instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Track::GetType() const
{
return m_info.type;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,375
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: size_t jsuGetFreeStack() {
#ifdef ARM
void *frame = __builtin_frame_address(0);
size_t stackPos = (size_t)((char*)frame);
size_t stackEnd = (size_t)((char*)&LINKER_END_VAR);
if (stackPos < stackEnd) return 0; // should never happen, but just in case of overflow!
return stackPos - stackEnd;
#elif defined(LINUX)
char ptr; // this is on the stack
extern void *STACK_BASE;
uint32_t count = (uint32_t)((size_t)STACK_BASE - (size_t)&ptr);
return 1000000 - count; // give it 1 megabyte of stack
#else
return 1000000; // no stack depth check on this platform
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via an integer overflow during syntax parsing. This was addressed by fixing stack size detection on Linux in jsutils.c.
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
|
Medium
| 169,218
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int64_t http_seek_internal(URLContext *h, int64_t off, int whence, int force_reconnect)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
URLContext *old_hd = s->hd;
int64_t old_off = s->off;
uint8_t old_buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int old_buf_size, ret;
AVDictionary *options = NULL;
if (whence == AVSEEK_SIZE)
return s->filesize;
else if (!force_reconnect &&
((whence == SEEK_CUR && off == 0) ||
(whence == SEEK_SET && off == s->off)))
return s->off;
else if ((s->filesize == -1 && whence == SEEK_END))
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
if (whence == SEEK_CUR)
off += s->off;
else if (whence == SEEK_END)
off += s->filesize;
else if (whence != SEEK_SET)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (off < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
s->off = off;
if (s->off && h->is_streamed)
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
/* we save the old context in case the seek fails */
old_buf_size = s->buf_end - s->buf_ptr;
memcpy(old_buf, s->buf_ptr, old_buf_size);
s->hd = NULL;
/* if it fails, continue on old connection */
if ((ret = http_open_cnx(h, &options)) < 0) {
av_dict_free(&options);
memcpy(s->buffer, old_buf, old_buf_size);
s->buf_ptr = s->buffer;
s->buf_end = s->buffer + old_buf_size;
s->hd = old_hd;
s->off = old_off;
return ret;
}
av_dict_free(&options);
ffurl_close(old_hd);
return off;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
|
Low
| 168,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: uint8_t smb2cli_session_security_mode(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = session->conn;
uint8_t security_mode = 0;
if (conn == NULL) {
return security_mode;
}
security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
return security_mode;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Samba 3.x and 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3 supports connections that are encrypted but unsigned, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct encrypted-to-unencrypted downgrade attacks by modifying the client-server data stream, related to clidfs.c, libsmb_server.c, and smbXcli_base.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::RunCallback(int32_t result) {
if (!pending_callback_.get()) {
CHECK(main_document_loader_);
return;
}
TrackedCallback::ClearAndRun(&pending_callback_, result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.89 does not properly load URLs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger a *stale buffer.*
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MountError PerformFakeMount(const std::string& source_path,
const base::FilePath& mounted_path) {
if (mounted_path.empty())
return MOUNT_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!base::CreateDirectory(mounted_path)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create directory at " << mounted_path.value();
return MOUNT_ERROR_DIRECTORY_CREATION_FAILED;
}
const base::FilePath dummy_file_path =
mounted_path.Append("SUCCESSFULLY_PERFORMED_FAKE_MOUNT.txt");
const std::string dummy_file_content = "This is a dummy file.";
const int write_result = base::WriteFile(
dummy_file_path, dummy_file_content.data(), dummy_file_content.size());
if (write_result != static_cast<int>(dummy_file_content.size())) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to put a dummy file at "
<< dummy_file_path.value();
return MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_PROGRAM_FAILED;
}
return MOUNT_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.80 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
Low
| 171,731
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
dec_pic_params_t * ps_pps = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
WORD32 ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Read remaining contents of the slice header */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec_ref_pic_marking function */
/* G050 */
if(ps_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc != 0)
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read)
ps_dec->u4_bitoffset = ih264d_read_mmco_commands(
ps_dec);
else
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += ps_dec->u4_bitoffset;
}
/* G050 */
/* Read slice_qp_delta */
i_temp = ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp
+ ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((i_temp < 0) || (i_temp > 51))
return ERROR_INV_RANGE_QP_T;
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_qp_delta",
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp - ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp);
if(ps_pps->u1_deblocking_filter_parameters_present_flag == 1)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: disable_deblocking_filter_idc", u4_temp);
if(u4_temp > SLICE_BOUNDARY_DBLK_DISABLED)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = u4_temp;
if(u4_temp != 1)
{
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset >> 1);
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_beta_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset >> 1);
}
else
{
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
/* Initialization to check if number of motion vector per 2 Mbs */
/* are exceeding the range or not */
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
/*set slice header cone to 2 ,to indicate correct header*/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
SWITCHOFFTRACE; SWITCHONTRACECABAC;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cabac(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
SWITCHONTRACE; SWITCHOFFTRACECABAC;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The H.264 decoder in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 mishandles Memory Management Control Operation (MMCO) data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25818142.
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
|
Low
| 173,909
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static js_Ast *callexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *a = newexp(J);
loop:
if (jsP_accept(J, '.')) { a = EXP2(MEMBER, a, identifiername(J)); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '[')) { a = EXP2(INDEX, a, expression(J, 0)); jsP_expect(J, ']'); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '(')) { a = EXP2(CALL, a, arguments(J)); jsP_expect(J, ')'); goto loop; }
return a;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: jsparse.c in Artifex MuJS through 1.0.2 does not properly maintain the AST depth for binary expressions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive recursion) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Track::Seek(
long long time_ns,
const BlockEntry*& pResult) const
{
const long status = GetFirst(pResult);
if (status < 0) //buffer underflow, etc
return status;
assert(pResult);
if (pResult->EOS())
return 0;
const Cluster* pCluster = pResult->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
if (time_ns <= pResult->GetBlock()->GetTime(pCluster))
return 0;
Cluster** const clusters = m_pSegment->m_clusters;
assert(clusters);
const long count = m_pSegment->GetCount(); //loaded only, not preloaded
assert(count > 0);
Cluster** const i = clusters + pCluster->GetIndex();
assert(i);
assert(*i == pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
Cluster** const j = clusters + count;
Cluster** lo = i;
Cluster** hi = j;
while (lo < hi)
{
Cluster** const mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
assert(mid < hi);
pCluster = *mid;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() >= 0);
assert(pCluster->GetIndex() == long(mid - m_pSegment->m_clusters));
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
lo = mid + 1;
else
hi = mid;
assert(lo <= hi);
}
assert(lo == hi);
assert(lo > i);
assert(lo <= j);
while (lo > i)
{
pCluster = *--lo;
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
pResult = pCluster->GetEntry(this);
if ((pResult != 0) && !pResult->EOS())
return 0;
}
pResult = GetEOS(); //weird
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,435
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct fileIdentDesc *udf_find_entry(struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *child,
struct udf_fileident_bh *fibh,
struct fileIdentDesc *cfi)
{
struct fileIdentDesc *fi = NULL;
loff_t f_pos;
int block, flen;
unsigned char *fname = NULL;
unsigned char *nameptr;
uint8_t lfi;
uint16_t liu;
loff_t size;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint32_t elen;
sector_t offset;
struct extent_position epos = {};
struct udf_inode_info *dinfo = UDF_I(dir);
int isdotdot = child->len == 2 &&
child->name[0] == '.' && child->name[1] == '.';
size = udf_ext0_offset(dir) + dir->i_size;
f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(dir);
fibh->sbh = fibh->ebh = NULL;
fibh->soffset = fibh->eoffset = f_pos & (dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
if (inode_bmap(dir, f_pos >> dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits, &epos,
&eloc, &elen, &offset) != (EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED >> 30))
goto out_err;
block = udf_get_lb_pblock(dir->i_sb, &eloc, offset);
if ((++offset << dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits) < elen) {
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct long_ad);
} else
offset = 0;
fibh->sbh = fibh->ebh = udf_tread(dir->i_sb, block);
if (!fibh->sbh)
goto out_err;
}
fname = kmalloc(UDF_NAME_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!fname)
goto out_err;
while (f_pos < size) {
fi = udf_fileident_read(dir, &f_pos, fibh, cfi, &epos, &eloc,
&elen, &offset);
if (!fi)
goto out_err;
liu = le16_to_cpu(cfi->lengthOfImpUse);
lfi = cfi->lengthFileIdent;
if (fibh->sbh == fibh->ebh) {
nameptr = fi->fileIdent + liu;
} else {
int poffset; /* Unpaded ending offset */
poffset = fibh->soffset + sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc) +
liu + lfi;
if (poffset >= lfi)
nameptr = (uint8_t *)(fibh->ebh->b_data +
poffset - lfi);
else {
nameptr = fname;
memcpy(nameptr, fi->fileIdent + liu,
lfi - poffset);
memcpy(nameptr + lfi - poffset,
fibh->ebh->b_data, poffset);
}
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_DELETED) != 0) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(dir->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UNDELETE))
continue;
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_HIDDEN) != 0) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(dir->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UNHIDE))
continue;
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_PARENT) &&
isdotdot)
goto out_ok;
if (!lfi)
continue;
flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, fname, lfi);
if (flen && udf_match(flen, fname, child->len, child->name))
goto out_ok;
}
out_err:
fi = NULL;
if (fibh->sbh != fibh->ebh)
brelse(fibh->ebh);
brelse(fibh->sbh);
out_ok:
brelse(epos.bh);
kfree(fname);
return fi;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The UDF filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 does not ensure that space is available for storing a symlink target's name along with a trailing 0 character, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information via a crafted filesystem image, related to fs/udf/symlink.c and fs/udf/unicode.c.
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 166,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::GetAllCookies(
std::unique_ptr<GetAllCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
scoped_refptr<CookieRetriever> retriever =
new CookieRetriever(std::move(callback));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CookieRetriever::RetrieveAllCookiesOnIO, retriever,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext())));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
static char buff[16384];
struct cpio _cpio; /* Allocated on stack. */
struct cpio *cpio;
const char *errmsg;
int uid, gid;
int opt;
cpio = &_cpio;
memset(cpio, 0, sizeof(*cpio));
cpio->buff = buff;
cpio->buff_size = sizeof(buff);
#if defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(SIGPIPE)
{ /* Ignore SIGPIPE signals. */
struct sigaction sa;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
}
#endif
/* Set lafe_progname before calling lafe_warnc. */
lafe_setprogname(*argv, "bsdcpio");
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
if (setlocale(LC_ALL, "") == NULL)
lafe_warnc(0, "Failed to set default locale");
#endif
cpio->uid_override = -1;
cpio->gid_override = -1;
cpio->argv = argv;
cpio->argc = argc;
cpio->mode = '\0';
cpio->verbose = 0;
cpio->compress = '\0';
cpio->extract_flags = ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_AUTODIR;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
#if !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
if (geteuid() == 0)
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
#endif
cpio->bytes_per_block = 512;
cpio->filename = NULL;
cpio->matching = archive_match_new();
if (cpio->matching == NULL)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Out of memory");
while ((opt = cpio_getopt(cpio)) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '0': /* GNU convention: --null, -0 */
cpio->option_null = 1;
break;
case 'A': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
cpio->option_append = 1;
break;
case 'a': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_atime_restore = 1;
break;
case 'B': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->bytes_per_block = 5120;
break;
case OPTION_B64ENCODE:
cpio->add_filter = opt;
break;
case 'C': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
cpio->bytes_per_block = atoi(cpio->argument);
if (cpio->bytes_per_block <= 0)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Invalid blocksize %s", cpio->argument);
break;
case 'c': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->format = "odc";
break;
case 'd': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_AUTODIR;
break;
case 'E': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
if (archive_match_include_pattern_from_file(
cpio->matching, cpio->argument,
cpio->option_null) != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Error : %s",
archive_error_string(cpio->matching));
break;
case 'F': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD/GNU cpio */
cpio->filename = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'f': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (archive_match_exclude_pattern(cpio->matching,
cpio->argument) != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Error : %s",
archive_error_string(cpio->matching));
break;
case OPTION_GRZIP:
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'H': /* GNU cpio (also --format) */
cpio->format = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'h':
long_help();
break;
case 'I': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
cpio->filename = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'i': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (cpio->mode != '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Cannot use both -i and -%c", cpio->mode);
cpio->mode = opt;
break;
case 'J': /* GNU tar, others */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'j': /* GNU tar, others */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case OPTION_INSECURE:
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
break;
case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
break;
case 'l': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_link = 1;
break;
case OPTION_LRZIP:
case OPTION_LZ4:
case OPTION_LZMA: /* GNU tar, others */
case OPTION_LZOP: /* GNU tar, others */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'm': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_TIME;
break;
case 'n': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->option_numeric_uid_gid = 1;
break;
case OPTION_NO_PRESERVE_OWNER: /* GNU cpio */
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
break;
case 'O': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->filename = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'o': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (cpio->mode != '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Cannot use both -o and -%c", cpio->mode);
cpio->mode = opt;
break;
case 'p': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (cpio->mode != '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Cannot use both -p and -%c", cpio->mode);
cpio->mode = opt;
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
break;
case OPTION_PASSPHRASE:
cpio->passphrase = cpio->argument;
break;
case OPTION_PRESERVE_OWNER:
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
break;
case OPTION_QUIET: /* GNU cpio */
cpio->quiet = 1;
break;
case 'R': /* GNU cpio, also --owner */
/* TODO: owner_parse should return uname/gname
* also; use that to set [ug]name_override. */
errmsg = owner_parse(cpio->argument, &uid, &gid);
if (errmsg) {
lafe_warnc(-1, "%s", errmsg);
usage();
}
if (uid != -1) {
cpio->uid_override = uid;
cpio->uname_override = NULL;
}
if (gid != -1) {
cpio->gid_override = gid;
cpio->gname_override = NULL;
}
break;
case 'r': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_rename = 1;
break;
case 't': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_list = 1;
break;
case 'u': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->extract_flags
&= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
break;
case OPTION_UUENCODE:
cpio->add_filter = opt;
break;
case 'v': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->verbose++;
break;
case 'V': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->dot++;
break;
case OPTION_VERSION: /* GNU convention */
version();
break;
#if 0
/*
* cpio_getopt() handles -W specially, so it's not
* available here.
*/
case 'W': /* Obscure, but useful GNU convention. */
break;
#endif
case 'y': /* tar convention */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'Z': /* tar convention */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'z': /* tar convention */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
/*
* Sanity-check args, error out on nonsensical combinations.
*/
/* -t implies -i if no mode was specified. */
if (cpio->option_list && cpio->mode == '\0')
cpio->mode = 'i';
/* -t requires -i */
if (cpio->option_list && cpio->mode != 'i')
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option -t requires -i");
/* -n requires -it */
if (cpio->option_numeric_uid_gid && !cpio->option_list)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option -n requires -it");
/* Can only specify format when writing */
if (cpio->format != NULL && cpio->mode != 'o')
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option --format requires -o");
/* -l requires -p */
if (cpio->option_link && cpio->mode != 'p')
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option -l requires -p");
/* -v overrides -V */
if (cpio->dot && cpio->verbose)
cpio->dot = 0;
/* TODO: Flag other nonsensical combinations. */
switch (cpio->mode) {
case 'o':
/* TODO: Implement old binary format in libarchive,
use that here. */
if (cpio->format == NULL)
cpio->format = "odc"; /* Default format */
mode_out(cpio);
break;
case 'i':
while (*cpio->argv != NULL) {
if (archive_match_include_pattern(cpio->matching,
*cpio->argv) != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Error : %s",
archive_error_string(cpio->matching));
--cpio->argc;
++cpio->argv;
}
if (cpio->option_list)
mode_list(cpio);
else
mode_in(cpio);
break;
case 'p':
if (*cpio->argv == NULL || **cpio->argv == '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"-p mode requires a target directory");
mode_pass(cpio, *cpio->argv);
break;
default:
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Must specify at least one of -i, -o, or -p");
}
archive_match_free(cpio->matching);
free_cache(cpio->gname_cache);
free_cache(cpio->uname_cache);
free(cpio->destdir);
passphrase_free(cpio->ppbuff);
return (cpio->return_value);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Absolute path traversal vulnerability in bsdcpio in libarchive 3.1.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a full pathname in an archive.
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
|
Low
| 166,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 3)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
const String& str(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
float a(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toFloat(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
if (exec->argumentCount() > 2 && !exec->argument(2).isUndefinedOrNull() && !exec->argument(2).inherits(&JSint::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
int* b(toint(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec)));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,609
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: T42_Face_Init( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Face t42face, /* T42_Face */
FT_Int face_index,
FT_Int num_params,
FT_Parameter* params )
{
T42_Face face = (T42_Face)t42face;
FT_Error error;
FT_Service_PsCMaps psnames;
PSAux_Service psaux;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
T1_Font type1 = &face->type1;
PS_FontInfo info = &type1->font_info;
FT_UNUSED( num_params );
FT_UNUSED( params );
FT_UNUSED( stream );
face->ttf_face = NULL;
face->root.num_faces = 1;
FT_FACE_FIND_GLOBAL_SERVICE( face, psnames, POSTSCRIPT_CMAPS );
face->psnames = psnames;
face->psaux = FT_Get_Module_Interface( FT_FACE_LIBRARY( face ),
"psaux" );
psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
if ( !psaux )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Face_Init: cannot access `psaux' module\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Missing_Module );
goto Exit;
}
FT_TRACE2(( "Type 42 driver\n" ));
/* open the tokenizer, this will also check the font format */
error = T42_Open_Face( face );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
/* if we just wanted to check the format, leave successfully now */
if ( face_index < 0 )
goto Exit;
/* check the face index */
if ( face_index > 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Face_Init: invalid face index\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
goto Exit;
}
/* Now load the font program into the face object */
/* Init the face object fields */
/* Now set up root face fields */
root->num_glyphs = type1->num_glyphs;
root->num_charmaps = 0;
root->face_index = 0;
root->face_flags |= FT_FACE_FLAG_SCALABLE |
FT_FACE_FLAG_HORIZONTAL |
FT_FACE_FLAG_GLYPH_NAMES;
if ( info->is_fixed_pitch )
root->face_flags |= FT_FACE_FLAG_FIXED_WIDTH;
/* We only set this flag if we have the patented bytecode interpreter. */
/* There are no known `tricky' Type42 fonts that could be loaded with */
/* the unpatented interpreter. */
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
root->face_flags |= FT_FACE_FLAG_HINTER;
#endif
/* XXX: TODO -- add kerning with .afm support */
/* get style name -- be careful, some broken fonts only */
/* have a `/FontName' dictionary entry! */
root->family_name = info->family_name;
/* assume "Regular" style if we don't know better */
root->style_name = (char *)"Regular";
if ( root->family_name )
{
char* full = info->full_name;
char* family = root->family_name;
if ( full )
{
while ( *full )
{
if ( *full == *family )
{
family++;
full++;
}
else
{
if ( *full == ' ' || *full == '-' )
full++;
else if ( *family == ' ' || *family == '-' )
family++;
else
{
if ( !*family )
root->style_name = full;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
/* do we have a `/FontName'? */
if ( type1->font_name )
root->family_name = type1->font_name;
}
/* no embedded bitmap support */
root->num_fixed_sizes = 0;
root->available_sizes = 0;
/* Load the TTF font embedded in the T42 font */
{
FT_Open_Args args;
args.flags = FT_OPEN_MEMORY;
args.memory_base = face->ttf_data;
args.memory_size = face->ttf_size;
args.flags |= FT_OPEN_PARAMS;
args.num_params = num_params;
args.params = params;
}
error = FT_Open_Face( FT_FACE_LIBRARY( face ),
&args, 0, &face->ttf_face );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: type42/t42parse.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not consider that scanning can be incomplete without triggering an error, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Type42 font.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,860
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void fput(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
if (likely(!in_interrupt() && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
init_task_work(&file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, ____fput);
if (!task_work_add(task, &file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, true))
return;
/*
* After this task has run exit_task_work(),
* task_work_add() will fail. Fall through to delayed
* fput to avoid leaking *file.
*/
}
if (llist_add(&file->f_u.fu_llist, &delayed_fput_list))
schedule_work(&delayed_fput_work);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,801
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GetPreviewDataForIndex(int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
if (index != printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX &&
index < printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX) {
return;
}
PreviewPageDataMap::iterator it = page_data_map_.find(index);
if (it != page_data_map_.end())
*data = it->second.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,822
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType AnnotateImage(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
char
*p,
primitive[MaxTextExtent],
*text,
**textlist;
DrawInfo
*annotate,
*annotate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register ssize_t
i;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
number_lines;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (draw_info->text == (char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*draw_info->text == '\0')
return(MagickTrue);
annotate=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
text=annotate->text;
annotate->text=(char *) NULL;
annotate_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
number_lines=1;
for (p=text; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (*p == '\n')
number_lines++;
textlist=AcquireQuantumMemory(number_lines+1,sizeof(*textlist));
if (textlist == (char **) NULL)
{
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
return(MagickFalse);
}
p=text;
for (i=0; i < number_lines; i++)
{
char
*q;
textlist[i]=p;
for (q=p; *q != '\0'; q++)
if ((*q == '\r') || (*q == '\n'))
break;
if (*q == '\r')
{
*q='\0';
q++;
}
*q='\0';
p=q+1;
}
textlist[i]=(char *) NULL;
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
SetGeometryInfo(&geometry_info);
if (annotate_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) ParsePageGeometry(image,annotate_info->geometry,&geometry,
&image->exception);
(void) ParseGeometry(annotate_info->geometry,&geometry_info);
}
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
textlist=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(textlist);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=MagickTrue;
(void) memset(&metrics,0,sizeof(metrics));
for (i=0; textlist[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
if (*textlist[i] == '\0')
continue;
/*
Position text relative to image.
*/
annotate_info->affine.tx=geometry_info.xi-image->page.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=geometry_info.psi-image->page.y;
(void) CloneString(&annotate->text,textlist[i]);
if ((metrics.width == 0) || (annotate->gravity != NorthWestGravity))
(void) GetTypeMetrics(image,annotate,&metrics);
height=(ssize_t) (metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+0.5);
switch (annotate->gravity)
{
case UndefinedGravity:
default:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent;
break;
}
case NorthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent)-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
case WestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height+
annotate_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case StaticGravity:
case CenterGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.sy*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.sy*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case SouthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0-annotate_info->affine.sy*
(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width-annotate_info->affine.sy*
(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
}
switch (annotate->align)
{
case LeftAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case CenterAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case RightAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (draw_info->undercolor.opacity != TransparentOpacity)
{
DrawInfo
*undercolor_info;
/*
Text box.
*/
undercolor_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
undercolor_info->fill=draw_info->undercolor;
undercolor_info->affine=draw_info->affine;
undercolor_info->affine.tx=offset.x-draw_info->affine.ry*metrics.ascent;
undercolor_info->affine.ty=offset.y-draw_info->affine.sy*metrics.ascent;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MaxTextExtent,
"rectangle 0.0,0.0 %g,%g",metrics.origin.x,(double) height);
(void) CloneString(&undercolor_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,undercolor_info);
(void) DestroyDrawInfo(undercolor_info);
}
annotate_info->affine.tx=offset.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=offset.y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MaxTextExtent,"stroke-width %g "
"line 0,0 %g,0",metrics.underline_thickness,metrics.width);
if (annotate->decorate == OverlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+
metrics.descent-metrics.underline_position));
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info);
}
else
if (annotate->decorate == UnderlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*
metrics.underline_position);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info);
}
/*
Annotate image with text.
*/
status=RenderType(image,annotate,&offset,&metrics);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (annotate->decorate == LineThroughDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(height+
metrics.underline_position+metrics.descent)/2.0);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info);
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
textlist=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(textlist);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16, ComplexImages in MagickCore/fourier.c has a heap-based buffer over-read because of incorrect calls to GetCacheViewVirtualPixels.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
|
Medium
| 169,589
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_asntime_into_isotime (unsigned char const **buf, size_t *len,
ksba_isotime_t isotime)
{
struct tag_info ti;
gpg_error_t err;
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (buf, len, &ti);
if (err)
;
else if ( !(ti.class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL
&& (ti.tag == TYPE_UTC_TIME || ti.tag == TYPE_GENERALIZED_TIME)
&& !ti.is_constructed) )
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
else if (!(err = _ksba_asntime_to_iso (*buf, ti.length,
ti.tag == TYPE_UTC_TIME, isotime)))
parse_skip (buf, len, &ti);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Libksba before 1.3.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and crash) via unspecified vectors, related to the "returned length of the object from _ksba_ber_parse_tl."
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ScriptPromise VRDisplay::exitPresent(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (!is_presenting_) {
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "VRDisplay is not presenting.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
if (!display_) {
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "VRService is not available.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
display_->ExitPresent();
resolver->Resolve();
StopPresenting();
return promise;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
|
Low
| 172,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡउওဒვპ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of a confusable character in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Include U+0517 in set of Cyrillic/Latin lookalikes.
Cyrillic letter U+0517 (ԗ) looks somewhat similar to the Latin letter p.
This CL adds this character to the set of Cyrillic characters that look
like Latin characters. Domains made up entirely of Cyrillic/Latin
lookalikes are displayed as punycode in URLs.
Bug: 863663
Change-Id: I4340c48d124c9c4cd3d3b5d0f9d3865d709e082d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286825
Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600582}
|
Medium
| 173,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(const char *) ap_limit_section(cmd_parms *cmd,
void *dummy,
const char *arg)
{
const char *endp = ap_strrchr_c(arg, '>');
const char *limited_methods;
void *tog = cmd->cmd->cmd_data;
apr_int64_t limited = 0;
apr_int64_t old_limited = cmd->limited;
const char *errmsg;
if (endp == NULL) {
return unclosed_directive(cmd);
}
limited_methods = apr_pstrmemdup(cmd->temp_pool, arg, endp - arg);
if (!limited_methods[0]) {
return missing_container_arg(cmd);
}
while (limited_methods[0]) {
char *method = ap_getword_conf(cmd->temp_pool, &limited_methods);
int methnum;
/* check for builtin or module registered method number */
methnum = ap_method_number_of(method);
if (methnum == M_TRACE && !tog) {
return "TRACE cannot be controlled by <Limit>, see TraceEnable";
}
else if (methnum == M_INVALID) {
/* method has not been registered yet, but resource restriction
* is always checked before method handling, so register it.
*/
methnum = ap_method_register(cmd->pool,
apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, method));
}
limited |= (AP_METHOD_BIT << methnum);
}
/* Killing two features with one function,
* if (tog == NULL) <Limit>, else <LimitExcept>
*/
limited = tog ? ~limited : limited;
if (!(old_limited & limited)) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> directive excludes all methods", NULL);
}
else if ((old_limited & limited) == old_limited) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> directive specifies methods already excluded",
NULL);
}
cmd->limited &= limited;
errmsg = ap_walk_config(cmd->directive->first_child, cmd, cmd->context);
cmd->limited = old_limited;
return errmsg;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Apache httpd allows remote attackers to read secret data from process memory if the Limit directive can be set in a user's .htaccess file, or if httpd.conf has certain misconfigurations, aka Optionsbleed. This affects the Apache HTTP Server through 2.2.34 and 2.4.x through 2.4.27. The attacker sends an unauthenticated OPTIONS HTTP request when attempting to read secret data. This is a use-after-free issue and thus secret data is not always sent, and the specific data depends on many factors including configuration. Exploitation with .htaccess can be blocked with a patch to the ap_limit_section function in server/core.c.
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
Low
| 168,085
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const
{
return GetTime(pChapters, m_stop_timecode);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,357
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 170,143
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteIPLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
IPLInfo
ipl_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info, image);
if ((quantum_info->format == UndefinedQuantumFormat) &&
(IsHighDynamicRangeImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
switch(quantum_info->depth){
case 8:
ipl_info.byteType = 0;
break;
case 16:
if(quantum_info->format == SignedQuantumFormat){
ipl_info.byteType = 2;
}
else{
ipl_info.byteType = 1;
}
break;
case 32:
if(quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat){
ipl_info.byteType = 3;
}
else{
ipl_info.byteType = 4;
}
break;
case 64:
ipl_info.byteType = 10;
break;
default:
ipl_info.byteType = 2;
break;
}
ipl_info.z = (unsigned int) GetImageListLength(image);
/* There is no current method for detecting whether we have T or Z stacks */
ipl_info.time = 1;
ipl_info.width = (unsigned int) image->columns;
ipl_info.height = (unsigned int) image->rows;
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if(IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) { ipl_info.colors = 3; }
else{ ipl_info.colors = 1; }
ipl_info.size = (unsigned int) (28 +
((image->depth)/8)*ipl_info.height*ipl_info.width*ipl_info.colors*ipl_info.z);
/* Ok! Calculations are done. Lets write this puppy down! */
/*
Write IPL header.
*/
/* Shockingly (maybe not if you have used IPLab), IPLab itself CANNOT read MSBEndian
files! The reader above can, but they cannot. For compatability reasons, I will leave
the code in here, but it is all but useless if you want to use IPLab. */
if(image_info->endian == MSBEndian)
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "mmmm");
else{
image->endian = LSBEndian;
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "iiii");
}
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, 4);
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "100f");
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "data");
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.colors);
if(image_info->adjoin == MagickFalse)
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, 1);
else
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.z);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.time);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.byteType);
exception=(&image->exception);
do
{
/*
Convert MIFF to IPL raster pixels.
*/
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if(ipl_info.colors == 1){
/* Red frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
GrayQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
}
}
if(ipl_info.colors == 3){
/* Red frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
RedQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
}
/* Green frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
GreenQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
}
/* Blue frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
BlueQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "fini");
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, 0);
CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: coders/ipl.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecific impact by leveraging a missing malloc check.
Commit Message: ...
|
Low
| 168,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TabGroupData::TabGroupData() {
static int next_placeholder_title_number = 1;
title_ = base::ASCIIToUTF16(
"Group " + base::NumberToString(next_placeholder_title_number));
++next_placeholder_title_number;
static SkRandom rand;
stroke_color_ = rand.nextU() | 0xff000000;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pgp_enumerate_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
const u8 *in;
int r;
if (blob->files != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if ((r = pgp_read_blob(card, blob)) < 0)
return r;
in = blob->data;
while ((int) blob->len > (in - blob->data)) {
unsigned int cla, tag, tmptag;
size_t len;
const u8 *data = in;
pgp_blob_t *new;
r = sc_asn1_read_tag(&data, blob->len - (in - blob->data),
&cla, &tag, &len);
if (r < 0 || data == NULL) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Unexpected end of contents\n");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
/* undo ASN1's split of tag & class */
for (tmptag = tag; tmptag > 0x0FF; tmptag >>= 8) {
cla <<= 8;
}
tag |= cla;
/* Awful hack for composite DOs that have
* a TLV with the DO's id encompassing the
* entire blob. Example: Yubikey Neo */
if (tag == blob->id) {
in = data;
continue;
}
/* create fake file system hierarchy by
* using constructed DOs as DF */
if ((new = pgp_new_blob(card, blob, tag, sc_file_new())) == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
pgp_set_blob(new, data, len);
in = data + len;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: __releases(kernel_lock)
__acquires(kernel_lock)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
char *cp;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_mount_opt = 0;
sbi->s_resuid = EXT4_DEF_RESUID;
sbi->s_resgid = EXT4_DEF_RESGID;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
for (cp = sb->s_id; (cp = strchr(cp, '/'));)
*cp = '!';
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, "bsdgroups",
"2.6.38");
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
}
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
set_opt(sb, MBLK_IO_SUBMIT);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BLOCK_VALIDITY)
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid);
sbi->s_resgid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid);
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, NULL, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, NULL, 0))
goto failed_mount;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_HUGE_FILE);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
sb->s_dirt = 1;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
ret = err;
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data"
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc(db_count * sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
goto failed_mount;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (ext4_proc_root)
sbi->s_proc = proc_mkdir(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
#endif
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
}
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount3;
}
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_max_writeback_mb_bump = 128;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
else
sb->s_op = &ext4_nojournal_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
mutex_init(&sbi->s_resize_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER));
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_blocks_count(es) > 0xffffffffULL &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0, 0);
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else {
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
/*
* The journal may have updated the bg summary counts, so we
* need to update the global counters.
*/
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
no_journal:
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-dio-unwritten", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create DIO workqueue\n");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_alloc_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_EXTRA_ISIZE)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring delalloc option - "
"requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
if (sb->s_blocksize < PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - block size is too small");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
}
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb, needs_recovery);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount4;
sbi->s_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
err = kobject_init_and_add(&sbi->s_kobj, &ext4_ktype, NULL,
"%s", sb->s_id);
if (err) {
ext4_mb_release(sb);
ext4_ext_release(sb);
goto failed_mount4;
};
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
init_timer(&sbi->s_err_report);
sbi->s_err_report.function = print_daily_error_info;
sbi->s_err_report.data = (unsigned long) sb;
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
failed_mount4:
iput(root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3:
if (sbi->s_flex_groups) {
if (is_vmalloc_addr(sbi->s_flex_groups))
vfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
else
kfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
}
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_proc) {
remove_proc_entry(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4_fill_super function in fs/ext4/super.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly initialize a certain error-report data structure, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by attempting to mount a crafted ext4 filesystem.
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 165,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool:
case NPNVasdEnabledBool:
case NPNVisOfflineBool:
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
type = RPC_TYPE_UINT32;
break;
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: nspluginwrapper before 1.4.4 does not properly provide access to NPNVprivateModeBool variable settings, which could prevent Firefox plugins from determining if they should run in Private Browsing mode and allow remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions, as demonstrated using Flash.
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
|
Low
| 165,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(move_uploaded_file)
{
char *path, *new_path;
int path_len, new_path_len;
zend_bool successful = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int oldmask; int ret;
#endif
if (!SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &path, &path_len, &new_path, &new_path_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(new_path TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (VCWD_RENAME(path, new_path) == 0) {
successful = 1;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
oldmask = umask(077);
umask(oldmask);
ret = VCWD_CHMOD(new_path, 0666 & ~oldmask);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
} else if (php_copy_file_ex(path, new_path, STREAM_DISABLE_OPEN_BASEDIR TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
VCWD_UNLINK(path);
successful = 1;
}
if (successful) {
zend_hash_del(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to move '%s' to '%s'", path, new_path);
}
RETURN_BOOL(successful);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The move_uploaded_file implementation in ext/standard/basic_functions.c in PHP before 5.4.39, 5.5.x before 5.5.23, and 5.6.x before 5.6.7 truncates a pathname upon encountering a \x00 character, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended extension restrictions and create files with unexpected names via a crafted second argument. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2006-7243.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int handle_unaligned_access(insn_size_t instruction, struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mem_access *ma, int expected,
unsigned long address)
{
u_int rm;
int ret, index;
/*
* XXX: We can't handle mixed 16/32-bit instructions yet
*/
if (instruction_size(instruction) != 2)
return -EINVAL;
index = (instruction>>8)&15; /* 0x0F00 */
rm = regs->regs[index];
/*
* Log the unexpected fixups, and then pass them on to perf.
*
* We intentionally don't report the expected cases to perf as
* otherwise the trapped I/O case will skew the results too much
* to be useful.
*/
if (!expected) {
unaligned_fixups_notify(current, instruction, regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
ret = -EFAULT;
switch (instruction&0xF000) {
case 0x0000:
if (instruction==0x000B) {
/* rts */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc = regs->pr;
}
else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0023) {
/* braf @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc += rm + 4;
}
else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0003) {
/* bsrf @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
regs->pr = regs->pc + 4;
regs->pc += rm + 4;
}
}
else {
/* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */
goto simple;
}
break;
case 0x1000: /* mov.l Rm,@(disp,Rn) */
goto simple;
case 0x2000: /* mov.[bwl] to memory, possibly with pre-decrement */
goto simple;
case 0x4000:
if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x002B) {
/* jmp @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc = rm;
}
else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x000B) {
/* jsr @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
regs->pr = regs->pc + 4;
regs->pc = rm;
}
}
else {
/* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */
goto simple;
}
break;
case 0x5000: /* mov.l @(disp,Rm),Rn */
goto simple;
case 0x6000: /* mov.[bwl] from memory, possibly with post-increment */
goto simple;
case 0x8000: /* bf lab, bf/s lab, bt lab, bt/s lab */
switch (instruction&0x0F00) {
case 0x0100: /* mov.w R0,@(disp,Rm) */
goto simple;
case 0x0500: /* mov.w @(disp,Rm),R0 */
goto simple;
case 0x0B00: /* bf lab - no delayslot*/
break;
case 0x0F00: /* bf/s lab */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB)
if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) != 0)
regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */
else
#endif
regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
}
break;
case 0x0900: /* bt lab - no delayslot */
break;
case 0x0D00: /* bt/s lab */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB)
if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) == 0)
regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */
else
#endif
regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
}
break;
}
break;
case 0xA000: /* bra label */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
break;
case 0xB000: /* bsr label */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
regs->pr = regs->pc + 4;
regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
}
break;
}
return ret;
/* handle non-delay-slot instruction */
simple:
ret = handle_unaligned_ins(instruction, regs, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc += instruction_size(instruction);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static irqreturn_t armv7pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* Get and reset the IRQ flags
*/
pmnc = armv7_pmnc_getreset_flags();
/*
* Did an overflow occur?
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_has_overflowed(pmnc))
return IRQ_NONE;
/*
* Handle the counter(s) overflow(s)
*/
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_export_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
interprocess_token);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
size_t cn_len;
int ret;
int pathlen = 0, selfsigned = 0;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
mbedtls_x509_name *name;
mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
if( profile == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
*flags = 0;
if( cn != NULL )
{
name = &crt->subject;
cn_len = strlen( cn );
if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )
{
cur = &crt->subject_alt_names;
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( cur->buf.len == cn_len &&
x509_memcasecmp( cn, cur->buf.p, cn_len ) == 0 )
break;
if( cur->buf.len > 2 &&
memcmp( cur->buf.p, "*.", 2 ) == 0 &&
x509_check_wildcard( cn, &cur->buf ) == 0 )
{
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
if( cur == NULL )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
}
else
{
while( name != NULL )
{
if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 )
{
if( name->val.len == cn_len &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->val.p, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )
break;
if( name->val.len > 2 &&
memcmp( name->val.p, "*.", 2 ) == 0 &&
x509_check_wildcard( cn, &name->val ) == 0 )
break;
}
name = name->next;
}
if( name == NULL )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
}
}
/* Check the type and size of the key */
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, pk_type, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */
for( parent = trust_ca; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
{
if( x509_crt_check_parent( crt, parent, 0, pathlen == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( parent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, parent, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
/* Look for a parent upwards the chain */
for( parent = crt->next; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
if( x509_crt_check_parent( crt, parent, 0, pathlen == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
/* Are we part of the chain or at the top? */
if( parent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( crt, parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
if( *flags != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 1.3.21 and 2.x before 2.1.9, if optional authentication is configured, allows remote attackers to bypass peer authentication via an X.509 certificate chain with many intermediates. NOTE: although mbed TLS was formerly known as PolarSSL, the releases shipped with the PolarSSL name are not affected.
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
|
Medium
| 167,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void processRequest(struct reqelem * req)
{
ssize_t n;
unsigned int l, m;
unsigned char buf[2048];
const unsigned char * p;
enum request_type type;
struct device * d = devlist;
unsigned char rbuf[RESPONSE_BUFFER_SIZE];
unsigned char * rp;
unsigned char nrep = 0;
time_t t;
struct service * newserv = NULL;
struct service * serv;
n = read(req->socket, buf, sizeof(buf));
if(n<0) {
if(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return; /* try again later */
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) processRequest(): read(): %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
if(n==0) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "(s=%d) request connection closed", req->socket);
goto error;
}
t = time(NULL);
type = buf[0];
p = buf + 1;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding l=%u n=%u)",
l, (unsigned)n);
goto error;
}
if(l == 0 && type != MINISSDPD_SEARCH_ALL
&& type != MINISSDPD_GET_VERSION && type != MINISSDPD_NOTIF) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length=0, type=%d)", type);
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "(s=%d) request type=%d str='%.*s'",
req->socket, type, l, p);
switch(type) {
case MINISSDPD_GET_VERSION:
rp = rbuf;
CODELENGTH((sizeof(MINISSDPD_VERSION) - 1), rp);
memcpy(rp, MINISSDPD_VERSION, sizeof(MINISSDPD_VERSION) - 1);
rp += (sizeof(MINISSDPD_VERSION) - 1);
if(write_or_buffer(req, rbuf, rp - rbuf) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
break;
case MINISSDPD_SEARCH_TYPE: /* request by type */
case MINISSDPD_SEARCH_USN: /* request by USN (unique id) */
case MINISSDPD_SEARCH_ALL: /* everything */
rp = rbuf+1;
while(d && (nrep < 255)) {
if(d->t < t) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "outdated device");
} else {
/* test if we can put more responses in the buffer */
if(d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l + d->headers[HEADER_NT].l
+ d->headers[HEADER_USN].l + 6
+ (rp - rbuf) >= (int)sizeof(rbuf))
break;
if( (type==MINISSDPD_SEARCH_TYPE && 0==memcmp(d->headers[HEADER_NT].p, p, l))
||(type==MINISSDPD_SEARCH_USN && 0==memcmp(d->headers[HEADER_USN].p, p, l))
||(type==MINISSDPD_SEARCH_ALL) ) {
/* response :
* 1 - Location
* 2 - NT (device/service type)
* 3 - usn */
m = d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].p, d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l;
m = d->headers[HEADER_NT].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_NT].p, d->headers[HEADER_NT].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_NT].l;
m = d->headers[HEADER_USN].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_USN].p, d->headers[HEADER_USN].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_USN].l;
nrep++;
}
}
d = d->next;
}
/* Also look in service list */
for(serv = servicelisthead.lh_first;
serv && (nrep < 255);
serv = serv->entries.le_next) {
/* test if we can put more responses in the buffer */
if(strlen(serv->location) + strlen(serv->st)
+ strlen(serv->usn) + 6 + (rp - rbuf) >= sizeof(rbuf))
break;
if( (type==MINISSDPD_SEARCH_TYPE && 0==strncmp(serv->st, (const char *)p, l))
||(type==MINISSDPD_SEARCH_USN && 0==strncmp(serv->usn, (const char *)p, l))
||(type==MINISSDPD_SEARCH_ALL) ) {
/* response :
* 1 - Location
* 2 - NT (device/service type)
* 3 - usn */
m = strlen(serv->location);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->location, m);
rp += m;
m = strlen(serv->st);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->st, m);
rp += m;
m = strlen(serv->usn);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->usn, m);
rp += m;
nrep++;
}
}
rbuf[0] = nrep;
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "(s=%d) response : %d device%s",
req->socket, nrep, (nrep > 1) ? "s" : "");
if(write_or_buffer(req, rbuf, rp - rbuf) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
break;
case MINISSDPD_SUBMIT: /* submit service */
newserv = malloc(sizeof(struct service));
if(!newserv) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memset(newserv, 0, sizeof(struct service)); /* set pointers to NULL */
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (st contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
newserv->st = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->st) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->st, p, l);
newserv->st[l] = '\0';
p += l;
if(p >= buf + n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (missing usn)");
goto error;
}
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (usn contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "usn='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->usn = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->usn) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->usn, p, l);
newserv->usn[l] = '\0';
p += l;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (server contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "server='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->server = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->server) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->server, p, l);
newserv->server[l] = '\0';
p += l;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (location contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "location='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->location = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->location) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->location, p, l);
newserv->location[l] = '\0';
/* look in service list for duplicate */
for(serv = servicelisthead.lh_first;
serv;
serv = serv->entries.le_next) {
if(0 == strcmp(newserv->usn, serv->usn)
&& 0 == strcmp(newserv->st, serv->st)) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Service already in the list. Updating...");
free(newserv->st);
free(newserv->usn);
free(serv->server);
serv->server = newserv->server;
free(serv->location);
serv->location = newserv->location;
free(newserv);
newserv = NULL;
return;
}
}
/* Inserting new service */
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&servicelisthead, newserv, entries);
sendNotifications(NOTIF_NEW, NULL, newserv);
newserv = NULL;
break;
case MINISSDPD_NOTIF: /* switch socket to notify */
rbuf[0] = '\0';
if(write_or_buffer(req, rbuf, 1) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
req->is_notify = 1;
break;
default:
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Unknown request type %d", type);
rbuf[0] = '\0';
if(write_or_buffer(req, rbuf, 1) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
}
return;
error:
if(newserv) {
free(newserv->st);
free(newserv->usn);
free(newserv->server);
free(newserv->location);
free(newserv);
newserv = NULL;
}
close(req->socket);
req->socket = -1;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The processRequest function in minissdpd.c in MiniSSDPd 1.2.20130907-3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access and daemon crash) via vectors involving a negative length value.
Commit Message: minissdpd: Fix broken overflow test (p+l > buf+n) thanks to Salva Piero
|
Low
| 168,844
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pcf_read_TOC( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Face face )
{
FT_Error error;
PCF_Toc toc = &face->toc;
PCF_Table tables;
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory;
FT_UInt n;
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK ( 0 ) ||
FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS ( pcf_toc_header, toc ) )
return FT_THROW( Cannot_Open_Resource );
if ( toc->version != PCF_FILE_VERSION ||
toc->count > FT_ARRAY_MAX( face->toc.tables ) ||
toc->count == 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( face->toc.tables, toc->count ) )
return FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_table_header, tables ) )
goto Exit;
tables++;
}
/* Sort tables and check for overlaps. Because they are almost */
/* always ordered already, an in-place bubble sort with simultaneous */
/* boundary checking seems appropriate. */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count - 1; n++ )
{
FT_UInt i, have_change;
have_change = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < toc->count - 1 - n; i++ )
{
PCF_TableRec tmp;
if ( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset )
{
tmp = tables[i];
tables[i] = tables[i + 1];
tables[i + 1] = tmp;
have_change = 1;
}
if ( ( tables[i].size > tables[i + 1].offset ) ||
( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset - tables[i].size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Exit;
}
}
if ( !have_change )
break;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_TRACE4(( " %d: type=%s, format=0x%X, "
"size=%ld (0x%lX), offset=%ld (0x%lX)\n",
i, name,
tables[i].format,
tables[i].size, tables[i].size,
tables[i].offset, tables[i].offset ));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Off-by-one error in the pcf_get_properties function in pcf/pcfread.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted PCF file with a 0xffffffff size value that is improperly incremented.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,843
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedImpl(contents);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,519
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::ParseBlockGroup(
long long payload_size,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
const long long payload_start = pos;
const long long payload_stop = pos + payload_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
if ((total >= 0) && (payload_stop > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (payload_stop > avail)
{
len = static_cast<long>(payload_size);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long discard_padding = 0;
while (pos < payload_stop)
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) //not a value ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field
if (pos > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x35A2) //DiscardPadding
{
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, len, discard_padding);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
}
if (id != 0x21) //sub-part of BlockGroup is not a Block
{
pos += size; //consume sub-part of block group
if (pos > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
continue;
}
const long long block_stop = pos + size;
if (block_stop > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (track < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(track);
if (track == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#if 0
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#endif
pos += len; //consume track number
if ((pos + 2) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 2) > avail)
{
len = 2;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos += 2; //consume timecode
if ((pos + 1) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
{
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; //consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail))
{
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos = block_stop; //consume block-part of block group
assert(pos <= payload_stop);
}
assert(pos == payload_stop);
status = CreateBlock(0x20, //BlockGroup ID
payload_start, payload_size,
discard_padding);
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = payload_stop;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_attr_rmtval_set(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_inode *dp = args->dp;
struct xfs_mount *mp = dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map;
xfs_dablk_t lblkno;
xfs_fileoff_t lfileoff = 0;
__uint8_t *src = args->value;
int blkcnt;
int valuelen;
int nmap;
int error;
int offset = 0;
trace_xfs_attr_rmtval_set(args);
/*
* Find a "hole" in the attribute address space large enough for
* us to drop the new attribute's value into. Because CRC enable
* attributes have headers, we can't just do a straight byte to FSB
* conversion and have to take the header space into account.
*/
blkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(mp, args->valuelen);
error = xfs_bmap_first_unused(args->trans, args->dp, blkcnt, &lfileoff,
XFS_ATTR_FORK);
if (error)
return error;
args->rmtblkno = lblkno = (xfs_dablk_t)lfileoff;
args->rmtblkcnt = blkcnt;
/*
* Roll through the "value", allocating blocks on disk as required.
*/
while (blkcnt > 0) {
int committed;
/*
* Allocate a single extent, up to the size of the value.
*/
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
nmap = 1;
error = xfs_bmapi_write(args->trans, dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK | XFS_BMAPI_METADATA,
args->firstblock, args->total, &map, &nmap,
args->flist);
if (!error) {
error = xfs_bmap_finish(&args->trans, args->flist,
&committed);
}
if (error) {
ASSERT(committed);
args->trans = NULL;
xfs_bmap_cancel(args->flist);
return(error);
}
/*
* bmap_finish() may have committed the last trans and started
* a new one. We need the inode to be in all transactions.
*/
if (committed)
xfs_trans_ijoin(args->trans, dp, 0);
ASSERT(nmap == 1);
ASSERT((map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
lblkno += map.br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount;
/*
* Start the next trans in the chain.
*/
error = xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, dp);
if (error)
return (error);
}
/*
* Roll through the "value", copying the attribute value to the
* already-allocated blocks. Blocks are written synchronously
* so that we can know they are all on disk before we turn off
* the INCOMPLETE flag.
*/
lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
valuelen = args->valuelen;
while (valuelen > 0) {
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_daddr_t dblkno;
int dblkcnt;
ASSERT(blkcnt > 0);
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
nmap = 1;
error = xfs_bmapi_read(dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt, &map, &nmap,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
if (error)
return(error);
ASSERT(nmap == 1);
ASSERT((map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map.br_startblock),
dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map.br_blockcount);
bp = xfs_buf_get(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt, 0);
if (!bp)
return ENOMEM;
bp->b_ops = &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops;
xfs_attr_rmtval_copyin(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino, &offset,
&valuelen, &src);
error = xfs_bwrite(bp); /* GROT: NOTE: synchronous write */
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
if (error)
return error;
/* roll attribute extent map forwards */
lblkno += map.br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount;
}
ASSERT(valuelen == 0);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
|
Low
| 166,740
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the process_nested_data function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted unserialize call that leverages improper handling of duplicate numerical keys within the serialized properties of an object. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-8142.
Commit Message: Fix for bug #68710 (Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's unserialize())
|
Low
| 166,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ppp_unregister_channel(struct ppp_channel *chan)
{
struct channel *pch = chan->ppp;
struct ppp_net *pn;
if (!pch)
return; /* should never happen */
chan->ppp = NULL;
/*
* This ensures that we have returned from any calls into the
* the channel's start_xmit or ioctl routine before we proceed.
*/
down_write(&pch->chan_sem);
spin_lock_bh(&pch->downl);
pch->chan = NULL;
spin_unlock_bh(&pch->downl);
up_write(&pch->chan_sem);
ppp_disconnect_channel(pch);
pn = ppp_pernet(pch->chan_net);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
list_del(&pch->list);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
pch->file.dead = 1;
wake_up_interruptible(&pch->file.rwait);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&pch->file.refcnt))
ppp_destroy_channel(pch);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash, or spinlock) or possibly have unspecified other impact by removing a network namespace, related to the ppp_register_net_channel and ppp_unregister_channel functions.
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,230
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool CrossesExtensionProcessBoundary(
const ExtensionSet& extensions,
const GURL& old_url,
const GURL& new_url,
bool should_consider_workaround) {
const extensions::Extension* old_url_extension = GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
extensions,
old_url);
const extensions::Extension* new_url_extension = GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
extensions,
new_url);
if (should_consider_workaround) {
bool old_url_is_hosted_app = old_url_extension &&
!old_url_extension->web_extent().is_empty() &&
!AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(old_url_extension);
bool new_url_is_normal_or_hosted = !new_url_extension ||
(!new_url_extension->web_extent().is_empty() &&
!AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(new_url_extension));
bool either_is_web_store =
(old_url_extension &&
old_url_extension->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId) ||
(new_url_extension &&
new_url_extension->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId);
if (old_url_is_hosted_app &&
new_url_is_normal_or_hosted &&
!either_is_web_store)
return false;
}
return old_url_extension != new_url_extension;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to access Extension pages without authorisation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
|
Medium
| 172,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags = IOMMU_READ;
if (!(slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
flags |= IOMMU_WRITE;
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent)
flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
while (gfn < end_gfn) {
unsigned long page_size;
/* Check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn))) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Get the page size we could use to map */
page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
/* Make sure the page_size does not exceed the memslot */
while ((gfn + (page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) > end_gfn)
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure gfn is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while ((gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure hva is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while (__gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/*
* Pin all pages we are about to map in memory. This is
* important because we unmap and unpin in 4kb steps later.
*/
pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Map into IO address space */
r = iommu_map(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
page_size, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%llx\n", pfn);
goto unmap_pages;
}
gfn += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return 0;
unmap_pages:
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, slot->base_gfn, gfn);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The kvm_iommu_map_pages function in virt/kvm/iommu.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.1 miscalculates the number of pages during the handling of a mapping failure, which allows guest OS users to (1) cause a denial of service (host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large gfn value or (2) cause a denial of service (host OS memory consumption) by triggering a small gfn value that leads to permanently pinned pages.
Commit Message: kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)
The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong,
It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'.
By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to
go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size.
Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never
unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS.
Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case,
because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus
allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot
happen because of the condition that can trigger the error:
- out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page)
should not be possible for the attacker to trigger
- when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn
will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside
kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The
page thus would not be unpinned at all.
Reported-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,390
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
int i, err;
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
dquot_disable(sb, -1, DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED | DQUOT_LIMITS_ENABLED);
flush_workqueue(sbi->rsv_conversion_wq);
destroy_workqueue(sbi->rsv_conversion_wq);
if (sbi->s_journal) {
err = jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
if (err < 0)
ext4_abort(sb, "Couldn't clean up the journal");
}
ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb);
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(sbi);
del_timer_sync(&sbi->s_err_report);
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
ext4_mb_release(sb);
ext4_ext_release(sb);
ext4_xattr_put_super(sb);
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
ext4_clear_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb);
es->s_state = cpu_to_le16(sbi->s_mount_state);
}
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_gdb_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kvfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
kvfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter);
brelse(sbi->s_sbh);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
/* Debugging code just in case the in-memory inode orphan list
* isn't empty. The on-disk one can be non-empty if we've
* detected an error and taken the fs readonly, but the
* in-memory list had better be clean by this point. */
if (!list_empty(&sbi->s_orphan))
dump_orphan_list(sb, sbi);
J_ASSERT(list_empty(&sbi->s_orphan));
sync_blockdev(sb->s_bdev);
invalidate_bdev(sb->s_bdev);
if (sbi->journal_bdev && sbi->journal_bdev != sb->s_bdev) {
/*
* Invalidate the journal device's buffers. We don't want them
* floating about in memory - the physical journal device may
* hotswapped, and it breaks the `ro-after' testing code.
*/
sync_blockdev(sbi->journal_bdev);
invalidate_bdev(sbi->journal_bdev);
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
}
if (sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext4_xattr_destroy_cache(sbi->s_mb_cache);
sbi->s_mb_cache = NULL;
}
if (sbi->s_mmp_tsk)
kthread_stop(sbi->s_mmp_tsk);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
/*
* Now that we are completely done shutting down the
* superblock, we need to actually destroy the kobject.
*/
kobject_put(&sbi->s_kobj);
wait_for_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,987
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
|
Low
| 168,485
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
unsigned long size)
{
gfn_t end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn);
end_gfn = gfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
gfn += 1;
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
return pfn;
while (gfn < end_gfn)
gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn++);
return pfn;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The kvm_iommu_map_pages function in virt/kvm/iommu.c in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 miscalculates the number of pages during the handling of a mapping failure, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS page unpinning) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging guest OS privileges. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2014-3601.
Commit Message: kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_pages() takes a number of pages, so fix the problem
by matching the two.
This was introduced by commit 350b8bd ("kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter
of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)"), which fixes the lack of
un-pinning for pages intended to be un-pinned (i.e. memory leak) but
unfortunately potentially aggravated the number of pages we un-pin that
should have stayed pinned. As far as I understand though, the same
practical mitigations apply.
This issue was found during review of Red Hat 6.6 patches to prepare
Ksplice rebootless updates.
Thanks to Vegard for his time on a late Friday evening to help me in
understanding this code.
Fixes: 350b8bd ("kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of... (CVE-2014-3601)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,245
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateSecureBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data, sp<NativeHandle> *native_handle) {
if (buffer == NULL || buffer_data == NULL || native_handle == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle) {
*buffer_data = NULL;
*native_handle = NativeHandle::create(
(native_handle_t *)header->pBuffer, false /* ownsHandle */);
} else {
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
*native_handle = NULL;
}
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateSecureBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p:%p", size, *buffer_data,
*native_handle == NULL ? NULL : (*native_handle)->handle()));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of a privileged process. This issue is rated as High because it could be used to gain local access to elevated capabilities, which are not normally accessible to a third-party application. Android ID: A-31385713.
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
|
Medium
| 173,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event) &&
perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */
if (!(p_event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW))
return 0;
/* Some events are ok to be traced by non-root users... */
if (p_event->attach_state == PERF_ATTACH_TASK) {
if (tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY)
return 0;
}
/*
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
* only allow root to have these.
*/
if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The perf_trace_event_perm function in kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.2 does not properly restrict access to the perf subsystem, which allows local users to enable function tracing via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
Low
| 166,048
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int read_data(void *opaque, uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
struct playlist *v = opaque;
HLSContext *c = v->parent->priv_data;
int ret, i;
int just_opened = 0;
restart:
if (!v->needed)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->input) {
int64_t reload_interval;
struct segment *seg;
/* Check that the playlist is still needed before opening a new
* segment. */
if (v->ctx && v->ctx->nb_streams) {
v->needed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < v->n_main_streams; i++) {
if (v->main_streams[i]->discard < AVDISCARD_ALL) {
v->needed = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!v->needed) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_INFO, "No longer receiving playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
/* If this is a live stream and the reload interval has elapsed since
* the last playlist reload, reload the playlists now. */
reload_interval = default_reload_interval(v);
reload:
if (!v->finished &&
av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time >= reload_interval) {
if ((ret = parse_playlist(c, v->url, v, NULL)) < 0) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reload playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return ret;
}
/* If we need to reload the playlist again below (if
* there's still no more segments), switch to a reload
* interval of half the target duration. */
reload_interval = v->target_duration / 2;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no < v->start_seq_no) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"skipping %d segments ahead, expired from playlists\n",
v->start_seq_no - v->cur_seq_no);
v->cur_seq_no = v->start_seq_no;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no >= v->start_seq_no + v->n_segments) {
if (v->finished)
return AVERROR_EOF;
while (av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time < reload_interval) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_usleep(100*1000);
}
/* Enough time has elapsed since the last reload */
goto reload;
}
seg = current_segment(v);
/* load/update Media Initialization Section, if any */
ret = update_init_section(v, seg);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = open_input(c, v, seg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to open segment of playlist %d\n",
v->index);
v->cur_seq_no += 1;
goto reload;
}
just_opened = 1;
}
if (v->init_sec_buf_read_offset < v->init_sec_data_len) {
/* Push init section out first before first actual segment */
int copy_size = FFMIN(v->init_sec_data_len - v->init_sec_buf_read_offset, buf_size);
memcpy(buf, v->init_sec_buf, copy_size);
v->init_sec_buf_read_offset += copy_size;
return copy_size;
}
ret = read_from_url(v, current_segment(v), buf, buf_size, READ_NORMAL);
if (ret > 0) {
if (just_opened && v->is_id3_timestamped != 0) {
/* Intercept ID3 tags here, elementary audio streams are required
* to convey timestamps using them in the beginning of each segment. */
intercept_id3(v, buf, buf_size, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
ff_format_io_close(v->parent, &v->input);
v->cur_seq_no++;
c->cur_seq_no = v->cur_seq_no;
goto restart;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: In FFmpeg 3.3.3, the read_data function in libavformat/hls.c does not restrict reload attempts for an insufficient list, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop).
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 167,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe) {
pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe->bufs) {
init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
return pipe;
}
kfree(pipe);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,386
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf);
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable(obuf);
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
Low
| 170,219
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> AppWindowCustomBindings::GetView(
const v8::Arguments& args) {
if (args.Length() != 1)
return v8::Undefined();
if (!args[0]->IsInt32())
return v8::Undefined();
int view_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
if (view_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return v8::Undefined();
FindViewByID view_finder(view_id);
content::RenderView::ForEach(&view_finder);
content::RenderView* view = view_finder.view();
if (!view)
return v8::Undefined();
content::RenderView* render_view = GetCurrentRenderView();
if (!render_view)
return v8::Undefined();
WebKit::WebFrame* opener = render_view->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
WebKit::WebFrame* frame = view->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
frame->setOpener(opener);
v8::Local<v8::Value> window = frame->mainWorldScriptContext()->Global();
return window;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,815
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: vtp_print (netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length)
{
int type, len, tlv_len, tlv_value, mgmtd_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const struct vtp_vlan_ *vtp_vlan;
if (length < VTP_HEADER_LEN)
goto trunc;
tptr = pptr;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_HEADER_LEN);
type = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VTPv%u, Message %s (0x%02x), length %u",
*tptr,
tok2str(vtp_message_type_values,"Unknown message type", type),
type,
length));
/* In non-verbose mode, just print version and message type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
/* verbose mode print all fields */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tDomain name: "));
mgmtd_len = *(tptr + 3);
if (mgmtd_len < 1 || mgmtd_len > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [invalid MgmtD Len %d]", mgmtd_len));
return;
}
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 4, mgmtd_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s: %u",
tok2str(vtp_header_values, "Unknown", type),
*(tptr+2)));
tptr += VTP_HEADER_LEN;
switch (type) {
case VTP_SUMMARY_ADV:
/*
* SUMMARY ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Followers | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Updater Identity IP address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Update Timestamp (12 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | MD5 digest (16 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Config Rev %x, Updater %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
tptr += 8;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Timestamp 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8)));
tptr += VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MD5 digest: %08x%08x%08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 12)));
tptr += VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
break;
case VTP_SUBSET_ADV:
/*
* SUBSET ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Seq number | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field 1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ................ |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Config Rev %x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
/*
* VLAN INFORMATION
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | V info len | Status | VLAN type | VLAN name len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ISL vlan id | MTU size |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 802.10 index (SAID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN name |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
tptr += 4;
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
ND_TCHECK_8BITS(tptr);
len = *tptr;
if (len == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
vtp_vlan = (const struct vtp_vlan_*)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vtp_vlan);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVLAN info status %s, type %s, VLAN-id %u, MTU %u, SAID 0x%08x, Name ",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_status,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->status),
tok2str(vtp_vlan_type_values,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->type),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->vlanid),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vtp_vlan->index)));
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET, vtp_vlan->name_len, NULL);
/*
* Vlan names are aligned to 32-bit boundaries.
*/
len -= VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
tptr += VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
/* TLV information follows */
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Cisco specs says 2 bytes for type + 2 bytes for length, take only 1
* See: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/trsrb/frames.htm
*/
type = *tptr;
tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s (0x%04x) TLV",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_tlv_values, "Unknown", type),
type));
/*
* infinite loop check
*/
if (type == 0 || tlv_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlv_len * 2 +2);
tlv_value = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
switch (type) {
case VTP_VLAN_STE_HOP_COUNT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_PRUNING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_STP_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(vtp_stp_type_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BRIDGE_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "SRB" : "SRT",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BACKUP_CRF_MODE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Backup" : "Not backup",
tlv_value));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_RING_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_BRIDGE_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_PARENT_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_TRANS_BRIDGED_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_ARP_HOP_COUNT:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", 2 + tlv_len*2);
break;
}
len -= 2 + tlv_len*2;
tptr += 2 + tlv_len*2;
}
}
break;
case VTP_ADV_REQUEST:
/*
* ADVERTISEMENT REQUEST
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Reserved | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Start value |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tStart value: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case VTP_JOIN_MESSAGE:
/* FIXME - Could not find message format */
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vtp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VTP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-vtp.c:vtp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13033/VTP: Add more bound and length checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another VTP test's .out file for this change.
Don't treate a TLV type or length of 0 as invalid; a type of 0 should
just be reported as illegal if that type isn't used, and the length is
the length of the *value*, not the length of the entire TLV, so if it's
zero there won't be an infinite loop. (It's still not *legal*, as the
values of all the TLVs we handle are 1 16-bit word long; we added a
check for that.)
Update some comments while we're at it, to give a new URL for one Cisco
page and a non-Cisco URL for another former Cisco page (Cisco's UniverCD
pages don't seem to be available any more, and Cisco's robots.txt file
didn't allow the Wayback Machine to archive it).
|
Low
| 167,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
start_position;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
blue,
bytes_per_line,
green,
length,
red;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[12],
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a BMP file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
start_position=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
do
{
LongPixelPacket
shift;
PixelPacket
quantum_bits;
size_t
profile_data,
profile_size;
/*
Verify BMP identifier.
*/
if (bmp_info.ba_offset == 0)
start_position=TellBlob(image)-2;
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
while (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0)
{
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.ba_offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Magick: %c%c",
magick[0],magick[1]);
if ((count == 0) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" File_size in header: %u bytes",bmp_info.file_size);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," BMP size: %u",
bmp_info.size);
if (bmp_info.size == 12)
{
/*
OS/2 BMP image file.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP2",MaxTextExtent);
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=0;
bmp_info.y_pixels=0;
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.image_size=0;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: OS/2 Bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
}
}
else
{
/*
Microsoft Windows BMP image file.
*/
if (bmp_info.size < 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NonOS2HeaderSizeError");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
profile_data=0;
profile_size=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: MS Windows bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Bits per pixel: %.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch ((int) bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE4:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE4");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
case BI_PNG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_PNG");
break;
}
case BI_JPEG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_JPEG");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
bmp_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.size > 40)
{
double
sum;
/*
Read color management information.
*/
bmp_info.alpha_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colorspace=(int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/*
Decode 2^30 fixed point formatted CIE primaries.
*/
# define BMP_DENOM ((double) 0x40000000)
bmp_info.red_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
sum=bmp_info.red_primary.x+bmp_info.red_primary.y+
bmp_info.red_primary.z;
bmp_info.red_primary.x/=sum;
bmp_info.red_primary.y/=sum;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=bmp_info.red_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=bmp_info.red_primary.y;
sum=bmp_info.green_primary.x+bmp_info.green_primary.y+
bmp_info.green_primary.z;
bmp_info.green_primary.x/=sum;
bmp_info.green_primary.y/=sum;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=bmp_info.green_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=bmp_info.green_primary.y;
sum=bmp_info.blue_primary.x+bmp_info.blue_primary.y+
bmp_info.blue_primary.z;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x/=sum;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y/=sum;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=bmp_info.blue_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=bmp_info.blue_primary.y;
/*
Decode 16^16 fixed point formatted gamma_scales.
*/
bmp_info.gamma_scale.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
/*
Compute a single gamma from the BMP 3-channel gamma.
*/
image->gamma=(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x+bmp_info.gamma_scale.y+
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z)/3.0;
}
else
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP3",MaxTextExtent);
if (bmp_info.size > 108)
{
size_t
intent;
/*
Read BMP Version 5 color management information.
*/
intent=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
switch ((int) intent)
{
case LCS_GM_BUSINESS:
{
image->rendering_intent=SaturationIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_GRAPHICS:
{
image->rendering_intent=RelativeIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_IMAGES:
{
image->rendering_intent=PerceptualIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC:
{
image->rendering_intent=AbsoluteIntent;
break;
}
}
profile_data=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
profile_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) profile_data;
(void) profile_size;
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Reserved byte */
}
}
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size > GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",image->filename);
else
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size < GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (bmp_info.width <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.height == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.planes != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"StaticPlanesValueNotEqualToOne");
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 16) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16 &&
bmp_info.number_colors > (1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel))
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedNumberOfColors");
}
if ((bmp_info.compression == 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 3) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
case BI_RLE8:
case BI_RLE4:
case BI_BITFIELDS:
break;
case BI_JPEG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"JPEGCompressNotSupported");
case BI_PNG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"PNGCompressNotSupported");
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.height);
image->depth=bmp_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? bmp_info.bits_per_pixel : 8;
image->matte=((bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0) &&
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS)) ||
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=bmp_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
size_t
packet_size;
/*
Read BMP raster colormap.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading colormap of %.20g colors",(double) image->colors);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bmp_info.size == 12) || (bmp_info.size == 64))
packet_size=3;
else
packet_size=4;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+14+bmp_info.size,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,bmp_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
image->x_resolution=(double) bmp_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->y_resolution=(double) bmp_info.y_pixels/100.0;
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Read image data.
*/
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+bmp_info.offset_bits,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=(size_t) bytes_per_line*image->rows;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading pixels (%.20g bytes)",(double) length);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
status=DecodeImage(image,bmp_info.compression,pixels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
}
/*
Convert BMP raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB)
{
bmp_info.alpha_mask=image->matte != MagickFalse ? 0xff000000U : 0U;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
/*
RGB555.
*/
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
}
}
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
register size_t
sample;
/*
Get shift and quantum bits info from bitfield masks.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&shift,0,sizeof(shift));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&quantum_bits,0,sizeof(quantum_bits));
if (bmp_info.red_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << shift.red) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
shift.red++;
if (bmp_info.green_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << shift.green) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
shift.green++;
if (bmp_info.blue_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << shift.blue) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
shift.blue++;
if (bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << shift.opacity) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
shift.opacity++;
sample=shift.red;
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
sample++;
quantum_bits.red=ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) sample-shift.red);
sample=shift.green;
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
sample++;
quantum_bits.green=ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) sample-shift.green);
sample=shift.blue;
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
sample++;
quantum_bits.blue=ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) sample-shift.blue);
sample=shift.opacity;
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
sample++;
quantum_bits.opacity=ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) sample-
shift.opacity);
}
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; --x)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes,index);
indexes++;
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 16:
{
size_t
alpha,
pixel;
/*
Convert bitfield encoded 16-bit PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB &&
bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=2*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(size_t) (*p++);
pixel|=(*p++) << 8;
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 5)
red|=((red & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.red <= 8)
red|=((red & 0xff00) >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 5)
green|=((green & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.green == 6)
green|=((green & 0xc000) >> 6);
if (quantum_bits.green <= 8)
green|=((green & 0xff00) >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 5)
blue|=((blue & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.blue <= 8)
blue|=((blue & 0xff00) >> 8);
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.opacity) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.opacity <= 8)
alpha|=((alpha & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) alpha));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*24+31)/32);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert bitfield encoded DirectColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
size_t
alpha,
pixel;
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(size_t) (*p++);
pixel|=((size_t) *p++ << 8);
pixel|=((size_t) *p++ << 16);
pixel|=((size_t) *p++ << 24);
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 8)
red|=(red >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 8)
green|=(green >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 8)
blue|=(blue >> 8);
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.opacity) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.opacity == 8)
alpha|=(alpha >> 8);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue));
SetPixelAlpha(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) alpha));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (bmp_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
*magick='\0';
if (bmp_info.ba_offset != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) bmp_info.ba_offset,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if ((count == 2) && (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Acquire next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long dgnc_mgmt_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long flags;
void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg;
switch (cmd) {
case DIGI_GETDD:
{
/*
* This returns the total number of boards
* in the system, as well as driver version
* and has space for a reserved entry
*/
struct digi_dinfo ddi;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
ddi.dinfo_nboards = dgnc_NumBoards;
sprintf(ddi.dinfo_version, "%s", DG_PART);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &ddi, sizeof(ddi)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case DIGI_GETBD:
{
int brd;
struct digi_info di;
if (copy_from_user(&brd, uarg, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
if (brd < 0 || brd >= dgnc_NumBoards)
return -ENODEV;
memset(&di, 0, sizeof(di));
di.info_bdnum = brd;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_Board[brd]->bd_lock, flags);
di.info_bdtype = dgnc_Board[brd]->dpatype;
di.info_bdstate = dgnc_Board[brd]->dpastatus;
di.info_ioport = 0;
di.info_physaddr = (ulong)dgnc_Board[brd]->membase;
di.info_physsize = (ulong)dgnc_Board[brd]->membase
- dgnc_Board[brd]->membase_end;
if (dgnc_Board[brd]->state != BOARD_FAILED)
di.info_nports = dgnc_Board[brd]->nasync;
else
di.info_nports = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_Board[brd]->bd_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &di, sizeof(di)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case DIGI_GET_NI_INFO:
{
struct channel_t *ch;
struct ni_info ni;
unsigned char mstat = 0;
uint board = 0;
uint channel = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&ni, uarg, sizeof(ni)))
return -EFAULT;
board = ni.board;
channel = ni.channel;
/* Verify boundaries on board */
if (board >= dgnc_NumBoards)
return -ENODEV;
/* Verify boundaries on channel */
if (channel >= dgnc_Board[board]->nasync)
return -ENODEV;
ch = dgnc_Board[board]->channels[channel];
if (!ch || ch->magic != DGNC_CHANNEL_MAGIC)
return -ENODEV;
memset(&ni, 0, sizeof(ni));
ni.board = board;
ni.channel = channel;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ch->ch_lock, flags);
mstat = (ch->ch_mostat | ch->ch_mistat);
if (mstat & UART_MCR_DTR) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_DTR;
ni.dtr = TIOCM_DTR;
}
if (mstat & UART_MCR_RTS) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_RTS;
ni.rts = TIOCM_RTS;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_CTS) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_CTS;
ni.cts = TIOCM_CTS;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_RI) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_RI;
ni.ri = TIOCM_RI;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_DCD) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_CD;
ni.dcd = TIOCM_CD;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_DSR)
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_DSR;
ni.iflag = ch->ch_c_iflag;
ni.oflag = ch->ch_c_oflag;
ni.cflag = ch->ch_c_cflag;
ni.lflag = ch->ch_c_lflag;
if (ch->ch_digi.digi_flags & CTSPACE ||
ch->ch_c_cflag & CRTSCTS)
ni.hflow = 1;
else
ni.hflow = 0;
if ((ch->ch_flags & CH_STOPI) ||
(ch->ch_flags & CH_FORCED_STOPI))
ni.recv_stopped = 1;
else
ni.recv_stopped = 0;
if ((ch->ch_flags & CH_STOP) || (ch->ch_flags & CH_FORCED_STOP))
ni.xmit_stopped = 1;
else
ni.xmit_stopped = 0;
ni.curtx = ch->ch_txcount;
ni.currx = ch->ch_rxcount;
ni.baud = ch->ch_old_baud;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ch->ch_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &ni, sizeof(ni)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl function in drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: staging/dgnc: fix info leak in ioctl
The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct digi_dinfo after the ->dinfo_nboards member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,574
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __perf_sw_event(u32 event_id, u64 nr, int nmi,
struct pt_regs *regs, u64 addr)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
int rctx;
preempt_disable_notrace();
rctx = perf_swevent_get_recursion_context();
if (rctx < 0)
return;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, addr);
do_perf_sw_event(PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE, event_id, nr, nmi, &data, regs);
perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(rctx);
preempt_enable_notrace();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,827
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Block::GetDiscardPadding() const
{
return m_discard_padding;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,303
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebRtcAudioRenderer::Initialize(WebRtcAudioRendererSource* source) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
DCHECK_EQ(state_, UNINITIALIZED);
DCHECK(source);
DCHECK(!sink_);
DCHECK(!source_);
sink_ = AudioDeviceFactory::NewOutputDevice();
DCHECK(sink_);
int sample_rate = GetAudioOutputSampleRate();
DVLOG(1) << "Audio output hardware sample rate: " << sample_rate;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputSampleRate",
sample_rate, media::kUnexpectedAudioSampleRate);
if (std::find(&kValidOutputRates[0],
&kValidOutputRates[0] + arraysize(kValidOutputRates),
sample_rate) ==
&kValidOutputRates[arraysize(kValidOutputRates)]) {
DLOG(ERROR) << sample_rate << " is not a supported output rate.";
return false;
}
media::ChannelLayout channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO;
int buffer_size = 0;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO;
if (sample_rate == 96000 || sample_rate == 48000) {
buffer_size = (sample_rate / 100);
} else {
buffer_size = 2 * 440;
}
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
buffer_size = 3 * buffer_size;
DLOG(WARNING) << "Extending the output buffer size by a factor of three "
<< "since Windows XP has been detected.";
}
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MONO;
if (sample_rate == 48000) {
buffer_size = 480;
} else {
buffer_size = 440;
}
#elif defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_OPENBSD)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MONO;
buffer_size = 480;
#else
DLOG(ERROR) << "Unsupported platform";
return false;
#endif
params_.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LOW_LATENCY, channel_layout,
sample_rate, 16, buffer_size);
buffer_.reset(new int16[params_.frames_per_buffer() * params_.channels()]);
source_ = source;
source->SetRenderFormat(params_);
sink_->Initialize(params_, this);
sink_->SetSourceRenderView(source_render_view_id_);
sink_->Start();
state_ = PAUSED;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputChannelLayout",
channel_layout, media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputFramesPerBuffer",
buffer_size, kUnexpectedAudioBufferSize);
AddHistogramFramesPerBuffer(buffer_size);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: content/renderer/media/webrtc_audio_renderer.cc in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 on Mac OS X does not use an appropriate buffer size for the 96 kHz sampling rate, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a web site that provides WebRTC audio.
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void gdImageFillToBorder (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int border, int color)
{
int lastBorder;
/* Seek left */
int leftLimit = -1, rightLimit;
int i, restoreAlphaBlending = 0;
if (border < 0) {
/* Refuse to fill to a non-solid border */
return;
}
if (!im->trueColor) {
if ((color > (im->colorsTotal - 1)) || (border > (im->colorsTotal - 1)) || (color < 0)) {
return;
}
}
restoreAlphaBlending = im->alphaBlendingFlag;
im->alphaBlendingFlag = 0;
if (x >= im->sx) {
x = im->sx - 1;
} else if (x < 0) {
x = 0;
}
if (y >= im->sy) {
y = im->sy - 1;
} else if (y < 0) {
y = 0;
}
for (i = x; i >= 0; i--) {
if (gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y) == border) {
break;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, i, y, color);
leftLimit = i;
}
if (leftLimit == -1) {
im->alphaBlendingFlag = restoreAlphaBlending;
return;
}
/* Seek right */
rightLimit = x;
for (i = (x + 1); i < im->sx; i++) {
if (gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y) == border) {
break;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, i, y, color);
rightLimit = i;
}
/* Look at lines above and below and start paints */
/* Above */
if (y > 0) {
lastBorder = 1;
for (i = leftLimit; i <= rightLimit; i++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y - 1);
if (lastBorder) {
if ((c != border) && (c != color)) {
gdImageFillToBorder(im, i, y - 1, border, color);
lastBorder = 0;
}
} else if ((c == border) || (c == color)) {
lastBorder = 1;
}
}
}
/* Below */
if (y < ((im->sy) - 1)) {
lastBorder = 1;
for (i = leftLimit; i <= rightLimit; i++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y + 1);
if (lastBorder) {
if ((c != border) && (c != color)) {
gdImageFillToBorder(im, i, y + 1, border, color);
lastBorder = 0;
}
} else if ((c == border) || (c == color)) {
lastBorder = 1;
}
}
}
im->alphaBlendingFlag = restoreAlphaBlending;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack consumption vulnerability in the gdImageFillToBorder function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.2, as used in PHP before 5.6.28 and 7.x before 7.0.13, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation violation) via a crafted imagefilltoborder call that triggers use of a negative color value.
Commit Message: Fix #72696: imagefilltoborder stackoverflow on truecolor images
We must not allow negative color values be passed to
gdImageFillToBorder(), because that can lead to infinite recursion
since the recursion termination condition will not necessarily be met.
|
Low
| 168,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void CancelHandwritingStrokes(int stroke_count) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
chromeos::CancelHandwriting(input_method_status_connection_, stroke_count);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
|
Medium
| 169,618
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Huff_transmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout) {
int i;
if (huff->loc[ch] == NULL) {
/* node_t hasn't been transmitted, send a NYT, then the symbol */
Huff_transmit(huff, NYT, fout);
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
add_bit((char)((ch >> i) & 0x1), fout);
}
} else {
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ioquake3 before 2017-08-02 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
|
Low
| 167,996
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate(struct ib_uverbs_file *ufile)
{
struct rdma_umap_priv *priv, *next_priv;
lockdep_assert_held(&ufile->hw_destroy_rwsem);
while (1) {
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
/* Get an arbitrary mm pointer that hasn't been cleaned yet */
mutex_lock(&ufile->umap_lock);
while (!list_empty(&ufile->umaps)) {
int ret;
priv = list_first_entry(&ufile->umaps,
struct rdma_umap_priv, list);
mm = priv->vma->vm_mm;
ret = mmget_not_zero(mm);
if (!ret) {
list_del_init(&priv->list);
mm = NULL;
continue;
}
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&ufile->umap_lock);
if (!mm)
return;
/*
* The umap_lock is nested under mmap_sem since it used within
* the vma_ops callbacks, so we have to clean the list one mm
* at a time to get the lock ordering right. Typically there
* will only be one mm, so no big deal.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mutex_lock(&ufile->umap_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe (priv, next_priv, &ufile->umaps,
list) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = priv->vma;
if (vma->vm_mm != mm)
continue;
list_del_init(&priv->list);
zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE);
}
mutex_unlock(&ufile->umap_lock);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
m_viewportHandler.reset(new QtViewportHandler(webPageProxy.get(), q, pageView.data()));
pageView->eventHandler()->setViewportHandler(m_viewportHandler.data());
_q_onVisibleChanged();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly implement JavaScript bindings for plug-ins, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,997
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static uint16_t transmit_data(serial_data_type_t type, uint8_t *data, uint16_t length) {
assert(data != NULL);
assert(length > 0);
if (type < DATA_TYPE_COMMAND || type > DATA_TYPE_SCO) {
LOG_ERROR("%s invalid data type: %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
--data;
uint8_t previous_byte = *data;
*(data) = type;
++length;
uint16_t transmitted_length = 0;
while (length > 0) {
ssize_t ret = write(uart_fd, data + transmitted_length, length);
switch (ret) {
case -1:
LOG_ERROR("In %s, error writing to the uart serial port: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto done;
case 0:
goto done;
default:
transmitted_length += ret;
length -= ret;
break;
}
}
done:;
*(data) = previous_byte;
if (transmitted_length > 0)
--transmitted_length;
return transmitted_length;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,476
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(ExecutionContext* context,
MediaStream* stream,
const MediaRecorderOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state)
: PausableObject(context),
stream_(stream),
mime_type_(options->hasMimeType() ? options->mimeType()
: kDefaultMimeType),
stopped_(true),
audio_bits_per_second_(0),
video_bits_per_second_(0),
state_(State::kInactive),
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_(AsyncMethodRunner<MediaRecorder>::Create(
this,
&MediaRecorder::DispatchScheduledEvent,
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation))) {
DCHECK(stream_->getTracks().size());
recorder_handler_ = Platform::Current()->CreateMediaRecorderHandler(
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMediaRealTime));
DCHECK(recorder_handler_);
if (!recorder_handler_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No MediaRecorder handler can be created.");
return;
}
AllocateVideoAndAudioBitrates(exception_state, context, options, stream,
&audio_bits_per_second_,
&video_bits_per_second_);
const ContentType content_type(mime_type_);
if (!recorder_handler_->Initialize(
this, stream->Descriptor(), content_type.GetType(),
content_type.Parameter("codecs"), audio_bits_per_second_,
video_bits_per_second_)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"Failed to initialize native MediaRecorder the type provided (" +
mime_type_ + ") is not supported.");
return;
}
if (options->mimeType().IsEmpty()) {
const String actual_mime_type = recorder_handler_->ActualMimeType();
if (!actual_mime_type.IsEmpty())
mime_type_ = actual_mime_type;
}
stopped_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle in MediaRecorder in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
|
Medium
| 172,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
int len;
int val;
if (ip6_mroute_opt(optname))
return ip6_mroute_getsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP &&
sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
val = sk->sk_family;
break;
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter gsf;
int err;
if (len < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gsf, optval, GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0)))
return -EFAULT;
if (gsf.gf_group.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_mc_msfget(sk, &gsf,
(struct group_filter __user *)optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct msghdr msg;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
msg.msg_control = optval;
msg.msg_controllen = len;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
lock_sock(sk);
skb = np->pktoptions;
if (skb)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, &msg, skb);
release_sock(sk);
if (!skb) {
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo) {
struct in6_pktinfo src_info;
src_info.ipi6_ifindex = np->mcast_oif ? np->mcast_oif :
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
src_info.ipi6_addr = np->mcast_oif ? sk->sk_v6_daddr : np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, sizeof(src_info), &src_info);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim) {
int hlim = np->mcast_hops;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HOPLIMIT, sizeof(hlim), &hlim);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass) {
int tclass = (int)ip6_tclass(np->rcv_flowinfo);
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, sizeof(tclass), &tclass);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo) {
struct in6_pktinfo src_info;
src_info.ipi6_ifindex = np->mcast_oif ? np->mcast_oif :
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
src_info.ipi6_addr = np->mcast_oif ? sk->sk_v6_daddr :
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292PKTINFO, sizeof(src_info), &src_info);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim) {
int hlim = np->mcast_hops;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT, sizeof(hlim), &hlim);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxflow) {
__be32 flowinfo = np->rcv_flowinfo;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_FLOWINFO, sizeof(flowinfo), &flowinfo);
}
}
len -= msg.msg_controllen;
return put_user(len, optlen);
}
case IPV6_MTU:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
val = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst)
val = dst_mtu(dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!val)
return -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
val = sk->sk_ipv6only;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo;
break;
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
val = np->rxopt.bits.srcrt;
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
val = np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt;
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
lock_sock(sk);
len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt,
optname, optval, len);
release_sock(sk);
/* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */
if (len < 0)
return len;
return put_user(len, optlen);
}
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.hopopts;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts;
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.dstopts;
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.odstopts;
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
val = np->tclass;
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxflow;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu;
break;
case IPV6_PATHMTU:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct ip6_mtuinfo mtuinfo;
if (len < sizeof(mtuinfo))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(mtuinfo);
memset(&mtuinfo, 0, sizeof(mtuinfo));
rcu_read_lock();
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst)
mtuinfo.ip6m_mtu = dst_mtu(dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!mtuinfo.ip6m_mtu)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &mtuinfo, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
val = inet_sk(sk)->transparent;
break;
case IPV6_RECVORIGDSTADDR:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
if (optname == IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS)
val = np->hop_limit;
else
val = np->mcast_hops;
if (val < 0) {
rcu_read_lock();
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst)
val = ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (val < 0)
val = sock_net(sk)->ipv6.devconf_all->hop_limit;
break;
}
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
val = np->mc_loop;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
val = np->mcast_oif;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_IF:
val = (__force int)htonl((__u32) np->ucast_oif);
break;
case IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER:
val = np->pmtudisc;
break;
case IPV6_RECVERR:
val = np->recverr;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND:
val = np->sndflow;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR:
{
struct in6_flowlabel_req freq;
int flags;
if (len < sizeof(freq))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&freq, optval, sizeof(freq)))
return -EFAULT;
if (freq.flr_action != IPV6_FL_A_GET)
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(freq);
flags = freq.flr_flags;
memset(&freq, 0, sizeof(freq));
val = ipv6_flowlabel_opt_get(sk, &freq, flags);
if (val < 0)
return val;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &freq, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case IPV6_ADDR_PREFERENCES:
val = 0;
if (np->srcprefs & IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP)
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP;
else if (np->srcprefs & IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC)
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC;
else {
/* XXX: should we return system default? */
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT;
}
if (np->srcprefs & IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA)
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
else
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME;
break;
case IPV6_MINHOPCOUNT:
val = np->min_hopcount;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
val = np->dontfrag;
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
val = np->autoflowlabel;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(int), len);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,335
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, OnigSyntaxType **syntax, int *eval)
{
int n;
char c;
int optm = 0;
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
if (parg != NULL) {
n = 0;
while(n < narg) {
c = parg[n++];
switch (c) {
case 'i':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_IGNORECASE;
break;
case 'x':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_EXTEND;
break;
case 'm':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE;
break;
case 's':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE;
break;
case 'p':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE;
break;
case 'l':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_FIND_LONGEST;
break;
case 'n':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_FIND_NOT_EMPTY;
break;
case 'j':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_JAVA;
break;
case 'u':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_GNU_REGEX;
break;
case 'g':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_GREP;
break;
case 'c':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_EMACS;
break;
case 'r':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
break;
case 'z':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL;
break;
case 'b':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_BASIC;
break;
case 'd':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED;
break;
case 'e':
if (eval != NULL) *eval = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (option != NULL) *option|=optm;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
Low
| 167,120
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DCTStream::reset() {
int row_stride;
str->reset();
if (row_buffer)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&cinfo);
init();
}
bool startFound = false;
int c = 0, c2 = 0;
while (!startFound)
{
if (!c)
if (c == -1)
{
error(-1, "Could not find start of jpeg data");
src.abort = true;
return;
}
if (c != 0xFF) c = 0;
return;
}
if (c != 0xFF) c = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: DCTStream.cc in Poppler before 0.13.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,394
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int try_smi_init(struct smi_info *new_smi)
{
int rv = 0;
int i;
char *init_name = NULL;
pr_info("Trying %s-specified %s state machine at %s address 0x%lx, slave address 0x%x, irq %d\n",
ipmi_addr_src_to_str(new_smi->io.addr_source),
si_to_str[new_smi->io.si_type],
addr_space_to_str[new_smi->io.addr_type],
new_smi->io.addr_data,
new_smi->io.slave_addr, new_smi->io.irq);
switch (new_smi->io.si_type) {
case SI_KCS:
new_smi->handlers = &kcs_smi_handlers;
break;
case SI_SMIC:
new_smi->handlers = &smic_smi_handlers;
break;
case SI_BT:
new_smi->handlers = &bt_smi_handlers;
break;
default:
/* No support for anything else yet. */
rv = -EIO;
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->si_num = smi_num;
/* Do this early so it's available for logs. */
if (!new_smi->io.dev) {
init_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "ipmi_si.%d",
new_smi->si_num);
/*
* If we don't already have a device from something
* else (like PCI), then register a new one.
*/
new_smi->pdev = platform_device_alloc("ipmi_si",
new_smi->si_num);
if (!new_smi->pdev) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate platform device\n");
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->io.dev = &new_smi->pdev->dev;
new_smi->io.dev->driver = &ipmi_platform_driver.driver;
/* Nulled by device_add() */
new_smi->io.dev->init_name = init_name;
}
/* Allocate the state machine's data and initialize it. */
new_smi->si_sm = kmalloc(new_smi->handlers->size(), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_smi->si_sm) {
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->io.io_size = new_smi->handlers->init_data(new_smi->si_sm,
&new_smi->io);
/* Now that we know the I/O size, we can set up the I/O. */
rv = new_smi->io.io_setup(&new_smi->io);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev, "Could not set up I/O space\n");
goto out_err;
}
/* Do low-level detection first. */
if (new_smi->handlers->detect(new_smi->si_sm)) {
if (new_smi->io.addr_source)
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Interface detection failed\n");
rv = -ENODEV;
goto out_err;
}
/*
* Attempt a get device id command. If it fails, we probably
* don't have a BMC here.
*/
rv = try_get_dev_id(new_smi);
if (rv) {
if (new_smi->io.addr_source)
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"There appears to be no BMC at this location\n");
goto out_err;
}
setup_oem_data_handler(new_smi);
setup_xaction_handlers(new_smi);
check_for_broken_irqs(new_smi);
new_smi->waiting_msg = NULL;
new_smi->curr_msg = NULL;
atomic_set(&new_smi->req_events, 0);
new_smi->run_to_completion = false;
for (i = 0; i < SI_NUM_STATS; i++)
atomic_set(&new_smi->stats[i], 0);
new_smi->interrupt_disabled = true;
atomic_set(&new_smi->need_watch, 0);
rv = try_enable_event_buffer(new_smi);
if (rv == 0)
new_smi->has_event_buffer = true;
/*
* Start clearing the flags before we enable interrupts or the
* timer to avoid racing with the timer.
*/
start_clear_flags(new_smi);
/*
* IRQ is defined to be set when non-zero. req_events will
* cause a global flags check that will enable interrupts.
*/
if (new_smi->io.irq) {
new_smi->interrupt_disabled = false;
atomic_set(&new_smi->req_events, 1);
}
if (new_smi->pdev && !new_smi->pdev_registered) {
rv = platform_device_add(new_smi->pdev);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Unable to register system interface device: %d\n",
rv);
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->pdev_registered = true;
}
dev_set_drvdata(new_smi->io.dev, new_smi);
rv = device_add_group(new_smi->io.dev, &ipmi_si_dev_attr_group);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Unable to add device attributes: error %d\n",
rv);
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->dev_group_added = true;
rv = ipmi_register_smi(&handlers,
new_smi,
new_smi->io.dev,
new_smi->io.slave_addr);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Unable to register device: error %d\n",
rv);
goto out_err;
}
/* Don't increment till we know we have succeeded. */
smi_num++;
dev_info(new_smi->io.dev, "IPMI %s interface initialized\n",
si_to_str[new_smi->io.si_type]);
WARN_ON(new_smi->io.dev->init_name != NULL);
out_err:
kfree(init_name);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.4. There is a use-after-free upon attempted read access to /proc/ioports after the ipmi_si module is removed, related to drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c, drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_mem_io.c, and drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_port_io.c.
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
|
Low
| 169,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void lsi_execute_script(LSIState *s)
{
PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(s);
uint32_t insn;
uint32_t addr, addr_high;
int opcode;
int insn_processed = 0;
s->istat1 |= LSI_ISTAT1_SRUN;
again:
s->istat1 |= LSI_ISTAT1_SRUN;
again:
insn_processed++;
insn = read_dword(s, s->dsp);
if (!insn) {
/* If we receive an empty opcode increment the DSP by 4 bytes
s->dbc = insn & 0xffffff;
s->rbc = s->dbc;
/* ??? Set ESA. */
s->ia = s->dsp - 8;
if (insn & (1 << 29)) {
/* Indirect addressing. */
addr = read_dword(s, addr);
} else if (insn & (1 << 28)) {
uint32_t buf[2];
int32_t offset;
/* Table indirect addressing. */
/* 32-bit Table indirect */
offset = sextract32(addr, 0, 24);
pci_dma_read(pci_dev, s->dsa + offset, buf, 8);
/* byte count is stored in bits 0:23 only */
s->dbc = cpu_to_le32(buf[0]) & 0xffffff;
s->rbc = s->dbc;
addr = cpu_to_le32(buf[1]);
/* 40-bit DMA, upper addr bits [39:32] stored in first DWORD of
* table, bits [31:24] */
if (lsi_dma_40bit(s))
addr_high = cpu_to_le32(buf[0]) >> 24;
else if (lsi_dma_ti64bit(s)) {
int selector = (cpu_to_le32(buf[0]) >> 24) & 0x1f;
switch (selector) {
case 0 ... 0x0f:
/* offset index into scratch registers since
* TI64 mode can use registers C to R */
addr_high = s->scratch[2 + selector];
break;
case 0x10:
addr_high = s->mmrs;
break;
case 0x11:
addr_high = s->mmws;
break;
case 0x12:
addr_high = s->sfs;
break;
case 0x13:
addr_high = s->drs;
break;
case 0x14:
addr_high = s->sbms;
break;
case 0x15:
addr_high = s->dbms;
break;
default:
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"lsi_scsi: Illegal selector specified (0x%x > 0x15) "
"for 64-bit DMA block move", selector);
break;
}
}
} else if (lsi_dma_64bit(s)) {
/* fetch a 3rd dword if 64-bit direct move is enabled and
only if we're not doing table indirect or indirect addressing */
s->dbms = read_dword(s, s->dsp);
s->dsp += 4;
s->ia = s->dsp - 12;
}
if ((s->sstat1 & PHASE_MASK) != ((insn >> 24) & 7)) {
trace_lsi_execute_script_blockmove_badphase(
scsi_phase_name(s->sstat1),
scsi_phase_name(insn >> 24));
lsi_script_scsi_interrupt(s, LSI_SIST0_MA, 0);
break;
}
s->dnad = addr;
s->dnad64 = addr_high;
switch (s->sstat1 & 0x7) {
case PHASE_DO:
s->waiting = LSI_DMA_SCRIPTS;
lsi_do_dma(s, 1);
if (s->waiting)
s->waiting = LSI_DMA_IN_PROGRESS;
break;
case PHASE_DI:
s->waiting = LSI_DMA_SCRIPTS;
lsi_do_dma(s, 0);
if (s->waiting)
s->waiting = LSI_DMA_IN_PROGRESS;
break;
case PHASE_CMD:
lsi_do_command(s);
break;
case PHASE_ST:
lsi_do_status(s);
break;
case PHASE_MO:
lsi_do_msgout(s);
break;
case PHASE_MI:
lsi_do_msgin(s);
break;
default:
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "lsi_scsi: Unimplemented phase %s\n",
scsi_phase_name(s->sstat1));
}
s->dfifo = s->dbc & 0xff;
s->ctest5 = (s->ctest5 & 0xfc) | ((s->dbc >> 8) & 3);
s->sbc = s->dbc;
s->rbc -= s->dbc;
s->ua = addr + s->dbc;
break;
case 1: /* IO or Read/Write instruction. */
opcode = (insn >> 27) & 7;
if (opcode < 5) {
uint32_t id;
if (insn & (1 << 25)) {
id = read_dword(s, s->dsa + sextract32(insn, 0, 24));
} else {
id = insn;
}
id = (id >> 16) & 0xf;
if (insn & (1 << 26)) {
addr = s->dsp + sextract32(addr, 0, 24);
}
s->dnad = addr;
switch (opcode) {
case 0: /* Select */
s->sdid = id;
if (s->scntl1 & LSI_SCNTL1_CON) {
trace_lsi_execute_script_io_alreadyreselected();
s->dsp = s->dnad;
break;
}
s->sstat0 |= LSI_SSTAT0_WOA;
s->scntl1 &= ~LSI_SCNTL1_IARB;
if (!scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, id, 0)) {
lsi_bad_selection(s, id);
break;
}
trace_lsi_execute_script_io_selected(id,
insn & (1 << 3) ? " ATN" : "");
/* ??? Linux drivers compain when this is set. Maybe
it only applies in low-level mode (unimplemented).
lsi_script_scsi_interrupt(s, LSI_SIST0_CMP, 0); */
s->select_tag = id << 8;
s->scntl1 |= LSI_SCNTL1_CON;
if (insn & (1 << 3)) {
s->socl |= LSI_SOCL_ATN;
s->sbcl |= LSI_SBCL_ATN;
}
s->sbcl |= LSI_SBCL_BSY;
lsi_set_phase(s, PHASE_MO);
s->waiting = LSI_NOWAIT;
break;
case 1: /* Disconnect */
trace_lsi_execute_script_io_disconnect();
s->scntl1 &= ~LSI_SCNTL1_CON;
/* FIXME: this is not entirely correct; the target need not ask
* for reselection until it has to send data, while here we force a
* reselection as soon as the bus is free. The correct flow would
* reselect before lsi_transfer_data and disconnect as soon as
* DMA ends.
*/
if (!s->current) {
lsi_request *p = get_pending_req(s);
if (p) {
lsi_reselect(s, p);
}
}
break;
case 2: /* Wait Reselect */
if (s->istat0 & LSI_ISTAT0_SIGP) {
s->dsp = s->dnad;
} else if (!lsi_irq_on_rsl(s)) {
lsi_wait_reselect(s);
}
break;
case 3: /* Set */
trace_lsi_execute_script_io_set(
insn & (1 << 3) ? " ATN" : "",
insn & (1 << 6) ? " ACK" : "",
insn & (1 << 9) ? " TM" : "",
insn & (1 << 10) ? " CC" : "");
if (insn & (1 << 3)) {
s->socl |= LSI_SOCL_ATN;
s->sbcl |= LSI_SBCL_ATN;
lsi_set_phase(s, PHASE_MO);
}
if (insn & (1 << 6)) {
s->sbcl |= LSI_SBCL_ACK;
}
if (insn & (1 << 9)) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
"lsi_scsi: Target mode not implemented\n");
}
if (insn & (1 << 10))
s->carry = 1;
break;
case 4: /* Clear */
trace_lsi_execute_script_io_clear(
insn & (1 << 3) ? " ATN" : "",
insn & (1 << 6) ? " ACK" : "",
insn & (1 << 9) ? " TM" : "",
insn & (1 << 10) ? " CC" : "");
if (insn & (1 << 3)) {
s->socl &= ~LSI_SOCL_ATN;
s->sbcl &= ~LSI_SBCL_ATN;
}
if (insn & (1 << 6)) {
s->sbcl &= ~LSI_SBCL_ACK;
}
if (insn & (1 << 10))
s->carry = 0;
break;
}
} else {
uint8_t op0;
uint8_t op1;
uint8_t data8;
int reg;
int operator;
static const char *opcode_names[3] =
{"Write", "Read", "Read-Modify-Write"};
static const char *operator_names[8] =
{"MOV", "SHL", "OR", "XOR", "AND", "SHR", "ADD", "ADC"};
reg = ((insn >> 16) & 0x7f) | (insn & 0x80);
data8 = (insn >> 8) & 0xff;
opcode = (insn >> 27) & 7;
operator = (insn >> 24) & 7;
trace_lsi_execute_script_io_opcode(
opcode_names[opcode - 5], reg,
operator_names[operator], data8, s->sfbr,
(insn & (1 << 23)) ? " SFBR" : "");
op0 = op1 = 0;
switch (opcode) {
case 5: /* From SFBR */
op0 = s->sfbr;
op1 = data8;
break;
case 6: /* To SFBR */
if (operator)
op0 = lsi_reg_readb(s, reg);
op1 = data8;
break;
case 7: /* Read-modify-write */
if (operator)
op0 = lsi_reg_readb(s, reg);
if (insn & (1 << 23)) {
op1 = s->sfbr;
} else {
op1 = data8;
}
break;
}
switch (operator) {
case 0: /* move */
op0 = op1;
break;
case 1: /* Shift left */
op1 = op0 >> 7;
op0 = (op0 << 1) | s->carry;
s->carry = op1;
break;
case 2: /* OR */
op0 |= op1;
break;
case 3: /* XOR */
op0 ^= op1;
break;
case 4: /* AND */
op0 &= op1;
break;
case 5: /* SHR */
op1 = op0 & 1;
op0 = (op0 >> 1) | (s->carry << 7);
s->carry = op1;
break;
case 6: /* ADD */
op0 += op1;
s->carry = op0 < op1;
break;
case 7: /* ADC */
op0 += op1 + s->carry;
if (s->carry)
s->carry = op0 <= op1;
else
s->carry = op0 < op1;
break;
}
switch (opcode) {
case 5: /* From SFBR */
case 7: /* Read-modify-write */
lsi_reg_writeb(s, reg, op0);
break;
case 6: /* To SFBR */
s->sfbr = op0;
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* Transfer Control. */
{
int cond;
int jmp;
if ((insn & 0x002e0000) == 0) {
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_nop();
break;
}
if (s->sist1 & LSI_SIST1_STO) {
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_delayedselect_timeout();
lsi_stop_script(s);
break;
}
cond = jmp = (insn & (1 << 19)) != 0;
if (cond == jmp && (insn & (1 << 21))) {
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_compc(s->carry == jmp);
cond = s->carry != 0;
}
if (cond == jmp && (insn & (1 << 17))) {
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_compp(scsi_phase_name(s->sstat1),
jmp ? '=' : '!', scsi_phase_name(insn >> 24));
cond = (s->sstat1 & PHASE_MASK) == ((insn >> 24) & 7);
}
if (cond == jmp && (insn & (1 << 18))) {
uint8_t mask;
mask = (~insn >> 8) & 0xff;
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_compd(
s->sfbr, mask, jmp ? '=' : '!', insn & mask);
cond = (s->sfbr & mask) == (insn & mask);
}
if (cond == jmp) {
if (insn & (1 << 23)) {
/* Relative address. */
addr = s->dsp + sextract32(addr, 0, 24);
}
switch ((insn >> 27) & 7) {
case 0: /* Jump */
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_jump(addr);
s->adder = addr;
s->dsp = addr;
break;
case 1: /* Call */
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_call(addr);
s->temp = s->dsp;
s->dsp = addr;
break;
case 2: /* Return */
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_return(s->temp);
s->dsp = s->temp;
break;
case 3: /* Interrupt */
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_interrupt(s->dsps);
if ((insn & (1 << 20)) != 0) {
s->istat0 |= LSI_ISTAT0_INTF;
lsi_update_irq(s);
} else {
lsi_script_dma_interrupt(s, LSI_DSTAT_SIR);
}
break;
default:
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_illegal();
lsi_script_dma_interrupt(s, LSI_DSTAT_IID);
break;
}
} else {
trace_lsi_execute_script_tc_cc_failed();
}
}
break;
case 3:
if ((insn & (1 << 29)) == 0) {
/* Memory move. */
uint32_t dest;
/* ??? The docs imply the destination address is loaded into
the TEMP register. However the Linux drivers rely on
the value being presrved. */
dest = read_dword(s, s->dsp);
s->dsp += 4;
lsi_memcpy(s, dest, addr, insn & 0xffffff);
} else {
uint8_t data[7];
int reg;
int n;
int i;
if (insn & (1 << 28)) {
addr = s->dsa + sextract32(addr, 0, 24);
}
n = (insn & 7);
reg = (insn >> 16) & 0xff;
if (insn & (1 << 24)) {
pci_dma_read(pci_dev, addr, data, n);
trace_lsi_execute_script_mm_load(reg, n, addr, *(int *)data);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
lsi_reg_writeb(s, reg + i, data[i]);
}
} else {
trace_lsi_execute_script_mm_store(reg, n, addr);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
data[i] = lsi_reg_readb(s, reg + i);
}
pci_dma_write(pci_dev, addr, data, n);
}
}
}
if (insn_processed > 10000 && s->waiting == LSI_NOWAIT) {
/* Some windows drivers make the device spin waiting for a memory
location to change. If we have been executed a lot of code then
assume this is the case and force an unexpected device disconnect.
This is apparently sufficient to beat the drivers into submission.
*/
if (!(s->sien0 & LSI_SIST0_UDC)) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"lsi_scsi: inf. loop with UDC masked");
}
lsi_script_scsi_interrupt(s, LSI_SIST0_UDC, 0);
lsi_disconnect(s);
} else if (s->istat1 & LSI_ISTAT1_SRUN && s->waiting == LSI_NOWAIT) {
if (s->dcntl & LSI_DCNTL_SSM) {
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: In QEMU 1:4.1-1, 1:2.1+dfsg-12+deb8u6, 1:2.8+dfsg-6+deb9u8, 1:3.1+dfsg-8~deb10u1, 1:3.1+dfsg-8+deb10u2, and 1:2.1+dfsg-12+deb8u12 (fixed), when executing script in lsi_execute_script(), the LSI scsi adapter emulator advances 's->dsp' index to read next opcode. This can lead to an infinite loop if the next opcode is empty. Move the existing loop exit after 10k iterations so that it covers no-op opcodes as well.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,722
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void snd_usb_mixer_disconnect(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer)
{
usb_kill_urb(mixer->urb);
usb_kill_urb(mixer->rc_urb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: sound/usb/mixer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (snd_usb_mixer_interrupt use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,683
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg, u8 cpl,
enum x86_transfer_type transfer,
struct desc_struct *desc)
{
struct desc_struct seg_desc, old_desc;
u8 dpl, rpl;
unsigned err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
u32 err_code = 0;
bool null_selector = !(selector & ~0x3); /* 0000-0003 are null */
ulong desc_addr;
int ret;
u16 dummy;
u32 base3 = 0;
memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof seg_desc);
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) {
/* set real mode segment descriptor (keep limit etc. for
* unreal mode) */
ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &seg_desc, NULL, seg);
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
goto load;
} else if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86) {
/* VM86 needs a clean new segment descriptor */
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
set_desc_limit(&seg_desc, 0xffff);
seg_desc.type = 3;
seg_desc.p = 1;
seg_desc.s = 1;
seg_desc.dpl = 3;
goto load;
}
rpl = selector & 3;
/* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and SS (except for long mode) */
if ((seg == VCPU_SREG_CS
|| (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS
&& (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl))
|| seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
&& null_selector)
goto exception;
/* TR should be in GDT only */
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
goto exception;
if (null_selector) /* for NULL selector skip all following checks */
goto load;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
err_code = selector & 0xfffc;
err_vec = (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH) ? TS_VECTOR :
GP_VECTOR;
/* can't load system descriptor into segment selector */
if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && !seg_desc.s) {
if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
goto exception;
}
if (!seg_desc.p) {
err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
goto exception;
}
dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
switch (seg) {
case VCPU_SREG_SS:
/*
* segment is not a writable data segment or segment
* selector's RPL != CPL or segment selector's RPL != CPL
*/
if (rpl != cpl || (seg_desc.type & 0xa) != 0x2 || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_CS:
if (!(seg_desc.type & 8))
goto exception;
if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
/* conforming */
if (dpl > cpl)
goto exception;
} else {
/* nonconforming */
if (rpl > cpl || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
}
/* in long-mode d/b must be clear if l is set */
if (seg_desc.d && seg_desc.l) {
u64 efer = 0;
ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
if (efer & EFER_LMA)
goto exception;
}
/* CS(RPL) <- CPL */
selector = (selector & 0xfffc) | cpl;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_TR:
if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
goto exception;
old_desc = seg_desc;
seg_desc.type |= 2; /* busy */
ret = ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, desc_addr, &old_desc, &seg_desc,
sizeof(seg_desc), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_LDTR:
if (seg_desc.s || seg_desc.type != 2)
goto exception;
break;
default: /* DS, ES, FS, or GS */
/*
* segment is not a data or readable code segment or
* ((segment is a data or nonconforming code segment)
* and (both RPL and CPL > DPL))
*/
if ((seg_desc.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ||
(((seg_desc.type & 0xc) != 0xc) &&
(rpl > dpl && cpl > dpl)))
goto exception;
break;
}
if (seg_desc.s) {
/* mark segment as accessed */
if (!(seg_desc.type & 1)) {
seg_desc.type |= 1;
ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector,
&seg_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
} else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
ret = ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3,
sizeof(base3), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (is_noncanonical_address(get_desc_base(&seg_desc) |
((u64)base3 << 32)))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
load:
ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, base3, seg);
if (desc)
*desc = seg_desc;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
exception:
return emulate_exception(ctxt, err_vec, err_code, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The load_segment_descriptor implementation in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.5 improperly emulates a *MOV SS, NULL selector* instruction, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) or gain guest OS privileges via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <zhangxiaohan1@huawei.com>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
s->s_flags = flags;
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_alloc_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
iput(inode);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower(s->s_root, path.dentry);
ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower_mnt(s->s_root, path.mnt);
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Race condition in the ecryptfs_mount function in fs/ecryptfs/main.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to bypass intended file permissions via a mount.ecryptfs_private mount with a mismatched uid.
Commit Message: Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
Medium
| 165,874
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestAppendTabsToTabStrip(bool focus_tab_strip) {
LifecycleUnit* first_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* second_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(focus_tab_strip, &first_lifecycle_unit,
&second_lifecycle_unit);
const base::TimeTicks first_tab_last_focused_time =
first_lifecycle_unit->GetLastFocusedTime();
const base::TimeTicks second_tab_last_focused_time =
second_lifecycle_unit->GetLastFocusedTime();
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
LifecycleUnit* third_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_))
.WillOnce(testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
third_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_EQ(first_tab_last_focused_time,
first_lifecycle_unit->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(second_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(first_tab_last_focused_time,
first_lifecycle_unit->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_EQ(second_tab_last_focused_time,
second_lifecycle_unit->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
EXPECT_EQ(NowTicks(), third_lifecycle_unit->GetLastFocusedTime());
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> third_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_third_web_contents = third_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(third_web_contents), false);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_third_web_contents));
CloseTabsAndExpectNotifications(
tab_strip_model_.get(),
{first_lifecycle_unit, second_lifecycle_unit, third_lifecycle_unit});
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
Medium
| 172,227
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT)
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
else
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The rose_parse_ccitt function in net/rose/rose_subr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not validate the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP fields, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (integer underflow, heap memory corruption, and panic) via a small length value in data sent to a ROSE socket, or (2) conduct stack-based buffer overflow attacks via a large length value in data sent to a ROSE socket.
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(
long long id,
long long pos, //absolute pos of payload
long long size,
long long discard_padding)
{
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); //BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) //haven't parsed anything yet
{
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry*[m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
}
else
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size)
{
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry*[entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else //SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int phar_zip_flush(phar_archive_data *phar, char *user_stub, long len, int defaultstub, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *pos;
smart_str main_metadata_str = {0};
static const char newstub[] = "<?php // zip-based phar archive stub file\n__HALT_COMPILER();";
char halt_stub[] = "__HALT_COMPILER();";
char *tmp;
php_stream *stubfile, *oldfile;
php_serialize_data_t metadata_hash;
int free_user_stub, closeoldfile = 0;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
char *temperr = NULL;
struct _phar_zip_pass pass;
phar_zip_dir_end eocd;
php_uint32 cdir_size, cdir_offset;
pass.error = &temperr;
entry.flags = PHAR_ENT_PERM_DEF_FILE;
entry.timestamp = time(NULL);
entry.is_modified = 1;
entry.is_zip = 1;
entry.phar = phar;
entry.fp_type = PHAR_MOD;
if (phar->is_persistent) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "internal error: attempt to flush cached zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
if (phar->is_data) {
goto nostub;
}
/* set alias */
if (!phar->is_temporary_alias && phar->alias_len) {
entry.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (entry.fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return EOF;
}
if (phar->alias_len != (int)php_stream_write(entry.fp, phar->alias, phar->alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to set alias in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize = phar->alias_len;
entry.filename = estrndup(".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1);
entry.filename_len = sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to set alias in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
} else {
zend_hash_del(&phar->manifest, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1);
}
/* register alias */
if (phar->alias_len) {
if (FAILURE == phar_get_archive(&phar, phar->fname, phar->fname_len, phar->alias, phar->alias_len, error TSRMLS_CC)) {
return EOF;
}
}
/* set stub */
if (user_stub && !defaultstub) {
if (len < 0) {
/* resource passed in */
if (!(php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stubfile, (zval **)user_stub))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to access resource to copy stub to new zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
if (len == -1) {
len = PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL;
} else {
len = -len;
}
user_stub = 0;
if (!(len = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stubfile, &user_stub, len, 0)) || !user_stub) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to read resource to copy stub to new zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
free_user_stub = 1;
} else {
free_user_stub = 0;
}
tmp = estrndup(user_stub, len);
if ((pos = php_stristr(tmp, halt_stub, len, sizeof(halt_stub) - 1)) == NULL) {
efree(tmp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "illegal stub for zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
return EOF;
}
pos = user_stub + (pos - tmp);
efree(tmp);
len = pos - user_stub + 18;
entry.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (entry.fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return EOF;
}
entry.uncompressed_filesize = len + 5;
if ((size_t)len != php_stream_write(entry.fp, user_stub, len)
|| 5 != php_stream_write(entry.fp, " ?>\r\n", 5)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to create stub from string in new zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
return EOF;
}
entry.filename = estrndup(".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1);
entry.filename_len = sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to set stub in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
} else {
/* Either this is a brand new phar (add the stub), or the default stub is required (overwrite the stub) */
entry.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (entry.fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return EOF;
}
if (sizeof(newstub)-1 != php_stream_write(entry.fp, newstub, sizeof(newstub)-1)) {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to %s stub in%szip-based phar \"%s\", failed", user_stub ? "overwrite" : "create", user_stub ? " " : " new ", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize = sizeof(newstub) - 1;
entry.filename = estrndup(".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1);
entry.filename_len = sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1;
if (!defaultstub) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(&phar->manifest, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to create stub in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
} else {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
efree(entry.filename);
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to overwrite stub in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
}
}
nostub:
if (phar->fp && !phar->is_brandnew) {
oldfile = phar->fp;
closeoldfile = 0;
php_stream_rewind(oldfile);
} else {
oldfile = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar->fname, "rb", 0, NULL);
closeoldfile = oldfile != NULL;
}
/* save modified files to the zip */
pass.old = oldfile;
pass.filefp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (!pass.filefp) {
fperror:
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to open temporary file", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
pass.centralfp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (!pass.centralfp) {
goto fperror;
}
pass.free_fp = pass.free_ufp = 1;
memset(&eocd, 0, sizeof(eocd));
strncpy(eocd.signature, "PK\5\6", 4);
if (!phar->is_data && !phar->sig_flags) {
phar->sig_flags = PHAR_SIG_SHA1;
}
if (phar->sig_flags) {
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.counthere, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest) + 1);
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.count, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest) + 1);
} else {
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.counthere, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest));
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.count, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest));
}
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(&phar->manifest, phar_zip_changed_apply, (void *) &pass TSRMLS_CC);
if (phar->metadata) {
/* set phar metadata */
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_INIT(metadata_hash);
php_var_serialize(&main_metadata_str, &phar->metadata, &metadata_hash TSRMLS_CC);
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(metadata_hash);
}
if (temperr) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: %s", phar->fname, temperr);
}
efree(temperr);
temperror:
php_stream_close(pass.centralfp);
nocentralerror:
if (phar->metadata) {
smart_str_free(&main_metadata_str);
}
php_stream_close(pass.filefp);
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
return EOF;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_zip_applysignature(phar, &pass, &main_metadata_str TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto temperror;
}
/* save zip */
cdir_size = php_stream_tell(pass.centralfp);
cdir_offset = php_stream_tell(pass.filefp);
PHAR_SET_32(eocd.cdir_size, cdir_size);
PHAR_SET_32(eocd.cdir_offset, cdir_offset);
php_stream_seek(pass.centralfp, 0, SEEK_SET);
{
size_t clen;
int ret = phar_stream_copy_to_stream(pass.centralfp, pass.filefp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, &clen);
if (SUCCESS != ret || clen != cdir_size) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write central-directory", phar->fname);
}
goto temperror;
}
}
php_stream_close(pass.centralfp);
if (phar->metadata) {
/* set phar metadata */
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.comment_len, main_metadata_str.len);
if (sizeof(eocd) != php_stream_write(pass.filefp, (char *)&eocd, sizeof(eocd))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write end of central-directory", phar->fname);
}
goto nocentralerror;
}
if (main_metadata_str.len != php_stream_write(pass.filefp, main_metadata_str.c, main_metadata_str.len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write metadata to zip comment", phar->fname);
}
goto nocentralerror;
}
smart_str_free(&main_metadata_str);
} else {
if (sizeof(eocd) != php_stream_write(pass.filefp, (char *)&eocd, sizeof(eocd))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write end of central-directory", phar->fname);
}
goto nocentralerror;
}
}
if (phar->fp && pass.free_fp) {
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
}
if (phar->ufp) {
if (pass.free_ufp) {
php_stream_close(phar->ufp);
}
phar->ufp = NULL;
}
/* re-open */
phar->is_brandnew = 0;
if (phar->donotflush) {
/* deferred flush */
phar->fp = pass.filefp;
} else {
phar->fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar->fname, "w+b", IGNORE_URL|STREAM_MUST_SEEK|REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (!phar->fp) {
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
phar->fp = pass.filefp;
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "unable to open new phar \"%s\" for writing", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
php_stream_rewind(pass.filefp);
phar_stream_copy_to_stream(pass.filefp, phar->fp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, NULL);
/* we could also reopen the file in "rb" mode but there is no need for that */
php_stream_close(pass.filefp);
}
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
return EOF;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The phar_parse_zipfile function in zip.c in the PHAR extension in PHP before 5.5.33 and 5.6.x before 5.6.19 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) by placing a PK\x05\x06 signature at an invalid location.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,164
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProfileSyncService::RegisterNewDataType(syncable::ModelType data_type) {
if (data_type_controllers_.count(data_type) > 0)
return;
switch (data_type) {
case syncable::SESSIONS:
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableSyncTabs)) {
return;
}
RegisterDataTypeController(
new browser_sync::SessionDataTypeController(factory_.get(),
profile_,
this));
return;
default:
break;
}
NOTREACHED();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void i8042_stop(struct serio *serio)
{
struct i8042_port *port = serio->port_data;
port->exists = false;
/*
* We synchronize with both AUX and KBD IRQs because there is
* a (very unlikely) chance that AUX IRQ is raised for KBD port
* and vice versa.
*/
synchronize_irq(I8042_AUX_IRQ);
synchronize_irq(I8042_KBD_IRQ);
port->serio = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: drivers/input/serio/i8042.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact because the port->exists value can change after it is validated.
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 169,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
if (opt->type & UINT16)
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & (IPV4 | ARRAY))
return dl % sz;
return (dl == sz ? 0 : -1);
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: dhcpcd before 6.10.0, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 and other products, mismanages option lengths, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) via a malformed DHCP response, aka internal bug 26461634.
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
|
Low
| 173,900
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int x86_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_event *event;
int idx, handled = 0;
u64 val;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/*
* Some chipsets need to unmask the LVTPC in a particular spot
* inside the nmi handler. As a result, the unmasking was pushed
* into all the nmi handlers.
*
* This generic handler doesn't seem to have any issues where the
* unmasking occurs so it was left at the top.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) {
/*
* Though we deactivated the counter some cpus
* might still deliver spurious interrupts still
* in flight. Catch them:
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(idx, cpuc->running))
handled++;
continue;
}
event = cpuc->events[idx];
val = x86_perf_event_update(event);
if (val & (1ULL << (x86_pmu.cntval_bits - 1)))
continue;
/*
* event overflow
*/
handled++;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!x86_perf_event_set_period(event))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
if (handled)
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,818
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,493
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltRegisterExtModuleElement(const xmlChar * name, const xmlChar * URI,
xsltPreComputeFunction precomp,
xsltTransformFunction transform)
{
int ret;
xsltExtElementPtr ext;
if ((name == NULL) || (URI == NULL) || (transform == NULL))
return (-1);
if (xsltElementsHash == NULL)
xsltElementsHash = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (xsltElementsHash == NULL)
return (-1);
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
ext = xsltNewExtElement(precomp, transform);
if (ext == NULL) {
ret = -1;
goto done;
}
xmlHashUpdateEntry2(xsltElementsHash, name, URI, (void *) ext,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtElement);
done:
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
break;
}
if (c) { /* encoded mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
}
} else { /* absolute mode */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
break;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
y++;
pix = pData + y * stride;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = 0U;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
if ((j & 1) == 0) {
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
}
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
}
if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
getc(IN);
}
}
}
} /* while(y < height) */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.
Commit Message: convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
|
Medium
| 170,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
int objectsCount = 0;
Guint numOffset = 0;
std::vector<Object> pages;
std::vector<Guint> offsets;
XRef *yRef, *countRef;
FILE *f;
OutStream *outStr;
int i;
int j, rootNum;
std::vector<PDFDoc *>docs;
int majorVersion = 0;
int minorVersion = 0;
char *fileName = argv[argc - 1];
int exitCode;
exitCode = 99;
const GBool ok = parseArgs (argDesc, &argc, argv);
if (!ok || argc < 3 || printVersion || printHelp) {
fprintf(stderr, "pdfunite version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION);
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", popplerCopyright);
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", xpdfCopyright);
if (!printVersion) {
printUsage("pdfunite", "<PDF-sourcefile-1>..<PDF-sourcefile-n> <PDF-destfile>",
argDesc);
}
if (printVersion || printHelp)
exitCode = 0;
return exitCode;
}
exitCode = 0;
globalParams = new GlobalParams();
for (i = 1; i < argc - 1; i++) {
GooString *gfileName = new GooString(argv[i]);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc(gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (doc->isOk() && !doc->isEncrypted()) {
docs.push_back(doc);
if (doc->getPDFMajorVersion() > majorVersion) {
majorVersion = doc->getPDFMajorVersion();
minorVersion = doc->getPDFMinorVersion();
} else if (doc->getPDFMajorVersion() == majorVersion) {
if (doc->getPDFMinorVersion() > minorVersion) {
minorVersion = doc->getPDFMinorVersion();
}
}
} else if (doc->isOk()) {
error(errUnimplemented, -1, "Could not merge encrypted files ('{0:s}')", argv[i]);
return -1;
} else {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not merge damaged documents ('{0:s}')", argv[i]);
return -1;
}
}
if (!(f = fopen(fileName, "wb"))) {
error(errIO, -1, "Could not open file '{0:s}'", fileName);
return -1;
}
outStr = new FileOutStream(f, 0);
yRef = new XRef();
countRef = new XRef();
yRef->add(0, 65535, 0, gFalse);
PDFDoc::writeHeader(outStr, majorVersion, minorVersion);
Object intents;
Object afObj;
Object ocObj;
Object names;
if (docs.size() >= 1) {
Object catObj;
docs[0]->getXRef()->getCatalog(&catObj);
Dict *catDict = catObj.getDict();
catDict->lookup("OutputIntents", &intents);
catDict->lookupNF("AcroForm", &afObj);
Ref *refPage = docs[0]->getCatalog()->getPageRef(1);
if (!afObj.isNull()) {
docs[0]->markAcroForm(&afObj, yRef, countRef, 0, refPage->num, refPage->num);
}
catDict->lookupNF("OCProperties", &ocObj);
if (!ocObj.isNull() && ocObj.isDict()) {
docs[0]->markPageObjects(ocObj.getDict(), yRef, countRef, 0, refPage->num, refPage->num);
}
catDict->lookup("Names", &names);
if (!names.isNull() && names.isDict()) {
docs[0]->markPageObjects(names.getDict(), yRef, countRef, 0, refPage->num, refPage->num);
}
if (intents.isArray() && intents.arrayGetLength() > 0) {
for (i = 1; i < (int) docs.size(); i++) {
Object pagecatObj, pageintents;
docs[i]->getXRef()->getCatalog(&pagecatObj);
Dict *pagecatDict = pagecatObj.getDict();
pagecatDict->lookup("OutputIntents", &pageintents);
if (pageintents.isArray() && pageintents.arrayGetLength() > 0) {
for (j = intents.arrayGetLength() - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
Object intent;
intents.arrayGet(j, &intent, 0);
if (intent.isDict()) {
Object idf;
intent.dictLookup("OutputConditionIdentifier", &idf);
if (idf.isString()) {
GooString *gidf = idf.getString();
GBool removeIntent = gTrue;
for (int k = 0; k < pageintents.arrayGetLength(); k++) {
Object pgintent;
pageintents.arrayGet(k, &pgintent, 0);
if (pgintent.isDict()) {
Object pgidf;
pgintent.dictLookup("OutputConditionIdentifier", &pgidf);
if (pgidf.isString()) {
GooString *gpgidf = pgidf.getString();
if (gpgidf->cmp(gidf) == 0) {
pgidf.free();
removeIntent = gFalse;
break;
}
}
pgidf.free();
}
}
if (removeIntent) {
intents.arrayRemove(j);
error(errSyntaxWarning, -1, "Output intent {0:s} missing in pdf {1:s}, removed",
gidf->getCString(), docs[i]->getFileName()->getCString());
}
} else {
intents.arrayRemove(j);
error(errSyntaxWarning, -1, "Invalid output intent dict, missing required OutputConditionIdentifier");
}
idf.free();
} else {
intents.arrayRemove(j);
}
intent.free();
}
} else {
error(errSyntaxWarning, -1, "Output intents differs, remove them all");
intents.free();
break;
}
pagecatObj.free();
pageintents.free();
}
}
if (intents.isArray() && intents.arrayGetLength() > 0) {
for (j = intents.arrayGetLength() - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
Object intent;
intents.arrayGet(j, &intent, 0);
if (intent.isDict()) {
docs[0]->markPageObjects(intent.getDict(), yRef, countRef, numOffset, 0, 0);
} else {
intents.arrayRemove(j);
}
intent.free();
}
}
catObj.free();
}
for (i = 0; i < (int) docs.size(); i++) {
for (j = 1; j <= docs[i]->getNumPages(); j++) {
PDFRectangle *cropBox = NULL;
if (docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->isCropped())
cropBox = docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->getCropBox();
Object page;
docs[i]->getXRef()->fetch(refPage->num, refPage->gen, &page);
Dict *pageDict = page.getDict();
Dict *resDict = docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->getResourceDict();
if (resDict) {
Object *newResource = new Object();
newResource->initDict(resDict);
pageDict->set("Resources", newResource);
delete newResource;
}
pages.push_back(page);
offsets.push_back(numOffset);
docs[i]->markPageObjects(pageDict, yRef, countRef, numOffset, refPage->num, refPage->num);
Object annotsObj;
pageDict->lookupNF("Annots", &annotsObj);
if (!annotsObj.isNull()) {
docs[i]->markAnnotations(&annotsObj, yRef, countRef, numOffset, refPage->num, refPage->num);
annotsObj.free();
}
}
Object pageCatObj, pageNames, pageForm;
docs[i]->getXRef()->getCatalog(&pageCatObj);
Dict *pageCatDict = pageCatObj.getDict();
pageCatDict->lookup("Names", &pageNames);
if (!pageNames.isNull() && pageNames.isDict()) {
if (!names.isDict()) {
names.free();
names.initDict(yRef);
}
doMergeNameDict(docs[i], yRef, countRef, 0, 0, names.getDict(), pageNames.getDict(), numOffset);
}
pageCatDict->lookup("AcroForm", &pageForm);
if (i > 0 && !pageForm.isNull() && pageForm.isDict()) {
if (afObj.isNull()) {
pageCatDict->lookupNF("AcroForm", &afObj);
} else if (afObj.isDict()) {
doMergeFormDict(afObj.getDict(), pageForm.getDict(), numOffset);
}
}
pageForm.free();
pageNames.free();
pageCatObj.free();
objectsCount += docs[i]->writePageObjects(outStr, yRef, numOffset, gTrue);
numOffset = yRef->getNumObjects() + 1;
}
rootNum = yRef->getNumObjects() + 1;
yRef->add(rootNum, 0, outStr->getPos(), gTrue);
outStr->printf("%d 0 obj\n", rootNum);
outStr->printf("<< /Type /Catalog /Pages %d 0 R", rootNum + 1);
if (intents.isArray() && intents.arrayGetLength() > 0) {
outStr->printf(" /OutputIntents [");
for (j = 0; j < intents.arrayGetLength(); j++) {
Object intent;
intents.arrayGet(j, &intent, 0);
if (intent.isDict()) {
PDFDoc::writeObject(&intent, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0);
}
intent.free();
}
outStr->printf("]");
}
intents.free();
if (!afObj.isNull()) {
outStr->printf(" /AcroForm ");
PDFDoc::writeObject(&afObj, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0);
afObj.free();
}
if (!ocObj.isNull() && ocObj.isDict()) {
outStr->printf(" /OCProperties ");
PDFDoc::writeObject(&ocObj, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0);
ocObj.free();
}
if (!names.isNull() && names.isDict()) {
outStr->printf(" /Names ");
PDFDoc::writeObject(&names, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0);
names.free();
}
outStr->printf(">>\nendobj\n");
objectsCount++;
yRef->add(rootNum + 1, 0, outStr->getPos(), gTrue);
outStr->printf("%d 0 obj\n", rootNum + 1);
outStr->printf("<< /Type /Pages /Kids [");
for (j = 0; j < (int) pages.size(); j++)
outStr->printf(" %d 0 R", rootNum + j + 2);
outStr->printf(" ] /Count %zd >>\nendobj\n", pages.size());
objectsCount++;
for (i = 0; i < (int) pages.size(); i++) {
yRef->add(rootNum + i + 2, 0, outStr->getPos(), gTrue);
outStr->printf("%d 0 obj\n", rootNum + i + 2);
outStr->printf("<< ");
Dict *pageDict = pages[i].getDict();
for (j = 0; j < pageDict->getLength(); j++) {
if (j > 0)
outStr->printf(" ");
const char *key = pageDict->getKey(j);
Object value;
pageDict->getValNF(j, &value);
if (strcmp(key, "Parent") == 0) {
outStr->printf("/Parent %d 0 R", rootNum + 1);
} else {
outStr->printf("/%s ", key);
PDFDoc::writeObject(&value, outStr, yRef, offsets[i], NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0);
}
value.free();
}
outStr->printf(" >>\nendobj\n");
objectsCount++;
}
Goffset uxrefOffset = outStr->getPos();
Ref ref;
ref.num = rootNum;
ref.gen = 0;
Dict *trailerDict = PDFDoc::createTrailerDict(objectsCount, gFalse, 0, &ref, yRef,
fileName, outStr->getPos());
PDFDoc::writeXRefTableTrailer(trailerDict, yRef, gTrue, // write all entries according to ISO 32000-1, 7.5.4 Cross-Reference Table: "For a file that has never been incrementally updated, the cross-reference section shall contain only one subsection, whose object numbering begins at 0."
uxrefOffset, outStr, yRef);
delete trailerDict;
outStr->close();
delete outStr;
fclose(f);
delete yRef;
delete countRef;
for (j = 0; j < (int) pages.size (); j++) pages[j].free();
for (i = 0; i < (int) docs.size (); i++) delete docs[i];
delete globalParams;
return exitCode;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: poppler since version 0.17.3 has been vulnerable to NULL pointer dereference in pdfunite triggered by specially crafted documents.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,890
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::DeleteInstance(PP_Instance instance) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
DCHECK(it != instance_map_.end());
for (auto& observer : it->second->observer_list)
observer.OnHostDestroyed();
instance_map_.erase(it);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
|
Medium
| 172,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __glXDisp_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLXconfig *config;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
int err;
if (!validGlxScreen(cl->client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
if (!validGlxVisual(cl->client, pGlxScreen, req->visual, &config, &err))
config, pGlxScreen, req->isDirect);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The GLX extension in X.Org xserver 1.7.7 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (server crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via (1) a crafted request that triggers a client swap in glx/glxcmdsswap.c; or (2) a crafted length or (3) a negative value in the screen field in a request to glx/glxcmds.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,271
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
|
Low
| 169,779
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via vectors related to databases.
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chstart;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chstart = ch;
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string DataUseUserData::GetServiceNameAsString(ServiceName service_name) {
switch (service_name) {
case SUGGESTIONS:
return "Suggestions";
case NOT_TAGGED:
return "NotTagged";
case TRANSLATE:
return "Translate";
case SYNC:
return "Sync";
case OMNIBOX:
return "Omnibox";
case INVALIDATION:
return "Invalidation";
case RAPPOR:
return "Rappor";
case VARIATIONS:
return "Variations";
case UMA:
return "UMA";
case DOMAIN_RELIABILITY:
return "DomainReliability";
case PROFILE_DOWNLOADER:
return "ProfileDownloader";
case GOOGLE_URL_TRACKER:
return "GoogleURLTracker";
case AUTOFILL:
return "Autofill";
case POLICY:
return "Policy";
case SPELL_CHECKER:
return "SpellChecker";
case NTP_SNIPPETS:
return "NTPSnippets";
case SAFE_BROWSING:
return "SafeBrowsing";
case DATA_REDUCTION_PROXY:
return "DataReductionProxy";
case PRECACHE:
return "Precache";
case NTP_TILES:
return "NTPTiles";
case FEEDBACK_UPLOADER:
return "FeedbackUploader";
case TRACING_UPLOADER:
return "TracingUploader";
case DOM_DISTILLER:
return "DOMDistiller";
case CLOUD_PRINT:
return "CloudPrint";
case SEARCH_PROVIDER_LOGOS:
return "SearchProviderLogos";
case UPDATE_CLIENT:
return "UpdateClient";
case GCM_DRIVER:
return "GCMDriver";
case WEB_HISTORY_SERVICE:
return "WebHistoryService";
case NETWORK_TIME_TRACKER:
return "NetworkTimeTracker";
case SUPERVISED_USER:
return "SupervisedUser";
case IMAGE_FETCHER_UNTAGGED:
return "ImageFetcherUntagged";
case GAIA:
return "GAIA";
}
return "INVALID";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SkAutoSTArray implementation in include/core/SkTemplates.h in the filters implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger a reset action with a large count value, leading to an out-of-bounds write operation.
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
|
Low
| 172,018
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::SocketStream* socket, const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info, bool fatal) {
int socket_id = SocketStreamHost::SocketIdFromSocketStream(socket);
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError socket_id="
<< socket_id;
if (socket_id == content::kNoSocketId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NoSocketId in OnSSLCertificateError";
return;
}
SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = hosts_.Lookup(socket_id);
DCHECK(socket_stream_host);
content::GlobalRequestID request_id(-1, socket_id);
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request_id, ResourceType::SUB_RESOURCE, socket->url(),
render_process_id_, socket_stream_host->render_view_id(), ssl_info,
fatal);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,992
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FileMetricsProviderTest()
: create_large_files_(GetParam()),
task_runner_(new base::TestSimpleTaskRunner()),
thread_task_runner_handle_(task_runner_),
statistics_recorder_(
base::StatisticsRecorder::CreateTemporaryForTesting()),
prefs_(new TestingPrefServiceSimple) {
EXPECT_TRUE(temp_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir());
FileMetricsProvider::RegisterPrefs(prefs_->registry(), kMetricsName);
FileMetricsProvider::SetTaskRunnerForTesting(task_runner_);
base::GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
Medium
| 172,141
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct import_t* MACH0_(get_imports)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct import_t *imports;
int i, j, idx, stridx;
const char *symstr;
if (!bin->symtab || !bin->symstr || !bin->sects || !bin->indirectsyms)
return NULL;
if (bin->dysymtab.nundefsym < 1 || bin->dysymtab.nundefsym > 0xfffff) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(imports = malloc ((bin->dysymtab.nundefsym + 1) * sizeof (struct import_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = j = 0; i < bin->dysymtab.nundefsym; i++) {
idx = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + i;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nsymtab) {
bprintf ("WARNING: Imports index out of bounds. Ignoring relocs\n");
free (imports);
return NULL;
}
stridx = bin->symtab[idx].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char *)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "";
}
if (!*symstr) {
continue;
}
{
int i = 0;
int len = 0;
char *symstr_dup = NULL;
len = bin->symstrlen - stridx;
imports[j].name[0] = 0;
if (len > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((unsigned char)symstr[i] == 0xff || !symstr[i]) {
len = i;
break;
}
}
symstr_dup = r_str_ndup (symstr, len);
if (symstr_dup) {
r_str_ncpy (imports[j].name, symstr_dup, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
r_str_filter (imports[j].name, - 1);
imports[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 2] = 0;
free (symstr_dup);
}
}
}
imports[j].ord = i;
imports[j++].last = 0;
}
imports[j].last = 1;
if (!bin->imports_by_ord_size) {
if (j > 0) {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = j;
bin->imports_by_ord = (RBinImport**)calloc (j, sizeof (RBinImport*));
} else {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = 0;
bin->imports_by_ord = NULL;
}
}
return imports;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The parse_import_ptr() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted Mach-O file.
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
|
Medium
| 169,225
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static uint32_t scsi_init_iovec(SCSIDiskReq *r)
{
r->iov.iov_len = MIN(r->sector_count * 512, SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
return r->qiov.size / 512;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_unregister_devs_sas_addr(struct domain_device *parent,
int phy_id, bool last)
{
struct expander_device *ex_dev = &parent->ex_dev;
struct ex_phy *phy = &ex_dev->ex_phy[phy_id];
struct domain_device *child, *n, *found = NULL;
if (last) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(child, n,
&ex_dev->children, siblings) {
if (SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr) ==
SAS_ADDR(phy->attached_sas_addr)) {
set_bit(SAS_DEV_GONE, &child->state);
if (child->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
child->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE)
sas_unregister_ex_tree(parent->port, child);
else
sas_unregister_dev(parent->port, child);
found = child;
break;
}
}
sas_disable_routing(parent, phy->attached_sas_addr);
}
memset(phy->attached_sas_addr, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
if (phy->port) {
sas_port_delete_phy(phy->port, phy->phy);
sas_device_set_phy(found, phy->port);
if (phy->port->num_phys == 0)
sas_port_delete(phy->port);
phy->port = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jpc_qmfb_join_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t joinbuf[QMFB_JOINBUFSIZE * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = joinbuf;
jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int hstartcol;
/* Allocate memory for the join buffer from the heap. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_JOINBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc3(bufsize, JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide. */
abort();
}
}
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
/* Save the samples from the lowpass channel. */
n = hstartcol;
srcptr = &a[0];
dstptr = buf;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
srcptr += stride;
dstptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
/* Copy the samples from the highpass channel into place. */
srcptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - hstartcol;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += 2 * stride;
srcptr += stride;
}
/* Copy the samples from the lowpass channel into place. */
srcptr = buf;
dstptr = &a[parity * stride];
n = hstartcol;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += 2 * stride;
srcptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
/* If the join buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != joinbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap-buffer overflow vulnerability was found in QMFB code in JPC codec caused by buffer being allocated with too small size. jasper versions before 2.0.0 are affected.
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
|
Medium
| 169,444
|
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