME_FORMAT_VERSION;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (VOLUME_PROPERTIES_STRUCT);
}
}
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (RESOLVE_SYMLINK_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
RESOLVE_SYMLINK_STRUCT *resolve = (RESOLVE_SYMLINK_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
{
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
EnsureNullTerminatedString (resolve->symLinkName, sizeof (resolve->symLinkName));
ntStatus = SymbolicLinkToTarget (resolve->symLinkName,
resolve->targetName,
sizeof (resolve->targetName));
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (RESOLVE_SYMLINK_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
}
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (DISK_PARTITION_INFO_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
DISK_PARTITION_INFO_STRUCT *info = (DISK_PARTITION_INFO_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
{
PARTITION_INFORMATION_EX pi;
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
EnsureNullTerminatedString (info->deviceName, sizeof (info->deviceName));
ntStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (info->deviceName, IOCTL_DISK_GET_PARTITION_INFO_EX, NULL, 0, &pi, sizeof (pi));
if (NT_SUCCESS(ntStatus))
{
memset (&info->partInfo, 0, sizeof (info->partInfo));
info->partInfo.PartitionLength = pi.PartitionLength;
info->partInfo.PartitionNumber = pi.PartitionNumber;
info->partInfo.StartingOffset = pi.StartingOffset;
if (pi.PartitionStyle == PARTITION_STYLE_MBR)
{
info->partInfo.PartitionType = pi.Mbr.PartitionType;
info->partInfo.BootIndicator = pi.Mbr.BootIndicator;
}
info->IsGPT = pi.PartitionStyle == PARTITION_STYLE_GPT;
}
else
{
ntStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (info->deviceName, IOCTL_DISK_GET_PARTITION_INFO, NULL, 0, &info->partInfo, sizeof (info->partInfo));
info->IsGPT = FALSE;
}
if (!NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
GET_LENGTH_INFORMATION lengthInfo;
ntStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (info->deviceName, IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO, NULL, 0, &lengthInfo, sizeof (lengthInfo));
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
{
memset (&info->partInfo, 0, sizeof (info->partInfo));
info->partInfo.PartitionLength = lengthInfo.Length;
}
}
info->IsDynamic = FALSE;
if (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus) && OsMajorVersion >= 6)
{
# define IOCTL_VOLUME_IS_DYNAMIC CTL_CODE(IOCTL_VOLUME_BASE, 18, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
if (!NT_SUCCESS (TCDeviceIoControl (info->deviceName, IOCTL_VOLUME_IS_DYNAMIC, NULL, 0, &info->IsDynamic, sizeof (info->IsDynamic))))
info->IsDynamic = FALSE;
}
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (DISK_PARTITION_INFO_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
}
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (DISK_GEOMETRY_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
DISK_GEOMETRY_STRUCT *g = (DISK_GEOMETRY_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
{
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
EnsureNullTerminatedString (g->deviceName, sizeof (g->deviceName));
Dump ("Calling IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY on %ls\n", g->deviceName);
ntStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (g->deviceName,
IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY,
NULL, 0, &g->diskGeometry, sizeof (g->diskGeometry));
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (DISK_GEOMETRY_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
}
}
break;
case VC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (DISK_GEOMETRY_EX_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
DISK_GEOMETRY_EX_STRUCT *g = (DISK_GEOMETRY_EX_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
{
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
PVOID buffer = TCalloc (256); // enough for DISK_GEOMETRY_EX and padded data
if (buffer)
{
EnsureNullTerminatedString (g->deviceName, sizeof (g->deviceName));
Dump ("Calling IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX on %ls\n", g->deviceName);
ntStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (g->deviceName,
IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX,
NULL, 0, buffer, 256);
if (NT_SUCCESS(ntStatus))
{
PDISK_GEOMETRY_EX pGeo = (PDISK_GEOMETRY_EX) buffer;
memcpy (&g->diskGeometry, &pGeo->Geometry, sizeof (DISK_GEOMETRY));
g->DiskSize.QuadPart = pGeo->DiskSize.QuadPart;
}
else
{
DISK_GEOMETRY dg = {0};
Dump ("Failed. Calling IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY on %ls\n", g->deviceName);
ntStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (g->deviceName,
IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY,
NULL, 0, &dg, sizeof (dg));
if (NT_SUCCESS(ntStatus))
{
memcpy (&g->diskGeometry, &dg, sizeof (DISK_GEOMETRY));
g->DiskSize.QuadPart = dg.Cylinders.QuadPart * dg.SectorsPerTrack * dg.TracksPerCylinder * dg.BytesPerSector;
if (OsMajorVersion >= 6)
{
STORAGE_READ_CAPACITY storage = {0};
NTSTATUS lStatus;
storage.Version = sizeof (STORAGE_READ_CAPACITY);
Dump ("Calling IOCTL_STORAGE_READ_CAPACITY on %ls\n", g->deviceName);
lStatus = TCDeviceIoControl (g->deviceName,
IOCTL_STORAGE_READ_CAPACITY,
NULL, 0, &storage, sizeof (STORAGE_READ_CAPACITY));
if ( NT_SUCCESS(lStatus)
&& (storage.Size == sizeof (STORAGE_READ_CAPACITY))
)
{
g->DiskSize.QuadPart = storage.DiskLength.QuadPart;
}
}
}
}
TCfree (buffer);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (DISK_GEOMETRY_EX_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ntStatus;
}
else
{
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
}
}
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_PROBE_REAL_DRIVE_SIZE:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (ProbeRealDriveSizeRequest), ValidateInputOutput))
{
ProbeRealDriveSizeRequest *request = (ProbeRealDriveSizeRequest *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
NTSTATUS status;
UNICODE_STRING name;
PFILE_OBJECT fileObject;
PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject;
EnsureNullTerminatedString (request->DeviceName, sizeof (request->DeviceName));
RtlInitUnicodeString (&name, request->DeviceName);
status = IoGetDeviceObjectPointer (&name, FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES, &fileObject, &deviceObject);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = status;
break;
}
status = ProbeRealDriveSize (deviceObject, &request->RealDriveSize);
ObDereferenceObject (fileObject);
if (status == STATUS_TIMEOUT)
{
request->TimeOut = TRUE;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (ProbeRealDriveSizeRequest);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
else if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = status;
}
else
{
request->TimeOut = FALSE;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (ProbeRealDriveSizeRequest);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = status;
}
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_MOUNT_VOLUME:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (MOUNT_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
MOUNT_STRUCT *mount = (MOUNT_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
if (mount->VolumePassword.Length > MAX_PASSWORD || mount->ProtectedHidVolPassword.Length > MAX_PASSWORD
|| mount->pkcs5_prf < 0 || mount->pkcs5_prf > LAST_PRF_ID
|| mount->VolumePim < -1 || mount->VolumePim == INT_MAX
|| mount->ProtectedHidVolPkcs5Prf < 0 || mount->ProtectedHidVolPkcs5Prf > LAST_PRF_ID
|| (mount->bTrueCryptMode != FALSE && mount->bTrueCryptMode != TRUE)
)
{
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
}
EnsureNullTerminatedString (mount->wszVolume, sizeof (mount->wszVolume));
EnsureNullTerminatedString (mount->wszLabel, sizeof (mount->wszLabel));
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (MOUNT_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = MountDevice (DeviceObject, mount);
burn (&mount->VolumePassword, sizeof (mount->VolumePassword));
burn (&mount->ProtectedHidVolPassword, sizeof (mount->ProtectedHidVolPassword));
burn (&mount->pkcs5_prf, sizeof (mount->pkcs5_prf));
burn (&mount->VolumePim, sizeof (mount->VolumePim));
burn (&mount->bTrueCryptMode, sizeof (mount->bTrueCryptMode));
burn (&mount->ProtectedHidVolPkcs5Prf, sizeof (mount->ProtectedHidVolPkcs5Prf));
burn (&mount->ProtectedHidVolPim, sizeof (mount->ProtectedHidVolPim));
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_DISMOUNT_VOLUME:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (UNMOUNT_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
UNMOUNT_STRUCT *unmount = (UNMOUNT_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
PDEVICE_OBJECT ListDevice = GetVirtualVolumeDeviceObject (unmount->nDosDriveNo);
unmount->nReturnCode = ERR_DRIVE_NOT_FOUND;
if (ListDevice)
{
PEXTENSION ListExtension = (PEXTENSION) ListDevice->DeviceExtension;
if (IsVolumeAccessibleByCurrentUser (ListExtension))
unmount->nReturnCode = UnmountDevice (unmount, ListDevice, unmount->ignoreOpenFiles);
}
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (UNMOUNT_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_DISMOUNT_ALL_VOLUMES:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (UNMOUNT_STRUCT), ValidateInputOutput))
{
UNMOUNT_STRUCT *unmount = (UNMOUNT_STRUCT *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
unmount->nReturnCode = UnmountAllDevices (unmount, unmount->ignoreOpenFiles);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (UNMOUNT_STRUCT);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_SETUP:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = StartBootEncryptionSetup (DeviceObject, Irp, irpSp);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_ABORT_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_SETUP:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = AbortBootEncryptionSetup();
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_STATUS:
GetBootEncryptionStatus (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_SETUP_RESULT:
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = GetSetupResult();
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_DRIVE_VOLUME_PROPERTIES:
GetBootDriveVolumeProperties (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_LOADER_VERSION:
GetBootLoaderVersion (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case TC_IOCTL_REOPEN_BOOT_VOLUME_HEADER:
ReopenBootVolumeHeader (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case VC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_LOADER_FINGERPRINT:
GetBootLoaderFingerprint (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_NAME:
GetBootEncryptionAlgorithmName (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case TC_IOCTL_IS_HIDDEN_SYSTEM_RUNNING:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (int), ValidateOutput))
{
*(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = IsHiddenSystemRunning() ? 1 : 0;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (int);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_START_DECOY_SYSTEM_WIPE:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = StartDecoySystemWipe (DeviceObject, Irp, irpSp);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_ABORT_DECOY_SYSTEM_WIPE:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = AbortDecoySystemWipe();
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DECOY_SYSTEM_WIPE_RESULT:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = GetDecoySystemWipeResult();
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DECOY_SYSTEM_WIPE_STATUS:
GetDecoySystemWipeStatus (Irp, irpSp);
break;
case TC_IOCTL_WRITE_BOOT_DRIVE_SECTOR:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = WriteBootDriveSector (Irp, irpSp);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_WARNING_FLAGS:
if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (GetWarningFlagsRequest), ValidateOutput))
{
GetWarningFlagsRequest *flags = (GetWarningFlagsRequest *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
flags->PagingFileCreationPrevented = PagingFileCreationPrevented;
PagingFileCreationPrevented = FALSE;
flags->SystemFavoriteVolumeDirty = SystemFavoriteVolumeDirty;
SystemFavoriteVolumeDirty = FALSE;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (GetWarningFlagsRequest);
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case TC_IOCTL_SET_SYSTEM_FAVORITE_VOLUME_DIRTY:
if (UserCanAccessDriveDevice())
{
SystemFavoriteVolumeDirty = TRUE;
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
else
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_REREAD_DRIVER_CONFIG:
Irp->IoStatus.Status = ReadRegistryConfigFlags (FALSE);
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
break;
case TC_IOCTL_GET_SYSTEM_DRIVE_DUMP_CONFIG:
if ( (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (GetSystemDriveDumpConfigRequest), ValidateOutput))
&& (Irp->RequestorMode == KernelMode)
)
{
GetSystemDriveDumpConfigRequest *request = (GetSystemDriveDumpConfigRequest *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
request->BootDriveFilterExtension = GetBootDriveFilterExtension();
if (IsBootDriveMounted() && request->BootDriveFilterExtension)
{
request->HwEncryptionEnabled = IsHwEncryptionEnabled();
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (*request);
}
else
{
Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
}
}
break;
default:
return TCCompleteIrp (Irp, STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST, 0);
}
#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(DEBUG_TRACE)
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Irp->IoStatus.Status))
{
switch (irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode)
{
case TC_IOCTL_GET_MOUNTED_VOLUMES:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_PASSWORD_CACHE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_PORTABLE_MODE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_SET_PORTABLE_MODE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_OPEN_TEST:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_DRIVE_VOLUME_PROPERTIES:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_IS_HIDDEN_SYSTEM_RUNNING:
break;
default:
Dump ("IOCTL error 0x%08x\n", Irp->IoStatus.Status);
}
}
#endif
return TCCompleteIrp (Irp, Irp->IoStatus.Status, Irp->IoStatus.Information);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: IDRIX, Truecrypt Veracrypt, Truecrypt Prior to 1.23-Hotfix-1 (Veracrypt), all versions (Truecrypt) is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Minor information disclosure of kernel stack. The component is: Veracrypt NT Driver (veracrypt.sys). The attack vector is: Locally executed code, IOCTL request to driver. The fixed version is: 1.23-Hotfix-1.
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
|
Low
| 169,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
explicit_vr[MaxTextExtent],
implicit_vr[MaxTextExtent],
magick[MaxTextExtent],
photometric[MaxTextExtent];
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
index,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
polarity,
sequence,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
Quantum
*scale;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_allocated,
bytes_per_pixel,
colors,
depth,
height,
length,
mask,
max_value,
number_scenes,
quantum,
samples_per_pixel,
signed_data,
significant_bits,
status,
width,
window_width;
ssize_t
count,
scene,
window_center,
y;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MaxTextExtent);
bits_allocated=8;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
polarity=MagickFalse;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
depth=8;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
max_value=255UL;
mask=0xffff;
number_scenes=1;
samples_per_pixel=1;
scale=(Quantum *) NULL;
sequence=MagickFalse;
signed_data=(~0UL);
significant_bits=0;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
window_center=0;
window_width=0;
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ||
(sequence != MagickFalse); )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) && (element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MaxTextExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strcmp(implicit_vr,"xs") == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MaxTextExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strcmp(implicit_vr,"!!") == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strcmp(explicit_vr,"OB") == 0) ||
(strcmp(explicit_vr,"UN") == 0) ||
(strcmp(explicit_vr,"OW") == 0) || (strcmp(explicit_vr,"SQ") == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=(int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
else
datum=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
else
datum=(int) ReadBlobShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strcmp(implicit_vr,"SS") == 0) ||
(strcmp(implicit_vr,"US") == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strcmp(implicit_vr,"UL") == 0) ||
(strcmp(implicit_vr,"SL") == 0) ||
(strcmp(implicit_vr,"FL") == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strcmp(implicit_vr,"FD") != 0)
quantum=1;
else
quantum=8;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((sequence == MagickFalse) && (group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=(int) ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
else
datum=(int) ReadBlobShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=(int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
else
datum=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
else
if ((unsigned int) datum == 0xFFFFFFFFU)
{
sequence=MagickTrue;
continue;
}
if ((unsigned int) ((group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
sequence=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
if (sequence != MagickFalse)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
subtype,
type;
type=0;
subtype=0;
(void) sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,&subtype);
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MaxTextExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
bytes_per_pixel=2;
depth=bits_allocated;
if (depth > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=(1UL << bits_allocated)-1;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (significant_bits > 8)
bytes_per_pixel=2;
depth=significant_bits;
if (depth > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=(1UL << significant_bits)-1;
mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(significant_bits);
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
window_center=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
window_width=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char*) data,"INVERSE", 7) == 0))
polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (signed_data == 0xffff)
signed_data=(size_t) (significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for ( ; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"jpeg:%s",
filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"j2k:%s",
filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property));
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
size_t
length;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1);
scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*scale));
if (scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1); i++)
scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
break;
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=depth;
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
if ((image->colormap == (PixelPacket *) NULL) && (samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,one << depth) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
bytes_per_pixel=1;
depth=8;
}
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
stream_info->remaining-=64;
}
if ((samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
int
byte;
LongPixelPacket
pixel;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
byte=0;
i=0;
if ((window_center != 0) && (window_width == 0))
window_width=(size_t) window_center;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
window_width=0;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=polarity != MagickFalse ? ((int) max_value-
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((bits_allocated != 12) || (significant_bits != 12))
pixel_value=(int) (polarity != MagickFalse ? (max_value-
ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image));
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=(int) ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
index=pixel_value;
if (window_width == 0)
{
if (signed_data == 1)
index=pixel_value-32767;
}
else
{
ssize_t
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=(ssize_t) ceil((double) window_center-
(window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=(ssize_t) floor((double) window_center+
(window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if ((ssize_t) pixel_value <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if ((ssize_t) pixel_value > window_max)
index=(int) max_value;
else
index=(int) (max_value*(((pixel_value-window_center-
0.5)/(window_width-1))+0.5));
}
index&=mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) index);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
pixel.red=1U*image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=1U*image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=1U*image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=mask;
pixel.green&=mask;
pixel.blue&=mask;
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
pixel.red=scale[pixel.red];
pixel.green=scale[pixel.green];
pixel.blue=scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
SetPixelRed(q,pixel.red);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel.green);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel.blue);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=polarity != MagickFalse ? ((int) max_value-
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((bits_allocated != 12) || (significant_bits != 12))
{
pixel_value=(int) (polarity != MagickFalse ? (max_value-
ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image));
if (signed_data == 1)
pixel_value=((signed short) pixel_value);
}
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=(int) ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
index=pixel_value;
if (window_width == 0)
{
if (signed_data == 1)
index=pixel_value-32767;
}
else
{
ssize_t
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=(ssize_t) ceil((double) window_center-
(window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=(ssize_t) floor((double) window_center+
(window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if ((ssize_t) pixel_value <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if ((ssize_t) pixel_value > window_max)
index=(int) max_value;
else
index=(int) (max_value*(((pixel_value-window_center-
0.5)/(window_width-1))+0.5));
}
index&=mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) index);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)) |
(((size_t) index) << 8)));
pixel.red=1U*image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=1U*image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=1U*image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=mask;
pixel.green&=mask;
pixel.blue&=mask;
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
pixel.red=scale[pixel.red];
pixel.green=scale[pixel.green];
pixel.blue=scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
SetPixelRed(q,(((size_t) GetPixelRed(q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.red) << 8)));
SetPixelGreen(q,(((size_t) GetPixelGreen(q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.green) << 8)));
SetPixelBlue(q,(((size_t) GetPixelBlue(q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.blue) << 8)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (IsGrayImage(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rds_loop_xmit(struct rds_connection *conn, struct rds_message *rm,
unsigned int hdr_off, unsigned int sg,
unsigned int off)
{
/* Do not send cong updates to loopback */
if (rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags & RDS_FLAG_CONG_BITMAP) {
rds_cong_map_updated(conn->c_fcong, ~(u64) 0);
return sizeof(struct rds_header) + RDS_CONG_MAP_BYTES;
}
BUG_ON(hdr_off || sg || off);
rds_inc_init(&rm->m_inc, conn, conn->c_laddr);
/* For the embedded inc. Matching put is in loop_inc_free() */
rds_message_addref(rm);
rds_recv_incoming(conn, conn->c_laddr, conn->c_faddr, &rm->m_inc,
GFP_KERNEL, KM_USER0);
rds_send_drop_acked(conn, be64_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_sequence),
NULL);
rds_inc_put(&rm->m_inc);
return sizeof(struct rds_header) + be32_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38 does not properly handle congestion map updates, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON and system crash) via vectors involving (1) a loopback (aka loop) transmit operation or (2) an InfiniBand (aka ib) transmit operation.
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,900
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_options *opt)
{
struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
u8 *hash_location;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
struct sock *ret = sk;
struct request_sock *req;
int mss;
struct rtable *rt;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
bool ecn_ok;
if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
goto out;
if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk) ||
(mss = cookie_check(skb, cookie)) == 0) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
goto out;
}
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
/* check for timestamp cookie support */
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &hash_location, 0);
if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt, &ecn_ok))
goto out;
ret = NULL;
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
if (!req)
goto out;
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
treq = tcp_rsk(req);
treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
treq->snt_isn = cookie;
req->mss = mss;
ireq->loc_port = th->dest;
ireq->rmt_port = th->source;
ireq->loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
ireq->rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
ireq->ecn_ok = ecn_ok;
ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
/* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
* the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
*/
if (opt && opt->optlen) {
int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options) + opt->optlen;
ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(ireq->opt, skb)) {
kfree(ireq->opt);
ireq->opt = NULL;
}
}
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
reqsk_free(req);
goto out;
}
req->expires = 0UL;
req->retrans = 0;
/*
* We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
* window size. We should better make sure that the window size
* hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
* no easy way to do this.
*/
{
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, 0, sk->sk_mark, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->loc_addr, th->source, th->dest);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
reqsk_free(req);
goto out;
}
}
/* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
&req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
out: return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,569
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ih264d decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles slice numbers, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28673410.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix slice number increment for error clips
Bug: 28673410
|
Low
| 173,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::setRemoteDescription(const WebRTCVoidRequest& request, const WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor& remoteDescription)
{
if (!remoteDescription.isNull() && remoteDescription.type() == "answer") {
m_remoteDescription = remoteDescription;
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, true));
} else
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, false));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::MaybeSetSyncTabsInNigoriNode(
const ModelTypeSet enabled_types) {
if (initialized_ && enabled_types.Has(syncable::SESSIONS)) {
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
WriteNode node(&trans);
if (node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag) != sync_api::BaseNode::INIT_OK) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unable to set 'sync_tabs' bit because Nigori node not "
<< "found.";
return;
}
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics specifics(node.GetNigoriSpecifics());
specifics.set_sync_tabs(true);
node.SetNigoriSpecifics(specifics);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: lib_file_open(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile)
{ /* i_ctx_p is NULL running arg (@) files.
* lib_path and mem are never NULL
*/
bool starting_arg_file = (i_ctx_p == NULL) ? true : i_ctx_p->starting_arg_file;
bool search_with_no_combine = false;
bool search_with_combine = false;
char fmode[2] = { 'r', 0};
gx_io_device *iodev = iodev_default(mem);
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory(mem);
int code;
/* when starting arg files (@ files) iodev_default is not yet set */
if (iodev == 0)
iodev = (gx_io_device *)gx_io_device_table[0];
search_with_combine = false;
} else {
search_with_no_combine = starting_arg_file;
search_with_combine = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Ghostscript before 9.21 might allow remote attackers to bypass the SAFER mode protection mechanism and consequently read arbitrary files via the use of the .libfile operator in a crafted postscript document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
int* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int encoded_pixels;
int rle_size;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (int*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
rle_size = gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx);
if (rle_size <= 0) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < rle_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & ~TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + pixel_block_size > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size) > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The read_image_tga function in gd_tga.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted TGA file, related to the decompression buffer.
Commit Message: Fix OOB reads of the TGA decompression buffer
It is possible to craft TGA files which will overflow the decompression
buffer, but not the image's bitmap. Therefore we also have to check for
potential decompression buffer overflows.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org;
a modified case exposing an off-by-one error of the first patch had been
provided by Konrad Beckmann.
This commit is an amendment to commit fb0e0cce, so we use CVE-2016-6906
as well.
|
Medium
| 170,120
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static uint32_t readU32(const uint8_t* data, size_t offset) {
return data[offset] << 24 | data[offset + 1] << 16 | data[offset + 2] << 8 | data[offset + 3];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Integer overflow in the getCoverageFormat12 function in CmapCoverage.cpp in the Minikin library in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G and 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (continuous rebooting) via an application that triggers loading of a crafted TTF font, aka internal bug 25645298.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in parsing fonts
A malformed TTF can cause size calculations to overflow. This patch
checks the maximum reasonable value so that the total size fits in 32
bits. It also adds some explicit casting to avoid possible technical
undefined behavior when parsing sized unsigned values.
Bug: 25645298
Change-Id: Id4716132041a6f4f1fbb73ec4e445391cf7d9616
(cherry picked from commit 183c9ec2800baa2ce099ee260c6cbc6121cf1274)
|
Low
| 173,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char *suhosin_decrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key, char **where TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
int o_name_len = name_len;
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
decrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
memcpy(*where, name, o_name_len);
*where += o_name_len;
**where = '='; *where +=1;
memcpy(*where, value, value_len);
*where += value_len;
return *where;
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto decrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_decrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key, &l, SUHOSIN_G(cookie_checkraddr) TSRMLS_CC);
if (d == NULL) {
goto skip_cookie;
}
d_url = php_url_encode(d, l, &l);
efree(d);
memcpy(*where, name, o_name_len);
*where += o_name_len;
**where = '=';*where += 1;
memcpy(*where, d_url, l);
*where += l;
efree(d_url);
skip_cookie:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return *where;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie function in the transparent cookie-encryption feature in the Suhosin extension before 0.9.33 for PHP, when suhosin.cookie.encrypt and suhosin.multiheader are enabled, might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long string that is used in a Set-Cookie HTTP header.
Commit Message: Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory)
|
High
| 165,649
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("CACHE");
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MPC");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMPCImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMPCImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMPC;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/mpc.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-1 does not enable seekable streams and thus cannot validate blob sizes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an image received from stdin.
Commit Message: ...
|
Medium
| 170,040
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CCLayerTreeHostTest()
: m_beginning(false)
, m_endWhenBeginReturns(false)
, m_running(false)
, m_timedOut(false)
{
m_webThread = adoptPtr(webKitPlatformSupport()->createThread("CCLayerTreeHostTest"));
WebCompositor::setThread(m_webThread.get());
#if USE(THREADED_COMPOSITING)
m_settings.enableCompositorThread = true;
#else
m_settings.enableCompositorThread = false;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,290
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_get_val (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = obj->val;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static TPM_RC StartAuthSession(TSS2_SYS_CONTEXT *sapi_context, SESSION *session )
{
TPM_RC rval;
TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET key;
char label[] = "ATH";
UINT16 bytes;
int i;
key.t.size = 0;
if( session->nonceOlder.t.size == 0 )
{
/* this is an internal routine to TSS and should be removed */
session->nonceOlder.t.size = GetDigestSize( TPM_ALG_SHA1 );
for( i = 0; i < session->nonceOlder.t.size; i++ )
session->nonceOlder.t.buffer[i] = 0;
}
session->nonceNewer.t.size = session->nonceOlder.t.size;
rval = Tss2_Sys_StartAuthSession( sapi_context, session->tpmKey, session->bind, 0,
&( session->nonceOlder ), &( session->encryptedSalt ), session->sessionType,
&( session->symmetric ), session->authHash, &( session->sessionHandle ),
&( session->nonceNewer ), 0 );
if( rval == TPM_RC_SUCCESS )
{
if( session->tpmKey == TPM_RH_NULL )
session->salt.t.size = 0;
if( session->bind == TPM_RH_NULL )
session->authValueBind.t.size = 0;
if( session->tpmKey == TPM_RH_NULL && session->bind == TPM_RH_NULL )
{
session->sessionKey.b.size = 0;
}
else
{
bool result = string_bytes_concat_buffer( (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&key, &( session->authValueBind.b ) );
if (!result)
{
return TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
}
result = string_bytes_concat_buffer( (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&key, &( session->salt.b ) );
if (!result)
{
return TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
}
bytes = GetDigestSize( session->authHash );
if( key.t.size == 0 )
{
session->sessionKey.t.size = 0;
}
else
{
rval = tpm_kdfa(sapi_context, session->authHash, &(key.b), label, &( session->nonceNewer.b ),
&( session->nonceOlder.b ), bytes * 8, (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&( session->sessionKey ) );
}
if( rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS )
{
return( TSS2_APP_RC_CREATE_SESSION_KEY_FAILED );
}
}
session->nonceTpmDecrypt.b.size = 0;
session->nonceTpmEncrypt.b.size = 0;
session->nvNameChanged = 0;
}
return rval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-522
Summary: tpm2-tools versions before 1.1.1 are vulnerable to a password leak due to transmitting password in plaintext from client to server when generating HMAC.
Commit Message: kdfa: use openssl for hmac not tpm
While not reachable in the current code base tools, a potential
security bug lurked in tpm_kdfa().
If using that routine for an hmac authorization, the hmac was
calculated using the tpm. A user of an object wishing to
authenticate via hmac, would expect that the password is never
sent to the tpm. However, since the hmac calculation relies on
password, and is performed by the tpm, the password ends up
being sent in plain text to the tpm.
The fix is to use openssl to generate the hmac on the host.
Fixes: CVE-2017-7524
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
|
Low
| 168,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CastCastView::CastCastView(CastConfigDelegate* cast_config_delegate)
: cast_config_delegate_(cast_config_delegate) {
set_background(views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kBackgroundColor));
ui::ResourceBundle& bundle = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal,
kTrayPopupPaddingHorizontal, 0,
kTrayPopupPaddingBetweenItems));
icon_ = new FixedSizedImageView(0, kTrayPopupItemHeight);
icon_->SetImage(
bundle.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_UBER_TRAY_CAST_ENABLED).ToImageSkia());
AddChildView(icon_);
label_container_ = new views::View;
label_container_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
title_ = new views::Label;
title_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
title_->SetFontList(bundle.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::BoldFont));
label_container_->AddChildView(title_);
details_ = new views::Label;
details_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
details_->SetMultiLine(false);
details_->SetEnabledColor(kHeaderTextColorNormal);
label_container_->AddChildView(details_);
AddChildView(label_container_);
base::string16 stop_button_text =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetLocalizedString(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_CAST_STOP);
stop_button_ = new TrayPopupLabelButton(this, stop_button_text);
AddChildView(stop_button_);
UpdateLabel();
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the DocumentLoader::maybeCreateArchive function in core/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via crafted MHTML content, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
|
Medium
| 171,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Segment::ParseHeaders() {
long long total, available;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (total < 0) || (segment_stop <= total));
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
for (;;) {
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
break;
long long pos = m_pos;
const long long element_start = pos;
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return id;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return size;
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long element_size = size + pos - element_start;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
if (id == 0x0549A966) { // Segment Info ID
if (m_pInfo)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pInfo = new (std::nothrow)
SegmentInfo(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pInfo == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pInfo->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x0654AE6B) { // Tracks ID
if (m_pTracks)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pTracks = new (std::nothrow)
Tracks(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pTracks->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) { // Cues ID
if (m_pCues == NULL) {
m_pCues = new (std::nothrow)
Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pCues == NULL)
return -1;
}
} else if (id == 0x014D9B74) { // SeekHead ID
if (m_pSeekHead == NULL) {
m_pSeekHead = new (std::nothrow)
SeekHead(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pSeekHead == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pSeekHead->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
} else if (id == 0x0043A770) { // Chapters ID
if (m_pChapters == NULL) {
m_pChapters = new (std::nothrow)
Chapters(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pChapters == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pChapters->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
}
m_pos = pos + size; // consume payload
}
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
if (m_pInfo == NULL) // TODO: liberalize this behavior
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,856
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: processInternalEntity(XML_Parser parser, ENTITY *entity, XML_Bool betweenDecl) {
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity;
if (parser->m_freeInternalEntities) {
openEntity = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
} else {
openEntity
= (OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY));
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
entity->processed = 0;
openEntity->next = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity;
openEntity->entity = entity;
openEntity->startTagLevel = parser->m_tagLevel;
openEntity->betweenDecl = betweenDecl;
openEntity->internalEventPtr = NULL;
openEntity->internalEventEndPtr = NULL;
textStart = (char *)entity->textPtr;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, parser->m_tagLevel, parser->m_internalEncoding,
textStart, textEnd, &next, XML_FALSE);
if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
if (textEnd != next && parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - textStart);
parser->m_processor = internalEntityProcessor;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat before 2.2.8, crafted XML input could fool the parser into changing from DTD parsing to document parsing too early; a consecutive call to XML_GetCurrentLineNumber (or XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber) then resulted in a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
Low
| 169,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int yr_execute_code(
YR_RULES* rules,
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
int timeout,
time_t start_time)
{
int64_t mem[MEM_SIZE];
int32_t sp = 0;
uint8_t* ip = rules->code_start;
YR_VALUE args[MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS];
YR_VALUE *stack;
YR_VALUE r1;
YR_VALUE r2;
YR_VALUE r3;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
YR_RULE* current_rule = NULL;
#endif
YR_RULE* rule;
YR_MATCH* match;
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* function;
char* identifier;
char* args_fmt;
int i;
int found;
int count;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int stop = FALSE;
int cycle = 0;
int tidx = context->tidx;
int stack_size;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
clock_t start = clock();
#endif
yr_get_configuration(YR_CONFIG_STACK_SIZE, (void*) &stack_size);
stack = (YR_VALUE*) yr_malloc(stack_size * sizeof(YR_VALUE));
if (stack == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
while(!stop)
{
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_NOP:
break;
case OP_HALT:
assert(sp == 0); // When HALT is reached the stack should be empty.
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_PUSH:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP:
pop(r1);
break;
case OP_CLEAR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i] = 0;
break;
case OP_ADD_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (!is_undef(r2))
mem[r1.i] += r2.i;
break;
case OP_INCR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i]++;
break;
case OP_PUSH_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
mem[r1.i] = r2.i;
break;
case OP_SWAPUNDEF:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
{
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
}
else
{
push(r2);
}
break;
case OP_JNUNDEF:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1), ip);
break;
case OP_JLE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
push(r1);
push(r2);
ip = jmp_if(r1.i <= r2.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JTRUE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1) && r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JFALSE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(is_undef(r1) || !r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1) || is_undef(r2))
r1.i = 0;
else
r1.i = r1.i && r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
push(r2);
}
else if (is_undef(r2))
{
push(r1);
}
else
{
r1.i = r1.i || r2.i;
push(r1);
}
break;
case OP_NOT:
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.i= !r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_MOD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i % r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >> r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i << r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_NOT:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = ~r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i & r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i | r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_XOR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i ^ r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_PUSH_RULE:
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = rule->t_flags[tidx] & RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INIT_RULE:
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
current_rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
#endif
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case OP_MATCH_RULE:
pop(r1);
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
if (!is_undef(r1) && r1.i)
rule->t_flags[tidx] |= RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH;
else if (RULE_IS_GLOBAL(rule))
rule->ns->t_flags[tidx] |= NAMESPACE_TFLAGS_UNSATISFIED_GLOBAL;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
start = clock();
#endif
break;
case OP_OBJ_LOAD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.o = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
context->objects_table,
identifier,
NULL);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_FIELD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.o = yr_object_lookup_field(r1.o, identifier);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_VALUE:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
switch(r1.o->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
r1.i = ((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
if (isnan(((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.d = ((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
if (((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.p = ((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INDEX_ARRAY:
pop(r1); // index
pop(r2); // array
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
r1.o = yr_object_array_get_item(r2.o, 0, (int) r1.i);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_LOOKUP_DICT:
pop(r1); // key
pop(r2); // dictionary
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY);
r1.o = yr_object_dict_get_item(
r2.o, 0, r1.ss->c_string);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CALL:
args_fmt = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
i = (int) strlen(args_fmt);
count = 0;
while (i > 0)
{
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1)) // count the number of undefined args
count++;
args[i - 1] = r1;
i--;
}
pop(r2);
ensure_defined(r2);
if (count > 0)
{
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
}
function = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) r2.o;
result = ERROR_INTERNAL_FATAL_ERROR;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS; i++)
{
if (function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt == NULL)
break;
if (strcmp(function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt, args_fmt) == 0)
{
result = function->prototypes[i].code(args, context, function);
break;
}
}
assert(i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS);
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
r1.o = function->return_obj;
push(r1);
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case OP_FOUND:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FOUND_AT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
r1.i = 0;
push(r1);
break;
}
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL)
{
if (r1.i == match->base + match->offset)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
break;
}
if (r1.i < match->base + match->offset)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_FOUND_IN:
pop(r3);
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
match = r3.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL && !r3.i)
{
if (match->base + match->offset >= r1.i &&
match->base + match->offset <= r2.i)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
}
if (match->base + match->offset > r2.i)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_COUNT:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].count;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OFFSET:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->base + match->offset;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_LENGTH:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->match_length;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_OF:
found = 0;
count = 0;
pop(r1);
while (!is_undef(r1))
{
if (r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL)
found++;
count++;
pop(r1);
}
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
r1.i = found >= count ? 1 : 0;
else
r1.i = found >= r2.i ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FILESIZE:
r1.i = context->file_size;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_ENTRYPOINT:
r1.i = context->entry_point;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CONTAINS:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
r1.i = memmem(r1.ss->c_string, r1.ss->length,
r2.ss->c_string, r2.ss->length) != NULL;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_IMPORT:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
result = yr_modules_load((char*) r1.p, context);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_MATCHES:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r1.ss->length == 0)
{
r1.i = FALSE;
push(r1);
break;
}
result = yr_re_exec(
(uint8_t*) r2.re->code,
(uint8_t*) r1.ss->c_string,
r1.ss->length,
0,
r2.re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL,
&found);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
r1.i = found >= 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_TO_DBL:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r2 = stack[sp - r1.i];
if (is_undef(r2))
stack[sp - r1.i].i = UNDEFINED;
else
stack[sp - r1.i].d = (double) r2.i;
break;
case OP_STR_TO_BOOL:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.ss->length > 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i == r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i != r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i < r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i > r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i <= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i + r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i - r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i * r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i / r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = -r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d < r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d > r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d <= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d >= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d == r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d != r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d + r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d - r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d * r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d / r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = -r1.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_STR_EQ:
case OP_STR_NEQ:
case OP_STR_LT:
case OP_STR_LE:
case OP_STR_GT:
case OP_STR_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_STR_EQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) == 0);
break;
case OP_STR_NEQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) != 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) < 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) <= 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) > 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) >= 0);
break;
}
push(r1);
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
if (timeout > 0) // timeout == 0 means no timeout
{
if (++cycle == 10)
{
if (difftime(time(NULL), start_time) > timeout)
{
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
assert(current_rule != NULL);
current_rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
#endif
result = ERROR_SCAN_TIMEOUT;
stop = TRUE;
}
cycle = 0;
}
}
ip++;
}
yr_modules_unload_all(context);
yr_free(stack);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The sized_string_cmp function in libyara/sizedstr.c in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted rule.
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
|
Low
| 168,186
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static uint64_t ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64_t value;
reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value);
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Uninitialized data in media in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
|
Medium
| 173,019
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
{
union cpuid10_edx edx;
union cpuid10_eax eax;
union cpuid10_ebx ebx;
struct event_constraint *c;
unsigned int unused;
int version;
if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
case 0x6:
return p6_pmu_init();
case 0xb:
return knc_pmu_init();
case 0xf:
return p4_pmu_init();
}
return -ENODEV;
}
/*
* Check whether the Architectural PerfMon supports
* Branch Misses Retired hw_event or not.
*/
cpuid(10, &eax.full, &ebx.full, &unused, &edx.full);
if (eax.split.mask_length < ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTS_COUNT)
return -ENODEV;
version = eax.split.version_id;
if (version < 2)
x86_pmu = core_pmu;
else
x86_pmu = intel_pmu;
x86_pmu.version = version;
x86_pmu.num_counters = eax.split.num_counters;
x86_pmu.cntval_bits = eax.split.bit_width;
x86_pmu.cntval_mask = (1ULL << eax.split.bit_width) - 1;
x86_pmu.events_maskl = ebx.full;
x86_pmu.events_mask_len = eax.split.mask_length;
x86_pmu.max_pebs_events = min_t(unsigned, MAX_PEBS_EVENTS, x86_pmu.num_counters);
/*
* Quirk: v2 perfmon does not report fixed-purpose events, so
* assume at least 3 events:
*/
if (version > 1)
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed = max((int)edx.split.num_counters_fixed, 3);
/*
* v2 and above have a perf capabilities MSR
*/
if (version > 1) {
u64 capabilities;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES, capabilities);
x86_pmu.intel_cap.capabilities = capabilities;
}
intel_ds_init();
x86_add_quirk(intel_arch_events_quirk); /* Install first, so it runs last */
/*
* Install the hw-cache-events table:
*/
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case 14: /* 65 nm core solo/duo, "Yonah" */
pr_cont("Core events, ");
break;
case 15: /* original 65 nm celeron/pentium/core2/xeon, "Merom"/"Conroe" */
x86_add_quirk(intel_clovertown_quirk);
case 22: /* single-core 65 nm celeron/core2solo "Merom-L"/"Conroe-L" */
case 23: /* current 45 nm celeron/core2/xeon "Penryn"/"Wolfdale" */
case 29: /* six-core 45 nm xeon "Dunnington" */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, core2_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_core();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_core2_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_core2_pebs_event_constraints;
pr_cont("Core2 events, ");
break;
case 26: /* 45 nm nehalem, "Bloomfield" */
case 30: /* 45 nm nehalem, "Lynnfield" */
case 46: /* 45 nm nehalem-ex, "Beckton" */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, nehalem_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, nehalem_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_nhm();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_nehalem_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_nehalem_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.enable_all = intel_pmu_nhm_enable_all;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_nehalem_extra_regs;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.STALLED_CYCLES */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
/* UOPS_EXECUTED.CORE_ACTIVE_CYCLES,c=1,i=1 */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0xb1, .umask=0x3f, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
x86_add_quirk(intel_nehalem_quirk);
pr_cont("Nehalem events, ");
break;
case 28: /* Atom */
case 38: /* Lincroft */
case 39: /* Penwell */
case 53: /* Cloverview */
case 54: /* Cedarview */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, atom_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_atom();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_gen_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_atom_pebs_event_constraints;
pr_cont("Atom events, ");
break;
case 37: /* 32 nm nehalem, "Clarkdale" */
case 44: /* 32 nm nehalem, "Gulftown" */
case 47: /* 32 nm Xeon E7 */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, westmere_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, nehalem_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_nhm();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_westmere_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.enable_all = intel_pmu_nhm_enable_all;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_westmere_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_westmere_extra_regs;
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_HAS_RSP_1;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.STALLED_CYCLES */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
/* UOPS_EXECUTED.CORE_ACTIVE_CYCLES,c=1,i=1 */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0xb1, .umask=0x3f, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
pr_cont("Westmere events, ");
break;
case 42: /* SandyBridge */
case 45: /* SandyBridge, "Romely-EP" */
x86_add_quirk(intel_sandybridge_quirk);
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, snb_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, snb_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_snb();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_snb_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_snb_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_aliases = intel_pebs_aliases_snb;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_snb_extra_regs;
/* all extra regs are per-cpu when HT is on */
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_HAS_RSP_1;
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_NO_HT_SHARING;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.ANY,c=1,i=1 to count stall cycles */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
/* UOPS_DISPATCHED.THREAD,c=1,i=1 to count stall cycles*/
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0xb1, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
pr_cont("SandyBridge events, ");
break;
case 58: /* IvyBridge */
case 62: /* IvyBridge EP */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, snb_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, snb_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_snb();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_ivb_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_ivb_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_aliases = intel_pebs_aliases_snb;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_snb_extra_regs;
/* all extra regs are per-cpu when HT is on */
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_HAS_RSP_1;
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_NO_HT_SHARING;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.ANY,c=1,i=1 to count stall cycles */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
pr_cont("IvyBridge events, ");
break;
default:
switch (x86_pmu.version) {
case 1:
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_v1_event_constraints;
pr_cont("generic architected perfmon v1, ");
break;
default:
/*
* default constraints for v2 and up
*/
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_gen_event_constraints;
pr_cont("generic architected perfmon, ");
break;
}
}
if (x86_pmu.num_counters > INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) {
WARN(1, KERN_ERR "hw perf events %d > max(%d), clipping!",
x86_pmu.num_counters, INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC);
x86_pmu.num_counters = INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC;
}
x86_pmu.intel_ctrl = (1 << x86_pmu.num_counters) - 1;
if (x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed > INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED) {
WARN(1, KERN_ERR "hw perf events fixed %d > max(%d), clipping!",
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed, INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed = INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED;
}
x86_pmu.intel_ctrl |=
((1LL << x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed)-1) << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED;
if (x86_pmu.event_constraints) {
/*
* event on fixed counter2 (REF_CYCLES) only works on this
* counter, so do not extend mask to generic counters
*/
for_each_event_constraint(c, x86_pmu.event_constraints) {
if (c->cmask != X86_RAW_EVENT_MASK
|| c->idxmsk64 == INTEL_PMC_MSK_FIXED_REF_CYCLES) {
continue;
}
c->idxmsk64 |= (1ULL << x86_pmu.num_counters) - 1;
c->weight += x86_pmu.num_counters;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9, when the Performance Events Subsystem is enabled, specifies an incorrect bitmask, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (general protection fault and system crash) by attempting to set a reserved bit.
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 166,081
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
height,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+bytes_per_line % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/sun.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted SUN file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 170,125
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gss_wrap_iov (minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
int * conf_state;
gss_iov_buffer_desc * iov;
int iov_count;
{
/* EXPORT DELETE START */
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_wrap_iov_args(minor_status, context_handle,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
conf_state, iov, iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_wrap_iov) {
status = mech->gss_wrap_iov(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
/* EXPORT DELETE END */
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,031
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int bmpr_read_rle(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
if(!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 && rctx->bitcount==8) &&
!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4 && rctx->bitcount==4))
{
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression type incompatible with image type");
}
if(rctx->topdown) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression not allowed with top-down images");
}
rctx->img->imgtype = IW_IMGTYPE_RGBA;
rctx->img->bit_depth = 8;
rctx->img->bpr = iw_calc_bytesperrow(rctx->width,32);
rctx->img->pixels = (iw_byte*)iw_malloc_large(rctx->ctx,rctx->img->bpr,rctx->img->height);
if(!rctx->img->pixels) goto done;
if(!bmpr_read_rle_internal(rctx)) goto done;
if(!bmpr_has_transparency(rctx->img)) {
bmpr_strip_alpha(rctx->img);
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: imagew-main.c:960:12 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer underflow) via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c.
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
|
Medium
| 168,117
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EntrySync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitResolveLocalFileSystemSyncURL(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, const String& url, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL completedURL = worker.completeURL(url);
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem() || !secureContext->securityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
if (!completedURL.isValid()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(EncodingError, "the URL '" + url + "' is invalid.");
return 0;
}
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> resolveURLHelper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = ResolveURICallbacks::create(resolveURLHelper->successCallback(), resolveURLHelper->errorCallback(), &worker);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->resolveURL(&worker, completedURL, callbacks.release());
return resolveURLHelper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Segment::LoadCluster(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
for (;;)
{
const long result = DoLoadCluster(pos, len);
if (result <= 1)
return result;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Format string vulnerability in the php_snmp_error function in ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in an SNMP::get call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void OPENSSL_fork_child(void)
{
rand_fork();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-330
Summary: OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not being used in the default case. A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1c).
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,142
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int yyinput (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#else
static int input (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#endif
{
int c;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yy_hold_char;
if ( *yyg->yy_c_buf_p == YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR )
{
/* yy_c_buf_p now points to the character we want to return.
* If this occurs *before* the EOB characters, then it's a
* valid NUL; if not, then we've hit the end of the buffer.
*/
if ( yyg->yy_c_buf_p < &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[yyg->yy_n_chars] )
/* This was really a NUL. */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0';
else
{ /* need more input */
yy_size_t offset = yyg->yy_c_buf_p - yyg->yytext_ptr;
++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( yyscanner ) )
{
case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH:
/* This happens because yy_g_n_b()
* sees that we've accumulated a
* token and flags that we need to
* try matching the token before
* proceeding. But for input(),
* there's no matching to consider.
* So convert the EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH
* to EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE.
*/
/* Reset buffer status. */
re_yyrestart(yyin ,yyscanner);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE:
{
if ( re_yywrap(yyscanner ) )
return EOF;
if ( ! yyg->yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof )
YY_NEW_FILE;
#ifdef __cplusplus
return yyinput(yyscanner);
#else
return input(yyscanner);
#endif
}
case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN:
yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yytext_ptr + offset;
break;
}
}
}
c = *(unsigned char *) yyg->yy_c_buf_p; /* cast for 8-bit char's */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0'; /* preserve yytext */
yyg->yy_hold_char = *++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
if ( c == '\n' )
do{ yylineno++;
yycolumn=0;
}while(0)
;
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
|
Low
| 168,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static char* get_icu_value_internal( const char* loc_name , char* tag_name, int* result , int fromParseLocale)
{
char* tag_value = NULL;
int32_t tag_value_len = 512;
int singletonPos = 0;
char* mod_loc_name = NULL;
int grOffset = 0;
int32_t buflen = 512;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
if( strcmp(tag_name, LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG) != 0 ){
/* Handle grandfathered languages */
grOffset = findOffset( LOC_GRANDFATHERED , loc_name );
if( grOffset >= 0 ){
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_LANG_TAG)==0 ){
return estrdup(loc_name);
} else {
/* Since Grandfathered , no value , do nothing , retutn NULL */
return NULL;
}
}
if( fromParseLocale==1 ){
/* Handle singletons */
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_LANG_TAG)==0 ){
if( strlen(loc_name)>1 && (isIDPrefix(loc_name) == 1) ){
return estrdup(loc_name);
}
}
singletonPos = getSingletonPos( loc_name );
if( singletonPos == 0){
/* singleton at start of script, region , variant etc.
* or invalid singleton at start of language */
return NULL;
} else if( singletonPos > 0 ){
/* singleton at some position except at start
* strip off the singleton and rest of the loc_name */
mod_loc_name = estrndup ( loc_name , singletonPos-1);
}
} /* end of if fromParse */
} /* end of if != LOC_CANONICAL_TAG */
if( mod_loc_name == NULL){
mod_loc_name = estrdup(loc_name );
}
/* Proceed to ICU */
do{
tag_value = erealloc( tag_value , buflen );
tag_value_len = buflen;
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_SCRIPT_TAG)==0 ){
buflen = uloc_getScript ( mod_loc_name ,tag_value , tag_value_len , &status);
}
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_LANG_TAG )==0 ){
buflen = uloc_getLanguage ( mod_loc_name ,tag_value , tag_value_len , &status);
}
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_REGION_TAG)==0 ){
buflen = uloc_getCountry ( mod_loc_name ,tag_value , tag_value_len , &status);
}
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG)==0 ){
buflen = uloc_getVariant ( mod_loc_name ,tag_value , tag_value_len , &status);
}
if( strcmp(tag_name , LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG)==0 ){
buflen = uloc_canonicalize ( mod_loc_name ,tag_value , tag_value_len , &status);
}
if( U_FAILURE( status ) ) {
if( status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR ) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
continue;
}
/* Error in retriving data */
*result = 0;
if( tag_value ){
efree( tag_value );
}
if( mod_loc_name ){
efree( mod_loc_name);
}
return NULL;
}
} while( buflen > tag_value_len );
if( buflen ==0 ){
/* No value found */
*result = -1;
if( tag_value ){
efree( tag_value );
}
if( mod_loc_name ){
efree( mod_loc_name);
}
return NULL;
} else {
*result = 1;
}
if( mod_loc_name ){
efree( mod_loc_name);
}
return tag_value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void vnc_async_encoding_start(VncState *orig, VncState *local)
{
local->vnc_encoding = orig->vnc_encoding;
local->features = orig->features;
local->ds = orig->ds;
local->vd = orig->vd;
local->lossy_rect = orig->lossy_rect;
local->write_pixels = orig->write_pixels;
local->clientds = orig->clientds;
local->tight = orig->tight;
local->zlib = orig->zlib;
local->hextile = orig->hextile;
local->output = queue->buffer;
local->csock = -1; /* Don't do any network work on this thread */
buffer_reset(&local->output);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,469
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::free_input_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
if (bufferHdr == NULL || m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufferHdr - m_inp_mem_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Input Buffer index = %d",index);
if (index < drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount && drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Input Buffer index = %d",index);
if (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd > 0) {
struct vdec_setbuffer_cmd setbuffers;
setbuffers.buffer_type = VDEC_BUFFER_TYPE_INPUT;
memcpy (&setbuffers.buffer,&drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index],
sizeof (vdec_bufferpayload));
if (!secure_mode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("unmap the input buffer fd=%d",
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("unmap the input buffer size=%u address = %p",
(unsigned int)drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].mmaped_size,
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].bufferaddr);
munmap (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].bufferaddr,
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].mmaped_size);
}
close (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd);
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd = -1;
if (m_desc_buffer_ptr && m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].buf_addr) {
free(m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].buf_addr);
m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].buf_addr = NULL;
m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].desc_data_size = 0;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&drv_ctx.ip_buf_ion_info[index]);
#endif
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
Low
| 173,752
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void scsi_write_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_write_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
if (n) {
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_WRITE);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_writev(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_write_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEM);
}
} else {
/* Invoke completion routine to fetch data from host. */
scsi_write_complete(r, 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
|
High
| 169,923
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gamma_image_validate(gamma_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
/* Get some constants derived from the input and output file formats: */
PNG_CONST png_store* PNG_CONST ps = dp->this.ps;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_ct = dp->this.colour_type;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_bd = dp->this.bit_depth;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 w = dp->this.w;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 h = dp->this.h;
PNG_CONST size_t cbRow = dp->this.cbRow;
PNG_CONST png_byte out_ct = png_get_color_type(pp, pi);
PNG_CONST png_byte out_bd = png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi);
/* There are three sources of error, firstly the quantization in the
* file encoding, determined by sbit and/or the file depth, secondly
* the output (screen) gamma and thirdly the output file encoding.
*
* Since this API receives the screen and file gamma in double
* precision it is possible to calculate an exact answer given an input
* pixel value. Therefore we assume that the *input* value is exact -
* sample/maxsample - calculate the corresponding gamma corrected
* output to the limits of double precision arithmetic and compare with
* what libpng returns.
*
* Since the library must quantize the output to 8 or 16 bits there is
* a fundamental limit on the accuracy of the output of +/-.5 - this
* quantization limit is included in addition to the other limits
* specified by the paramaters to the API. (Effectively, add .5
* everywhere.)
*
* The behavior of the 'sbit' paramter is defined by section 12.5
* (sample depth scaling) of the PNG spec. That section forces the
* decoder to assume that the PNG values have been scaled if sBIT is
* present:
*
* png-sample = floor( input-sample * (max-out/max-in) + .5);
*
* This means that only a subset of the possible PNG values should
* appear in the input. However, the spec allows the encoder to use a
* variety of approximations to the above and doesn't require any
* restriction of the values produced.
*
* Nevertheless the spec requires that the upper 'sBIT' bits of the
* value stored in a PNG file be the original sample bits.
* Consequently the code below simply scales the top sbit bits by
* (1<<sbit)-1 to obtain an original sample value.
*
* Because there is limited precision in the input it is arguable that
* an acceptable result is any valid result from input-.5 to input+.5.
* The basic tests below do not do this, however if 'use_input_precision'
* is set a subsequent test is performed above.
*/
PNG_CONST unsigned int samples_per_pixel = (out_ct & 2U) ? 3U : 1U;
int processing;
png_uint_32 y;
PNG_CONST store_palette_entry *in_palette = dp->this.palette;
PNG_CONST int in_is_transparent = dp->this.is_transparent;
int out_npalette = -1;
int out_is_transparent = 0; /* Just refers to the palette case */
store_palette out_palette;
validate_info vi;
/* Check for row overwrite errors */
store_image_check(dp->this.ps, pp, 0);
/* Supply the input and output sample depths here - 8 for an indexed image,
* otherwise the bit depth.
*/
init_validate_info(&vi, dp, pp, in_ct==3?8:in_bd, out_ct==3?8:out_bd);
processing = (vi.gamma_correction > 0 && !dp->threshold_test)
|| in_bd != out_bd || in_ct != out_ct || vi.do_background;
/* TODO: FIX THIS: MAJOR BUG! If the transformations all happen inside
* the palette there is no way of finding out, because libpng fails to
* update the palette on png_read_update_info. Indeed, libpng doesn't
* even do the required work until much later, when it doesn't have any
* info pointer. Oops. For the moment 'processing' is turned off if
* out_ct is palette.
*/
if (in_ct == 3 && out_ct == 3)
processing = 0;
if (processing && out_ct == 3)
out_is_transparent = read_palette(out_palette, &out_npalette, pp, pi);
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep pRow = store_image_row(ps, pp, 0, y);
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, std, in_ct, in_bd, y);
if (processing)
{
unsigned int x;
for (x=0; x<w; ++x)
{
double alpha = 1; /* serves as a flag value */
/* Record the palette index for index images. */
PNG_CONST unsigned int in_index =
in_ct == 3 ? sample(std, 3, in_bd, x, 0) : 256;
PNG_CONST unsigned int out_index =
out_ct == 3 ? sample(std, 3, out_bd, x, 0) : 256;
/* Handle input alpha - png_set_background will cause the output
* alpha to disappear so there is nothing to check.
*/
if ((in_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 || (in_ct == 3 &&
in_is_transparent))
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int input_alpha = in_ct == 3 ?
dp->this.palette[in_index].alpha :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, samples_per_pixel);
unsigned int output_alpha = 65536 /* as a flag value */;
if (out_ct == 3)
{
if (out_is_transparent)
output_alpha = out_palette[out_index].alpha;
}
else if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0)
output_alpha = sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x,
samples_per_pixel);
if (output_alpha != 65536)
alpha = gamma_component_validate("alpha", &vi, input_alpha,
output_alpha, -1/*alpha*/, 0/*background*/);
else /* no alpha in output */
{
/* This is a copy of the calculation of 'i' above in order to
* have the alpha value to use in the background calculation.
*/
alpha = input_alpha >> vi.isbit_shift;
alpha /= vi.sbit_max;
}
}
/* Handle grayscale or RGB components. */
if ((in_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0) /* grayscale */
(void)gamma_component_validate("gray", &vi,
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0),
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 0), alpha/*component*/,
vi.background_red);
else /* RGB or palette */
{
(void)gamma_component_validate("red", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].red :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].red :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 0),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_red);
(void)gamma_component_validate("green", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].green :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 1),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].green :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 1),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_green);
(void)gamma_component_validate("blue", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].blue :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 2),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].blue :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 2),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_blue);
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(std, pRow, cbRow) != 0)
{
char msg[64];
/* No transform is expected on the threshold tests. */
sprintf(msg, "gamma: below threshold row %lu changed",
(unsigned long)y);
png_error(pp, msg);
}
} /* row (y) loop */
dp->this.ps->validated = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,612
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int write_output(void)
{
int fd;
struct filter_op *fop;
struct filter_header fh;
size_t ninst, i;
u_char *data;
/* conver the tree to an array of filter_op */
ninst = compile_tree(&fop);
if (fop == NULL)
return -E_NOTHANDLED;
/* create the file */
fd = open(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, 0644);
ON_ERROR(fd, -1, "Can't create file %s", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
/* display the message */
fprintf(stdout, " Writing output to \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
fflush(stdout);
/* compute the header */
fh.magic = htons(EC_FILTER_MAGIC);
strncpy(fh.version, EC_VERSION, sizeof(fh.version));
fh.data = sizeof(fh);
data = create_data_segment(&fh, fop, ninst);
/* write the header */
write(fd, &fh, sizeof(struct filter_header));
/* write the data segment */
write(fd, data, fh.code - fh.data);
/* write the instructions */
for (i = 0; i <= ninst; i++) {
print_progress_bar(&fop[i]);
write(fd, &fop[i], sizeof(struct filter_op));
}
close(fd);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
fprintf(stdout, " -> Script encoded into %d instructions.\n\n", (int)(i - 1));
return E_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The compile_tree function in ef_compiler.c in the Etterfilter utility in Ettercap 0.8.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted filter.
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
|
Medium
| 168,338
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned long error = 0;
/*
* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values.
*/
if (bits < 16) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL)
goto err;
bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
bitsq = bits - bitsp;
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* generate p and q */
for (;;) {
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
/* GCD != 1 */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
goto err;
for (;;) {
do {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
} while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
/* GCD != 1 */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
pr0 = &local_r0;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
pr0 = r0;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx))
goto err; /* d */
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
d = rsa->d;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
p = rsa->p;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx))
goto err;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok == -1) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
ok = 0;
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-327
Summary: The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0i-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0h). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2p-dev (Affected 1.0.2b-1.0.2o).
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ftrace_syscall_enter(void *data, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
{
struct trace_array *tr = data;
struct ftrace_event_file *ftrace_file;
struct syscall_trace_enter *entry;
struct syscall_metadata *sys_data;
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
struct ring_buffer *buffer;
unsigned long irq_flags;
int pc;
int syscall_nr;
int size;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
if (syscall_nr < 0)
return;
/* Here we're inside tp handler's rcu_read_lock_sched (__DO_TRACE) */
ftrace_file = rcu_dereference_sched(tr->enter_syscall_files[syscall_nr]);
if (!ftrace_file)
return;
if (ftrace_trigger_soft_disabled(ftrace_file))
return;
sys_data = syscall_nr_to_meta(syscall_nr);
if (!sys_data)
return;
size = sizeof(*entry) + sizeof(unsigned long) * sys_data->nb_args;
local_save_flags(irq_flags);
pc = preempt_count();
buffer = tr->trace_buffer.buffer;
event = trace_buffer_lock_reserve(buffer,
sys_data->enter_event->event.type, size, irq_flags, pc);
if (!event)
return;
entry = ring_buffer_event_data(event);
entry->nr = syscall_nr;
syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, 0, sys_data->nb_args, entry->args);
event_trigger_unlock_commit(ftrace_file, buffer, event, entry,
irq_flags, pc);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly handle private syscall numbers during use of the ftrace subsystem, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
Low
| 166,254
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cherokee_validator_ldap_check (cherokee_validator_ldap_t *ldap,
cherokee_connection_t *conn)
{
int re;
ret_t ret;
size_t size;
char *dn;
LDAPMessage *message;
LDAPMessage *first;
char *attrs[] = { LDAP_NO_ATTRS, NULL };
cherokee_validator_ldap_props_t *props = VAL_LDAP_PROP(ldap);
/* Sanity checks
*/
if ((conn->validator == NULL) ||
cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&conn->validator->user))
return ret_error;
size = cherokee_buffer_cnt_cspn (&conn->validator->user, 0, "*()");
if (size != conn->validator->user.len)
return ret_error;
/* Build filter
*/
ret = init_filter (ldap, props, conn);
if (ret != ret_ok)
return ret;
/* Search
*/
re = ldap_search_s (ldap->conn, props->basedn.buf, LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE, ldap->filter.buf, attrs, 0, &message);
if (re != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
LOG_ERROR (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_SEARCH,
props->filter.buf ? props->filter.buf : "");
return ret_error;
}
TRACE (ENTRIES, "subtree search (%s): done\n", ldap->filter.buf ? ldap->filter.buf : "");
/* Check that there a single entry
*/
re = ldap_count_entries (ldap->conn, message);
if (re != 1) {
ldap_msgfree (message);
return ret_not_found;
}
/* Pick up the first one
*/
first = ldap_first_entry (ldap->conn, message);
if (first == NULL) {
ldap_msgfree (message);
return ret_not_found;
}
/* Get DN
*/
dn = ldap_get_dn (ldap->conn, first);
if (dn == NULL) {
ldap_msgfree (message);
return ret_error;
}
ldap_msgfree (message);
/* Check that it's right
*/
ret = validate_dn (props, dn, conn->validator->passwd.buf);
if (ret != ret_ok)
return ret;
/* Disconnect from the LDAP server
*/
re = ldap_unbind_s (ldap->conn);
if (re != LDAP_SUCCESS)
return ret_error;
/* Validated!
*/
TRACE (ENTRIES, "Access to use %s has been granted\n", conn->validator->user.buf);
return ret_ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The cherokee_validator_ldap_check function in validator_ldap.c in Cherokee 1.2.103 and earlier, when LDAP is used, does not properly consider unauthenticated-bind semantics, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via an empty password.
Commit Message: Prevent the LDAP validator from accepting an empty password.
|
Medium
| 166,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: handle_associated_event(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
int idx, struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
mipspmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx);
data->period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
return;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, data, regs))
mipspmu->disable_event(idx);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void process_blob(struct rev_info *revs,
struct blob *blob,
show_object_fn show,
struct strbuf *path,
const char *name,
void *cb_data)
{
struct object *obj = &blob->object;
if (!revs->blob_objects)
return;
if (!obj)
die("bad blob object");
if (obj->flags & (UNINTERESTING | SEEN))
return;
obj->flags |= SEEN;
show(obj, path, name, cb_data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 167,418
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int alen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)addr;
struct sock *other;
unsigned int hash;
int err;
if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, alen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
alen = err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) &&
!unix_sk(sk)->addr && (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
restart:
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, alen, sock->type, hash, &err);
if (!other)
goto out;
unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
/* Apparently VFS overslept socket death. Retry. */
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
goto restart;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
} else {
/*
* 1003.1g breaking connected state with AF_UNSPEC
*/
other = NULL;
unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
}
/*
* If it was connected, reconnect.
*/
if (unix_peer(sk)) {
struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk);
unix_peer(sk) = other;
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
if (other != old_peer)
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, old_peer);
sock_put(old_peer);
} else {
unix_peer(sk) = other;
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
}
return 0;
out_unlock:
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,834
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::PreviewPageRendered(int page_number,
PdfMetafileSkia* metafile) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
if (!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable() ||
!print_preview_context_.generate_draft_pages()) {
DCHECK(!metafile);
return true;
}
if (!metafile) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(
PREVIEW_ERROR_PAGE_RENDERED_WITHOUT_METAFILE);
return false;
}
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params preview_page_params;
if (!CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem(*metafile,
&preview_page_params.metafile_data_handle)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem failed";
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_COPY_FAILED);
return false;
}
preview_page_params.data_size = metafile->GetDataSize();
preview_page_params.page_number = page_number;
preview_page_params.preview_request_id =
print_pages_params_->params.preview_request_id;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage(routing_id(), preview_page_params));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void uipc_wakeup_locked(void)
{
char sig_on = 1;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC SEND WAKE UP");
send(uipc_main.signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void esp_do_dma(ESPState *s)
{
uint32_t len;
int to_device;
len = s->dma_left;
if (s->do_cmd) {
trace_esp_do_dma(s->cmdlen, len);
s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, &s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen], len);
return;
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The esp_do_dma function in hw/scsi/esp.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with ESP/NCR53C9x controller emulation support, allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and QEMU process crash) or execute arbitrary code on the QEMU host via vectors involving DMA read into ESP command buffer.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetTouchpadLibrary(
TouchpadLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->touchpad_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,648
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GF_Err gf_sm_load_init(GF_SceneLoader *load)
{
GF_Err e = GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
char *ext, szExt[50];
/*we need at least a scene graph*/
if (!load || (!load->ctx && !load->scene_graph)
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM
|| (!load->fileName && !load->isom && !(load->flags & GF_SM_LOAD_FOR_PLAYBACK) )
#endif
) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (!load->type) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM
if (load->isom) {
load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_MP4;
} else
#endif
{
ext = (char *)strrchr(load->fileName, '.');
if (!ext) return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
if (!stricmp(ext, ".gz")) {
char *anext;
ext[0] = 0;
anext = (char *)strrchr(load->fileName, '.');
ext[0] = '.';
ext = anext;
}
strcpy(szExt, &ext[1]);
strlwr(szExt);
if (strstr(szExt, "bt")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_BT;
else if (strstr(szExt, "wrl")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_VRML;
else if (strstr(szExt, "x3dv")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3DV;
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_XMT
else if (strstr(szExt, "xmt") || strstr(szExt, "xmta")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA;
else if (strstr(szExt, "x3d")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3D;
#endif
else if (strstr(szExt, "swf")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_SWF;
else if (strstr(szExt, "mov")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_QT;
else if (strstr(szExt, "svg")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_SVG;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xsr")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XSR;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xbl")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XBL;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xml")) {
char *rtype = gf_xml_get_root_type(load->fileName, &e);
if (rtype) {
if (!strcmp(rtype, "SAFSession")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XSR;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "XMT-A")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "X3D")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3D;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "bindings")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XBL;
gf_free(rtype);
}
}
}
}
if (!load->type) return e;
if (!load->scene_graph) load->scene_graph = load->ctx->scene_graph;
switch (load->type) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_BT
case GF_SM_LOAD_BT:
case GF_SM_LOAD_VRML:
case GF_SM_LOAD_X3DV:
return gf_sm_load_init_bt(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_XMT
case GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA:
case GF_SM_LOAD_X3D:
return gf_sm_load_init_xmt(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SVG
case GF_SM_LOAD_SVG:
case GF_SM_LOAD_XSR:
case GF_SM_LOAD_DIMS:
return gf_sm_load_init_svg(load);
case GF_SM_LOAD_XBL:
e = gf_sm_load_init_xbl(load);
load->process = gf_sm_load_run_xbl;
load->done = gf_sm_load_done_xbl;
return e;
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SWF_IMPORT
case GF_SM_LOAD_SWF:
return gf_sm_load_init_swf(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_ISOM
case GF_SM_LOAD_MP4:
return gf_sm_load_init_isom(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_QTVR
case GF_SM_LOAD_QT:
return gf_sm_load_init_qt(load);
#endif
default:
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: GPAC version 0.7.1 and earlier has a buffer overflow vulnerability in the cat_multiple_files function in applications/mp4box/fileimport.c when MP4Box is used for a local directory containing crafted filenames.
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
|
Medium
| 169,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnDrm::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case INIT_CHECK:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(initCheck());
return OK;
}
case IS_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
String8 mimeType = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(isCryptoSchemeSupported(uuid, mimeType));
return OK;
}
case CREATE_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
reply->writeInt32(createPlugin(uuid));
return OK;
}
case DESTROY_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(destroyPlugin());
return OK;
}
case OPEN_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
status_t result = openSession(sessionId);
writeVector(reply, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case CLOSE_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(closeSession(sessionId));
return OK;
}
case GET_KEY_REQUEST:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, initData;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, initData);
String8 mimeType = data.readString8();
DrmPlugin::KeyType keyType = (DrmPlugin::KeyType)data.readInt32();
KeyedVector<String8, String8> optionalParameters;
uint32_t count = data.readInt32();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
String8 key, value;
key = data.readString8();
value = data.readString8();
optionalParameters.add(key, value);
}
Vector<uint8_t> request;
String8 defaultUrl;
DrmPlugin::KeyRequestType keyRequestType;
status_t result = getKeyRequest(sessionId, initData, mimeType,
keyType, optionalParameters, request, defaultUrl,
&keyRequestType);
writeVector(reply, request);
reply->writeString8(defaultUrl);
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(keyRequestType));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case PROVIDE_KEY_RESPONSE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, response, keySetId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, response);
uint32_t result = provideKeyResponse(sessionId, response, keySetId);
writeVector(reply, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case REMOVE_KEYS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> keySetId;
readVector(data, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(removeKeys(keySetId));
return OK;
}
case RESTORE_KEYS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keySetId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(restoreKeys(sessionId, keySetId));
return OK;
}
case QUERY_KEY_STATUS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
KeyedVector<String8, String8> infoMap;
status_t result = queryKeyStatus(sessionId, infoMap);
size_t count = infoMap.size();
reply->writeInt32(count);
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
reply->writeString8(infoMap.keyAt(i));
reply->writeString8(infoMap.valueAt(i));
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_PROVISION_REQUEST:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 certType = data.readString8();
String8 certAuthority = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> request;
String8 defaultUrl;
status_t result = getProvisionRequest(certType, certAuthority,
request, defaultUrl);
writeVector(reply, request);
reply->writeString8(defaultUrl);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case PROVIDE_PROVISION_RESPONSE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> response;
Vector<uint8_t> certificate;
Vector<uint8_t> wrappedKey;
readVector(data, response);
status_t result = provideProvisionResponse(response, certificate, wrappedKey);
writeVector(reply, certificate);
writeVector(reply, wrappedKey);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case UNPROVISION_DEVICE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
status_t result = unprovisionDevice();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
List<Vector<uint8_t> > secureStops;
status_t result = getSecureStops(secureStops);
size_t count = secureStops.size();
reply->writeInt32(count);
List<Vector<uint8_t> >::iterator iter = secureStops.begin();
while(iter != secureStops.end()) {
size_t size = iter->size();
reply->writeInt32(size);
reply->write(iter->array(), iter->size());
iter++;
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_SECURE_STOP:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> ssid, secureStop;
readVector(data, ssid);
status_t result = getSecureStop(ssid, secureStop);
writeVector(reply, secureStop);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case RELEASE_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> ssRelease;
readVector(data, ssRelease);
reply->writeInt32(releaseSecureStops(ssRelease));
return OK;
}
case RELEASE_ALL_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(releaseAllSecureStops());
return OK;
}
case GET_PROPERTY_STRING:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
String8 value;
status_t result = getPropertyString(name, value);
reply->writeString8(value);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> value;
status_t result = getPropertyByteArray(name, value);
writeVector(reply, value);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SET_PROPERTY_STRING:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
String8 value = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setPropertyString(name, value));
return OK;
}
case SET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> value;
readVector(data, value);
reply->writeInt32(setPropertyByteArray(name, value));
return OK;
}
case SET_CIPHER_ALGORITHM:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setCipherAlgorithm(sessionId, algorithm));
return OK;
}
case SET_MAC_ALGORITHM:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setMacAlgorithm(sessionId, algorithm));
return OK;
}
case ENCRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, input);
readVector(data, iv);
uint32_t result = encrypt(sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output);
writeVector(reply, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case DECRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, input);
readVector(data, iv);
uint32_t result = decrypt(sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output);
writeVector(reply, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SIGN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, message, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, message);
uint32_t result = sign(sessionId, keyId, message, signature);
writeVector(reply, signature);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case VERIFY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, message, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, message);
readVector(data, signature);
bool match;
uint32_t result = verify(sessionId, keyId, message, signature, match);
reply->writeInt32(match);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SIGN_RSA:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, message, wrappedKey, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
readVector(data, message);
readVector(data, wrappedKey);
uint32_t result = signRSA(sessionId, algorithm, message, wrappedKey, signature);
writeVector(reply, signature);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SET_LISTENER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
sp<IDrmClient> listener =
interface_cast<IDrmClient>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(setListener(listener));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: media/libmedia/IDrm.cpp in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not initialize a certain key-request data structure, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via unspecified vectors, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26323455.
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
|
Low
| 173,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::set_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void)hComp;
if (configData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: param is null");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: config called in Invalid state");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)configIndex) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config(): OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate (%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nEncodeBitrate);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_config(configData, OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = pParam->nEncodeBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = pParam->nEncodeBitrate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nEncodeBitrate;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port index: %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate:
{
OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config(): OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate (0x%x)", (unsigned int)pParam->xEncodeFramerate);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_config(configData, OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sConfigFramerate.xEncodeFramerate = pParam->xEncodeFramerate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.xFramerate = pParam->xEncodeFramerate;
m_sOutPortFormat.xFramerate = pParam->xEncodeFramerate;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port index: %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config(): QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_720P
if (pParam->nBFrames > 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("B frames not supported");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Old: P/B frames = %u/%u, New: P/B frames = %u/%u",
(unsigned int)m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames, (unsigned int)m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames,
(unsigned int)pParam->nPFrames, (unsigned int)pParam->nBFrames);
if (m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames != pParam->nBFrames) {
if(hier_b_enabled && m_state == OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_INFO("B-frames setting is supported if HierB is enabled");
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Dynamically changing B-frames not supported");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_config(configData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE) QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = pParam->nPFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = pParam->nBFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nIDRPeriod = pParam->nIDRPeriod;
if (m_sOutPortFormat.eCompressionFormat == OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4) {
m_sParamMPEG4.nPFrames = pParam->nPFrames;
if (m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileSimple)
m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = pParam->nBFrames;
else
m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = 0;
} else if (m_sOutPortFormat.eCompressionFormat == OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263) {
m_sParamH263.nPFrames = pParam->nPFrames;
} else {
m_sParamAVC.nPFrames = pParam->nPFrames;
if ((m_sParamAVC.eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline) &&
(m_sParamAVC.eProfile != (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE) QOMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileConstrainedBaseline))
m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = pParam->nBFrames;
else
m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = 0;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod) Unsupported port index: %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE* pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE*>(configData);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config(): OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_config(configData,
OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sConfigIntraRefreshVOP.IntraRefreshVOP = pParam->IntraRefreshVOP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port index: %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonRotate:
{
OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE *pParam =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE*>(configData);
OMX_S32 nRotation;
if (pParam->nPortIndex != PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port index: %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if ( pParam->nRotation == 0 ||
pParam->nRotation == 90 ||
pParam->nRotation == 180 ||
pParam->nRotation == 270 ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: Rotation Angle %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nRotation);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: un supported Rotation %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nRotation);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
nRotation = pParam->nRotation - m_sConfigFrameRotation.nRotation;
if (nRotation < 0)
nRotation = -nRotation;
if (nRotation == 90 || nRotation == 270) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: updating device Dims");
if (handle->venc_set_config(configData,
OMX_IndexConfigCommonRotate) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set OMX_IndexConfigCommonRotate failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
OMX_U32 nFrameWidth;
OMX_U32 nFrameHeight;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: updating port Dims");
nFrameWidth = m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nFrameWidth;
nFrameHeight = m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nFrameHeight;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nFrameWidth = nFrameHeight;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nFrameHeight = nFrameWidth;
m_sConfigFrameRotation.nRotation = pParam->nRotation;
}
} else {
m_sConfigFrameRotation.nRotation = pParam->nRotation;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoFramePackingArrangement:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config(): OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoFramePackingArrangement");
if (m_sOutPortFormat.eCompressionFormat == OMX_VIDEO_CodingAVC) {
OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT *configFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT *) configData;
extra_data_handle.set_frame_pack_data(configFmt);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: FramePackingData not supported for non AVC compression");
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoLTRPeriod:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRPERIOD_TYPE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRPERIOD_TYPE*)configData;
if (!handle->venc_set_config(configData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexConfigVideoLTRPeriod)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR period failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sConfigLTRPeriod, pParam, sizeof(m_sConfigLTRPeriod));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame:
{
OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE*) configData;
if (!handle->venc_set_config(pParam, (OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting VP8 reference frame");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sConfigVp8ReferenceFrame, pParam, sizeof(m_sConfigVp8ReferenceFrame));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoLTRUse:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRUSE_TYPE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRUSE_TYPE*)configData;
if (!handle->venc_set_config(pParam, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexConfigVideoLTRUse)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR use failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sConfigLTRUse, pParam, sizeof(m_sConfigLTRUse));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoLTRMark:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRMARK_TYPE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRMARK_TYPE*)configData;
if (!handle->venc_set_config(pParam, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexConfigVideoLTRMark)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR mark failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD *pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD*) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod");
if (!handle->venc_set_config(pParam, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sConfigAVCIDRPeriod, pParam, sizeof(m_sConfigAVCIDRPeriod));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE *pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE*) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config: OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace");
if (!handle->venc_set_config(pParam, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sConfigDeinterlace, pParam, sizeof(m_sConfigDeinterlace));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoVencPerfMode:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_PERFMODE* pParam = (QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_PERFMODE*)configData;
if (!handle->venc_set_config(pParam, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoVencPerfMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoVencPerfMode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigPriority:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_config(configData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexConfigPriority)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set OMX_IndexConfigPriority");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_config(configData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate");
return handle->hw_overload ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: unsupported index %d", (int) configIndex);
break;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
|
Medium
| 173,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::CreateMessageFilters() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
AddFilter(new ResourceSchedulerFilter(GetID()));
MediaInternals* media_internals = MediaInternals::GetInstance();
scoped_refptr<BrowserPluginMessageFilter> bp_message_filter(
new BrowserPluginMessageFilter(GetID()));
AddFilter(bp_message_filter.get());
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> request_context(
storage_partition_impl_->GetURLRequestContext());
scoped_refptr<RenderMessageFilter> render_message_filter(
new RenderMessageFilter(
GetID(), GetBrowserContext(), request_context.get(),
widget_helper_.get(), media_internals,
storage_partition_impl_->GetDOMStorageContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetCacheStorageContext()));
AddFilter(render_message_filter.get());
render_frame_message_filter_ = new RenderFrameMessageFilter(
GetID(),
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
PluginServiceImpl::GetInstance(),
#else
nullptr,
#endif
GetBrowserContext(),
request_context.get(),
widget_helper_.get());
AddFilter(render_frame_message_filter_.get());
BrowserContext* browser_context = GetBrowserContext();
ResourceContext* resource_context = browser_context->GetResourceContext();
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> media_request_context(
GetStoragePartition()->GetMediaURLRequestContext());
ResourceMessageFilter::GetContextsCallback get_contexts_callback(
base::Bind(&GetContexts, browser_context->GetResourceContext(),
request_context, media_request_context));
scoped_refptr<ChromeBlobStorageContext> blob_storage_context =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(browser_context);
resource_message_filter_ = new ResourceMessageFilter(
GetID(), storage_partition_impl_->GetAppCacheService(),
blob_storage_context.get(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetFileSystemContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetServiceWorkerContext(),
get_contexts_callback);
AddFilter(resource_message_filter_.get());
media::AudioManager* audio_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->audio_manager();
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager();
audio_input_renderer_host_ = new AudioInputRendererHost(
GetID(), base::GetProcId(GetHandle()), audio_manager,
media_stream_manager, AudioMirroringManager::GetInstance(),
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->user_input_monitor());
AddFilter(audio_input_renderer_host_.get());
audio_renderer_host_ = new AudioRendererHost(
GetID(), audio_manager, AudioMirroringManager::GetInstance(),
media_stream_manager,
browser_context->GetResourceContext()->GetMediaDeviceIDSalt());
AddFilter(audio_renderer_host_.get());
AddFilter(
new MidiHost(GetID(), BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->midi_service()));
AddFilter(new AppCacheDispatcherHost(
storage_partition_impl_->GetAppCacheService(), GetID()));
AddFilter(new ClipboardMessageFilter(blob_storage_context));
AddFilter(new DOMStorageMessageFilter(
storage_partition_impl_->GetDOMStorageContext()));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
peer_connection_tracker_host_ = new PeerConnectionTrackerHost(
GetID(), webrtc_eventlog_host_.GetWeakPtr());
AddFilter(peer_connection_tracker_host_.get());
AddFilter(new MediaStreamDispatcherHost(
GetID(), browser_context->GetResourceContext()->GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
media_stream_manager));
AddFilter(new MediaStreamTrackMetricsHost());
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
AddFilter(new PepperRendererConnection(GetID()));
#endif
AddFilter(new SpeechRecognitionDispatcherHost(
GetID(), storage_partition_impl_->GetURLRequestContext()));
AddFilter(new FileAPIMessageFilter(
GetID(), storage_partition_impl_->GetURLRequestContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetFileSystemContext(),
blob_storage_context.get(), StreamContext::GetFor(browser_context)));
AddFilter(new BlobDispatcherHost(
GetID(), blob_storage_context,
make_scoped_refptr(storage_partition_impl_->GetFileSystemContext())));
AddFilter(new FileUtilitiesMessageFilter(GetID()));
AddFilter(
new DatabaseMessageFilter(storage_partition_impl_->GetDatabaseTracker()));
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
AddFilter(new TextInputClientMessageFilter());
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
AddFilter(new DWriteFontProxyMessageFilter());
channel_->AddFilter(new FontCacheDispatcher());
#endif
message_port_message_filter_ = new MessagePortMessageFilter(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHelper::GetNextRoutingID,
base::Unretained(widget_helper_.get())));
AddFilter(message_port_message_filter_.get());
scoped_refptr<CacheStorageDispatcherHost> cache_storage_filter =
new CacheStorageDispatcherHost();
cache_storage_filter->Init(storage_partition_impl_->GetCacheStorageContext());
AddFilter(cache_storage_filter.get());
scoped_refptr<ServiceWorkerDispatcherHost> service_worker_filter =
new ServiceWorkerDispatcherHost(
GetID(), message_port_message_filter_.get(), resource_context);
service_worker_filter->Init(
storage_partition_impl_->GetServiceWorkerContext());
AddFilter(service_worker_filter.get());
AddFilter(new SharedWorkerMessageFilter(
GetID(), resource_context,
WorkerStoragePartition(
storage_partition_impl_->GetURLRequestContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetMediaURLRequestContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetAppCacheService(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetQuotaManager(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetFileSystemContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetDatabaseTracker(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetIndexedDBContext(),
storage_partition_impl_->GetServiceWorkerContext()),
message_port_message_filter_.get()));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_host_ = new P2PSocketDispatcherHost(
resource_context, request_context.get());
AddFilter(p2p_socket_dispatcher_host_.get());
#endif
AddFilter(new TraceMessageFilter(GetID()));
AddFilter(new ResolveProxyMsgHelper(request_context.get()));
AddFilter(new QuotaDispatcherHost(
GetID(), storage_partition_impl_->GetQuotaManager(),
GetContentClient()->browser()->CreateQuotaPermissionContext()));
scoped_refptr<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper> service_worker_context(
static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
storage_partition_impl_->GetServiceWorkerContext()));
notification_message_filter_ = new NotificationMessageFilter(
GetID(), storage_partition_impl_->GetPlatformNotificationContext(),
resource_context, service_worker_context, browser_context);
AddFilter(notification_message_filter_.get());
AddFilter(new ProfilerMessageFilter(PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER));
AddFilter(new HistogramMessageFilter());
AddFilter(new MemoryMessageFilter(this));
AddFilter(new PushMessagingMessageFilter(
GetID(), storage_partition_impl_->GetServiceWorkerContext()));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
AddFilter(new ScreenOrientationListenerAndroid());
synchronous_compositor_filter_ =
new SynchronousCompositorBrowserFilter(GetID());
AddFilter(synchronous_compositor_filter_.get());
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
Low
| 171,987
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestProcessOverflow() {
int tab_count = 1;
int host_count = 1;
WebContents* tab1 = NULL;
WebContents* tab2 = NULL;
content::RenderProcessHost* rph1 = NULL;
content::RenderProcessHost* rph2 = NULL;
content::RenderProcessHost* rph3 = NULL;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
LoadExtension(test_data_dir_.AppendASCII("options_page"));
GURL omnibox(chrome::kChromeUIOmniboxURL);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), omnibox);
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
rph1 = tab1->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(omnibox, tab1->GetURL());
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
GURL page1("data:text/html,hello world1");
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer1(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), page1);
observer1.Wait();
tab_count++;
host_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
rph2 = tab1->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(tab1->GetURL(), page1);
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_NE(rph1, rph2);
GURL page2("data:text/html,hello world2");
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer2(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), page2);
observer2.Wait();
tab_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetURL(), page2);
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess(), rph2);
GURL history(chrome::kChromeUIHistoryURL);
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer3(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), history);
observer3.Wait();
tab_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetURL(), GURL(history));
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess(), rph1);
GURL extension_url("chrome-extension://" + extension->id());
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer4(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), extension_url);
observer4.Wait();
tab_count++;
host_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
rph3 = tab1->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(tab1->GetURL(), extension_url);
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_NE(rph1, rph3);
EXPECT_NE(rph2, rph3);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in site isolation in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
|
Medium
| 173,180
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
scoped_ptr<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
nacl_ipc_proxy_ = true;
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy.release());
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,745
|
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