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stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateEffect() {
DCHECK(properties_);
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
const auto* output_clip =
object_.IsSVGChild() ? context_.current.clip : nullptr;
if (NeedsEffect(object_)) {
base::Optional<IntRect> mask_clip = CSSMaskPainter::MaskBoundingBox(
object_, context_.current.paint_offset);
bool has_clip_path =
style.ClipPath() && fragment_data_.ClipPathBoundingBox();
bool has_spv1_composited_clip_path =
has_clip_path && object_.HasLayer() &&
ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object_).Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping();
bool has_mask_based_clip_path =
has_clip_path && !fragment_data_.ClipPathPath();
base::Optional<IntRect> clip_path_clip;
if (has_spv1_composited_clip_path || has_mask_based_clip_path) {
clip_path_clip = fragment_data_.ClipPathBoundingBox();
}
if ((mask_clip || clip_path_clip) &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
IntRect combined_clip = mask_clip ? *mask_clip : *clip_path_clip;
if (mask_clip && clip_path_clip)
combined_clip.Intersect(*clip_path_clip);
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateMaskClip(
context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{context_.current.transform,
FloatRoundedRect(combined_clip)}));
output_clip = properties_->MaskClip();
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearMaskClip());
}
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
state.output_clip = output_clip;
state.opacity = style.Opacity();
if (object_.IsBlendingAllowed()) {
state.blend_mode = WebCoreCompositeToSkiaComposite(
kCompositeSourceOver, style.GetBlendMode());
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
if (CompositingReasonFinder::RequiresCompositingForOpacityAnimation(
style)) {
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReason::kActiveOpacityAnimation;
}
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kPrimary);
}
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateEffect(context_.current_effect, std::move(state)));
if (mask_clip || has_spv1_composited_clip_path) {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State mask_state;
mask_state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
mask_state.output_clip = output_clip;
mask_state.color_filter = CSSMaskPainter::MaskColorFilter(object_);
mask_state.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
mask_state.compositor_element_id =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(),
CompositorElementIdNamespace::kEffectMask);
}
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateMask(properties_->Effect(),
std::move(mask_state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearMask());
}
if (has_mask_based_clip_path) {
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* parent = has_spv1_composited_clip_path
? properties_->Mask()
: properties_->Effect();
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State clip_path_state;
clip_path_state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
clip_path_state.output_clip = output_clip;
clip_path_state.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
clip_path_state.compositor_element_id =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(),
CompositorElementIdNamespace::kEffectClipPath);
}
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateClipPath(parent, std::move(clip_path_state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearClipPath());
}
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearEffect());
OnClear(properties_->ClearMask());
OnClear(properties_->ClearClipPath());
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearMaskClip());
}
}
if (properties_->Effect()) {
context_.current_effect = properties_->Effect();
if (properties_->MaskClip()) {
context_.current.clip = context_.absolute_position.clip =
context_.fixed_position.clip = properties_->MaskClip();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpDecodedStrips)
{
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
tdata_t buf = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
(void) imagewidth; (void) spp;
if (buf) {
tstrip_t s, ns = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
uint32 row = 0;
_TIFFmemset(buf, 0, stripsize);
for (s = 0; s < ns; s++) {
tsize_t cc = (row + rowsperstrip > imagelength) ?
TIFFVStripSize(in, imagelength - row) : stripsize;
if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip(in, s, buf, cc) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu",
(unsigned long) s);
goto bad;
}
if (TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(out, s, buf, cc) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write strip %lu",
(unsigned long) s);
goto bad;
}
row += rowsperstrip;
}
_TIFFfree(buf);
return 1;
} else {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't allocate memory buffer of size %lu "
"to read strips", (unsigned long) stripsize);
return 0;
}
bad:
_TIFFfree(buf);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-191
Summary: tools/tiffcp.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer underflow and heap-based buffer under-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, related to *READ of size 78490* and libtiff/tif_unix.c:115:23.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: avoid uint32 underflow in cpDecodedStrips that
can cause various issues, such as buffer overflows in the library.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2598
|
Medium
| 168,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::matchUARules(ElementRuleCollector& collector)
{
collector.setMatchingUARules(true);
if (CSSDefaultStyleSheets::simpleDefaultStyleSheet)
collector.matchedResult().isCacheable = false;
RuleSet* userAgentStyleSheet = m_medium->mediaTypeMatchSpecific("print")
? CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultPrintStyle : CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultStyle;
matchUARules(collector, userAgentStyleSheet);
if (document().inQuirksMode())
matchUARules(collector, CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultQuirksStyle);
if (document().isViewSource())
matchUARules(collector, CSSDefaultStyleSheets::viewSourceStyle());
collector.setMatchingUARules(false);
matchWatchSelectorRules(collector);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,585
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ip, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV4, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,211
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
int err;
if (!seed && slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
seed = buf;
}
err = tfm->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The rngapi_reset function in crypto/rng.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 167,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsEmulatedQueryTarget(GLenum target) const {
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
Medium
| 172,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging incorrect tracking of descriptor ownership and sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-4312.
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) == -1)
errExit("fchown");
if (chmod(dest, 0600) == -1)
errExit("fchmod");
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix
|
Low
| 170,100
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: email_close(FILE *mailer)
{
char *temp;
mode_t prev_umask;
priv_state priv;
char *customSig;
if ( mailer == NULL ) {
return;
}
/* Want the letter to come from "condor" if possible */
priv = set_condor_priv();
customSig = NULL;
if ((customSig = param("EMAIL_SIGNATURE")) != NULL) {
fprintf( mailer, "\n\n");
fprintf( mailer, customSig);
fprintf( mailer, "\n");
free(customSig);
} else {
/* Put a signature on the bottom of the email */
fprintf( mailer, "\n\n-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=\n" );
fprintf( mailer, "Questions about this message or Condor in general?\n" );
/* See if there's an address users should use for help */
temp = param( "CONDOR_SUPPORT_EMAIL" );
if( ! temp ) {
temp = param( "CONDOR_ADMIN" );
}
if( temp ) {
fprintf( mailer, "Email address of the local Condor administrator: "
"%s\n", temp );
free( temp );
}
fprintf( mailer, "The Official Condor Homepage is "
"http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor\n" );
}
fflush(mailer);
/* there are some oddities with how pclose can close a file. In some
arches, pclose will create temp files for locking and they need to
be of the correct perms in order to be deleted. So the umask is
set to something useable for the close operation. -pete 9/11/99
*/
prev_umask = umask(022);
/*
** we fclose() on UNIX, pclose on win32
*/
#if defined(WIN32)
if (EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND == NULL) {
my_pclose( mailer );
} else {
char *email_filename = NULL;
/* Should this be a pclose??? -Erik 9/21/00 */
fclose( mailer );
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Sending email via system(%s)\n",
EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND);
system(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND);
if ( (email_filename=strrchr(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND,'<')) ) {
email_filename++; /* go past the "<" */
email_filename++; /* go past the space after the < */
if ( unlink(email_filename) == -1 ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"email_close: cannot unlink temp file %s\n",
email_filename);
}
}
free(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND);
EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND = NULL;
}
#else
(void)fclose( mailer );
#endif
umask(prev_umask);
/* Set priv state back */
set_priv(priv);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sctp_generate_timeout_event(struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_event_timeout_t timeout_type)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
int error = 0;
bh_lock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(asoc->base.sk)) {
pr_debug("%s: sock is busy: timer %d\n", __func__,
timeout_type);
/* Try again later. */
if (!mod_timer(&asoc->timers[timeout_type], jiffies + (HZ/20)))
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Is this association really dead and just waiting around for
* the timer to let go of the reference?
*/
if (asoc->base.dead)
goto out_unlock;
/* Run through the state machine. */
error = sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_TIMEOUT,
SCTP_ST_TIMEOUT(timeout_type),
asoc->state, asoc->ep, asoc,
(void *)timeout_type, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error)
asoc->base.sk->sk_err = -error;
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 does not properly manage the relationship between a lock and a socket, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted sctp_accept call.
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void set_own_dir(const char *argv0) {
size_t l = strlen(argv0);
while(l && argv0[l - 1] != '/')
l--;
if(l == 0)
memcpy(own_dir, ".", 2);
else {
memcpy(own_dir, argv0, l - 1);
own_dir[l] = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-426
Summary: Untrusted search path vulnerability in ProxyChains-NG before 4.9 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse libproxychains4.so library in the current working directory, which is referenced in the LD_PRELOAD path.
Commit Message: fix for CVE-2015-3887
closes #60
|
Low
| 168,884
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RemoteFrame::ScheduleNavigation(Document& origin_document,
const KURL& url,
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type,
UserGestureStatus user_gesture_status) {
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(&origin_document, ResourceRequest(url));
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
user_gesture_status == UserGestureStatus::kActive);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
IsMainFrame() ? network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kTopLevel
: network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested);
Navigate(frame_request, frame_load_type);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Remote frame navigations was incorrectly permitted to local resources in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to access files on the local file system via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
|
Medium
| 172,614
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int perf_pmu_register(struct pmu *pmu, const char *name, int type)
{
int cpu, ret;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_disable_count = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!pmu->pmu_disable_count)
goto unlock;
pmu->type = -1;
if (!name)
goto skip_type;
pmu->name = name;
if (type < 0) {
type = idr_alloc(&pmu_idr, pmu, PERF_TYPE_MAX, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (type < 0) {
ret = type;
goto free_pdc;
}
}
pmu->type = type;
if (pmu_bus_running) {
ret = pmu_dev_alloc(pmu);
if (ret)
goto free_idr;
}
skip_type:
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = find_pmu_context(pmu->task_ctx_nr);
if (pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto got_cpu_context;
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = alloc_percpu(struct perf_cpu_context);
if (!pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto free_dev;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
__perf_event_init_context(&cpuctx->ctx);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.mutex, &cpuctx_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.lock, &cpuctx_lock);
cpuctx->ctx.type = cpu_context;
cpuctx->ctx.pmu = pmu;
__perf_cpu_hrtimer_init(cpuctx, cpu);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpuctx->rotation_list);
cpuctx->unique_pmu = pmu;
}
got_cpu_context:
if (!pmu->start_txn) {
if (pmu->pmu_enable) {
/*
* If we have pmu_enable/pmu_disable calls, install
* transaction stubs that use that to try and batch
* hardware accesses.
*/
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_start_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_commit_txn;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_cancel_txn;
} else {
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_nop_int;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
}
if (!pmu->pmu_enable) {
pmu->pmu_enable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->pmu_disable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
if (!pmu->event_idx)
pmu->event_idx = perf_event_idx_default;
list_add_rcu(&pmu->entry, &pmus);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
return ret;
free_dev:
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
free_idr:
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
free_pdc:
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
goto unlock;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19 mishandles counter grouping, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, related to the perf_pmu_register and perf_event_open functions.
Commit Message: perf: Tighten (and fix) the grouping condition
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 168,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AppModalDialog::~AppModalDialog() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extension system in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 does not properly handle modal dialogs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,755
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: psf_fwrite (const void *ptr, sf_count_t bytes, sf_count_t items, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t total = 0 ;
ssize_t count ;
if (psf->virtual_io)
return psf->vio.write (ptr, bytes*items, psf->vio_user_data) / bytes ;
items *= bytes ;
/* Do this check after the multiplication above. */
if (items <= 0)
return 0 ;
while (items > 0)
{ /* Break the writes down to a sensible size. */
count = (items > SENSIBLE_SIZE) ? SENSIBLE_SIZE : items ;
count = write (psf->file.filedes, ((const char*) ptr) + total, count) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0)
break ;
total += count ;
items -= count ;
} ;
if (psf->is_pipe)
psf->pipeoffset += total ;
return total / bytes ;
} /* psf_fwrite */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The psf_fwrite function in file_io.c in libsndfile allows attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via unspecified vectors related to the headindex variable.
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
|
Low
| 166,754
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned long long Track::GetUid() const
{
return m_info.uid;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,378
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int hns_xgmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_xgmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.12, Hisilicon Network Subsystem (HNS) does not consider the ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS case when retrieving sset_count data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact, as demonstrated by incompatibility between hns_get_sset_count and ethtool_get_strings.
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,401
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long hstart, hend;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
/*
* Not yet faulted in so we will register later in the
* page fault if needed.
*/
return 0;
if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_ops)
/* khugepaged not yet working on file or special mappings */
return 0;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (hstart < hend)
return khugepaged_enter(vma);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly create transparent huge pages in response to a MAP_PRIVATE mmap system call on /dev/zero, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,227
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Sp_replace_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *source, *s, *r;
js_Buffer *sb = NULL;
int n, x;
Resub m;
source = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
if (js_regexec(re->prog, source, &m, 0)) {
js_copy(J, 0);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
loop:
s = m.sub[0].sp;
n = m.sub[0].ep - m.sub[0].sp;
if (js_iscallable(J, 2)) {
js_copy(J, 2);
js_pushundefined(J);
for (x = 0; m.sub[x].sp; ++x) /* arg 0..x: substring and subexps that matched */
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep - m.sub[x].sp);
js_pushnumber(J, s - source); /* arg x+2: offset within search string */
js_copy(J, 0); /* arg x+3: search string */
js_call(J, 2 + x);
r = js_tostring(J, -1);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
js_puts(J, &sb, r);
js_pop(J, 1);
} else {
r = js_tostring(J, 2);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
while (*r) {
if (*r == '$') {
switch (*(++r)) {
case 0: --r; /* end of string; back up */
/* fallthrough */
case '$': js_putc(J, &sb, '$'); break;
case '`': js_putm(J, &sb, source, s); break;
case '\'': js_puts(J, &sb, s + n); break;
case '&':
js_putm(J, &sb, s, s + n);
break;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
x = *r - '0';
if (r[1] >= '0' && r[1] <= '9')
x = x * 10 + *(++r) - '0';
if (x > 0 && x < m.nsub) {
js_putm(J, &sb, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
if (x > 10) {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x / 10);
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x % 10);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x);
}
}
break;
default:
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
js_putc(J, &sb, *r);
break;
}
++r;
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, *r++);
}
}
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
source = m.sub[0].ep;
if (n == 0) {
if (*source)
js_putc(J, &sb, *source++);
else
goto end;
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, source, &m, REG_NOTBOL))
goto loop;
}
end:
js_puts(J, &sb, s + n);
js_putc(J, &sb, 0);
if (js_try(J)) {
js_free(J, sb);
js_throw(J);
}
js_pushstring(J, sb ? sb->s : "");
js_endtry(J);
js_free(J, sb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex MuJS 1.0.5. It has unlimited recursion because the match function in regexp.c lacks a depth check.
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
|
Low
| 169,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid .asoundrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) == -1)
errExit("fchown");
if (chmod(dest, 0644) == -1)
errExit("fchmod");
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix
|
Low
| 170,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bigint *sig_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len,
bigint *modulus, bigint *pub_exp)
{
int i, size;
bigint *decrypted_bi, *dat_bi;
bigint *bir = NULL;
uint8_t *block = (uint8_t *)malloc(sig_len);
/* decrypt */
dat_bi = bi_import(ctx, sig, sig_len);
ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET;
/* convert to a normal block */
decrypted_bi = bi_mod_power2(ctx, dat_bi, modulus, pub_exp);
bi_export(ctx, decrypted_bi, block, sig_len);
ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET;
i = 10; /* start at the first possible non-padded byte */
while (block[i++] && i < sig_len);
size = sig_len - i;
/* get only the bit we want */
if (size > 0)
{
int len;
const uint8_t *sig_ptr = get_signature(&block[i], &len);
if (sig_ptr)
{
bir = bi_import(ctx, sig_ptr, len);
}
}
free(block);
/* save a few bytes of memory */
bi_clear_cache(ctx);
return bir;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-347
Summary: In sig_verify() in x509.c in axTLS version 2.1.3 and before, the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification does not properly verify the ASN.1 metadata. Consequently, a remote attacker can forge signatures when small public exponents are being used, which could lead to impersonation through fake X.509 certificates. This is an even more permissive variant of CVE-2006-4790 and CVE-2014-1568.
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info.
|
Medium
| 169,086
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab)
{
int i, len;
size_t len_sent = 0;
const char __user *p;
char *buf;
p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
/*
* we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
* allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
* for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
* should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
*/
buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
&len_sent, p, buf);
if (len <= 0)
break;
p += len;
}
kfree(buf);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the audit_log_single_execve_arg function in kernel/auditsc.c in the Linux kernel through 4.7 allows local users to bypass intended character-set restrictions or disrupt system-call auditing by changing a certain string, aka a *double fetch* vulnerability.
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
Medium
| 167,018
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BnCrypto::readVector(const Parcel &data, Vector<uint8_t> &vector) const {
uint32_t size = data.readInt32();
vector.insertAt((size_t)0, size);
data.read(vector.editArray(), size);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In readVector of iCrypto.cpp, there is a possible invalid read due to uninitialized data. This could lead to local information disclosure from the DRM server with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-79218474
Commit Message: Fix information disclosure in mediadrmserver
Test:POC provided in bug
Bug:79218474
Change-Id: Iba12c07a5e615f8ed234b01ac53e3559ba9ac12e
(cherry picked from commit c1bf68a8d1321d7cdf7da6933f0b89b171d251c6)
|
Low
| 174,083
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void edge_sparse_csr_reader_double( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
double l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: There is a heap-based buffer-overflow at generator_spgemm_csc_reader.c (function libxsmm_sparse_csc_reader) in LIBXSMM 1.10, a different vulnerability than CVE-2018-20541 (which is in a different part of the source code and is seen at a different address).
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
|
Medium
| 168,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static const char *parse_number( cJSON *item, const char *num )
{
int64_t i = 0;
double f = 0;
int isint = 1;
int sign = 1, scale = 0, subscale = 0, signsubscale = 1;
/* Could use sscanf for this? */
if ( *num == '-' ) {
/* Has sign. */
sign = -1;
++num;
}
if ( *num == '0' )
/* Is zero. */
++num;
if ( *num >= '1' && *num<='9' ) {
/* Number. */
do {
i = ( i * 10 ) + ( *num - '0' );
f = ( f * 10.0 ) + ( *num - '0' );
++num;
} while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' );
}
if ( *num == '.' && num[1] >= '0' && num[1] <= '9' ) {
/* Fractional part. */
isint = 0;
++num;
do {
f = ( f * 10.0 ) + ( *num++ - '0' );
scale--;
} while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' );
}
if ( *num == 'e' || *num == 'E' ) {
/* Exponent. */
isint = 0;
++num;
if ( *num == '+' )
++num;
else if ( *num == '-' ) {
/* With sign. */
signsubscale = -1;
++num;
}
while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' )
subscale = ( subscale * 10 ) + ( *num++ - '0' );
}
/* Put it together. */
if ( isint ) {
/* Int: number = +/- number */
i = sign * i;
item->valueint = i;
item->valuefloat = i;
} else {
/* Float: number = +/- number.fraction * 10^+/- exponent */
f = sign * f * ipow( 10.0, scale + subscale * signsubscale );
item->valueint = f;
item->valuefloat = f;
}
item->type = cJSON_Number;
return num;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,302
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Chapters::Display::Init()
{
m_string = NULL;
m_language = NULL;
m_country = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,388
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in ext/standard/link_win32.c in PHP before 5.6.37, 7.0.x before 7.0.31, 7.1.x before 7.1.20, and 7.2.x before 7.2.8. The linkinfo function on Windows doesn't implement the open_basedir check. This could be abused to find files on paths outside of the allowed directories.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #76459 windows linkinfo lacks openbasedir check
|
Low
| 169,107
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_bslice(dec_struct_t * ps_dec, UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
dec_pic_params_t * ps_pps = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD8 u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_temp, ui_temp1;
WORD32 i_temp;
WORD32 ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Read remaining contents of the slice header */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
WORD8 *pi1_buf;
WORD16 *pi2_mv = ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.i2_mv;
WORD32 *pi4_mv = (WORD32*)pi2_mv;
WORD16 *pi16_refFrame;
pi1_buf = ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.i1_ref_frame;
pi16_refFrame = (WORD16*)pi1_buf;
*pi4_mv = 0;
*(pi4_mv + 1) = 0;
*pi16_refFrame = OUT_OF_RANGE_REF;
ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.u1_col_ref_pic_idx = (UWORD8)-1;
ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.u1_pic_type = (UWORD8)-1;
}
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: num_ref_idx_override_flag",
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag);
u4_temp = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
ui_temp1 = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1];
if(ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag)
{
u4_temp = 1 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1",
u4_temp - 1);
ui_temp1 = 1 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1",
ui_temp1 - 1);
}
{
UWORD8 u1_max_ref_idx = MAX_FRAMES;
if(ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
u1_max_ref_idx = MAX_FRAMES << 1;
}
if((u4_temp > u1_max_ref_idx) || (ui_temp1 > u1_max_ref_idx))
{
return ERROR_NUM_REF;
}
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0] = u4_temp;
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1] = ui_temp1;
}
/* Initialize the Reference list once in Picture if the slice type */
/* of first slice is between 5 to 9 defined in table 7.3 of standard */
/* If picture contains both P & B slices then Initialize the Reference*/
/* List only when it switches from P to B and B to P */
{
UWORD8 init_idx_flg = (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type
!= ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type);
if(ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic
|| (init_idx_flg & !ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9)
|| ps_dec->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active_prev
!= ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0])
ih264d_init_ref_idx_lx_b(ps_dec);
if(ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic & ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9)
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 0;
}
/* Store the value for future slices in the same picture */
ps_dec->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active_prev =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ref_pic_list_reordering_flag_l0",u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx);
/* Modified temporarily */
if(u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx)
{
WORD8 ret;
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[0];
ret = ih264d_ref_idx_reordering(ps_dec, 0);
if(ret == -1)
return ERROR_REFIDX_ORDER_T;
}
else
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ref_pic_list_reordering_flag_l1",u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx);
/* Modified temporarily */
if(u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx)
{
WORD8 ret;
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[1];
ret = ih264d_ref_idx_reordering(ps_dec, 1);
if(ret == -1)
return ERROR_REFIDX_ORDER_T;
}
else
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1];
/* Create refIdx to POC mapping */
{
void **ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx;
WORD8 idx;
struct pic_buffer_t *ps_pic;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc + FRM_LIST_L0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
idx++)
{
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
}
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc + FRM_LIST_L1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1];
idx++)
{
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
void **ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t, **ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ TOP_LIST_FLD_L0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ BOT_LIST_FLD_L0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t++;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
idx++)
{
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[0] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[0] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t += 2;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b += 2;
}
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ TOP_LIST_FLD_L1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ BOT_LIST_FLD_L1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t++;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1];
idx++)
{
UWORD8 u1_tmp_idx = idx << 1;
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[u1_tmp_idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[u1_tmp_idx + 1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[u1_tmp_idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[u1_tmp_idx + 1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3)
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
memcpy((void *)ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc,
ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc,
size);
}
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0))
{
ih264d_convert_frm_mbaff_list(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->u1_wted_bipred_idc == 1)
{
ret = ih264d_parse_pred_weight_table(ps_slice, ps_bitstrm);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ih264d_form_pred_weight_matrix(ps_dec);
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
}
else if(ps_pps->u1_wted_bipred_idc == 2)
{
/* Implicit Weighted prediction */
ps_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = 0x0505;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
ih264d_get_implicit_weights(ps_dec);
}
else
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
/* G050 */
if(ps_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc != 0)
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read)
ps_dec->u4_bitoffset = ih264d_read_mmco_commands(ps_dec);
else
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += ps_dec->u4_bitoffset;
}
/* G050 */
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode == CABAC)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_CABAC_INIT_IDC)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_cabac_init_idc = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: cabac_init_idc",ps_slice->u1_cabac_init_idc);
}
/* Read slice_qp_delta */
i_temp = ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp
+ ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((i_temp < 0) || (i_temp > 51))
{
return ERROR_INV_RANGE_QP_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_qp_delta",
(WORD8)(ps_slice->u1_slice_qp - ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp));
if(ps_pps->u1_deblocking_filter_parameters_present_flag == 1)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > SLICE_BOUNDARY_DBLK_DISABLED)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
} COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: disable_deblocking_filter_idc", u4_temp);
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = u4_temp;
if(u4_temp != 1)
{
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset >> 1);
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_beta_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset >> 1);
}
else
{
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
SWITCHOFFTRACE; SWITCHONTRACECABAC;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_slice = ih264d_parse_inter_slice_data_cabac;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_mb = ih264d_parse_bmb_cabac;
ih264d_init_cabac_contexts(B_SLICE, ps_dec);
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_mbaff;
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_nonmbaff;
}
else
{
SWITCHONTRACE; SWITCHOFFTRACECABAC;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_slice = ih264d_parse_inter_slice_data_cavlc;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_mb = ih264d_parse_bmb_cavlc;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff;
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff;
}
ret = ih264d_cal_col_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u1_B = 1;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_bmb;
ret = ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_slice(ps_dec, ps_slice, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The H.264 decoder in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 mishandles Memory Management Control Operation (MMCO) data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25818142.
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
|
Low
| 173,908
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cf2_initGlobalRegionBuffer( CFF_Decoder* decoder,
CF2_UInt idx,
CF2_Buffer buf )
{
FT_ASSERT( decoder && decoder->globals );
FT_ZERO( buf );
idx += decoder->globals_bias;
if ( idx >= decoder->num_globals )
return TRUE; /* error */
buf->start =
buf->ptr = decoder->globals[idx];
buf->end = decoder->globals[idx + 1];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The (1) cf2_initLocalRegionBuffer and (2) cf2_initGlobalRegionBuffer functions in cff/cf2ft.c in FreeType before 2.5.3 do not properly check if a subroutine exists, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure), as demonstrated by a crafted ttf file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,221
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::FillVAPicture(
VAPictureH264* va_pic,
scoped_refptr<H264Picture> pic) {
VASurfaceID va_surface_id = VA_INVALID_SURFACE;
if (!pic->nonexisting) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
H264PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
va_surface_id = dec_surface->va_surface()->id();
}
va_pic->picture_id = va_surface_id;
va_pic->frame_idx = pic->frame_num;
va_pic->flags = 0;
switch (pic->field) {
case H264Picture::FIELD_NONE:
break;
case H264Picture::FIELD_TOP:
va_pic->flags |= VA_PICTURE_H264_TOP_FIELD;
break;
case H264Picture::FIELD_BOTTOM:
va_pic->flags |= VA_PICTURE_H264_BOTTOM_FIELD;
break;
}
if (pic->ref) {
va_pic->flags |= pic->long_term ? VA_PICTURE_H264_LONG_TERM_REFERENCE
: VA_PICTURE_H264_SHORT_TERM_REFERENCE;
}
va_pic->TopFieldOrderCnt = pic->top_field_order_cnt;
va_pic->BottomFieldOrderCnt = pic->bottom_field_order_cnt;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,800
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int handle_packet(unsigned char *data, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_hdr pkthdr;
/* Minimal size checks (pings are not supported here) */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN){
return -1;
}
parse_packet(data, &pkthdr);
/* We only care about packets with correct sessionkey */
if (pkthdr.seskey != sessionkey) {
return -1;
}
/* Handle data packets */
if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_DATA) {
struct mt_packet odata;
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
int success = 0;
/* Always transmit ACKNOWLEDGE packets in response to DATA packets */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, pkthdr.counter + (data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN));
send_udp(&odata, 0);
/* Accept first packet, and all packets greater than incounter, and if counter has
wrapped around. */
if (pkthdr.counter > incounter || (incounter - pkthdr.counter) > 65535) {
incounter = pkthdr.counter;
} else {
/* Ignore double or old packets */
return -1;
}
/* Parse controlpacket data */
success = parse_control_packet(data + MT_HEADER_LEN, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
/* If we receive pass_salt, transmit auth data back */
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT) {
memcpy(pass_salt, cpkt.data, cpkt.length);
send_auth(username, password);
}
/* If the (remaining) data did not have a control-packet magic byte sequence,
the data is raw terminal data to be outputted to the terminal. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
fwrite((const void *)cpkt.data, 1, cpkt.length, stdout);
}
/* END_AUTH means that the user/password negotiation is done, and after this point
terminal data may arrive, so we set up the terminal to raw mode. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH) {
/* we have entered "terminal mode" */
terminal_mode = 1;
if (is_a_tty) {
/* stop input buffering at all levels. Give full control of terminal to RouterOS */
raw_term();
setvbuf(stdin, (char*)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
/* Add resize signal handler */
signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
}
}
/* Parse next controlpacket */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
}
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_ACK) {
/* Handled elsewhere */
}
/* The server wants to terminate the connection, we have to oblige */
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_END) {
struct mt_packet odata;
/* Acknowledge the disconnection by sending a END packet in return */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_END, srcmac, dstmac, pkthdr.seskey, 0);
send_udp(&odata, 0);
if (!quiet_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Connection closed.\n"));
}
/* exit */
running = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, _("Unhandeled packet type: %d received from server %s\n"), pkthdr.ptype, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
return -1;
}
return pkthdr.ptype;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the handle_packet function in mactelnet.c in the client in MAC-Telnet 0.4.3 and earlier allows remote TELNET servers to execute arbitrary code via a long string in an MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT control packet.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
|
Low
| 166,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The xfrm_replay_verify_len function in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not validate certain size data after an XFRM_MSG_NEWAE update, which allows local users to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds access) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, as demonstrated during a Pwn2Own competition at CanSecWest 2017 for the Ubuntu 16.10 linux-image-* package 4.8.0.41.52.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.
We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
replay_window.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 170,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageImpl(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
Image* image,
WebGLImageConversion::ImageHtmlDomSource dom_source,
bool flip_y,
bool premultiply_alpha,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (type == GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV) {
type = GL_FLOAT;
}
Vector<uint8_t> data;
IntRect sub_rect = source_image_rect;
if (sub_rect == SentinelEmptyRect()) {
sub_rect = SafeGetImageSize(image);
}
bool selecting_sub_rectangle = false;
if (!ValidateTexImageSubRectangle(func_name, function_id, image, sub_rect,
depth, unpack_image_height,
&selecting_sub_rectangle)) {
return;
}
IntRect adjusted_source_image_rect = sub_rect;
if (flip_y) {
adjusted_source_image_rect.SetY(image->height() -
adjusted_source_image_rect.MaxY());
}
WebGLImageConversion::ImageExtractor image_extractor(
image, dom_source, premultiply_alpha,
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE);
if (!image_extractor.ImagePixelData()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "bad image data");
return;
}
WebGLImageConversion::DataFormat source_data_format =
image_extractor.ImageSourceFormat();
WebGLImageConversion::AlphaOp alpha_op = image_extractor.ImageAlphaOp();
const void* image_pixel_data = image_extractor.ImagePixelData();
bool need_conversion = true;
if (type == GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE &&
source_data_format == WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8 &&
format == GL_RGBA && alpha_op == WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing &&
!flip_y && !selecting_sub_rectangle && depth == 1) {
need_conversion = false;
} else {
if (!WebGLImageConversion::PackImageData(
image, image_pixel_data, format, type, flip_y, alpha_op,
source_data_format, image_extractor.ImageWidth(),
image_extractor.ImageHeight(), adjusted_source_image_rect, depth,
image_extractor.ImageSourceUnpackAlignment(), unpack_image_height,
data)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "packImage error");
return;
}
}
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore temporary_reset_unpack(this);
if (function_id == kTexImage2D) {
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), 0, format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
} else if (function_id == kTexSubImage2D) {
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
} else {
if (function_id == kTexImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexImage3D(
target, level, internalformat, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), depth, 0, format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(function_id, kTexSubImage3D);
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), depth, format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
|
Medium
| 172,668
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sd_compat_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = scsi_disk(bdev->bd_disk)->device;
/*
* If we are in the middle of error recovery, don't let anyone
* else try and use this device. Also, if error recovery fails, it
* may try and take the device offline, in which case all further
* access to the device is prohibited.
*/
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdev))
return -ENODEV;
if (sdev->host->hostt->compat_ioctl) {
int ret;
ret = sdev->host->hostt->compat_ioctl(sdev, cmd, (void __user *)arg);
return ret;
}
/*
* Let the static ioctl translation table take care of it.
*/
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly restrict SG_IO ioctl calls, which allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on disk read and write operations by sending a SCSI command to (1) a partition block device or (2) an LVM volume.
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,890
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != IPPROTO_ICMP)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,294
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MaybeCreateThrottle(
NavigationHandle* handle) {
DCHECK(content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame());
if (!handle->GetParentFrame()) {
return nullptr;
}
int32_t parent_process_id = handle->GetParentFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
auto& map = *GetProcessIdToFilterMap();
if (!base::ContainsKey(map, parent_process_id) || !map[parent_process_id]) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto& pair : map[parent_process_id]->frame_navigation_helpers_) {
if (!pair.second->ShouldCancelAndIgnore(handle))
continue;
return std::make_unique<CancelAndIgnoreNavigationForPluginFrameThrottle>(
handle);
}
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,044
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelType
channel;
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
channel=mogrify_info->channel;
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
channel=DefaultChannels;
break;
}
channel=(ChannelType) ParseChannelOption(argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImageChannel(image,channel,clut_image);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,channel,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
const char
*option;
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedMetric;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImageChannels(image,reconstruct_image,
channel,metric,&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mask_image,
*composite_image,
*image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,
composite_image->geometry);
SetGeometry(composite_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(composite_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,
&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((image->compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(image->compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
/*
Merge Y displacement into X displacement image.
*/
(void) CompositeImage(composite_image,CopyGreenCompositeOp,
mask_image,0,0);
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
else
{
/*
Set a blending mask for the composition.
*/
if (image->mask != (Image *) NULL)
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
image->mask=mask_image;
(void) NegateImage(image->mask,MagickFalse);
}
}
(void) CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,image->compose,
composite_image,geometry.x,geometry.y);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
mask_image=image->mask;
}
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
deconstruct_image=DeconstructImages(*images,exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither=MagickFalse;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither=MagickTrue;
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fx_image=FxImageChannel(*images,channel,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImageChannel(image,channel,hald_image);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
ImageLayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(ImageLayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImageChannel(*images,channel,
number_arguments >> 1,arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*arguments;
int
next,
status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
arguments=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=",
"\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (status == 0)
{
const char
*argv;
argv=(&(arguments[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&argv,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in MagickWand/mogrify.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616
|
Medium
| 169,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool handle_client_startup(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
const char *passwd;
const uint8_t *key;
bool ok;
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
/* don't tolerate partial packets */
if (incomplete_pkt(pkt)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client sent partial pkt in startup phase");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_welcome) {
if (finish_client_login(client)) {
/* the packet was already parsed */
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
} else
return false;
}
switch (pkt->type) {
case PKT_SSLREQ:
slog_noise(client, "C: req SSL");
slog_noise(client, "P: nak");
/* reject SSL attempt */
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "N", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to nak SSL");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_STARTUP_V2:
disconnect_client(client, true, "Old V2 protocol not supported");
return false;
case PKT_STARTUP:
if (client->pool) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client re-sent startup pkt");
return false;
}
if (!decide_startup_pool(client, pkt))
return false;
if (client->pool->db->admin) {
if (!admin_pre_login(client))
return false;
}
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST || client->own_user) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
if (!send_client_authreq(client)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to send auth req");
return false;
}
}
break;
case 'p': /* PasswordMessage */
/* haven't requested it */
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "unrequested passwd pkt");
return false;
}
ok = mbuf_get_string(&pkt->data, &passwd);
if (ok && check_client_passwd(client, passwd)) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Auth failed");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_CANCEL:
if (mbuf_avail_for_read(&pkt->data) == BACKENDKEY_LEN
&& mbuf_get_bytes(&pkt->data, BACKENDKEY_LEN, &key))
{
memcpy(client->cancel_key, key, BACKENDKEY_LEN);
accept_cancel_request(client);
} else
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad cancel request");
return false;
default:
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad packet");
return false;
}
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: PgBouncer before 1.5.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) by sending a password packet before a startup packet.
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
|
Low
| 168,883
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
c = ZSWAP32((z_crc_t)crc);
c = ~c;
while (len && ((ptrdiff_t)buf & 3)) {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
len--;
}
buf4 = (const z_crc_t FAR *)(const void FAR *)buf;
buf4--;
while (len >= 32) {
DOBIG32;
len -= 32;
}
while (len >= 4) {
DOBIG4;
len -= 4;
}
buf4++;
buf = (const unsigned char FAR *)buf4;
if (len) do {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
} while (--len);
c = ~c;
return (unsigned long)(ZSWAP32(c));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The crc32_big function in crc32.c in zlib 1.2.8 might allow context-dependent attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving big-endian CRC calculation.
Commit Message: Avoid pre-decrement of pointer in big-endian CRC calculation.
There was a small optimization for PowerPCs to pre-increment a
pointer when accessing a word, instead of post-incrementing. This
required prefacing the loop with a decrement of the pointer,
possibly pointing before the object passed. This is not compliant
with the C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its
allocated memory is undefined. When tested on a modern PowerPC
with a modern compiler, the optimization no longer has any effect.
Due to all that, and per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
|
Low
| 168,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsWithUI(
int document_page_count,
bool has_selection,
bool is_scripted) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (is_scripted) {
PrintingContextDelegate* printing_context_delegate =
static_cast<PrintingContextDelegate*>(printing_context_delegate_.get());
content::WebContents* web_contents =
printing_context_delegate->GetWebContents();
TabAndroid* tab =
web_contents ? TabAndroid::FromWebContents(web_contents) : nullptr;
if (tab)
tab->SetPendingPrint();
}
#endif
printing_context_->AskUserForSettings(
document_page_count, has_selection, is_scripted,
base::Bind(&PostOnOwnerThread, make_scoped_refptr(owner_),
base::Bind(&PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsDone,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in modal dialog handling in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to prevent a full screen warning from being displayed via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
Medium
| 172,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: open_log_file(const char *name, const char *prog, const char *namespace, const char *instance)
{
char *file_name;
if (log_file) {
fclose(log_file);
log_file = NULL;
}
if (!name)
return;
file_name = make_file_name(name, prog, namespace, instance);
log_file = fopen(file_name, "a");
if (log_file) {
int n = fileno(log_file);
fcntl(n, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC | fcntl(n, F_GETFD));
fcntl(n, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK | fcntl(n, F_GETFL));
}
FREE(file_name);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,994
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned long error = 0;
/*
* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values.
*/
if (bits < 16) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL)
goto err;
bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
bitsq = bits - bitsp;
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* generate p and q */
for (;;) {
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
/* GCD != 1 */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
goto err;
for (;;) {
do {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
} while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
/* GCD != 1 */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
{
BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
if (pr0 == NULL)
goto err;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
BN_free(pr0);
goto err; /* d */
}
/* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
BN_free(pr0);
}
{
BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
if (d == NULL)
goto err;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if ( /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
|| !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
BN_free(d);
goto err;
}
/* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
BN_free(d);
}
{
BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
BN_free(p);
goto err;
}
/* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
BN_free(p);
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok == -1) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
ok = 0;
}
if (ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-327
Summary: The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0i-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0h). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2p-dev (Affected 1.0.2b-1.0.2o).
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,327
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sf_open (const char *path, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
/* Ultimate sanity check. */
assert (sizeof (sf_count_t) == 8) ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "File : %s\n", path) ;
if (copy_filename (psf, path) != 0)
{ sf_errno = psf->error ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
if (strcmp (path, "-") == 0)
psf->error = psf_set_stdio (psf) ;
else
psf->error = psf_fopen (psf) ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void edge_bulk_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = urb->context;
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int port_number;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n", __func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero read bulk status received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
if (status == -EPIPE)
goto exit;
if (status) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - stopping read!\n", __func__);
return;
}
port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
if (edge_port->lsr_event) {
edge_port->lsr_event = 0;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s ===== Port %u LSR Status = %02x, Data = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 1, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
/* Adjust buffer length/pointer */
--urb->actual_length;
++data;
}
if (urb->actual_length) {
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (edge_port->close_pending)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - close pending, dropping data on the floor\n",
__func__);
else
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, data,
urb->actual_length);
edge_port->port->icount.rx += urb->actual_length;
}
exit:
/* continue read unless stopped */
spin_lock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING)
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPING)
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED;
spin_unlock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (retval)
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n", __func__, retval);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-191
Summary: The edge_bulk_in_callback function in drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.4 allows local users to obtain sensitive information (in the dmesg ringbuffer and syslog) from uninitialized kernel memory by using a crafted USB device (posing as an io_ti USB serial device) to trigger an integer underflow.
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 168,189
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, isValidPharFilename)
{
char *fname;
const char *ext_str;
size_t fname_len;
int ext_len, is_executable;
zend_bool executable = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|b", &fname, &fname_len, &executable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
is_executable = executable;
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(fname, fname_len, &ext_str, &ext_len, is_executable, 2, 1) == SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,059
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void IndexedDBCursor::RemoveCursorFromTransaction() {
if (transaction_)
transaction_->UnregisterOpenCursor(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in IndexedDB in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Android, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
|
Medium
| 172,307
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id(struct ion_client *client,
int id)
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
handle = idr_find(&client->idr, id);
if (handle)
ion_handle_get(handle);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return handle ? handle : ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the ion_ioctl function in drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by calling ION_IOC_FREE on two CPUs at the same time.
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,897
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SSLCertErrorHandler::SSLCertErrorHandler(
base::WeakPtr<Delegate> delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal)
: SSLErrorHandler(delegate, id, resource_type, url, render_process_id,
render_view_id),
ssl_info_(ssl_info),
cert_error_(net::MapCertStatusToNetError(ssl_info.cert_status)),
fatal_(fatal) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,994
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_encoding( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_encoding: out of bounds\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* if we have a number or `[', the encoding is an array, */
/* and we must load it now */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || *cur == '[' )
{
T1_Encoding encode = &face->type1.encoding;
FT_Int count, n;
PS_Table char_table = &loader->encoding_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Bool only_immediates = 0;
/* read the number of entries in the encoding; should be 256 */
if ( *cur == '[' )
{
count = 256;
only_immediates = 1;
parser->root.cursor++;
}
else
count = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
/* we use a T1_Table to store our charnames */
loader->num_chars = encode->num_chars = count;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_index, count ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_name, count ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
char_table, count, memory ) ) )
{
parser->root.error = error;
return;
}
/* We need to `zero' out encoding_table.elements */
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
char* notdef = (char *)".notdef";
T1_Add_Table( char_table, n, notdef, 8 );
}
/* Now we need to read records of the form */
/* */
/* ... charcode /charname ... */
/* */
/* for each entry in our table. */
/* */
/* We simply look for a number followed by an immediate */
/* name. Note that this ignores correctly the sequence */
/* that is often seen in type1 fonts: */
/* */
/* 0 1 255 { 1 index exch /.notdef put } for dup */
/* */
/* used to clean the encoding array before anything else. */
/* */
/* Alternatively, if the array is directly given as */
/* */
/* /Encoding [ ... ] */
/* */
/* we only read immediates. */
n = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
/* we stop when we encounter a `def' or `]' */
if ( *cur == 'd' && cur + 3 < limit )
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'f' &&
IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur += 3;
break;
}
}
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur++;
break;
}
/* check whether we've found an entry */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || only_immediates )
{
FT_Int charcode;
if ( only_immediates )
charcode = n;
else
{
charcode = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
cur = parser->root.cursor;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
parser->root.error = T1_Add_Table( char_table, charcode,
cur, len + 1 );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
char_table->elements[charcode][len] = '\0';
n++;
}
else if ( only_immediates )
{
/* Since the current position is not updated for */
/* immediates-only mode we would get an infinite loop if */
/* we don't do anything here. */
/* */
/* This encoding array is not valid according to the type1 */
/* specification (it might be an encoding for a CID type1 */
/* font, however), so we conclude that this font is NOT a */
/* type1 font. */
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return;
}
}
else
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The parse_encoding function in type1/t1load.c in FreeType before 2.5.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a "broken number-with-base" in a Postscript stream, as demonstrated by 8#garbage.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LogoService::LogoService(
const base::FilePath& cache_directory,
TemplateURLService* template_url_service,
std::unique_ptr<image_fetcher::ImageDecoder> image_decoder,
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> request_context_getter,
bool use_gray_background)
: cache_directory_(cache_directory),
template_url_service_(template_url_service),
request_context_getter_(request_context_getter),
use_gray_background_(use_gray_background),
image_decoder_(std::move(image_decoder)) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
|
Medium
| 171,955
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
first = mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The psh_glyph_find_strong_points function in pshinter/pshalgo.c in FreeType before 2.4.0 does not properly implement hinting masks, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file that triggers an invalid free operation.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnDestructionImminent(AppCacheHost* host) {
PendingMasters::iterator found =
pending_master_entries_.find(host->pending_master_entry_url());
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
PendingHosts::iterator it = std::find(hosts.begin(), hosts.end(), host);
DCHECK(it != hosts.end());
hosts.erase(it);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
|
Low
| 171,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: net/socket.c in the Linux kernel 3.19 before 3.19.3 does not validate certain range data for (1) sendto and (2) recvfrom system calls, which allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging a subsystem that uses the copy_from_iter function in the iov_iter interface, as demonstrated by the Bluetooth subsystem.
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Array(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::ListValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Array> result(v8::Array::New(isolate, val->GetSize()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < val->GetSize(); ++i) {
const base::Value* child = NULL;
CHECK(val->Get(i, &child));
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, child);
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
result->Set(static_cast<uint32_t>(i), child_v8);
if (try_catch.HasCaught())
LOG(ERROR) << "Setter for index " << i << " threw an exception.";
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ToV8Value function in content/child/v8_value_converter_impl.cc in the V8 bindings in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 does not properly restrict use of getters and setters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
|
Medium
| 173,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: t42_parse_sfnts( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
FT_Error error;
FT_Int num_tables = 0;
FT_ULong count, ttf_size = 0;
FT_Long n, string_size, old_string_size, real_size;
FT_Byte* string_buf = NULL;
FT_Bool allocated = 0;
T42_Load_Status status;
/* The format is */
/* */
/* /sfnts [ <hexstring> <hexstring> ... ] def */
/* */
/* or */
/* */
/* /sfnts [ */
/* <num_bin_bytes> RD <binary data> */
/* <num_bin_bytes> RD <binary data> */
/* ... */
/* ] def */
/* */
/* with exactly one space after the `RD' token. */
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit || *parser->root.cursor++ != '[' )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: can't find begin of sfnts vector\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
status = BEFORE_START;
string_size = 0;
old_string_size = 0;
count = 0;
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
parser->root.cursor++;
goto Exit;
}
else if ( *cur == '<' )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
goto Exit;
/* don't include delimiters */
string_size = (FT_Long)( ( parser->root.cursor - cur - 2 + 1 ) / 2 );
if ( FT_REALLOC( string_buf, old_string_size, string_size ) )
goto Fail;
allocated = 1;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
(void)T1_ToBytes( parser, string_buf, string_size, &real_size, 1 );
old_string_size = string_size;
string_size = real_size;
}
else if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) )
{
if ( allocated )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: "
"can't handle mixed binary and hex strings\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
string_size = T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( string_size < 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: invalid string size\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `RD' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
string_buf = parser->root.cursor + 1; /* one space after `RD' */
if ( limit - parser->root.cursor < string_size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too many binary data\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
else
parser->root.cursor += string_size + 1;
}
if ( !string_buf )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: invalid data in sfnts array\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* A string can have a trailing zero (odd) byte for padding. */
/* Ignore it. */
if ( ( string_size & 1 ) && string_buf[string_size - 1] == 0 )
string_size--;
if ( !string_size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: invalid string\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
for ( n = 0; n < string_size; n++ )
{
switch ( status )
{
case BEFORE_START:
/* load offset table, 12 bytes */
if ( count < 12 )
{
face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n];
continue;
}
else
{
num_tables = 16 * face->ttf_data[4] + face->ttf_data[5];
status = BEFORE_TABLE_DIR;
ttf_size = 12 + 16 * num_tables;
if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12, ttf_size ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* fall through */
case BEFORE_TABLE_DIR:
/* the offset table is read; read the table directory */
if ( count < ttf_size )
{
face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n];
continue;
}
else
{
int i;
FT_ULong len;
for ( i = 0; i < num_tables; i++ )
{
FT_Byte* p = face->ttf_data + 12 + 16 * i + 12;
len = FT_PEEK_ULONG( p );
/* Pad to a 4-byte boundary length */
ttf_size += ( len + 3 ) & ~3;
}
status = OTHER_TABLES;
face->ttf_size = ttf_size;
/* there are no more than 256 tables, so no size check here */
if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 + 16 * num_tables,
ttf_size + 1 ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* fall through */
case OTHER_TABLES:
/* all other tables are just copied */
if ( count >= ttf_size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too many binary data\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
}
face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n];
}
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: type42/t42parse.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not consider that scanning can be incomplete without triggering an error, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Type42 font.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > ss * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, ss * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: file before 5.11 and libmagic allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted Composite Document File (CDF) file that triggers (1) an out-of-bounds read or (2) an invalid pointer dereference.
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
|
Medium
| 165,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Cluster::EOS() const
//// long long element_size)
{
return (m_pSegment == NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main(const int argc, const char * const * const argv)
{
/* For each file on the command line test it with a range of transforms */
int option_end, ilog = 0;
struct display d;
validate_T();
display_init(&d);
for (option_end=1; option_end<argc; ++option_end)
{
const char *name = argv[option_end];
if (strcmp(name, "--verbose") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | VERBOSE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--warnings") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | WARNINGS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--errors") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | ERRORS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--quiet") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | QUIET;
else if (strcmp(name, "--exhaustive") == 0)
d.options |= EXHAUSTIVE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--fast") == 0)
d.options &= ~EXHAUSTIVE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--strict") == 0)
d.options |= STRICT;
else if (strcmp(name, "--relaxed") == 0)
d.options &= ~STRICT;
else if (strcmp(name, "--log") == 0)
{
ilog = option_end; /* prevent display */
d.options |= LOG;
}
else if (strcmp(name, "--nolog") == 0)
d.options &= ~LOG;
else if (strcmp(name, "--continue") == 0)
d.options |= CONTINUE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--stop") == 0)
d.options &= ~CONTINUE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--skip-bugs") == 0)
d.options |= SKIP_BUGS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--test-all") == 0)
d.options &= ~SKIP_BUGS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--log-skipped") == 0)
d.options |= LOG_SKIPPED;
else if (strcmp(name, "--nolog-skipped") == 0)
d.options &= ~LOG_SKIPPED;
else if (strcmp(name, "--find-bad-combos") == 0)
d.options |= FIND_BAD_COMBOS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--nofind-bad-combos") == 0)
d.options &= ~FIND_BAD_COMBOS;
else if (name[0] == '-' && name[1] == '-')
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngimage: %s: unknown option\n", name);
return 99;
}
else
break; /* Not an option */
}
{
int i;
int errors = 0;
for (i=option_end; i<argc; ++i)
{
{
int ret = do_test(&d, argv[i]);
if (ret > QUIET) /* abort on user or internal error */
return 99;
}
/* Here on any return, including failures, except user/internal issues
*/
{
const int pass = (d.options & STRICT) ?
RESULT_STRICT(d.results) : RESULT_RELAXED(d.results);
if (!pass)
++errors;
if (d.options & LOG)
{
int j;
printf("%s: pngimage ", pass ? "PASS" : "FAIL");
for (j=1; j<option_end; ++j) if (j != ilog)
printf("%s ", argv[j]);
printf("%s\n", d.filename);
}
}
display_clean(&d);
}
return errors != 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,589
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void TearDownTestCase() {
vpx_free(input_ - 1);
input_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output_);
output_ = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::WriteBarrier(void* value) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->IsIncrementalMarking());
DCHECK(value);
DCHECK_NE(value, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
BasePage* const page = PageFromObject(value);
HeapObjectHeader* const header =
page->IsLargeObjectPage()
? static_cast<LargeObjectPage*>(page)->GetHeapObjectHeader()
: static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->FindHeaderFromAddress(
reinterpret_cast<Address>(const_cast<void*>(value)));
if (header->IsMarked())
return;
header->Mark();
marking_worklist_->Push(
WorklistTaskId::MainThread,
{header->Payload(), ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_});
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct path *lowerpath,
struct kstat *stat, struct iattr *attr,
const char *link)
{
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out;
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
if (err)
goto out2;
if (S_ISREG(stat->mode)) {
struct path upperpath;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
upperpath.dentry = newdentry;
err = ovl_copy_up_data(lowerpath, &upperpath, stat->size);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
}
err = ovl_copy_xattr(lowerpath->dentry, newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
mutex_lock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = ovl_set_attr(newdentry, stat);
if (!err && attr)
err = notify_change(newdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, newdentry, udir, upper, 0);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
newdentry = NULL;
/*
* Non-directores become opaque when copied up.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(stat->mode))
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry, true);
out2:
dput(upper);
out1:
dput(newdentry);
out:
return err;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, newdentry);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.6 uses an incorrect cleanup code path, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (dentry reference leak) via filesystem operations on a large file in a lower overlayfs layer.
Commit Message: ovl: fix dentry reference leak
In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through
out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't
actually release the ref on newdentry.
The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly
newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught
given the catch of newdentry.
Without this fix, something like the following is seen:
BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup.
An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with
something like:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000))
to create a large file (4.1G). Overlay an upper layer that is too small
(on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably.
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18+
|
Low
| 167,469
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloatArray( double *numbers, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateFloat( numbers[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,273
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidDeleteInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance) {
in_process_host_->DeleteInstance(instance);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
|
Medium
| 172,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: file_transfer_t *imcb_file_send_start(struct im_connection *ic, char *handle, char *file_name, size_t file_size)
{
bee_t *bee = ic->bee;
bee_user_t *bu = bee_user_by_handle(bee, ic, handle);
if (bee->ui->ft_in_start) {
return bee->ui->ft_in_start(bee, bu, file_name, file_size);
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: BitlBee before 3.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a file transfer request for a contact that is not in the contact list.
Commit Message: imcb_file_send_start: handle ft attempts from non-existing users
|
Low
| 168,506
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < kcontrol->count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 does not ensure possession of a read/write lock, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) and obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 166,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void record_recent_object(struct object *obj,
struct strbuf *path,
const char *last,
void *data)
{
sha1_array_append(&recent_objects, obj->oid.hash);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 167,414
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void SetImePropertyActivated(const std::string& key,
bool activated) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
DCHECK(!key.empty());
chromeos::SetImePropertyActivated(
input_method_status_connection_, key.c_str(), activated);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid, bool build)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct free_nid *i;
struct nat_entry *ne;
int err;
/* 0 nid should not be used */
if (unlikely(nid == 0))
return false;
if (build) {
/* do not add allocated nids */
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
return false;
}
i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
i->nid = nid;
i->state = NID_NEW;
if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS)) {
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return true;
}
spin_lock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
err = __insert_nid_to_list(sbi, i, FREE_NID_LIST, true);
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (err) {
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return true;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The add_free_nid function in fs/f2fs/node.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12 does not properly track an allocated nid, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (race condition) or possibly have unspecified other impact via concurrent threads.
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 169,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders(const SpdyHeaderBlock& headers) {
SpdyHeaderBlock::const_iterator it = headers.find(kHttp2MethodHeader);
DCHECK(it != headers.end());
if (!(it->second == "GET" || it->second == "HEAD")) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid method "
<< it->second;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_METHOD);
return;
}
if (!SpdyUtils::UrlIsValid(headers)) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid URL "
<< url_;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
if (!session_->IsAuthorized(SpdyUtils::GetHostNameFromHeaderBlock(headers))) {
Reset(QUIC_UNAUTHORIZED_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
request_headers_.reset(new SpdyHeaderBlock(headers.Clone()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A stack buffer overflow in the QUIC networking stack in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.89 allowed a remote attacker to gain code execution via a malicious server.
Commit Message: Fix Stack Buffer Overflow in QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders
BUG=777728
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I6a80db88aafdf20c7abd3847404b818565681310
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748425
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513105}
|
Low
| 172,940
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: process_chpw_request(krb5_context context, void *server_handle, char *realm,
krb5_keytab keytab, const krb5_fulladdr *local_faddr,
const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *req,
krb5_data *rep)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *ptr;
unsigned int plen, vno;
krb5_data ap_req, ap_rep = empty_data();
krb5_data cipher = empty_data(), clear = empty_data();
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_principal changepw = NULL;
krb5_principal client, target = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_replay_data replay;
krb5_error krberror;
int numresult;
char strresult[1024];
char *clientstr = NULL, *targetstr = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen;
char *cdots;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen_t salen;
char addrbuf[100];
krb5_address *addr = remote_faddr->address;
*rep = empty_data();
if (req->length < 4) {
/* either this, or the server is printing bad messages,
or the caller passed in garbage */
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ptr = req->data;
/* verify length */
plen = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
plen = (plen<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (plen != req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request length was inconsistent",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* verify version number */
vno = (*ptr++ & 0xff) ;
vno = (vno<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (vno != 1 && vno != RFC3244_VERSION) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION;
snprintf(strresult, sizeof(strresult),
"Request contained unknown protocol version number %d", vno);
goto chpwfail;
}
/* read, check ap-req length */
ap_req.length = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
ap_req.length = (ap_req.length<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (ptr + ap_req.length >= req->data + req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated in AP-REQ",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* verify ap_req */
ap_req.data = ptr;
ptr += ap_req.length;
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &changepw, strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed building kadmin/changepw principal",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &ap_req, changepw, keytab,
NULL, &ticket);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed reading application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* construct the ap-rep */
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed replying to application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* decrypt the ChangePasswdData */
cipher.length = (req->data + req->length) - ptr;
cipher.data = ptr;
/*
* Don't set a remote address in auth_context before calling krb5_rd_priv,
* so that we can work against clients behind a NAT. Reflection attacks
* aren't a concern since we use sequence numbers and since our requests
* don't look anything like our responses. Also don't set a local address,
* since we don't know what interface the request was received on.
*/
ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &cipher, &clear, &replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decrypting request", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
/* decode ChangePasswdData for setpw requests */
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
krb5_data *clear_data;
ret = decode_krb5_setpw_req(&clear, &clear_data, &target);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decoding ChangePasswdData",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
clear = *clear_data;
free(clear_data);
if (target != NULL) {
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, target, &targetstr);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing target name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &clientstr);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing client name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* for cpw, verify that this is an AS_REQ ticket */
if (vno == 1 &&
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) == 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Ticket must be derived from a password",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* change the password */
ptr = k5memdup0(clear.data, clear.length, &ret);
ret = schpw_util_wrapper(server_handle, client, target,
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) != 0,
ptr, NULL, strresult, sizeof(strresult));
if (ret)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
/* zap the password */
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
zapfree(ptr, clear.length);
clear = empty_data();
clen = strlen(clientstr);
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
switch (addr->addrtype) {
case ADDRTYPE_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = ss2sin(&ss);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin->sin_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin);
break;
}
case ADDRTYPE_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = ss2sin6(&ss);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin6->sin6_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin6);
break;
}
default: {
struct sockaddr *sa = ss2sa(&ss);
sa->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
salen = sizeof(*sa);
break;
}
}
if (getnameinfo(ss2sa(&ss), salen,
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
strlcpy(addrbuf, "<unprintable>", sizeof(addrbuf));
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
size_t tlen;
char *tdots;
const char *targetp;
if (target == NULL) {
tlen = clen;
tdots = cdots;
targetp = targetstr;
} else {
tlen = strlen(targetstr);
trunc_name(&tlen, &tdots);
targetp = clientstr;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("setpw request from %s by %.*s%s for "
"%.*s%s: %s"), addrbuf, (int) clen,
clientstr, cdots, (int) tlen, targetp, tdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("chpw request from %s for %.*s%s: %s"),
addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
}
switch (ret) {
case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED;
break;
case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT:
case KADM5_PASS_REUSE:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_GENERIC:
case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR;
break;
case 0:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS;
strlcpy(strresult, "", sizeof(strresult));
break;
default:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
break;
}
chpwfail:
clear.length = 2 + strlen(strresult);
clear.data = (char *) malloc(clear.length);
ptr = clear.data;
*ptr++ = (numresult>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = numresult & 0xff;
memcpy(ptr, strresult, strlen(strresult));
cipher = empty_data();
if (ap_rep.length) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context,
local_faddr->address, NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult,
"Failed storing client and server internet addresses",
sizeof(strresult));
} else {
ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &clear, &cipher,
&replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed encrypting reply",
sizeof(strresult));
}
}
}
/* if no KRB-PRIV was constructed, then we need a KRB-ERROR.
if this fails, just bail. there's nothing else we can do. */
if (cipher.length == 0) {
/* clear out ap_rep now, so that it won't be inserted in the
reply */
if (ap_rep.length) {
free(ap_rep.data);
ap_rep = empty_data();
}
krberror.ctime = 0;
krberror.cusec = 0;
krberror.susec = 0;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &krberror.stime);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
/* this is really icky. but it's what all the other callers
to mk_error do. */
krberror.error = ret;
krberror.error -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (krberror.error < 0 || krberror.error > 128)
krberror.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krberror.client = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &krberror.server,
strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
krberror.text.length = 0;
krberror.e_data = clear;
ret = krb5_mk_error(context, &krberror, &cipher);
krb5_free_principal(context, krberror.server);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
}
/* construct the reply */
ret = alloc_data(rep, 6 + ap_rep.length + cipher.length);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
ptr = rep->data;
/* length */
*ptr++ = (rep->length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = rep->length & 0xff;
/* version == 0x0001 big-endian */
*ptr++ = 0;
*ptr++ = 1;
/* ap_rep length, big-endian */
*ptr++ = (ap_rep.length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = ap_rep.length & 0xff;
/* ap-rep data */
if (ap_rep.length) {
memcpy(ptr, ap_rep.data, ap_rep.length);
ptr += ap_rep.length;
}
/* krb-priv or krb-error */
memcpy(ptr, cipher.data, cipher.length);
bailout:
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_principal(context, changepw);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
free(ap_rep.data);
free(clear.data);
free(cipher.data);
krb5_free_principal(context, target);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, targetstr);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, clientstr);
krb5_free_error_message(context, errmsg);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: schpw.c in the kpasswd service in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.11.3 does not properly validate UDP packets before sending responses, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and bandwidth consumption) via a forged packet that triggers a communication loop, as demonstrated by krb_pingpong.nasl, a related issue to CVE-1999-0103.
Commit Message: Fix kpasswd UDP ping-pong [CVE-2002-2443]
The kpasswd service provided by kadmind was vulnerable to a UDP
"ping-pong" attack [CVE-2002-2443]. Don't respond to packets unless
they pass some basic validation, and don't respond to our own error
packets.
Some authors use CVE-1999-0103 to refer to the kpasswd UDP ping-pong
attack or UDP ping-pong attacks in general, but there is discussion
leading toward narrowing the definition of CVE-1999-0103 to the echo,
chargen, or other similar built-in inetd services.
Thanks to Vincent Danen for alerting us to this issue.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 7637 (new)
target_version: 1.11.3
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,235
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void re_yyensure_buffer_stack (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
yy_size_t num_to_alloc;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (!yyg->yy_buffer_stack) {
/* First allocation is just for 2 elements, since we don't know if this
* scanner will even need a stack. We use 2 instead of 1 to avoid an
* immediate realloc on the next call.
*/
num_to_alloc = 1; // After all that talk, this was set to 1 anyways...
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyalloc
(num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack, 0, num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top = 0;
return;
}
if (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top >= (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max) - 1){
/* Increase the buffer to prepare for a possible push. */
yy_size_t grow_size = 8 /* arbitrary grow size */;
num_to_alloc = yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max + grow_size;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyrealloc
(yyg->yy_buffer_stack,
num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
/* zero only the new slots.*/
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack + yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max, 0, grow_size * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
|
Low
| 168,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static BOOLEAN flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(l2cap_socket *sock)
{
uint8_t *buf;
uint32_t len;
while (packet_get_head_l(sock, &buf, &len)) {
int sent = send(sock->our_fd, buf, len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == (signed)len)
osi_free(buf);
else if (sent >= 0) {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf + sent, len - sent);
osi_free(buf);
if (!sent) /* special case if other end not keeping up */
return TRUE;
}
else {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf, len);
osi_free(buf);
return errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sctp_chunk_length_valid(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
__u16 required_length)
{
__u16 chunk_length = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (unlikely(chunk_length < required_length))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.17.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering a large number of chunks in an association's output queue, as demonstrated by ASCONF probes, related to net/sctp/inqueue.c and net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *config,
const char *prefix,
const char *fmt,
va_list ap)
{
size_t width = (79 - strlen(prefix));
if(!config->mute) {
size_t len;
char *ptr;
char *print_buffer;
print_buffer = curlx_mvaprintf(fmt, ap);
if(!print_buffer)
return;
len = strlen(print_buffer);
ptr = print_buffer;
while(len > 0) {
fputs(prefix, config->errors);
if(len > width) {
size_t cut = width-1;
while(!ISSPACE(ptr[cut]) && cut) {
cut--;
}
if(0 == cut)
/* not a single cutting position was found, just cut it at the
max text width then! */
cut = width-1;
(void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
fputs("\n", config->errors);
ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
len -= cut;
}
else {
fputs(ptr, config->errors);
len = 0;
}
}
curl_free(print_buffer);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Curl versions 7.14.1 through 7.61.1 are vulnerable to a heap-based buffer over-read in the tool_msgs.c:voutf() function that may result in information exposure and denial of service.
Commit Message: voutf: fix bad arethmetic when outputting warnings to stderr
CVE-2018-16842
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16842.html
|
Low
| 169,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + (tim.length - 3),
(tim.length - 3));
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c:parse_elements().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12987/IEEE 802.11: Fix processing of TIM IE.
The arguments to memcpy() were completely wrong.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
|
Low
| 170,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
const char __user *, _description,
const void __user *, _payload,
size_t, plen,
key_serial_t, ringid)
{
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
char type[32], *description;
void *payload;
long ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
/* draw all the data into kernel space */
ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
description = NULL;
if (_description) {
description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(description)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(description);
goto error;
}
if (!*description) {
kfree(description);
description = NULL;
} else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
(strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto error2;
}
}
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (_payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto error2;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
goto error3;
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
}
/* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
* keyring */
key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
key_ref_put(key_ref);
}
else {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
}
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
kvfree(payload);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: security/keys/keyctl.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.5 does not consider the case of a NULL payload in conjunction with a nonzero length value, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted add_key or keyctl system call, a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-12192.
Commit Message: KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 167,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: StorageHandler::IndexedDBObserver* StorageHandler::GetIndexedDBObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!indexed_db_observer_) {
indexed_db_observer_ = std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<IndexedDBContextImpl*>(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetIndexedDBContext()));
}
return indexed_db_observer_.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,772
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __u8 *ch_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 17 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Cherry Cymotion report descriptor\n");
rdesc[11] = rdesc[16] = 0xff;
rdesc[12] = rdesc[17] = 0x03;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asn1_get_bit_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *bit_len)
{
int len_len, len_byte;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
len_byte = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len) - 1;
if (len_byte < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = len_byte + len_len + 1;
*bit_len = len_byte * 8 - der[len_len];
if (str_size >= len_byte)
memcpy (str, der + len_len + 1, len_byte);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The asn1_get_bit_der function in GNU Libtasn1 before 3.6 does not properly report an error when a negative bit length is identified, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause out-of-bounds access via crafted ASN.1 data.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line,
const FilePath& exposed_dir) {
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
content::ProcessType type;
std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN;
} else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY;
} else if (type_str == switches::kNaClBrokerProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU;
} else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN;
} else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiBrokerProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
bool in_sandbox =
(type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER) &&
(type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) &&
(type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER);
if ((type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) &&
(cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) {
in_sandbox = false;
DVLOG(1) << "GPU sandbox is disabled";
}
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
in_sandbox = false;
}
#if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) {
in_sandbox = false;
}
#endif
if (!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) &&
!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL) &&
browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) {
in_sandbox = false;
}
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) {
if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) {
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame);
}
}
bool child_needs_help =
DebugFlags::ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox);
cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type));
sandbox::ResultCode result;
base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target;
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN &&
!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) &&
content::GetContentClient()->SandboxPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) {
in_sandbox = true;
}
#endif
if (!in_sandbox) {
policy->Release();
base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
return process;
}
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) {
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
AddPluginDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
} else if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) {
if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy))
return 0;
} else {
if (!AddPolicyForRenderer(policy))
return 0;
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER ||
type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER) {
AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(policy);
} else if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN) {
if (!AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(policy))
return 0;
}
if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
}
}
if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
exposed_dir.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return 0;
FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
exposed_files.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return 0;
}
if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
policy, target.Receive());
policy->Release();
TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
return 0;
}
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER &&
(base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->wow64_status() ==
base::win::OSInfo::WOW64_DISABLED)) {
const SIZE_T kOneGigabyte = 1 << 30;
void* nacl_mem = VirtualAllocEx(target.process_handle(),
NULL,
kOneGigabyte,
MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_NOACCESS);
if (!nacl_mem) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to reserve address space for Native Client";
}
}
ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
if (child_needs_help)
base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.process_id());
return target.TakeProcessHandle();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,947
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static char *print_array( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char **entries;
char *out = 0, *ptr, *ret;
int len = 5;
cJSON *child = item->child;
int numentries = 0, i = 0, fail = 0;
/* How many entries in the array? */
while ( child ) {
++numentries;
child = child->next;
}
/* Allocate an array to hold the values for each. */
if ( ! ( entries = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) )
return 0;
memset( entries, 0, numentries * sizeof(char*) );
/* Retrieve all the results. */
child = item->child;
while ( child && ! fail ) {
ret = print_value( child, depth + 1, fmt );
entries[i++] = ret;
if ( ret )
len += strlen( ret ) + 2 + ( fmt ? 1 : 0 );
else
fail = 1;
child = child -> next;
}
/* If we didn't fail, try to malloc the output string. */
if ( ! fail ) {
out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len );
if ( ! out )
fail = 1;
}
/* Handle failure. */
if ( fail ) {
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i )
if ( entries[i] )
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output array. */
*out = '[';
ptr = out + 1;
*ptr = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
strcpy( ptr, entries[i] );
ptr += strlen( entries[i] );
if ( i != numentries - 1 ) {
*ptr++ = ',';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = ' ';
*ptr = 0;
}
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( entries );
*ptr++ = ']';
*ptr++ = 0;
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,306
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWEBPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
int
webp_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
header[12],
*stream;
WebPDecoderConfig
configure;
WebPDecBuffer
*magick_restrict webp_image = &configure.output;
WebPBitstreamFeatures
*magick_restrict features = &configure.input;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (WebPInitDecoderConfig(&configure) == 0)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
webp_image->colorspace=MODE_RGBA;
count=ReadBlob(image,12,header);
if (count != 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
status=IsWEBP(header,count);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
length=(size_t) (ReadWebPLSBWord(header+4)+8);
if (length < 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
stream=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*stream));
if (stream == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memcpy(stream,header,12);
count=ReadBlob(image,length-12,stream+12);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length-12))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
webp_status=WebPGetFeatures(stream,length,features);
if (webp_status == VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
image->columns=(size_t) features->width;
image->rows=(size_t) features->height;
image->depth=8;
image->matte=features->has_alpha != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (IsWEBPImageLossless(stream,length) != MagickFalse)
image->quality=100;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
webp_status=WebPDecode(stream,length,&configure);
}
if (webp_status != VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
switch (webp_status)
{
case VP8_STATUS_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_INVALID_PARAM:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"invalid parameter");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_BITSTREAM_ERROR:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_SUSPENDED:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"decoder suspended");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_USER_ABORT:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"user abort");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
}
p=(unsigned char *) webp_image->u.RGBA.rgba;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
WebPFreeDecBuffer(webp_image);
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in ImageMagick 6.9.7. A specially crafted webp file could lead to a file-descriptor leak in libmagickcore (thus, a DoS).
Commit Message: Fixed fd leak for webp coder (patch from #382)
|
Medium
| 168,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::parserInsertBefore(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> newChild, Node& nextChild)
{
ASSERT(newChild);
ASSERT(nextChild.parentNode() == this);
ASSERT(!newChild->isDocumentFragment());
ASSERT(!isHTMLTemplateElement(this));
if (nextChild.previousSibling() == newChild || &nextChild == newChild) // nothing to do
return;
if (!checkParserAcceptChild(*newChild))
return;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> protect(this);
while (RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ContainerNode> parent = newChild->parentNode())
parent->parserRemoveChild(*newChild);
if (document() != newChild->document())
document().adoptNode(newChild.get(), ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
treeScope().adoptIfNeeded(*newChild);
insertBeforeCommon(nextChild, *newChild);
newChild->updateAncestorConnectedSubframeCountForInsertion();
ChildListMutationScope(*this).childAdded(*newChild);
}
notifyNodeInserted(*newChild, ChildrenChangeSourceParser);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ContainerNode::parserInsertBefore function in core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71, proceeds with a DOM tree insertion in certain cases where a parent node no longer contains a child node, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: parserInsertBefore: Bail out if the parent no longer contains the child.
nextChild may be removed from the DOM tree during the
|parserRemoveChild(*newChild)| call which triggers unload events of newChild's
descendant iframes. In order to maintain the integrity of the DOM tree, the
insertion of newChild must be aborted in this case.
This patch adds a return statement that rectifies the behavior in this
edge case.
BUG=519558
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1283263002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@200690 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::handleVersion(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
if(_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName(), "VERSION"))
return;
reply(nickFromMask(prefix), "VERSION", QString("Quassel IRC %1 (built on %2) -- http://www.quassel-irc.org")
.arg(Quassel::buildInfo().plainVersionString)
.arg(Quassel::buildInfo().buildDate));
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP VERSION request by %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
str.append(tr(" with arguments: %1").arg(param));
emit displayMsg(Message::Error, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", str);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ctcphandler.cpp in Quassel before 0.6.3 and 0.7.x before 0.7.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (unresponsive IRC) via multiple Client-To-Client Protocol (CTCP) requests in a PRIVMSG message.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Reverb_command(effect_handle_t self,
uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData){
android::ReverbContext * pContext = (android::ReverbContext *) self;
int retsize;
LVREV_ControlParams_st ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
if (pContext == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command ERROR pContext == NULL");
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode){
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_INIT: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = android::Reverb_setConfig(pContext,
(effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
android::Reverb_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
Reverb_setConfig(pContext, &pContext->config);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM:{
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize);
p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
int voffset = ((p->psize - 1) / sizeof(int32_t) + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
p->status = android::Reverb_getParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
(size_t *)&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + voffset + p->vsize;
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM:{
if (pCmdData == NULL || (cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t))) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\t4LVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR, psize is not sizeof(int32_t)");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Reverb_setParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->bEnabled == LVM_TRUE){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE: ERROR-Effect is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
pContext->bEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_GetControlParameters", "EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE")
pContext->SamplesToExitCount =
(ActiveParams.T60 * pContext->config.inputCfg.samplingRate)/1000;
pContext->volumeMode = android::REVERB_VOLUME_FLAT;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->bEnabled == LVM_FALSE){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE: ERROR-Effect is not yet enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
pContext->bEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pReplyData != NULL) { // we have volume control
pContext->leftVolume = (LVM_INT16)((*(uint32_t *)pCmdData + (1 << 11)) >> 12);
pContext->rightVolume = (LVM_INT16)((*((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 1) + (1 << 11)) >> 12);
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = (1 << 24);
*((uint32_t *)pReplyData + 1) = (1 << 24);
if (pContext->volumeMode == android::REVERB_VOLUME_OFF) {
pContext->volumeMode = android::REVERB_VOLUME_FLAT;
}
} else { // we don't have volume control
pContext->leftVolume = REVERB_UNIT_VOLUME;
pContext->rightVolume = REVERB_UNIT_VOLUME;
pContext->volumeMode = android::REVERB_VOLUME_OFF;
}
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME left %d, right %d mode %d",
pContext->leftVolume, pContext->rightVolume, pContext->volumeMode);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"DEFAULT start %d ERROR",cmdCode);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
} /* end Reverb_command */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in libeffects in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, related to EffectBundle.cpp and EffectReverb.cpp, aka internal bug 26347509.
Commit Message: fix possible overflow in effect wrappers.
Add checks on parameter size field in effect command handlers
to avoid overflow leading to invalid comparison with min allowed
size for command and reply buffers.
Bug: 26347509.
Change-Id: I20e6a9b6de8e5172b957caa1ac9410b9752efa4d
(cherry picked from commit ad1bd92a49d78df6bc6e75bee68c517c1326f3cf)
|
Medium
| 173,935
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static netdev_tx_t hns_nic_net_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
int ret;
assert(skb->queue_mapping < ndev->ae_handle->q_num);
ret = hns_nic_net_xmit_hw(ndev, skb,
&tx_ring_data(priv, skb->queue_mapping));
if (ret == NETDEV_TX_OK) {
netif_trans_update(ndev);
ndev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
ndev->stats.tx_packets++;
}
return (netdev_tx_t)ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13, local users can cause a denial of service (use-after-free and BUG) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging differences in skb handling between hns_nic_net_xmit_hw and hns_nic_net_xmit.
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,403
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SendNotImplementedError(struct mg_connection* connection,
const struct mg_request_info* request_info,
void* user_data) {
std::string body = base::StringPrintf(
"{\"status\":%d,\"value\":{\"message\":"
"\"Command has not been implemented yet: %s %s\"}}",
kUnknownCommand, request_info->request_method, request_info->uri);
std::string header = base::StringPrintf(
"HTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented\r\n"
"Content-Type:application/json\r\n"
"Content-Length:%" PRIuS "\r\n"
"\r\n", body.length());
LOG(ERROR) << header << body;
mg_write(connection, header.data(), header.length());
mg_write(connection, body.data(), body.length());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,457
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BiquadDSPKernel::updateCoefficientsIfNecessary(bool useSmoothing, bool forceUpdate)
{
if (forceUpdate || biquadProcessor()->filterCoefficientsDirty()) {
double value1;
double value2;
double gain;
double detune; // in Cents
if (biquadProcessor()->hasSampleAccurateValues()) {
value1 = biquadProcessor()->parameter1()->finalValue();
value2 = biquadProcessor()->parameter2()->finalValue();
gain = biquadProcessor()->parameter3()->finalValue();
detune = biquadProcessor()->parameter4()->finalValue();
} else if (useSmoothing) {
value1 = biquadProcessor()->parameter1()->smoothedValue();
value2 = biquadProcessor()->parameter2()->smoothedValue();
gain = biquadProcessor()->parameter3()->smoothedValue();
detune = biquadProcessor()->parameter4()->smoothedValue();
} else {
value1 = biquadProcessor()->parameter1()->value();
value2 = biquadProcessor()->parameter2()->value();
gain = biquadProcessor()->parameter3()->value();
detune = biquadProcessor()->parameter4()->value();
}
double nyquist = this->nyquist();
double normalizedFrequency = value1 / nyquist;
if (detune)
normalizedFrequency *= pow(2, detune / 1200);
switch (biquadProcessor()->type()) {
case BiquadProcessor::LowPass:
m_biquad.setLowpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::HighPass:
m_biquad.setHighpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::BandPass:
m_biquad.setBandpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::LowShelf:
m_biquad.setLowShelfParams(normalizedFrequency, gain);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::HighShelf:
m_biquad.setHighShelfParams(normalizedFrequency, gain);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::Peaking:
m_biquad.setPeakingParams(normalizedFrequency, value2, gain);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::Notch:
m_biquad.setNotchParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::Allpass:
m_biquad.setAllpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: modules/webaudio/BiquadDSPKernel.cpp in the Web Audio API implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, does not properly consider concurrent threads during attempts to update biquad filter coefficients, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via crafted API calls.
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,662
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The SOAP parser in PHP before 5.3.22 and 5.4.x before 5.4.12 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a SOAP WSDL file containing an XML external entity declaration in conjunction with an entity reference, related to an XML External Entity (XXE) issue in the soap_xmlParseFile and soap_xmlParseMemory functions.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
return 0;
}
return err;
}
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err == 0) {
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (bt_sk(sk)->skb_msg_name)
bt_sk(sk)->skb_msg_name(skb, msg->msg_name,
&msg->msg_namelen);
else
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
const size_t num_samples,
const std::string& histogram_name) const {
return num_samples ==
histogram_tester_.GetAllSamples(histogram_name).size();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-281
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to local scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page, related to the unsafe-inline keyword.
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
|
Medium
| 172,430
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
local_socket_close_locked(s);
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
|
High
| 174,153
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
if (timeout == NULL)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, NULL);
if (get_compat_timespec(&ktspec, timeout))
return -EFAULT;
datagrams = __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, &ktspec);
if (datagrams > 0 && put_compat_timespec(&ktspec, timeout))
datagrams = -EFAULT;
return datagrams;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The compat_sys_recvmmsg function in net/compat.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.2, when CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled, allows local users to gain privileges via a recvmmsg system call with a crafted timeout pointer parameter.
Commit Message: x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: onig_new_deluxe(regex_t** reg, const UChar* pattern, const UChar* pattern_end,
OnigCompileInfo* ci, OnigErrorInfo* einfo)
{
int r;
UChar *cpat, *cpat_end;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(einfo)) einfo->par = (UChar* )NULL;
if (ci->pattern_enc != ci->target_enc) {
r = conv_encoding(ci->pattern_enc, ci->target_enc, pattern, pattern_end,
&cpat, &cpat_end);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
else {
cpat = (UChar* )pattern;
cpat_end = (UChar* )pattern_end;
}
*reg = (regex_t* )xmalloc(sizeof(regex_t));
if (IS_NULL(*reg)) {
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
goto err2;
}
r = onig_reg_init(*reg, ci->option, ci->case_fold_flag, ci->target_enc,
ci->syntax);
if (r != 0) goto err;
r = onig_compile(*reg, cpat, cpat_end, einfo);
if (r != 0) {
err:
onig_free(*reg);
*reg = NULL;
}
err2:
if (cpat != pattern) xfree(cpat);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free in onig_new_deluxe() in regext.c in Oniguruma 6.9.2 allows attackers to potentially cause information disclosure, denial of service, or possibly code execution by providing a crafted regular expression. The attacker provides a pair of a regex pattern and a string, with a multi-byte encoding that gets handled by onig_new_deluxe(). Oniguruma issues often affect Ruby, as well as common optional libraries for PHP and Rust.
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
|
Low
| 169,613
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
height,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
else
{
if (sun_info.length > (height*bytes_per_line))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(sun_pixels,sun_data,sun_info.length);
}
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+bytes_per_line % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/sun.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted SUN file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 170,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::get_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_INOUT OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
switch ((unsigned long)configIndex) {
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigInterlaced: {
OMX_QCOM_CONFIG_INTERLACETYPE *configFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_CONFIG_INTERLACETYPE *) configData;
if (configFmt->nPortIndex == 1) {
if (configFmt->nIndex == 0) {
configFmt->eInterlaceType = OMX_QCOM_InterlaceFrameProgressive;
} else if (configFmt->nIndex == 1) {
configFmt->eInterlaceType =
OMX_QCOM_InterlaceInterleaveFrameTopFieldFirst;
} else if (configFmt->nIndex == 2) {
configFmt->eInterlaceType =
OMX_QCOM_InterlaceInterleaveFrameBottomFieldFirst;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigInterlaced:"
" NoMore Interlaced formats");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: Bad port index %d queried on only o/p port",
(int)configFmt->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexQueryNumberOfVideoDecInstance: {
QOMX_VIDEO_QUERY_DECODER_INSTANCES *decoderinstances =
(QOMX_VIDEO_QUERY_DECODER_INSTANCES*)configData;
decoderinstances->nNumOfInstances = 16;
/*TODO: How to handle this case */
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoFramePackingArrangement: {
if (drv_ctx.decoder_format == VDEC_CODECTYPE_H264) {
OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT *configFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT *) configData;
memcpy(configFmt, &m_frame_pack_arrangement,
sizeof(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: Framepack data not supported for non H264 codecs");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop: {
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rect = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *) configData;
memcpy(rect, &rectangle, sizeof(OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("get_config: crop info: L: %u, T: %u, R: %u, B: %u",
rectangle.nLeft, rectangle.nTop,
rectangle.nWidth, rectangle.nHeight);
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel: {
struct v4l2_control control;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed getting performance level: %d", errno);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
switch (control.value) {
case V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO:
perf->ePerfLevel = OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo;
break;
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Unknown perf level %d, reporting Nominal instead", control.value);
/* Fall through */
case V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL:
perf->ePerfLevel = OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal;
break;
}
}
break;
}
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: unknown param %d",configIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
|
Medium
| 173,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg)
{
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
cairo_surface_t *image;
cairo_pattern_t *pattern;
int x, y;
ImageStream *imgStr;
Guchar *pix;
int i;
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
if (maskColors) {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
for (i = 0; i < colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); ++i) {
if (pix[i] < maskColors[2*i] * 255||
pix[i] > maskColors[2*i+1] * 255) {
*dest = *dest | 0xff000000;
break;
}
}
pix += colorMap->getNumPixelComps();
dest++;
}
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
width, height, width * 4);
}
else {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24,
width, height, width * 4);
}
if (image == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
pattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (image);
if (pattern == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
LOG (printf ("drawImageMask %dx%d\n", width, height));
cairo_matrix_init_translate (&matrix, 0, height);
cairo_matrix_scale (&matrix, width, -height);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (pattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (pattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BILINEAR);
cairo_set_source (cairo, pattern);
cairo_paint (cairo);
if (cairo_shape) {
#if 0
cairo_rectangle (cairo_shape, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo_shape);
#else
cairo_save (cairo_shape);
/* this should draw a rectangle the size of the image
* we use this instead of rect,fill because of the lack
* of EXTEND_PAD */
/* NOTE: this will multiply the edges of the image twice */
cairo_set_source (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_paint(cairo_shape);
cairo_restore (cairo_shape);
#endif
}
cairo_pattern_destroy (pattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (image);
free (buffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,605
|
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