instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long VideoTrack::Parse(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
VideoTrack*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kVideo)
return -1;
long long width = 0;
long long height = 0;
double rate = 0.0;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) //pixel width
{
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x3A) //pixel height
{
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0383E3) //frame rate
{
const long status = UnserializeFloat(
pReader,
pos,
size,
rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
VideoTrack* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) // error
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mp_dss_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags)
{
const struct mp_dss *mdss = (const struct mp_dss *) opt;
if ((opt_len != mp_dss_len(mdss, 1) &&
opt_len != mp_dss_len(mdss, 0)) || flags & TH_SYN)
return 0;
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_F)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fin"));
opt += 4;
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_A) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack "));
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_a) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(opt)));
opt += 8;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
}
}
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_M) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq "));
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_m) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(opt)));
opt += 8;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subseq %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(opt)));
opt += 2;
if (opt_len == mp_dss_len(mdss, 1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " csum 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(opt)));
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The MPTCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mptcp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int csum_len_for_type(int cst)
{
switch (cst) {
case CSUM_NONE:
return 1;
case CSUM_ARCHAIC:
return 2;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
return MD4_DIGEST_LEN;
case CSUM_MD5:
return MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static cJSON *create_reference( cJSON *item )
{
cJSON *ref;
if ( ! ( ref = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0;
memcpy( ref, item, sizeof(cJSON) );
ref->string = 0;
ref->type |= cJSON_IsReference;
ref->next = ref->prev = 0;
return ref;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FillConstant(uint8_t *data, int stride, uint8_t fill_constant) {
for (int h = 0; h < height_; ++h) {
for (int w = 0; w < width_; ++w) {
data[h * stride + w] = fill_constant;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,571
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int lock_flags) __releases(RCU)
{
struct inode *inode = VFS_I(ip);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
int error;
/*
* check for re-use of an inode within an RCU grace period due to the
* radix tree nodes not being updated yet. We monitor for this by
* setting the inode number to zero before freeing the inode structure.
* If the inode has been reallocated and set up, then the inode number
* will not match, so check for that, too.
*/
spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (ip->i_ino != ino) {
trace_xfs_iget_skip(ip);
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_ig_frecycle);
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out_error;
}
/*
* If we are racing with another cache hit that is currently
* instantiating this inode or currently recycling it out of
* reclaimabe state, wait for the initialisation to complete
* before continuing.
*
* XXX(hch): eventually we should do something equivalent to
* wait_on_inode to wait for these flags to be cleared
* instead of polling for it.
*/
if (ip->i_flags & (XFS_INEW|XFS_IRECLAIM)) {
trace_xfs_iget_skip(ip);
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_ig_frecycle);
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out_error;
}
/*
* If lookup is racing with unlink return an error immediately.
*/
if (VFS_I(ip)->i_mode == 0 && !(flags & XFS_IGET_CREATE)) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out_error;
}
/*
* If IRECLAIMABLE is set, we've torn down the VFS inode already.
* Need to carefully get it back into useable state.
*/
if (ip->i_flags & XFS_IRECLAIMABLE) {
trace_xfs_iget_reclaim(ip);
if (flags & XFS_IGET_INCORE) {
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out_error;
}
/*
* We need to set XFS_IRECLAIM to prevent xfs_reclaim_inode
* from stomping over us while we recycle the inode. We can't
* clear the radix tree reclaimable tag yet as it requires
* pag_ici_lock to be held exclusive.
*/
ip->i_flags |= XFS_IRECLAIM;
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
error = xfs_reinit_inode(mp, inode);
if (error) {
bool wake;
/*
* Re-initializing the inode failed, and we are in deep
* trouble. Try to re-add it to the reclaim list.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
wake = !!__xfs_iflags_test(ip, XFS_INEW);
ip->i_flags &= ~(XFS_INEW | XFS_IRECLAIM);
if (wake)
wake_up_bit(&ip->i_flags, __XFS_INEW_BIT);
ASSERT(ip->i_flags & XFS_IRECLAIMABLE);
trace_xfs_iget_reclaim_fail(ip);
goto out_error;
}
spin_lock(&pag->pag_ici_lock);
spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
/*
* Clear the per-lifetime state in the inode as we are now
* effectively a new inode and need to return to the initial
* state before reuse occurs.
*/
ip->i_flags &= ~XFS_IRECLAIM_RESET_FLAGS;
ip->i_flags |= XFS_INEW;
xfs_inode_clear_reclaim_tag(pag, ip->i_ino);
inode->i_state = I_NEW;
ASSERT(!rwsem_is_locked(&inode->i_rwsem));
init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem);
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
spin_unlock(&pag->pag_ici_lock);
} else {
/* If the VFS inode is being torn down, pause and try again. */
if (!igrab(inode)) {
trace_xfs_iget_skip(ip);
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out_error;
}
/* We've got a live one. */
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
trace_xfs_iget_hit(ip);
}
if (lock_flags != 0)
xfs_ilock(ip, lock_flags);
if (!(flags & XFS_IGET_INCORE))
xfs_iflags_clear(ip, XFS_ISTALE | XFS_IDONTCACHE);
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_ig_found);
return 0;
out_error:
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. There is a NULL pointer dereference and panic in lookup_slow() on a NULL inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks on a corrupted xfs image. This occurs because of a lack of proper validation that cached inodes are free during allocation.
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
Medium
| 169,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct crypto_template *crypto_lookup_template(const char *name)
{
return try_then_request_module(__crypto_lookup_template(name), "%s",
name);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Crypto API in the Linux kernel before 3.18.5 allows local users to load arbitrary kernel modules via a bind system call for an AF_ALG socket with a parenthesized module template expression in the salg_name field, as demonstrated by the vfat(aes) expression, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-7421.
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,771
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dex_loadcode(RBinFile *arch, RBinDexObj *bin) {
struct r_bin_t *rbin = arch->rbin;
int i;
int *methods = NULL;
int sym_count = 0;
if (!bin || bin->methods_list) {
return false;
}
bin->code_from = UT64_MAX;
bin->code_to = 0;
bin->methods_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
if (!bin->methods_list) {
return false;
}
bin->imports_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
if (!bin->imports_list) {
r_list_free (bin->methods_list);
return false;
}
bin->classes_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)__r_bin_class_free);
if (!bin->classes_list) {
r_list_free (bin->methods_list);
r_list_free (bin->imports_list);
return false;
}
if (bin->header.method_size>bin->size) {
bin->header.method_size = 0;
return false;
}
/* WrapDown the header sizes to avoid huge allocations */
bin->header.method_size = R_MIN (bin->header.method_size, bin->size);
bin->header.class_size = R_MIN (bin->header.class_size, bin->size);
bin->header.strings_size = R_MIN (bin->header.strings_size, bin->size);
if (bin->header.strings_size > bin->size) {
eprintf ("Invalid strings size\n");
return false;
}
if (bin->classes) {
ut64 amount = sizeof (int) * bin->header.method_size;
if (amount > UT32_MAX || amount < bin->header.method_size) {
return false;
}
methods = calloc (1, amount + 1);
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.class_size; i++) {
char *super_name, *class_name;
struct dex_class_t *c = &bin->classes[i];
class_name = dex_class_name (bin, c);
super_name = dex_class_super_name (bin, c);
if (dexdump) {
rbin->cb_printf ("Class #%d -\n", i);
}
parse_class (arch, bin, c, i, methods, &sym_count);
free (class_name);
free (super_name);
}
}
if (methods) {
int import_count = 0;
int sym_count = bin->methods_list->length;
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.method_size; i++) {
int len = 0;
if (methods[i]) {
continue;
}
if (bin->methods[i].class_id > bin->header.types_size - 1) {
continue;
}
if (is_class_idx_in_code_classes(bin, bin->methods[i].class_id)) {
continue;
}
char *class_name = getstr (
bin, bin->types[bin->methods[i].class_id]
.descriptor_id);
if (!class_name) {
free (class_name);
continue;
}
len = strlen (class_name);
if (len < 1) {
continue;
}
class_name[len - 1] = 0; // remove last char ";"
char *method_name = dex_method_name (bin, i);
char *signature = dex_method_signature (bin, i);
if (method_name && *method_name) {
RBinImport *imp = R_NEW0 (RBinImport);
imp->name = r_str_newf ("%s.method.%s%s", class_name, method_name, signature);
imp->type = r_str_const ("FUNC");
imp->bind = r_str_const ("NONE");
imp->ordinal = import_count++;
r_list_append (bin->imports_list, imp);
RBinSymbol *sym = R_NEW0 (RBinSymbol);
sym->name = r_str_newf ("imp.%s", imp->name);
sym->type = r_str_const ("FUNC");
sym->bind = r_str_const ("NONE");
sym->paddr = sym->vaddr = bin->b->base + bin->header.method_offset + (sizeof (struct dex_method_t) * i) ;
sym->ordinal = sym_count++;
r_list_append (bin->methods_list, sym);
sdb_num_set (mdb, sdb_fmt (0, "method.%d", i), sym->paddr, 0);
}
free (method_name);
free (signature);
free (class_name);
}
free (methods);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The dex_loadcode function in libr/bin/p/bin_dex.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: fix #6857
|
Medium
| 168,341
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct Curl_multi *m;
if(!data)
return CURLE_OK;
Curl_expire_clear(data); /* shut off timers */
m = data->multi;
if(m)
/* This handle is still part of a multi handle, take care of this first
and detach this handle from there. */
curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
if(data->multi_easy)
/* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
use and this is the one */
curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
/* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
/normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in
case" */
Curl_llist_destroy(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL);
data->magic = 0; /* force a clear AFTER the possibly enforced removal from
the multi handle, since that function uses the magic
field! */
if(data->state.rangestringalloc)
free(data->state.range);
/* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */
Curl_free_request_state(data);
/* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */
Curl_ssl_close_all(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.first_host);
Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch);
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
/* Cleanup possible redirect junk */
free(data->req.newurl);
data->req.newurl = NULL;
if(data->change.referer_alloc) {
Curl_safefree(data->change.referer);
data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
}
data->change.referer = NULL;
Curl_up_free(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer);
Curl_safefree(data->state.headerbuff);
Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf);
Curl_flush_cookies(data, 1);
Curl_digest_cleanup(data);
Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype);
Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect);
/* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */
Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.resolver);
Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(data);
Curl_convert_close(data);
/* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */
if(data->share) {
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
data->share->dirty--;
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE);
}
/* destruct wildcard structures if it is needed */
Curl_wildcard_dtor(&data->wildcard);
Curl_freeset(data);
free(data);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use-after-free flaw was found in curl versions from 7.59.0 through 7.61.1 in the code related to closing an easy handle. When closing and cleaning up an 'easy' handle in the `Curl_close()` function, the library code first frees a struct (without nulling the pointer) and might then subsequently erroneously write to a struct field within that already freed struct.
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
|
Low
| 169,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int send_write(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
u32 rmr, u64 to,
u32 xdr_off, int write_len,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec)
{
struct ib_rdma_wr write_wr;
struct ib_sge *sge;
int xdr_sge_no;
int sge_no;
int sge_bytes;
int sge_off;
int bc;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
if (vec->count > RPCSVC_MAXPAGES) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Too many pages (%lu)\n", vec->count);
return -EIO;
}
dprintk("svcrdma: RDMA_WRITE rmr=%x, to=%llx, xdr_off=%d, "
"write_len=%d, vec->sge=%p, vec->count=%lu\n",
rmr, (unsigned long long)to, xdr_off,
write_len, vec->sge, vec->count);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
sge = ctxt->sge;
/* Find the SGE associated with xdr_off */
for (bc = xdr_off, xdr_sge_no = 1; bc && xdr_sge_no < vec->count;
xdr_sge_no++) {
if (vec->sge[xdr_sge_no].iov_len > bc)
break;
bc -= vec->sge[xdr_sge_no].iov_len;
}
sge_off = bc;
bc = write_len;
sge_no = 0;
/* Copy the remaining SGE */
while (bc != 0) {
sge_bytes = min_t(size_t,
bc, vec->sge[xdr_sge_no].iov_len-sge_off);
sge[sge_no].length = sge_bytes;
sge[sge_no].addr =
dma_map_xdr(xprt, &rqstp->rq_res, xdr_off,
sge_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
xdr_off += sge_bytes;
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
sge[sge_no].addr))
goto err;
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
sge[sge_no].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->count++;
sge_off = 0;
sge_no++;
xdr_sge_no++;
if (xdr_sge_no > vec->count) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Too many sges (%d)\n", xdr_sge_no);
goto err;
}
bc -= sge_bytes;
if (sge_no == xprt->sc_max_sge)
break;
}
/* Prepare WRITE WR */
memset(&write_wr, 0, sizeof write_wr);
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_write;
write_wr.wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
write_wr.wr.sg_list = &sge[0];
write_wr.wr.num_sge = sge_no;
write_wr.wr.opcode = IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE;
write_wr.wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
write_wr.rkey = rmr;
write_wr.remote_addr = to;
/* Post It */
atomic_inc(&rdma_stat_write);
if (svc_rdma_send(xprt, &write_wr.wr))
goto err;
return write_len - bc;
err:
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 0);
return -EIO;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,169
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int xfrm6_tunnel_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
__be32 spi;
spi = xfrm6_tunnel_spi_lookup((xfrm_address_t *)&iph->saddr);
return xfrm6_rcv_spi(skb, spi);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the xfrm6_tunnel_rcv function in net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.22, when the xfrm6_tunnel module is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted IPv6 packets.
Commit Message: [IPV6]: Fix slab corruption running ip6sic
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int svc_rdma_bc_sendto(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
struct rpc_rqst *rqst)
{
struct xdr_buf *sndbuf = &rqst->rq_snd_buf;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec;
struct ib_send_wr send_wr;
int ret;
vec = svc_rdma_get_req_map(rdma);
ret = svc_rdma_map_xdr(rdma, sndbuf, vec, false);
if (ret)
goto out_err;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(rdma, GFP_NOIO);
if (ret)
goto out_err;
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(rdma);
ctxt->pages[0] = virt_to_page(rqst->rq_buffer);
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = rdma->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = sndbuf->len;
ctxt->sge[0].addr =
ib_dma_map_page(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->pages[0], 0,
sndbuf->len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out_unmap;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(rdma, ctxt);
memset(&send_wr, 0, sizeof(send_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
send_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
send_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
send_wr.num_sge = 1;
send_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
send_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
ret = svc_rdma_send(rdma, &send_wr);
if (ret) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out_unmap;
}
out_err:
svc_rdma_put_req_map(rdma, vec);
dprintk("svcrdma: %s returns %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
out_unmap:
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
goto out_err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,157
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DWORD UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::GetExitCode() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
return exit_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: queryin(char *buf)
{
QPRS_STATE state;
int32 i;
ltxtquery *query;
int32 commonlen;
ITEM *ptr;
NODE *tmp;
int32 pos = 0;
#ifdef BS_DEBUG
char pbuf[16384],
*cur;
#endif
/* init state */
state.buf = buf;
state.state = WAITOPERAND;
state.count = 0;
state.num = 0;
state.str = NULL;
/* init list of operand */
state.sumlen = 0;
state.lenop = 64;
state.curop = state.op = (char *) palloc(state.lenop);
*(state.curop) = '\0';
/* parse query & make polish notation (postfix, but in reverse order) */
makepol(&state);
if (!state.num)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("syntax error"),
errdetail("Empty query.")));
/* make finish struct */
commonlen = COMPUTESIZE(state.num, state.sumlen);
query = (ltxtquery *) palloc(commonlen);
SET_VARSIZE(query, commonlen);
query->size = state.num;
ptr = GETQUERY(query);
/* set item in polish notation */
for (i = 0; i < state.num; i++)
{
ptr[i].type = state.str->type;
ptr[i].val = state.str->val;
ptr[i].distance = state.str->distance;
ptr[i].length = state.str->length;
ptr[i].flag = state.str->flag;
tmp = state.str->next;
pfree(state.str);
state.str = tmp;
}
/* set user friendly-operand view */
memcpy((void *) GETOPERAND(query), (void *) state.op, state.sumlen);
pfree(state.op);
/* set left operand's position for every operator */
pos = 0;
findoprnd(ptr, &pos);
return query;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,408
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
long length; /* length of scanline server padded */
long lengthProto; /* length of scanline protocol padded */
char *tmpImage;
REQUEST(xPutImageReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPutImageReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
if (stuff->format == XYBitmap) {
if ((stuff->depth != 1) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
}
else if (stuff->format == XYPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
length *= stuff->depth;
}
else if (stuff->format == ZPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) || (stuff->leftPad != 0))
return BadMatch;
length = PixmapBytePad(stuff->width, stuff->depth);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->format;
return BadValue;
}
tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1];
lengthProto = length;
if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
return BadLength;
if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) +
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len)
return BadLength;
ReformatImage(tmpImage, lengthProto * stuff->height,
stuff->format == ZPixmap ? BitsPerPixel(stuff->depth) : 1,
ClientOrder(client));
(*pGC->ops->PutImage) (pDraw, pGC, stuff->depth, stuff->dstX, stuff->dstY,
stuff->width, stuff->height,
stuff->leftPad, stuff->format, tmpImage);
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The ProcPutImage function in dix/dispatch.c in X.Org Server (aka xserver and xorg-server) before 1.16.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero and crash) via a zero-height PutImage request.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,308
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
struct cfg80211_mgmt_tx_params *params, u64 *cookie)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct ieee80211_channel *chan = params->chan;
const u8 *buf = params->buf;
size_t len = params->len;
const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
s32 err = 0;
s32 ie_offset;
s32 ie_len;
struct brcmf_fil_action_frame_le *action_frame;
struct brcmf_fil_af_params_le *af_params;
bool ack;
s32 chan_nr;
u32 freq;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
*cookie = 0;
mgmt = (const struct ieee80211_mgmt *)buf;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(mgmt->frame_control)) {
brcmf_err("Driver only allows MGMT packet type\n");
return -EPERM;
}
vif = container_of(wdev, struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif, wdev);
if (ieee80211_is_probe_resp(mgmt->frame_control)) {
/* Right now the only reason to get a probe response */
/* is for p2p listen response or for p2p GO from */
/* wpa_supplicant. Unfortunately the probe is send */
/* on primary ndev, while dongle wants it on the p2p */
/* vif. Since this is only reason for a probe */
/* response to be sent, the vif is taken from cfg. */
/* If ever desired to send proberesp for non p2p */
/* response then data should be checked for */
/* "DIRECT-". Note in future supplicant will take */
/* dedicated p2p wdev to do this and then this 'hack'*/
/* is not needed anymore. */
ie_offset = DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN +
DOT11_BCN_PRB_FIXED_LEN;
ie_len = len - ie_offset;
if (vif == cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_PRIMARY].vif)
vif = cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_DEVICE].vif;
err = brcmf_vif_set_mgmt_ie(vif,
BRCMF_VNDR_IE_PRBRSP_FLAG,
&buf[ie_offset],
ie_len);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, true,
GFP_KERNEL);
} else if (ieee80211_is_action(mgmt->frame_control)) {
af_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*af_params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (af_params == NULL) {
brcmf_err("unable to allocate frame\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
action_frame = &af_params->action_frame;
/* Add the packet Id */
action_frame->packet_id = cpu_to_le32(*cookie);
/* Add BSSID */
memcpy(&action_frame->da[0], &mgmt->da[0], ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&af_params->bssid[0], &mgmt->bssid[0], ETH_ALEN);
/* Add the length exepted for 802.11 header */
action_frame->len = cpu_to_le16(len - DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN);
/* Add the channel. Use the one specified as parameter if any or
* the current one (got from the firmware) otherwise
*/
if (chan)
freq = chan->center_freq;
else
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(vif->ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_CHANNEL,
&freq);
chan_nr = ieee80211_frequency_to_channel(freq);
af_params->channel = cpu_to_le32(chan_nr);
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Action frame, cookie=%lld, len=%d, freq=%d\n",
*cookie, le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len), freq);
ack = brcmf_p2p_send_action_frame(cfg, cfg_to_ndev(cfg),
af_params);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, ack,
GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(af_params);
} else {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Unhandled, fc=%04x!!\n", mgmt->frame_control);
brcmf_dbg_hex_dump(true, buf, len, "payload, len=%zu\n", len);
}
exit:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx function in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted NL80211_CMD_FRAME Netlink packet.
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CreateSymbolicLink(const FilePath& target, const FilePath& symlink) {
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateSymbolicLink(target, symlink))
<< ": " << target.value() << ": " << symlink.value();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,504
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BlockPainter::PaintScrollHitTestDisplayItem(const PaintInfo& paint_info) {
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled());
if (paint_info.GetGlobalPaintFlags() & kGlobalPaintFlattenCompositingLayers)
return;
const auto* fragment = paint_info.FragmentToPaint(layout_block_);
const auto* properties = fragment ? fragment->PaintProperties() : nullptr;
if (properties && properties->Scroll()) {
DCHECK(properties->ScrollTranslation());
ScopedPaintChunkProperties scroll_hit_test_properties(
paint_info.context.GetPaintController(),
fragment->LocalBorderBoxProperties(), layout_block_,
DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest);
ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Record(paint_info.context, layout_block_,
DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest,
properties->ScrollTranslation());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int rm_read_multi(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, char *mime)
{
int number_of_streams = avio_rb16(pb);
int number_of_mdpr;
int i, ret;
unsigned size2;
for (i = 0; i<number_of_streams; i++)
avio_rb16(pb);
number_of_mdpr = avio_rb16(pb);
if (number_of_mdpr != 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(s, "MLTI with multiple (%d) MDPR", number_of_mdpr);
}
for (i = 0; i < number_of_mdpr; i++) {
AVStream *st2;
if (i > 0) {
st2 = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return ret;
}
st2->id = st->id + (i<<16);
st2->codecpar->bit_rate = st->codecpar->bit_rate;
st2->start_time = st->start_time;
st2->duration = st->duration;
st2->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
st2->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st2->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
} else
st2 = st;
size2 = avio_rb32(pb);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, s->pb, st2, st2->priv_data,
size2, mime);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: FFmpeg before commit a7e032a277452366771951e29fd0bf2bd5c029f0 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in the realmedia demuxer that can result in vulnerability allows attacker to read heap memory. This attack appear to be exploitable via specially crafted RM file has to be provided as input. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in a7e032a277452366771951e29fd0bf2bd5c029f0 and later.
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,924
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::OnMouseEntered(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (is_in_drag_ || contents_view_->layer()->GetAnimator()->is_animating())
return;
close_button_->SetVisible(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 172,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Block::IsInvisible() const
{
return bool(int(m_flags & 0x08) != 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,391
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre)
{
onig_free(*pre);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
Low
| 167,122
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CCThreadProxy::stop()
{
TRACE_EVENT("CCThreadProxy::stop", this, 0);
ASSERT(isMainThread());
ASSERT(m_started);
CCCompletionEvent completion;
s_ccThread->postTask(createCCThreadTask(this, &CCThreadProxy::layerTreeHostClosedOnCCThread, AllowCrossThreadAccess(&completion)));
completion.wait();
ASSERT(!m_layerTreeHostImpl); // verify that the impl deleted.
m_layerTreeHost = 0;
m_started = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,289
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tsize_t t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input, TIFF* output, ttile_t tile){
uint16 edge=0;
tsize_t written=0;
unsigned char* buffer=NULL;
tsize_t bufferoffset=0;
unsigned char* samplebuffer=NULL;
tsize_t samplebufferoffset=0;
tsize_t read=0;
uint16 i=0;
ttile_t tilecount=0;
/* tsize_t tilesize=0; */
ttile_t septilecount=0;
tsize_t septilesize=0;
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
unsigned char* jpt;
float* xfloatp;
uint32 xuint32=0;
#endif
/* Fail if prior error (in particular, can't trust tiff_datasize) */
if (t2p->t2p_error != T2P_ERR_OK)
return(0);
edge |= t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile);
edge |= t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile);
if( (t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW) && ((edge == 0)
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT) || defined(OJPEG_SUPPORT)
|| (t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG)
#endif
)
){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4){
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawTile(input, tile, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
TIFFReverseBits(buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP){
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawTile(input, tile, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
TIFFReverseBits(buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG){
if(! t2p->pdf_ojpegdata){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with "
"bad tables",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
buffer=(unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, t2p->pdf_ojpegdata, t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength);
if(edge!=0){
if(t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile)){
buffer[7]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[8]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength ) & 0xff;
}
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile)){
buffer[9]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[10]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth ) & 0xff;
}
}
bufferoffset=t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength;
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawTile(input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG){
unsigned char table_end[2];
uint32 count = 0;
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) {
if (count >= 4) {
int retTIFFReadRawTile;
/* Ignore EOI marker of JpegTables */
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count - 2);
bufferoffset += count - 2;
/* Store last 2 bytes of the JpegTables */
table_end[0] = buffer[bufferoffset-2];
table_end[1] = buffer[bufferoffset-1];
xuint32 = bufferoffset;
bufferoffset -= 2;
retTIFFReadRawTile= TIFFReadRawTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
if( retTIFFReadRawTile < 0 )
{
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset += retTIFFReadRawTile;
/* Overwrite SOI marker of image scan with previously */
/* saved end of JpegTables */
buffer[xuint32-2]=table_end[0];
buffer[xuint32-1]=table_end[1];
}
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample==T2P_SAMPLE_NOTHING){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for "
"t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
read = TIFFReadEncodedTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
} else {
if(t2p->pdf_sample == T2P_SAMPLE_PLANAR_SEPARATE_TO_CONTIG){
septilesize=TIFFTileSize(input);
septilecount=TIFFNumberOfTiles(input);
/* tilesize=septilesize*t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel; */
tilecount=septilecount/t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebuffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset=0;
for(i=0;i<t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedTile(input,
tile + i*tilecount,
(tdata_t) &(samplebuffer[samplebufferoffset]),
septilesize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile + i*tilecount,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset+=read;
}
t2p_sample_planar_separate_to_contig(
t2p,
&(buffer[bufferoffset]),
samplebuffer,
samplebufferoffset);
bufferoffset+=samplebufferoffset;
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
}
if(buffer==NULL){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
read = TIFFReadEncodedTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgba_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBAA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgbaa_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_YCBCR_TO_RGB){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for YCbCr to RGB in tile for %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_LAB_SIGNED_TO_UNSIGNED){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_lab_signed_to_unsigned(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
}
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) != 0){
t2p_tile_collapse_left(
buffer,
TIFFTileRowSize(input),
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
t2p_disable(output);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, t2p->tiff_photometric);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, t2p->tiff_bitspersample);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) == 0){
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth);
} else {
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth);
}
if(t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) == 0){
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
} else {
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength);
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength);
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, FILLORDER_MSB2LSB);
switch(t2p->pdf_compression){
case T2P_COMPRESS_NONE:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_NONE);
break;
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_G4:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4);
break;
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG:
if (t2p->tiff_photometric==PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
uint16 hor = 0, ver = 0;
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, &hor, &ver)!=0) {
if (hor != 0 && ver != 0) {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, hor, ver);
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, &xfloatp)!=0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, xfloatp);
}
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_JPEG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE, 0); /* JPEGTABLESMODE_NONE */
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & (T2P_CS_RGB | T2P_CS_LAB)){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
if(t2p->tiff_photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_GRAY){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_CMYK){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality);
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_DEFLATE);
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality%100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality % 100);
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality/100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,
(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality / 100));
}
break;
#endif
default:
break;
}
t2p_enable(output);
t2p->outputwritten = 0;
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t) 0, buffer,
TIFFStripSize(output));
if (buffer != NULL) {
_TIFFfree(buffer);
buffer = NULL;
}
if (bufferoffset == -1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error writing encoded tile to output PDF %s",
TIFFFileName(output));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
written = t2p->outputwritten;
return(written);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile function in tools/tiff2pdf.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image.
Commit Message: * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640
|
Medium
| 168,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pit_ioport_read(struct kvm_io_device *this,
gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
int ret, count;
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
if (!pit_in_range(addr))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
addr &= KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK;
s = &pit_state->channels[addr];
mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
if (s->status_latched) {
s->status_latched = 0;
ret = s->status;
} else if (s->count_latched) {
switch (s->count_latched) {
default:
case RW_STATE_LSB:
ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
s->count_latched = 0;
break;
case RW_STATE_MSB:
ret = s->latched_count >> 8;
s->count_latched = 0;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD0:
ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
s->count_latched = RW_STATE_MSB;
break;
}
} else {
switch (s->read_state) {
default:
case RW_STATE_LSB:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = count & 0xff;
break;
case RW_STATE_MSB:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD0:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = count & 0xff;
s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD1;
break;
case RW_STATE_WORD1:
count = pit_get_count(kvm, addr);
ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD0;
break;
}
}
if (len > sizeof(ret))
len = sizeof(ret);
memcpy(data, (char *)&ret, len);
mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The pit_ioport_read in i8254.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33 and QEMU before 2.3.1 does not distinguish between read lengths and write lengths, which might allow guest OS users to execute arbitrary code on the host OS by triggering use of an invalid index.
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderViewCreated(RenderView* render_view) {
ContentSettingsObserver* content_settings =
new ContentSettingsObserver(render_view);
new DevToolsAgent(render_view);
new ExtensionHelper(render_view, extension_dispatcher_.get());
new PageLoadHistograms(render_view, histogram_snapshots_.get());
new PrintWebViewHelper(render_view);
new SearchBox(render_view);
new SpellCheckProvider(render_view, spellcheck_.get());
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
safe_browsing::MalwareDOMDetails::Create(render_view);
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
new TextInputClientObserver(render_view);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
PasswordAutofillManager* password_autofill_manager =
new PasswordAutofillManager(render_view);
AutofillAgent* autofill_agent = new AutofillAgent(render_view,
password_autofill_manager);
PageClickTracker* page_click_tracker = new PageClickTracker(render_view);
page_click_tracker->AddListener(password_autofill_manager);
page_click_tracker->AddListener(autofill_agent);
TranslateHelper* translate = new TranslateHelper(render_view, autofill_agent);
new ChromeRenderViewObserver(
render_view, content_settings, extension_dispatcher_.get(), translate);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
new AutomationRendererHelper(render_view);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle strings in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted document that triggers an incorrect read operation.
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kg_unseal_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
size_t token_wrapper_len,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
int toktype)
{
OM_uint32 code;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
unsigned char *ptr;
int sealalg;
int signalg;
krb5_checksum cksum;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
size_t cksum_len = 0;
size_t conflen = 0;
int direction;
krb5_ui_4 seqnum;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t sumlen;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
assert(header != NULL);
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->buffer.length != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (header->buffer.length < token_wrapper_len + 14) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value + token_wrapper_len;
signalg = ptr[0];
signalg |= ptr[1] << 8;
sealalg = ptr[2];
sealalg |= ptr[3] << 8;
if (ptr[4] != 0xFF || ptr[5] != 0xFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
!(sealalg == 0xFFFF || sealalg == ctx->sealalg)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
cksum_len = 8;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
case SGN_ALG_3:
cksum_len = 16;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
cksum_len = 20;
break;
default:
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
/* get the token parameters */
code = kg_get_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
&seqnum);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
/* decode the message, if SEAL */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
if (sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(seqnum, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_k_key_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
&bigend_seqnum[0], 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_decrypt_iov(context, 0,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
conflen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
}
if (header->buffer.length != token_wrapper_len + 14 + cksum_len + conflen) {
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
case SGN_ALG_3:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
default:
abort();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &sumlen);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
md5cksum.length = sumlen;
/* compute the checksum of the message */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
cksum_len, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt_inplace(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used,
gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->keyblock.contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
cksum.length = cksum_len;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
code = k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
break;
default:
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* For GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, the caller manages the padding, because the
* pad length is in the RPC PDU. The value of the padding may be
* uninitialized. For normal GSS, the last bytes of the decrypted
* data contain the pad length. kg_fixup_padding_iov() will find
* this and fixup the last data IOV appropriately.
*/
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
(ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0) {
retval = kg_fixup_padding_iov(&code, iov, iov_count);
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
}
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = (sealalg != 0xFFFF);
if (qop_state != NULL)
*qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0)) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_DIRECTION;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
code = 0;
retval = g_order_check(&ctx->seqstate, (gssint_uint64)seqnum);
cleanup:
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
*minor_status = code;
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7.x through 1.12.x before 1.12.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read or NULL pointer dereference, and application crash) by injecting invalid tokens into a GSSAPI application session.
Commit Message: Handle invalid RFC 1964 tokens [CVE-2014-4341...]
Detect the following cases which would otherwise cause invalid memory
accesses and/or integer underflow:
* An RFC 1964 token being processed by an RFC 4121-only context
[CVE-2014-4342]
* A header with fewer than 22 bytes after the token ID or an
incomplete checksum [CVE-2014-4341 CVE-2014-4342]
* A ciphertext shorter than the confounder [CVE-2014-4341]
* A declared padding length longer than the plaintext [CVE-2014-4341]
If we detect a bad pad byte, continue on to compute the checksum to
avoid creating a padding oracle, but treat the checksum as invalid
even if it compares equal.
CVE-2014-4341:
In MIT krb5, an unauthenticated remote attacker with the ability to
inject packets into a legitimately established GSSAPI application
session can cause a program crash due to invalid memory references
when attempting to read beyond the end of a buffer.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
CVE-2014-4342:
In MIT krb5 releases krb5-1.7 and later, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to inject packets into a legitimately
established GSSAPI application session can cause a program crash due
to invalid memory references when reading beyond the end of a buffer
or by causing a null pointer dereference.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE summaries, CVSS]
(cherry picked from commit fb99962cbd063ac04c9a9d2cc7c75eab73f3533d)
ticket: 7949
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
|
Low
| 166,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: raptor_libxml_getEntity(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
return libxml2_getEntity(sax2->xc, name);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
|
Medium
| 165,658
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CameraSource::signalBufferReturned(MediaBuffer *buffer) {
ALOGV("signalBufferReturned: %p", buffer->data());
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
for (List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it = mFramesBeingEncoded.begin();
it != mFramesBeingEncoded.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->pointer() == buffer->data()) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame((*it));
mFramesBeingEncoded.erase(it);
++mNumFramesEncoded;
buffer->setObserver(0);
buffer->release();
mFrameCompleteCondition.signal();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!"signalBufferReturned: bogus buffer");
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The camera APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allow attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and obtain sensitive information about ANW buffer addresses via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28466701.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
Medium
| 173,510
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
if (end < start) {
return false;
}
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
|
Low
| 173,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
svm->vcpu.fpu_active = 1;
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0;
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
set_dr_intercepts(svm);
set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
control->iopm_base_pa = iopm_base;
control->msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->msrpm);
control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
init_seg(&save->es);
init_seg(&save->ss);
init_seg(&save->ds);
init_seg(&save->fs);
init_seg(&save->gs);
save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
/* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
svm_set_efer(&svm->vcpu, 0);
save->dr6 = 0xffff0ff0;
kvm_set_rflags(&svm->vcpu, 2);
save->rip = 0x0000fff0;
svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = save->rip;
/*
* svm_set_cr0() sets PG and WP and clears NW and CD on save->cr0.
* It also updates the guest-visible cr0 value.
*/
svm_set_cr0(&svm->vcpu, X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(&svm->vcpu);
save->cr4 = X86_CR4_PAE;
/* rdx = ?? */
if (npt_enabled) {
/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
control->nested_ctl = 1;
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
save->g_pat = svm->vcpu.arch.pat;
save->cr3 = 0;
save->cr4 = 0;
}
svm->asid_generation = 0;
svm->nested.vmcb = 0;
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) {
control->pause_filter_count = 3000;
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
}
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
enable_gif(svm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6, and Xen 4.3.x through 4.6.x, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS panic or hang) by triggering many #AC (aka Alignment Check) exceptions, related to svm.c and vmx.c.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,598
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if ((flags & 2) && (dataSize >= 2)) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
if (readOffset <= oldSize) {
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
} else {
ALOGE("b/34618607 (%zu %zu %zu %zu)", readOffset, writeOffset, oldSize, mSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34618607");
}
}
flags &= ~2;
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (av) related to id3 unsynchronization. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-63100526.
Commit Message: Fix edge case when applying id3 unsynchronization
Bug: 63100526
Test: opened poc, other files
Change-Id: I0a51a2a11d0ea84ede0c075de650a7118f0e00c5
(cherry picked from commit 3e70296461c5f260988ab21854a6f43fdafea764)
|
Low
| 174,108
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin(const KURL& url) const {
if (url.ProtocolIsData()) {
return false;
}
Document* document = GetDocument();
if (document && document->GetSecurityOrigin()) {
return !document->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanRequest(url);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(const IdentityInfo& identity_info) const {
std::unique_ptr<PageInfoUI::SecurityDescription> security_description(
new PageInfoUI::SecurityDescription());
switch (identity_info.safe_browsing_status) {
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_NONE:
break;
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_MALWARE:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_MALWARE_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_MALWARE_DETAILS);
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SOCIAL_ENGINEERING:
return CreateSecurityDescription(
SecuritySummaryColor::RED, IDS_PAGE_INFO_SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_DETAILS);
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_UNWANTED_SOFTWARE:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_UNWANTED_SOFTWARE_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_UNWANTED_SOFTWARE_DETAILS);
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE:
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
return CreateSecurityDescriptionForPasswordReuse(
/*is_enterprise_password=*/false);
#endif
NOTREACHED();
break;
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE:
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
return CreateSecurityDescriptionForPasswordReuse(
/*is_enterprise_password=*/true);
#endif
NOTREACHED();
break;
case PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_BILLING:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_BILLING_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_BILLING_DETAILS);
}
switch (identity_info.identity_status) {
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_INTERNAL_PAGE:
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::GREEN,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_INTERNAL_PAGE,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_INTERNAL_PAGE);
#else
NOTREACHED();
FALLTHROUGH;
#endif
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_EV_CERT:
FALLTHROUGH;
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_CERT:
FALLTHROUGH;
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_CERT_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN:
FALLTHROUGH;
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_ADMIN_PROVIDED_CERT:
switch (identity_info.connection_status) {
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INSECURE_ACTIVE_SUBRESOURCE:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NOT_SECURE_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NOT_SECURE_DETAILS);
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INSECURE_FORM_ACTION:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_MIXED_CONTENT_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NOT_SECURE_DETAILS);
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INSECURE_PASSIVE_SUBRESOURCE:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_MIXED_CONTENT_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_MIXED_CONTENT_DETAILS);
default:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::GREEN,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_SECURE_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_SECURE_DETAILS);
}
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_DEPRECATED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_UNKNOWN:
case PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_NO_CERT:
default:
return CreateSecurityDescription(SecuritySummaryColor::RED,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NOT_SECURE_SUMMARY,
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NOT_SECURE_DETAILS);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
|
Low
| 172,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __exit void sctp_exit(void)
{
/* BUG. This should probably do something useful like clean
* up all the remaining associations and all that memory.
*/
/* Unregister with inet6/inet layers. */
sctp_v6_del_protocol();
sctp_v4_del_protocol();
unregister_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
/* Free protosw registrations */
sctp_v6_protosw_exit();
sctp_v4_protosw_exit();
/* Unregister with socket layer. */
sctp_v6_pf_exit();
sctp_v4_pf_exit();
sctp_sysctl_unregister();
free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_assoc_hashtable,
get_order(sctp_assoc_hashsize *
sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket)));
kfree(sctp_ep_hashtable);
free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_port_hashtable,
get_order(sctp_port_hashsize *
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket)));
percpu_counter_destroy(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for completion of call_rcu()'s */
kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_chunk_cachep);
kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_bucket_cachep);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sctp_init function in net/sctp/protocol.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.3 has an incorrect sequence of protocol-initialization steps, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic or memory corruption) by creating SCTP sockets before all of the steps have finished.
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SharedMemoryHandleProvider::GetHandleForInterProcessTransit(bool read_only) {
if (read_only_flag_ && !read_only) {
NOTREACHED();
return mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle();
}
return mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(
base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(shared_memory_->handle()),
mapped_size_, read_only);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,869
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *ComplexImages(const Image *images,const ComplexOperator op,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ComplexImageTag "Complex/Image"
CacheView
*Ai_view,
*Ar_view,
*Bi_view,
*Br_view,
*Ci_view,
*Cr_view;
const char
*artifact;
const Image
*Ai_image,
*Ar_image,
*Bi_image,
*Br_image;
double
snr;
Image
*Ci_image,
*complex_images,
*Cr_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->next == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageError,
"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",images->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(image);
}
image->depth=32UL;
complex_images=NewImageList();
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
/*
Apply complex mathematics to image pixels.
*/
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"complex:snr");
snr=0.0;
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
snr=StringToDouble(artifact,(char **) NULL);
Ar_image=images;
Ai_image=images->next;
Br_image=images;
Bi_image=images->next;
if ((images->next->next != (Image *) NULL) &&
(images->next->next->next != (Image *) NULL))
{
Br_image=images->next->next;
Bi_image=images->next->next->next;
}
Cr_image=complex_images;
Ci_image=complex_images->next;
Ar_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ar_image,exception);
Ai_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ai_image,exception);
Br_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Br_image,exception);
Bi_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Bi_image,exception);
Cr_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Cr_image,exception);
Ci_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Ci_image,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(images,complex_images,images->rows,1L)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) images->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict Ai,
*magick_restrict Ar,
*magick_restrict Bi,
*magick_restrict Br;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict Ci,
*magick_restrict Cr;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
Ar=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ar_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Ar_image->columns,Cr_image->columns),1,exception);
Ai=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ai_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Ai_image->columns,Ci_image->columns),1,exception);
Br=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Br_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Br_image->columns,Cr_image->columns),1,exception);
Bi=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Bi_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Bi_image->columns,Ci_image->columns),1,exception);
Cr=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Ci=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,0,y,Ci_image->columns,1,exception);
if ((Ar == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (Ai == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(Br == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (Bi == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(Cr == (Quantum *) NULL) || (Ci == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) images->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(images); i++)
{
switch (op)
{
case AddComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]+Br[i];
Ci[i]=Ai[i]+Bi[i];
break;
}
case ConjugateComplexOperator:
default:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i];
Ci[i]=(-Bi[i]);
break;
}
case DivideComplexOperator:
{
double
gamma;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(Br[i]*Br[i]+Bi[i]*Bi[i]+snr);
Cr[i]=gamma*(Ar[i]*Br[i]+Ai[i]*Bi[i]);
Ci[i]=gamma*(Ai[i]*Br[i]-Ar[i]*Bi[i]);
break;
}
case MagnitudePhaseComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=sqrt(Ar[i]*Ar[i]+Ai[i]*Ai[i]);
Ci[i]=atan2(Ai[i],Ar[i])/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
break;
}
case MultiplyComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=QuantumScale*(Ar[i]*Br[i]-Ai[i]*Bi[i]);
Ci[i]=QuantumScale*(Ai[i]*Br[i]+Ar[i]*Bi[i]);
break;
}
case RealImaginaryComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai[i]-0.5));
Ci[i]=Ar[i]*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai[i]-0.5));
break;
}
case SubtractComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]-Br[i];
Ci[i]=Ai[i]-Bi[i];
break;
}
}
}
Ar+=GetPixelChannels(Ar_image);
Ai+=GetPixelChannels(Ai_image);
Br+=GetPixelChannels(Br_image);
Bi+=GetPixelChannels(Bi_image);
Cr+=GetPixelChannels(Cr_image);
Ci+=GetPixelChannels(Ci_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (images->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(images,ComplexImageTag,progress,images->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
Cr_view=DestroyCacheView(Cr_view);
Ci_view=DestroyCacheView(Ci_view);
Br_view=DestroyCacheView(Br_view);
Bi_view=DestroyCacheView(Bi_view);
Ar_view=DestroyCacheView(Ar_view);
Ai_view=DestroyCacheView(Ai_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImage.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595
|
Medium
| 170,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if((ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0) ||
(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs > IVD_VIDDEC_MAX_IO_BUFFERS))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 0)
{
/*Come out of flush mode and return*/
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
/* check output buffer size given by the application */
if(check_app_out_buf_size(ps_dec) != IV_SUCCESS)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ps_dec->u4_sps_cnt_in_process = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
/* Since 8 bytes are read ahead, ensure 8 bytes are free at the
end of the buffer, which will be memset to 0 after emulation prevention */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size - 8);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
header_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T)
|| (ret == IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
WORD32 ht_in_mbs;
ht_in_mbs = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht >> (4 + ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag);
num_mb_skipped = (ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T) ||
(ret1 == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ret = ret1;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if ((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Do End of Pic processing. */
/* Should be called only if frame was decoded in previous process call*/
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libavc). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-63122634.
Commit Message: Decoder: Increased allocation and added checks in sei parsing.
This prevents heap overflow while parsing sei_message.
Bug: 63122634
Test: ran PoC on unpatched/patched
Change-Id: I61c1ff4ac053a060be8c24da4671db985cac628c
(cherry picked from commit f2b70d353768af8d4ead7f32497be05f197925ef)
|
Low
| 174,106
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreEarlyInitialization() {
base::CommandLine* singleton_command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableSync);
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableExtensions);
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled = false;
}
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginManager) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kLoginUser,
cryptohome::Identification(user_manager::StubAccountId()).id());
if (!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginProfile)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLoginProfile,
chrome::kTestUserProfileDir);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Running as stub user with profile dir: "
<< singleton_command_line
->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kLoginProfile)
.value();
}
RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary();
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
const char kChromeOSReleaseTrack[] = "CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK";
std::string channel;
if (base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue(kChromeOSReleaseTrack, &channel))
chrome::SetChannel(channel);
#endif
dbus_pre_early_init_ = std::make_unique<internal::DBusPreEarlyInit>();
return ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreEarlyInitialization();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.80 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
Low
| 171,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: vtp_print (netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length)
{
int type, len, tlv_len, tlv_value, mgmtd_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const struct vtp_vlan_ *vtp_vlan;
if (length < VTP_HEADER_LEN)
goto trunc;
tptr = pptr;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_HEADER_LEN);
type = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VTPv%u, Message %s (0x%02x), length %u",
*tptr,
tok2str(vtp_message_type_values,"Unknown message type", type),
type,
length));
/* In non-verbose mode, just print version and message type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
/* verbose mode print all fields */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tDomain name: "));
mgmtd_len = *(tptr + 3);
if (mgmtd_len < 1 || mgmtd_len > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [invalid MgmtD Len %d]", mgmtd_len));
return;
}
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 4, mgmtd_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s: %u",
tok2str(vtp_header_values, "Unknown", type),
*(tptr+2)));
tptr += VTP_HEADER_LEN;
switch (type) {
case VTP_SUMMARY_ADV:
/*
* SUMMARY ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Followers | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Updater Identity IP address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Update Timestamp (12 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | MD5 digest (16 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Config Rev %x, Updater %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
tptr += 8;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Timestamp 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8)));
tptr += VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MD5 digest: %08x%08x%08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 12)));
tptr += VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
break;
case VTP_SUBSET_ADV:
/*
* SUBSET ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Seq number | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field 1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ................ |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Config Rev %x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
/*
* VLAN INFORMATION
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | V info len | Status | VLAN type | VLAN name len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ISL vlan id | MTU size |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 802.10 index (SAID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN name |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
tptr += 4;
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
len = *tptr;
if (len == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
vtp_vlan = (const struct vtp_vlan_*)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vtp_vlan);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVLAN info status %s, type %s, VLAN-id %u, MTU %u, SAID 0x%08x, Name ",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_status,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->status),
tok2str(vtp_vlan_type_values,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->type),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->vlanid),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vtp_vlan->index)));
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET, vtp_vlan->name_len, NULL);
/*
* Vlan names are aligned to 32-bit boundaries.
*/
len -= VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
tptr += VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
/* TLV information follows */
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Cisco specs says 2 bytes for type + 2 bytes for length, take only 1
* See: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/trsrb/frames.htm
*/
type = *tptr;
tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s (0x%04x) TLV",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_tlv_values, "Unknown", type),
type));
/*
* infinite loop check
*/
if (type == 0 || tlv_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlv_len * 2 +2);
tlv_value = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
switch (type) {
case VTP_VLAN_STE_HOP_COUNT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_PRUNING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_STP_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(vtp_stp_type_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BRIDGE_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "SRB" : "SRT",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BACKUP_CRF_MODE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Backup" : "Not backup",
tlv_value));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_RING_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_BRIDGE_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_PARENT_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_TRANS_BRIDGED_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_ARP_HOP_COUNT:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", 2 + tlv_len*2);
break;
}
len -= 2 + tlv_len*2;
tptr += 2 + tlv_len*2;
}
}
break;
case VTP_ADV_REQUEST:
/*
* ADVERTISEMENT REQUEST
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Reserved | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Start value |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tStart value: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case VTP_JOIN_MESSAGE:
/* FIXME - Could not find message format */
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vtp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VTP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-vtp.c:vtp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13020/VTP: Add some missing bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,872
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HostPortAllocatorSession::SendSessionRequest(const std::string& host,
int port) {
GURL url("https://" + host + ":" + base::IntToString(port) +
GetSessionRequestUrl() + "&sn=1");
scoped_ptr<UrlFetcher> url_fetcher(new UrlFetcher(url, UrlFetcher::GET));
url_fetcher->SetRequestContext(url_context_);
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Talk-Google-Relay-Auth", relay_token());
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Google-Relay-Auth", relay_token());
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Stream-Type", "chromoting");
url_fetcher->Start(base::Bind(&HostPortAllocatorSession::OnSessionRequestDone,
base::Unretained(this), url_fetcher.get()));
url_fetchers_.insert(url_fetcher.release());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
exit_ext2_xattr();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,972
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Disallow Arabic/Hebrew NSMs to come after an unrelated base char.
Arabic NSM(non-spacing mark)s and Hebrew NSMs are allowed to mix with
Latin with the current 'moderately restrictive script mixing policy'.
They're not blocked by BiDi check either because both LTR and RTL labels
can have an NSM.
Block them from coming after an unrelated script (e.g. Latin + Arabic
NSM).
Bug: chromium:729979
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: I5b93fbcf76d17121bf1baaa480ef3624424b3317
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/528348
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478205}
|
Medium
| 172,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (sts) { // STS k, Rr
int r = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
ESIL_A ("r%d,", r);
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 1);
op->cycles = 2;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _inst__sts() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #10091 - crash in AVR analysis
|
Medium
| 169,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len) if (*end_ptr++ == '\\') end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: parse_string in cJSON.c in cJSON before 2016-10-02 has a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by a string that begins with a * character and ends with a character.
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
|
Low
| 169,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress,
char progress_granularity, char immediate_load)
{
int rc;
char p = ' ', numbers = 3, count = 0;
int w = 0, h = 0, v = 255, c = 0;
char buf[256];
FILE *f = NULL;
if (im->data)
return 0;
f = fopen(im->real_file, "rb");
if (!f)
return 0;
/* can't use fgets(), because there might be
* binary data after the header and there
* needn't be a newline before the data, so
* no chance to distinguish between end of buffer
* and a binary 0.
*/
/* read the header info */
rc = 0; /* Error */
c = fgetc(f);
if (c != 'P')
goto quit;
p = fgetc(f);
if (p == '1' || p == '4')
numbers = 2; /* bitimages don't have max value */
if ((p < '1') || (p > '8'))
goto quit;
count = 0;
while (count < numbers)
{
c = fgetc(f);
if (c == EOF)
goto quit;
/* eat whitespace */
while (isspace(c))
c = fgetc(f);
/* if comment, eat that */
if (c == '#')
{
do
c = fgetc(f);
while (c != '\n' && c != EOF);
}
/* no comment -> proceed */
else
{
int i = 0;
/* read numbers */
while (c != EOF && !isspace(c) && (i < 255))
{
buf[i++] = c;
c = fgetc(f);
}
if (i)
{
buf[i] = 0;
count++;
switch (count)
{
/* width */
case 1:
w = atoi(buf);
break;
/* height */
case 2:
h = atoi(buf);
break;
/* max value, only for color and greyscale */
case 3:
v = atoi(buf);
break;
}
}
}
}
if ((v < 0) || (v > 255))
goto quit;
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit;
if (!im->format)
{
if (p == '8')
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
else
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
im->format = strdup("pnm");
}
rc = 1; /* Ok */
if (((!im->data) && (im->loader)) || (immediate_load) || (progress))
{
DATA8 *data = NULL; /* for the binary versions */
DATA8 *ptr = NULL;
int *idata = NULL; /* for the ASCII versions */
int *iptr;
char buf2[256];
DATA32 *ptr2;
int i, j, x, y, pl = 0;
char pper = 0;
/* must set the im->data member before callign progress function */
ptr2 = im->data = malloc(w * h * sizeof(DATA32));
if (!im->data)
goto quit_error;
/* start reading the data */
switch (p)
{
case '1': /* ASCII monochrome */
buf[0] = 0;
i = 0;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
x = 0;
while (x < w)
{
if (!buf[i]) /* fill buffer */
{
if (!fgets(buf, 255, f))
goto quit_error;
i = 0;
}
while (buf[i] && isspace(buf[i]))
i++;
if (buf[i])
{
if (buf[i] == '1')
*ptr2 = 0xff000000;
else if (buf[i] == '0')
*ptr2 = 0xffffffff;
else
goto quit_error;
ptr2++;
i++;
}
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '2': /* ASCII greyscale */
idata = malloc(sizeof(int) * w);
if (!idata)
goto quit_error;
buf[0] = 0;
i = 0;
j = 0;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
iptr = idata;
x = 0;
while (x < w)
{
int k;
/* check 4 chars ahead to see if we need to
* fill the buffer */
for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
{
if (!buf[i + k]) /* fill buffer */
{
if (fseek(f, -k, SEEK_CUR) == -1 ||
!fgets(buf, 255, f))
goto quit_error;
i = 0;
break;
}
}
while (buf[i] && isspace(buf[i]))
i++;
while (buf[i] && !isspace(buf[i]))
buf2[j++] = buf[i++];
if (j)
{
buf2[j] = 0;
*(iptr++) = atoi(buf2);
j = 0;
x++;
}
}
iptr = idata;
if (v == 255)
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 | (iptr[0] << 16) | (iptr[0] << 8)
| iptr[0];
ptr2++;
iptr++;
}
}
else
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 |
(((iptr[0] * 255) / v) << 16) |
(((iptr[0] * 255) / v) << 8) |
((iptr[0] * 255) / v);
ptr2++;
iptr++;
}
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '3': /* ASCII RGB */
idata = malloc(3 * sizeof(int) * w);
if (!idata)
goto quit_error;
buf[0] = 0;
i = 0;
j = 0;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
int w3 = 3 * w;
iptr = idata;
x = 0;
while (x < w3)
{
int k;
/* check 4 chars ahead to see if we need to
* fill the buffer */
for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
{
if (!buf[i + k]) /* fill buffer */
{
if (fseek(f, -k, SEEK_CUR) == -1 ||
!fgets(buf, 255, f))
goto quit_error;
i = 0;
break;
}
}
while (buf[i] && isspace(buf[i]))
i++;
while (buf[i] && !isspace(buf[i]))
buf2[j++] = buf[i++];
if (j)
{
buf2[j] = 0;
*(iptr++) = atoi(buf2);
j = 0;
x++;
}
}
iptr = idata;
if (v == 255)
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 | (iptr[0] << 16) | (iptr[1] << 8)
| iptr[2];
ptr2++;
iptr += 3;
}
}
else
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 |
(((iptr[0] * 255) / v) << 16) |
(((iptr[1] * 255) / v) << 8) |
((iptr[2] * 255) / v);
ptr2++;
iptr += 3;
}
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '4': /* binary 1bit monochrome */
data = malloc((w + 7) / 8 * sizeof(DATA8));
if (!data)
goto quit_error;
ptr2 = im->data;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
if (!fread(data, (w + 7) / 8, 1, f))
goto quit_error;
ptr = data;
for (x = 0; x < w; x += 8)
{
j = (w - x >= 8) ? 8 : w - x;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
{
if (ptr[0] & (0x80 >> i))
*ptr2 = 0xff000000;
else
*ptr2 = 0xffffffff;
ptr2++;
}
ptr++;
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '5': /* binary 8bit grayscale GGGGGGGG */
data = malloc(1 * sizeof(DATA8) * w);
if (!data)
goto quit_error;
ptr2 = im->data;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
if (!fread(data, w * 1, 1, f))
break;
ptr = data;
if (v == 255)
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 | (ptr[0] << 16) | (ptr[0] << 8) |
ptr[0];
ptr2++;
ptr++;
}
}
else
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 |
(((ptr[0] * 255) / v) << 16) |
(((ptr[0] * 255) / v) << 8) |
((ptr[0] * 255) / v);
ptr2++;
ptr++;
}
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '6': /* 24bit binary RGBRGBRGB */
data = malloc(3 * sizeof(DATA8) * w);
if (!data)
goto quit_error;
ptr2 = im->data;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
if (!fread(data, w * 3, 1, f))
break;
ptr = data;
if (v == 255)
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 | (ptr[0] << 16) | (ptr[1] << 8) |
ptr[2];
ptr2++;
ptr += 3;
}
}
else
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 |
(((ptr[0] * 255) / v) << 16) |
(((ptr[1] * 255) / v) << 8) |
((ptr[2] * 255) / v);
ptr2++;
ptr += 3;
}
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '7': /* XV's 8bit 332 format */
data = malloc(1 * sizeof(DATA8) * w);
if (!data)
goto quit_error;
ptr2 = im->data;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
if (!fread(data, w * 1, 1, f))
break;
ptr = data;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
int r, g, b;
r = (*ptr >> 5) & 0x7;
g = (*ptr >> 2) & 0x7;
b = (*ptr) & 0x3;
*ptr2 =
0xff000000 |
(((r << 21) | (r << 18) | (r << 15)) & 0xff0000) |
(((g << 13) | (g << 10) | (g << 7)) & 0xff00) |
((b << 6) | (b << 4) | (b << 2) | (b << 0));
ptr2++;
ptr++;
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
case '8': /* 24bit binary RGBARGBARGBA */
data = malloc(4 * sizeof(DATA8) * w);
if (!data)
goto quit_error;
ptr2 = im->data;
for (y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
if (!fread(data, w * 4, 1, f))
break;
ptr = data;
if (v == 255)
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
(ptr[3] << 24) | (ptr[0] << 16) |
(ptr[1] << 8) | ptr[2];
ptr2++;
ptr += 4;
}
}
else
{
for (x = 0; x < w; x++)
{
*ptr2 =
(((ptr[3] * 255) / v) << 24) |
(((ptr[0] * 255) / v) << 16) |
(((ptr[1] * 255) / v) << 8) |
((ptr[2] * 255) / v);
ptr2++;
ptr += 4;
}
}
if (progress &&
do_progress(im, progress, progress_granularity,
&pper, &pl, y))
goto quit_progress;
}
break;
default:
quit_error:
rc = 0;
break;
quit_progress:
rc = 2;
break;
}
if (idata)
free(idata);
if (data)
free(data);
}
quit:
fclose(f);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted PNM file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,339
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::HandleBlurEvent() {
input_type_->DisableSecureTextInput();
input_type_view_->HandleBlurEvent();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
Low
| 171,856
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Tracks::ParseTrackEntry(
long long track_start,
long long track_size,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
Track*& pResult) const
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = track_start;
const long long track_stop = track_start + track_size;
Track::Info info;
info.type = 0;
info.number = 0;
info.uid = 0;
info.defaultDuration = 0;
Track::Settings v;
v.start = -1;
v.size = -1;
Track::Settings a;
a.start = -1;
a.size = -1;
Track::Settings e; //content_encodings_settings;
e.start = -1;
e.size = -1;
long long lacing = 1; //default is true
while (pos < track_stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
track_stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long start = pos;
if (id == 0x60) // VideoSettings ID
{
v.start = start;
v.size = size;
}
else if (id == 0x61) // AudioSettings ID
{
a.start = start;
a.size = size;
}
else if (id == 0x2D80) // ContentEncodings ID
{
e.start = start;
e.size = size;
}
else if (id == 0x33C5) //Track UID
{
if (size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.uid = 0;
long long pos_ = start;
const long long pos_end = start + size;
while (pos_ != pos_end)
{
unsigned char b;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos_, 1, &b);
if (status)
return status;
info.uid <<= 8;
info.uid |= b;
++pos_;
}
}
else if (id == 0x57) //Track Number
{
const long long num = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((num <= 0) || (num > 127))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.number = static_cast<long>(num);
}
else if (id == 0x03) //Track Type
{
const long long type = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((type <= 0) || (type > 254))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.type = static_cast<long>(type);
}
else if (id == 0x136E) //Track Name
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
info.nameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x02B59C) //Track Language
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
info.language);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x03E383) //Default Duration
{
const long long duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.defaultDuration = static_cast<unsigned long long>(duration);
}
else if (id == 0x06) //CodecID
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
info.codecId);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x1C) //lacing
{
lacing = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((lacing < 0) || (lacing > 1))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x23A2) //Codec Private
{
delete[] info.codecPrivate;
info.codecPrivate = NULL;
info.codecPrivateSize = 0;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
if (buflen)
{
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen, buf);
if (status)
{
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
info.codecPrivate = buf;
info.codecPrivateSize = buflen;
}
}
else if (id == 0x058688) //Codec Name
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
info.codecNameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x16AA) //Codec Delay
{
info.codecDelay = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
}
else if (id == 0x16BB) //Seek Pre Roll
{
info.seekPreRoll = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= track_stop);
}
assert(pos == track_stop);
if (info.number <= 0) //not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (GetTrackByNumber(info.number))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.type <= 0) //not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.lacing = (lacing > 0) ? true : false;
if (info.type == Track::kVideo)
{
if (v.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = v;
VideoTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = VideoTrack::Parse(m_pSegment,
info,
element_start,
element_size,
pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
}
else if (info.type == Track::kAudio)
{
if (a.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = a;
AudioTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = AudioTrack::Parse(m_pSegment,
info,
element_start,
element_size,
pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
}
else
{
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (e.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings.start = -1;
info.settings.size = 0;
Track* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = Track::Create(m_pSegment,
info,
element_start,
element_size,
pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
}
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,430
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014\
Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gs_call_interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p, ref * pref, int user_errors,
int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
ref *epref = pref;
ref doref;
ref *perrordict;
ref error_name;
int code, ccode;
ref saref;
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
int *gc_signal = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal;
*pexit_code = 0;
*gc_signal = 0;
ialloc_reset_requested(idmemory);
again:
/* Avoid a dangling error object that might get traced by a future GC. */
make_null(perror_object);
o_stack.requested = e_stack.requested = d_stack.requested = 0;
while (*gc_signal) { /* Some routine below triggered a GC. */
gs_gc_root_t epref_root;
*gc_signal = 0;
/* Make sure that doref will get relocated properly if */
/* a garbage collection happens with epref == &doref. */
gs_register_ref_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
(void **)&epref, "gs_call_interp(epref)");
code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
gs_unregister_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
"gs_call_interp(epref)");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = interp(pi_ctx_p, epref, perror_object);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
if (!r_has_type(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid)) {
*perror_object = i_ctx_p->error_object;
make_t(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid);
}
/* Prevent a dangling reference to the GC signal in ticks_left */
/* in the frame of interp, but be prepared to do a GC if */
/* an allocation in this routine asks for it. */
*gc_signal = 0;
set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, 1);
if (esp < esbot) /* popped guard entry */
esp = esbot;
switch (code) {
case gs_error_Fatal:
*pexit_code = 255;
return code;
case gs_error_Quit:
*perror_object = osp[-1];
*pexit_code = code = osp->value.intval;
osp -= 2;
return
(code == 0 ? gs_error_Quit :
code < 0 && code > -100 ? code : gs_error_Fatal);
case gs_error_InterpreterExit:
return 0;
case gs_error_ExecStackUnderflow:
/****** WRONG -- must keep mark blocks intact ******/
ref_stack_pop_block(&e_stack);
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_VMreclaim:
/* Do the GC and continue. */
/* We ignore the return value here, if it fails here
* we'll call it again having jumped to the "again" label.
* Where, assuming it fails again, we'll handle the error.
*/
(void)interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p,
(osp->value.intval == 2 ?
avm_global : avm_local));
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
make_oper(&doref, 0, zpop);
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_NeedInput:
case gs_error_interrupt:
return code;
}
/* Adjust osp in case of operand stack underflow */
if (osp < osbot - 1)
osp = osbot - 1;
/* We have to handle stack over/underflow specially, because */
/* we might be able to recover by adding or removing a block. */
switch (code) {
case gs_error_dictstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_dstack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if` we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
/* Skip system dictionaries for CET 20-02-02 */
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, min_dstack_size, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size);
dict_set_top();
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_dictstackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&d_stack) >= 0) {
dict_set_top();
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
case gs_error_execstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_estack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
{
uint count = ref_stack_count(&e_stack);
uint limit = ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack) - ES_HEADROOM;
if (count > limit) {
/*
* If there is an e-stack mark within MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK of
* the new top, cut the stack back to remove the mark.
*/
int skip = count - limit;
int i;
for (i = skip; i < skip + MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK; ++i) {
const ref *ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i);
if (r_has_type_attrs(ep, t_null, a_executable)) {
skip = i + 1;
break;
}
}
pop_estack(i_ctx_p, skip);
}
}
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackoverflow:
if (ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, o_stack.requested) >= 0) { /* We can't just re-execute the object, because */
/* it might be a procedure being pushed as a */
/* literal. We check for this case specially. */
doref = *perror_object;
if (r_is_proc(&doref)) {
*++osp = doref;
make_null_proc(&doref);
}
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_clear(&o_stack);
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&o_stack) >= 0) {
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
}
if (user_errors < 0)
return code;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) < 0)
return code; /* out-of-range error code! */
/*
* For greater Adobe compatibility, only the standard PostScript errors
* are defined in errordict; the rest are in gserrordict.
*/
if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
(dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0 &&
(dict_find_string(systemdict, "gserrordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0))
)
return code; /* error name not in errordict??? */
doref = *epref;
epref = &doref;
/* Push the error object on the operand stack if appropriate. */
if (!GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(code)) {
/* Replace the error object if within an oparray or .errorexec. */
*++osp = *perror_object;
errorexec_find(i_ctx_p, osp);
}
goto again;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-388
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use insufficient interpreter stack-size checking during error handling to crash the interpreter.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,694
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cg_rmdir(const char *path)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *fpath = NULL, *cgdir = NULL, *controller;
const char *cgroup;
int ret;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EINVAL;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup)
return -EINVAL;
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
fprintf(stderr, "rmdir: verifying access to %s:%s (req path %s)\n",
controller, cgdir, path);
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgdir, NULL, O_WRONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, cgroup, NULL)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!cgfs_remove(controller, cgroup)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,708
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<DrawingBuffer> DrawingBuffer::Create(
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
Client* client,
const IntSize& size,
bool premultiplied_alpha,
bool want_alpha_channel,
bool want_depth_buffer,
bool want_stencil_buffer,
bool want_antialiasing,
PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve,
WebGLVersion web_gl_version,
ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage,
const CanvasColorParams& color_params) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
if (g_should_fail_drawing_buffer_creation_for_testing) {
g_should_fail_drawing_buffer_creation_for_testing = false;
return nullptr;
}
std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util =
Extensions3DUtil::Create(context_provider->ContextGL());
if (!extensions_util->IsValid()) {
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK(extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil"));
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
bool multisample_supported =
want_antialiasing &&
(extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample") ||
extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture")) &&
extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
if (multisample_supported) {
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
if (extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample"))
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample");
else
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled(
"GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture");
}
bool discard_framebuffer_supported =
extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
if (discard_framebuffer_supported)
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer> drawing_buffer = AdoptRef(new DrawingBuffer(
std::move(context_provider), std::move(extensions_util), client,
discard_framebuffer_supported, want_alpha_channel, premultiplied_alpha,
preserve, web_gl_version, want_depth_buffer, want_stencil_buffer,
chromium_image_usage, color_params));
if (!drawing_buffer->Initialize(size, multisample_supported)) {
drawing_buffer->BeginDestruction();
return PassRefPtr<DrawingBuffer>();
}
return drawing_buffer;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
Medium
| 172,290
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_encrypt (const RIJNDAEL_context *ctx,
unsigned char *bx, const unsigned char *ax)
{
#ifdef USE_AMD64_ASM
return _gcry_aes_amd64_encrypt_block(ctx->keyschenc, bx, ax, ctx->rounds,
encT);
#elif defined(USE_ARM_ASM)
return _gcry_aes_arm_encrypt_block(ctx->keyschenc, bx, ax, ctx->rounds, encT);
#else
return do_encrypt_fn (ctx, bx, ax);
#endif /* !USE_ARM_ASM && !USE_AMD64_ASM*/
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
|
Medium
| 170,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Init() {
DCHECK(!initialized_successfully_) << "Already initialized";
if (!CrosLibrary::Get()->EnsureLoaded())
return false;
input_method_status_connection_ = chromeos::MonitorInputMethodStatus(
this,
&InputMethodChangedHandler,
&RegisterPropertiesHandler,
&UpdatePropertyHandler,
&ConnectionChangeHandler);
if (!input_method_status_connection_)
return false;
initialized_successfully_ = true;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
register Quantum *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
clone_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
if (ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image2=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image2 == NULL)
goto MATLAB_KO;
image=image2;
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
{
MATLAB_KO:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
if((MagickSizeType) (MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize+filepos) > GetBlobSize(image))
goto MATLAB_KO;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = decompress_block(image,&MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if (MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
continue; /* skip another objects. */
}
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
(void) ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
default:
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
if((unsigned long)ldblk*MATLAB_HDR.SizeY > MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(image,q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow(image, (double *)BImgBuff, i, MinVal, MaxVal,
exception);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow(image,(float *)BImgBuff,i,MinVal,MaxVal,
exception);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if ((image2!=NULL) && (image2!=image)) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
END_OF_READING:
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if (image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader")
else
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
return (image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the DestroyImage function in image.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/662
|
Medium
| 167,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
size_t msg_len)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
int err = 0;
long current_timeo = *timeo_p;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld, msg_len:%zu\n", __func__, asoc,
*timeo_p, msg_len);
/* Increment the association's refcnt. */
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
/* Wait on the association specific sndbuf space. */
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&asoc->wait, &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!*timeo_p)
goto do_nonblock;
if (sk->sk_err || asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING ||
asoc->base.dead)
goto do_error;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto do_interrupted;
if (msg_len <= sctp_wspace(asoc))
break;
/* Let another process have a go. Since we are going
* to sleep anyway.
*/
release_sock(sk);
current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
goto do_error;
lock_sock(sk);
*timeo_p = current_timeo;
}
out:
finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait);
/* Release the association's refcnt. */
sctp_association_put(asoc);
return err;
do_error:
err = -EPIPE;
goto out;
do_interrupted:
err = sock_intr_errno(*timeo_p);
goto out;
do_nonblock:
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.1 does not properly restrict association peel-off operations during certain wait states, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (invalid unlock and double free) via a multithreaded application. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2017-5986.
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,343
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Equalizer_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 3 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 5 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (*pValueSize < (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
*(int16_t *)pValue = -1500;
*((int16_t *)pValue + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32438598");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
*(int16_t *)pValue = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32436341");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
*(int32_t *)pValue = EqualizerGetCentreFrequency(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32247948");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
EqualizerGetBandFreqRange(pContext, param2, (uint32_t *)pValue, ((uint32_t *)pValue + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetBand(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetNumPresets();
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)pValue;
strncpy(name, EqualizerGetPresetName(param2), *pValueSize - 1);
name[*pValueSize - 1] = 0;
*pValueSize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("\tEqualizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES");
p[0] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
p[1] = (int16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
p[2 + i] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, i);
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_getParameter */
int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
int Volume_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;;
char *name;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize != sizeof(int16_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
status = VolumeGetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t *)(pValue));
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
*(int16_t *)pValue = 0;
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
VolumeGetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
status = VolumeGetMute(pContext, (uint32_t *)pValue);
ALOGV("\tVolume_getParameter() VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE Value is %d",
*(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
*(int32_t *)pValue = pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_getParameter */
int Volume_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t level;
int16_t position;
uint32_t mute;
uint32_t positionEnabled;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t)level);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
mute = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetMute(pContext, mute);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
positionEnabled = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeEnableStereoPosition(pContext, positionEnabled);
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
position = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t)position);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_setParameter */
/****************************************************************************************
* Name : LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16()
* Input : Signed 32-bit integer
* Output : Signed 16-bit integer
* MSB (16) = sign bit
* (15->05) = integer part
* (04->01) = decimal part
* Returns : Db value with respect to full scale
* Description :
* Remarks :
****************************************************************************************/
LVM_INT16 LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(LVM_INT32 Lin_fix)
{
LVM_INT16 db_fix;
LVM_INT16 Shift;
LVM_INT16 SmallRemainder;
LVM_UINT32 Remainder = (LVM_UINT32)Lin_fix;
/* Count leading bits, 1 cycle in assembly*/
for (Shift = 0; Shift<32; Shift++)
{
if ((Remainder & 0x80000000U)!=0)
{
break;
}
Remainder = Remainder << 1;
}
/*
* Based on the approximation equation (for Q11.4 format):
*
* dB = -96 * Shift + 16 * (8 * Remainder - 2 * Remainder^2)
*/
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(-96 * Shift); /* Six dB steps in Q11.4 format*/
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)((Remainder & 0x7fffffff) >> 24);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix + SmallRemainder );
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)(SmallRemainder * SmallRemainder);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - (LVM_INT16)((LVM_UINT16)SmallRemainder >> 9));
/* Correct for small offset */
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - 5);
return db_fix;
}
int Effect_setEnabled(EffectContext *pContext, bool enabled)
{
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() type %d, enabled %d", pContext->EffectType, enabled);
if (enabled) {
bool tempDisabled = false;
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tempDisabled) {
LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
} else {
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
return 0;
}
int16_t LVC_Convert_VolToDb(uint32_t vol){
int16_t dB;
dB = LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(vol <<7);
dB = (dB +8)>>4;
dB = (dB <-96) ? -96 : dB ;
return dB;
}
} // namespace
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in the Qualcomm audio post processor could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32588016.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Effect command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32448258
Bug: 32095626
Test: Use POC bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I69f24eac5866f8d9090fc4c0ebe58c2c297b63df
(cherry picked from commit 01183402d757f0c28bfd5e3b127b3809dfd67459)
|
Medium
| 174,059
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_siocgstamp(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timeval ktv;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&ktv);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timeval(up, &ktv);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) do_siocgstamp and (2) do_siocgstampns functions in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.4 use an incorrect argument order, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tga_readheader(FILE *fp, unsigned int *bits_per_pixel,
unsigned int *width, unsigned int *height, int *flip_image)
{
int palette_size;
unsigned char tga[TGA_HEADER_SIZE];
unsigned char id_len, /*cmap_type,*/ image_type;
unsigned char pixel_depth, image_desc;
unsigned short /*cmap_index,*/ cmap_len, cmap_entry_size;
unsigned short /*x_origin, y_origin,*/ image_w, image_h;
if (!bits_per_pixel || !width || !height || !flip_image) {
return 0;
}
if (fread(tga, TGA_HEADER_SIZE, 1, fp) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return 0 ;
}
id_len = tga[0];
/*cmap_type = tga[1];*/
image_type = tga[2];
/*cmap_index = get_ushort(&tga[3]);*/
cmap_len = get_ushort(&tga[5]);
cmap_entry_size = tga[7];
#if 0
x_origin = get_ushort(&tga[8]);
y_origin = get_ushort(&tga[10]);
#endif
image_w = get_ushort(&tga[12]);
image_h = get_ushort(&tga[14]);
pixel_depth = tga[16];
image_desc = tga[17];
*bits_per_pixel = (unsigned int)pixel_depth;
*width = (unsigned int)image_w;
*height = (unsigned int)image_h;
/* Ignore tga identifier, if present ... */
if (id_len) {
unsigned char *id = (unsigned char *) malloc(id_len);
if (id == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "tga_readheader: memory out\n");
return 0;
}
if (!fread(id, id_len, 1, fp)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
free(id);
return 0 ;
}
free(id);
}
/* Test for compressed formats ... not yet supported ...
if (image_type > 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, compressed tga files are not currently supported.\n");
return 0 ;
}
*flip_image = !(image_desc & 32);
/* Palettized formats are not yet supported, skip over the palette, if present ... */
palette_size = cmap_len * (cmap_entry_size / 8);
if (palette_size > 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "File contains a palette - not yet supported.");
fseek(fp, palette_size, SEEK_CUR);
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An invalid write access was discovered in bin/jp2/convert.c in OpenJPEG 2.2.0, triggering a crash in the tgatoimage function. The vulnerability may lead to remote denial of service or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: tgatoimage(): avoid excessive memory allocation attempt, and fixes unaligned load (#995)
|
Medium
| 167,781
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req_unhash,
bool *own_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
req_unhash, own_req);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
struct flowi6 fl6;
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newsk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features & ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO);
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newsk->sk_v6_daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
newnp->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq->ir_iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
*
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
if (np->opt != NULL)
newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newnp->opt != NULL)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
newnp->opt->opt_flen);
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
dccp_done(newsk);
goto out;
}
*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
if (*own_req && ireq->pktopts) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
ireq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
return newsk;
out_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr,
unsigned long shmlba)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long size;
struct file *file;
int err;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long prot;
int acc_mode;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
struct shm_file_data *sfd;
struct path path;
fmode_t f_mode;
unsigned long populate = 0;
err = -EINVAL;
if (shmid < 0)
goto out;
else if ((addr = (ulong)shmaddr)) {
if (addr & (shmlba - 1)) {
if (shmflg & SHM_RND)
addr &= ~(shmlba - 1); /* round down */
else
#ifndef __ARCH_FORCE_SHMLBA
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
#endif
goto out;
}
flags = MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED;
} else {
if ((shmflg & SHM_REMAP))
goto out;
flags = MAP_SHARED;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) {
prot = PROT_READ;
acc_mode = S_IRUGO;
f_mode = FMODE_READ;
} else {
prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
acc_mode = S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
f_mode = FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_EXEC) {
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
acc_mode |= S_IXUGO;
}
/*
* We cannot rely on the fs check since SYSV IPC does have an
* additional creator id...
*/
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
rcu_read_lock();
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, acc_mode))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
/* check if shm_destroy() is tearing down shp */
if (!ipc_valid_object(&shp->shm_perm)) {
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = -EIDRM;
goto out_unlock;
}
path = shp->shm_file->f_path;
path_get(&path);
shp->shm_nattch++;
size = i_size_read(d_inode(path.dentry));
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -ENOMEM;
sfd = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sfd) {
path_put(&path);
goto out_nattch;
}
file = alloc_file(&path, f_mode,
is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file) ?
&shm_file_operations_huge :
&shm_file_operations);
err = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
kfree(sfd);
path_put(&path);
goto out_nattch;
}
file->private_data = sfd;
file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;
sfd->id = shp->shm_perm.id;
sfd->ns = get_ipc_ns(ns);
sfd->file = shp->shm_file;
sfd->vm_ops = NULL;
err = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
if (err)
goto out_fput;
if (down_write_killable(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)) {
err = -EINTR;
goto out_fput;
}
if (addr && !(shmflg & SHM_REMAP)) {
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr + size < addr)
goto invalid;
if (find_vma_intersection(current->mm, addr, addr + size))
goto invalid;
}
addr = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, &populate, NULL);
*raddr = addr;
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
err = (long)addr;
invalid:
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (populate)
mm_populate(addr, populate);
out_fput:
fput(file);
out_nattch:
down_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
shp->shm_nattch--;
if (shm_may_destroy(ns, shp))
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
else
shm_unlock(shp);
up_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
return err;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The do_shmat function in ipc/shm.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.12 does not restrict the address calculated by a certain rounding operation, which allows local users to map page zero, and consequently bypass a protection mechanism that exists for the mmap system call, by making crafted shmget and shmat system calls in a privileged context.
Commit Message: ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection
The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931
The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and the
address rounded down to 0. For the regular mmap case, the protection
mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the address --
arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and return that
address. So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things get funky for
shmat().
The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will not
have a problem attaching a nil-page. There are two possible fixes to
this. The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root to
crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking up
the testcase and adding mmap(... |MAP_FIXED). While this approach is the
safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the rounded
address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags. This makes the behavior
of shmat() identical to the mmap() case. The downside of this is
obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains semantics
after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.
Passes shm related ltp tests.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Gareth Evans <gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateAbsoluteOrientationQuaternionSensor(
JNIEnv* env,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> sensor = Java_PlatformSensorProvider_createSensor(
env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION));
if (sensor.obj()) {
auto concrete_sensor = base::MakeRefCounted<PlatformSensorAndroid>(
mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION, std::move(mapping),
this, sensor);
callback.Run(concrete_sensor);
} else {
auto sensor_fusion_algorithm =
std::make_unique<OrientationQuaternionFusionAlgorithmUsingEulerAngles>(
true /* absolute */);
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(sensor_fusion_algorithm), callback);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,835
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u32 mtu;
struct iphdr *iph; /* Our header */
struct rtable *rt; /* Route we use */
struct ip_options *opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
/* that should never happen */
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto drop;
if (skb_warn_if_lro(skb))
goto drop;
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_FWD, skb))
goto drop;
if (IPCB(skb)->opt.router_alert && ip_call_ra_chain(skb))
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
skb_forward_csum(skb);
/*
* According to the RFC, we must first decrease the TTL field. If
* that reaches zero, we must reply an ICMP control message telling
* that the packet's lifetime expired.
*/
if (ip_hdr(skb)->ttl <= 1)
goto too_many_hops;
if (!xfrm4_route_forward(skb))
goto drop;
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (opt->is_strictroute && rt->rt_uses_gateway)
goto sr_failed;
IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_FORWARDED;
mtu = ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(&rt->dst, true);
if (!ip_may_fragment(skb) && ip_exceeds_mtu(skb, mtu)) {
IP_INC_STATS(dev_net(rt->dst.dev), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,
htonl(mtu));
goto drop;
}
/* We are about to mangle packet. Copy it! */
if (skb_cow(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev)+rt->dst.header_len))
goto drop;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
/* Decrease ttl after skb cow done */
ip_decrease_ttl(iph);
/*
* We now generate an ICMP HOST REDIRECT giving the route
* we calculated.
*/
if (rt->rt_flags&RTCF_DOREDIRECT && !opt->srr && !skb_sec_path(skb))
ip_rt_send_redirect(skb);
skb->priority = rt_tos2priority(iph->tos);
return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_FORWARD, skb, skb->dev,
rt->dst.dev, ip_forward_finish);
sr_failed:
/*
* Strict routing permits no gatewaying
*/
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_SR_FAILED, 0);
goto drop;
too_many_hops:
/* Tell the sender its packet died... */
IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_TTL, 0);
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 does not properly consider the length of the Read-Copy Update (RCU) grace period for redirecting lookups in the absence of caching, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a flood of packets.
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: fiber_switch(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_int len, const mrb_value *a, mrb_bool resume, mrb_bool vmexec)
{
struct mrb_context *c = fiber_check(mrb, self);
struct mrb_context *old_c = mrb->c;
mrb_value value;
fiber_check_cfunc(mrb, c);
if (resume && c->status == MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "resuming transferred fiber");
}
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_RUNNING || c->status == MRB_FIBER_RESUMED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "double resume (fib)");
}
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_TERMINATED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "resuming dead fiber");
}
mrb->c->status = resume ? MRB_FIBER_RESUMED : MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED;
c->prev = resume ? mrb->c : (c->prev ? c->prev : mrb->root_c);
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_CREATED) {
mrb_value *b, *e;
if (len >= c->stend - c->stack) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "too many arguments to fiber");
}
b = c->stack+1;
e = b + len;
while (b<e) {
*b++ = *a++;
}
c->cibase->argc = (int)len;
value = c->stack[0] = MRB_PROC_ENV(c->ci->proc)->stack[0];
}
else {
value = fiber_result(mrb, a, len);
}
fiber_switch_context(mrb, c);
if (vmexec) {
c->vmexec = TRUE;
value = mrb_vm_exec(mrb, c->ci[-1].proc, c->ci->pc);
mrb->c = old_c;
}
else {
MARK_CONTEXT_MODIFY(c);
}
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in mruby 1.4.1. There is a heap-based buffer over-read associated with OP_ENTER because mrbgems/mruby-fiber/src/fiber.c does not extend the stack in cases of many arguments to fiber.
Commit Message: Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
|
Low
| 169,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoll(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoll(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
|
Low
| 168,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.enabledAtRuntimeMethod2");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intArg, V8int::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8int::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->enabledAtRuntimeMethod2(intArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,083
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: stringprep_strerror (Stringprep_rc rc)
{
const char *p;
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
switch (rc)
{
case STRINGPREP_OK:
p = _("Success");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_UNASSIGNED:
p = _("Forbidden unassigned code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_BOTH_L_AND_RAL:
p = _("Conflicting bidirectional properties in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_LEADTRAIL_NOT_RAL:
p = _("Malformed bidirectional string");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited bidirectional code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_TOO_SMALL_BUFFER:
p = _("Output would exceed the buffer space provided");
break;
case STRINGPREP_PROFILE_ERROR:
p = _("Error in stringprep profile definition");
break;
case STRINGPREP_FLAG_ERROR:
p = _("Flag conflict with profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
p = _("Unknown profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_NFKC_FAILED:
p = _("Unicode normalization failed (internal error)");
break;
default:
p = _("Unknown error");
break;
}
return p;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 function in libin before 1.31, as used in jabberd2, allows context-dependent attackers to read system memory and possibly have other unspecified impact via invalid UTF-8 characters in a string, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,761
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FLAC__StreamDecoderWriteStatus FLACParser::writeCallback(
const FLAC__Frame *frame, const FLAC__int32 * const buffer[])
{
if (mWriteRequested) {
mWriteRequested = false;
mWriteHeader = frame->header;
mWriteBuffer = buffer;
mWriteCompleted = true;
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_WRITE_STATUS_CONTINUE;
} else {
ALOGE("FLACParser::writeCallback unexpected");
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_WRITE_STATUS_ABORT;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
Medium
| 174,026
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
{
rcu_read_lock();
__ptrace_link(child, new_parent, __task_cred(new_parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.17, ptrace_link in kernel/ptrace.c mishandles the recording of the credentials of a process that wants to create a ptrace relationship, which allows local users to obtain root access by leveraging certain scenarios with a parent-child process relationship, where a parent drops privileges and calls execve (potentially allowing control by an attacker). One contributing factor is an object lifetime issue (which can also cause a panic). Another contributing factor is incorrect marking of a ptrace relationship as privileged, which is exploitable through (for example) Polkit's pkexec helper with PTRACE_TRACEME. NOTE: SELinux deny_ptrace might be a usable workaround in some environments.
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,606
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int hash_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct ahash_request *req = &ctx->req;
char state[crypto_ahash_statesize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req))];
struct sock *sk2;
struct alg_sock *ask2;
struct hash_ctx *ctx2;
int err;
err = crypto_ahash_export(req, state);
if (err)
return err;
err = af_alg_accept(ask->parent, newsock);
if (err)
return err;
sk2 = newsock->sk;
ask2 = alg_sk(sk2);
ctx2 = ask2->private;
ctx2->more = 1;
err = crypto_ahash_import(&ctx2->req, state);
if (err) {
sock_orphan(sk2);
sock_put(sk2);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The hash_accept function in crypto/algif_hash.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by attempting to trigger use of in-kernel hash algorithms for a socket that has received zero bytes of data.
Commit Message: crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data
The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.
This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Harsh Jain <harshjain.prof@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
|
Low
| 166,912
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ScopedRequest(PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper* owner,
const Delegate::EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback)
: owner_(owner),
callback_(callback),
requested_(false),
request_id_(0),
sync_call_(false) {
if (!owner_->document_url_.is_valid())
return;
requested_ = true;
sync_call_ = true;
request_id_ = owner_->delegate_->EnumerateDevices(
owner_->device_type_,
owner_->document_url_,
base::Bind(&ScopedRequest::EnumerateDevicesCallbackBody, AsWeakPtr()));
sync_call_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
|
Low
| 171,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value || value < 0)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fpdfsdk/src/jsapi/fxjs_v8.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not use signatures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
|
Low
| 171,770
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BrowserContext* SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::GetBrowserContext() {
RenderProcessHost* rph = GetProcess();
return rph ? rph->GetBrowserContext() : nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebsiteSettingsPopupView::WebsiteSettingsPopupView(
views::View* anchor_view,
gfx::NativeView parent_window,
Profile* profile,
content::WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& url,
const content::SSLStatus& ssl)
: BubbleDelegateView(anchor_view, views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT),
web_contents_(web_contents),
header_(nullptr),
tabbed_pane_(nullptr),
permissions_tab_(nullptr),
site_data_content_(nullptr),
cookie_dialog_link_(nullptr),
permissions_content_(nullptr),
connection_tab_(nullptr),
identity_info_content_(nullptr),
certificate_dialog_link_(nullptr),
reset_decisions_button_(nullptr),
help_center_content_(nullptr),
cert_id_(0),
help_center_link_(nullptr),
connection_info_content_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {
set_parent_window(parent_window);
set_anchor_view_insets(gfx::Insets(kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0,
kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0));
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(this);
SetLayoutManager(layout);
const int content_column = 0;
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(content_column);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
1,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0,
0);
header_ = new PopupHeaderView(this);
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(header_);
layout->AddPaddingRow(1, kHeaderMarginBottom);
tabbed_pane_ = new views::TabbedPane();
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(tabbed_pane_);
permissions_tab_ = CreatePermissionsTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_PERMISSIONS,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_PERMISSIONS),
permissions_tab_);
connection_tab_ = CreateConnectionTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_CONNECTION,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_CONNECTION),
connection_tab_);
DCHECK_EQ(tabbed_pane_->GetTabCount(), NUM_TAB_IDS);
tabbed_pane_->set_listener(this);
set_margins(gfx::Insets(kPopupMarginTop, kPopupMarginLeft,
kPopupMarginBottom, kPopupMarginRight));
views::BubbleDelegateView::CreateBubble(this);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this, profile,
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents), url, ssl,
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Infobars implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site, related to browser/ui/views/website_settings/website_settings_popup_view.cc.
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
|
Medium
| 171,779
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Encoder::Flush() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
deadline_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,537
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void usb_ehci_pci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
{
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(dev);
static void usb_ehci_pci_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(dev);
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(pci_dev);
EHCIState *s = &i->ehci;
ehci_reset(s);
}
static void usb_ehci_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *dev, uint32_t addr,
uint32_t val, int l)
{
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(dev);
bool busmaster;
pci_default_write_config(dev, addr, val, l);
if (!range_covers_byte(addr, l, PCI_COMMAND)) {
return;
}
busmaster = pci_get_word(dev->config + PCI_COMMAND) & PCI_COMMAND_MASTER;
i->ehci.as = busmaster ? pci_get_address_space(dev) : &address_space_memory;
}
static Property ehci_pci_properties[] = {
DEFINE_PROP_UINT32("maxframes", EHCIPCIState, ehci.maxframes, 128),
DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(),
};
static const VMStateDescription vmstate_ehci_pci = {
.name = "ehci",
.version_id = 2,
.minimum_version_id = 1,
.fields = (VMStateField[]) {
VMSTATE_PCI_DEVICE(pcidev, EHCIPCIState),
VMSTATE_STRUCT(ehci, EHCIPCIState, 2, vmstate_ehci, EHCIState),
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
}
};
static void ehci_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
k->realize = usb_ehci_pci_realize;
k->exit = usb_ehci_pci_exit;
k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB;
k->config_write = usb_ehci_pci_write_config;
dc->vmsd = &vmstate_ehci_pci;
dc->props = ehci_pci_properties;
dc->reset = usb_ehci_pci_reset;
}
static const TypeInfo ehci_pci_type_info = {
.name = TYPE_PCI_EHCI,
.parent = TYPE_PCI_DEVICE,
.instance_size = sizeof(EHCIPCIState),
.instance_init = usb_ehci_pci_init,
.abstract = true,
.class_init = ehci_class_init,
};
static void ehci_data_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
.parent = TYPE_PCI_DEVICE,
.instance_size = sizeof(EHCIPCIState),
.instance_init = usb_ehci_pci_init,
.abstract = true,
.class_init = ehci_class_init,
};
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with USB EHCI Emulation support, allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by repeatedly hot-unplugging the device.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void OMXNodeInstance::onEvent(
OMX_EVENTTYPE event, OMX_U32 arg1, OMX_U32 arg2) {
const char *arg1String = "??";
const char *arg2String = "??";
ADebug::Level level = ADebug::kDebugInternalState;
switch (event) {
case OMX_EventCmdComplete:
arg1String = asString((OMX_COMMANDTYPE)arg1);
switch (arg1) {
case OMX_CommandStateSet:
arg2String = asString((OMX_STATETYPE)arg2);
level = ADebug::kDebugState;
break;
case OMX_CommandFlush:
case OMX_CommandPortEnable:
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
default:
arg2String = portString(arg2);
}
break;
case OMX_EventError:
arg1String = asString((OMX_ERRORTYPE)arg1);
level = ADebug::kDebugLifeCycle;
break;
case OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged:
arg2String = asString((OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)arg2);
default:
arg1String = portString(arg1);
}
CLOGI_(level, onEvent, "%s(%x), %s(%x), %s(%x)",
asString(event), event, arg1String, arg1, arg2String, arg2);
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL
&& event == OMX_EventCmdComplete
&& arg1 == OMX_CommandStateSet
&& arg2 == OMX_StateExecuting) {
bufferSource->omxExecuting();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
|
Medium
| 173,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
struct key *key;
size_t desclen, quotalen;
int ret;
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!desc || !*desc)
goto error;
if (type->vet_description) {
ret = type->vet_description(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
desclen = strlen(desc);
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
user = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
* its description */
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&user->lock);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
goto no_quota;
}
user->qnkeys++;
user->qnbytes += quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto no_memory_2;
key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
key->index_key.type = type;
key->user = user;
key->quotalen = quotalen;
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
key_alloc_serial(key);
error:
return key;
security_error:
kfree(key->description);
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
no_memory_3:
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
no_memory_2:
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
no_memory_1:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto error;
no_quota:
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
goto error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a local user could create keyrings for other users via keyctl commands, setting unwanted defaults or causing a denial of service.
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 169,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jbig2_image_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int width, int height)
{
Jbig2Image *image;
int stride;
int64_t check;
image = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image, 1);
if (image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image structure in jbig2_image_new");
return NULL;
}
stride = ((width - 1) >> 3) + 1; /* generate a byte-aligned stride */
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
check = ((int64_t) stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow from stride(%d)*height(%d)", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
/* Add 1 to accept runs that exceed image width and clamped to width+1 */
image->data = jbig2_new(ctx, uint8_t, (int)check + 1);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image data buffer! [stride(%d)*height(%d) bytes]", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
image->width = width;
image->height = height;
image->stride = stride;
image->refcount = 1;
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished() {
if (!should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_)
return;
CheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void filter_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
const int kInterp_Extend = 4;
const unsigned int intermediate_height =
(kInterp_Extend - 1) + output_height + kInterp_Extend;
/* Size of intermediate_buffer is max_intermediate_height * filter_max_width,
* where max_intermediate_height = (kInterp_Extend - 1) + filter_max_height
* + kInterp_Extend
* = 3 + 16 + 4
* = 23
* and filter_max_width = 16
*/
uint8_t intermediate_buffer[71 * 64];
const int intermediate_next_stride = 1 - intermediate_height * output_width;
{
uint8_t *output_ptr = intermediate_buffer;
const int src_next_row_stride = src_stride - output_width;
unsigned int i, j;
src_ptr -= (kInterp_Extend - 1) * src_stride + (kInterp_Extend - 1);
for (i = 0; i < intermediate_height; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < output_width; ++j) {
const int temp = (src_ptr[0] * HFilter[0]) +
(src_ptr[1] * HFilter[1]) +
(src_ptr[2] * HFilter[2]) +
(src_ptr[3] * HFilter[3]) +
(src_ptr[4] * HFilter[4]) +
(src_ptr[5] * HFilter[5]) +
(src_ptr[6] * HFilter[6]) +
(src_ptr[7] * HFilter[7]) +
(VP9_FILTER_WEIGHT >> 1); // Rounding
*output_ptr = clip_pixel(temp >> VP9_FILTER_SHIFT);
++src_ptr;
output_ptr += intermediate_height;
}
src_ptr += src_next_row_stride;
output_ptr += intermediate_next_stride;
}
}
{
uint8_t *src_ptr = intermediate_buffer;
const int dst_next_row_stride = dst_stride - output_width;
unsigned int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < output_height; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < output_width; ++j) {
const int temp = (src_ptr[0] * VFilter[0]) +
(src_ptr[1] * VFilter[1]) +
(src_ptr[2] * VFilter[2]) +
(src_ptr[3] * VFilter[3]) +
(src_ptr[4] * VFilter[4]) +
(src_ptr[5] * VFilter[5]) +
(src_ptr[6] * VFilter[6]) +
(src_ptr[7] * VFilter[7]) +
(VP9_FILTER_WEIGHT >> 1); // Rounding
*dst_ptr++ = clip_pixel(temp >> VP9_FILTER_SHIFT);
src_ptr += intermediate_height;
}
src_ptr += intermediate_next_stride;
dst_ptr += dst_next_row_stride;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,509
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int asn1_ber_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder,
void *context,
const unsigned char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
const unsigned char *machine = decoder->machine;
const asn1_action_t *actions = decoder->actions;
size_t machlen = decoder->machlen;
enum asn1_opcode op;
unsigned char tag = 0, csp = 0, jsp = 0, optag = 0, hdr = 0;
const char *errmsg;
size_t pc = 0, dp = 0, tdp = 0, len = 0;
int ret;
unsigned char flags = 0;
#define FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 0x01
#define FLAG_MATCHED 0x02
#define FLAG_LAST_MATCHED 0x04 /* Last tag matched */
#define FLAG_CONS 0x20 /* Corresponds to CONS bit in the opcode tag
* - ie. whether or not we are going to parse
* a compound type.
*/
#define NR_CONS_STACK 10
unsigned short cons_dp_stack[NR_CONS_STACK];
unsigned short cons_datalen_stack[NR_CONS_STACK];
unsigned char cons_hdrlen_stack[NR_CONS_STACK];
#define NR_JUMP_STACK 10
unsigned char jump_stack[NR_JUMP_STACK];
if (datalen > 65535)
return -EMSGSIZE;
next_op:
pr_debug("next_op: pc=\e[32m%zu\e[m/%zu dp=\e[33m%zu\e[m/%zu C=%d J=%d\n",
pc, machlen, dp, datalen, csp, jsp);
if (unlikely(pc >= machlen))
goto machine_overrun_error;
op = machine[pc];
if (unlikely(pc + asn1_op_lengths[op] > machlen))
goto machine_overrun_error;
/* If this command is meant to match a tag, then do that before
* evaluating the command.
*/
if (op <= ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG) {
unsigned char tmp;
/* Skip conditional matches if possible */
if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND &&
flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
dp == datalen) {
flags &= ~FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
}
flags = 0;
hdr = 2;
/* Extract a tag from the data */
if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - 1))
goto data_overrun_error;
tag = data[dp++];
if (unlikely((tag & 0x1f) == ASN1_LONG_TAG))
goto long_tag_not_supported;
if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY) {
pr_debug("- any %02x\n", tag);
} else {
/* Extract the tag from the machine
* - Either CONS or PRIM are permitted in the data if
* CONS is not set in the op stream, otherwise CONS
* is mandatory.
*/
optag = machine[pc + 1];
flags |= optag & FLAG_CONS;
/* Determine whether the tag matched */
tmp = optag ^ tag;
tmp &= ~(optag & ASN1_CONS_BIT);
pr_debug("- match? %02x %02x %02x\n", tag, optag, tmp);
if (tmp != 0) {
/* All odd-numbered tags are MATCH_OR_SKIP. */
if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP) {
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
dp--;
goto next_op;
}
goto tag_mismatch;
}
}
flags |= FLAG_MATCHED;
len = data[dp++];
if (len > 0x7f) {
if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
/* Indefinite length */
if (unlikely(!(tag & ASN1_CONS_BIT)))
goto indefinite_len_primitive;
flags |= FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
if (unlikely(2 > datalen - dp))
goto data_overrun_error;
} else {
int n = len - 0x80;
if (unlikely(n > 2))
goto length_too_long;
if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - n))
goto data_overrun_error;
hdr += n;
for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
len <<= 8;
len |= data[dp++];
}
if (unlikely(len > datalen - dp))
goto data_overrun_error;
}
}
if (flags & FLAG_CONS) {
/* For expected compound forms, we stack the positions
* of the start and end of the data.
*/
if (unlikely(csp >= NR_CONS_STACK))
goto cons_stack_overflow;
cons_dp_stack[csp] = dp;
cons_hdrlen_stack[csp] = hdr;
if (!(flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
cons_datalen_stack[csp] = datalen;
datalen = dp + len;
} else {
cons_datalen_stack[csp] = 0;
}
csp++;
}
pr_debug("- TAG: %02x %zu%s\n",
tag, len, flags & FLAG_CONS ? " CONS" : "");
tdp = dp;
}
/* Decide how to handle the operation */
switch (op) {
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
goto skip_data;
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 2]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
goto skip_data;
case ASN1_OP_MATCH:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY:
skip_data:
if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) {
if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
ret = asn1_find_indefinite_length(
data, datalen, &dp, &len, &errmsg);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
} else {
dp += len;
}
pr_debug("- LEAF: %zu\n", len);
}
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP:
pr_debug("- MATCH_JUMP\n");
if (unlikely(jsp == NR_JUMP_STACK))
goto jump_stack_overflow;
jump_stack[jsp++] = pc + asn1_op_lengths[op];
pc = machine[pc + 2];
goto next_op;
case ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL:
if (unlikely(!(flags & FLAG_MATCHED)))
goto tag_mismatch;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
case ASN1_OP_COMPLETE:
if (unlikely(jsp != 0 || csp != 0)) {
pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Stacks not empty at completion (%u, %u)\n",
jsp, csp);
return -EBADMSG;
}
return 0;
case ASN1_OP_END_SET:
case ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT:
if (unlikely(!(flags & FLAG_MATCHED)))
goto tag_mismatch;
case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ:
case ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF:
case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF:
case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT:
case ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT:
case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT:
if (unlikely(csp <= 0))
goto cons_stack_underflow;
csp--;
tdp = cons_dp_stack[csp];
hdr = cons_hdrlen_stack[csp];
len = datalen;
datalen = cons_datalen_stack[csp];
pr_debug("- end cons t=%zu dp=%zu l=%zu/%zu\n",
tdp, dp, len, datalen);
if (datalen == 0) {
/* Indefinite length - check for the EOC. */
datalen = len;
if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2))
goto data_overrun_error;
if (data[dp++] != 0) {
if (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF) {
dp--;
csp++;
pc = machine[pc + 1];
pr_debug("- continue\n");
goto next_op;
}
goto missing_eoc;
}
if (data[dp++] != 0)
goto invalid_eoc;
len = dp - tdp - 2;
} else {
if (dp < len && (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF)) {
datalen = len;
csp++;
pc = machine[pc + 1];
pr_debug("- continue\n");
goto next_op;
}
if (dp != len)
goto cons_length_error;
len -= tdp;
pr_debug("- cons len l=%zu d=%zu\n", len, dp - tdp);
}
if (op & ASN1_OP_END__ACT) {
unsigned char act;
if (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF)
act = machine[pc + 2];
else
act = machine[pc + 1];
ret = actions[act](context, hdr, 0, data + tdp, len);
}
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
case ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT:
if (!(flags & FLAG_LAST_MATCHED)) {
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
}
case ASN1_OP_ACT:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + tdp, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
case ASN1_OP_RETURN:
if (unlikely(jsp <= 0))
goto jump_stack_underflow;
pc = jump_stack[--jsp];
flags |= FLAG_MATCHED | FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
goto next_op;
default:
break;
}
/* Shouldn't reach here */
pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u) pc=%zu\n",
op, pc);
return -EBADMSG;
data_overrun_error:
errmsg = "Data overrun error";
goto error;
machine_overrun_error:
errmsg = "Machine overrun error";
goto error;
jump_stack_underflow:
errmsg = "Jump stack underflow";
goto error;
jump_stack_overflow:
errmsg = "Jump stack overflow";
goto error;
cons_stack_underflow:
errmsg = "Cons stack underflow";
goto error;
cons_stack_overflow:
errmsg = "Cons stack overflow";
goto error;
cons_length_error:
errmsg = "Cons length error";
goto error;
missing_eoc:
errmsg = "Missing EOC in indefinite len cons";
goto error;
invalid_eoc:
errmsg = "Invalid length EOC";
goto error;
length_too_long:
errmsg = "Unsupported length";
goto error;
indefinite_len_primitive:
errmsg = "Indefinite len primitive not permitted";
goto error;
tag_mismatch:
errmsg = "Unexpected tag";
goto error;
long_tag_not_supported:
errmsg = "Long tag not supported";
error:
pr_debug("\nASN1: %s [m=%zu d=%zu ot=%02x t=%02x l=%zu]\n",
errmsg, pc, dp, optag, tag, len);
return -EBADMSG;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The asn1_ber_decoder function in lib/asn1_decoder.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via an ASN.1 BER file that lacks a public key, leading to mishandling by the public_key_verify_signature function in crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c.
Commit Message: ASN.1: Fix non-match detection failure on data overrun
If the ASN.1 decoder is asked to parse a sequence of objects, non-optional
matches get skipped if there's no more data to be had rather than a
data-overrun error being reported.
This is due to the code segment that decides whether to skip optional
matches (ie. matches that could get ignored because an element is marked
OPTIONAL in the grammar) due to a lack of data also skips non-optional
elements if the data pointer has reached the end of the buffer.
This can be tested with the data decoder for the new RSA akcipher algorithm
that takes three non-optional integers. Currently, it skips the last
integer if there is insufficient data.
Without the fix, #defining DEBUG in asn1_decoder.c will show something
like:
next_op: pc=0/13 dp=0/270 C=0 J=0
- match? 30 30 00
- TAG: 30 266 CONS
next_op: pc=2/13 dp=4/270 C=1 J=0
- match? 02 02 00
- TAG: 02 257
- LEAF: 257
next_op: pc=5/13 dp=265/270 C=1 J=0
- match? 02 02 00
- TAG: 02 3
- LEAF: 3
next_op: pc=8/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
next_op: pc=11/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
- end cons t=4 dp=270 l=270/270
The next_op line for pc=8/13 should be followed by a match line.
This is not exploitable for X.509 certificates by means of shortening the
message and fixing up the ASN.1 CONS tags because:
(1) The relevant records being built up are cleared before use.
(2) If the message is shortened sufficiently to remove the public key, the
ASN.1 parse of the RSA key will fail quickly due to a lack of data.
(3) Extracted signature data is either turned into MPIs (which cope with a
0 length) or is simpler integers specifying algoritms and suchlike
(which can validly be 0); and
(4) The AKID and SKID extensions are optional and their removal is handled
without risking passing a NULL to asymmetric_key_generate_id().
(5) If the certificate is truncated sufficiently to remove the subject,
issuer or serialNumber then the ASN.1 decoder will fail with a 'Cons
stack underflow' return.
This is not exploitable for PKCS#7 messages by means of removal of elements
from such a message from the tail end of a sequence:
(1) Any shortened X.509 certs embedded in the PKCS#7 message are survivable
as detailed above.
(2) The message digest content isn't used if it shows a NULL pointer,
similarly, the authattrs aren't used if that shows a NULL pointer.
(3) A missing signature results in a NULL MPI - which the MPI routines deal
with.
(4) If data is NULL, it is expected that the message has detached content and
that is handled appropriately.
(5) If the serialNumber is excised, the unconditional action associated
with it will pick up the containing SEQUENCE instead, so no NULL
pointer will be seen here.
If both the issuer and the serialNumber are excised, the ASN.1 decode
will fail with an 'Unexpected tag' return.
In either case, there's no way to get to asymmetric_key_generate_id()
with a NULL pointer.
(6) Other fields are decoded to simple integers. Shortening the message
to omit an algorithm ID field will cause checks on this to fail early
in the verification process.
This can also be tested by snipping objects off of the end of the ASN.1 stream
such that mandatory tags are removed - or even from the end of internal
SEQUENCEs. If any mandatory tag is missing, the error EBADMSG *should* be
produced. Without this patch ERANGE or ENOPKG might be produced or the parse
may apparently succeed, perhaps with ENOKEY or EKEYREJECTED being produced
later, depending on what gets snipped.
Just snipping off the final BIT_STRING or OCTET_STRING from either sample
should be a start since both are mandatory and neither will cause an EBADMSG
without the patches
Reported-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
|
Medium
| 167,442
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int perf_event_task_enable(void)
{
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_enable);
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 166,990
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadController::CreateGETDownload(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
bool must_download,
const DownloadInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadController::StartAndroidDownload,
base::Unretained(this),
wc_getter, must_download, info));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The UnescapeURLWithAdjustmentsImpl implementation in net/base/escape.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 does not prevent display of Unicode LOCK characters in the omnibox, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the SSL lock icon by placing one of these characters at the end of a URL, as demonstrated by the omnibox in localizations for right-to-left languages.
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
|
Low
| 171,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool OMXNodeInstance::handleMessage(omx_message &msg) {
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (msg.type == omx_message::FILL_BUFFER_DONE) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer =
findBufferHeader(msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(buffer);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(
FBD, WITH_STATS(FULL_BUFFER(
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer, buffer, msg.fenceFd)));
unbumpDebugLevel_l(kPortIndexOutput);
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(buffer->pAppPrivate);
if (buffer->nOffset + buffer->nFilledLen < buffer->nOffset
|| buffer->nOffset + buffer->nFilledLen > buffer->nAllocLen) {
CLOG_ERROR(onFillBufferDone, OMX_ErrorBadParameter,
FULL_BUFFER(NULL, buffer, msg.fenceFd));
}
buffer_meta->CopyFromOMX(buffer);
if (bufferSource != NULL) {
bufferSource->codecBufferFilled(buffer);
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp = buffer->nTimeStamp;
}
} else if (msg.type == omx_message::EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer =
findBufferHeader(msg.u.buffer_data.buffer);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mInputBuffersWithCodec.remove(buffer);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(
EBD, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(msg.u.buffer_data.buffer, buffer, msg.fenceFd)));
}
if (bufferSource != NULL) {
bufferSource->codecBufferEmptied(buffer, msg.fenceFd);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (audio_thread_.get() && !audio_thread_->IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.92 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to audio devices.
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Chapters::Edition::ExpandAtomsArray()
{
if (m_atoms_size > m_atoms_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_atoms_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_atoms_size;
Atom* const atoms = new (std::nothrow) Atom[size];
if (atoms == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_atoms_count; ++idx)
{
m_atoms[idx].ShallowCopy(atoms[idx]);
}
delete[] m_atoms;
m_atoms = atoms;
m_atoms_size = size;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnCrypto::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case INIT_CHECK:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(initCheck());
return OK;
}
case IS_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
reply->writeInt32(isCryptoSchemeSupported(uuid));
return OK;
}
case CREATE_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
size_t opaqueSize = data.readInt32();
void *opaqueData = NULL;
if (opaqueSize > 0) {
opaqueData = malloc(opaqueSize);
data.read(opaqueData, opaqueSize);
}
reply->writeInt32(createPlugin(uuid, opaqueData, opaqueSize));
if (opaqueData != NULL) {
free(opaqueData);
opaqueData = NULL;
}
return OK;
}
case DESTROY_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(destroyPlugin());
return OK;
}
case REQUIRES_SECURE_COMPONENT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
const char *mime = data.readCString();
reply->writeInt32(requiresSecureDecoderComponent(mime));
return OK;
}
case DECRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
bool secure = data.readInt32() != 0;
CryptoPlugin::Mode mode = (CryptoPlugin::Mode)data.readInt32();
uint8_t key[16];
data.read(key, sizeof(key));
uint8_t iv[16];
data.read(iv, sizeof(iv));
size_t totalSize = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> sharedBuffer =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
int32_t offset = data.readInt32();
int32_t numSubSamples = data.readInt32();
CryptoPlugin::SubSample *subSamples =
new CryptoPlugin::SubSample[numSubSamples];
data.read(
subSamples,
sizeof(CryptoPlugin::SubSample) * numSubSamples);
void *secureBufferId, *dstPtr;
if (secure) {
secureBufferId = reinterpret_cast<void *>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(data.readInt64()));
} else {
dstPtr = calloc(1, totalSize);
}
AString errorDetailMsg;
ssize_t result;
size_t sumSubsampleSizes = 0;
bool overflow = false;
for (int32_t i = 0; i < numSubSamples; ++i) {
CryptoPlugin::SubSample &ss = subSamples[i];
if (sumSubsampleSizes <= SIZE_MAX - ss.mNumBytesOfEncryptedData) {
sumSubsampleSizes += ss.mNumBytesOfEncryptedData;
} else {
overflow = true;
}
if (sumSubsampleSizes <= SIZE_MAX - ss.mNumBytesOfClearData) {
sumSubsampleSizes += ss.mNumBytesOfClearData;
} else {
overflow = true;
}
}
if (overflow || sumSubsampleSizes != totalSize) {
result = -EINVAL;
} else if (offset + totalSize > sharedBuffer->size()) {
result = -EINVAL;
} else {
result = decrypt(
secure,
key,
iv,
mode,
sharedBuffer, offset,
subSamples, numSubSamples,
secure ? secureBufferId : dstPtr,
&errorDetailMsg);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
if (isCryptoError(result)) {
reply->writeCString(errorDetailMsg.c_str());
}
if (!secure) {
if (result >= 0) {
CHECK_LE(result, static_cast<ssize_t>(totalSize));
reply->write(dstPtr, result);
}
free(dstPtr);
dstPtr = NULL;
}
delete[] subSamples;
subSamples = NULL;
return OK;
}
case NOTIFY_RESOLUTION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
int32_t width = data.readInt32();
int32_t height = data.readInt32();
notifyResolution(width, height);
return OK;
}
case SET_MEDIADRM_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(setMediaDrmSession(sessionId));
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Integer overflow in the BnCrypto::onTransact function in media/libmedia/ICrypto.cpp in libmediaplayerservice in Android 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering an improper size calculation, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25800375.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability in ICrypto DO NOT MERGE
b/25800375
Change-Id: I03c9395f7c7de4ac5813a1207452aac57aa39484
|
Low
| 173,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_fcntl64(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct oabi_flock64 user;
struct flock64 kernel;
mm_segment_t fs = USER_DS; /* initialized to kill a warning */
unsigned long local_arg = arg;
int ret;
switch (cmd) {
case F_OFD_GETLK:
case F_OFD_SETLK:
case F_OFD_SETLKW:
case F_GETLK64:
case F_SETLK64:
case F_SETLKW64:
if (copy_from_user(&user, (struct oabi_flock64 __user *)arg,
sizeof(user)))
return -EFAULT;
kernel.l_type = user.l_type;
kernel.l_whence = user.l_whence;
kernel.l_start = user.l_start;
kernel.l_len = user.l_len;
kernel.l_pid = user.l_pid;
local_arg = (unsigned long)&kernel;
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
}
ret = sys_fcntl64(fd, cmd, local_arg);
switch (cmd) {
case F_GETLK64:
if (!ret) {
user.l_type = kernel.l_type;
user.l_whence = kernel.l_whence;
user.l_start = kernel.l_start;
user.l_len = kernel.l_len;
user.l_pid = kernel.l_pid;
if (copy_to_user((struct oabi_flock64 __user *)arg,
&user, sizeof(user)))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
case F_SETLK64:
case F_SETLKW64:
set_fs(fs);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted (1) F_OFD_GETLK, (2) F_OFD_SETLK, or (3) F_OFD_SETLKW command in an fcntl64 system call.
Commit Message: [PATCH] arm: fix handling of F_OFD_... in oabi_fcntl64()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.15+
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForGPU(int host_id,
int route_id,
bool alive,
bool did_swap) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForGPU,
host_id,
route_id,
alive,
did_swap));
return;
}
GpuProcessHost* host = GpuProcessHost::FromID(host_id);
if (host) {
if (alive)
host->Send(new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(
route_id, did_swap, 0));
else
host->ForceShutdown();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,354
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Register(const GURL& url,
const base::FilePath& root_http,
ReportResponseHeadersOnUI report_on_ui) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::IO));
base::FilePath file_path(root_http);
file_path =
file_path.AppendASCII(url.scheme() + "." + url.host() + ".html");
net::URLRequestFilter::GetInstance()->AddUrlInterceptor(
url, base::WrapUnique(
new MirrorMockJobInterceptor(file_path, report_on_ui)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
|
Low
| 172,579
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Vector<unsigned long> unsignedLongArray(jsUnsignedLongArrayToVector(exec, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->methodWithUnsignedLongArray(unsignedLongArray);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab,
int arg_num,
size_t *len_sent,
const char __user *p,
char *buf)
{
char arg_num_len_buf[12];
const char __user *tmp_p = p;
/* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
size_t len, len_left, to_send;
size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
int ret;
/* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
/*
* We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
* we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
* for strings that are too long, we should not have created
* any.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
/* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
do {
if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
else
to_send = len_left;
ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
/*
* There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
* copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
* space yet.
*/
if (ret) {
WARN_ON(1);
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
buf[to_send] = '\0';
has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
if (has_cntl) {
/*
* hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
* send half as much in each message
*/
max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
break;
}
len_left -= to_send;
tmp_p += to_send;
} while (len_left > 0);
len_left = len;
if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
too_long = 1;
/* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
int room_left;
if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
else
to_send = len_left;
/* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
if (has_cntl)
room_left -= (to_send * 2);
else
room_left -= to_send;
if (room_left < 0) {
*len_sent = 0;
audit_log_end(*ab);
*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
if (!*ab)
return 0;
}
/*
* first record needs to say how long the original string was
* so we can be sure nothing was lost.
*/
if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
/*
* normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
* filled buf above when we checked for control characters
* so don't bother with another copy_from_user
*/
if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
else
ret = 0;
if (ret) {
WARN_ON(1);
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
buf[to_send] = '\0';
/* actually log it */
audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
if (too_long)
audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
if (has_cntl)
audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
else
audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
p += to_send;
len_left -= to_send;
*len_sent += arg_num_len;
if (has_cntl)
*len_sent += to_send * 2;
else
*len_sent += to_send;
}
/* include the null we didn't log */
return len + 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the audit_log_single_execve_arg function in kernel/auditsc.c in the Linux kernel through 4.7 allows local users to bypass intended character-set restrictions or disrupt system-call auditing by changing a certain string, aka a *double fetch* vulnerability.
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
Medium
| 167,019
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int output_quantization_factor(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth,
int out_depth)
{
if (out_depth == 16 && in_depth != 16 &&
pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
return 257;
else
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,676
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TraceEvent::AppendAsJSON(
std::string* out,
const ArgumentFilterPredicate& argument_filter_predicate) const {
int64 time_int64 = timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
int process_id = TraceLog::GetInstance()->process_id();
const char* category_group_name =
TraceLog::GetCategoryGroupName(category_group_enabled_);
DCHECK(!strchr(name_, '"'));
StringAppendF(out, "{\"pid\":%i,\"tid\":%i,\"ts\":%" PRId64
","
"\"ph\":\"%c\",\"cat\":\"%s\",\"name\":\"%s\",\"args\":",
process_id, thread_id_, time_int64, phase_, category_group_name,
name_);
bool strip_args = arg_names_[0] && !argument_filter_predicate.is_null() &&
!argument_filter_predicate.Run(category_group_name, name_);
if (strip_args) {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
} else {
*out += "{";
for (int i = 0; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs && arg_names_[i]; ++i) {
if (i > 0)
*out += ",";
*out += "\"";
*out += arg_names_[i];
*out += "\":";
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i]->AppendAsTraceFormat(out);
else
AppendValueAsJSON(arg_types_[i], arg_values_[i], out);
}
*out += "}";
}
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_COMPLETE) {
int64 duration = duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"dur\":%" PRId64, duration);
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_duration = thread_duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (thread_duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tdur\":%" PRId64, thread_duration);
}
}
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_time_int64 = thread_timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tts\":%" PRId64, thread_time_int64);
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_ASYNC_TTS) {
StringAppendF(out, ", \"use_async_tts\":1");
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"", static_cast<uint64>(id_));
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_BIND_TO_ENCLOSING)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bp\":\"e\"");
if ((flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT) ||
(flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)) {
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bind_id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(bind_id_));
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_in\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_out\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_CONTEXT_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"cid\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(context_id_));
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_INSTANT) {
char scope = '?';
switch (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_SCOPE_MASK) {
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_GLOBAL;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_PROCESS;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_THREAD;
break;
}
StringAppendF(out, ",\"s\":\"%c\"", scope);
}
*out += "}";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
|
Low
| 171,678
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void btsock_l2cap_signaled(int fd, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
char drop_it = FALSE;
/* We use MSG_DONTWAIT when sending data to JAVA, hence it can be accepted to hold the lock. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
sock = btsock_l2cap_find_by_id_l(user_id);
if (sock) {
if ((flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD) && !sock->server) {
if (sock->connected) {
int size = 0;
if (!(flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION) || (ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size)
== 0 && size)) {
uint8_t *buffer = osi_malloc(L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH);
/* Apparently we hijack the req_id (UINT32) to pass the pointer to the buffer to
* the write complete callback, which call a free... wonder if this works on a
* 64 bit platform? */
if (buffer != NULL) {
/* The socket is created with SOCK_SEQPACKET, hence we read one message at
* the time. The maximum size of a message is allocated to ensure data is
* not lost. This is okay to do as Android uses virtual memory, hence even
* if we only use a fraction of the memory it should not block for others
* to use the memory. As the definition of ioctl(FIONREAD) do not clearly
* define what value will be returned if multiple messages are written to
* the socket before any message is read from the socket, we could
* potentially risk to allocate way more memory than needed. One of the use
* cases for this socket is obex where multiple 64kbyte messages are
* typically written to the socket in a tight loop, hence we risk the ioctl
* will return the total amount of data in the buffer, which could be
* multiple 64kbyte chunks.
* UPDATE: As bluedroid cannot handle 64kbyte buffers, the size is reduced
* to around 8kbyte - and using malloc for buffer allocation here seems to
* be wrong
* UPDATE: Since we are responsible for freeing the buffer in the
* write_complete_ind, it is OK to use malloc. */
int count = recv(fd, buffer, L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH,
MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btsock_l2cap_signaled - %d bytes received from socket",
count);
if (sock->fixed_chan) {
if(BTA_JvL2capWriteFixed(sock->channel, (BD_ADDR*)&sock->addr,
(UINT32)buffer, btsock_l2cap_cbk, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_fixed_done(buffer, user_id);
}
} else {
if(BTA_JvL2capWrite(sock->handle, (UINT32)buffer, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_done(buffer, user_id);
}
}
} else {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("Unable to allocate memory for data packet from JAVA...")
}
}
} else
drop_it = TRUE;
}
if (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR) {
if (flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(sock) && sock->connected)
btsock_thread_add_fd(pth, sock->our_fd, BTSOCK_L2CAP, SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR, sock->id);
}
if (drop_it || (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION)) {
int size = 0;
if (drop_it || ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size) != 0 || size == 0)
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,453
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EBMLHeader::Init()
{
m_version = 1;
m_readVersion = 1;
m_maxIdLength = 4;
m_maxSizeLength = 8;
if (m_docType)
{
delete[] m_docType;
m_docType = NULL;
}
m_docTypeVersion = 1;
m_docTypeReadVersion = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,389
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pimv1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register u_char type;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
type = bp[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(pimv1_type_str, "[type %u]", type)));
switch (type) {
case PIMV1_TYPE_QUERY:
if (ND_TTEST(bp[8])) {
switch (bp[8] >> 4) {
case 0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Dense-mode"));
break;
case 1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Sparse-mode"));
break;
case 2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Sparse-Dense-mode"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " mode-%d", bp[8] >> 4));
break;
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[10],2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (Hold-time "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[10]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
break;
case PIMV1_TYPE_REGISTER:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], 20); /* ip header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for %s > %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[20]),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[24])));
break;
case PIMV1_TYPE_REGISTER_STOP:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[12], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for %s > %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[8]),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[12])));
break;
case PIMV1_TYPE_RP_REACHABILITY:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[22], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[12]) != 0xffffffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[12])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP %s hold ", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[16])));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[22]));
}
break;
case PIMV1_TYPE_ASSERT:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[16], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for %s > %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[16]),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[12]) != 0xffffffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[12])));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[24], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s pref %d metric %d",
(bp[20] & 0x80) ? "RP-tree" : "SPT",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[20]) & 0x7fffffff,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[24])));
break;
case PIMV1_TYPE_JOIN_PRUNE:
case PIMV1_TYPE_GRAFT:
case PIMV1_TYPE_GRAFT_ACK:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
pimv1_join_prune_print(ndo, &bp[8], len - 8);
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(bp[4]);
if ((bp[4] >> 4) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [v%d]", bp[4] >> 4));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes.
|
Low
| 167,856
|
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