instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_table(type, lens, codes, table, bits, work)
codetype type;
unsigned short FAR *lens;
unsigned codes;
code FAR * FAR *table;
unsigned FAR *bits;
unsigned short FAR *work;
{
unsigned len; /* a code's length in bits */
unsigned sym; /* index of code symbols */
unsigned min, max; /* minimum and maximum code lengths */
unsigned root; /* number of index bits for root table */
unsigned curr; /* number of index bits for current table */
unsigned drop; /* code bits to drop for sub-table */
int left; /* number of prefix codes available */
unsigned used; /* code entries in table used */
unsigned huff; /* Huffman code */
unsigned incr; /* for incrementing code, index */
unsigned fill; /* index for replicating entries */
unsigned low; /* low bits for current root entry */
unsigned mask; /* mask for low root bits */
code here; /* table entry for duplication */
code FAR *next; /* next available space in table */
const unsigned short FAR *base; /* base value table to use */
const unsigned short FAR *extra; /* extra bits table to use */
int end; /* use base and extra for symbol > end */
unsigned short count[MAXBITS+1]; /* number of codes of each length */
unsigned short offs[MAXBITS+1]; /* offsets in table for each length */
static const unsigned short lbase[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 base */
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 27, 31,
35, 43, 51, 59, 67, 83, 99, 115, 131, 163, 195, 227, 258, 0, 0};
static const unsigned short lext[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 extra */
16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 17, 18, 18, 18, 18,
19, 19, 19, 19, 20, 20, 20, 20, 21, 21, 21, 21, 16, 203, 198};
static const unsigned short dbase[32] = { /* Distance codes 0..29 base */
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 17, 25, 33, 49, 65, 97, 129, 193,
257, 385, 513, 769, 1025, 1537, 2049, 3073, 4097, 6145,
8193, 12289, 16385, 24577, 0, 0};
static const unsigned short dext[32] = { /* Distance codes 0..29 extra */
16, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 18, 18, 19, 19, 20, 20, 21, 21, 22, 22,
23, 23, 24, 24, 25, 25, 26, 26, 27, 27,
28, 28, 29, 29, 64, 64};
/*
Process a set of code lengths to create a canonical Huffman code. The
code lengths are lens[0..codes-1]. Each length corresponds to the
symbols 0..codes-1. The Huffman code is generated by first sorting the
symbols by length from short to long, and retaining the symbol order
for codes with equal lengths. Then the code starts with all zero bits
for the first code of the shortest length, and the codes are integer
increments for the same length, and zeros are appended as the length
increases. For the deflate format, these bits are stored backwards
from their more natural integer increment ordering, and so when the
decoding tables are built in the large loop below, the integer codes
are incremented backwards.
This routine assumes, but does not check, that all of the entries in
lens[] are in the range 0..MAXBITS. The caller must assure this.
1..MAXBITS is interpreted as that code length. zero means that that
symbol does not occur in this code.
The codes are sorted by computing a count of codes for each length,
creating from that a table of starting indices for each length in the
sorted table, and then entering the symbols in order in the sorted
table. The sorted table is work[], with that space being provided by
the caller.
The length counts are used for other purposes as well, i.e. finding
the minimum and maximum length codes, determining if there are any
codes at all, checking for a valid set of lengths, and looking ahead
at length counts to determine sub-table sizes when building the
decoding tables.
*/
/* accumulate lengths for codes (assumes lens[] all in 0..MAXBITS) */
for (len = 0; len <= MAXBITS; len++)
count[len] = 0;
for (sym = 0; sym < codes; sym++)
count[lens[sym]]++;
/* bound code lengths, force root to be within code lengths */
root = *bits;
for (max = MAXBITS; max >= 1; max--)
if (count[max] != 0) break;
if (root > max) root = max;
if (max == 0) { /* no symbols to code at all */
here.op = (unsigned char)64; /* invalid code marker */
here.bits = (unsigned char)1;
here.val = (unsigned short)0;
*(*table)++ = here; /* make a table to force an error */
*(*table)++ = here;
*bits = 1;
return 0; /* no symbols, but wait for decoding to report error */
}
for (min = 1; min < max; min++)
if (count[min] != 0) break;
if (root < min) root = min;
/* check for an over-subscribed or incomplete set of lengths */
left = 1;
for (len = 1; len <= MAXBITS; len++) {
left <<= 1;
left -= count[len];
if (left < 0) return -1; /* over-subscribed */
}
if (left > 0 && (type == CODES || max != 1))
return -1; /* incomplete set */
/* generate offsets into symbol table for each length for sorting */
offs[1] = 0;
for (len = 1; len < MAXBITS; len++)
offs[len + 1] = offs[len] + count[len];
/* sort symbols by length, by symbol order within each length */
for (sym = 0; sym < codes; sym++)
if (lens[sym] != 0) work[offs[lens[sym]]++] = (unsigned short)sym;
/*
Create and fill in decoding tables. In this loop, the table being
filled is at next and has curr index bits. The code being used is huff
with length len. That code is converted to an index by dropping drop
bits off of the bottom. For codes where len is less than drop + curr,
those top drop + curr - len bits are incremented through all values to
fill the table with replicated entries.
root is the number of index bits for the root table. When len exceeds
root, sub-tables are created pointed to by the root entry with an index
of the low root bits of huff. This is saved in low to check for when a
new sub-table should be started. drop is zero when the root table is
being filled, and drop is root when sub-tables are being filled.
When a new sub-table is needed, it is necessary to look ahead in the
code lengths to determine what size sub-table is needed. The length
counts are used for this, and so count[] is decremented as codes are
entered in the tables.
used keeps track of how many table entries have been allocated from the
provided *table space. It is checked for LENS and DIST tables against
the constants ENOUGH_LENS and ENOUGH_DISTS to guard against changes in
the initial root table size constants. See the comments in inftrees.h
for more information.
sym increments through all symbols, and the loop terminates when
all codes of length max, i.e. all codes, have been processed. This
routine permits incomplete codes, so another loop after this one fills
in the rest of the decoding tables with invalid code markers.
*/
/* set up for code type */
switch (type) {
case CODES:
base = extra = work; /* dummy value--not used */
end = 19;
break;
case LENS:
base = lbase;
base -= 257;
extra = lext;
extra -= 257;
end = 256;
break;
default: /* DISTS */
base = dbase;
extra = dext;
end = -1;
}
/* initialize state for loop */
huff = 0; /* starting code */
sym = 0; /* starting code symbol */
len = min; /* starting code length */
next = *table; /* current table to fill in */
curr = root; /* current table index bits */
drop = 0; /* current bits to drop from code for index */
low = (unsigned)(-1); /* trigger new sub-table when len > root */
used = 1U << root; /* use root table entries */
mask = used - 1; /* mask for comparing low */
/* check available table space */
if ((type == LENS && used > ENOUGH_LENS) ||
(type == DISTS && used > ENOUGH_DISTS))
return 1;
/* process all codes and make table entries */
for (;;) {
/* create table entry */
here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
if ((int)(work[sym]) < end) {
here.op = (unsigned char)0;
here.val = work[sym];
}
else if ((int)(work[sym]) > end) {
here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym]]);
here.val = base[work[sym]];
}
else {
here.op = (unsigned char)(32 + 64); /* end of block */
here.val = 0;
}
/* replicate for those indices with low len bits equal to huff */
incr = 1U << (len - drop);
fill = 1U << curr;
min = fill; /* save offset to next table */
do {
fill -= incr;
next[(huff >> drop) + fill] = here;
} while (fill != 0);
/* backwards increment the len-bit code huff */
incr = 1U << (len - 1);
while (huff & incr)
incr >>= 1;
if (incr != 0) {
huff &= incr - 1;
huff += incr;
}
else
huff = 0;
/* go to next symbol, update count, len */
sym++;
if (--(count[len]) == 0) {
if (len == max) break;
len = lens[work[sym]];
}
/* create new sub-table if needed */
if (len > root && (huff & mask) != low) {
/* if first time, transition to sub-tables */
if (drop == 0)
drop = root;
/* increment past last table */
next += min; /* here min is 1 << curr */
/* determine length of next table */
curr = len - drop;
left = (int)(1 << curr);
while (curr + drop < max) {
left -= count[curr + drop];
if (left <= 0) break;
curr++;
left <<= 1;
}
/* check for enough space */
used += 1U << curr;
if ((type == LENS && used > ENOUGH_LENS) ||
(type == DISTS && used > ENOUGH_DISTS))
return 1;
/* point entry in root table to sub-table */
low = huff & mask;
(*table)[low].op = (unsigned char)curr;
(*table)[low].bits = (unsigned char)root;
(*table)[low].val = (unsigned short)(next - *table);
}
}
/* fill in remaining table entry if code is incomplete (guaranteed to have
at most one remaining entry, since if the code is incomplete, the
maximum code length that was allowed to get this far is one bit) */
if (huff != 0) {
here.op = (unsigned char)64; /* invalid code marker */
here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
here.val = (unsigned short)0;
next[huff] = here;
}
/* set return parameters */
*table += used;
*bits = root;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: inftrees.c in zlib 1.2.8 might allow context-dependent attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging improper pointer arithmetic.
Commit Message: Remove offset pointer optimization in inftrees.c.
inftrees.c was subtracting an offset from a pointer to an array,
in order to provide a pointer that allowed indexing starting at
the offset. This is not compliant with the C standard, for which
the behavior of a pointer decremented before its allocated memory
is undefined. Per the recommendation of a security audit of the
zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this tiny optimization was removed, in order
to avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
|
Medium
| 168,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct compat_user *dummy32 = NULL;
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
__u32 mask = PSW32_MASK_USER;
mask |= is_ri_task(child) ? PSW32_MASK_RI : 0;
/* Build a 64 bit psw mask from 31 bit mask. */
if ((tmp & ~mask) != PSW32_USER_BITS)
/* Invalid psw mask. */
return -EINVAL;
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_USER) |
(regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & mask) << 32;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.addr) {
/* Build a 64 bit psw address from 31 bit address. */
regs->psw.addr = (__u64) tmp & PSW32_ADDR_INSN;
/* Transfer 31 bit amode bit to psw mask. */
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & PSW32_ADDR_AMODE);
} else {
/* gpr 0-15 */
*(__u32*)((addr_t) ®s->psw + addr*2 + 4) = tmp;
}
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs;
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent writess of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
return 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs.fpc &&
test_fp_ctl(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs;
*(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.per_info;
__poke_user_per_compat(child, addr, data);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.8 on the s390 platform does not properly restrict address-space control operations in PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA requests, which allows local users to obtain read and write access to kernel memory locations, and consequently gain privileges, via a crafted application that makes a ptrace system call.
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
|
Low
| 166,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ieee802_11_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int orig_caplen, int pad,
u_int fcslen)
{
uint16_t fc;
u_int caplen, hdrlen, meshdrlen;
struct lladdr_info src, dst;
int llc_hdrlen;
caplen = orig_caplen;
/* Remove FCS, if present */
if (length < fcslen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return caplen;
}
length -= fcslen;
if (caplen > length) {
/* Amount of FCS in actual packet data, if any */
fcslen = caplen - length;
caplen -= fcslen;
ndo->ndo_snapend -= fcslen;
}
if (caplen < IEEE802_11_FC_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return orig_caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(ndo, fc);
if (hdrlen == 0) {
/* Unknown frame type or control frame subtype; quit. */
return (0);
}
if (pad)
hdrlen = roundup2(hdrlen, 4);
if (ndo->ndo_Hflag && FC_TYPE(fc) == T_DATA &&
DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(FC_SUBTYPE(fc))) {
meshdrlen = extract_mesh_header_length(p+hdrlen);
hdrlen += meshdrlen;
} else
meshdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ieee_802_11_hdr_print(ndo, fc, p, hdrlen, meshdrlen);
/*
* Go past the 802.11 header.
*/
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
p += hdrlen;
src.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
dst.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
switch (FC_TYPE(fc)) {
case T_MGMT:
get_mgmt_src_dst_mac(p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
if (!mgmt_body_print(ndo, fc, src.addr, p, length)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_CTRL:
if (!ctrl_body_print(ndo, fc, p - hdrlen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_DATA:
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_NULL(FC_SUBTYPE(fc)))
return hdrlen; /* no-data frame */
/* There may be a problem w/ AP not having this bit set */
if (FC_PROTECTED(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data"));
if (!wep_print(ndo, p)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
} else {
get_data_src_dst_mac(fc, p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, &src, &dst);
if (llc_hdrlen < 0) {
/*
* Some kinds of LLC packet we cannot
* handle intelligently
*/
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
llc_hdrlen = -llc_hdrlen;
}
hdrlen += llc_hdrlen;
}
break;
default:
/* We shouldn't get here - we should already have quit */
break;
}
return hdrlen;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c for the Mesh Flags subfield.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16227/IEEE 802.11: add a missing bounds check
ieee802_11_print() tried to access the Mesh Flags subfield of the Mesh
Control field to find the size of the latter and increment the expected
802.11 header length before checking it is fully present in the input
buffer. Add an intermediate bounds check to make it safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Ryan Ackroyd.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 169,821
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool CheckMov(const uint8* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 8);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 8 < buffer_size) {
int atomsize = Read32(buffer + offset);
uint32 atomtype = Read32(buffer + offset + 4);
switch (atomtype) {
case TAG('f','t','y','p'):
case TAG('p','d','i','n'):
case TAG('m','o','o','v'):
case TAG('m','o','o','f'):
case TAG('m','f','r','a'):
case TAG('m','d','a','t'):
case TAG('f','r','e','e'):
case TAG('s','k','i','p'):
case TAG('m','e','t','a'):
case TAG('m','e','c','o'):
case TAG('s','t','y','p'):
case TAG('s','i','d','x'):
case TAG('s','s','i','x'):
case TAG('p','r','f','t'):
case TAG('b','l','o','c'):
break;
default:
return false;
}
if (atomsize == 1) {
if (offset + 16 > buffer_size)
break;
if (Read32(buffer + offset + 8) != 0)
break; // Offset is way past buffer size.
atomsize = Read32(buffer + offset + 12);
}
if (atomsize <= 0)
break; // Indicates the last atom or length too big.
offset += atomsize;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the CheckMov function in media/base/container_names.cc in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large atom in (1) MPEG-4 or (2) QuickTime .mov data.
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
|
Low
| 171,611
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebPluginProxy::SetWindowlessPumpEvent(HANDLE pump_messages_event) {
HANDLE pump_messages_event_for_renderer = NULL;
DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(), pump_messages_event,
channel_->renderer_handle(),
&pump_messages_event_for_renderer,
0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS);
DCHECK(pump_messages_event_for_renderer != NULL);
Send(new PluginHostMsg_SetWindowlessPumpEvent(
route_id_, pump_messages_event_for_renderer));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int parse_import_ptr(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, struct reloc_t *reloc, int idx) {
int i, j, sym, wordsize;
ut32 stype;
wordsize = MACH0_(get_bits)(bin) / 8;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nsymtab) {
return 0;
}
if ((bin->symtab[idx].n_desc & REFERENCE_TYPE) == REFERENCE_FLAG_UNDEFINED_LAZY) {
stype = S_LAZY_SYMBOL_POINTERS;
} else {
stype = S_NON_LAZY_SYMBOL_POINTERS;
}
reloc->offset = 0;
reloc->addr = 0;
reloc->addend = 0;
#define CASE(T) case (T / 8): reloc->type = R_BIN_RELOC_ ## T; break
switch (wordsize) {
CASE(8);
CASE(16);
CASE(32);
CASE(64);
default: return false;
}
#undef CASE
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if ((bin->sects[i].flags & SECTION_TYPE) == stype) {
for (j=0, sym=-1; bin->sects[i].reserved1+j < bin->nindirectsyms; j++)
if (idx == bin->indirectsyms[bin->sects[i].reserved1 + j]) {
sym = j;
break;
}
reloc->offset = sym == -1 ? 0 : bin->sects[i].offset + sym * wordsize;
reloc->addr = sym == -1 ? 0 : bin->sects[i].addr + sym * wordsize;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The parse_import_ptr() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted Mach-O file.
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
|
Medium
| 169,227
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: lmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct lmp_common_header *lmp_com_header;
const struct lmp_object_header *lmp_obj_header;
const u_char *tptr,*obj_tptr;
int tlen,lmp_obj_len,lmp_obj_ctype,obj_tlen;
int hexdump;
int offset,subobj_type,subobj_len,total_subobj_len;
int link_type;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
tptr=pptr;
lmp_com_header = (const struct lmp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*lmp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0]) != LMP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LMP version %u packet not supported",
LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0])));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LMPv%u %s Message, length: %u",
LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0]),
tok2str(lmp_msg_type_values, "unknown (%u)",lmp_com_header->msg_type),
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tlen=EXTRACT_16BITS(lmp_com_header->length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tLMPv%u, msg-type: %s, Flags: [%s], length: %u",
LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0]),
tok2str(lmp_msg_type_values, "unknown, type: %u",lmp_com_header->msg_type),
bittok2str(lmp_header_flag_values,"none",lmp_com_header->flags),
tlen));
tptr+=sizeof(const struct lmp_common_header);
tlen-=sizeof(const struct lmp_common_header);
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct lmp_object_header));
lmp_obj_header = (const struct lmp_object_header *)tptr;
lmp_obj_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(lmp_obj_header->length);
lmp_obj_ctype=(lmp_obj_header->ctype)&0x7f;
if(lmp_obj_len % 4 || lmp_obj_len < 4)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %s (%u) Flags: [%snegotiable], length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_obj_values,
"Unknown",
lmp_obj_header->class_num),
lmp_obj_header->class_num,
tok2str(lmp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
((lmp_obj_header->class_num)<<8)+lmp_obj_ctype),
lmp_obj_ctype,
(lmp_obj_header->ctype)&0x80 ? "" : "non-",
lmp_obj_len));
obj_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct lmp_object_header);
obj_tlen=lmp_obj_len-sizeof(struct lmp_object_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, lmp_obj_len);
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(lmp_obj_header->class_num) {
case LMP_OBJ_CC_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Control Channel ID: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_LINK_ID:
case LMP_OBJ_INTERFACE_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 Link ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 Link ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link ID: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Message ID: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Message ID Ack: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_NODE_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Node ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_CONFIG:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_HELLO_CONFIG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hello Interval: %u\n\t Hello Dead Interval: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_HELLO:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_HELLO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tx Seq: %u, Rx Seq: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_TE_LINK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%s]",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_te_link_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8)));
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Local Link-ID: %s (0x%08x)"
"\n\t Remote Link-ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_DATA_LINK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%s]",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_data_link_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8)));
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Local Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)"
"\n\t Remote Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8)));
total_subobj_len = lmp_obj_len - 16;
offset = 12;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset)>>8;
subobj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset)&0x00FF;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)>>8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)>>8));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)&0x00FF),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)&0x00FF));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_VERIFY_BEGIN:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_begin_verify_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify Interval: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Data links: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding type: %s",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values, "Unknown", *(obj_tptr+8))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify Transport Mechanism: %u (0x%x)%s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10)&8000 ? " (Payload test messages capable)" : ""));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transmission Rate: %.3f Mbps",bw.f*8/1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+16)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_VERIFY_BEGIN_ACK:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify Dead Interval: %u"
"\n\t Verify Transport Response: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_VERIFY_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify ID: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_CHANNEL_STATUS:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
offset = 0;
/* Decode pairs: <Interface_ID (4 bytes), Channel_status (4 bytes)> */
while (offset < (lmp_obj_len-(int)sizeof(struct lmp_object_header)) ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+offset),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Active: %s (%u)", (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>31) ?
"Allocated" : "Non-allocated",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>31)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Direction: %s (%u)", (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>30)&0x1 ?
"Transmit" : "Receive",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>30)&0x1));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Channel Status: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_obj_channel_status_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)&0x3FFFFFF),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)&0x3FFFFFF));
offset+=8;
}
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_CHANNEL_STATUS_REQ:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
offset = 0;
while (offset < (lmp_obj_len-(int)sizeof(struct lmp_object_header)) ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+offset),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset)));
offset+=4;
}
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_ERROR_CODE:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_BEGIN_VERIFY_ERROR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Error Code: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_begin_verify_error_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_LINK_SUMMARY_ERROR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Error Code: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_link_summary_error_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_SERVICE_CONFIG:
switch (lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_SP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_service_config_sp_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t UNI Version: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_CPSA:
link_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_sd_service_config_cpsa_link_type_values,
"Unknown", link_type),
link_type));
if (link_type == LMP_SD_SERVICE_CONFIG_CPSA_LINK_TYPE_SDH) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Signal Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_sd_service_config_cpsa_signal_type_sdh_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF));
}
if (link_type == LMP_SD_SERVICE_CONFIG_CPSA_LINK_TYPE_SONET) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Signal Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_sd_service_config_cpsa_signal_type_sonet_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transparency: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_service_config_cpsa_tp_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)>>8)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Contiguous Concatenation Types: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_service_config_cpsa_cct_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)>>8 & 0x00FF)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Minimum NCC: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Maximum NCC: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Minimum NVC:%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+8)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Maximum NVC:%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Local Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+12),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+12)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_TRANSPARENCY_TCM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transparency Flags: %s",
bittok2str(
lmp_obj_service_config_nsa_transparency_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t TCM Monitoring Flags: %s",
bittok2str(
lmp_obj_service_config_nsa_tcm_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6) & 0x00FF)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_NETWORK_DIVERSITY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Diversity: Flags: %s",
bittok2str(
lmp_obj_service_config_nsa_network_diversity_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2) & 0x00FF)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,obj_tptr,"\n\t ",obj_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump==TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct lmp_object_header),"\n\t ",
lmp_obj_len-sizeof(struct lmp_object_header));
tptr+=lmp_obj_len;
tlen-=lmp_obj_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The LMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-lmp.c:lmp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13003/Clean up the LMP dissector.
Do a lot more bounds and length checks.
Add a EXTRACT_8BITS() macro, for completeness, and so as not to confuse
people into thinking that, to fetch a 1-byte value from a packet, they
need to use EXTRACT_16BITS() to fetch a 2-byte value and then use
shifting and masking to extract the desired byte. Use that rather than
using EXTRACT_16BITS() to fetch a 2-byte value and then shifting and
masking to extract the desired byte.
Don't treat IPv4 addresses and unnumbered interface IDs the same; the
first should be printed as an IPv4 address but the latter should just be
printed as numbers. Handle IPv6 addresses in more object types while
we're at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,904
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: u32 h264bsdInitDpb(
dpbStorage_t *dpb,
u32 picSizeInMbs,
u32 dpbSize,
u32 maxRefFrames,
u32 maxFrameNum,
u32 noReordering)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i;
/* Code */
ASSERT(picSizeInMbs);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= MAX_NUM_REF_PICS);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= dpbSize);
ASSERT(maxFrameNum);
ASSERT(dpbSize);
dpb->maxLongTermFrameIdx = NO_LONG_TERM_FRAME_INDICES;
dpb->maxRefFrames = MAX(maxRefFrames, 1);
if (noReordering)
dpb->dpbSize = dpb->maxRefFrames;
else
dpb->dpbSize = dpbSize;
dpb->maxFrameNum = maxFrameNum;
dpb->noReordering = noReordering;
dpb->fullness = 0;
dpb->numRefFrames = 0;
dpb->prevRefFrameNum = 0;
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t);
if (dpb->buffer == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->buffer, 0,
(MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1)*sizeof(dpbPicture_t));
for (i = 0; i < dpb->dpbSize + 1; i++)
{
/* Allocate needed amount of memory, which is:
* image size + 32 + 15, where 32 cames from the fact that in ARM OpenMax
* DL implementation Functions may read beyond the end of an array,
* by a maximum of 32 bytes. And +15 cames for the need to align memory
* to 16-byte boundary */
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, (picSizeInMbs*384 + 32+15), u8);
if (dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
dpb->buffer[i].data = ALIGN(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, 16);
}
ALLOCATE(dpb->list, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t*);
ALLOCATE(dpb->outBuf, dpb->dpbSize+1, dpbOutPicture_t);
if (dpb->list == NULL || dpb->outBuf == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->list, 0,
((MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1) * sizeof(dpbPicture_t*)) );
dpb->numOut = dpb->outIndex = 0;
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in codecs/on2/h264dec/source/h264bsd_dpb.c in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28533562.
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
|
Low
| 173,546
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_main)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut64 addr = 0LL;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int i;
if (!(symbols = MACH0_(get_symbols) (bin))) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; !symbols[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbols[i].name, "_main")) {
addr = symbols[i].addr;
break;
}
}
free (symbols);
if (!addr && bin->main_cmd.cmd == LC_MAIN) {
addr = bin->entry + bin->baddr;
}
if (!addr) {
ut8 b[128];
ut64 entry = addr_to_offset(bin, bin->entry);
if (entry > bin->size || entry + sizeof (b) > bin->size)
return 0;
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry, b, sizeof (b));
if (i < 1) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
if (b[i] == 0xe8 && !b[i+3] && !b[i+4]) {
int delta = b[i+1] | (b[i+2] << 8) | (b[i+3] << 16) | (b[i+4] << 24);
return bin->entry + i + 5 + delta;
}
}
}
return addr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The get_relocs_64 function in libr/bin/format/mach0/mach0.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted Mach0 file.
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
|
Medium
| 168,235
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void update_logging() {
bool should_log = module_started &&
(logging_enabled_via_api || stack_config->get_btsnoop_turned_on());
if (should_log == is_logging)
return;
is_logging = should_log;
if (should_log) {
btsnoop_net_open();
const char *log_path = stack_config->get_btsnoop_log_path();
if (stack_config->get_btsnoop_should_save_last()) {
char last_log_path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(last_log_path, PATH_MAX, "%s.%llu", log_path, btsnoop_timestamp());
if (!rename(log_path, last_log_path) && errno != ENOENT)
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to rename '%s' to '%s': %s", __func__, log_path, last_log_path, strerror(errno));
}
logfile_fd = open(log_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IROTH);
if (logfile_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to open '%s': %s", __func__, log_path, strerror(errno));
is_logging = false;
return;
}
write(logfile_fd, "btsnoop\0\0\0\0\1\0\0\x3\xea", 16);
} else {
if (logfile_fd != INVALID_FD)
close(logfile_fd);
logfile_fd = INVALID_FD;
btsnoop_net_close();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
time_t timep;
struct tm *timeptr;
char *now;
if (argc < 3) {
send_error(1);
return -1;
} else if (argc > 3) {
send_error(5);
return -1;
}
build_needs_escape();
if (argv[2] == NULL)
index_directory(argv[1], argv[1]);
else
index_directory(argv[1], argv[2]);
time(&timep);
#ifdef USE_LOCALTIME
timeptr = localtime(&timep);
#else
timeptr = gmtime(&timep);
#endif
now = strdup(asctime(timeptr));
now[strlen(now) - 1] = '\0';
#ifdef USE_LOCALTIME
printf("</table>\n<hr noshade>\nIndex generated %s %s\n"
"<!-- This program is part of the Boa Webserver Copyright (C) 1991-2002 http://www.boa.org -->\n"
"</body>\n</html>\n", now, TIMEZONE(timeptr));
#else
printf("</table>\n<hr noshade>\nIndex generated %s UTC\n"
"<!-- This program is part of the Boa Webserver Copyright (C) 1991-2002 http://www.boa.org -->\n"
"</body>\n</html>\n", now);
#endif
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Boa through 0.94.14rc21 allows remote attackers to trigger a memory leak because of missing calls to the free function.
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
|
???
| 169,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, next)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD)) {
spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
intern->u.file.current_line_num++;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::setFlags(int flags)
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,057
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct hw_perf_event fake_event = event->hw;
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (is_software_event(event))
return 1;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, &fake_event) >= 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1 on arm64 platforms allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via vectors involving events that are mishandled during a span of multiple HW PMUs.
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
Medium
| 167,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in HevcUtils.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as Low due to details specific to the vulnerability. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35467107.
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
|
Medium
| 174,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void OpenSession() {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://test.com"));
ASSERT_TRUE(opened_device_label_.empty());
MediaDeviceInfoArray video_devices;
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT] = true;
media_stream_manager_->media_devices_manager()->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::BindOnce(&VideoInputDevicesEnumerated, run_loop.QuitClosure(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin, &video_devices));
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_FALSE(video_devices.empty());
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
video_devices[0].device_id, MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin},
base::BindOnce(&VideoCaptureTest::OnDeviceOpened,
base::Unretained(this), run_loop.QuitClosure()),
MediaStreamManager::DeviceStoppedCallback());
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_NE(MediaStreamDevice::kNoId, opened_session_id_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,109
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
struct timespec now;
unsigned long timo;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
char xbuf[16];
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = key->type,
.index_key.description = key->description,
.cred = m->file->f_cred,
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.raw_data = key,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
* skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
*/
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
}
}
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
now = current_kernel_time();
rcu_read_lock();
/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
if (key->expiry == 0) {
memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
} else {
timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
if (timo < 60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo);
else if (timo < 60*60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60);
else if (timo < 60*60*24)
sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60));
else if (timo < 60*60*24*7)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24));
else
sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
}
#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
(test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
key->serial,
showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
key->type->name);
#undef showflag
if (key->type->describe)
key->type->describe(key, m);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int string_check(char *buf, const char *buf2)
{
if(strcmp(buf, buf2)) {
/* they shouldn't differ */
printf("sprintf failed:\nwe '%s'\nsystem: '%s'\n",
buf, buf2);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: curl before version 7.52.0 is vulnerable to a buffer overflow when doing a large floating point output in libcurl's implementation of the printf() functions. If there are any application that accepts a format string from the outside without necessary input filtering, it could allow remote attacks.
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
|
Medium
| 169,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void btsnoop_net_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
if (client_socket_ != -1) {
if (send(client_socket_, data, length, 0) == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET) {
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Horizontal_Sweep_Drop( RAS_ARGS Short y,
FT_F26Dot6 x1,
FT_F26Dot6 x2,
PProfile left,
PProfile right )
{
Long e1, e2, pxl;
PByte bits;
Byte f1;
/* During the horizontal sweep, we only take care of drop-outs */
/* e1 + <-- pixel center */
/* | */
/* x1 ---+--> <-- contour */
/* | */
/* | */
/* x2 <--+--- <-- contour */
/* | */
/* | */
/* e2 + <-- pixel center */
e1 = CEILING( x1 );
e2 = FLOOR ( x2 );
pxl = e1;
if ( e1 > e2 )
{
Int dropOutControl = left->flags & 7;
if ( e1 == e2 + ras.precision )
{
switch ( dropOutControl )
{
case 0: /* simple drop-outs including stubs */
pxl = e2;
break;
case 4: /* smart drop-outs including stubs */
pxl = FLOOR( ( x1 + x2 - 1 ) / 2 + ras.precision_half );
break;
case 1: /* simple drop-outs excluding stubs */
case 5: /* smart drop-outs excluding stubs */
/* see Vertical_Sweep_Drop for details */
/* rightmost stub test */
if ( left->next == right &&
left->height <= 0 &&
!( left->flags & Overshoot_Top &&
x2 - x1 >= ras.precision_half ) )
return;
/* leftmost stub test */
if ( right->next == left &&
left->start == y &&
!( left->flags & Overshoot_Bottom &&
x2 - x1 >= ras.precision_half ) )
return;
if ( dropOutControl == 1 )
pxl = e2;
else
pxl = FLOOR( ( x1 + x2 - 1 ) / 2 + ras.precision_half );
break;
default: /* modes 2, 3, 6, 7 */
return; /* no drop-out control */
}
/* undocumented but confirmed: If the drop-out would result in a */
/* pixel outside of the bounding box, use the pixel inside of the */
/* bounding box instead */
if ( pxl < 0 )
pxl = e1;
else if ( TRUNC( pxl ) >= ras.target.rows )
pxl = e2;
/* check that the other pixel isn't set */
e1 = pxl == e1 ? e2 : e1;
e1 = TRUNC( e1 );
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
bits -= e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
bits += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
if ( e1 >= 0 &&
e1 < ras.target.rows &&
*bits & f1 )
return;
}
else
return;
}
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
e1 = TRUNC( pxl );
if ( e1 >= 0 && e1 < ras.target.rows )
{
bits -= e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
bits += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
bits[0] |= f1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, buildFromDirectory)
{
char *dir, *error, *regex = NULL;
int dir_len, regex_len = 0;
zend_bool apply_reg = 0;
zval arg, arg2, *iter, *iteriter, *regexiter = NULL;
struct _phar_t pass;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot write to archive - write operations restricted by INI setting");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|s", &dir, &dir_len, ®ex, ®ex_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(iter);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(iter, spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate directory iterator for %s", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg, dir, dir_len, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(&arg2);
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, 0);
#else
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS|SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS);
#endif
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&iter, spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator,
&spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg, &arg2);
if (EG(exception)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(iteriter);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(iteriter, spl_ce_RecursiveIteratorIterator)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate directory iterator for %s", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&iteriter, spl_ce_RecursiveIteratorIterator,
&spl_ce_RecursiveIteratorIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, iter);
if (EG(exception)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
if (regex_len > 0) {
apply_reg = 1;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(regexiter);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(regexiter, spl_ce_RegexIterator)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
zval_dtor(regexiter);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate regex iterator for %s", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg2, regex, regex_len, 0);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(®exiter, spl_ce_RegexIterator,
&spl_ce_RegexIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, iteriter, &arg2);
}
array_init(return_value);
pass.c = apply_reg ? Z_OBJCE_P(regexiter) : Z_OBJCE_P(iteriter);
pass.p = phar_obj;
pass.b = dir;
pass.l = dir_len;
pass.count = 0;
pass.ret = return_value;
pass.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (pass.fp == NULL) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" unable to create temporary file", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->arc.archive) TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
if (apply_reg) {
zval_ptr_dtor(®exiter);
}
php_stream_close(pass.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == spl_iterator_apply((apply_reg ? regexiter : iteriter), (spl_iterator_apply_func_t) phar_build, (void *) &pass TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
if (apply_reg) {
zval_ptr_dtor(®exiter);
}
phar_obj->arc.archive->ufp = pass.fp;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
if (apply_reg) {
zval_ptr_dtor(®exiter);
}
php_stream_close(pass.fp);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,294
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool is_hsts_host) {
DCHECK(request);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(info);
GlobalRequestID request_id(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID());
int render_process_id;
int render_view_id;
if(!info->GetAssociatedRenderView(&render_process_id, &render_view_id))
NOTREACHED();
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request_id, info->GetResourceType(), request->url(), render_process_id,
render_view_id, ssl_info, is_hsts_host);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,989
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WarmupURLFetcher::WarmupURLFetcher(
CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
WarmupURLFetcherCallback callback,
GetHttpRttCallback get_http_rtt_callback,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner,
const std::string& user_agent)
: is_fetch_in_flight_(false),
previous_attempt_counts_(0),
create_custom_proxy_config_callback_(create_custom_proxy_config_callback),
callback_(callback),
get_http_rtt_callback_(get_http_rtt_callback),
user_agent_(user_agent),
ui_task_runner_(ui_task_runner) {
DCHECK(create_custom_proxy_config_callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
Medium
| 172,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct fsck_gitmodules_data *data = vdata;
const char *subsection, *key;
int subsection_len;
char *name;
if (parse_config_key(var, "submodule", &subsection, &subsection_len, &key) < 0 ||
!subsection)
return 0;
name = xmemdupz(subsection, subsection_len);
if (check_submodule_name(name) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_NAME,
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
free(name);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Git before 2.14.5, 2.15.x before 2.15.3, 2.16.x before 2.16.5, 2.17.x before 2.17.2, 2.18.x before 2.18.1, and 2.19.x before 2.19.1 allows remote code execution during processing of a recursive *git clone* of a superproject if a .gitmodules file has a URL field beginning with a '-' character.
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 169,019
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ext4_invalidatepage(struct page *page, unsigned long offset)
{
journal_t *journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(page->mapping->host);
/*
* If it's a full truncate we just forget about the pending dirtying
*/
if (offset == 0)
ClearPageChecked(page);
if (journal)
jbd2_journal_invalidatepage(journal, page, offset);
else
block_invalidatepage(page, offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char* problem_data_save(problem_data_t *pd)
{
load_abrt_conf();
struct dump_dir *dd = create_dump_dir_from_problem_data(pd, g_settings_dump_location);
char *problem_id = NULL;
if (dd)
{
problem_id = xstrdup(dd->dd_dirname);
dd_close(dd);
}
log_info("problem id: '%s'", problem_id);
return problem_id;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 170,151
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcParams = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE omxLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel41;
if (OMX_ErrorNone
!= ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(mAVCEncLevel, &omxLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
avcParams->eLevel = omxLevel;
avcParams->nRefFrames = 1;
avcParams->bUseHadamard = OMX_TRUE;
avcParams->nAllowedPictureTypes = (OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI
| OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB);
avcParams->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->bWeightedPPrediction = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bconstIpred = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirect8x8Inference = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirectSpatialTemporal = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->nCabacInitIdc = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator(
VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator* vaapi_dec,
VaapiWrapper* vaapi_wrapper)
: vaapi_wrapper_(vaapi_wrapper), vaapi_dec_(vaapi_dec) {
DCHECK(vaapi_wrapper_);
DCHECK(vaapi_dec_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,815
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CL_Init( void ) {
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization -----\n" );
Con_Init();
if(!com_fullyInitialized)
{
CL_ClearState();
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED; // no longer CA_UNINITIALIZED
cl_oldGameSet = qfalse;
}
cls.realtime = 0;
CL_InitInput();
cl_noprint = Cvar_Get( "cl_noprint", "0", 0 );
#ifdef UPDATE_SERVER_NAME
cl_motd = Cvar_Get( "cl_motd", "1", 0 );
#endif
cl_autoupdate = Cvar_Get( "cl_autoupdate", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_timeout = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeout", "200", 0 );
cl_wavefilerecord = Cvar_Get( "cl_wavefilerecord", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_timeNudge = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeNudge", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_shownet = Cvar_Get( "cl_shownet", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_shownuments = Cvar_Get( "cl_shownuments", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_visibleClients = Cvar_Get( "cl_visibleClients", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showServerCommands = Cvar_Get( "cl_showServerCommands", "0", 0 );
cl_showSend = Cvar_Get( "cl_showSend", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showTimeDelta = Cvar_Get( "cl_showTimeDelta", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_freezeDemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_freezeDemo", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
rcon_client_password = Cvar_Get( "rconPassword", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_activeAction = Cvar_Get( "activeAction", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_timedemo = Cvar_Get( "timedemo", "0", 0 );
cl_timedemoLog = Cvar_Get ("cl_timedemoLog", "", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_autoRecordDemo = Cvar_Get ("cl_autoRecordDemo", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviFrameRate = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviFrameRate", "25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviMotionJpeg = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviMotionJpeg", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_avidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_avidemo", "0", 0 );
cl_forceavidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_forceavidemo", "0", 0 );
rconAddress = Cvar_Get( "rconAddress", "", 0 );
cl_yawspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_yawspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_pitchspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_pitchspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_anglespeedkey = Cvar_Get( "cl_anglespeedkey", "1.5", 0 );
cl_maxpackets = Cvar_Get( "cl_maxpackets", "38", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_packetdup = Cvar_Get( "cl_packetdup", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_showPing = Cvar_Get( "cl_showPing", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_run = Cvar_Get( "cl_run", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_sensitivity = Cvar_Get( "sensitivity", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccel = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccel", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_freelook = Cvar_Get( "cl_freelook", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelStyle = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelStyle", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelOffset", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_CheckRange(cl_mouseAccelOffset, 0.001f, 50000.0f, qfalse);
cl_showMouseRate = Cvar_Get( "cl_showmouserate", "0", 0 );
cl_allowDownload = Cvar_Get( "cl_allowDownload", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_CURL_DLOPEN
cl_cURLLib = Cvar_Get("cl_cURLLib", DEFAULT_CURL_LIB, CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoswitch", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_wolfparticles", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_conXOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_conXOffset", "0", 0 );
cl_inGameVideo = Cvar_Get( "r_inGameVideo", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_serverStatusResendTime = Cvar_Get( "cl_serverStatusResendTime", "750", 0 );
cl_recoilPitch = Cvar_Get( "cg_recoilPitch", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_bypassMouseInput = Cvar_Get( "cl_bypassMouseInput", "0", 0 ); //CVAR_ROM ); // NERVE - SMF
m_pitch = Cvar_Get( "m_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_yaw = Cvar_Get( "m_yaw", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_forward = Cvar_Get( "m_forward", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_side = Cvar_Get( "m_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_filter = Cvar_Get( "m_filter", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
j_pitch = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw", "-0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward = Cvar_Get ("j_forward", "-0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side = Cvar_Get ("j_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up = Cvar_Get ("j_up", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_pitch_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch_axis", "3", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw_axis", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_forward_axis", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_side_axis", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_up_axis", "4", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_pitch_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_yaw_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_forward_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_side_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_up_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
cl_motdString = Cvar_Get( "cl_motdString", "", CVAR_ROM );
Cvar_Get( "cl_maxPing", "800", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_lanForcePackets = Cvar_Get ("cl_lanForcePackets", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_guid = Cvar_Get( "cl_guid", "unknown", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM );
cl_guidServerUniq = Cvar_Get ("cl_guidServerUniq", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_consoleKeys = Cvar_Get( "cl_consoleKeys", "~ ` 0x7e 0x60", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawCompass", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawNotifyText", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_quickMessageAlt", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_popupLimboMenu", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_descriptiveText", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawTeamOverlay", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_uselessNostalgia", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE ); // JPW NERVE
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawGun", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_cursorHints", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_voiceSpriteTime", "6000", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_teamChatsOnly", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_noVoiceChats", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_noVoiceText", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_crosshairSize", "48", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawCrosshair", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_zoomDefaultSniper", "20", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_zoomstepsniper", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "mp_playerType", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_currentPlayerType", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_weapon", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_team", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_currentTeam", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "name", "WolfPlayer", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_rate = Cvar_Get( "rate", "25000", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE ); // NERVE - SMF - changed from 3000
Cvar_Get( "snaps", "20", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "model", "multi", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "head", "default", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "color", "4", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "handicap", "100", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "sex", "male", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cl_anonymous", "0", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "password", "", CVAR_USERINFO );
Cvar_Get( "cg_predictItems", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
cl_useMumble = Cvar_Get ("cl_useMumble", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
cl_mumbleScale = Cvar_Get ("cl_mumbleScale", "0.0254", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_VOIP
cl_voipSend = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSend", "0", 0);
cl_voipSendTarget = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSendTarget", "spatial", 0);
cl_voipGainDuringCapture = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipGainDuringCapture", "0.2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipCaptureMult = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipCaptureMult", "2.0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipUseVAD = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipUseVAD", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipVADThreshold = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipVADThreshold", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipShowMeter = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipShowMeter", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voip = Cvar_Get ("cl_voip", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange( cl_voip, 0, 1, qtrue );
cl_voipProtocol = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipProtocol", cl_voip->integer ? "opus" : "", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoactivate", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_viewsize", "100", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get ("cg_stereoSeparation", "0", CVAR_ROM);
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoReload", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_USERINFO );
cl_missionStats = Cvar_Get( "g_missionStats", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_waitForFire = Cvar_Get( "cl_waitForFire", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_language = Cvar_Get( "cl_language", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_debugTranslation = Cvar_Get( "cl_debugTranslation", "0", 0 );
cl_updateavailable = Cvar_Get( "cl_updateavailable", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_updatefiles = Cvar_Get( "cl_updatefiles", "", CVAR_ROM );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[0], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER1_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[1], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER2_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[2], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER3_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[3], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER4_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[4], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER5_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cmd", CL_ForwardToServer_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "configstrings", CL_Configstrings_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "clientinfo", CL_Clientinfo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "snd_restart", CL_Snd_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "vid_restart", CL_Vid_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "ui_restart", CL_UI_Restart_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "disconnect", CL_Disconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "record", CL_Record_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "demo", CL_PlayDemo_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "demo", CL_CompleteDemoName );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cinematic", CL_PlayCinematic_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "stoprecord", CL_StopRecord_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "connect", CL_Connect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "reconnect", CL_Reconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "localservers", CL_LocalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "globalservers", CL_GlobalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "rcon", CL_Rcon_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "rcon", CL_CompleteRcon );
Cmd_AddCommand( "ping", CL_Ping_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "serverstatus", CL_ServerStatus_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "showip", CL_ShowIP_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_openedList", CL_OpenedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_referencedList", CL_ReferencedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("video", CL_Video_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("stopvideo", CL_StopVideo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_startgather", CL_Cache_StartGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_usedfile", CL_Cache_UsedFile_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_setindex", CL_Cache_SetIndex_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_mapchange", CL_Cache_MapChange_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_endgather", CL_Cache_EndGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatehunkusage", CL_UpdateLevelHunkUsage );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatescreen", SCR_UpdateScreen );
Cmd_AddCommand( "SaveTranslations", CL_SaveTranslations_f ); // NERVE - SMF - localization
Cmd_AddCommand( "SaveNewTranslations", CL_SaveNewTranslations_f ); // NERVE - SMF - localization
Cmd_AddCommand( "LoadTranslations", CL_LoadTranslations_f ); // NERVE - SMF - localization
Cmd_AddCommand( "startSingleplayer", CL_startSingleplayer_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "setRecommended", CL_SetRecommended_f );
CL_InitRef();
SCR_Init();
Cvar_Set( "cl_running", "1" );
autoupdateChecked = qfalse;
autoupdateStarted = qfalse;
CL_InitTranslation(); // NERVE - SMF - localization
CL_GenerateQKey();
CL_UpdateGUID( NULL, 0 );
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization Complete -----\n" );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
Medium
| 170,081
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = (struct f2fs_super_block *)
(bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET);
struct super_block *sb = sbi->sb;
unsigned int blocksize;
if (F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC != le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Magic Mismatch, valid(0x%x) - read(0x%x)",
F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB page cache size */
if (F2FS_BLKSIZE != PAGE_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid page_cache_size (%lu), supports only 4KB\n",
PAGE_SIZE);
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB block size */
blocksize = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize);
if (blocksize != F2FS_BLKSIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid blocksize (%u), supports only 4KB\n",
blocksize);
return 1;
}
/* check log blocks per segment */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg) != 9) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log blocks per segment (%u)\n",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support 512/1024/2048/4096 bytes sector size */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) >
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) <
F2FS_MIN_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Invalid log sectorsize (%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block) +
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) !=
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log sectors per block(%u) log sectorsize(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
/* check reserved ino info */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino) != 3) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid Fs Meta Ino: node(%u) meta(%u) root(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino));
return 1;
}
/* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sbi, bh))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The sanity_check_raw_super function in fs/f2fs/super.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.1 does not validate the segment count, which allows local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check segment count
F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 168,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLDocument::removeItemFromMap(HashCountedSet<StringImpl*>& map, const AtomicString& name)
{
if (name.isEmpty())
return;
map.remove(name.impl());
if (Frame* f = frame())
f->script()->namedItemRemoved(this, name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the string values of id attributes.
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,157
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int misaligned_load(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_sign_extend)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int destreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
destreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
if (__copy_user(&buffer, (const void *)(int)address, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
switch (width_shift) {
case 1:
if (do_sign_extend) {
regs->regs[destreg] = (__u64)(__s64) *(__s16 *) &buffer;
} else {
regs->regs[destreg] = (__u64) *(__u16 *) &buffer;
}
break;
case 2:
regs->regs[destreg] = (__u64)(__s64) *(__s32 *) &buffer;
break;
case 3:
regs->regs[destreg] = buffer;
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_load, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
} else {
/* kernel mode - we can take short cuts since if we fault, it's a genuine bug */
__u64 lo, hi;
switch (width_shift) {
case 1:
misaligned_kernel_word_load(address, do_sign_extend, ®s->regs[destreg]);
break;
case 2:
asm ("ldlo.l %1, 0, %0" : "=r" (lo) : "r" (address));
asm ("ldhi.l %1, 3, %0" : "=r" (hi) : "r" (address));
regs->regs[destreg] = lo | hi;
break;
case 3:
asm ("ldlo.q %1, 0, %0" : "=r" (lo) : "r" (address));
asm ("ldhi.q %1, 7, %0" : "=r" (hi) : "r" (address));
regs->regs[destreg] = lo | hi;
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_load, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,799
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c0() {
return ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,821
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaintArtifactCompositor::CollectPendingLayers(
const PaintArtifact& paint_artifact,
Vector<PendingLayer>& pending_layers) {
Vector<PaintChunk>::const_iterator cursor =
paint_artifact.PaintChunks().begin();
LayerizeGroup(paint_artifact, pending_layers,
*EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(), cursor);
DCHECK_EQ(paint_artifact.PaintChunks().end(), cursor);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,813
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: generate_row(png_bytep row, size_t rowbytes, unsigned int y, int color_type,
int bit_depth, png_const_bytep gamma_table, double conv,
unsigned int *colors)
{
png_uint_32 size_max = image_size_of_type(color_type, bit_depth, colors)-1;
png_uint_32 depth_max = (1U << bit_depth)-1; /* up to 65536 */
if (colors[0] == 0) switch (channels_of_type(color_type))
{
/* 1 channel: a square image with a diamond, the least luminous colors are on
* the edge of the image, the most luminous in the center.
*/
case 1:
{
png_uint_32 x;
png_uint_32 base = 2*size_max - abs(2*y-size_max);
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
png_uint_32 luma = base - abs(2*x-size_max);
/* 'luma' is now in the range 0..2*size_max, we need
* 0..depth_max
*/
luma = (luma*depth_max + size_max) / (2*size_max);
set_value(row, rowbytes, x, bit_depth, luma, gamma_table, conv);
}
}
break;
/* 2 channels: the color channel increases in luminosity from top to bottom,
* the alpha channel increases in opacity from left to right.
*/
case 2:
{
png_uint_32 alpha = (depth_max * y * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max);
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x, bit_depth,
(depth_max * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max), gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x+1, bit_depth, alpha, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
/* 3 channels: linear combinations of, from the top-left corner clockwise,
* black, green, white, red.
*/
case 3:
{
/* x0: the black->red scale (the value of the red component) at the
* start of the row (blue and green are 0).
* x1: the green->white scale (the value of the red and blue
* components at the end of the row; green is depth_max).
*/
png_uint_32 Y = (depth_max * y * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max);
png_uint_32 x;
/* Interpolate x/depth_max from start to end:
*
* start end difference
* red: Y Y 0
* green: 0 depth_max depth_max
* blue: 0 Y Y
*/
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+0, bit_depth, /* red */ Y,
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+1, bit_depth, /* green */
(depth_max * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+2, bit_depth, /* blue */
(Y * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
}
}
break;
/* 4 channels: linear combinations of, from the top-left corner clockwise,
* transparent, red, green, blue.
*/
case 4:
{
/* x0: the transparent->blue scale (the value of the blue and alpha
* components) at the start of the row (red and green are 0).
* x1: the red->green scale (the value of the red and green
* components at the end of the row; blue is 0 and alpha is
* depth_max).
*/
png_uint_32 Y = (depth_max * y * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max);
png_uint_32 x;
/* Interpolate x/depth_max from start to end:
*
* start end difference
* red: 0 depth_max-Y depth_max-Y
* green: 0 Y Y
* blue: Y 0 -Y
* alpha: Y depth_max depth_max-Y
*/
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+0, bit_depth, /* red */
((depth_max-Y) * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+1, bit_depth, /* green */
(Y * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+2, bit_depth, /* blue */
Y - (Y * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+3, bit_depth, /* alpha */
Y + ((depth_max-Y) * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
}
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: internal bad channel count\n");
exit(2);
}
else if (color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_PALETTE)
{
/* Palette with fixed color: the image rows are all 0 and the image width
* is 16.
*/
memset(row, 0, rowbytes);
}
else if (colors[0] == channels_of_type(color_type))
switch (channels_of_type(color_type))
{
case 1:
{
const png_uint_32 luma = colors[1];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
set_value(row, rowbytes, x, bit_depth, luma, gamma_table,
conv);
}
break;
case 2:
{
const png_uint_32 luma = colors[1];
const png_uint_32 alpha = colors[2];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x, bit_depth, luma, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x+1, bit_depth, alpha, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
case 3:
{
const png_uint_32 red = colors[1];
const png_uint_32 green = colors[2];
const png_uint_32 blue = colors[3];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+0, bit_depth, red, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+1, bit_depth, green, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+2, bit_depth, blue, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
const png_uint_32 red = colors[1];
const png_uint_32 green = colors[2];
const png_uint_32 blue = colors[3];
const png_uint_32 alpha = colors[4];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+0, bit_depth, red, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+1, bit_depth, green, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+2, bit_depth, blue, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+3, bit_depth, alpha, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: internal bad channel count\n");
exit(2);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr,
"makepng: --color: count(%u) does not match channels(%u)\n",
colors[0], channels_of_type(color_type));
exit(1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,580
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltCopyTreeInternal(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
xmlNodePtr invocNode,
xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE, int topElemVisited)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if (node == NULL)
return(NULL);
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE:
case XML_ENTITY_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
case XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE:
#endif
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE: {
int noenc = (node->name == xmlStringTextNoenc);
return(xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, insert, node->content, noenc));
}
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
return(xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, insert, node->content, 0));
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
return((xmlNodePtr)
xsltShallowCopyAttr(ctxt, invocNode, insert, (xmlAttrPtr) node));
case XML_NAMESPACE_DECL:
return((xmlNodePtr) xsltShallowCopyNsNode(ctxt, invocNode,
insert, (xmlNsPtr) node));
case XML_DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_FRAG_NODE:
case XML_NOTATION_NODE:
case XML_DTD_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_DECL:
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_DECL:
case XML_ENTITY_DECL:
case XML_XINCLUDE_START:
case XML_XINCLUDE_END:
return(NULL);
}
if (XSLT_IS_RES_TREE_FRAG(node)) {
if (node->children != NULL)
copy = xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, invocNode,
node->children, insert, 0, 0);
else
copy = NULL;
return(copy);
}
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
/*
* The node may have been coalesced into another text node.
*/
if (insert->last != copy)
return(insert->last);
copy->next = NULL;
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Copy in-scope namespace nodes.
*
* REVISIT: Since we try to reuse existing in-scope ns-decls by
* using xmlSearchNsByHref(), this will eventually change
* the prefix of an original ns-binding; thus it might
* break QNames in element/attribute content.
* OPTIMIZE TODO: If we had a xmlNsPtr * on the transformation
* context, plus a ns-lookup function, which writes directly
* to a given list, then we wouldn't need to create/free the
* nsList every time.
*/
if ((topElemVisited == 0) &&
(node->parent != NULL) &&
(node->parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
(node->parent->type != XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
{
xmlNsPtr *nsList, *curns, ns;
/*
* If this is a top-most element in a tree to be
* copied, then we need to ensure that all in-scope
* namespaces are copied over. For nodes deeper in the
* tree, it is sufficient to reconcile only the ns-decls
* (node->nsDef entries).
*/
nsList = xmlGetNsList(node->doc, node);
if (nsList != NULL) {
curns = nsList;
do {
/*
* Search by prefix first in order to break as less
* QNames in element/attribute content as possible.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(insert->doc, insert,
(*curns)->prefix);
if ((ns == NULL) ||
(! xmlStrEqual(ns->href, (*curns)->href)))
{
ns = NULL;
/*
* Search by namespace name.
* REVISIT TODO: Currently disabled.
*/
#if 0
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(insert->doc,
insert, (*curns)->href);
#endif
}
if (ns == NULL) {
/*
* Declare a new namespace on the copied element.
*/
ns = xmlNewNs(copy, (*curns)->href,
(*curns)->prefix);
/* TODO: Handle errors */
}
if (node->ns == *curns) {
/*
* If this was the original's namespace then set
* the generated counterpart on the copy.
*/
copy->ns = ns;
}
curns++;
} while (*curns != NULL);
xmlFree(nsList);
}
} else if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* Copy over all namespace declaration attributes.
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
}
/*
* Set the namespace.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (copy->ns == NULL) {
/*
* This will map copy->ns to one of the newly created
* in-scope ns-decls, OR create a new ns-decl on @copy.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, invocNode,
node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace on @copy with xmlns="".
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, invocNode, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
/*
* Copy attribute nodes.
*/
if (node->properties != NULL) {
xsltCopyAttrListNoOverwrite(ctxt, invocNode,
copy, node->properties);
}
if (topElemVisited == 0)
topElemVisited = 1;
}
/*
* Copy the subtree.
*/
if (node->children != NULL) {
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, invocNode,
node->children, copy, isLRE, topElemVisited);
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"xsltCopyTreeInternal: Copying of '%s' failed.\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: varbit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *input_string = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
#ifdef NOT_USED
Oid typelem = PG_GETARG_OID(1);
#endif
int32 atttypmod = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
VarBit *result; /* The resulting bit string */
char *sp; /* pointer into the character string */
bits8 *r; /* pointer into the result */
int len, /* Length of the whole data structure */
bitlen, /* Number of bits in the bit string */
slen; /* Length of the input string */
bool bit_not_hex; /* false = hex string true = bit string */
int bc;
bits8 x = 0;
/* Check that the first character is a b or an x */
if (input_string[0] == 'b' || input_string[0] == 'B')
{
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else if (input_string[0] == 'x' || input_string[0] == 'X')
{
bit_not_hex = false;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else
{
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string;
}
slen = strlen(sp);
/* Determine bitlength from input string */
if (bit_not_hex)
bitlen = slen;
else
bitlen = slen * 4;
/*
* Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make
* sure that the bitstring fits.
*/
if (atttypmod <= 0)
atttypmod = bitlen;
else if (bitlen > atttypmod)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_RIGHT_TRUNCATION),
errmsg("bit string too long for type bit varying(%d)",
atttypmod)));
len = VARBITTOTALLEN(bitlen);
/* set to 0 so that *r is always initialised and string is zero-padded */
result = (VarBit *) palloc0(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = Min(bitlen, atttypmod);
r = VARBITS(result);
if (bit_not_hex)
{
/* Parse the bit representation of the string */
/* We know it fits, as bitlen was compared to atttypmod */
x = HIGHBIT;
for (; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp == '1')
*r |= x;
else if (*sp != '0')
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid binary digit",
*sp)));
x >>= 1;
if (x == 0)
{
x = HIGHBIT;
r++;
}
}
}
else
{
/* Parse the hex representation of the string */
for (bc = 0; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9')
x = (bits8) (*sp - '0');
else if (*sp >= 'A' && *sp <= 'F')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'A') + 10;
else if (*sp >= 'a' && *sp <= 'f')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'a') + 10;
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid hexadecimal digit",
*sp)));
if (bc)
{
*r++ |= x;
bc = 0;
}
else
{
*r = x << 4;
bc = 1;
}
}
}
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,419
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("CACHE");
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MPC");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMPCImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMPCImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMPC;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/mpc.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-1 does not enable seekable streams and thus cannot validate blob sizes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an image received from stdin.
Commit Message: ...
|
Medium
| 168,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char *url_decode_r(char *to, char *url, size_t size) {
char *s = url, // source
*d = to, // destination
*e = &to[size - 1]; // destination end
while(*s && d < e) {
if(unlikely(*s == '%')) {
if(likely(s[1] && s[2])) {
*d++ = from_hex(s[1]) << 4 | from_hex(s[2]);
s += 2;
}
}
else if(unlikely(*s == '+'))
*d++ = ' ';
else
*d++ = *s;
s++;
}
*d = '\0';
return to;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in Netdata 1.10.0. Full Path Disclosure (FPD) exists via api/v1/alarms. NOTE: the vendor says *is intentional.*
Commit Message: fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
|
Low
| 169,812
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int kvm_set_guest_paused(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!vcpu->arch.time_page)
return -EINVAL;
vcpu->arch.pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that triggers use of a guest physical address (GPA) in (1) movable or (2) removable memory during an MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME kvm_set_msr_common operation.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,117
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_unstringify (MyObject *obj, const char *str, GValue *value, GError **error)
{
if (str[0] == '\0' || !g_ascii_isdigit (str[0])) {
g_value_init (value, G_TYPE_STRING);
g_value_set_string (value, str);
} else {
g_value_init (value, G_TYPE_INT);
g_value_set_int (value, (int) g_ascii_strtoull (str, NULL, 10));
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,125
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProfilingProcessHost::Mode ProfilingProcessHost::GetCurrentMode() {
const base::CommandLine* cmdline = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_ALLOCATOR_SHIM)
if (cmdline->HasSwitch(switches::kMemlog) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kOOPHeapProfilingFeature)) {
if (cmdline->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableHeapProfiling)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "--" << switches::kEnableHeapProfiling
<< " specified with --" << switches::kMemlog
<< "which are not compatible. Memlog will be disabled.";
return Mode::kNone;
}
std::string mode;
if (cmdline->HasSwitch(switches::kMemlog)) {
mode = cmdline->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kMemlog);
} else {
mode = base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(
kOOPHeapProfilingFeature, kOOPHeapProfilingFeatureMode);
}
if (mode == switches::kMemlogModeAll)
return Mode::kAll;
if (mode == switches::kMemlogModeMinimal)
return Mode::kMinimal;
if (mode == switches::kMemlogModeBrowser)
return Mode::kBrowser;
if (mode == switches::kMemlogModeGpu)
return Mode::kGpu;
if (mode == switches::kMemlogModeRendererSampling)
return Mode::kRendererSampling;
DLOG(ERROR) << "Unsupported value: \"" << mode << "\" passed to --"
<< switches::kMemlog;
}
return Mode::kNone;
#else
LOG_IF(ERROR, cmdline->HasSwitch(switches::kMemlog))
<< "--" << switches::kMemlog
<< " specified but it will have no effect because the use_allocator_shim "
<< "is not available in this build.";
return Mode::kNone;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
|
Medium
| 172,924
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long fuse_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
struct fuse_ioctl_in inarg = {
.fh = ff->fh,
.cmd = cmd,
.arg = arg,
.flags = flags
};
struct fuse_ioctl_out outarg;
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct page **pages = NULL;
struct page *iov_page = NULL;
struct iovec *in_iov = NULL, *out_iov = NULL;
unsigned int in_iovs = 0, out_iovs = 0, num_pages = 0, max_pages;
size_t in_size, out_size, transferred;
int err;
/* assume all the iovs returned by client always fits in a page */
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct iovec) * FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV > PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
pages = kzalloc(sizeof(pages[0]) * FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ, GFP_KERNEL);
iov_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages || !iov_page)
goto out;
/*
* If restricted, initialize IO parameters as encoded in @cmd.
* RETRY from server is not allowed.
*/
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED)) {
struct iovec *iov = page_address(iov_page);
iov->iov_base = (void __user *)arg;
iov->iov_len = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
in_iov = iov;
in_iovs = 1;
}
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) {
out_iov = iov;
out_iovs = 1;
}
}
retry:
inarg.in_size = in_size = iov_length(in_iov, in_iovs);
inarg.out_size = out_size = iov_length(out_iov, out_iovs);
/*
* Out data can be used either for actual out data or iovs,
* make sure there always is at least one page.
*/
out_size = max_t(size_t, out_size, PAGE_SIZE);
max_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(max(in_size, out_size), PAGE_SIZE);
/* make sure there are enough buffer pages and init request with them */
err = -ENOMEM;
if (max_pages > FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ)
goto out;
while (num_pages < max_pages) {
pages[num_pages] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM);
if (!pages[num_pages])
goto out;
num_pages++;
}
req = fuse_get_req(fc);
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
err = PTR_ERR(req);
req = NULL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(req->pages, pages, sizeof(req->pages[0]) * num_pages);
req->num_pages = num_pages;
/* okay, let's send it to the client */
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_IOCTL;
req->in.h.nodeid = ff->nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 1;
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
req->in.args[0].value = &inarg;
if (in_size) {
req->in.numargs++;
req->in.args[1].size = in_size;
req->in.argpages = 1;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, in_iov, in_iovs, in_size,
false);
if (err)
goto out;
}
req->out.numargs = 2;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(outarg);
req->out.args[0].value = &outarg;
req->out.args[1].size = out_size;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->out.argvar = 1;
fuse_request_send(fc, req);
err = req->out.h.error;
transferred = req->out.args[1].size;
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
req = NULL;
if (err)
goto out;
/* did it ask for retry? */
if (outarg.flags & FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY) {
char *vaddr;
/* no retry if in restricted mode */
err = -EIO;
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED))
goto out;
in_iovs = outarg.in_iovs;
out_iovs = outarg.out_iovs;
/*
* Make sure things are in boundary, separate checks
* are to protect against overflow.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
if (in_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
in_iovs + out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV)
goto out;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(pages[0], KM_USER0);
err = fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec(page_address(iov_page), vaddr,
transferred, in_iovs + out_iovs,
(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT) != 0);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr, KM_USER0);
if (err)
goto out;
in_iov = page_address(iov_page);
out_iov = in_iov + in_iovs;
goto retry;
}
err = -EIO;
if (transferred > inarg.out_size)
goto out;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, out_iov, out_iovs, transferred, true);
out:
if (req)
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
if (iov_page)
__free_page(iov_page);
while (num_pages)
__free_page(pages[--num_pages]);
kfree(pages);
return err ? err : outarg.result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the fuse_do_ioctl function in fs/fuse/file.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the ability to operate a CUSE server.
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
|
Low
| 165,906
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)doc);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: libxslt 1.1.26 and earlier, as used in Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.89, does not properly manage memory, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted XSLT expression that is not properly identified during XPath navigation, related to (1) the xsltCompileLocationPathPattern function in libxslt/pattern.c and (2) the xsltGenerateIdFunction function in libxslt/functions.c.
Commit Message: Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
surface_width(vs->vd->ds),
surface_height(vs->vd->ds),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void printResources()
{
printf("Printing resources (%zu resources in total)\n", m_resources.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_resources.size(); ++i) {
printf("%zu. '%s', '%s'\n", i, m_resources[i].url.string().utf8().data(),
m_resources[i].mimeType.utf8().data());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,572
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int xpm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame *p=data;
const uint8_t *end, *ptr = avpkt->data;
int ncolors, cpp, ret, i, j;
int64_t size;
uint32_t *dst;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGRA;
end = avpkt->data + avpkt->size;
while (memcmp(ptr, "/* XPM */", 9) && ptr < end - 9)
ptr++;
if (ptr >= end) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "missing signature\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ptr += mod_strcspn(ptr, "\"");
if (sscanf(ptr, "\"%u %u %u %u\",",
&avctx->width, &avctx->height, &ncolors, &cpp) != 4) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "missing image parameters\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height)) < 0)
return ret;
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
if (cpp <= 0 || cpp >= 5) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported/invalid number of chars per pixel: %d\n", cpp);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size = 1;
for (i = 0; i < cpp; i++)
size *= 94;
if (ncolors <= 0 || ncolors > size) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid number of colors: %d\n", ncolors);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size *= 4;
av_fast_padded_malloc(&x->pixels, &x->pixels_size, size);
if (!x->pixels)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ptr += mod_strcspn(ptr, ",") + 1;
for (i = 0; i < ncolors; i++) {
const uint8_t *index;
int len;
ptr += mod_strcspn(ptr, "\"") + 1;
if (ptr + cpp > end)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
index = ptr;
ptr += cpp;
ptr = strstr(ptr, "c ");
if (ptr) {
ptr += 2;
} else {
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
len = strcspn(ptr, "\" ");
if ((ret = ascii2index(index, cpp)) < 0)
return ret;
x->pixels[ret] = color_string_to_rgba(ptr, len);
ptr += mod_strcspn(ptr, ",") + 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < avctx->height; i++) {
dst = (uint32_t *)(p->data[0] + i * p->linesize[0]);
ptr += mod_strcspn(ptr, "\"") + 1;
for (j = 0; j < avctx->width; j++) {
if (ptr + cpp > end)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if ((ret = ascii2index(ptr, cpp)) < 0)
return ret;
*dst++ = x->pixels[ret];
ptr += cpp;
}
ptr += mod_strcspn(ptr, ",") + 1;
}
p->key_frame = 1;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
*got_frame = 1;
return avpkt->size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the color_string_to_rgba function in libavcodec/xpmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,078
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext4_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
int error;
ce = mb_cache_entry_alloc(ext4_mb_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ce) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "out of memory");
return;
}
error = mb_cache_entry_insert(ce, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr, hash);
if (error) {
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache");
error = 0;
}
} else {
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x]", (int)hash);
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,992
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int parse_index(git_index *index, const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
int error = 0;
unsigned int i;
struct index_header header = { 0 };
git_oid checksum_calculated, checksum_expected;
const char *last = NULL;
const char *empty = "";
#define seek_forward(_increase) { \
if (_increase >= buffer_size) { \
error = index_error_invalid("ran out of data while parsing"); \
goto done; } \
buffer += _increase; \
buffer_size -= _increase;\
}
if (buffer_size < INDEX_HEADER_SIZE + INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE)
return index_error_invalid("insufficient buffer space");
/* Precalculate the SHA1 of the files's contents -- we'll match it to
* the provided SHA1 in the footer */
git_hash_buf(&checksum_calculated, buffer, buffer_size - INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE);
/* Parse header */
if ((error = read_header(&header, buffer)) < 0)
return error;
index->version = header.version;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = empty;
seek_forward(INDEX_HEADER_SIZE);
assert(!index->entries.length);
if (index->ignore_case)
git_idxmap_icase_resize((khash_t(idxicase) *) index->entries_map, header.entry_count);
else
git_idxmap_resize(index->entries_map, header.entry_count);
/* Parse all the entries */
for (i = 0; i < header.entry_count && buffer_size > INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE; ++i) {
git_index_entry *entry = NULL;
size_t entry_size = read_entry(&entry, index, buffer, buffer_size, last);
/* 0 bytes read means an object corruption */
if (entry_size == 0) {
error = index_error_invalid("invalid entry");
goto done;
}
if ((error = git_vector_insert(&index->entries, entry)) < 0) {
index_entry_free(entry);
goto done;
}
INSERT_IN_MAP(index, entry, &error);
if (error < 0) {
index_entry_free(entry);
goto done;
}
error = 0;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = entry->path;
seek_forward(entry_size);
}
if (i != header.entry_count) {
error = index_error_invalid("header entries changed while parsing");
goto done;
}
/* There's still space for some extensions! */
while (buffer_size > INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE) {
size_t extension_size;
extension_size = read_extension(index, buffer, buffer_size);
/* see if we have read any bytes from the extension */
if (extension_size == 0) {
error = index_error_invalid("extension is truncated");
goto done;
}
seek_forward(extension_size);
}
if (buffer_size != INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE) {
error = index_error_invalid(
"buffer size does not match index footer size");
goto done;
}
/* 160-bit SHA-1 over the content of the index file before this checksum. */
git_oid_fromraw(&checksum_expected, (const unsigned char *)buffer);
if (git_oid__cmp(&checksum_calculated, &checksum_expected) != 0) {
error = index_error_invalid(
"calculated checksum does not match expected");
goto done;
}
git_oid_cpy(&index->checksum, &checksum_calculated);
#undef seek_forward
/* Entries are stored case-sensitively on disk, so re-sort now if
* in-memory index is supposed to be case-insensitive
*/
git_vector_set_sorted(&index->entries, !index->ignore_case);
git_vector_sort(&index->entries);
done:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Incorrect returning of an error code in the index.c:read_entry() function leads to a double free in libgit2 before v0.26.2, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
|
Medium
| 169,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: http_DissectRequest(struct sess *sp)
{
struct http_conn *htc;
struct http *hp;
uint16_t retval;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp, SESS_MAGIC);
htc = sp->htc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
hp = sp->http;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
retval = http_splitline(sp->wrk, sp->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_REQ, HTTP_HDR_URL, HTTP_HDR_PROTO);
if (retval != 0) {
WSPR(sp, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->rxbuf);
return (retval);
}
http_ProtoVer(hp);
retval = htc_request_check_host_hdr(hp);
if (retval != 0) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (retval);
}
return (retval);
}
Vulnerability Type: Http R.Spl.
CWE ID:
Summary: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
|
Low
| 167,479
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int init_items(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct load_command lc = {0, 0};
ut8 loadc[sizeof (struct load_command)] = {0};
bool is_first_thread = true;
ut64 off = 0LL;
int i, len;
bin->uuidn = 0;
bin->os = 0;
bin->has_crypto = 0;
if (bin->hdr.sizeofcmds > bin->size) {
bprintf ("Warning: chopping hdr.sizeofcmds\n");
bin->hdr.sizeofcmds = bin->size - 128;
}
for (i = 0, off = sizeof (struct MACH0_(mach_header)); \
i < bin->hdr.ncmds; i++, off += lc.cmdsize) {
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct load_command) > bin->size){
bprintf ("mach0: out of bounds command\n");
return false;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, loadc, sizeof (struct load_command));
if (len < 1) {
bprintf ("Error: read (lc) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", off);
return false;
}
lc.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&loadc[0], bin->big_endian);
lc.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&loadc[4], bin->big_endian);
if (lc.cmdsize < 1 || off + lc.cmdsize > bin->size) {
bprintf ("Warning: mach0_header %d = cmdsize<1.\n", i);
break;
}
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.offset", i), off, 0);
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.format", i), "xd cmd size", 0);
switch (lc.cmd) {
case LC_DATA_IN_CODE:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "data_in_code", 0);
break;
case LC_RPATH:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "rpath", 0);
break;
case LC_SEGMENT_64:
case LC_SEGMENT:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "segment", 0);
bin->nsegs++;
if (!parse_segments (bin, off)) {
bprintf ("error parsing segment\n");
bin->nsegs--;
return false;
}
break;
case LC_SYMTAB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "symtab", 0);
if (!parse_symtab (bin, off)) {
bprintf ("error parsing symtab\n");
return false;
}
break;
case LC_DYSYMTAB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dysymtab", 0);
if (!parse_dysymtab(bin, off)) {
bprintf ("error parsing dysymtab\n");
return false;
}
break;
case LC_DYLIB_CODE_SIGN_DRS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dylib_code_sign_drs", 0);
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_MACOSX:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_macosx", 0);
bin->os = 1;
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_IPHONEOS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_iphoneos", 0);
bin->os = 2;
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_TVOS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_tvos", 0);
bin->os = 4;
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_WATCHOS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_watchos", 0);
bin->os = 3;
break;
case LC_UUID:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "uuid", 0);
{
struct uuid_command uc = {0};
if (off + sizeof (struct uuid_command) > bin->size) {
bprintf ("UUID out of obunds\n");
return false;
}
if (r_buf_fread_at (bin->b, off, (ut8*)&uc, "24c", 1) != -1) {
char key[128];
char val[128];
snprintf (key, sizeof (key)-1, "uuid.%d", bin->uuidn++);
r_hex_bin2str ((ut8*)&uc.uuid, 16, val);
sdb_set (bin->kv, key, val, 0);
}
}
break;
case LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64:
/* TODO: the struct is probably different here */
case LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "encryption_info", 0);
{
struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command) eic = {0};
ut8 seic[sizeof (struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command))] = {0};
if (off + sizeof (struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command)) > bin->size) {
bprintf ("encryption info out of bounds\n");
return false;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, seic, sizeof (struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command))) != -1) {
eic.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&seic[0], bin->big_endian);
eic.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&seic[4], bin->big_endian);
eic.cryptoff = r_read_ble32 (&seic[8], bin->big_endian);
eic.cryptsize = r_read_ble32 (&seic[12], bin->big_endian);
eic.cryptid = r_read_ble32 (&seic[16], bin->big_endian);
bin->has_crypto = eic.cryptid;
sdb_set (bin->kv, "crypto", "true", 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptid", eic.cryptid, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptoff", eic.cryptoff, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptsize", eic.cryptsize, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptheader", off, 0);
} }
break;
case LC_LOAD_DYLINKER:
{
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dylinker", 0);
free (bin->intrp);
bin->intrp = NULL;
struct dylinker_command dy = {0};
ut8 sdy[sizeof (struct dylinker_command)] = {0};
if (off + sizeof (struct dylinker_command) > bin->size){
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot parse dylinker command\n");
return false;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, sdy, sizeof (struct dylinker_command)) == -1) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (LC_DYLD_INFO) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", off);
} else {
dy.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&sdy[0], bin->big_endian);
dy.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&sdy[4], bin->big_endian);
dy.name = r_read_ble32 (&sdy[8], bin->big_endian);
int len = dy.cmdsize;
char *buf = malloc (len+1);
if (buf) {
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off + 0xc, (ut8*)buf, len);
buf[len] = 0;
free (bin->intrp);
bin->intrp = buf;
}
}
}
break;
case LC_MAIN:
{
struct {
ut64 eo;
ut64 ss;
} ep = {0};
ut8 sep[2 * sizeof (ut64)] = {0};
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "main", 0);
if (!is_first_thread) {
bprintf("Error: LC_MAIN with other threads\n");
return false;
}
if (off + 8 > bin->size || off + sizeof (ep) > bin->size) {
bprintf ("invalid command size for main\n");
return false;
}
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off + 8, sep, 2 * sizeof (ut64));
ep.eo = r_read_ble64 (&sep[0], bin->big_endian);
ep.ss = r_read_ble64 (&sep[8], bin->big_endian);
bin->entry = ep.eo;
bin->main_cmd = lc;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", off + 8, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "stacksize", ep.ss, 0);
is_first_thread = false;
}
break;
case LC_UNIXTHREAD:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "unixthread", 0);
if (!is_first_thread) {
bprintf("Error: LC_UNIXTHREAD with other threads\n");
return false;
}
case LC_THREAD:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "thread", 0);
if (!parse_thread (bin, &lc, off, is_first_thread)) {
bprintf ("Cannot parse thread\n");
return false;
}
is_first_thread = false;
break;
case LC_LOAD_DYLIB:
case LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "load_dylib", 0);
bin->nlibs++;
if (!parse_dylib(bin, off)){
bprintf ("Cannot parse dylib\n");
bin->nlibs--;
return false;
}
break;
case LC_DYLD_INFO:
case LC_DYLD_INFO_ONLY:
{
ut8 dyldi[sizeof (struct dyld_info_command)] = {0};
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dyld_info", 0);
bin->dyld_info = malloc (sizeof(struct dyld_info_command));
if (off + sizeof (struct dyld_info_command) > bin->size){
bprintf ("Cannot parse dyldinfo\n");
free (bin->dyld_info);
return false;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, dyldi, sizeof (struct dyld_info_command)) == -1) {
free (bin->dyld_info);
bin->dyld_info = NULL;
bprintf ("Error: read (LC_DYLD_INFO) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", off);
} else {
bin->dyld_info->cmd = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[0], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[4], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->rebase_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[8], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->rebase_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[12], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->bind_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[16], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->bind_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[20], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->weak_bind_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[24], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->weak_bind_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[28], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[32], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[36], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->export_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[40], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->export_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[44], bin->big_endian);
}
}
break;
case LC_CODE_SIGNATURE:
parse_signature (bin, off);
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "signature", 0);
/* ut32 dataoff
break;
case LC_SOURCE_VERSION:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version", 0);
/* uint64_t version; */
/* A.B.C.D.E packed as a24.b10.c10.d10.e10 */
break;
case LC_SEGMENT_SPLIT_INFO:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "split_info", 0);
/* TODO */
break;
case LC_FUNCTION_STARTS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "function_starts", 0);
if (!parse_function_starts (bin, off)) {
bprintf ("Cannot parse LC_FUNCTION_STARTS\n");
}
break;
case LC_REEXPORT_DYLIB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt (0, "mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dylib", 0);
/* TODO */
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The get_relocs_64 function in libr/bin/format/mach0/mach0.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted Mach0 file.
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
|
Medium
| 168,237
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_ucm_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t result;
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
result = ucm_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr),
hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!result)
result = len;
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The InfiniBand (aka IB) stack in the Linux kernel before 4.5.3 incorrectly relies on the write system call, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (kernel memory write operation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a uAPI interface.
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
long ret;
pipe = get_pipe_info(file);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
switch (cmd) {
case F_SETPIPE_SZ: {
unsigned int size, nr_pages;
size = round_pipe_size(arg);
nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!nr_pages)
goto out;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
ret = pipe_set_size(pipe, nr_pages);
break;
}
case F_GETPIPE_SZ:
ret = pipe->buffers * PAGE_SIZE;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
out:
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,388
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::CreateWriter(const GURL& file_path,
CreateWriterCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(opt_error.value(), nullptr);
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY, nullptr);
return;
}
blink::mojom::FileWriterPtr writer;
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(std::make_unique<storage::FileWriterImpl>(
url, context_->CreateFileSystemOperationRunner(),
blob_storage_context_->context()->AsWeakPtr()),
MakeRequest(&writer));
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_OK, std::move(writer));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
|
Medium
| 173,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SQLWCHAR* _single_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 1 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source
|
Low
| 169,316
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest();
if (GetFrame()->FrameScheduler())
GetFrame()->FrameScheduler()->DidStartLoading(identifier);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
Medium
| 172,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls) || types.count(syncable::TYPED_URLS)) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] =
new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
}
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG use elements.
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,614
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int nonOpt(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int opt(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt, opt);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GahpServer::Reaper(Service *,int pid,int status)
{
/* This should be much better.... for now, if our Gahp Server
goes away for any reason, we EXCEPT. */
GahpServer *dead_server = NULL;
GahpServer *next_server = NULL;
GahpServersById.startIterations();
while ( GahpServersById.iterate( next_server ) != 0 ) {
if ( pid == next_server->m_gahp_pid ) {
dead_server = next_server;
break;
}
}
std::string buf;
sprintf( buf, "Gahp Server (pid=%d) ", pid );
if( WIFSIGNALED(status) ) {
sprintf_cat( buf, "died due to %s",
daemonCore->GetExceptionString(status) );
} else {
sprintf_cat( buf, "exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status) );
}
if ( dead_server ) {
sprintf_cat( buf, " unexpectedly" );
EXCEPT( buf.c_str() );
} else {
sprintf_cat( buf, "\n" );
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, buf.c_str() );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,373
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AddInputMethodNames(const GList* engines, InputMethodDescriptors* out) {
DCHECK(out);
for (; engines; engines = g_list_next(engines)) {
IBusEngineDesc* engine_desc = IBUS_ENGINE_DESC(engines->data);
const gchar* name = ibus_engine_desc_get_name(engine_desc);
const gchar* longname = ibus_engine_desc_get_longname(engine_desc);
const gchar* layout = ibus_engine_desc_get_layout(engine_desc);
const gchar* language = ibus_engine_desc_get_language(engine_desc);
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
out->push_back(CreateInputMethodDescriptor(name,
longname,
layout,
language));
DLOG(INFO) << name << " (preloaded)";
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: next_format(png_bytep colour_type, png_bytep bit_depth,
unsigned int* palette_number, int no_low_depth_gray)
{
if (*bit_depth == 0)
{
*colour_type = 0;
if (no_low_depth_gray)
*bit_depth = 8;
else
*bit_depth = 1;
*palette_number = 0;
return 1;
}
if (*colour_type == 3)
{
/* Add multiple palettes for colour type 3. */
if (++*palette_number < PALETTE_COUNT(*bit_depth))
return 1;
*palette_number = 0;
}
*bit_depth = (png_byte)(*bit_depth << 1);
/* Palette images are restricted to 8 bit depth */
if (*bit_depth <= 8
# ifdef DO_16BIT
|| (*colour_type != 3 && *bit_depth <= 16)
# endif
)
return 1;
/* Move to the next color type, or return 0 at the end. */
switch (*colour_type)
{
case 0:
*colour_type = 2;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 2:
*colour_type = 3;
*bit_depth = 1;
return 1;
case 3:
*colour_type = 4;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 4:
*colour_type = 6;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_group ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * display_name;
struct mailimf_mailbox_list * mailbox_list;
struct mailimf_group * group;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
mailbox_list = NULL;
r = mailimf_display_name_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &display_name);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_mailbox_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &mailbox_list);
switch (r) {
case MAILIMF_NO_ERROR:
break;
case MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE:
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
break;
default:
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_semi_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
group = mailimf_group_new(display_name, mailbox_list);
if (group == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
* indx = cur_token;
* result = group;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_mailbox_list:
if (mailbox_list != NULL) {
mailimf_mailbox_list_free(mailbox_list);
}
free_display_name:
mailimf_display_name_free(display_name);
err:
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A null dereference vulnerability has been found in the MIME handling component of LibEtPan before 1.8, as used in MailCore and MailCore 2. A crash can occur in low-level/imf/mailimf.c during a failed parse of a Cc header containing multiple e-mail addresses.
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
|
Low
| 168,192
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType GetEXIFProperty(const Image *image,
const char *property,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define EXIF_FMT_BYTE 1
#define EXIF_FMT_STRING 2
#define EXIF_FMT_USHORT 3
#define EXIF_FMT_ULONG 4
#define EXIF_FMT_URATIONAL 5
#define EXIF_FMT_SBYTE 6
#define EXIF_FMT_UNDEFINED 7
#define EXIF_FMT_SSHORT 8
#define EXIF_FMT_SLONG 9
#define EXIF_FMT_SRATIONAL 10
#define EXIF_FMT_SINGLE 11
#define EXIF_FMT_DOUBLE 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_GPS_OFFSET 0x8825
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
#define EXIFMultipleValues(size,format,arg) \
{ \
ssize_t \
component; \
\
size_t \
length; \
\
unsigned char \
*p1; \
\
length=0; \
p1=p; \
for (component=0; component < components; component++) \
{ \
length+=FormatLocaleString(buffer+length,MagickPathExtent-length, \
format", ",arg); \
if (length >= (MagickPathExtent-1)) \
length=MagickPathExtent-1; \
p1+=size; \
} \
if (length > 1) \
buffer[length-2]='\0'; \
value=AcquireString(buffer); \
}
#define EXIFMultipleFractions(size,format,arg1,arg2) \
{ \
ssize_t \
component; \
\
size_t \
length; \
\
unsigned char \
*p1; \
\
length=0; \
p1=p; \
for (component=0; component < components; component++) \
{ \
length+=FormatLocaleString(buffer+length,MagickPathExtent-length, \
format", ",(arg1),(arg2)); \
if (length >= (MagickPathExtent-1)) \
length=MagickPathExtent-1; \
p1+=size; \
} \
if (length > 1) \
buffer[length-2]='\0'; \
value=AcquireString(buffer); \
}
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
const unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
ssize_t
offset;
} DirectoryInfo;
typedef struct _TagInfo
{
size_t
tag;
const char
*description;
} TagInfo;
static TagInfo
EXIFTag[] =
{
{ 0x001, "exif:InteroperabilityIndex" },
{ 0x002, "exif:InteroperabilityVersion" },
{ 0x100, "exif:ImageWidth" },
{ 0x101, "exif:ImageLength" },
{ 0x102, "exif:BitsPerSample" },
{ 0x103, "exif:Compression" },
{ 0x106, "exif:PhotometricInterpretation" },
{ 0x10a, "exif:FillOrder" },
{ 0x10d, "exif:DocumentName" },
{ 0x10e, "exif:ImageDescription" },
{ 0x10f, "exif:Make" },
{ 0x110, "exif:Model" },
{ 0x111, "exif:StripOffsets" },
{ 0x112, "exif:Orientation" },
{ 0x115, "exif:SamplesPerPixel" },
{ 0x116, "exif:RowsPerStrip" },
{ 0x117, "exif:StripByteCounts" },
{ 0x11a, "exif:XResolution" },
{ 0x11b, "exif:YResolution" },
{ 0x11c, "exif:PlanarConfiguration" },
{ 0x11d, "exif:PageName" },
{ 0x11e, "exif:XPosition" },
{ 0x11f, "exif:YPosition" },
{ 0x118, "exif:MinSampleValue" },
{ 0x119, "exif:MaxSampleValue" },
{ 0x120, "exif:FreeOffsets" },
{ 0x121, "exif:FreeByteCounts" },
{ 0x122, "exif:GrayResponseUnit" },
{ 0x123, "exif:GrayResponseCurve" },
{ 0x124, "exif:T4Options" },
{ 0x125, "exif:T6Options" },
{ 0x128, "exif:ResolutionUnit" },
{ 0x12d, "exif:TransferFunction" },
{ 0x131, "exif:Software" },
{ 0x132, "exif:DateTime" },
{ 0x13b, "exif:Artist" },
{ 0x13e, "exif:WhitePoint" },
{ 0x13f, "exif:PrimaryChromaticities" },
{ 0x140, "exif:ColorMap" },
{ 0x141, "exif:HalfToneHints" },
{ 0x142, "exif:TileWidth" },
{ 0x143, "exif:TileLength" },
{ 0x144, "exif:TileOffsets" },
{ 0x145, "exif:TileByteCounts" },
{ 0x14a, "exif:SubIFD" },
{ 0x14c, "exif:InkSet" },
{ 0x14d, "exif:InkNames" },
{ 0x14e, "exif:NumberOfInks" },
{ 0x150, "exif:DotRange" },
{ 0x151, "exif:TargetPrinter" },
{ 0x152, "exif:ExtraSample" },
{ 0x153, "exif:SampleFormat" },
{ 0x154, "exif:SMinSampleValue" },
{ 0x155, "exif:SMaxSampleValue" },
{ 0x156, "exif:TransferRange" },
{ 0x157, "exif:ClipPath" },
{ 0x158, "exif:XClipPathUnits" },
{ 0x159, "exif:YClipPathUnits" },
{ 0x15a, "exif:Indexed" },
{ 0x15b, "exif:JPEGTables" },
{ 0x15f, "exif:OPIProxy" },
{ 0x200, "exif:JPEGProc" },
{ 0x201, "exif:JPEGInterchangeFormat" },
{ 0x202, "exif:JPEGInterchangeFormatLength" },
{ 0x203, "exif:JPEGRestartInterval" },
{ 0x205, "exif:JPEGLosslessPredictors" },
{ 0x206, "exif:JPEGPointTransforms" },
{ 0x207, "exif:JPEGQTables" },
{ 0x208, "exif:JPEGDCTables" },
{ 0x209, "exif:JPEGACTables" },
{ 0x211, "exif:YCbCrCoefficients" },
{ 0x212, "exif:YCbCrSubSampling" },
{ 0x213, "exif:YCbCrPositioning" },
{ 0x214, "exif:ReferenceBlackWhite" },
{ 0x2bc, "exif:ExtensibleMetadataPlatform" },
{ 0x301, "exif:Gamma" },
{ 0x302, "exif:ICCProfileDescriptor" },
{ 0x303, "exif:SRGBRenderingIntent" },
{ 0x320, "exif:ImageTitle" },
{ 0x5001, "exif:ResolutionXUnit" },
{ 0x5002, "exif:ResolutionYUnit" },
{ 0x5003, "exif:ResolutionXLengthUnit" },
{ 0x5004, "exif:ResolutionYLengthUnit" },
{ 0x5005, "exif:PrintFlags" },
{ 0x5006, "exif:PrintFlagsVersion" },
{ 0x5007, "exif:PrintFlagsCrop" },
{ 0x5008, "exif:PrintFlagsBleedWidth" },
{ 0x5009, "exif:PrintFlagsBleedWidthScale" },
{ 0x500A, "exif:HalftoneLPI" },
{ 0x500B, "exif:HalftoneLPIUnit" },
{ 0x500C, "exif:HalftoneDegree" },
{ 0x500D, "exif:HalftoneShape" },
{ 0x500E, "exif:HalftoneMisc" },
{ 0x500F, "exif:HalftoneScreen" },
{ 0x5010, "exif:JPEGQuality" },
{ 0x5011, "exif:GridSize" },
{ 0x5012, "exif:ThumbnailFormat" },
{ 0x5013, "exif:ThumbnailWidth" },
{ 0x5014, "exif:ThumbnailHeight" },
{ 0x5015, "exif:ThumbnailColorDepth" },
{ 0x5016, "exif:ThumbnailPlanes" },
{ 0x5017, "exif:ThumbnailRawBytes" },
{ 0x5018, "exif:ThumbnailSize" },
{ 0x5019, "exif:ThumbnailCompressedSize" },
{ 0x501a, "exif:ColorTransferFunction" },
{ 0x501b, "exif:ThumbnailData" },
{ 0x5020, "exif:ThumbnailImageWidth" },
{ 0x5021, "exif:ThumbnailImageHeight" },
{ 0x5022, "exif:ThumbnailBitsPerSample" },
{ 0x5023, "exif:ThumbnailCompression" },
{ 0x5024, "exif:ThumbnailPhotometricInterp" },
{ 0x5025, "exif:ThumbnailImageDescription" },
{ 0x5026, "exif:ThumbnailEquipMake" },
{ 0x5027, "exif:ThumbnailEquipModel" },
{ 0x5028, "exif:ThumbnailStripOffsets" },
{ 0x5029, "exif:ThumbnailOrientation" },
{ 0x502a, "exif:ThumbnailSamplesPerPixel" },
{ 0x502b, "exif:ThumbnailRowsPerStrip" },
{ 0x502c, "exif:ThumbnailStripBytesCount" },
{ 0x502d, "exif:ThumbnailResolutionX" },
{ 0x502e, "exif:ThumbnailResolutionY" },
{ 0x502f, "exif:ThumbnailPlanarConfig" },
{ 0x5030, "exif:ThumbnailResolutionUnit" },
{ 0x5031, "exif:ThumbnailTransferFunction" },
{ 0x5032, "exif:ThumbnailSoftwareUsed" },
{ 0x5033, "exif:ThumbnailDateTime" },
{ 0x5034, "exif:ThumbnailArtist" },
{ 0x5035, "exif:ThumbnailWhitePoint" },
{ 0x5036, "exif:ThumbnailPrimaryChromaticities" },
{ 0x5037, "exif:ThumbnailYCbCrCoefficients" },
{ 0x5038, "exif:ThumbnailYCbCrSubsampling" },
{ 0x5039, "exif:ThumbnailYCbCrPositioning" },
{ 0x503A, "exif:ThumbnailRefBlackWhite" },
{ 0x503B, "exif:ThumbnailCopyRight" },
{ 0x5090, "exif:LuminanceTable" },
{ 0x5091, "exif:ChrominanceTable" },
{ 0x5100, "exif:FrameDelay" },
{ 0x5101, "exif:LoopCount" },
{ 0x5110, "exif:PixelUnit" },
{ 0x5111, "exif:PixelPerUnitX" },
{ 0x5112, "exif:PixelPerUnitY" },
{ 0x5113, "exif:PaletteHistogram" },
{ 0x1000, "exif:RelatedImageFileFormat" },
{ 0x1001, "exif:RelatedImageLength" },
{ 0x1002, "exif:RelatedImageWidth" },
{ 0x800d, "exif:ImageID" },
{ 0x80e3, "exif:Matteing" },
{ 0x80e4, "exif:DataType" },
{ 0x80e5, "exif:ImageDepth" },
{ 0x80e6, "exif:TileDepth" },
{ 0x828d, "exif:CFARepeatPatternDim" },
{ 0x828e, "exif:CFAPattern2" },
{ 0x828f, "exif:BatteryLevel" },
{ 0x8298, "exif:Copyright" },
{ 0x829a, "exif:ExposureTime" },
{ 0x829d, "exif:FNumber" },
{ 0x83bb, "exif:IPTC/NAA" },
{ 0x84e3, "exif:IT8RasterPadding" },
{ 0x84e5, "exif:IT8ColorTable" },
{ 0x8649, "exif:ImageResourceInformation" },
{ 0x8769, "exif:ExifOffset" },
{ 0x8773, "exif:InterColorProfile" },
{ 0x8822, "exif:ExposureProgram" },
{ 0x8824, "exif:SpectralSensitivity" },
{ 0x8825, "exif:GPSInfo" },
{ 0x8827, "exif:ISOSpeedRatings" },
{ 0x8828, "exif:OECF" },
{ 0x8829, "exif:Interlace" },
{ 0x882a, "exif:TimeZoneOffset" },
{ 0x882b, "exif:SelfTimerMode" },
{ 0x9000, "exif:ExifVersion" },
{ 0x9003, "exif:DateTimeOriginal" },
{ 0x9004, "exif:DateTimeDigitized" },
{ 0x9101, "exif:ComponentsConfiguration" },
{ 0x9102, "exif:CompressedBitsPerPixel" },
{ 0x9201, "exif:ShutterSpeedValue" },
{ 0x9202, "exif:ApertureValue" },
{ 0x9203, "exif:BrightnessValue" },
{ 0x9204, "exif:ExposureBiasValue" },
{ 0x9205, "exif:MaxApertureValue" },
{ 0x9206, "exif:SubjectDistance" },
{ 0x9207, "exif:MeteringMode" },
{ 0x9208, "exif:LightSource" },
{ 0x9209, "exif:Flash" },
{ 0x920a, "exif:FocalLength" },
{ 0x920b, "exif:FlashEnergy" },
{ 0x920c, "exif:SpatialFrequencyResponse" },
{ 0x920d, "exif:Noise" },
{ 0x9211, "exif:ImageNumber" },
{ 0x9212, "exif:SecurityClassification" },
{ 0x9213, "exif:ImageHistory" },
{ 0x9214, "exif:SubjectArea" },
{ 0x9215, "exif:ExposureIndex" },
{ 0x9216, "exif:TIFF-EPStandardID" },
{ 0x927c, "exif:MakerNote" },
{ 0x9C9b, "exif:WinXP-Title" },
{ 0x9C9c, "exif:WinXP-Comments" },
{ 0x9C9d, "exif:WinXP-Author" },
{ 0x9C9e, "exif:WinXP-Keywords" },
{ 0x9C9f, "exif:WinXP-Subject" },
{ 0x9286, "exif:UserComment" },
{ 0x9290, "exif:SubSecTime" },
{ 0x9291, "exif:SubSecTimeOriginal" },
{ 0x9292, "exif:SubSecTimeDigitized" },
{ 0xa000, "exif:FlashPixVersion" },
{ 0xa001, "exif:ColorSpace" },
{ 0xa002, "exif:ExifImageWidth" },
{ 0xa003, "exif:ExifImageLength" },
{ 0xa004, "exif:RelatedSoundFile" },
{ 0xa005, "exif:InteroperabilityOffset" },
{ 0xa20b, "exif:FlashEnergy" },
{ 0xa20c, "exif:SpatialFrequencyResponse" },
{ 0xa20d, "exif:Noise" },
{ 0xa20e, "exif:FocalPlaneXResolution" },
{ 0xa20f, "exif:FocalPlaneYResolution" },
{ 0xa210, "exif:FocalPlaneResolutionUnit" },
{ 0xa214, "exif:SubjectLocation" },
{ 0xa215, "exif:ExposureIndex" },
{ 0xa216, "exif:TIFF/EPStandardID" },
{ 0xa217, "exif:SensingMethod" },
{ 0xa300, "exif:FileSource" },
{ 0xa301, "exif:SceneType" },
{ 0xa302, "exif:CFAPattern" },
{ 0xa401, "exif:CustomRendered" },
{ 0xa402, "exif:ExposureMode" },
{ 0xa403, "exif:WhiteBalance" },
{ 0xa404, "exif:DigitalZoomRatio" },
{ 0xa405, "exif:FocalLengthIn35mmFilm" },
{ 0xa406, "exif:SceneCaptureType" },
{ 0xa407, "exif:GainControl" },
{ 0xa408, "exif:Contrast" },
{ 0xa409, "exif:Saturation" },
{ 0xa40a, "exif:Sharpness" },
{ 0xa40b, "exif:DeviceSettingDescription" },
{ 0xa40c, "exif:SubjectDistanceRange" },
{ 0xa420, "exif:ImageUniqueID" },
{ 0xc4a5, "exif:PrintImageMatching" },
{ 0xa500, "exif:Gamma" },
{ 0xc640, "exif:CR2Slice" },
{ 0x10000, "exif:GPSVersionID" },
{ 0x10001, "exif:GPSLatitudeRef" },
{ 0x10002, "exif:GPSLatitude" },
{ 0x10003, "exif:GPSLongitudeRef" },
{ 0x10004, "exif:GPSLongitude" },
{ 0x10005, "exif:GPSAltitudeRef" },
{ 0x10006, "exif:GPSAltitude" },
{ 0x10007, "exif:GPSTimeStamp" },
{ 0x10008, "exif:GPSSatellites" },
{ 0x10009, "exif:GPSStatus" },
{ 0x1000a, "exif:GPSMeasureMode" },
{ 0x1000b, "exif:GPSDop" },
{ 0x1000c, "exif:GPSSpeedRef" },
{ 0x1000d, "exif:GPSSpeed" },
{ 0x1000e, "exif:GPSTrackRef" },
{ 0x1000f, "exif:GPSTrack" },
{ 0x10010, "exif:GPSImgDirectionRef" },
{ 0x10011, "exif:GPSImgDirection" },
{ 0x10012, "exif:GPSMapDatum" },
{ 0x10013, "exif:GPSDestLatitudeRef" },
{ 0x10014, "exif:GPSDestLatitude" },
{ 0x10015, "exif:GPSDestLongitudeRef" },
{ 0x10016, "exif:GPSDestLongitude" },
{ 0x10017, "exif:GPSDestBearingRef" },
{ 0x10018, "exif:GPSDestBearing" },
{ 0x10019, "exif:GPSDestDistanceRef" },
{ 0x1001a, "exif:GPSDestDistance" },
{ 0x1001b, "exif:GPSProcessingMethod" },
{ 0x1001c, "exif:GPSAreaInformation" },
{ 0x1001d, "exif:GPSDateStamp" },
{ 0x1001e, "exif:GPSDifferential" },
{ 0x00000, (const char *) NULL }
};
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries,
tag,
tag_value;
SplayTreeInfo
*exif_resources;
ssize_t
all,
id,
level,
offset,
tag_offset;
static int
tag_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
/*
If EXIF data exists, then try to parse the request for a tag.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"exif");
if (profile == (const StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if ((property == (const char *) NULL) || (*property == '\0'))
return(MagickFalse);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *property)) != 0)
property++;
if (strlen(property) <= 5)
return(MagickFalse);
all=0;
tag=(~0UL);
switch (*(property+5))
{
case '*':
{
/*
Caller has asked for all the tags in the EXIF data.
*/
tag=0;
all=1; /* return the data in description=value format */
break;
}
case '!':
{
tag=0;
all=2; /* return the data in tagid=value format */
break;
}
case '#':
case '@':
{
int
c;
size_t
n;
/*
Check for a hex based tag specification first.
*/
tag=(*(property+5) == '@') ? 1UL : 0UL;
property+=6;
n=strlen(property);
if (n != 4)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
Parse tag specification as a hex number.
*/
n/=4;
do
{
for (i=(ssize_t) n-1L; i >= 0; i--)
{
c=(*property++);
tag<<=4;
if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9'))
tag|=(c-'0');
else
if ((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'F'))
tag|=(c-('A'-10));
else
if ((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'f'))
tag|=(c-('a'-10));
else
return(MagickFalse);
}
} while (*property != '\0');
break;
}
default:
{
/*
Try to match the text with a tag name instead.
*/
for (i=0; ; i++)
{
if (EXIFTag[i].tag == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare(EXIFTag[i].description,property) == 0)
{
tag=(size_t) EXIFTag[i].tag;
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (tag == (~0UL))
return(MagickFalse);
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertySignedShort(LSBEndian,exif);
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
Set the pointer to the first IFD and follow it were it leads.
*/
status=MagickFalse;
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
tag_offset=0;
exif_resources=NewSplayTree((int (*)(const void *,const void *)) NULL,
(void *(*)(void *)) NULL,(void *(*)(void *)) NULL);
do
{
/*
If there is anything on the stack then pop it off.
*/
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
tag_offset=directory_stack[level].offset;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=(size_t) ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
format;
ssize_t
number_bytes,
components;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+(12*entry)+2);
if (GetValueFromSplayTree(exif_resources,q) == q)
break;
(void) AddValueToSplayTree(exif_resources,q,q);
tag_value=(size_t) ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(endian,q)+tag_offset;
format=(size_t) ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(endian,q+2);
if (format >= (sizeof(tag_bytes)/sizeof(*tag_bytes)))
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,q+4);
number_bytes=(size_t) components*tag_bytes[format];
if (number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
ssize_t
offset;
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,q+8);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
continue;
if ((ssize_t) (offset+number_bytes) < offset)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
if ((all != 0) || (tag == (size_t) tag_value))
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
*value;
value=(char *) NULL;
*buffer='\0';
switch (format)
{
case EXIF_FMT_BYTE:
case EXIF_FMT_UNDEFINED:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(1,"%.20g",(double) (*(unsigned char *) p1));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_SBYTE:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(1,"%.20g",(double) (*(signed char *) p1));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_SSHORT:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(2,"%hd",ReadPropertySignedShort(endian,p1));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_USHORT:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(2,"%hu",ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(endian,p1));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_ULONG:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(4,"%.20g",(double)
ReadPropertyUnsignedLong(endian,p1));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_SLONG:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(4,"%.20g",(double)
ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,p1));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_URATIONAL:
{
EXIFMultipleFractions(8,"%.20g/%.20g",(double)
ReadPropertyUnsignedLong(endian,p1),(double)
ReadPropertyUnsignedLong(endian,p1+4));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_SRATIONAL:
{
EXIFMultipleFractions(8,"%.20g/%.20g",(double)
ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,p1),(double)
ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,p1+4));
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_SINGLE:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(4,"%f",(double) *(float *) p1);
break;
}
case EXIF_FMT_DOUBLE:
{
EXIFMultipleValues(8,"%f",*(double *) p1);
break;
}
default:
case EXIF_FMT_STRING:
{
value=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) number_bytes) >= 1)
value=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_bytes+1UL,
sizeof(*value));
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_bytes; i++)
{
value[i]='.';
if ((isprint((int) p[i]) != 0) || (p[i] == '\0'))
value[i]=(char) p[i];
}
value[i]='\0';
}
break;
}
}
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
char
*key;
register const char
*p;
key=AcquireString(property);
switch (all)
{
case 1:
{
const char
*description;
register ssize_t
i;
description="unknown";
for (i=0; ; i++)
{
if (EXIFTag[i].tag == 0)
break;
if (EXIFTag[i].tag == tag_value)
{
description=EXIFTag[i].description;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
description);
if (level == 2)
(void) SubstituteString(&key,"exif:","exif:thumbnail:");
break;
}
case 2:
{
if (tag_value < 0x10000)
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"#%04lx",
(unsigned long) tag_value);
else
if (tag_value < 0x20000)
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"@%04lx",
(unsigned long) (tag_value & 0xffff));
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"unknown");
break;
}
default:
{
if (level == 2)
(void) SubstituteString(&key,"exif:","exif:thumbnail:");
}
}
p=(const char *) NULL;
if (image->properties != (void *) NULL)
p=(const char *) GetValueFromSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *)
image->properties,key);
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,value,exception);
value=DestroyString(value);
key=DestroyString(key);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) ||
(tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_GPS_OFFSET))
{
ssize_t
offset;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
ssize_t
tag_offset1;
tag_offset1=(ssize_t) ((tag_value == TAG_GPS_OFFSET) ? 0x10000 :
0);
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
directory_stack[level].offset=tag_offset;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].offset=tag_offset1;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadPropertySignedLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
directory_stack[level].offset=tag_offset1;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
exif_resources=DestroySplayTree(exif_resources);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information via vectors involving the q variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
Low
| 169,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && !ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && !ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: print-wb.c in tcpdump before 4.7.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault and process crash).
Commit Message: whiteboard: fixup a few reversed tests (GH #446)
This is a follow-up to commit 3a3ec26.
|
Low
| 168,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RunLoop::BeforeRun() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(!run_called_);
run_called_ = true;
#endif // DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (quit_called_)
return false;
auto& active_run_loops_ = delegate_->active_run_loops_;
active_run_loops_.push(this);
const bool is_nested = active_run_loops_.size() > 1;
if (is_nested) {
CHECK(delegate_->allow_nesting_);
for (auto& observer : delegate_->nesting_observers_)
observer.OnBeginNestedRunLoop();
}
running_ = true;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
Low
| 171,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i], strlen(atts[i]));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i], strlen(atts[i])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The php_wddx_push_element function in ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer access and out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an incorrect boolean element in a wddxPacket XML document, leading to mishandling in a wddx_deserialize call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c
|
Low
| 166,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
FILE *infile, *outfile[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t cfg[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_pts_t frame_cnt = 0;
vpx_image_t raw[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_err_t res[NUM_ENCODERS];
int i;
long width;
long height;
int frame_avail;
int got_data;
int flags = 0;
/*Currently, only realtime mode is supported in multi-resolution encoding.*/
int arg_deadline = VPX_DL_REALTIME;
/* Set show_psnr to 1/0 to show/not show PSNR. Choose show_psnr=0 if you
don't need to know PSNR, which will skip PSNR calculation and save
encoding time. */
int show_psnr = 0;
uint64_t psnr_sse_total[NUM_ENCODERS] = {0};
uint64_t psnr_samples_total[NUM_ENCODERS] = {0};
double psnr_totals[NUM_ENCODERS][4] = {{0,0}};
int psnr_count[NUM_ENCODERS] = {0};
/* Set the required target bitrates for each resolution level.
* If target bitrate for highest-resolution level is set to 0,
* (i.e. target_bitrate[0]=0), we skip encoding at that level.
*/
unsigned int target_bitrate[NUM_ENCODERS]={1000, 500, 100};
/* Enter the frame rate of the input video */
int framerate = 30;
/* Set down-sampling factor for each resolution level.
dsf[0] controls down sampling from level 0 to level 1;
dsf[1] controls down sampling from level 1 to level 2;
dsf[2] is not used. */
vpx_rational_t dsf[NUM_ENCODERS] = {{2, 1}, {2, 1}, {1, 1}};
if(argc!= (5+NUM_ENCODERS))
die("Usage: %s <width> <height> <infile> <outfile(s)> <output psnr?>\n",
argv[0]);
printf("Using %s\n",vpx_codec_iface_name(interface));
width = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0);
height = strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0);
if(width < 16 || width%2 || height <16 || height%2)
die("Invalid resolution: %ldx%ld", width, height);
/* Open input video file for encoding */
if(!(infile = fopen(argv[3], "rb")))
die("Failed to open %s for reading", argv[3]);
/* Open output file for each encoder to output bitstreams */
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
if(!target_bitrate[i])
{
outfile[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
if(!(outfile[i] = fopen(argv[i+4], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[i+4]);
}
show_psnr = strtol(argv[NUM_ENCODERS + 4], NULL, 0);
/* Populate default encoder configuration */
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
res[i] = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(interface, &cfg[i], 0);
if(res[i]) {
printf("Failed to get config: %s\n", vpx_codec_err_to_string(res[i]));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
/*
* Update the default configuration according to needs of the application.
*/
/* Highest-resolution encoder settings */
cfg[0].g_w = width;
cfg[0].g_h = height;
cfg[0].g_threads = 1; /* number of threads used */
cfg[0].rc_dropframe_thresh = 30;
cfg[0].rc_end_usage = VPX_CBR;
cfg[0].rc_resize_allowed = 0;
cfg[0].rc_min_quantizer = 4;
cfg[0].rc_max_quantizer = 56;
cfg[0].rc_undershoot_pct = 98;
cfg[0].rc_overshoot_pct = 100;
cfg[0].rc_buf_initial_sz = 500;
cfg[0].rc_buf_optimal_sz = 600;
cfg[0].rc_buf_sz = 1000;
cfg[0].g_error_resilient = 1; /* Enable error resilient mode */
cfg[0].g_lag_in_frames = 0;
/* Disable automatic keyframe placement */
/* Note: These 3 settings are copied to all levels. But, except the lowest
* resolution level, all other levels are set to VPX_KF_DISABLED internally.
*/
cfg[0].kf_min_dist = 3000;
cfg[0].kf_max_dist = 3000;
cfg[0].rc_target_bitrate = target_bitrate[0]; /* Set target bitrate */
cfg[0].g_timebase.num = 1; /* Set fps */
cfg[0].g_timebase.den = framerate;
/* Other-resolution encoder settings */
for (i=1; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
memcpy(&cfg[i], &cfg[0], sizeof(vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t));
cfg[i].g_threads = 1; /* number of threads used */
cfg[i].rc_target_bitrate = target_bitrate[i];
/* Note: Width & height of other-resolution encoders are calculated
* from the highest-resolution encoder's size and the corresponding
* down_sampling_factor.
*/
{
unsigned int iw = cfg[i-1].g_w*dsf[i-1].den + dsf[i-1].num - 1;
unsigned int ih = cfg[i-1].g_h*dsf[i-1].den + dsf[i-1].num - 1;
cfg[i].g_w = iw/dsf[i-1].num;
cfg[i].g_h = ih/dsf[i-1].num;
}
/* Make width & height to be multiplier of 2. */
if((cfg[i].g_w)%2)cfg[i].g_w++;
if((cfg[i].g_h)%2)cfg[i].g_h++;
}
/* Allocate image for each encoder */
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
if(!vpx_img_alloc(&raw[i], VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, cfg[i].g_w, cfg[i].g_h, 32))
die("Failed to allocate image", cfg[i].g_w, cfg[i].g_h);
if (raw[0].stride[VPX_PLANE_Y] == raw[0].d_w)
read_frame_p = read_frame;
else
read_frame_p = read_frame_by_row;
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
if(outfile[i])
write_ivf_file_header(outfile[i], &cfg[i], 0);
/* Initialize multi-encoder */
if(vpx_codec_enc_init_multi(&codec[0], interface, &cfg[0], NUM_ENCODERS,
(show_psnr ? VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR : 0), &dsf[0]))
die_codec(&codec[0], "Failed to initialize encoder");
/* The extra encoding configuration parameters can be set as follows. */
/* Set encoding speed */
for ( i=0; i<NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
int speed = -6;
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[i], VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, speed))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to set cpu_used");
}
/* Set static threshold. */
for ( i=0; i<NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
unsigned int static_thresh = 1;
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[i], VP8E_SET_STATIC_THRESHOLD, static_thresh))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to set static threshold");
}
/* Set NOISE_SENSITIVITY to do TEMPORAL_DENOISING */
/* Enable denoising for the highest-resolution encoder. */
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[0], VP8E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, 1))
die_codec(&codec[0], "Failed to set noise_sensitivity");
for ( i=1; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[i], VP8E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, 0))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to set noise_sensitivity");
}
frame_avail = 1;
got_data = 0;
while(frame_avail || got_data)
{
vpx_codec_iter_t iter[NUM_ENCODERS]={NULL};
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt[NUM_ENCODERS];
flags = 0;
frame_avail = read_frame_p(infile, &raw[0]);
if(frame_avail)
{
for ( i=1; i<NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
/*Scale the image down a number of times by downsampling factor*/
/* FilterMode 1 or 2 give better psnr than FilterMode 0. */
I420Scale(raw[i-1].planes[VPX_PLANE_Y], raw[i-1].stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
raw[i-1].planes[VPX_PLANE_U], raw[i-1].stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
raw[i-1].planes[VPX_PLANE_V], raw[i-1].stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
raw[i-1].d_w, raw[i-1].d_h,
raw[i].planes[VPX_PLANE_Y], raw[i].stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
raw[i].planes[VPX_PLANE_U], raw[i].stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
raw[i].planes[VPX_PLANE_V], raw[i].stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
raw[i].d_w, raw[i].d_h, 1);
}
}
/* Encode each frame at multi-levels */
if(vpx_codec_encode(&codec[0], frame_avail? &raw[0] : NULL,
frame_cnt, 1, flags, arg_deadline))
die_codec(&codec[0], "Failed to encode frame");
for (i=NUM_ENCODERS-1; i>=0 ; i--)
{
got_data = 0;
while( (pkt[i] = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec[i], &iter[i])) )
{
got_data = 1;
switch(pkt[i]->kind) {
case VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT:
write_ivf_frame_header(outfile[i], pkt[i]);
(void) fwrite(pkt[i]->data.frame.buf, 1,
pkt[i]->data.frame.sz, outfile[i]);
break;
case VPX_CODEC_PSNR_PKT:
if (show_psnr)
{
int j;
psnr_sse_total[i] += pkt[i]->data.psnr.sse[0];
psnr_samples_total[i] += pkt[i]->data.psnr.samples[0];
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
}
psnr_count[i]++;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
printf(pkt[i]->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT
&& (pkt[i]->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)? "K":".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
frame_cnt++;
}
printf("\n");
fclose(infile);
printf("Processed %ld frames.\n",(long int)frame_cnt-1);
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
/* Calculate PSNR and print it out */
if ( (show_psnr) && (psnr_count[i]>0) )
{
int j;
double ovpsnr = sse_to_psnr(psnr_samples_total[i], 255.0,
psnr_sse_total[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n ENC%d PSNR (Overall/Avg/Y/U/V)", i);
fprintf(stderr, " %.3lf", ovpsnr);
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
fprintf(stderr, " %.3lf", psnr_totals[i][j]/psnr_count[i]);
}
}
if(vpx_codec_destroy(&codec[i]))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to destroy codec");
vpx_img_free(&raw[i]);
if(!outfile[i])
continue;
/* Try to rewrite the file header with the actual frame count */
if(!fseek(outfile[i], 0, SEEK_SET))
write_ivf_file_header(outfile[i], &cfg[i], frame_cnt-1);
fclose(outfile[i]);
}
printf("\n");
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,497
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem(
const PdfMetafileSkia& metafile,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* shared_mem_handle) {
uint32_t buf_size = metafile.GetDataSize();
if (buf_size == 0)
return false;
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shared_buf(
content::RenderThread::Get()->HostAllocateSharedMemoryBuffer(buf_size));
if (!shared_buf)
return false;
if (!shared_buf->Map(buf_size))
return false;
if (!metafile.GetData(shared_buf->memory(), buf_size))
return false;
*shared_mem_handle =
base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(shared_buf->handle());
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,851
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
int keep_flag, int event)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
unsigned long flags;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
if (!keep_flag) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
}
goto __end;
}
timer = timeri->timer;
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) &&
!(--timer->running)) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED;
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
}
}
if (!keep_flag)
timeri->flags &=
~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
__end:
if (event != SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, event);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 retains certain linked lists after a close or stop action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call, related to the (1) snd_timer_close and (2) _snd_timer_stop functions.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_text_compress(png_structp png_ptr,
png_charp text, png_size_t text_len, int compression,
compression_state *comp)
{
int ret;
comp->num_output_ptr = 0;
comp->max_output_ptr = 0;
comp->output_ptr = NULL;
comp->input = NULL;
comp->input_len = 0;
/* We may just want to pass the text right through */
if (compression == PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE)
{
comp->input = text;
comp->input_len = text_len;
return((int)text_len);
}
if (compression >= PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_LAST)
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char msg[50];
png_snprintf(msg, 50, "Unknown compression type %d", compression);
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
#else
png_warning(png_ptr, "Unknown compression type");
#endif
}
/* We can't write the chunk until we find out how much data we have,
* which means we need to run the compressor first and save the
* output. This shouldn't be a problem, as the vast majority of
* comments should be reasonable, but we will set up an array of
* malloc'd pointers to be sure.
*
* If we knew the application was well behaved, we could simplify this
* greatly by assuming we can always malloc an output buffer large
* enough to hold the compressed text ((1001 * text_len / 1000) + 12)
* and malloc this directly. The only time this would be a bad idea is
* if we can't malloc more than 64K and we have 64K of random input
* data, or if the input string is incredibly large (although this
* wouldn't cause a failure, just a slowdown due to swapping).
*/
/* Set up the compression buffers */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = (uInt)text_len;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (Bytef *)text;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = (Bytef *)png_ptr->zbuf;
/* This is the same compression loop as in png_write_row() */
do
{
/* Compress the data */
ret = deflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
if (ret != Z_OK)
{
/* Error */
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, png_ptr->zstream.msg);
else
png_error(png_ptr, "zlib error");
}
/* Check to see if we need more room */
if (!(png_ptr->zstream.avail_out))
{
/* Make sure the output array has room */
if (comp->num_output_ptr >= comp->max_output_ptr)
{
int old_max;
old_max = comp->max_output_ptr;
comp->max_output_ptr = comp->num_output_ptr + 4;
if (comp->output_ptr != NULL)
{
png_charpp old_ptr;
old_ptr = comp->output_ptr;
comp->output_ptr = (png_charpp)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)
(comp->max_output_ptr * png_sizeof(png_charpp)));
png_memcpy(comp->output_ptr, old_ptr, old_max
* png_sizeof(png_charp));
png_free(png_ptr, old_ptr);
}
else
comp->output_ptr = (png_charpp)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)
(comp->max_output_ptr * png_sizeof(png_charp)));
}
/* Save the data */
comp->output_ptr[comp->num_output_ptr] =
(png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
png_memcpy(comp->output_ptr[comp->num_output_ptr], png_ptr->zbuf,
png_ptr->zbuf_size);
comp->num_output_ptr++;
/* and reset the buffer */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
/* Continue until we don't have any more to compress */
} while (png_ptr->zstream.avail_in);
/* Finish the compression */
do
{
/* Tell zlib we are finished */
ret = deflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_FINISH);
if (ret == Z_OK)
{
/* Check to see if we need more room */
if (!(png_ptr->zstream.avail_out))
{
/* Check to make sure our output array has room */
if (comp->num_output_ptr >= comp->max_output_ptr)
{
int old_max;
old_max = comp->max_output_ptr;
comp->max_output_ptr = comp->num_output_ptr + 4;
if (comp->output_ptr != NULL)
{
png_charpp old_ptr;
old_ptr = comp->output_ptr;
/* This could be optimized to realloc() */
comp->output_ptr = (png_charpp)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(comp->max_output_ptr *
png_sizeof(png_charp)));
png_memcpy(comp->output_ptr, old_ptr,
old_max * png_sizeof(png_charp));
png_free(png_ptr, old_ptr);
}
else
comp->output_ptr = (png_charpp)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(comp->max_output_ptr *
png_sizeof(png_charp)));
}
/* Save the data */
comp->output_ptr[comp->num_output_ptr] =
(png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
png_memcpy(comp->output_ptr[comp->num_output_ptr], png_ptr->zbuf,
png_ptr->zbuf_size);
comp->num_output_ptr++;
/* and reset the buffer pointers */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
}
else if (ret != Z_STREAM_END)
{
/* We got an error */
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, png_ptr->zstream.msg);
else
png_error(png_ptr, "zlib error");
}
} while (ret != Z_STREAM_END);
/* Text length is number of buffers plus last buffer */
text_len = png_ptr->zbuf_size * comp->num_output_ptr;
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out < png_ptr->zbuf_size)
text_len += png_ptr->zbuf_size - (png_size_t)png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
return((int)text_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,192
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
* right in front, treat it the very same way.
*/
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
pointer_desc = "value ";
break;
case PTR_TO_CTX:
pointer_desc = "context ";
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
break;
default:
break;
}
return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
strict);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the lack of stack-pointer alignment enforcement.
Commit Message: bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ntlm_write_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->MaxLen < 1)
fields->MaxLen = fields->Len;
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sec_recv(RD_BOOL * is_fastpath)
{
uint8 fastpath_hdr, fastpath_flags;
uint16 sec_flags;
uint16 channel;
STREAM s;
while ((s = mcs_recv(&channel, is_fastpath, &fastpath_hdr)) != NULL)
{
if (*is_fastpath == True)
{
/* If fastpath packet is encrypted, read data
signature and decrypt */
/* FIXME: extracting flags from hdr could be made less obscure */
fastpath_flags = (fastpath_hdr & 0xC0) >> 6;
if (fastpath_flags & FASTPATH_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED)
{
in_uint8s(s, 8); /* signature */
sec_decrypt(s->p, s->end - s->p);
}
return s;
}
if (g_encryption || (!g_licence_issued && !g_licence_error_result))
{
/* TS_SECURITY_HEADER */
in_uint16_le(s, sec_flags);
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip sec_flags_hi */
if (g_encryption)
{
if (sec_flags & SEC_ENCRYPT)
{
in_uint8s(s, 8); /* signature */
sec_decrypt(s->p, s->end - s->p);
}
if (sec_flags & SEC_LICENSE_PKT)
{
licence_process(s);
continue;
}
if (sec_flags & SEC_REDIRECTION_PKT)
{
uint8 swapbyte;
in_uint8s(s, 8); /* signature */
sec_decrypt(s->p, s->end - s->p);
/* Check for a redirect packet, starts with 00 04 */
if (s->p[0] == 0 && s->p[1] == 4)
{
/* for some reason the PDU and the length seem to be swapped.
This isn't good, but we're going to do a byte for byte
swap. So the first four value appear as: 00 04 XX YY,
where XX YY is the little endian length. We're going to
use 04 00 as the PDU type, so after our swap this will look
like: XX YY 04 00 */
swapbyte = s->p[0];
s->p[0] = s->p[2];
s->p[2] = swapbyte;
swapbyte = s->p[1];
s->p[1] = s->p[3];
s->p[3] = swapbyte;
swapbyte = s->p[2];
s->p[2] = s->p[3];
s->p[3] = swapbyte;
}
}
}
else
{
if (sec_flags & SEC_LICENSE_PKT)
{
licence_process(s);
continue;
}
s->p -= 4;
}
}
if (channel != MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL)
{
channel_process(s, channel);
continue;
}
return s;
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
Low
| 169,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int nonCallback(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
if (exec->argumentCount() <= 1 || !exec->argument(1).isFunction()) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
RefPtr<TestCallback> callback = JSTestCallback::create(asObject(exec->argument(1)), castedThis->globalObject());
impl->methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg(nonCallback, callback);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The HMAC implementation (crypto/hmac.c) in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not validate that the underlying cryptographic hash algorithm is unkeyed, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based hash interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) and the SHA-3 hash algorithm (CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) to cause a kernel stack buffer overflow by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that encounter a missing SHA-3 initialization.
Commit Message: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 167,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionNavigationThrottle::WillStartOrRedirectRequest() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
content::WebContents* web_contents = navigation_handle()->GetWebContents();
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
const GURL& url = navigation_handle()->GetURL();
bool url_has_extension_scheme = url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme);
url::Origin target_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
const Extension* target_extension = nullptr;
if (url_has_extension_scheme) {
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
} else if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme) {
DCHECK(url.SchemeIsFileSystem() || url.SchemeIsBlob());
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(target_origin.host());
} else {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
if (!target_extension) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
if (target_extension->is_hosted_app()) {
base::StringPiece resource_root_relative_path =
url.path_piece().empty() ? base::StringPiece()
: url.path_piece().substr(1);
if (!IconsInfo::GetIcons(target_extension)
.ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
}
if (navigation_handle()->IsInMainFrame()) {
bool current_frame_is_extension_process =
!!registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (!url_has_extension_scheme && !current_frame_is_extension_process) {
if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme &&
navigation_handle()->GetSuggestedFilename().has_value()) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
bool has_webview_permission =
target_extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
APIPermission::kWebView);
if (!has_webview_permission)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
}
guest_view::GuestViewBase* guest =
guest_view::GuestViewBase::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (url_has_extension_scheme && guest) {
const std::string& owner_extension_id = guest->owner_host();
const Extension* owner_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(owner_extension_id);
std::string partition_domain;
std::string partition_id;
bool in_memory = false;
bool is_guest = WebViewGuest::GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL(),
&partition_domain, &partition_id, &in_memory);
bool allowed = true;
url_request_util::AllowCrossRendererResourceLoadHelper(
is_guest, target_extension, owner_extension, partition_id, url.path(),
navigation_handle()->GetPageTransition(), &allowed);
if (!allowed)
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
content::RenderFrameHost* parent = navigation_handle()->GetParentFrame();
bool external_ancestor = false;
for (auto* ancestor = parent; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->GetParent()) {
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedOrigin() == target_origin)
continue;
if (url::Origin::Create(ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL()) == target_origin)
continue;
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL().SchemeIs(
content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
continue;
external_ancestor = true;
break;
}
if (external_ancestor) {
if (!url_has_extension_scheme)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
if (!WebAccessibleResourcesInfo::IsResourceWebAccessible(target_extension,
url.path()))
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
if (target_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
const Extension* parent_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
parent->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (parent_extension && parent_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of input in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.170 allowed a remote attacker to perform privilege escalation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
Medium
| 173,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getgrnam_r(
const char *name,
struct group *gr,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t gid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(gr);
p = startswith(name, "vg-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
r = parse_gid(e + 1, &gid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineGroup",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) gid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_GROUP_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = sizeof(char*) + strlen(name) + 1;
if (buflen < l) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
strcpy(buffer + sizeof(char*), name);
gr->gr_name = buffer + sizeof(char*);
gr->gr_gid = gid;
gr->gr_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
gr->gr_mem = (char**) buffer;
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the getpwnam and getgrnam functions of the NSS module nss-mymachines in systemd.
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002
|
Low
| 168,869
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InputMethodDescriptors* GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting() {
InputMethodDescriptors* descriptions = new InputMethodDescriptors;
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:nl::nld", "Netherlands", "nl", "nl", "nld"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:be::nld", "Belgium", "be", "be", "nld"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:fr::fra", "France", "fr", "fr", "fra"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:be::fra", "Belgium", "be", "be", "fra"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ca::fra", "Canada", "ca", "ca", "fra"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ch:fr:fra", "Switzerland - French", "ch(fr)", "ch(fr)", "fra"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:de::ger", "Germany", "de", "de", "ger"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:de:neo:ger", "Germany - Neo 2", "de(neo)", "de(neo)", "ger"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:be::ger", "Belgium", "be", "be", "ger"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ch::ger", "Switzerland", "ch", "ch", "ger"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"mozc", "Mozc (US keyboard layout)", "us", "us", "ja"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"mozc-jp", "Mozc (Japanese keyboard layout)", "jp", "jp", "ja"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"mozc-dv",
"Mozc (US Dvorak keyboard layout)", "us(dvorak)", "us(dvorak)", "ja"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:jp::jpn", "Japan", "jp", "jp", "jpn"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ru::rus", "Russia", "ru", "ru", "rus"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ru:phonetic:rus",
"Russia - Phonetic", "ru(phonetic)", "ru(phonetic)", "rus"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:th:kesmanee", "kesmanee (m17n)", "us", "us", "th"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:th:pattachote", "pattachote (m17n)", "us", "us", "th"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:th:tis820", "tis820 (m17n)", "us", "us", "th"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"mozc-chewing", "Mozc Chewing (Chewing)", "us", "us", "zh_TW"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:zh:cangjie", "cangjie (m17n)", "us", "us", "zh"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:zh:quick", "quick (m17n)", "us", "us", "zh"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:vi:tcvn", "tcvn (m17n)", "us", "us", "vi"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:vi:telex", "telex (m17n)", "us", "us", "vi"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:vi:viqr", "viqr (m17n)", "us", "us", "vi"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:vi:vni", "vni (m17n)", "us", "us", "vi"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:us::eng", "USA", "us", "us", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:us:intl:eng",
"USA - International (with dead keys)", "us(intl)", "us(intl)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:us:altgr-intl:eng", "USA - International (AltGr dead keys)",
"us(altgr-intl)", "us(altgr-intl)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:us:dvorak:eng",
"USA - Dvorak", "us(dvorak)", "us(dvorak)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:us:colemak:eng",
"USA - Colemak", "us(colemak)", "us(colemak)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"hangul", "Korean", "kr(kr104)", "kr(kr104)", "ko"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"pinyin", "Pinyin", "us", "us", "zh"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"pinyin-dv", "Pinyin (for US Dvorak keyboard)",
"us(dvorak)", "us(dvorak)", "zh"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:ar:kbd", "kbd (m17n)", "us", "us", "ar"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:hi:itrans", "itrans (m17n)", "us", "us", "hi"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"m17n:fa:isiri", "isiri (m17n)", "us", "us", "fa"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:br::por", "Brazil", "br", "br", "por"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:bg::bul", "Bulgaria", "bg", "bg", "bul"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:bg:phonetic:bul", "Bulgaria - Traditional phonetic",
"bg(phonetic)", "bg(phonetic)", "bul"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ca:eng:eng", "Canada - English", "ca(eng)", "ca(eng)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:cz::cze", "Czechia", "cz", "cz", "cze"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ee::est", "Estonia", "ee", "ee", "est"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:es::spa", "Spain", "es", "es", "spa"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:es:cat:cat", "Spain - Catalan variant with middle-dot L",
"es(cat)", "es(cat)", "cat"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:dk::dan", "Denmark", "dk", "dk", "dan"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:gr::gre", "Greece", "gr", "gr", "gre"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:il::heb", "Israel", "il", "il", "heb"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:kr:kr104:kor", "Korea, Republic of - 101/104 key Compatible",
"kr(kr104)", "kr(kr104)", "kor"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:latam::spa", "Latin American", "latam", "latam", "spa"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:lt::lit", "Lithuania", "lt", "lt", "lit"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:lv:apostrophe:lav", "Latvia - Apostrophe (') variant",
"lv(apostrophe)", "lv(apostrophe)", "lav"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:hr::scr", "Croatia", "hr", "hr", "scr"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:gb:extd:eng", "United Kingdom - Extended - Winkeys",
"gb(extd)", "gb(extd)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:gb:dvorak:eng", "United Kingdom - Dvorak",
"gb(dvorak)", "gb(dvorak)", "eng"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:fi::fin", "Finland", "fi", "fi", "fin"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:hu::hun", "Hungary", "hu", "hu", "hun"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:it::ita", "Italy", "it", "it", "ita"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:no::nob", "Norway", "no", "no", "nob"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:pl::pol", "Poland", "pl", "pl", "pol"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:pt::por", "Portugal", "pt", "pt", "por"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ro::rum", "Romania", "ro", "ro", "rum"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:se::swe", "Sweden", "se", "se", "swe"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:sk::slo", "Slovakia", "sk", "sk", "slo"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:si::slv", "Slovenia", "si", "si", "slv"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:rs::srp", "Serbia", "rs", "rs", "srp"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:tr::tur", "Turkey", "tr", "tr", "tur"));
descriptions->push_back(InputMethodDescriptor(
"xkb:ua::ukr", "Ukraine", "ua", "ua", "ukr"));
return descriptions;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void VectorClamp(DDSVector4 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
value->w = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->w));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
|
Medium
| 168,906
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap = NULL;
int nr_start = *nr, ret = 0;
pte_t *ptep, *ptem;
ptem = ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
do {
pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep);
struct page *head, *page;
/*
* Similar to the PMD case below, NUMA hinting must take slow
* path using the pte_protnone check.
*/
if (pte_protnone(pte))
goto pte_unmap;
if (!pte_access_permitted(pte, write))
goto pte_unmap;
if (pte_devmap(pte)) {
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), pgmap);
if (unlikely(!pgmap)) {
undo_dev_pagemap(nr, nr_start, pages);
goto pte_unmap;
}
} else if (pte_special(pte))
goto pte_unmap;
VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
page = pte_page(pte);
head = compound_head(page);
if (!page_cache_get_speculative(head))
goto pte_unmap;
if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) {
put_page(head);
goto pte_unmap;
}
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
SetPageReferenced(page);
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
} while (ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
ret = 1;
pte_unmap:
if (pgmap)
put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
pte_unmap(ptem);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
Low
| 170,228
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
unsigned long identifier,
Resource* resource,
const ResourceRequest& original_resource_request) {
ResourceRequest resource_request(resource->Url());
resource_request.SetFrameType(original_resource_request.GetFrameType());
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
original_resource_request.GetRequestContext());
Context().DispatchDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(identifier, resource_request,
resource->GetResponse());
Context().DispatchWillSendRequest(identifier, resource_request,
ResourceResponse() /* redirects */,
resource->Options().initiator_info);
Context().DispatchDidReceiveResponse(
identifier, resource->GetResponse(), resource_request.GetFrameType(),
resource_request.GetRequestContext(), resource,
FetchContext::ResourceResponseType::kFromMemoryCache);
if (resource->EncodedSize() > 0)
Context().DispatchDidReceiveData(identifier, 0, resource->EncodedSize());
Context().DispatchDidFinishLoading(
identifier, 0, 0, resource->GetResponse().DecodedBodyLength());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
Medium
| 172,478
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params, int input_channels) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
uint32 buffer_size = media::AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(buffer_size, 0U);
DCHECK_LE(buffer_size,
static_cast<uint32>(media::limits::kMaxPacketSizeInBytes));
DCHECK_GE(input_channels, 0);
DCHECK_LT(input_channels, media::limits::kMaxChannels);
int output_memory_size = AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(output_memory_size, 0);
int frames = audio_params.frames_per_buffer();
int input_memory_size =
AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(input_channels, frames);
DCHECK_GE(input_memory_size, 0);
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 io_buffer_size = output_memory_size + input_memory_size;
uint32 shared_memory_size =
media::TotalSharedMemorySizeInBytes(io_buffer_size);
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(shared_memory_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioSyncReader> reader(
new AudioSyncReader(&entry->shared_memory, params, input_channels));
if (!reader->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->reader.reset(reader.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioOutputController::Create(
audio_manager_, this, audio_params, entry->reader.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamStatus(this, stream_id, "created");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the audio IPC layer in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod7Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod7");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(RefPtr<DOMStringList>, arrayArg, v8ValueToWebCoreDOMStringList(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XGetDeviceControl(
register Display *dpy,
XDevice *dev,
int control)
{
XDeviceControl *Device = NULL;
XDeviceControl *Sav = NULL;
xDeviceState *d = NULL;
xDeviceState *sav = NULL;
xGetDeviceControlReq *req;
xGetDeviceControlReply rep;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Add_XChangeDeviceControl, info) == -1)
return NULL;
GetReq(GetDeviceControl, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_GetDeviceControl;
req->deviceid = dev->device_id;
req->control = control;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse))
goto out;
if (rep.length > 0) {
unsigned long nbytes;
size_t size = 0;
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
d = Xmalloc(nbytes);
}
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
goto out;
}
sav = d;
_XRead(dpy, (char *)d, nbytes);
/* In theory, we should just be able to use d->length to get the size.
* Turns out that a number of X servers (up to and including server
* 1.4) sent the wrong length value down the wire. So to not break
* apps that run against older servers, we have to calculate the size
* manually.
*/
switch (d->control) {
case DEVICE_RESOLUTION:
{
xDeviceResolutionState *r;
size_t val_size;
size_t val_size;
r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
if (r->num_valuators >= (INT_MAX / (3 * sizeof(int))))
goto out;
val_size = 3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators;
if ((sizeof(xDeviceResolutionState) + val_size) > nbytes)
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB:
{
if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsCalibState) > nbytes)
goto out;
size = sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState);
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_AREA:
{
if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsAreaState) > nbytes)
goto out;
size = sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState);
break;
}
case DEVICE_CORE:
{
if (sizeof(xDeviceCoreState) > nbytes)
goto out;
size = sizeof(XDeviceCoreState);
break;
}
default:
if (d->length > nbytes)
goto out;
size = d->length;
break;
}
Device = Xmalloc(size);
if (!Device)
goto out;
Sav = Device;
d = sav;
switch (control) {
case DEVICE_RESOLUTION:
{
int *iptr, *iptr2;
xDeviceResolutionState *r;
XDeviceResolutionState *R;
unsigned int i;
r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
R = (XDeviceResolutionState *) Device;
R->control = DEVICE_RESOLUTION;
R->length = sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState);
R->num_valuators = r->num_valuators;
iptr = (int *)(R + 1);
iptr2 = (int *)(r + 1);
R->resolutions = iptr;
R->min_resolutions = iptr + R->num_valuators;
R->max_resolutions = iptr + (2 * R->num_valuators);
for (i = 0; i < (3 * R->num_valuators); i++)
*iptr++ = *iptr2++;
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB:
{
xDeviceAbsCalibState *c = (xDeviceAbsCalibState *) d;
XDeviceAbsCalibState *C = (XDeviceAbsCalibState *) Device;
C->control = DEVICE_ABS_CALIB;
C->length = sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState);
C->min_x = c->min_x;
C->max_x = c->max_x;
C->min_y = c->min_y;
C->max_y = c->max_y;
C->flip_x = c->flip_x;
C->flip_y = c->flip_y;
C->rotation = c->rotation;
C->button_threshold = c->button_threshold;
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_AREA:
{
xDeviceAbsAreaState *a = (xDeviceAbsAreaState *) d;
XDeviceAbsAreaState *A = (XDeviceAbsAreaState *) Device;
A->control = DEVICE_ABS_AREA;
A->length = sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState);
A->offset_x = a->offset_x;
A->offset_y = a->offset_y;
A->width = a->width;
A->height = a->height;
A->screen = a->screen;
A->following = a->following;
break;
}
case DEVICE_CORE:
{
xDeviceCoreState *c = (xDeviceCoreState *) d;
XDeviceCoreState *C = (XDeviceCoreState *) Device;
C->control = DEVICE_CORE;
C->length = sizeof(XDeviceCoreState);
C->status = c->status;
C->iscore = c->iscore;
break;
}
case DEVICE_ENABLE:
{
xDeviceEnableState *e = (xDeviceEnableState *) d;
XDeviceEnableState *E = (XDeviceEnableState *) Device;
E->control = DEVICE_ENABLE;
E->length = sizeof(E);
E->enable = e->enable;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: X.org libXi before 1.7.7 allows remote X servers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors involving length fields.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: stringprep (char *in,
size_t maxlen,
Stringprep_profile_flags flags,
const Stringprep_profile * profile)
{
int rc;
char *utf8 = NULL;
uint32_t *ucs4 = NULL;
size_t ucs4len, maxucs4len, adducs4len = 50;
do
{
uint32_t *newp;
free (ucs4);
ucs4 = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (in, -1, &ucs4len);
maxucs4len = ucs4len + adducs4len;
newp = realloc (ucs4, maxucs4len * sizeof (uint32_t));
if (!newp)
return STRINGPREP_MALLOC_ERROR;
}
ucs4 = newp;
rc = stringprep_4i (ucs4, &ucs4len, maxucs4len, flags, profile);
adducs4len += 50;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 function in libin before 1.31, as used in jabberd2, allows context-dependent attackers to read system memory and possibly have other unspecified impact via invalid UTF-8 characters in a string, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,762
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_akcipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_akcipher rakcipher;
strlcpy(rakcipher.type, "akcipher", sizeof(rakcipher.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AKCIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_akcipher), &rakcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.3. crypto_report_one() and related functions in crypto/crypto_user.c (the crypto user configuration API) do not fully initialize structures that are copied to userspace, potentially leaking sensitive memory to user programs. NOTE: this is a CVE-2013-2547 regression but with easier exploitability because the attacker does not need a capability (however, the system must have the CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER kconfig option).
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
???
| 168,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
bool off_is_neg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
bool ret;
if (env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
return 0;
/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
* paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
* to explore bad access from here.
*/
if (vstate->speculative)
goto do_sim;
alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
return 0;
/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
* limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
*/
if (aux->alu_state &&
(aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
return -EACCES;
/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
aux->alu_state = alu_state;
aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
do_sim:
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
* speculative execution from truncation as a result of
* masking when off was not within expected range. If off
* sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
* to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
* for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
* and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
* bad access.
*/
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
tmp = *dst_reg;
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
}
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg)
*dst_reg = tmp;
return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 169,731
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
int clockrt, u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2;
struct futex_q q;
int res, ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, clockrt ? CLOCK_REALTIME :
CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, fshared, &key2);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.pi_state = NULL;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/* Prepare to wait on uaddr. */
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, fshared, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquition by the requeue code.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current,
fshared);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!&q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, fshared, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(fshared, &key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The futex_wait function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly maintain a certain reference count during requeue operations, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that triggers a zero count.
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
Medium
| 166,450
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value;
if (!GetPrivate(global, kModulesField, &modules_value) ||
modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner function in extensions/renderer/module_system.cc in the extension bindings in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 mishandles properties, which allows remote attackers to conduct bindings-interception attacks and bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Harden against bindings interception
There's more we can do but this is a start.
BUG=590275
BUG=590118
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1748943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378621}
|
Medium
| 173,268
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void start_auth_request(PgSocket *client, const char *username)
{
int res;
PktBuf *buf;
client->auth_user = client->db->auth_user;
/* have to fetch user info from db */
client->pool = get_pool(client->db, client->db->auth_user);
if (!find_server(client)) {
client->wait_for_user_conn = true;
return;
}
slog_noise(client, "Doing auth_conn query");
client->wait_for_user_conn = false;
client->wait_for_user = true;
if (!sbuf_pause(&client->sbuf)) {
release_server(client->link);
disconnect_client(client, true, "pause failed");
return;
}
client->link->ready = 0;
res = 0;
buf = pktbuf_dynamic(512);
if (buf) {
pktbuf_write_ExtQuery(buf, cf_auth_query, 1, username);
res = pktbuf_send_immediate(buf, client->link);
pktbuf_free(buf);
/*
* Should do instead:
* res = pktbuf_send_queued(buf, client->link);
* but that needs better integration with SBuf.
*/
}
if (!res)
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "unable to send login query");
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: PgBouncer 1.6.x before 1.6.1, when configured with auth_user, allows remote attackers to gain login access as auth_user via an unknown username.
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
|
Medium
| 168,871
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
status_t err = NO_MEMORY;
void *params = calloc(size, 1);
if (params) {
err = data.read(params, size);
if (err != OK) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26914474");
} else {
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
}
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index, &bufferProducer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_PERSISTENT_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer;
status_t err = createPersistentInputSurface(
&bufferProducer, &bufferConsumer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferConsumer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer =
interface_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer>(data.readStrongBinder());
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = setInputSurface(node, port_index, bufferConsumer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length, flags, timestamp, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,185
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_wrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_message_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dalvik_disassemble (RAsm *a, RAsmOp *op, const ut8 *buf, int len) {
int vA, vB, vC, payload = 0, i = (int) buf[0];
int size = dalvik_opcodes[i].len;
char str[1024], *strasm;
ut64 offset;
const char *flag_str;
op->buf_asm[0] = 0;
if (buf[0] == 0x00) { /* nop */
switch (buf[1]) {
case 0x01: /* packed-switch-payload */
{
unsigned short array_size = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8);
int first_key = buf[4] | (buf[5] << 8) | (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 24);
sprintf (op->buf_asm, "packed-switch-payload %d, %d", array_size, first_key);
size = 8;
payload = 2 * (array_size * 2);
len = 0;
}
break;
case 0x02: /* sparse-switch-payload */
{
unsigned short array_size = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8);
sprintf (op->buf_asm, "sparse-switch-payload %d", array_size);
size = 4;
payload = 2 * (array_size*4);
len = 0;
}
break;
case 0x03: /* fill-array-data-payload */
if (len > 7) {
unsigned short elem_width = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8);
unsigned int array_size = buf[4] | (buf[5] << 8) | (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 24);
snprintf (op->buf_asm, sizeof (op->buf_asm),
"fill-array-data-payload %d, %d",
elem_width, array_size);
payload = 2 * ((array_size * elem_width+1)/2);
}
size = 8;
len = 0;
break;
default:
/* nop */
break;
}
}
strasm = NULL;
if (size <= len) {
strncpy (op->buf_asm, dalvik_opcodes[i].name, sizeof (op->buf_asm) - 1);
strasm = strdup (op->buf_asm);
size = dalvik_opcodes[i].len;
switch (dalvik_opcodes[i].fmt) {
case fmtop: break;
case fmtopvAvB:
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAvBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAAAvBBBB: // buf[1] seems useless :/
vA = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
vB = (buf[5] << 8) | buf[4];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAA:
vA = (int) buf[1];
sprintf (str, " v%i", vA);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAcB:
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
sprintf (str, " v%i, %#x", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
{
short sB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
sprintf (str, " v%i, %#04hx", vA, sB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
}
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8) | (buf[4] << 16) | (buf[5] << 24);
if (buf[0] == 0x17) { //const-wide/32
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i:v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vA + 1, vB);
} else { //const
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vB);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBB0000:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = 0 | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24);
if (buf[0] == 0x19) { // const-wide/high16
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i:v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vA + 1, vB);
} else {
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vB);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
#define llint long long int
llint lB = (llint)buf[2] | ((llint)buf[3] << 8)|
((llint)buf[4] << 16) | ((llint)buf[5] << 24)|
((llint)buf[6] << 32) | ((llint)buf[7] << 40)|
((llint)buf[8] << 48) | ((llint)buf[9] << 56);
#undef llint
sprintf (str, " v%i:v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, vA + 1, lB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAvBBvCC:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) buf[2];
vC = (int) buf[3];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, v%i", vA, vB, vC);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAvBBcCC:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) buf[2];
vC = (int) buf[3];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %#x", vA, vB, vC);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAvBcCCCC:
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %#x", vA, vB, vC);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoppAA:
vA = (char) buf[1];
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " 0x%08"PFMT64x, a->pc + (vA * 2)); // vA : word -> byte
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoppAAAA:
vA = (short) (buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]);
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " 0x%08"PFMT64x, a->pc + (vA * 2)); // vA : word -> byte
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAApBBBB: // if-*z
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) (buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]);
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08"PFMT64x, vA, a->pc + (vB * 2));
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoppAAAAAAAA:
vA = (int) (buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8) | (buf[4] << 16) | (buf[5] << 24));
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " 0x%08"PFMT64x, a->pc + (vA*2)); // vA : word -> byte
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAvBpCCCC: // if-*
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (int) (buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]);
snprintf (str, sizeof (str)," v%i, v%i, 0x%08"PFMT64x, vA, vB, a->pc + (vC * 2));
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAApBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) (buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8) | (buf[4] << 16) | (buf[5] << 24));
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08"PFMT64x, vA, a->pc + vB); // + (vB*2));
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinlineI:
vA = (int) (buf[1] & 0x0f);
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
*str = 0;
switch (vA) {
case 1:
sprintf (str, " {v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f);
break;
case 2:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 3:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f);
break;
case 4:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
default:
sprintf (str, " {}");
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
sprintf (str, ", [%04x]", vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinlineIR:
case fmtoptinvokeVSR:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
vC = (buf[5] << 8) | buf[4];
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, [%04x]", vC, vC + vA - 1, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinvokeVS:
vA = (int) (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
switch (vA) {
case 1:
sprintf (str, " {v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f);
break;
case 2:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 3:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f);
break;
case 4:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
default:
sprintf (str, " {}");
break;
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
sprintf (str, ", [%04x]", vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAtBBBB: // "sput-*"
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
if (buf[0] == 0x1a) {
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 's', vB);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, string+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, offset);
}
} else if (buf[0] == 0x1c || buf[0] == 0x1f || buf[0] == 0x22) {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vB);
if (!flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, class+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, %s", vA, flag_str);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'f', vB);
if (!flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, field+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, %s", vA, flag_str);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptopvAvBoCCCC:
vA = (buf[1] & 0x0f);
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (buf[3]<<8) | buf[2];
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 'o', vC);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, [obj+%04x]", vA, vB, vC);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, [0x%"PFMT64x"]", vA, vB, offset);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopAAtBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 't', vB);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, thing+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, offset);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAvBtCCCC:
vA = (buf[1] & 0x0f);
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
if (buf[0] == 0x20 || buf[0] == 0x23) { //instance-of & new-array
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vC);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %s", vA, vB, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, class+%i", vA, vB, vC);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'f', vC);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %s", vA, vB, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, field+%i", vA, vB, vC);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAtBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) (buf[5] | (buf[4] << 8) | (buf[3] << 16) | (buf[2] << 24));
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 's', vB);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, string+%i", vA, vB);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, offset);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvCCCCmBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
vC = (buf[5] << 8) | buf[4];
if (buf[0] == 0x25) { // filled-new-array/range
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, %s", vC, vC + vA - 1, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, class+%i", vC, vC + vA - 1, vB);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'm', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, %s", vC, vC + vA - 1, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, method+%i", vC, vC + vA - 1, vB);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvXtBBBB:
vA = (int) (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
switch (vA) {
case 1:
sprintf (str, " {v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f);
break;
case 2:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 3:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f);
break;
case 4:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 5:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[1] & 0x0f); // TOODO: recheck this
break;
default:
sprintf (str, " {}");
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
if (buf[0] == 0x24) { // filled-new-array
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, ", %s ; 0x%x", flag_str, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, ", class+%i", vB);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'm', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, ", %s ; 0x%x", flag_str, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, ", method+%i", vB);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinvokeI: // Any opcode has this formats
case fmtoptinvokeIR:
case fmt00:
default:
strcpy (op->buf_asm, "invalid ");
free (strasm);
strasm = NULL;
size = 2;
}
if (strasm) {
strncpy (op->buf_asm, strasm, sizeof (op->buf_asm) - 1);
op->buf_asm[sizeof (op->buf_asm) - 1] = 0;
} else {
strcpy (op->buf_asm , "invalid");
}
} else if (len > 0) {
strcpy (op->buf_asm, "invalid ");
op->size = len;
size = len;
}
op->payload = payload;
size += payload; // XXX
op->size = size;
free (strasm);
return size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dalvik_disassemble function in libr/asm/p/asm_dalvik.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: Fix #6885 - oob write in dalvik_disassemble
|
Medium
| 168,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SyncTest::TriggerSetSyncTabs() {
ASSERT_TRUE(ServerSupportsErrorTriggering());
std::string path = "chromiumsync/synctabs";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), sync_server_.GetURL(path));
ASSERT_EQ("Sync Tabs",
UTF16ToASCII(browser()->GetSelectedWebContents()->GetTitle()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int samldb_check_user_account_control_acl(struct samldb_ctx *ac,
struct dom_sid *sid,
uint32_t user_account_control,
uint32_t user_account_control_old)
{
int i, ret = 0;
bool need_acl_check = false;
struct ldb_result *res;
const char * const sd_attrs[] = {"ntSecurityDescriptor", NULL};
struct security_token *user_token;
struct security_descriptor *domain_sd;
struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module));
const struct uac_to_guid {
uint32_t uac;
const char *oid;
const char *guid;
enum sec_privilege privilege;
bool delete_is_privileged;
const char *error_string;
} map[] = {
{
},
{
.uac = UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD,
.guid = GUID_DRS_UNEXPIRE_PASSWORD,
.error_string = "Adding the UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD bit in userAccountControl requires the Unexpire-Password right that was not given on the Domain object"
},
{
.uac = UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED,
.guid = GUID_DRS_ENABLE_PER_USER_REVERSIBLY_ENCRYPTED_PASSWORD,
.error_string = "Adding the UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED bit in userAccountControl requires the Enable-Per-User-Reversibly-Encrypted-Password right that was not given on the Domain object"
},
{
.uac = UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
.guid = GUID_DRS_DS_INSTALL_REPLICA,
.error_string = "Adding the UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT bit in userAccountControl requires the DS-Install-Replica right that was not given on the Domain object"
},
{
.uac = UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT,
.guid = GUID_DRS_DS_INSTALL_REPLICA,
.error_string = "Adding the UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT bit in userAccountControl requires the DS-Install-Replica right that was not given on the Domain object"
},
.guid = GUID_DRS_DS_INSTALL_REPLICA,
.error_string = "Adding the UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT bit in userAccountControl requires the DS-Install-Replica right that was not given on the Domain object"
},
{
.uac = UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
.oid = DSDB_CONTROL_PERMIT_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_UAC_OID,
.error_string = "Updating the UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION bit in userAccountControl is not permitted without the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege"
}
};
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The samldb_check_user_account_control_acl function in dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/samldb.c in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3 does not properly check for administrative privileges during creation of machine accounts, which allows remote authenticated users to bypass intended access restrictions by leveraging the existence of a domain with both a Samba DC and a Windows DC, a similar issue to CVE-2015-2535.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getFramebufferAttachmentParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned target = toInt32(args[0]);
unsigned attachment = toInt32(args[1]);
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[2]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getFramebufferAttachmentParameter(target, attachment, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,122
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool FindAndUpdateProperty(const chromeos::ImeProperty& new_prop,
chromeos::ImePropertyList* prop_list) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < prop_list->size(); ++i) {
chromeos::ImeProperty& prop = prop_list->at(i);
if (prop.key == new_prop.key) {
const int saved_id = prop.selection_item_id;
prop = new_prop;
prop.selection_item_id = saved_id;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,484
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 mobility parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mobility.c:mobility_opt_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13023/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
|
Low
| 167,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TargetHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
auto_attacher_.SetRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const unsigned char* Track::GetCodecPrivate(size_t& size) const
{
size = m_info.codecPrivateSize;
return m_info.codecPrivate;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
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Low
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