instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static const char *parse_value( cJSON *item, const char *value )
{
if ( ! value )
return 0; /* Fail on null. */
if ( ! strncmp( value, "null", 4 ) ) {
item->type = cJSON_NULL;
return value + 4;
}
if ( ! strncmp( value, "false", 5 ) ) {
item->type = cJSON_False;
return value + 5;
}
if ( ! strncmp( value, "true", 4 ) ) {
item->type = cJSON_True;
item->valueint = 1;
return value + 4;
}
if ( *value == '\"' )
return parse_string( item, value );
if ( *value == '-' || ( *value >= '0' && *value <= '9' ) )
return parse_number( item, value );
if ( *value == '[' )
return parse_array( item, value );
if ( *value == '{' )
return parse_object( item, value );
/* Fail. */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
/* Render a value to text. */
static char *print_value( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char *out = 0;
if ( ! item )
return 0;
switch ( ( item->type ) & 255 ) {
case cJSON_NULL: out = cJSON_strdup( "null" ); break;
case cJSON_False: out = cJSON_strdup( "false" ); break;
case cJSON_True: out = cJSON_strdup( "true" ); break;
case cJSON_Number: out = print_number( item ); break;
case cJSON_String: out = print_string( item ); break;
case cJSON_Array: out = print_array( item, depth, fmt ); break;
case cJSON_Object: out = print_object( item, depth, fmt ); break;
}
return out;
}
/* Build an array from input text. */
static const char *parse_array( cJSON *item, const char *value )
{
cJSON *child;
if ( *value != '[' ) {
/* Not an array! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
item->type = cJSON_Array;
value = skip( value + 1 );
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* empty array. */
if ( ! ( item->child = child = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
while ( *value == ',' ) {
cJSON *new_item;
if ( ! ( new_item = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next = new_item;
new_item->prev = child;
child = new_item;
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value+1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
}
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* end of array */
/* Malformed. */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
/* Render an array to text */
static char *print_array( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char **entries;
char *out = 0, *ptr, *ret;
int len = 5;
cJSON *child = item->child;
int numentries = 0, i = 0, fail = 0;
/* How many entries in the array? */
while ( child ) {
++numentries;
child = child->next;
}
/* Allocate an array to hold the values for each. */
if ( ! ( entries = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) )
return 0;
memset( entries, 0, numentries * sizeof(char*) );
/* Retrieve all the results. */
child = item->child;
while ( child && ! fail ) {
ret = print_value( child, depth + 1, fmt );
entries[i++] = ret;
if ( ret )
len += strlen( ret ) + 2 + ( fmt ? 1 : 0 );
else
fail = 1;
child = child -> next;
}
/* If we didn't fail, try to malloc the output string. */
if ( ! fail ) {
out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len );
if ( ! out )
fail = 1;
}
/* Handle failure. */
if ( fail ) {
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i )
if ( entries[i] )
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output array. */
*out = '[';
ptr = out + 1;
*ptr = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
strcpy( ptr, entries[i] );
ptr += strlen( entries[i] );
if ( i != numentries - 1 ) {
*ptr++ = ',';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = ' ';
*ptr = 0;
}
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( entries );
*ptr++ = ']';
*ptr++ = 0;
return out;
}
/* Build an object from the text. */
static const char *parse_object( cJSON *item, const char *value )
{
cJSON *child;
if ( *value != '{' ) {
/* Not an object! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
item->type = cJSON_Object;
value =skip( value + 1 );
if ( *value == '}' )
return value + 1; /* empty array. */
if ( ! ( item->child = child = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0;
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_string( child, skip( value ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
child->string = child->valuestring;
child->valuestring = 0;
if ( *value != ':' ) {
/* Fail! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value + 1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
while ( *value == ',' ) {
cJSON *new_item;
if ( ! ( new_item = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next = new_item;
new_item->prev = child;
child = new_item;
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_string( child, skip( value + 1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
child->string = child->valuestring;
child->valuestring = 0;
if ( *value != ':' ) {
/* Fail! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value + 1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
}
if ( *value == '}' )
return value + 1; /* end of array */
/* Malformed. */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,305
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *load_bytes(RBinFile *arch, const ut8 *buf, ut64 sz, ut64 loaddr, Sdb *sdb) {
if (!buf || !sz || sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
RBuffer *tbuf = r_buf_new ();
r_buf_set_bytes (tbuf, buf, sz);
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *res = r_bin_bflt_new_buf (tbuf);
r_buf_free (tbuf);
return res ? res : NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The relocs function in libr/bin/p/bin_bflt.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
|
Medium
| 168,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
std::map<FilePath, bool>::iterator it = plugin_state_.find(plugin->path);
if (it == plugin_state_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No plug-in state for '" << plugin->path.value() << "'";
return false;
}
return it->second;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage the interaction between the browser process and renderer processes during authorization of the loading of a plug-in, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via vectors involving a blocked plug-in.
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int yr_execute_code(
YR_RULES* rules,
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
int timeout,
time_t start_time)
{
int64_t mem[MEM_SIZE];
int32_t sp = 0;
uint8_t* ip = rules->code_start;
YR_VALUE args[MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS];
YR_VALUE *stack;
YR_VALUE r1;
YR_VALUE r2;
YR_VALUE r3;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
YR_RULE* current_rule = NULL;
#endif
YR_RULE* rule;
YR_MATCH* match;
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* function;
char* identifier;
char* args_fmt;
int i;
int found;
int count;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int stop = FALSE;
int cycle = 0;
int tidx = context->tidx;
int stack_size;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
clock_t start = clock();
#endif
yr_get_configuration(YR_CONFIG_STACK_SIZE, (void*) &stack_size);
stack = (YR_VALUE*) yr_malloc(stack_size * sizeof(YR_VALUE));
if (stack == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
while(!stop)
{
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_HALT:
assert(sp == 0); // When HALT is reached the stack should be empty.
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_PUSH:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP:
pop(r1);
break;
case OP_CLEAR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i] = 0;
break;
case OP_ADD_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (!is_undef(r2))
mem[r1.i] += r2.i;
break;
case OP_INCR_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
mem[r1.i]++;
break;
case OP_PUSH_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
break;
case OP_POP_M:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
mem[r1.i] = r2.i;
break;
case OP_SWAPUNDEF:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
{
r1.i = mem[r1.i];
push(r1);
}
else
{
push(r2);
}
break;
case OP_JNUNDEF:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1), ip);
break;
case OP_JLE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
push(r1);
push(r2);
ip = jmp_if(r1.i <= r2.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JTRUE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(!is_undef(r1) && r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_JFALSE:
pop(r1);
push(r1);
ip = jmp_if(is_undef(r1) || !r1.i, ip);
break;
case OP_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1) || is_undef(r2))
r1.i = 0;
else
r1.i = r1.i && r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
push(r2);
}
else if (is_undef(r2))
{
push(r1);
}
else
{
r1.i = r1.i || r2.i;
push(r1);
}
break;
case OP_NOT:
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.i= !r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_MOD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i % r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >> r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_SHL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i << r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_NOT:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = ~r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_AND:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i & r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_OR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i | r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_BITWISE_XOR:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i ^ r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_PUSH_RULE:
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.i = rule->t_flags[tidx] & RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INIT_RULE:
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
current_rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
#endif
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case OP_MATCH_RULE:
pop(r1);
rule = *(YR_RULE**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
if (!is_undef(r1) && r1.i)
rule->t_flags[tidx] |= RULE_TFLAGS_MATCH;
else if (RULE_IS_GLOBAL(rule))
rule->ns->t_flags[tidx] |= NAMESPACE_TFLAGS_UNSATISFIED_GLOBAL;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
start = clock();
#endif
break;
case OP_OBJ_LOAD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r1.o = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
context->objects_table,
identifier,
NULL);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_FIELD:
identifier = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.o = yr_object_lookup_field(r1.o, identifier);
assert(r1.o != NULL);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OBJ_VALUE:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
switch(r1.o->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
r1.i = ((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
if (isnan(((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value))
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.d = ((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) r1.o)->value;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
if (((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
else
r1.p = ((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) r1.o)->value;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INDEX_ARRAY:
pop(r1); // index
pop(r2); // array
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
r1.o = yr_object_array_get_item(r2.o, 0, (int) r1.i);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_LOOKUP_DICT:
pop(r1); // key
pop(r2); // dictionary
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
assert(r2.o->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY);
r1.o = yr_object_dict_get_item(
r2.o, 0, r1.ss->c_string);
if (r1.o == NULL)
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CALL:
args_fmt = *(char**)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
i = (int) strlen(args_fmt);
count = 0;
while (i > 0)
{
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1)) // count the number of undefined args
count++;
args[i - 1] = r1;
i--;
}
pop(r2);
ensure_defined(r2);
if (count > 0)
{
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
}
function = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) r2.o;
result = ERROR_INTERNAL_FATAL_ERROR;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS; i++)
{
if (function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt == NULL)
break;
if (strcmp(function->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt, args_fmt) == 0)
{
result = function->prototypes[i].code(args, context, function);
break;
}
}
assert(i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS);
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
r1.o = function->return_obj;
push(r1);
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case OP_FOUND:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FOUND_AT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
if (is_undef(r1))
{
r1.i = 0;
push(r1);
break;
}
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL)
{
if (r1.i == match->base + match->offset)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
break;
}
if (r1.i < match->base + match->offset)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_FOUND_IN:
pop(r3);
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
match = r3.s->matches[tidx].head;
r3.i = FALSE;
while (match != NULL && !r3.i)
{
if (match->base + match->offset >= r1.i &&
match->base + match->offset <= r2.i)
{
r3.i = TRUE;
}
if (match->base + match->offset > r2.i)
break;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_COUNT:
pop(r1);
r1.i = r1.s->matches[tidx].count;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_OFFSET:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->base + match->offset;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_LENGTH:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
match = r2.s->matches[tidx].head;
i = 1;
r3.i = UNDEFINED;
while (match != NULL && r3.i == UNDEFINED)
{
if (r1.i == i)
r3.i = match->match_length;
i++;
match = match->next;
}
push(r3);
break;
case OP_OF:
found = 0;
count = 0;
pop(r1);
while (!is_undef(r1))
{
if (r1.s->matches[tidx].tail != NULL)
found++;
count++;
pop(r1);
}
pop(r2);
if (is_undef(r2))
r1.i = found >= count ? 1 : 0;
else
r1.i = found >= r2.i ? 1 : 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_FILESIZE:
r1.i = context->file_size;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_ENTRYPOINT:
r1.i = context->entry_point;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_little_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_int32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT8BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint8_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT16BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint16_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_UINT32BE:
pop(r1);
r1.i = read_uint32_t_big_endian(context->iterator, (size_t) r1.i);
push(r1);
break;
case OP_CONTAINS:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
r1.i = memmem(r1.ss->c_string, r1.ss->length,
r2.ss->c_string, r2.ss->length) != NULL;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_IMPORT:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
result = yr_modules_load((char*) r1.p, context);
if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
stop = TRUE;
break;
case OP_MATCHES:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r1.ss->length == 0)
{
r1.i = FALSE;
push(r1);
break;
}
r1.i = yr_re_exec(
(uint8_t*) r2.re->code,
(uint8_t*) r1.ss->c_string,
r1.ss->length,
r2.re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL) >= 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_TO_DBL:
r1.i = *(uint64_t*)(ip + 1);
ip += sizeof(uint64_t);
r2 = stack[sp - r1.i];
if (is_undef(r2))
stack[sp - r1.i].i = UNDEFINED;
else
stack[sp - r1.i].d = (double) r2.i;
break;
case OP_STR_TO_BOOL:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.ss->length > 0;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i == r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i != r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i < r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i > r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i <= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i >= r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i + r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i - r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.i * r2.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
if (r2.i != 0)
r1.i = r1.i / r2.i;
else
r1.i = UNDEFINED;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_INT_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = -r1.i;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d < r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GT:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d > r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_LE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d <= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d >= r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_EQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d == r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_NEQ:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.i = r1.d != r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_ADD:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d + r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_SUB:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d - r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MUL:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d * r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_DIV:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = r1.d / r2.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_DBL_MINUS:
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
r1.d = -r1.d;
push(r1);
break;
case OP_STR_EQ:
case OP_STR_NEQ:
case OP_STR_LT:
case OP_STR_LE:
case OP_STR_GT:
case OP_STR_GE:
pop(r2);
pop(r1);
ensure_defined(r1);
ensure_defined(r2);
switch(*ip)
{
case OP_STR_EQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) == 0);
break;
case OP_STR_NEQ:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) != 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) < 0);
break;
case OP_STR_LE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) <= 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GT:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) > 0);
break;
case OP_STR_GE:
r1.i = (sized_string_cmp(r1.ss, r2.ss) >= 0);
break;
}
push(r1);
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
if (timeout > 0) // timeout == 0 means no timeout
{
if (++cycle == 10)
{
if (difftime(time(NULL), start_time) > timeout)
{
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
assert(current_rule != NULL);
current_rule->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
#endif
result = ERROR_SCAN_TIMEOUT;
stop = TRUE;
}
cycle = 0;
}
}
ip++;
}
yr_modules_unload_all(context);
yr_free(stack);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libyara/re.c in the regex component in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yr_re_exec function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
|
Low
| 168,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (!name->IsString())
return;
auto nameString = name.As<v8::String>();
LocalDOMWindow* window = toLocalDOMWindow(V8Window::toImpl(info.Holder()));
if (!window)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toCoreAtomicString(nameString);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(nameString).IsEmpty())
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName)) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom function in bindings/core/v8/custom/V8WindowCustom.cpp in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger a frame detachment.
Commit Message: Reload frame in V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom after js call
R=marja@chromium.org
BUG=454954
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/901053006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189574 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 172,024
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
DOMWindow* window = V8Window::toNative(info.Holder());
if (!window)
return;
Frame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toWebCoreAtomicString(name);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(name).IsEmpty())
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName.impl()) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName.impl())) {
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the string values of id attributes.
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ip, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV4, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_dinode_verify(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
xfs_ino_t ino,
struct xfs_dinode *dip)
{
xfs_failaddr_t fa;
uint16_t mode;
uint16_t flags;
uint64_t flags2;
uint64_t di_size;
if (dip->di_magic != cpu_to_be16(XFS_DINODE_MAGIC))
return __this_address;
/* Verify v3 integrity information first */
if (dip->di_version >= 3) {
if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
return __this_address;
if (!xfs_verify_cksum((char *)dip, mp->m_sb.sb_inodesize,
XFS_DINODE_CRC_OFF))
return __this_address;
if (be64_to_cpu(dip->di_ino) != ino)
return __this_address;
if (!uuid_equal(&dip->di_uuid, &mp->m_sb.sb_meta_uuid))
return __this_address;
}
/* don't allow invalid i_size */
di_size = be64_to_cpu(dip->di_size);
if (di_size & (1ULL << 63))
return __this_address;
mode = be16_to_cpu(dip->di_mode);
if (mode && xfs_mode_to_ftype(mode) == XFS_DIR3_FT_UNKNOWN)
return __this_address;
/* No zero-length symlinks/dirs. */
if ((S_ISLNK(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode)) && di_size == 0)
return __this_address;
/* Fork checks carried over from xfs_iformat_fork */
if (mode &&
be32_to_cpu(dip->di_nextents) + be16_to_cpu(dip->di_anextents) >
be64_to_cpu(dip->di_nblocks))
return __this_address;
if (mode && XFS_DFORK_BOFF(dip) > mp->m_sb.sb_inodesize)
return __this_address;
flags = be16_to_cpu(dip->di_flags);
if (mode && (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME) && !mp->m_rtdev_targp)
return __this_address;
/* Do we have appropriate data fork formats for the mode? */
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFIFO:
case S_IFCHR:
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFSOCK:
if (dip->di_format != XFS_DINODE_FMT_DEV)
return __this_address;
break;
case S_IFREG:
case S_IFLNK:
case S_IFDIR:
switch (dip->di_format) {
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_LOCAL:
/*
* no local regular files yet
*/
if (S_ISREG(mode))
return __this_address;
if (di_size > XFS_DFORK_DSIZE(dip, mp))
return __this_address;
if (dip->di_nextents)
return __this_address;
/* fall through */
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_EXTENTS:
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE:
break;
default:
return __this_address;
}
break;
case 0:
/* Uninitialized inode ok. */
break;
default:
return __this_address;
}
if (XFS_DFORK_Q(dip)) {
switch (dip->di_aformat) {
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_LOCAL:
if (dip->di_anextents)
return __this_address;
/* fall through */
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_EXTENTS:
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE:
break;
default:
return __this_address;
}
} else {
/*
* If there is no fork offset, this may be a freshly-made inode
* in a new disk cluster, in which case di_aformat is zeroed.
* Otherwise, such an inode must be in EXTENTS format; this goes
* for freed inodes as well.
*/
switch (dip->di_aformat) {
case 0:
case XFS_DINODE_FMT_EXTENTS:
break;
default:
return __this_address;
}
if (dip->di_anextents)
return __this_address;
}
/* extent size hint validation */
fa = xfs_inode_validate_extsize(mp, be32_to_cpu(dip->di_extsize),
mode, flags);
if (fa)
return fa;
/* only version 3 or greater inodes are extensively verified here */
if (dip->di_version < 3)
return NULL;
flags2 = be64_to_cpu(dip->di_flags2);
/* don't allow reflink/cowextsize if we don't have reflink */
if ((flags2 & (XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK | XFS_DIFLAG2_COWEXTSIZE)) &&
!xfs_sb_version_hasreflink(&mp->m_sb))
return __this_address;
/* only regular files get reflink */
if ((flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK) && (mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG)
return __this_address;
/* don't let reflink and realtime mix */
if ((flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK) && (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME))
return __this_address;
/* don't let reflink and dax mix */
if ((flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK) && (flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_DAX))
return __this_address;
/* COW extent size hint validation */
fa = xfs_inode_validate_cowextsize(mp, be32_to_cpu(dip->di_cowextsize),
mode, flags, flags2);
if (fa)
return fa;
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_inode_buf.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. A denial of service (memory corruption and BUG) can occur for a corrupted xfs image upon encountering an inode that is in extent format, but has more extents than fit in the inode fork.
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
Medium
| 169,163
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t len,
struct iovec *iovec)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(!rw, buf, len)))
return -EFAULT;
iovec->iov_base = buf;
iovec->iov_len = len;
*nr_segs = 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in the aio_setup_single_vector function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel 4.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large AIO iovec. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of a CVE-2012-6701 regression.
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 170,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
bool found_cred=false;
CredentialWrapper * cred = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user = NULL;
void * data = NULL;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "sending cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred)) {
if (cred->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
socket->encode();
if (found_cred) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Found cred %s\n", cred->GetStorageName());
int data_size;
int rc = LoadData (cred->GetStorageName(), data, data_size);
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential::LoadData returned %d\n", rc);
if (rc == 0) {
goto EXIT;
}
socket->code (data_size);
socket->code_bytes (data, data_size);
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Credential name %s for owner %s returned to user %s\n",
name, owner, user);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Cannot find cred %s\n", name);
int rc = CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code (rc);
}
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if ( name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
if ( owner != NULL) {
free (owner);
}
if ( data != NULL) {
free (data);
}
return rtnVal;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,293
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_error_quark (void)
{
static GQuark quark = 0;
if (!quark)
quark = g_quark_from_static_string ("my_object_error");
return quark;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void IOHandler::Read(
const std::string& handle,
Maybe<int> offset,
Maybe<int> max_size,
std::unique_ptr<ReadCallback> callback) {
static const size_t kDefaultChunkSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
static const char kBlobPrefix[] = "blob:";
scoped_refptr<DevToolsIOContext::ROStream> stream =
io_context_->GetByHandle(handle);
if (!stream && process_host_ &&
StartsWith(handle, kBlobPrefix, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserContext* browser_context = process_host_->GetBrowserContext();
ChromeBlobStorageContext* blob_context =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(browser_context);
StoragePartition* storage_partition = process_host_->GetStoragePartition();
std::string uuid = handle.substr(strlen(kBlobPrefix));
stream =
io_context_->OpenBlob(blob_context, storage_partition, handle, uuid);
}
if (!stream) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid stream handle"));
return;
}
stream->Read(
offset.fromMaybe(-1), max_size.fromMaybe(kDefaultChunkSize),
base::BindOnce(&IOHandler::ReadComplete, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,750
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::appendFrom(const Parcel *parcel, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
status_t err;
const uint8_t *data = parcel->mData;
const binder_size_t *objects = parcel->mObjects;
size_t size = parcel->mObjectsSize;
int startPos = mDataPos;
int firstIndex = -1, lastIndex = -2;
if (len == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if ((offset > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (len > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (offset + len > parcel->mDataSize)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
for (int i = 0; i < (int) size; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i];
if ((off >= offset) && (off < offset + len)) {
if (firstIndex == -1) {
firstIndex = i;
}
lastIndex = i;
}
}
int numObjects = lastIndex - firstIndex + 1;
if ((mDataSize+len) > mDataCapacity) {
err = growData(len);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return err;
}
}
memcpy(mData + mDataPos, data + offset, len);
mDataPos += len;
mDataSize += len;
err = NO_ERROR;
if (numObjects > 0) {
if (mObjectsCapacity < mObjectsSize + numObjects) {
int newSize = ((mObjectsSize + numObjects)*3)/2;
binder_size_t *objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, newSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects == (binder_size_t*)0) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mObjects = objects;
mObjectsCapacity = newSize;
}
int idx = mObjectsSize;
for (int i = firstIndex; i <= lastIndex; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i] - offset + startPos;
mObjects[idx++] = off;
mObjectsSize++;
flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData + off);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
flat->handle = dup(flat->handle);
flat->cookie = 1;
mHasFds = mFdsKnown = true;
if (!mAllowFds) {
err = FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
}
}
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Parcel::appendFrom function in libs/binder/Parcel.cpp in Binder in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M does not consider parcel boundaries during identification of binder objects in an append operation, which allows attackers to obtain a different application's privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 17312693.
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
|
Medium
| 173,342
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::ParseSimpleBlock(
long long block_size,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
const long long block_start = pos;
const long long block_stop = pos + block_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (track < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(track);
if (track == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#if 0
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#endif
pos += len; //consume track number
if ((pos + 2) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 2) > avail)
{
len = 2;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos += 2; //consume timecode
if ((pos + 1) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
{
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; //consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail))
{
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = CreateBlock(0x23, //simple block id
block_start, block_size,
0); //DiscardPadding
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = block_stop;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,429
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
return -ENOKEY;
p = key->payload.data[0];
if (!p->migratable)
return -EPERM;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
if (!new_o) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
if (!new_p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
dump_payload(p);
dump_payload(new_p);
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
kzfree(datablob);
kzfree(new_o);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,708
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int smaps_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct mem_size_stats *mss = walk->private;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = mss->vma;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
spin_lock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (pmd_trans_splitting(*pmd)) {
spin_unlock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
wait_split_huge_page(vma->anon_vma, pmd);
} else {
smaps_pte_entry(*(pte_t *)pmd, addr,
HPAGE_PMD_SIZE, walk);
spin_unlock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
mss->anonymous_thp += HPAGE_PMD_SIZE;
return 0;
}
} else {
spin_unlock(&walk->mm->page_table_lock);
}
/*
* The mmap_sem held all the way back in m_start() is what
* keeps khugepaged out of here and from collapsing things
* in here.
*/
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)
smaps_pte_entry(*pte, addr, PAGE_SIZE, walk);
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,630
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rename_principal_2_svc(rprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg1,
*prime_arg2;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t tlen1, tlen2, clen, slen;
char *tdots1, *tdots2, *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->src, &prime_arg1) ||
krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->dest, &prime_arg2)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
tlen1 = strlen(prime_arg1);
trunc_name(&tlen1, &tdots1);
tlen2 = strlen(prime_arg2);
trunc_name(&tlen2, &tdots2);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, arg->src, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
/* any restrictions at all on the ADD kills the RENAME */
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, arg->dest, &rp) || rp) {
if (ret.code == KADM5_AUTH_DELETE)
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
}
} else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Unauthorized request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
arg->dest);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg1);
free(prime_arg2);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,523
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Textfield::OnFocus() {
GetRenderText()->set_focused(true);
if (ShouldShowCursor()) {
UpdateCursorViewPosition();
cursor_view_.SetVisible(true);
}
if (GetInputMethod())
GetInputMethod()->SetFocusedTextInputClient(this);
OnCaretBoundsChanged();
if (ShouldBlinkCursor())
StartBlinkingCursor();
if (use_focus_ring_) {
FocusRing::Install(this, invalid_
? ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_AlertSeverityHigh
: ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_NumColors);
}
SchedulePaint();
View::OnFocus();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
Low
| 171,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int semctl_down(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid,
int cmd, int version, void __user *p)
{
struct sem_array *sma;
int err;
struct semid64_ds semid64;
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp;
if(cmd == IPC_SET) {
if (copy_semid_from_user(&semid64, p, version))
return -EFAULT;
}
ipcp = ipcctl_pre_down_nolock(ns, &sem_ids(ns), semid, cmd,
&semid64.sem_perm, 0);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
return PTR_ERR(ipcp);
sma = container_of(ipcp, struct sem_array, sem_perm);
err = security_sem_semctl(sma, cmd);
if (err) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_unlock;
}
switch(cmd){
case IPC_RMID:
ipc_lock_object(&sma->sem_perm);
freeary(ns, ipcp);
goto out_up;
case IPC_SET:
ipc_lock_object(&sma->sem_perm);
err = ipc_update_perm(&semid64.sem_perm, ipcp);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
break;
default:
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_up;
}
out_unlock:
sem_unlock(sma);
out_up:
up_write(&sem_ids(ns).rw_mutex);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,979
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rpl_dio_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dio *dio = (const struct nd_rpl_dio *)bp;
const char *dagid_str;
ND_TCHECK(*dio);
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dio->rpl_dagid);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,rank:%u,%smop:%s,prf:%u]",
dagid_str,
dio->rpl_dtsn,
dio->rpl_instanceid,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dio->rpl_dagrank),
RPL_DIO_GROUNDED(dio->rpl_mopprf) ? "grounded,":"",
tok2str(rpl_mop_values, "mop%u", RPL_DIO_MOP(dio->rpl_mopprf)),
RPL_DIO_PRF(dio->rpl_mopprf)));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)&dio[1];
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|truncated]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
|
Low
| 169,830
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
{
struct keydata *keyptr;
__u32 hash[4];
keyptr = get_keyptr();
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
* The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
* which is then hashed with random data.
*/
hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,764
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(int fd, int64_t offset, int64_t length)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%d, %" PRId64 ", %" PRId64 ")", fd, offset, length);
status_t err = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(fd, offset, length))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libmedia in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 has certain incorrect declarations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28166152.
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
|
Low
| 173,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
{
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
int tot;
unsigned int n, nw;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
unsigned int max_send_fragment;
#endif
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
int i;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
tot = s->s3->wnum;
s->s3->wnum = 0;
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
/*
* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
* than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
* this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
* report the error in a way the user will notice
*/
if (len < tot) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (wb->left != 0) {
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
if (i <= 0) {
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->s3->wnum = tot;
return i;
}
tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
/*
* Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
* better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
* jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
* compromise is considered worthy.
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
unsigned char aad[13];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
int packlen;
/* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
max_send_fragment -= 512;
if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
max_send_fragment, NULL);
if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment)
packlen *= 8;
else
packlen *= 4;
wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
if(!wb->buf) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
wb->len = packlen;
} else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
wb->buf = NULL;
return tot;
}
n = (len - tot);
for (;;) {
if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
wb->buf = NULL;
break;
}
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0) {
s->s3->wnum = tot;
return i;
}
}
if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
else
nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
aad[8] = type;
aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
aad[11] = 0;
aad[12] = 0;
mb_param.out = NULL;
mb_param.inp = aad;
mb_param.len = nw;
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
wb->buf = NULL;
break;
}
mb_param.out = wb->buf;
mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
mb_param.len = nw;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
return -1;
s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
int j = 6;
while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
}
wb->offset = 0;
wb->left = packlen;
s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
s->s3->wpend_type = type;
s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
if (i <= 0) {
if (i < 0) {
OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
wb->buf = NULL;
}
s->s3->wnum = tot;
return i;
}
if (i == (int)n) {
OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
wb->buf = NULL;
return tot + i;
}
n -= i;
tot += i;
}
} else
#endif
if (tot == len) { /* done? */
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot;
}
n = (len - tot);
for (;;) {
if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
nw = s->max_send_fragment;
else
nw = n;
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->s3->wnum = tot;
return i;
}
if ((i == (int)n) ||
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
/*
* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
*/
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot + i;
}
n -= i;
tot += i;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The multi-block feature in the ssl3_write_bytes function in s3_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a on 64-bit x86 platforms with AES NI support does not properly handle certain non-blocking I/O cases, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (pointer corruption and application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,806
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char *path_name(const struct name_path *path, const char *name)
{
const struct name_path *p;
char *n, *m;
int nlen = strlen(name);
int len = nlen + 1;
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len)
len += p->elem_len + 1;
}
n = xmalloc(len);
m = n + len - (nlen + 1);
strcpy(m, name);
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len) {
m -= p->elem_len + 1;
memcpy(m, p->elem, p->elem_len);
m[p->elem_len] = '/';
}
}
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: revision.c in git before 2.7.4 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 167,429
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetNext(const CuePoint* pCurr) const {
if (pCurr == NULL)
return NULL;
assert(pCurr->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count >= 1);
#if 0
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
size_t index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
pNext->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
#else
long index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < m_count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= m_count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pNext;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,821
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static zend_always_inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, zend_long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval key, *data, d, *old_data;
zend_ulong idx;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&key);
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(&key, p, max, NULL, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
data = NULL;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&d);
if (!objprops) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
idx = Z_LVAL(key);
numeric_key:
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_index_find(ht, idx)) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_index_update(ht, idx, &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_index_add_new(ht, idx, &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING) {
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(Z_STR(key), idx))) {
goto numeric_key;
}
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING)) {
string_key:
if ((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(old_data) == IS_INDIRECT) {
old_data = Z_INDIRECT_P(old_data);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update_ind(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(&key);
goto string_key;
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(data, p, max, var_hash, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISUNDEF_P(data))) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
zend_hash_index_del(ht, Z_LVAL(key));
} else {
zend_hash_del_ind(ht, Z_STR(key));
}
} else {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, data);
}
zval_dtor(&key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP 7.0.x through 7.0.22 and 7.1.x through 7.1.8 is prone to a heap use after free while unserializing untrusted data, related to improper use of the hash API for key deletion in a situation with an invalid array size. Exploitation of this issue can have an unspecified impact on the integrity of PHP.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #74103 and bug #75054
Directly fail unserialization when trying to acquire an r/R
reference to an UNDEF HT slot. Previously this left an UNDEF and
later deleted the index/key from the HT.
What actually caused the issue here is a combination of two
factors: First, the key deletion was performed using the hash API,
rather than the symtable API, such that the element was not actually
removed if it used an integral string key. Second, a subsequent
deletion operation, while collecting trailing UNDEF ranges, would
mark the element as available for reuse (leaving a corrupted HT
state with nNumOfElemnts > nNumUsed).
Fix this by failing early and dropping the deletion code.
|
Low
| 167,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: compare_two_images(Image *a, Image *b, int via_linear,
png_const_colorp background)
{
ptrdiff_t stridea = a->stride;
ptrdiff_t strideb = b->stride;
png_const_bytep rowa = a->buffer+16;
png_const_bytep rowb = b->buffer+16;
const png_uint_32 width = a->image.width;
const png_uint_32 height = a->image.height;
const png_uint_32 formata = a->image.format;
const png_uint_32 formatb = b->image.format;
const unsigned int a_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formata);
const unsigned int b_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formatb);
int alpha_added, alpha_removed;
int bchannels;
int btoa[4];
png_uint_32 y;
Transform tr;
/* This should never happen: */
if (width != b->image.width || height != b->image.height)
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": width x height changed: ",
b->file_name);
/* Set up the background and the transform */
transform_from_formats(&tr, a, b, background, via_linear);
/* Find the first row and inter-row space. */
if (!(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
stridea *= 2;
if (!(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
strideb *= 2;
if (stridea < 0) rowa += (height-1) * (-stridea);
if (strideb < 0) rowb += (height-1) * (-strideb);
/* First shortcut the two colormap case by comparing the image data; if it
* matches then we expect the colormaps to match, although this is not
* absolutely necessary for an image match. If the colormaps fail to match
* then there is a problem in libpng.
*/
if (formata & formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
{
/* Only check colormap entries that actually exist; */
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
int match;
png_byte in_use[256], amax = 0, bmax = 0;
memset(in_use, 0, sizeof in_use);
ppa = rowa;
ppb = rowb;
/* Do this the slow way to accumulate the 'in_use' flags, don't break out
* of the loop until the end; this validates the color-mapped data to
* ensure all pixels are valid color-map indexes.
*/
for (y=0, match=1; y<height && match; ++y, ppa += stridea, ppb += strideb)
{
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<width; ++x)
{
png_byte bval = ppb[x];
png_byte aval = ppa[x];
if (bval > bmax)
bmax = bval;
if (bval != aval)
match = 0;
in_use[aval] = 1;
if (aval > amax)
amax = aval;
}
}
/* If the buffers match then the colormaps must too. */
if (match)
{
/* Do the color-maps match, entry by entry? Only check the 'in_use'
* entries. An error here should be logged as a color-map error.
*/
png_const_bytep a_cmap = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap;
png_const_bytep b_cmap = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap;
int result = 1; /* match by default */
/* This is used in logpixel to get the error message correct. */
tr.is_palette = 1;
for (y=0; y<256; ++y, a_cmap += a_sample, b_cmap += b_sample)
if (in_use[y])
{
/* The colormap entries should be valid, but because libpng doesn't
* do any checking at present the original image may contain invalid
* pixel values. These cause an error here (at present) unless
* accumulating errors in which case the program just ignores them.
*/
if (y >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
else if (y >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
/* All the mismatches are logged here; there can only be 256! */
else if (!cmppixel(&tr, a_cmap, b_cmap, 0, y))
result = 0;
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
result = 1; /* force a continue */
}
return result;
}
/* else the image buffers don't match pixel-wise so compare sample values
* instead, but first validate that the pixel indexes are in range (but
* only if not accumulating, when the error is ignored.)
*/
else if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
/* Check the original image first,
* TODO: deal with input images with bad pixel values?
*/
if (amax >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", amax,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
else if (bmax >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", bmax,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
}
}
/* We can directly compare pixel values without the need to use the read
* or transform support (i.e. a memory compare) if:
*
* 1) The bit depth has not changed.
* 2) RGB to grayscale has not been done (the reverse is ok; we just compare
* the three RGB values to the original grayscale.)
* 3) An alpha channel has not been removed from an 8-bit format, or the
* 8-bit alpha value of the pixel was 255 (opaque).
*
* If an alpha channel has been *added* then it must have the relevant opaque
* value (255 or 65535).
*
* The fist two the tests (in the order given above) (using the boolean
* equivalence !a && !b == !(a || b))
*/
if (!(((formata ^ formatb) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) |
(formata & (formatb ^ PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)))
{
/* Was an alpha channel changed? */
const png_uint_32 alpha_changed = (formata ^ formatb) &
PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA;
/* Was an alpha channel removed? (The third test.) If so the direct
* comparison is only possible if the input alpha is opaque.
*/
alpha_removed = (formata & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* Was an alpha channel added? */
alpha_added = (formatb & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* The channels may have been moved between input and output, this finds
* out how, recording the result in the btoa array, which says where in
* 'a' to find each channel of 'b'. If alpha was added then btoa[alpha]
* ends up as 4 (and is not used.)
*/
{
int i;
png_byte aloc[4];
png_byte bloc[4];
/* The following are used only if the formats match, except that
* 'bchannels' is a flag for matching formats. btoa[x] says, for each
* channel in b, where to find the corresponding value in a, for the
* bchannels. achannels may be different for a gray to rgb transform
* (a will be 1 or 2, b will be 3 or 4 channels.)
*/
(void)component_loc(aloc, formata);
bchannels = component_loc(bloc, formatb);
/* Hence the btoa array. */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i) if (bloc[i] < 4)
btoa[bloc[i]] = aloc[i]; /* may be '4' for alpha */
if (alpha_added)
alpha_added = bloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image b */
else
alpha_added = 4; /* Won't match an image b channel */
if (alpha_removed)
alpha_removed = aloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image a */
else
alpha_removed = 4;
}
}
else
{
/* Direct compare is not possible, cancel out all the corresponding local
* variables.
*/
bchannels = 0;
alpha_removed = alpha_added = 4;
btoa[3] = btoa[2] = btoa[1] = btoa[0] = 4; /* 4 == not present */
}
for (y=0; y<height; ++y, rowa += stridea, rowb += strideb)
{
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0, ppa=rowa, ppb=rowb; x<width; ++x)
{
png_const_bytep psa, psb;
if (formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psa = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap + a_sample * *ppa++;
else
psa = ppa, ppa += a_sample;
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psb = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap + b_sample * *ppb++;
else
psb = ppb, ppb += b_sample;
/* Do the fast test if possible. */
if (bchannels)
{
/* Check each 'b' channel against either the corresponding 'a'
* channel or the opaque alpha value, as appropriate. If
* alpha_removed value is set (not 4) then also do this only if the
* 'a' alpha channel (alpha_removed) is opaque; only relevant for
* the 8-bit case.
*/
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) /* 16-bit checks */
{
png_const_uint_16p pua = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psa);
png_const_uint_16p pub = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psb);
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (pua[btoa[3]] != pub[3]) break;
case 3:
if (pua[btoa[2]] != pub[2]) break;
case 2:
if (pua[btoa[1]] != pub[1]) break;
case 1:
if (pua[btoa[0]] != pub[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && pub[alpha_added] != 65535) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
else if (alpha_removed == 4 || psa[alpha_removed] == 255)
{
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (psa[btoa[3]] != psb[3]) break;
case 3:
if (psa[btoa[2]] != psb[2]) break;
case 2:
if (psa[btoa[1]] != psb[1]) break;
case 1:
if (psa[btoa[0]] != psb[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && psb[alpha_added] != 255) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
}
/* If we get to here the fast match failed; do the slow match for this
* pixel.
*/
if (!cmppixel(&tr, psa, psb, x, y) && (a->opts & KEEP_GOING) == 0)
return 0; /* error case */
}
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int asn1_find_indefinite_length(const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
size_t *_dp, size_t *_len,
const char **_errmsg)
{
unsigned char tag, tmp;
size_t dp = *_dp, len, n;
int indef_level = 1;
next_tag:
if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2)) {
if (datalen == dp)
goto missing_eoc;
goto data_overrun_error;
}
/* Extract a tag from the data */
tag = data[dp++];
if (tag == 0) {
/* It appears to be an EOC. */
if (data[dp++] != 0)
goto invalid_eoc;
if (--indef_level <= 0) {
*_len = dp - *_dp;
*_dp = dp;
return 0;
}
goto next_tag;
}
if (unlikely((tag & 0x1f) == ASN1_LONG_TAG)) {
do {
if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2))
goto data_overrun_error;
tmp = data[dp++];
} while (tmp & 0x80);
}
/* Extract the length */
len = data[dp++];
if (len <= 0x7f) {
dp += len;
goto next_tag;
}
if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
/* Indefinite length */
if (unlikely((tag & ASN1_CONS_BIT) == ASN1_PRIM << 5))
goto indefinite_len_primitive;
indef_level++;
goto next_tag;
}
n = len - 0x80;
if (unlikely(n > sizeof(size_t) - 1))
goto length_too_long;
if (unlikely(n > datalen - dp))
goto data_overrun_error;
for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
len <<= 8;
len |= data[dp++];
}
dp += len;
goto next_tag;
length_too_long:
*_errmsg = "Unsupported length";
goto error;
indefinite_len_primitive:
*_errmsg = "Indefinite len primitive not permitted";
goto error;
invalid_eoc:
*_errmsg = "Invalid length EOC";
goto error;
data_overrun_error:
*_errmsg = "Data overrun error";
goto error;
missing_eoc:
*_errmsg = "Missing EOC in indefinite len cons";
error:
*_dp = dp;
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in lib/asn1_decoder.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to gain privileges via crafted ASN.1 data.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing
This fixes CVE-2016-0758.
In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted,
it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added
to the cursor. With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check:
datalen - dp < 2
may then fail due to integer overflow.
Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining
data in both places a definite length is determined.
Whilst we're at it, make the following changes:
(1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity
of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that
variable is assumed to be (size_t).
(2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the
integer 0.
(3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of:
for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: find_file (const char *currpath, grub_fshelp_node_t currroot,
grub_fshelp_node_t *currfound,
struct grub_fshelp_find_file_closure *c)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char fpath[grub_strlen (currpath) + 1];
#else
char *fpath = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
#endif
char *name = fpath;
char *next;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
grub_fshelp_node_t currnode = currroot;
grub_fshelp_node_t oldnode = currroot;
c->currroot = currroot;
grub_strncpy (fpath, currpath, grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*name == '/')
name++;
if (! *name)
{
*currfound = currnode;
return 0;
}
for (;;)
{
int found;
struct find_file_closure cc;
/* Extract the actual part from the pathname. */
next = grub_strchr (name, '/');
if (next)
{
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*next == '/')
*(next++) = '\0';
}
/* At this point it is expected that the current node is a
directory, check if this is true. */
if (type != GRUB_FSHELP_DIR)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "not a directory");
}
cc.name = name;
cc.type = &type;
cc.oldnode = &oldnode;
cc.currnode = &currnode;
/* Iterate over the directory. */
found = c->iterate_dir (currnode, iterate, &cc);
if (! found)
{
if (grub_errno)
return grub_errno;
break;
}
/* Read in the symlink and follow it. */
if (type == GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK)
{
char *symlink;
/* Test if the symlink does not loop. */
if (++(c->symlinknest) == 8)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_SYMLINK_LOOP,
"too deep nesting of symlinks");
}
symlink = c->read_symlink (currnode);
free_node (currnode, c);
if (!symlink)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
/* The symlink is an absolute path, go back to the root inode. */
if (symlink[0] == '/')
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
oldnode = c->rootnode;
}
/* Lookup the node the symlink points to. */
find_file (symlink, oldnode, &currnode, c);
type = c->foundtype;
grub_free (symlink);
if (grub_errno)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
}
free_node (oldnode, c);
/* Found the node! */
if (! next || *next == '\0')
{
*currfound = currnode;
c->foundtype = type;
return 0;
}
name = next;
}
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "file not found");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The grub_ext2_read_block function in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB before 2013-11-12, as used in shlr/grub/fs/ext2.c in radare2 1.5.0, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive stack use and application crash) via a crafted binary file, related to use of a variable-size stack array.
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
|
Low
| 168,089
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zend_function *spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check(zval **object_ptr, char *method, int method_len, const struct _zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *fsobj = zend_object_store_get_object(*object_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
if (fsobj->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] == '\0' && fsobj->orig_path == NULL) {
method = "_bad_state_ex";
method_len = sizeof("_bad_state_ex") - 1;
key = NULL;
}
return zend_get_std_object_handlers()->get_method(object_ptr, method, method_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,085
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jp2_pclr_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
int lutsize;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int j;
int_fast32_t x;
pclr->lutdata = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &pclr->numlutents) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
lutsize = pclr->numlutents * pclr->numchans;
if (!(pclr->lutdata = jas_alloc2(lutsize, sizeof(int_fast32_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(pclr->bpc = jas_alloc2(pclr->numchans, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numchans; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->bpc[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numlutents; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < pclr->numchans; ++j) {
if (jp2_getint(in, (pclr->bpc[j] & 0x80) != 0,
(pclr->bpc[j] & 0x7f) + 1, &x)) {
return -1;
}
pclr->lutdata[i * pclr->numchans + j] = x;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
|
Medium
| 168,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppControllerImpl::GetApps(
mojom::AppController::GetAppsCallback callback) {
std::vector<chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::AppPtr> app_list;
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().ForEachApp(
[this, &app_list](const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
app_list.push_back(CreateAppPtr(update));
});
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(app_list));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
|
Medium
| 172,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long do_get_mempolicy(int *policy, nodemask_t *nmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags)
{
int err;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
struct mempolicy *pol = current->mempolicy;
if (flags &
~(unsigned long)(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR|MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED) {
if (flags & (MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR))
return -EINVAL;
*policy = 0; /* just so it's initialized */
task_lock(current);
*nmask = cpuset_current_mems_allowed;
task_unlock(current);
return 0;
}
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
/*
* Do NOT fall back to task policy if the
* vma/shared policy at addr is NULL. We
* want to return MPOL_DEFAULT in this case.
*/
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_intersection(mm, addr, addr+1);
if (!vma) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->get_policy)
pol = vma->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, addr);
else
pol = vma->vm_policy;
} else if (addr)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pol)
pol = &default_policy; /* indicates default behavior */
if (flags & MPOL_F_NODE) {
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
err = lookup_node(addr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
*policy = err;
} else if (pol == current->mempolicy &&
pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) {
*policy = next_node_in(current->il_prev, pol->v.nodes);
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else {
*policy = pol == &default_policy ? MPOL_DEFAULT :
pol->mode;
/*
* Internal mempolicy flags must be masked off before exposing
* the policy to userspace.
*/
*policy |= (pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS);
}
if (vma) {
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
vma = NULL;
}
err = 0;
if (nmask) {
if (mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)) {
*nmask = pol->w.user_nodemask;
} else {
task_lock(current);
get_policy_nodemask(pol, nmask);
task_unlock(current);
}
}
out:
mpol_cond_put(pol);
if (vma)
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The do_get_mempolicy function in mm/mempolicy.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy
I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled. The related call trace is as follows.
BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798
INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
mpol_new+0x66/0x80
SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
__mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int32_t FASTCALL get_word (WavpackStream *wps, int chan, int32_t *correction)
{
register struct entropy_data *c = wps->w.c + chan;
uint32_t ones_count, low, mid, high;
int32_t value;
int sign;
if (!wps->wvbits.ptr)
return WORD_EOF;
if (correction)
*correction = 0;
if (!(wps->w.c [0].median [0] & ~1) && !wps->w.holding_zero && !wps->w.holding_one && !(wps->w.c [1].median [0] & ~1)) {
uint32_t mask;
int cbits;
if (wps->w.zeros_acc) {
if (--wps->w.zeros_acc) {
c->slow_level -= (c->slow_level + SLO) >> SLS;
return 0;
}
}
else {
for (cbits = 0; cbits < 33 && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++cbits);
if (cbits == 33)
return WORD_EOF;
if (cbits < 2)
wps->w.zeros_acc = cbits;
else {
for (mask = 1, wps->w.zeros_acc = 0; --cbits; mask <<= 1)
if (getbit (&wps->wvbits))
wps->w.zeros_acc |= mask;
wps->w.zeros_acc |= mask;
}
if (wps->w.zeros_acc) {
c->slow_level -= (c->slow_level + SLO) >> SLS;
CLEAR (wps->w.c [0].median);
CLEAR (wps->w.c [1].median);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (wps->w.holding_zero)
ones_count = wps->w.holding_zero = 0;
else {
#ifdef USE_CTZ_OPTIMIZATION
while (wps->wvbits.bc < LIMIT_ONES) {
if (++(wps->wvbits.ptr) == wps->wvbits.end)
wps->wvbits.wrap (&wps->wvbits);
wps->wvbits.sr |= *(wps->wvbits.ptr) << wps->wvbits.bc;
wps->wvbits.bc += sizeof (*(wps->wvbits.ptr)) * 8;
}
#ifdef _WIN32
_BitScanForward (&ones_count, ~wps->wvbits.sr);
#else
ones_count = __builtin_ctz (~wps->wvbits.sr);
#endif
if (ones_count >= LIMIT_ONES) {
wps->wvbits.bc -= ones_count;
wps->wvbits.sr >>= ones_count;
for (; ones_count < (LIMIT_ONES + 1) && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++ones_count);
if (ones_count == (LIMIT_ONES + 1))
return WORD_EOF;
if (ones_count == LIMIT_ONES) {
uint32_t mask;
int cbits;
for (cbits = 0; cbits < 33 && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++cbits);
if (cbits == 33)
return WORD_EOF;
if (cbits < 2)
ones_count = cbits;
else {
for (mask = 1, ones_count = 0; --cbits; mask <<= 1)
if (getbit (&wps->wvbits))
ones_count |= mask;
ones_count |= mask;
}
ones_count += LIMIT_ONES;
}
}
else {
wps->wvbits.bc -= ones_count + 1;
wps->wvbits.sr >>= ones_count + 1;
}
#elif defined (USE_NEXT8_OPTIMIZATION)
int next8;
if (wps->wvbits.bc < 8) {
if (++(wps->wvbits.ptr) == wps->wvbits.end)
wps->wvbits.wrap (&wps->wvbits);
next8 = (wps->wvbits.sr |= *(wps->wvbits.ptr) << wps->wvbits.bc) & 0xff;
wps->wvbits.bc += sizeof (*(wps->wvbits.ptr)) * 8;
}
else
next8 = wps->wvbits.sr & 0xff;
if (next8 == 0xff) {
wps->wvbits.bc -= 8;
wps->wvbits.sr >>= 8;
for (ones_count = 8; ones_count < (LIMIT_ONES + 1) && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++ones_count);
if (ones_count == (LIMIT_ONES + 1))
return WORD_EOF;
if (ones_count == LIMIT_ONES) {
uint32_t mask;
int cbits;
for (cbits = 0; cbits < 33 && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++cbits);
if (cbits == 33)
return WORD_EOF;
if (cbits < 2)
ones_count = cbits;
else {
for (mask = 1, ones_count = 0; --cbits; mask <<= 1)
if (getbit (&wps->wvbits))
ones_count |= mask;
ones_count |= mask;
}
ones_count += LIMIT_ONES;
}
}
else {
wps->wvbits.bc -= (ones_count = ones_count_table [next8]) + 1;
wps->wvbits.sr >>= ones_count + 1;
}
#else
for (ones_count = 0; ones_count < (LIMIT_ONES + 1) && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++ones_count);
if (ones_count >= LIMIT_ONES) {
uint32_t mask;
int cbits;
if (ones_count == (LIMIT_ONES + 1))
return WORD_EOF;
for (cbits = 0; cbits < 33 && getbit (&wps->wvbits); ++cbits);
if (cbits == 33)
return WORD_EOF;
if (cbits < 2)
ones_count = cbits;
else {
for (mask = 1, ones_count = 0; --cbits; mask <<= 1)
if (getbit (&wps->wvbits))
ones_count |= mask;
ones_count |= mask;
}
ones_count += LIMIT_ONES;
}
#endif
if (wps->w.holding_one) {
wps->w.holding_one = ones_count & 1;
ones_count = (ones_count >> 1) + 1;
}
else {
wps->w.holding_one = ones_count & 1;
ones_count >>= 1;
}
wps->w.holding_zero = ~wps->w.holding_one & 1;
}
if ((wps->wphdr.flags & HYBRID_FLAG) && !chan)
update_error_limit (wps);
if (ones_count == 0) {
low = 0;
high = GET_MED (0) - 1;
DEC_MED0 ();
}
else {
low = GET_MED (0);
INC_MED0 ();
if (ones_count == 1) {
high = low + GET_MED (1) - 1;
DEC_MED1 ();
}
else {
low += GET_MED (1);
INC_MED1 ();
if (ones_count == 2) {
high = low + GET_MED (2) - 1;
DEC_MED2 ();
}
else {
low += (ones_count - 2) * GET_MED (2);
high = low + GET_MED (2) - 1;
INC_MED2 ();
}
}
}
low &= 0x7fffffff;
high &= 0x7fffffff;
mid = (high + low + 1) >> 1;
if (!c->error_limit)
mid = read_code (&wps->wvbits, high - low) + low;
else while (high - low > c->error_limit) {
if (getbit (&wps->wvbits))
mid = (high + (low = mid) + 1) >> 1;
else
mid = ((high = mid - 1) + low + 1) >> 1;
}
sign = getbit (&wps->wvbits);
if (bs_is_open (&wps->wvcbits) && c->error_limit) {
value = read_code (&wps->wvcbits, high - low) + low;
if (correction)
*correction = sign ? (mid - value) : (value - mid);
}
if (wps->wphdr.flags & HYBRID_BITRATE) {
c->slow_level -= (c->slow_level + SLO) >> SLS;
c->slow_level += wp_log2 (mid);
}
return sign ? ~mid : mid;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The read_new_config_info function in open_utils.c in Wavpack before 5.1.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted WV file.
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
|
Medium
| 168,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOL region16_union_rect(REGION16* dst, const REGION16* src, const RECTANGLE_16* rect)
{
const RECTANGLE_16* srcExtents;
RECTANGLE_16* dstExtents;
const RECTANGLE_16* currentBand, *endSrcRect, *nextBand;
REGION16_DATA* newItems = NULL;
RECTANGLE_16* dstRect = NULL;
UINT32 usedRects, srcNbRects;
UINT16 topInterBand;
assert(src);
assert(src->data);
assert(dst);
srcExtents = region16_extents(src);
dstExtents = region16_extents_noconst(dst);
if (!region16_n_rects(src))
{
/* source is empty, so the union is rect */
dst->extents = *rect;
dst->data = allocateRegion(1);
if (!dst->data)
return FALSE;
dstRect = region16_rects_noconst(dst);
dstRect->top = rect->top;
dstRect->left = rect->left;
dstRect->right = rect->right;
dstRect->bottom = rect->bottom;
return TRUE;
}
newItems = allocateRegion((1 + region16_n_rects(src)) * 4);
if (!newItems)
return FALSE;
dstRect = (RECTANGLE_16*)(&newItems[1]);
usedRects = 0;
/* adds the piece of rect that is on the top of src */
if (rect->top < srcExtents->top)
{
dstRect->top = rect->top;
dstRect->left = rect->left;
dstRect->right = rect->right;
dstRect->bottom = MIN(srcExtents->top, rect->bottom);
usedRects++;
dstRect++;
}
/* treat possibly overlapping region */
currentBand = region16_rects(src, &srcNbRects);
endSrcRect = currentBand + srcNbRects;
while (currentBand < endSrcRect)
{
if ((currentBand->bottom <= rect->top) || (rect->bottom <= currentBand->top) ||
rectangle_contained_in_band(currentBand, endSrcRect, rect))
{
/* no overlap between rect and the band, rect is totally below or totally above
* the current band, or rect is already covered by an item of the band.
* let's copy all the rectangles from this band
+----+
| | rect (case 1)
+----+
=================
band of srcRect
=================
+----+
| | rect (case 2)
+----+
*/
region16_copy_band_with_union(dstRect,
currentBand, endSrcRect,
currentBand->top, currentBand->bottom,
NULL, &usedRects,
&nextBand, &dstRect);
topInterBand = rect->top;
}
else
{
/* rect overlaps the band:
| | | |
====^=================| |==| |=========================== band
| top split | | | |
v | 1 | | 2 |
^ | | | | +----+ +----+
| merge zone | | | | | | | 4 |
v +----+ | | | | +----+
^ | | | 3 |
| bottom split | | | |
====v=========================| |==| |===================
| | | |
possible cases:
1) no top split, merge zone then a bottom split. The band will be splitted
in two
2) not band split, only the merge zone, band merged with rect but not splitted
3) a top split, the merge zone and no bottom split. The band will be split
in two
4) a top split, the merge zone and also a bottom split. The band will be
splitted in 3, but the coalesce algorithm may merge the created bands
*/
UINT16 mergeTop = currentBand->top;
UINT16 mergeBottom = currentBand->bottom;
/* test if we need a top split, case 3 and 4 */
if (rect->top > currentBand->top)
{
region16_copy_band_with_union(dstRect,
currentBand, endSrcRect,
currentBand->top, rect->top,
NULL, &usedRects,
&nextBand, &dstRect);
mergeTop = rect->top;
}
/* do the merge zone (all cases) */
if (rect->bottom < currentBand->bottom)
mergeBottom = rect->bottom;
region16_copy_band_with_union(dstRect,
currentBand, endSrcRect,
mergeTop, mergeBottom,
rect, &usedRects,
&nextBand, &dstRect);
/* test if we need a bottom split, case 1 and 4 */
if (rect->bottom < currentBand->bottom)
{
region16_copy_band_with_union(dstRect,
currentBand, endSrcRect,
mergeBottom, currentBand->bottom,
NULL, &usedRects,
&nextBand, &dstRect);
}
topInterBand = currentBand->bottom;
}
/* test if a piece of rect should be inserted as a new band between
* the current band and the next one. band n and n+1 shouldn't touch.
*
* ==============================================================
* band n
* +------+ +------+
* ===========| rect |====================| |===============
* | | +------+ | |
* +------+ | rect | | rect |
* +------+ | |
* =======================================| |================
* +------+ band n+1
* ===============================================================
*
*/
if ((nextBand < endSrcRect) && (nextBand->top != currentBand->bottom) &&
(rect->bottom > currentBand->bottom) && (rect->top < nextBand->top))
{
dstRect->right = rect->right;
dstRect->left = rect->left;
dstRect->top = topInterBand;
dstRect->bottom = MIN(nextBand->top, rect->bottom);
dstRect++;
usedRects++;
}
currentBand = nextBand;
}
/* adds the piece of rect that is below src */
if (srcExtents->bottom < rect->bottom)
{
dstRect->top = MAX(srcExtents->bottom, rect->top);
dstRect->left = rect->left;
dstRect->right = rect->right;
dstRect->bottom = rect->bottom;
usedRects++;
dstRect++;
}
if ((src == dst) && (src->data->size > 0) && (src->data != &empty_region))
free(src->data);
dstExtents->top = MIN(rect->top, srcExtents->top);
dstExtents->left = MIN(rect->left, srcExtents->left);
dstExtents->bottom = MAX(rect->bottom, srcExtents->bottom);
dstExtents->right = MAX(rect->right, srcExtents->right);
newItems->size = sizeof(REGION16_DATA) + (usedRects * sizeof(RECTANGLE_16));
dst->data = realloc(newItems, newItems->size);
if (!dst->data)
{
free(newItems);
return FALSE;
}
dst->data->nbRects = usedRects;
return region16_simplify_bands(dst);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies in lodepng.c in LodePNG through 2019-09-28, as used in WinPR in FreeRDP and other products, has a memory leak because a supplied realloc pointer (i.e., the first argument to realloc) is also used for a realloc return value.
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
Low
| 169,498
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::UnregisterClientProcess(
mojom::ClientProcess* client_process) {
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request != nullptr) {
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
std::set<QueuedRequest::PendingResponse>::iterator current = it++;
if (current->client != client_process)
continue;
RemovePendingResponse(client_process, current->type);
request->failed_memory_dump_count++;
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request = pair.second.get();
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
auto current = it++;
if (*current == client_process) {
request->pending_responses.erase(current);
}
}
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied,
base::Unretained(this), pair.second->dump_guid));
}
size_t num_deleted = clients_.erase(client_process);
DCHECK(num_deleted == 1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
|
Medium
| 173,216
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im), 4)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im) * 4, gdImageSY(im))) {
return;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the gdImageWebPtr function in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via large width and height values.
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
|
Low
| 168,817
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringCase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq);
int i;
int i;
CARD16 *in_devices = (CARD16 *) &stuff[1];
swaps(&stuff->length);
swaps(&stuff->num_devices);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
swaps(&stuff->x1);
swaps(&stuff->y1);
swaps(&stuff->x2);
swaps(&stuff->y2);
swapl(&stuff->directions);
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_devices; i++) {
swaps(in_devices + i);
}
return ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType] (client);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(struct rpcrdma_write_array *ary,
int chunks)
{
ary->wc_discrim = xdr_one;
ary->wc_nchunks = cpu_to_be32(chunks);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,161
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_user_token (const char *authfile,
const char *username,
const char *otp_id,
int verbose,
FILE *debug_file)
{
char buf[1024];
char *s_user, *s_token;
int retval = AUTH_ERROR;
int fd;
struct stat st;
FILE *opwfile;
fd = open(authfile, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Cannot open file: %s (%s)", authfile, strerror(errno));
return retval;
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Cannot stat file: %s (%s)", authfile, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return retval;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "%s is not a regular file", authfile);
close(fd);
return retval;
}
opwfile = fdopen(fd, "r");
if (opwfile == NULL) {
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return retval;
}
retval = AUTH_NO_TOKENS;
while (fgets (buf, 1024, opwfile))
{
char *saveptr = NULL;
if (buf[strlen (buf) - 1] == '\n')
buf[strlen (buf) - 1] = '\0';
if (buf[0] == '#') {
/* This is a comment and we may skip it. */
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Skipping comment line: %s", buf);
continue;
}
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Authorization line: %s", buf);
s_user = strtok_r (buf, ":", &saveptr);
if (s_user && strcmp (username, s_user) == 0)
{
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Matched user: %s", s_user);
retval = AUTH_NOT_FOUND; /* We found at least one line for the user */
do
{
s_token = strtok_r (NULL, ":", &saveptr);
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Authorization token: %s", s_token);
if (s_token && otp_id && strcmp (otp_id, s_token) == 0)
{
if(verbose)
D (debug_file, "Match user/token as %s/%s", username, otp_id);
return AUTH_FOUND;
}
}
while (s_token != NULL);
}
}
fclose (opwfile);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In check_user_token in util.c in the Yubico PAM module (aka pam_yubico) 2.18 through 2.25, successful logins can leak file descriptors to the auth mapping file, which can lead to information disclosure (serial number of a device) and/or DoS (reaching the maximum number of file descriptors).
Commit Message: util: make sure to close the authfile before returning success
fixes #136
|
Low
| 169,268
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::ConnectVSyncProvider() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__
<< ": IsPresentationFocused()=" << IsPresentationFocused()
<< " vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound()="
<< vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound();
if (!IsPresentationFocused() || vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound())
return;
display_->GetVRVSyncProvider(mojo::MakeRequest(&vr_v_sync_provider_));
vr_v_sync_provider_.set_connection_error_handler(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSyncConnectionError, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
if (pending_raf_ && !display_blurred_) {
pending_vsync_ = true;
vr_v_sync_provider_->GetVSync(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSync, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
|
Low
| 171,992
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl(
media::AudioSystem* audio_system,
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager)
: audio_system_(audio_system),
media_stream_manager_(media_stream_manager),
primary_session_id_(kSessionIDInvalid),
last_session_id_(kSessionIDInvalid),
is_dispatching_event_(false),
delegate_(GetContentClient()
->browser()
->CreateSpeechRecognitionManagerDelegate()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(!g_speech_recognition_manager_impl);
g_speech_recognition_manager_impl = this;
frame_deletion_observer_.reset(new FrameDeletionObserver(
base::BindRepeating(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::AbortSessionImpl,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,111
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
close(private->callback.socket);
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,652
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct desc_struct *get_desc(unsigned short sel)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {0, 0};
unsigned long desc_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
if ((sel & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
struct desc_struct *desc = NULL;
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* Bits [15:3] contain the index of the desired entry. */
sel >>= 3;
mutex_lock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
ldt = current->active_mm->context.ldt;
if (ldt && sel < ldt->nr_entries)
desc = &ldt->entries[sel];
mutex_unlock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
return desc;
}
#endif
native_store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
/*
* Segment descriptors have a size of 8 bytes. Thus, the index is
* multiplied by 8 to obtain the memory offset of the desired descriptor
* from the base of the GDT. As bits [15:3] of the segment selector
* contain the index, it can be regarded as multiplied by 8 already.
* All that remains is to clear bits [2:0].
*/
desc_base = sel & ~(SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK);
if (desc_base > gdt_desc.size)
return NULL;
return (struct desc_struct *)(gdt_desc.address + desc_base);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.9, there is a use-after-free for access to an LDT entry because of a race condition between modify_ldt() and a #BR exception for an MPX bounds violation.
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,607
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
RCAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
case OS_STYLE_FREEBSD:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t argoff, pidoff;
if (clazz == ELFCLASS32)
argoff = 4 + 4 + 17;
else
argoff = 4 + 4 + 8 + 17;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.80s'", nbuf + doff +
argoff) == -1)
return 1;
pidoff = argoff + 81 + 2;
if (doff + pidoff + 4 <= size) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", pid=%u",
elf_getu32(swap, *RCAST(uint32_t *, (nbuf +
doff + pidoff)))) == -1)
return 1;
}
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; cp < nbuf + size && *cp
&& isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: do_core_note in readelf.c in libmagic.a in file 5.35 has an out-of-bounds read because memcpy is misused.
Commit Message: Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso)
|
Medium
| 169,727
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int recv_msg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t buf_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
long timeout;
unsigned int sz;
u32 err;
int res;
/* Catch invalid receive requests */
if (unlikely(!buf_len))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED)) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
/* Look for a message in receive queue; wait if necessary */
while (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
if (timeout <= 0L) {
res = timeout ? timeout : -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto exit;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeout = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
tipc_rx_ready(sock),
timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
}
/* Look at first message in receive queue */
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
msg = buf_msg(buf);
sz = msg_data_sz(msg);
err = msg_errcode(msg);
/* Discard an empty non-errored message & try again */
if ((!sz) && (!err)) {
advance_rx_queue(sk);
goto restart;
}
/* Capture sender's address (optional) */
set_orig_addr(m, msg);
/* Capture ancillary data (optional) */
res = anc_data_recv(m, msg, tport);
if (res)
goto exit;
/* Capture message data (if valid) & compute return value (always) */
if (!err) {
if (unlikely(buf_len < sz)) {
sz = buf_len;
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
res = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(buf, msg_hdr_sz(msg),
m->msg_iov, sz);
if (res)
goto exit;
res = sz;
} else {
if ((sock->state == SS_READY) ||
((err == TIPC_CONN_SHUTDOWN) || m->msg_control))
res = 0;
else
res = -ECONNRESET;
}
/* Consume received message (optional) */
if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
if ((sock->state != SS_READY) &&
(++tport->conn_unacked >= TIPC_FLOW_CONTROL_WIN))
tipc_acknowledge(tport->ref, tport->conn_unacked);
advance_rx_queue(sk);
}
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/tipc/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure and a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
return -EIO;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-corsair.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 168,394
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Windows and Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Block Tifinagh + Latin mix
BUG=chromium:722639
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToU*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2894313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#474199}
|
Medium
| 172,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProcessHeap::Init() {
total_allocated_space_ = 0;
total_allocated_object_size_ = 0;
total_marked_object_size_ = 0;
GCInfoTable::Init();
base::SamplingHeapProfiler::SetHooksInstallCallback([]() {
HeapAllocHooks::SetAllocationHook(&BlinkGCAllocHook);
HeapAllocHooks::SetFreeHook(&BlinkGCFreeHook);
});
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,142
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StoreAccumulatedContentLength(int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool data_reduction_proxy_was_used) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UpdateContentLengthPrefs,
received_content_length, original_content_length,
data_reduction_proxy_was_used));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: feed_table_block_tag(struct table *tbl,
char *line, struct table_mode *mode, int indent, int cmd)
{
int offset;
if (mode->indent_level <= 0 && indent == -1)
return;
if (mode->indent_level >= CHAR_MAX && indent == 1)
return;
setwidth(tbl, mode);
feed_table_inline_tag(tbl, line, mode, -1);
clearcontentssize(tbl, mode);
if (indent == 1) {
mode->indent_level++;
if (mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent += INDENT_INCR;
}
else if (indent == -1) {
mode->indent_level--;
if (mode->indent_level < MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent -= INDENT_INCR;
}
offset = tbl->indent;
if (cmd == HTML_DT) {
if (mode->indent_level > 0 && mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
offset -= INDENT_INCR;
}
if (tbl->indent > 0) {
check_minimum0(tbl, 0);
addcontentssize(tbl, offset);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: w3m through 0.5.3 is prone to an infinite recursion flaw in HTMLlineproc0 because the feed_table_block_tag function in table.c does not prevent a negative indent value.
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
|
Low
| 169,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void fillWidgetStates(AXObject& axObject,
protocol::Array<AXProperty>& properties) {
AccessibilityRole role = axObject.roleValue();
if (roleAllowsChecked(role)) {
AccessibilityButtonState checked = axObject.checkboxOrRadioValue();
switch (checked) {
case ButtonStateOff:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateOn:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateMixed:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
}
}
AccessibilityExpanded expanded = axObject.isExpanded();
switch (expanded) {
case ExpandedUndefined:
break;
case ExpandedCollapsed:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(false, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
case ExpandedExpanded:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(true, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
}
if (role == ToggleButtonRole) {
if (!axObject.isPressed()) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
} else {
const AtomicString& pressedAttr =
axObject.getAttribute(HTMLNames::aria_pressedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(pressedAttr, "mixed"))
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
else
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
}
}
if (roleAllowsSelected(role)) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Selected,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isSelected())));
}
if (roleAllowsModal(role)) {
properties.addItem(createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Modal,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isModal())));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: stf_status ikev2parent_inI2outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
/* struct connection *c = st->st_connection; */
/*
* the initiator sent us an encrypted payload. We need to calculate
* our g^xy, and skeyseed values, and then decrypt the payload.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2"));
/* verify that there is in fact an encrypted payload */
if (!md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E]) {
libreswan_log("R2 state should receive an encrypted payload");
reset_globals();
return STF_FATAL;
}
/* now. we need to go calculate the g^xy */
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = alloc_thing(
struct dh_continuation,
"ikev2_inI2outR2 KE");
stf_status e;
dh->md = md;
set_suspended(st, dh->md);
pcrc_init(&dh->dh_pcrc);
dh->dh_pcrc.pcrc_func = ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue;
e = start_dh_v2(&dh->dh_pcrc, st, st->st_import, RESPONDER,
st->st_oakley.groupnum);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ikev2parent_inI1outR1 function in pluto/ikev2_parent.c in libreswan before 3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via an IKEv2 I1 notification without a KE payload.
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
|
Low
| 166,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
int ret = 0;
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh)
return 1;
BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
ret = udf_sb_alloc_partition_maps(sb, le32_to_cpu(lvd->numPartitionMaps));
if (ret)
goto out_bh;
for (i = 0, offset = 0;
i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
i++, offset += gpm->partitionMapLength) {
struct udf_part_map *map = &sbi->s_partmaps[i];
gpm = (struct genericPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
type = gpm->partitionMapType;
if (type == 1) {
struct genericPartitionMap1 *gpm1 =
(struct genericPartitionMap1 *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_TYPE1_MAP15;
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->partitionNum);
map->s_partition_func = NULL;
} else if (type == 2) {
struct udfPartitionMap2 *upm2 =
(struct udfPartitionMap2 *)gpm;
if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident, UDF_ID_VIRTUAL,
strlen(UDF_ID_VIRTUAL))) {
u16 suf =
le16_to_cpu(((__le16 *)upm2->partIdent.
identSuffix)[0]);
if (suf < 0x0200) {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP15;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt15;
} else {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP20;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt20;
}
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARABLE,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARABLE))) {
uint32_t loc;
struct sparingTable *st;
struct sparablePartitionMap *spm =
(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.s_packet_len =
le16_to_cpu(spm->packetLength);
for (j = 0; j < spm->numSparingTables; j++) {
struct buffer_head *bh2;
loc = le32_to_cpu(
spm->locSparingTable[j]);
bh2 = udf_read_tagged(sb, loc, loc,
&ident);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = bh2;
if (bh2 == NULL)
continue;
st = (struct sparingTable *)bh2->b_data;
if (ident != 0 || strncmp(
st->sparingIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARING,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING))) {
brelse(bh2);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = NULL;
}
}
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_spar15;
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_METADATA,
strlen(UDF_ID_METADATA))) {
struct udf_meta_data *mdata =
&map->s_type_specific.s_metadata;
struct metadataPartitionMap *mdm =
(struct metadataPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
udf_debug("Parsing Logical vol part %d type %d id=%s\n",
i, type, UDF_ID_METADATA);
map->s_partition_type = UDF_METADATA_MAP25;
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_meta25;
mdata->s_meta_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc);
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc);
mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc);
mdata->s_alloc_unit_size =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize);
mdata->s_align_unit_size =
le16_to_cpu(mdm->alignUnitSize);
if (mdm->flags & 0x01)
mdata->s_flags |= MF_DUPLICATE_MD;
udf_debug("Metadata Ident suffix=0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)
mdm->partIdent.identSuffix));
udf_debug("Metadata part num=%d\n",
le16_to_cpu(mdm->partitionNum));
udf_debug("Metadata part alloc unit size=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize));
udf_debug("Metadata file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc));
udf_debug("Mirror file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc));
udf_debug("Bitmap file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc));
udf_debug("Flags: %d %d\n",
mdata->s_flags, mdm->flags);
} else {
udf_debug("Unknown ident: %s\n",
upm2->partIdent.ident);
continue;
}
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(upm2->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(upm2->partitionNum);
}
udf_debug("Partition (%d:%d) type %d on volume %d\n",
i, map->s_partition_num, type, map->s_volumeseqnum);
}
if (fileset) {
struct long_ad *la = (struct long_ad *)&(lvd->logicalVolContentsUse[0]);
*fileset = lelb_to_cpu(la->extLocation);
udf_debug("FileSet found in LogicalVolDesc at block=%d, partition=%d\n",
fileset->logicalBlockNum,
fileset->partitionReferenceNum);
}
if (lvd->integritySeqExt.extLength)
udf_load_logicalvolint(sb, leea_to_cpu(lvd->integritySeqExt));
out_bh:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the udf_load_logicalvol function in fs/udf/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted UDF filesystem.
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
High
| 165,587
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
const vpx_image_t *img,
vpx_codec_pts_t pts,
unsigned int duration,
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags,
unsigned int deadline,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(ctx, img, pts, duration, flags,
deadline);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to encode frame.");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(ctx, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer, pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts))
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to write compressed frame.");
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void rfc_process_mx_message(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
MX_FRAME* p_rx_frame = &rfc_cb.rfc.rx_frame;
uint16_t length = p_buf->len;
uint8_t ea, cr, mx_len;
bool is_command;
p_rx_frame->ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->type = *p_data++ & ~(RFCOMM_CR_MASK | RFCOMM_EA_MASK);
if (!p_rx_frame->ea || !length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__
<< ": Invalid MX frame ea=" << std::to_string(p_rx_frame->ea)
<< ", len=" << length << ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
length--;
is_command = p_rx_frame->cr;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
mx_len = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH1;
length--;
if (!ea) {
mx_len += *p_data++ << RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH2;
length--;
}
if (mx_len != length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad MX frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
RFCOMM_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: type=%d, p_mcb=%p", __func__, p_rx_frame->type,
p_mcb);
switch (p_rx_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_MX_PN:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_PN_LEN) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Invalid PN length, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_DLCI_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.frame_type = *p_data & RFCOMM_PN_FRAME_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.conv_layer = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_CONV_LAYER_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.priority = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_PRIORITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.t1 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu = *p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8);
p_data += 2;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.n2 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.k = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_K_MASK;
if (!p_rx_frame->dlci || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu < RFCOMM_MIN_MTU) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu > RFCOMM_MAX_MTU)) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad PN frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_pn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_TEST:
if (!length) break;
p_rx_frame->u.test.p_data = p_data;
p_rx_frame->u.test.data_len = length;
p_buf->offset += 2;
p_buf->len -= 2;
if (is_command)
rfc_send_test(p_mcb, false, p_buf);
else
rfc_process_test_rsp(p_mcb, p_buf);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCON:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCON_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcon(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcoff(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_MSC:
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad MSC frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.msc.signals = *p_data++;
if (mx_len == RFCOMM_MX_MSC_LEN_WITH_BREAK) {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present =
*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_PRESENT_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration =
(*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_MASK) >> RFCOMM_MSC_SHIFT_BREAK;
} else {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present = false;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration = 0;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_msc(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_NSC:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_NSC_LEN) || !is_command) break;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.type = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_nsc(p_mcb, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RPN:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN) && (length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_LEN))
break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request = (length == RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN);
if (!p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request) {
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.baud_rate = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.byte_size =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.stop_bits =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity_type =
(*p_data++ >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_SHIFT) &
RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.fc_type = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_FC_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xon_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xoff_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.param_mask =
(*p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8)) & RFCOMM_RPN_PM_MASK;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rpn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request,
p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RLS:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_RLS_LEN) break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
p_rx_frame->u.rls.line_status = (*p_data & ~0x01);
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rls(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
if (is_command) rfc_send_nsc(p_mcb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In rfc_process_mx_message of rfc_ts_frames.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-80432928
Commit Message: Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
|
Low
| 174,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
if (apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile_))
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
|
Medium
| 172,089
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
|
Low
| 169,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::WillSendRequest(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
GURL* new_url) {
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
url,
GURL(frame->document().url()),
extension_dispatcher_->extensions())) {
*new_url = GURL("chrome-extension://invalid/");
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,000
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebUIExtension::Send(gin::Arguments* args) {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame;
RenderFrame* render_frame;
if (!ShouldRespondToRequest(&frame, &render_frame))
return;
std::string message;
if (!args->GetNext(&message)) {
args->ThrowError();
return;
}
if (base::EndsWith(message, "RequiringGesture",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) &&
!blink::WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(frame)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> content;
if (args->PeekNext().IsEmpty() || args->PeekNext()->IsUndefined()) {
content.reset(new base::ListValue());
} else {
v8::Local<v8::Object> obj;
if (!args->GetNext(&obj)) {
args->ThrowError();
return;
}
content = base::ListValue::From(V8ValueConverter::Create()->FromV8Value(
obj, frame->MainWorldScriptContext()));
DCHECK(content);
}
render_frame->Send(new FrameHostMsg_WebUISend(render_frame->GetRoutingID(),
frame->GetDocument().Url(),
message, *content));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use after free in WebUI in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Validate frame after conversion in chrome.send
BUG=797511
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/797511#c1
Change-Id: Ib1a99db4d7648fb1325eb6d7af4ef111d6dda4cb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844076
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526197}
|
Medium
| 172,695
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_ptrace(compat_long_t request, compat_long_t pid,
compat_long_t addr, compat_long_t data)
{
struct task_struct *child;
long ret;
if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
ret = ptrace_traceme();
goto out;
}
child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid);
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(child);
goto out;
}
if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
/*
* Some architectures need to do book-keeping after
* a ptrace attach.
*/
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(child);
goto out_put_task_struct;
}
ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
if (!ret)
ret = compat_arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
out_put_task_struct:
put_task_struct(child);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,137
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Start() {
DVLOG(2) << "Starting SafeBrowsing download check for: "
<< item_->DebugString(true);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DownloadCheckResultReason reason = REASON_MAX;
if (!IsSupportedDownload(
*item_, item_->GetTargetFilePath(), &reason, &type_)) {
switch (reason) {
case REASON_EMPTY_URL_CHAIN:
case REASON_INVALID_URL:
case REASON_UNSUPPORTED_URL_SCHEME:
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, reason);
return;
case REASON_NOT_BINARY_FILE:
RecordFileExtensionType(item_->GetTargetFilePath());
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, reason);
return;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
RecordFileExtensionType(item_->GetTargetFilePath());
if (item_->GetTargetFilePath().MatchesExtension(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".zip"))) {
StartExtractZipFeatures();
} else {
DCHECK(!download_protection_util::IsArchiveFile(
item_->GetTargetFilePath()));
StartExtractFileFeatures();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
|
Low
| 171,715
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
DCHECK(resources_list.size() == referrers_list.size());
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaymentRequest::AreRequestedMethodsSupportedCallback(
bool methods_supported) {
if (methods_supported) {
if (SatisfiesSkipUIConstraints()) {
skipped_payment_request_ui_ = true;
Pay();
}
} else {
journey_logger_.SetNotShown(
JourneyLogger::NOT_SHOWN_REASON_NO_SUPPORTED_PAYMENT_METHOD);
client_->OnError(mojom::PaymentErrorReason::NOT_SUPPORTED);
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnNotSupportedError();
OnConnectionTerminated();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
|
Medium
| 173,079
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataSaverEnabledByUser() const {
//// static
if (params::ShouldForceEnableDataReductionProxy())
return true;
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetPrefName().empty())
return false;
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
Medium
| 172,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/*set_parameter can be called in loaded state
or disabled port */
if (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded
|| m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE
|| m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
if (!dev_is_video_session_supported(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("video session not supported");
omx_report_unsupported_setting();
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (In_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return handle->hw_overload ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
memcpy(&m_sInPortDef, portDefn,sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
#endif
/*Query Input Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sInPortDef.nPortIndex);
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else if (PORT_INDEX_OUT == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (Out_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param output failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
#endif
memcpy(&m_sOutPortDef,portDefn,sizeof(struct OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
update_profile_level(); //framerate , bitrate
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
m_sConfigFramerate.xEncodeFramerate = portDefn->format.video.xFramerate;
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
update_profile_level(); //framerate
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portFmt->eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
#endif
{
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB;
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
}
m_sInPortFormat.xFramerate = portFmt->xFramerate;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit:
{ //TODO, do we need this index set param
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE);
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE*)(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set OMX_IndexParamVideoInit called");
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.eControlRate = pParam->eControlRate;
update_profile_level(); //bitrate
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("bitrate = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE mp4_param;
memcpy(&mp4_param, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
if (pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
mp4_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MPEG4: %u BFrames are being set", (unsigned int)mp4_param.nBFrames);
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&mp4_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamMPEG4,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = mp4_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoH263) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamH263,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamH263.nPFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamH263.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE avc_param;
memcpy(&avc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
if ((pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh)||
(pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain)) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 2) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: 2 RefFrames are needed, changing RefFrames from %u to 2", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 2;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes) {
avc_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
avc_param.nRefFrames = (avc_param.nBFrames < 4)? avc_param.nBFrames + 1 : 4;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("AVC: RefFrames: %u, BFrames: %u", (unsigned int)avc_param.nRefFrames, (unsigned int)avc_param.nBFrames);
avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC = (OMX_BOOL)(avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC && entropy);
avc_param.nCabacInitIdc = entropy ? avc_param.nCabacInitIdc : 0;
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&avc_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamAVC,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamAVC.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = avc_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames;
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE vp8_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
if (pParam->nDCTPartitions != m_sParamVP8.nDCTPartitions ||
pParam->bErrorResilientMode != m_sParamVP8.bErrorResilientMode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VP8 doesn't support nDCTPartitions or bErrorResilientMode");
}
memcpy(&vp8_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&vp8_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamVP8,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE hevc_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
memcpy(&hevc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&hevc_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed : set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamHEVC, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
if (handle->venc_set_param(pParam,OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent failed for Profile: %u "
"Level :%u", (unsigned int)pParam->eProfile, (unsigned int)pParam->eLevel);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MPEG4 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile,
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamH263.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_H263PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamH263.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_H263LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("H263 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamH263.eProfile,
m_sParamH263.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("\n AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamVP8.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamVP8.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VP8 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamVP8.eProfile,
m_sParamVP8.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamHEVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("HEVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamHEVC.eProfile,
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel);
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE);
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s\n", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %s", m_nkind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_sInBufSupplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE*) paramData;
if (session_qp->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpI = session_qp->nQpI;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpP = session_qp->nQpP;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpB = session_qp->nQpB;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for Session QP setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *qp_range = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE*) paramData;
if (qp_range->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQPRange.minQP= qp_range->minQP;
m_sSessionQPRange.maxQP= qp_range->maxQP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for QP range setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: SetParameter called on unsupported Port Index for QcomPortDefn");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Error Resilience failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sErrorCorrection,pParam, sizeof(m_sErrorCorrection));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra refresh failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sIntraRefresh, pParam, sizeof(m_sIntraRefresh));
break;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams);
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *pParam =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter:OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode: "
"port_index = %u, meta_mode = %d", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex, pParam->bStoreMetaData);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
if (meta_mode_enable) {
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin;
if (handle->venc_set_param(&m_sInPortDef,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
/*TODO: reset encoder driver Meta mode*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
}
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT && secure_session) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("\nERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: metamode is "
"valid for input port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
break;
#endif
#if !defined(MAX_RES_720P) || defined(_MSM8974_)
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType");
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *pParam = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *)paramData;
bool enable = false;
OMX_U32 mask = 0;
if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_SLICEINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("SliceInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Slice information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
} else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_MBINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MBInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: MB information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#ifndef _MSM8974_
else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoLTRInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_LTRINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("LTRInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: LTR information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: unsupported extrdata index (%x)",
pParam->nIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
m_sExtraData |= mask;
else
m_sExtraData &= ~mask;
enable = !!(m_sExtraData & mask);
if (handle->venc_set_param(&enable,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)pParam->nIndex) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Extradata (%x) failed", pParam->nIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("updated out_buf_req: buffer cnt=%u, "
"count min=%u, buffer size=%u",
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize);
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRMode, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRMode));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR count failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRCount, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRCount));
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
handle->m_max_allowed_bitrate_check =
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? true : false);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: max allowed bitrate check %s",
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck "
" called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting slice delivery mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, PrependSPSPPSToIDRFramesParams);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:",
"request for inband sps/pps failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_H264_AUD);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamh264AUDelimiter:",
"request for AU Delimiters failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS);
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if((pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType == QOMX_HIERARCHICALCODING_B) && pParam->nNumLayers)
hier_b_enabled = true;
m_sHierLayers.nNumLayers = pParam->nNumLayers;
m_sHierLayers.eHierarchicalCodingType = pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure called on wrong port(%u)",
(unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting performance level");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting VUI timing info");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting peak bitrate");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable initial QP failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamInitqp, paramData, sizeof(m_sParamInitqp));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Searchrange");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_HYBRID_HP_MODE);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable Hybrid Hier-P failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27662502.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
|
Medium
| 173,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jas_iccgetuint(jas_stream_t *in, int n, ulonglong *val)
{
int i;
int c;
ulonglong v;
v = 0;
for (i = n; i > 0; --i) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF)
return -1;
v = (v << 8) | c;
}
*val = v;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
int tok, const char *next, const char **nextPtr, XML_Bool haveMore) {
#ifdef XML_DTD
static const XML_Char externalSubsetName[] = {ASCII_HASH, '\0'};
#endif /* XML_DTD */
static const XML_Char atypeCDATA[]
= {ASCII_C, ASCII_D, ASCII_A, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeID[] = {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREF[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREFS[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITY[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T, ASCII_Y, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITIES[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_E, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKEN[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K, ASCII_E, ASCII_N, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKENS[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K,
ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char notationPrefix[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_O, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_O, ASCII_N, ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueSep[] = {ASCII_PIPE, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueStart[] = {ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
enum XML_Content_Quant quant;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
for (;;) {
int role;
XML_Bool handleDefault = XML_TRUE;
*eventPP = s;
*eventEndPP = next;
if (tok <= 0) {
if (haveMore && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case -XML_TOK_PROLOG_S:
tok = -tok;
break;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* for internal PE NOT referenced between declarations */
if (enc != parser->m_encoding
&& ! parser->m_openInternalEntities->betweenDecl) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
/* WFC: PE Between Declarations - must check that PE contains
complete markup, not only for external PEs, but also for
internal PEs if the reference occurs between declarations.
*/
if (parser->m_isParamEntity || enc != parser->m_encoding) {
if (XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, XML_TOK_NONE, end, end, enc)
== XML_ROLE_ERROR)
return XML_ERROR_INCOMPLETE_PE;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
default:
tok = -tok;
next = end;
break;
}
}
role = XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, tok, s, next, enc);
switch (role) {
case XML_ROLE_XML_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 0, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NAME:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_doctypeName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL; /* always initialize to NULL */
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 1);
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_TEXT_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 1, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
XML_Char *pubId;
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
pubId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! pubId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(pubId);
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = pubId;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
goto alreadyChecked;
}
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
alreadyChecked:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
XML_Char *tem
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = tem;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_CLOSE:
if (parser->m_doctypeName) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 0);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
/* parser->m_doctypeSysid will be non-NULL in the case of a previous
XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID, even if parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler
was not set, indicating an external subset
*/
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid || parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity) {
/* The external subset name "#" will have already been
* inserted into the hash table at the start of the
* external entity parsing, so no allocation will happen
* and lookup() cannot fail.
*/
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD)
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else if (! parser->m_doctypeSysid)
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_INSTANCE_START:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* if there is no DOCTYPE declaration then now is the
last chance to read the foreign DTD
*/
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
return contentProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_ELEMENT_NAME:
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NAME:
parser->m_declAttributeId = getAttributeId(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declAttributeId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_CDATA:
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeCDATA;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ID:
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeID;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREF:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREF;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREFS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREFS;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITY:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITIES:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITIES;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKEN:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKEN;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKENS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKENS;
checkAttListDeclHandler:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_ENUM_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *prefix;
if (parser->m_declAttributeType) {
prefix = enumValueSep;
} else {
prefix = (role == XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE ? notationPrefix
: enumValueStart);
}
if (! poolAppendString(&parser->m_tempPool, prefix))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! poolAppend(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_IMPLIED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
if (! defineAttribute(parser->m_declElementType,
parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
parser->m_declAttributeIsId, 0, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType, 0,
role == XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *attVal;
enum XML_Error result = storeAttributeValue(
parser, enc, parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar, &dtd->pool);
if (result)
return result;
attVal = poolStart(&dtd->pool);
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* ID attributes aren't allowed to have a default */
if (! defineAttribute(
parser->m_declElementType, parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata, XML_FALSE, attVal, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType,
attVal, role == XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
enum XML_Error result = storeEntityValue(
parser, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->textPtr = poolStart(&dtd->entityValuePool);
parser->m_declEntity->textLen
= (int)(poolLength(&dtd->entityValuePool));
poolFinish(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, parser->m_declEntity->textPtr,
parser->m_declEntity->textLen, parser->m_curBase, 0, 0, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else
poolDiscard(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeSysid = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
else
/* use externalSubsetName to make parser->m_doctypeSysid non-NULL
for the case where no parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler is set */
parser->m_doctypeSysid = externalSubsetName;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone
#ifdef XML_DTD
&& ! parser->m_paramEntityParsing
#endif /* XML_DTD */
&& parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
#ifndef XML_DTD
break;
#else /* XML_DTD */
if (! parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->systemId
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->base = parser->m_curBase;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_COMPLETE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity
&& parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, 0, 0, parser->m_declEntity->base,
parser->m_declEntity->systemId, parser->m_declEntity->publicId, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NOTATION_NAME:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->notation
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
if (parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} else if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name, 0, 0, 0,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GENERAL_ENTITY_NAME: {
if (XmlPredefinedEntityName(enc, s, next)) {
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
break;
}
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_FALSE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
} break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_NAME:
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_TRUE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
#else /* not XML_DTD */
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NAME:
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declNotationName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declNotationName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
if (parser
->m_declNotationName) { /* means m_notationDeclHandler != NULL */
XML_Char *tem = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = tem;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationName && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *systemId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
systemId, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NO_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationPublicId && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
0, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_ERROR:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
/* PE references in internal subset are
not allowed within declarations. */
return XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
default:
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_IGNORE_SECT: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
result = doIgnoreSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = ignoreSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_OPEN:
if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
if (parser->m_groupSize) {
{
char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
if (new_connector == NULL) {
parser->m_groupSize /= 2;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_groupConnector = new_connector;
}
if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
if (new_scaff_index == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffIndex = new_scaff_index;
}
} else {
parser->m_groupConnector
= (char *)MALLOC(parser, parser->m_groupSize = 32);
if (! parser->m_groupConnector) {
parser->m_groupSize = 0;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = 0;
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
assert(dtd->scaffIndex != NULL);
dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel] = myindex;
dtd->scaffLevel++;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_SEQ;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_SEQUENCE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_PIPE)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_COMMA;
if (dtd->in_eldecl && parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CHOICE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_COMMA)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
if (dtd->in_eldecl
&& ! parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level]
&& (dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
!= XML_CTYPE_MIXED)) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_CHOICE;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_PIPE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_INNER_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_paramEntityParsing)
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
else {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* first, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity handler
*/
if (parser->m_prologState.documentEntity
&& (dtd->standalone ? ! parser->m_openInternalEntities
: ! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs)) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal) {
/* It's hard to exhaustively search the code to be sure,
* but there doesn't seem to be a way of executing the
* following line. There are two cases:
*
* If 'standalone' is false, the DTD must have no
* parameter entities or we wouldn't have passed the outer
* 'if' statement. That measn the only entity in the hash
* table is the external subset name "#" which cannot be
* given as a parameter entity name in XML syntax, so the
* lookup must have returned NULL and we don't even reach
* the test for an internal entity.
*
* If 'standalone' is true, it does not seem to be
* possible to create entities taking this code path that
* are not internal entities, so fail the test above.
*
* Because this analysis is very uncertain, the code is
* being left in place and merely removed from the
* coverage test statistics.
*/
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
} else if (! entity) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
/* cannot report skipped entities in declarations */
if ((role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF)
&& parser->m_skippedEntityHandler) {
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 1);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Bool betweenDecl
= (role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF ? XML_TRUE : XML_FALSE);
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, betweenDecl);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId)) {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
}
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
if (! dtd->paramEntityRead) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
} else {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
break;
/* Element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NAME:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffLevel = 0;
dtd->scaffCount = 0;
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_TRUE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY:
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_EMPTY:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
XML_Content *content
= (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Content));
if (! content)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
content->quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
content->name = NULL;
content->numchildren = 0;
content->children = NULL;
content->type = ((role == XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY) ? XML_CTYPE_ANY
: XML_CTYPE_EMPTY);
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, content);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_PCDATA:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_MIXED;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
elementContent:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
const XML_Char *name;
int nameLen;
const char *nxt
= (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_NAME;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].quant = quant;
el = getElementType(parser, enc, s, nxt);
if (! el)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
name = el->name;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].name = name;
nameLen = 0;
for (; name[nameLen++];)
;
dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
closeGroup:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
dtd->scaffLevel--;
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel]].quant = quant;
if (dtd->scaffLevel == 0) {
if (! handleDefault) {
XML_Content *model = build_model(parser);
if (! model)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, model);
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
dtd->contentStringLen = 0;
}
}
break;
/* End element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NONE:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_BOM:
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NONE:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NONE:
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NONE:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
} /* end of big switch */
if (handleDefault && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(enc, s, end, &next);
}
}
/* not reached */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat before 2.2.8, crafted XML input could fool the parser into changing from DTD parsing to document parsing too early; a consecutive call to XML_GetCurrentLineNumber (or XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber) then resulted in a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
Low
| 169,529
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: aiff_read_chanmap (SF_PRIVATE * psf, unsigned dword)
{ const AIFF_CAF_CHANNEL_MAP * map_info ;
unsigned channel_bitmap, channel_decriptions, bytesread ;
int layout_tag ;
bytesread = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "444", &layout_tag, &channel_bitmap, &channel_decriptions) ;
if ((map_info = aiff_caf_of_channel_layout_tag (layout_tag)) == NULL)
return 0 ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Tag : %x\n", layout_tag) ;
if (map_info)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Layout : %s\n", map_info->name) ;
if (bytesread < dword)
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "j", dword - bytesread) ;
if (map_info->channel_map != NULL)
{ size_t chanmap_size = psf->sf.channels * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
if ((psf->channel_map = malloc (chanmap_size)) == NULL)
return SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
memcpy (psf->channel_map, map_info->channel_map, chanmap_size) ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* aiff_read_chanmap */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile version 1.0.28, an error in the *aiff_read_chanmap()* function (aiff.c) can be exploited to cause an out-of-bounds read memory access via a specially crafted AIFF file.
Commit Message: src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
|
Medium
| 168,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PixarLogDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* op, tmsize_t occ, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PixarLogDecode";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
PixarLogState* sp = DecoderState(tif);
tmsize_t i;
tmsize_t nsamples;
int llen;
uint16 *up;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
nsamples = occ / sizeof(float); /* XXX float == 32 bits */
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_12BITPICIO:
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_11BITLOG:
nsamples = occ / sizeof(uint16); /* XXX uint16 == 16 bits */
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BIT:
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BITABGR:
nsamples = occ;
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"%d bit input not supported in PixarLog",
td->td_bitspersample);
return 0;
}
llen = sp->stride * td->td_imagewidth;
(void) s;
assert(sp != NULL);
sp->stream.next_out = (unsigned char *) sp->tbuf;
assert(sizeof(sp->stream.avail_out)==4); /* if this assert gets raised,
we need to simplify this code to reflect a ZLib that is likely updated
to deal with 8byte memory sizes, though this code will respond
appropriately even before we simplify it */
sp->stream.avail_out = (uInt) (nsamples * sizeof(uint16));
if (sp->stream.avail_out != nsamples * sizeof(uint16))
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "ZLib cannot deal with buffers this size");
return (0);
}
do {
int state = inflate(&sp->stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (state == Z_STREAM_END) {
break; /* XXX */
}
if (state == Z_DATA_ERROR) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Decoding error at scanline %lu, %s",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row, sp->stream.msg ? sp->stream.msg : "(null)");
if (inflateSync(&sp->stream) != Z_OK)
return (0);
continue;
}
if (state != Z_OK) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "ZLib error: %s",
sp->stream.msg ? sp->stream.msg : "(null)");
return (0);
}
} while (sp->stream.avail_out > 0);
/* hopefully, we got all the bytes we needed */
if (sp->stream.avail_out != 0) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Not enough data at scanline %lu (short " TIFF_UINT64_FORMAT " bytes)",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row, (TIFF_UINT64_T) sp->stream.avail_out);
return (0);
}
up = sp->tbuf;
/* Swap bytes in the data if from a different endian machine. */
if (tif->tif_flags & TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(up, nsamples);
/*
* if llen is not an exact multiple of nsamples, the decode operation
* may overflow the output buffer, so truncate it enough to prevent
* that but still salvage as much data as possible.
*/
if (nsamples % llen) {
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"stride %lu is not a multiple of sample count, "
"%lu, data truncated.", (unsigned long) llen, (unsigned long) nsamples);
nsamples -= nsamples % llen;
}
for (i = 0; i < nsamples; i += llen, up += llen) {
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
horizontalAccumulateF(up, llen, sp->stride,
(float *)op, sp->ToLinearF);
op += llen * sizeof(float);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
horizontalAccumulate16(up, llen, sp->stride,
(uint16 *)op, sp->ToLinear16);
op += llen * sizeof(uint16);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_12BITPICIO:
horizontalAccumulate12(up, llen, sp->stride,
(int16 *)op, sp->ToLinearF);
op += llen * sizeof(int16);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_11BITLOG:
horizontalAccumulate11(up, llen, sp->stride,
(uint16 *)op);
op += llen * sizeof(uint16);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BIT:
horizontalAccumulate8(up, llen, sp->stride,
(unsigned char *)op, sp->ToLinear8);
op += llen * sizeof(unsigned char);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BITABGR:
horizontalAccumulate8abgr(up, llen, sp->stride,
(unsigned char *)op, sp->ToLinear8);
op += llen * sizeof(unsigned char);
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Unsupported bits/sample: %d",
td->td_bitspersample);
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Buffer overflow in the PixarLogDecode function in tif_pixarlog.c in LibTIFF 4.0.6 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, as demonstrated by overwriting the vgetparent function pointer with rgb2ycbcr.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
|
Medium
| 169,449
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || len < 1 || len > 8) {
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
const unsigned long long rollover_check =
static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + len;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
|
Medium
| 174,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ivr_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
unsigned tag, type, len, tlen, value;
int i, j, n, count, nb_streams = 0, ret;
uint8_t key[256], val[256];
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
int64_t pos, offset, temp;
pos = avio_tell(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag == MKTAG('.','R','1','M')) {
if (avio_rb16(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, len);
avio_skip(pb, 5);
temp = avio_rb64(pb);
while (!avio_feof(pb) && temp) {
offset = temp;
temp = avio_rb64(pb);
}
avio_skip(pb, offset - avio_tell(pb));
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, len);
if (avio_r8(pb) != 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 16);
pos = avio_tell(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
}
if (tag != MKTAG('.','R','E','C'))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_r8(pb) != 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
count = avio_rb32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
type = avio_r8(pb);
tlen = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_get_str(pb, tlen, key, sizeof(key));
len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (type == 5) {
avio_get_str(pb, len, val, sizeof(val));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '%s'\n", key, val);
} else if (type == 4) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '0x", key);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%X", avio_r8(pb));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "'\n");
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3 && !strncmp(key, "StreamCount", tlen)) {
nb_streams = value = avio_rb32(pb);
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3) {
value = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %d\n", key, value);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Skipping unsupported key: %s\n", key);
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
for (n = 0; n < nb_streams; n++) {
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (avio_r8(pb) != 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
count = avio_rb32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
type = avio_r8(pb);
tlen = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_get_str(pb, tlen, key, sizeof(key));
len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (type == 5) {
avio_get_str(pb, len, val, sizeof(val));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '%s'\n", key, val);
} else if (type == 4 && !strncmp(key, "OpaqueData", tlen)) {
ret = ffio_ensure_seekback(pb, 4);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (avio_rb32(pb) == MKBETAG('M', 'L', 'T', 'I')) {
ret = rm_read_multi(s, pb, st, NULL);
} else {
avio_seek(pb, -4, SEEK_CUR);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, pb, st, st->priv_data, len, NULL);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
} else if (type == 4) {
int j;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = '0x", key);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%X", avio_r8(pb));
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "'\n");
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3 && !strncmp(key, "Duration", tlen)) {
st->duration = avio_rb32(pb);
} else if (len == 4 && type == 3) {
value = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %d\n", key, value);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Skipping unsupported key: %s\n", key);
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
}
if (avio_r8(pb) != 6)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 12);
avio_skip(pb, avio_rb64(pb) + pos - avio_tell(s->pb));
if (avio_r8(pb) != 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, 8);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In libavformat/rmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in ivr_read_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted IVR file, which claims a large *len* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the first type==4 loop would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 167,778
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: setPath(JsonbIterator **it, Datum *path_elems,
bool *path_nulls, int path_len,
JsonbParseState **st, int level, Jsonb *newval, bool create)
{
JsonbValue v;
JsonbValue *res = NULL;
int r;
if (path_nulls[level])
elog(ERROR, "path element at the position %d is NULL", level + 1);
switch (r)
{
case WJB_BEGIN_ARRAY:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathArray(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.array.nElems, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, false);
Assert(r == WJB_END_ARRAY);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_BEGIN_OBJECT:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathObject(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.object.nPairs, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, true);
Assert(r == WJB_END_OBJECT);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_ELEM:
case WJB_VALUE:
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, &v);
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "impossible state");
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in json parsing in PostgreSQL before 9.3.x before 9.3.10 and 9.4.x before 9.4.5 allow attackers to cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors, which are not properly handled in (1) json or (2) jsonb values.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,681
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - Remove deprecated image defines
libvpx has always supported the VPX_ prefixed versions of these defines.
The unprefixed versions have been removed in the most recent release.
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libvpx/+/9cdaa3d72eade9ad162ef8f78a93bd8f85c6de10
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: I8a656f2262f117d7a95271f45100b8c6fd0a470f
|
Low
| 173,899
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_handler (void *opaque, int fd)
{
struct io_cb_data *data = (struct io_cb_data *) opaque;
engine_uiserver_t uiserver = (engine_uiserver_t) data->handler_value;
gpgme_error_t err = 0;
char *line;
size_t linelen;
do
{
err = assuan_read_line (uiserver->assuan_ctx, &line, &linelen);
if (err)
{
/* Try our best to terminate the connection friendly. */
/* assuan_write_line (uiserver->assuan_ctx, "BYE"); */
TRACE3 (DEBUG_CTX, "gpgme:status_handler", uiserver,
"fd 0x%x: error from assuan (%d) getting status line : %s",
fd, err, gpg_strerror (err));
}
else if (linelen >= 3
&& line[0] == 'E' && line[1] == 'R' && line[2] == 'R'
&& (line[3] == '\0' || line[3] == ' '))
{
if (line[3] == ' ')
err = atoi (&line[4]);
if (! err)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
TRACE2 (DEBUG_CTX, "gpgme:status_handler", uiserver,
"fd 0x%x: ERR line - mapped to: %s",
fd, err ? gpg_strerror (err) : "ok");
/* Try our best to terminate the connection friendly. */
/* assuan_write_line (uiserver->assuan_ctx, "BYE"); */
}
else if (linelen >= 2
&& line[0] == 'O' && line[1] == 'K'
&& (line[2] == '\0' || line[2] == ' '))
{
if (uiserver->status.fnc)
err = uiserver->status.fnc (uiserver->status.fnc_value,
GPGME_STATUS_EOF, "");
if (!err && uiserver->colon.fnc && uiserver->colon.any)
{
/* We must tell a colon function about the EOF. We do
this only when we have seen any data lines. Note
that this inlined use of colon data lines will
eventually be changed into using a regular data
channel. */
uiserver->colon.any = 0;
err = uiserver->colon.fnc (uiserver->colon.fnc_value, NULL);
}
TRACE2 (DEBUG_CTX, "gpgme:status_handler", uiserver,
"fd 0x%x: OK line - final status: %s",
fd, err ? gpg_strerror (err) : "ok");
_gpgme_io_close (uiserver->status_cb.fd);
return err;
}
else if (linelen > 2
&& line[0] == 'D' && line[1] == ' '
&& uiserver->colon.fnc)
{
/* We are using the colon handler even for plain inline data
- strange name for that function but for historic reasons
we keep it. */
/* FIXME We can't use this for binary data because we
assume this is a string. For the current usage of colon
output it is correct. */
char *src = line + 2;
char *end = line + linelen;
char *dst;
char **aline = &uiserver->colon.attic.line;
int *alinelen = &uiserver->colon.attic.linelen;
if (uiserver->colon.attic.linesize < *alinelen + linelen + 1)
{
char *newline = realloc (*aline, *alinelen + linelen + 1);
if (!newline)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
*aline = newline;
uiserver->colon.attic.linesize += linelen + 1;
}
}
if (!err)
{
dst = *aline + *alinelen;
while (!err && src < end)
{
if (*src == '%' && src + 2 < end)
{
/* Handle escaped characters. */
++src;
*dst = _gpgme_hextobyte (src);
(*alinelen)++;
src += 2;
}
else
{
*dst = *src++;
(*alinelen)++;
}
if (*dst == '\n')
{
/* Terminate the pending line, pass it to the colon
handler and reset it. */
uiserver->colon.any = 1;
if (*alinelen > 1 && *(dst - 1) == '\r')
dst--;
*dst = '\0';
/* FIXME How should we handle the return code? */
err = uiserver->colon.fnc (uiserver->colon.fnc_value, *aline);
if (!err)
{
dst = *aline;
*alinelen = 0;
}
}
else
dst++;
}
}
TRACE2 (DEBUG_CTX, "gpgme:status_handler", uiserver,
"fd 0x%x: D line; final status: %s",
fd, err? gpg_strerror (err):"ok");
}
else if (linelen > 2
&& line[0] == 'D' && line[1] == ' '
&& uiserver->inline_data)
{
char *src = line + 2;
char *end = line + linelen;
char *dst = src;
gpgme_ssize_t nwritten;
linelen = 0;
while (src < end)
{
if (*src == '%' && src + 2 < end)
{
/* Handle escaped characters. */
++src;
*dst++ = _gpgme_hextobyte (src);
src += 2;
}
else
*dst++ = *src++;
linelen++;
}
src = line + 2;
while (linelen > 0)
{
nwritten = gpgme_data_write (uiserver->inline_data, src, linelen);
if (!nwritten || (nwritten < 0 && errno != EINTR)
|| nwritten > linelen)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
src += nwritten;
linelen -= nwritten;
}
TRACE2 (DEBUG_CTX, "gpgme:status_handler", uiserver,
"fd 0x%x: D inlinedata; final status: %s",
fd, err? gpg_strerror (err):"ok");
}
else if (linelen > 2
&& line[0] == 'S' && line[1] == ' ')
{
char *rest;
gpgme_status_code_t r;
rest = strchr (line + 2, ' ');
if (!rest)
rest = line + linelen; /* set to an empty string */
else
*(rest++) = 0;
r = _gpgme_parse_status (line + 2);
if (r >= 0)
{
if (uiserver->status.fnc)
err = uiserver->status.fnc (uiserver->status.fnc_value, r, rest);
}
else
fprintf (stderr, "[UNKNOWN STATUS]%s %s", line + 2, rest);
TRACE3 (DEBUG_CTX, "gpgme:status_handler", uiserver,
"fd 0x%x: S line (%s) - final status: %s",
fd, line+2, err? gpg_strerror (err):"ok");
}
else if (linelen >= 7
&& line[0] == 'I' && line[1] == 'N' && line[2] == 'Q'
&& line[3] == 'U' && line[4] == 'I' && line[5] == 'R'
&& line[6] == 'E'
&& (line[7] == '\0' || line[7] == ' '))
{
char *keyword = line+7;
while (*keyword == ' ')
keyword++;;
default_inq_cb (uiserver, keyword);
assuan_write_line (uiserver->assuan_ctx, "END");
}
}
while (!err && assuan_pending_line (uiserver->assuan_ctx));
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the status_handler function in (1) engine-gpgsm.c and (2) engine-uiserver.c in GPGME before 1.5.1 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors related to "different line lengths in a specific order."
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A missing check for JS-simulated input events in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to download arbitrary files with no user input via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
|
???
| 173,192
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
{
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
image->matte=sun_info.depth == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) sun_info.length,
sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+7-bit,((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01));
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+7-bit,(*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01);
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(q)].red);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(q)].green);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(q)].blue);
}
q++;
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,606
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void btsnoop_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
if (logfile_fd != INVALID_FD)
write(logfile_fd, data, length);
btsnoop_net_write(data, length);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,472
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Extension::HasAPIPermission(const std::string& function_name) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_data_lock_);
return runtime_data_.GetActivePermissions()->
HasAccessToFunction(function_name);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly restrict API privileges during interaction with the Chrome Web Store, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static JSON_INLINE size_t num_buckets(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
return primes[hashtable->num_buckets];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
Low
| 166,534
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!intern->u.file.current_line && !intern->u.file.current_zval) {
spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (intern->u.file.current_line && (!SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV) || !intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
RETURN_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::key()
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(old_contents);
AddInterstitialObservers(new_contents->web_contents());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,512
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DevToolsSession::DevToolsSession(DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host,
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client)
: binding_(this),
agent_host_(agent_host),
client_(client),
process_host_id_(ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID),
host_(nullptr),
dispatcher_(new protocol::UberDispatcher(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
dispatcher_->setFallThroughForNotFound(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,247
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nfs4_close_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
int clear_rd, clear_wr, clear_rdwr;
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(calldata->arg.seqid, task) != 0)
return;
clear_rd = clear_wr = clear_rdwr = 0;
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
/* Calculate the change in open mode */
if (state->n_rdwr == 0) {
if (state->n_rdonly == 0) {
clear_rd |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
clear_rdwr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
if (state->n_wronly == 0) {
clear_wr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
clear_rdwr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (!clear_rd && !clear_wr && !clear_rdwr) {
/* Note: exit _without_ calling nfs4_close_done */
task->tk_action = NULL;
return;
}
nfs_fattr_init(calldata->res.fattr);
if (test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.open_flags = FMODE_READ;
} else if (test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.open_flags = FMODE_WRITE;
}
calldata->timestamp = jiffies;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,690
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionType option, OnigSyntaxType *syntax)
{
size_t len_left = len;
size_t len_req = 0;
char *p = str;
char c;
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_IGNORECASE) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'i';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_EXTEND) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'x';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & (ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE)) ==
(ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE)) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'p';
}
++len_req;
} else {
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'm';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 's';
}
++len_req;
}
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_FIND_LONGEST) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'l';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_FIND_NOT_EMPTY) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'n';
}
++len_req;
}
c = 0;
if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_JAVA) {
c = 'j';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_GNU_REGEX) {
c = 'u';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_GREP) {
c = 'g';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_EMACS) {
c = 'c';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY) {
c = 'r';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL) {
c = 'z';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_BASIC) {
c = 'b';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED) {
c = 'd';
}
if (c != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = c;
}
++len_req;
}
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = '\0';
}
++len_req;
if (len < len_req) {
return len_req;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
Low
| 167,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: KeyedService* LogoServiceFactory::BuildServiceInstanceFor(
content::BrowserContext* context) const {
Profile* profile = static_cast<Profile*>(context);
DCHECK(!profile->IsOffTheRecord());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool use_gray_background = !GetIsChromeHomeEnabled();
#else
bool use_gray_background = false;
#endif
return new LogoService(profile->GetPath().Append(kCachedLogoDirectory),
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile),
base::MakeUnique<suggestions::ImageDecoderImpl>(),
profile->GetRequestContext(), use_gray_background);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
|
Medium
| 171,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnCreateWindow(
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
int* route_id,
int* surface_id,
int64* cloned_session_storage_namespace_id) {
bool no_javascript_access;
bool can_create_window =
GetContentClient()->browser()->CanCreateWindow(
GURL(params.opener_url),
GURL(params.opener_security_origin),
params.window_container_type,
resource_context_,
render_process_id_,
&no_javascript_access);
if (!can_create_window) {
*route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
*surface_id = 0;
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl> cloned_namespace =
new SessionStorageNamespaceImpl(dom_storage_context_,
params.session_storage_namespace_id);
*cloned_session_storage_namespace_id = cloned_namespace->id();
render_widget_helper_->CreateNewWindow(params,
no_javascript_access,
peer_handle(),
route_id,
surface_id,
cloned_namespace);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 does not validate URLs during the opening of new windows, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,497
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin()
: speech_synthesizer_(NULL),
paused_(false) {
CoCreateInstance(
CLSID_SpVoice,
NULL,
CLSCTX_SERVER,
IID_ISpVoice,
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&speech_synthesizer_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,401
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_clip(jas_matrix_t *matrix, jas_seqent_t minval,
jas_seqent_t maxval)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t v;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
jas_seqent_t *data;
int rowstep;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
data = rowstart;
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
v = *data;
if (v < minval) {
*data = minval;
} else if (v > maxval) {
*data = maxval;
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,817
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int add_post_vars(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *vars, zend_bool eof TSRMLS_DC)
{
uint64_t max_vars = PG(max_input_vars);
vars->ptr = vars->str.c;
vars->end = vars->str.c + vars->str.len;
while (add_post_var(arr, vars, eof TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (++vars->cnt > max_vars) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"Input variables exceeded %" PRIu64 ". "
"To increase the limit change max_input_vars in php.ini.",
max_vars);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!eof) {
memmove(vars->str.c, vars->ptr, vars->str.len = vars->end - vars->ptr);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In PHP before 5.6.31, 7.x before 7.0.17, and 7.1.x before 7.1.3, remote attackers could cause a CPU consumption denial of service attack by injecting long form variables, related to main/php_variables.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
|
Low
| 168,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SecurityContext::SecurityContext()
: m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent(false)
, m_haveInitializedSecurityOrigin(false)
, m_sandboxFlags(SandboxNone)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during handling of the INPUT element, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted HTML document.
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
now_on_tap_version(0) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
Low
| 171,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void uipc_check_interrupt_locked(void)
{
if (SAFE_FD_ISSET(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &uipc_main.read_set))
{
char sig_recv = 0;
recv(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &sig_recv, sizeof(sig_recv), MSG_WAITALL);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,496
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PushMessagingServiceImpl::PushMessagingServiceImpl(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
push_subscription_count_(0),
pending_push_subscription_count_(0),
notification_manager_(profile),
push_messaging_service_observer_(PushMessagingServiceObserver::Create()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->AddObserver(this);
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
|
Medium
| 172,942
|
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