instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::component_deinit(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_U32 i = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_venc(): Inside component_deinit()");
if (OMX_StateLoaded != m_state) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING:Rxd DeInit,OMX not in LOADED state %d",\
m_state);
}
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Output Memory");
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
free_output_buffer (&m_out_mem_ptr[i]);
}
free(m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
/*Check if the input buffers have to be cleaned up*/
if (m_inp_mem_ptr
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
&& !meta_mode_enable
#endif
) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Input Memory");
for (i=0; i<m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
free_input_buffer (&m_inp_mem_ptr[i]);
}
free(m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
m_ftb_q.m_size=0;
m_cmd_q.m_size=0;
m_etb_q.m_size=0;
m_ftb_q.m_read = m_ftb_q.m_write =0;
m_cmd_q.m_read = m_cmd_q.m_write =0;
m_etb_q.m_read = m_etb_q.m_write =0;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling m_heap_ptr.clear()");
m_heap_ptr.clear();
#endif // _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling venc_close()");
if (handle) {
handle->venc_close();
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Deleting HANDLE[%p]", handle);
delete (handle);
handle = NULL;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_INFO("Component Deinit");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27662502.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
|
Medium
| 173,782
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: StorageHandler::StorageHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Storage::Metainfo::domainName),
process_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(
const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const
{
if (pCP == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,287
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadCUTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowCUTReaderException(severity,tag) \
{ \
if (palette != NULL) \
palette=DestroyImage(palette); \
if (clone_info != NULL) \
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info); \
ThrowReaderException(severity,tag); \
}
Image *image,*palette;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
MagickBooleanType status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t EncodedByte;
unsigned char RunCount,RunValue,RunCountMasked;
CUTHeader Header;
CUTPalHeader PalHeader;
ssize_t depth;
ssize_t i,j;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff=NULL,*ptrB;
register Quantum *q;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read CUT image.
*/
palette=NULL;
clone_info=NULL;
Header.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.Width==0 || Header.Height==0 || Header.Reserved!=0)
CUT_KO: ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*---This code checks first line of image---*/
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
ldblk=0;
while((int) RunCountMasked!=0) /*end of line?*/
{
i=1;
if((int) RunCount<0x80) i=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
offset=SeekBlob(image,TellBlob(image)+i,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data*/
EncodedByte-=i+1;
ldblk+=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: unexpected eof in line*/
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
if(EncodedByte!=1) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: size incorrect*/
i=0; /*guess a number of bit planes*/
if(ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=8;
if(2*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=4;
if(8*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=1;
if(i==0) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: incorrect bit planes*/
depth=i;
image->columns=Header.Width;
image->rows=Header.Height;
image->depth=8;
image->colors=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(1UL*i)+1);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse) goto Finish;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/* ----- Do something with palette ----- */
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL) goto NoPalette;
i=(ssize_t) strlen(clone_info->filename);
j=i;
while(--i>0)
{
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='.')
{
break;
}
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='/' || clone_info->filename[i]=='\\' ||
clone_info->filename[i]==':' )
{
i=j;
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".PAL",(size_t)
(MagickPathExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".pal",(size_t)
(MagickPathExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info->filename[i]='\0';
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
}
}
if( (palette=AcquireImage(clone_info,exception))==NULL ) goto NoPalette;
status=OpenBlob(clone_info,palette,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ErasePalette:
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
palette=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
if(palette!=NULL)
{
(void) ReadBlob(palette,2,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.FileId);
if(strncmp(PalHeader.FileId,"AH",2) != 0) goto ErasePalette;
PalHeader.Version=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.Size=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.FileType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.SubType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.BoardID=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.GraphicsMode=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxRed=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxGreen=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxBlue=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
(void) ReadBlob(palette,20,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.PaletteId);
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
if(PalHeader.MaxIndex<1) goto ErasePalette;
image->colors=PalHeader.MaxIndex+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse) goto NoMemory;
if(PalHeader.MaxRed==0) PalHeader.MaxRed=(unsigned int) QuantumRange; /*avoid division by 0*/
if(PalHeader.MaxGreen==0) PalHeader.MaxGreen=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
if(PalHeader.MaxBlue==0) PalHeader.MaxBlue=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
for(i=0;i<=(int) PalHeader.MaxIndex;i++)
{ /*this may be wrong- I don't know why is palette such strange*/
j=(ssize_t) TellBlob(palette);
if((j % 512)>512-6)
{
j=((j / 512)+1)*512;
offset=SeekBlob(palette,j,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxRed)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
image->colormap[i].red*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxRed>>1))/
PalHeader.MaxRed);
}
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxGreen)
{
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum
(((double) image->colormap[i].green*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxGreen>>1))/PalHeader.MaxGreen);
}
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxBlue)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum
(((double)image->colormap[i].blue*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxBlue>>1))/PalHeader.MaxBlue);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
NoPalette:
if(palette==NULL)
{
image->colors=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
NoMemory:
ThrowCUTReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
}
/* ----- Load RLE compressed raster ----- */
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk,
sizeof(*BImgBuff)); /*Ldblk was set in the check phase*/
if(BImgBuff==NULL) goto NoMemory;
offset=SeekBlob(image,6 /*sizeof(Header)*/,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
for (i=0; i < (int) Header.Height; i++)
{
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
ptrB=BImgBuff;
j=ldblk;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
while ((int) RunCountMasked != 0)
{
if((ssize_t) RunCountMasked>j)
{ /*Wrong Data*/
RunCountMasked=(unsigned char) j;
if(j==0)
{
break;
}
}
if((int) RunCount>0x80)
{
RunValue=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) memset(ptrB,(int) RunValue,(size_t) RunCountMasked);
}
else {
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) RunCountMasked,ptrB);
}
ptrB+=(int) RunCountMasked;
j-=(int) RunCountMasked;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto Finish; /* wrong data: unexpected eof in line */
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
InsertRow(image,depth,BImgBuff,i,exception);
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
/*detect monochrome image*/
if(palette==NULL)
{ /*attempt to detect binary (black&white) images*/
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if(GetCutColors(image,exception)==2)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
register Quantum
sample;
sample=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
if(image->colormap[i].red!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].green!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].blue!=sample) goto Finish;
}
image->colormap[1].red=image->colormap[1].green=
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->rows; i++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t)image->columns; j++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(image,q) == ScaleCharToQuantum(1))
{
SetPixelRed(image,QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,QuantumRange,q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) goto Finish;
}
}
}
}
Finish:
if (BImgBuff != NULL)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a *use of uninitialized value* vulnerability in the function ReadCUTImage in coders/cut.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599
|
Medium
| 169,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintViewManager::RenderFrameDeleted(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host == print_preview_rfh_)
print_preview_state_ = NOT_PREVIEWING;
PrintViewManagerBase::RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A use after free in printing in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.133 for Linux and Windows allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Properly clean up in PrintViewManager::RenderFrameCreated().
BUG=694382,698622
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2742853003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#457363}
|
Medium
| 172,405
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* Expect expand_16 to expand everything to 16 bits as a result of also
* causing 'expand' to happen.
*/
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
if (that->bit_depth < 16)
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 16;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
|
High
| 170,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GURL CreateResource(const std::string& content, const std::string& file_ext) {
base::FilePath path;
EXPECT_TRUE(base::CreateTemporaryFile(&path));
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<int>(content.size()),
base::WriteFile(path, content.c_str(), content.size()));
base::FilePath path_with_extension;
path_with_extension = path.AddExtension(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(file_ext));
EXPECT_TRUE(base::Move(path, path_with_extension));
return net::FilePathToFileURL(path_with_extension);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Parsing documents as HTML in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to cause Chrome to execute scripts via a local non-HTML page.
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
|
???
| 172,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: batadv_frag_merge_packets(struct hlist_head *chain, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct batadv_frag_packet *packet;
struct batadv_frag_list_entry *entry;
struct sk_buff *skb_out = NULL;
int size, hdr_size = sizeof(struct batadv_frag_packet);
/* Make sure incoming skb has non-bogus data. */
packet = (struct batadv_frag_packet *)skb->data;
size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
if (size > batadv_frag_size_limit())
goto free;
/* Remove first entry, as this is the destination for the rest of the
* fragments.
*/
entry = hlist_entry(chain->first, struct batadv_frag_list_entry, list);
hlist_del(&entry->list);
skb_out = entry->skb;
kfree(entry);
/* Make room for the rest of the fragments. */
if (pskb_expand_head(skb_out, 0, size - skb->len, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb_out);
skb_out = NULL;
goto free;
}
/* Move the existing MAC header to just before the payload. (Override
* the fragment header.)
*/
skb_pull_rcsum(skb_out, hdr_size);
memmove(skb_out->data - ETH_HLEN, skb_mac_header(skb_out), ETH_HLEN);
skb_set_mac_header(skb_out, -ETH_HLEN);
skb_reset_network_header(skb_out);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb_out);
/* Copy the payload of the each fragment into the last skb */
hlist_for_each_entry(entry, chain, list) {
size = entry->skb->len - hdr_size;
memcpy(skb_put(skb_out, size), entry->skb->data + hdr_size,
size);
}
free:
/* Locking is not needed, because 'chain' is not part of any orig. */
batadv_frag_clear_chain(chain);
return skb_out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The batadv_frag_merge_packets function in net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c in the B.A.T.M.A.N. implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 uses an incorrect length field during a calculation of an amount of memory, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (mesh-node system crash) via fragmented packets.
Commit Message: batman-adv: Calculate extra tail size based on queued fragments
The fragmentation code was replaced in 610bfc6bc99bc83680d190ebc69359a05fc7f605
("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge"). The new code provided a
mostly unused parameter skb for the merging function. It is used inside the
function to calculate the additionally needed skb tailroom. But instead of
increasing its own tailroom, it is only increasing the tailroom of the first
queued skb. This is not correct in some situations because the first queued
entry can be a different one than the parameter.
An observed problem was:
1. packet with size 104, total_size 1464, fragno 1 was received
- packet is queued
2. packet with size 1400, total_size 1464, fragno 0 was received
- packet is queued at the end of the list
3. enough data was received and can be given to the merge function
(1464 == (1400 - 20) + (104 - 20))
- merge functions gets 1400 byte large packet as skb argument
4. merge function gets first entry in queue (104 byte)
- stored as skb_out
5. merge function calculates the required extra tail as total_size - skb->len
- pskb_expand_head tail of skb_out with 64 bytes
6. merge function tries to squeeze the extra 1380 bytes from the second queued
skb (1400 byte aka skb parameter) in the 64 extra tail bytes of skb_out
Instead calculate the extra required tail bytes for skb_out also using skb_out
instead of using the parameter skb. The skb parameter is only used to get the
total_size from the last received packet. This is also the total_size used to
decide that all fragments were received.
Reported-by: Philipp Psurek <philipp.psurek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Acked-by: Martin Hundebøll <martin@hundeboll.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,786
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LogLuvClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/*
* For consistency, we always want to write out the same
* bitspersample and sampleformat for our TIFF file,
* regardless of the data format being used by the application.
* Since this routine is called after tags have been set but
* before they have been recorded in the file, we reset them here.
*/
td->td_samplesperpixel =
(td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3;
td->td_bitspersample = 16;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, related to *READ of size 512* and libtiff/tif_unix.c:340:2.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
|
Medium
| 168,464
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::OnContentBlocked(
ContentSettingsType type,
const std::string& resource_identifier) {
DCHECK(type != CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION)
<< "Geolocation settings handled by OnGeolocationPermissionSet";
content_accessed_[type] = true;
std::string identifier;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableResourceContentSettings)) {
identifier = resource_identifier;
}
if (!identifier.empty())
AddBlockedResource(type, identifier);
#if defined (OS_ANDROID)
if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_POPUPS) {
content_blocked_[type] = false;
content_blockage_indicated_to_user_[type] = false;
}
#endif
if (!content_blocked_[type]) {
content_blocked_[type] = true;
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENT_SETTINGS_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebContents>(web_contents()),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Array index error in the content-blocking functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestWebKitPlatformSupport::TestWebKitPlatformSupport(bool unit_test_mode)
: unit_test_mode_(unit_test_mode) {
v8::V8::SetCounterFunction(base::StatsTable::FindLocation);
WebKit::initialize(this);
WebKit::setLayoutTestMode(true);
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsLocal(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsNoAccess(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebScriptController::enableV8SingleThreadMode();
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSockets(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableApplicationCache(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDatabase(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDataTransferItems(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enablePushState(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableNotifications(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTouch(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGamepad(true);
bool enable_media = false;
FilePath module_path;
if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_path)) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::mac::AmIBundled())
module_path = module_path.DirName().DirName().DirName();
#endif
if (media::InitializeMediaLibrary(module_path))
enable_media = true;
}
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableMediaPlayer(enable_media);
LOG_IF(WARNING, !enable_media) << "Failed to initialize the media library.\n";
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGeolocation(false);
if (!appcache_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the appcache, "
"using in-memory storage.";
DCHECK(appcache_dir_.path().empty());
}
SimpleAppCacheSystem::InitializeOnUIThread(appcache_dir_.path());
WebKit::WebDatabase::setObserver(&database_system_);
blob_registry_ = new TestShellWebBlobRegistryImpl();
file_utilities_.set_sandbox_enabled(false);
if (!file_system_root_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the filesystem."
"FileSystem feature will be disabled.";
DCHECK(file_system_root_.path().empty());
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
SetThemeEngine(NULL);
#endif
net::HttpCache::Mode cache_mode = net::HttpCache::NORMAL;
net::CookieMonster::EnableFileScheme();
SimpleResourceLoaderBridge::Init(FilePath(), cache_mode, true);
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebScriptController::registerExtension(extensions_v8::GCExtension::Get());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nntp_hcache_namer(const char *path, char *dest, size_t destlen)
{
return snprintf(dest, destlen, "%s.hcache", path);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. newsrc.c does not properly restrict '/' characters that may have unsafe interaction with cache pathnames.
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
|
Low
| 169,119
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const extensions::Extension* GetExtension(Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
const ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
const extensions::Extension* extension =
service->GetInstalledExtension(extension_id);
return extension;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
|
Low
| 171,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 on Android does not prevent navigation to a URL in cases where an intent for the URL lacks CATEGORY_BROWSABLE, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
|
Low
| 171,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int chmd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys, struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mschmd_header *chm, int entire)
{
unsigned int section, name_len, x, errors, num_chunks;
unsigned char buf[0x54], *chunk = NULL, *name, *p, *end;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *link = NULL;
off_t offset, length;
int num_entries;
/* initialise pointers */
chm->files = NULL;
chm->sysfiles = NULL;
chm->chunk_cache = NULL;
chm->sec0.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec0.base.id = 0;
chm->sec1.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec1.base.id = 1;
chm->sec1.content = NULL;
chm->sec1.control = NULL;
chm->sec1.spaninfo = NULL;
chm->sec1.rtable = NULL;
/* read the first header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhead_SIZEOF) != chmhead_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check ITSF signature */
if (EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Signature]) != 0x46535449) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* check both header GUIDs */
if (mspack_memcmp(&buf[chmhead_GUID1], &guids[0], 32L) != 0) {
D(("incorrect GUIDs"))
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
chm->version = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Version]);
chm->timestamp = EndGetM32(&buf[chmhead_Timestamp]);
chm->language = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_LanguageID]);
if (chm->version > 3) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; CHM version > 3");
}
/* read the header section table */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhst3_SIZEOF) != chmhst3_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* chmhst3_OffsetCS0 does not exist in version 1 or 2 CHM files.
* The offset will be corrected later, once HS1 is read.
*/
if (read_off64(&offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS0], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->dir_offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS1], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->sec0.offset, &buf[chmhst3_OffsetCS0], sys, fh))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 0 */
if (sys->seek(fh, offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 0 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs0_SIZEOF) != chmhs0_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
if (read_off64(&chm->length, &buf[chmhs0_FileLen], sys, fh)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 1 */
if (sys->seek(fh, chm->dir_offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 1 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs1_SIZEOF) != chmhs1_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
chm->dir_offset = sys->tell(fh);
chm->chunk_size = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_ChunkSize]);
chm->density = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Density]);
chm->depth = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Depth]);
chm->index_root = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_IndexRoot]);
chm->num_chunks = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_NumChunks]);
chm->first_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_FirstPMGL]);
chm->last_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_LastPMGL]);
if (chm->version < 3) {
/* versions before 3 don't have chmhst3_OffsetCS0 */
chm->sec0.offset = chm->dir_offset + (chm->chunk_size * chm->num_chunks);
}
/* check if content offset or file size is wrong */
if (chm->sec0.offset > chm->length) {
D(("content section begins after file has ended"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* ensure there are chunks and that chunk size is
* large enough for signature and num_entries */
if (chm->chunk_size < (pmgl_Entries + 2)) {
D(("chunk size not large enough"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->num_chunks == 0) {
D(("no chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* The chunk_cache data structure is not great; large values for num_chunks
* or num_chunks*chunk_size can exhaust all memory. Until a better chunk
* cache is implemented, put arbitrary limits on num_chunks and chunk size.
*/
if (chm->num_chunks > 100000) {
D(("more than 100,000 chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if ((off_t)chm->chunk_size * (off_t)chm->num_chunks > chm->length) {
D(("chunks larger than entire file"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* common sense checks on header section 1 fields */
if ((chm->chunk_size & (chm->chunk_size - 1)) != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; chunk size is not a power of two");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; first PMGL chunk is not zero");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl > chm->last_pmgl) {
D(("first pmgl chunk is after last pmgl chunk"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->index_root != 0xFFFFFFFF && chm->index_root >= chm->num_chunks) {
D(("index_root outside valid range"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* if we are doing a quick read, stop here! */
if (!entire) {
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
/* seek to the first PMGL chunk, and reduce the number of chunks to read */
if ((x = chm->first_pmgl) != 0) {
if (sys->seek(fh,(off_t) (x * chm->chunk_size), MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
}
num_chunks = chm->last_pmgl - x + 1;
if (!(chunk = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)chm->chunk_size))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* read and process all chunks from FirstPMGL to LastPMGL */
errors = 0;
while (num_chunks--) {
/* read next chunk */
if (sys->read(fh, chunk, (int)chm->chunk_size) != (int)chm->chunk_size) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* process only directory (PMGL) chunks */
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_Signature]) != 0x4C474D50) continue;
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) < 2) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too small");
}
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) >
((int)chm->chunk_size - pmgl_Entries))
{
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too large");
}
p = &chunk[pmgl_Entries];
end = &chunk[chm->chunk_size - 2];
num_entries = EndGetI16(end);
while (num_entries--) {
READ_ENCINT(name_len);
if (name_len > (unsigned int) (end - p)) goto chunk_end;
/* consider blank filenames to be an error */
if (name_len == 0) goto chunk_end;
name = p; p += name_len;
READ_ENCINT(section);
READ_ENCINT(offset);
READ_ENCINT(length);
/* empty files and directory names are stored as a file entry at
* offset 0 with length 0. We want to keep empty files, but not
* directory names, which end with a "/" */
if ((offset == 0) && (length == 0)) {
if ((name_len > 0) && (name[name_len-1] == '/')) continue;
}
if (section > 1) {
sys->message(fh, "invalid section number '%u'.", section);
continue;
}
if (!(fi = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(struct mschmd_file) + name_len + 1))) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
fi->next = NULL;
fi->filename = (char *) &fi[1];
fi->section = ((section == 0) ? (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec0)
: (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec1));
fi->offset = offset;
fi->length = length;
sys->copy(name, fi->filename, (size_t) name_len);
fi->filename[name_len] = '\0';
if (name[0] == ':' && name[1] == ':') {
/* system file */
if (mspack_memcmp(&name[2], &content_name[2], 31L) == 0) {
if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &content_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.content = fi;
}
else if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &control_name[33], 11L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.control = fi;
}
else if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &spaninfo_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.spaninfo = fi;
}
else if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &rtable_name[33], 72L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.rtable = fi;
}
}
fi->next = chm->sysfiles;
chm->sysfiles = fi;
}
else {
/* normal file */
if (link) link->next = fi; else chm->files = fi;
link = fi;
}
}
/* this is reached either when num_entries runs out, or if
* reading data from the chunk reached a premature end of chunk */
chunk_end:
if (num_entries >= 0) {
D(("chunk ended before all entries could be read"))
errors++;
}
}
sys->free(chunk);
return (errors > 0) ? MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT : MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: chmd_read_headers in mspack/chmd.c in libmspack before 0.8alpha accepts a filename that has '0' as its first or second character (such as the */0* name).
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
|
Medium
| 169,003
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_name, "benchmark") &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, "whitelisted")) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
|
Low
| 171,681
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Process_ipfix_template_withdraw(exporter_ipfix_domain_t *exporter, void *DataPtr, uint32_t size_left, FlowSource_t *fs) {
ipfix_template_record_t *ipfix_template_record;
while ( size_left ) {
uint32_t id;
ipfix_template_record = (ipfix_template_record_t *)DataPtr;
size_left -= 4;
id = ntohs(ipfix_template_record->TemplateID);
if ( id == IPFIX_TEMPLATE_FLOWSET_ID ) {
remove_all_translation_tables(exporter);
ReInitExtensionMapList(fs);
} else {
remove_translation_table(fs, exporter, id);
}
DataPtr = DataPtr + 4;
if ( size_left < 4 ) {
dbg_printf("Skip %u bytes padding\n", size_left);
size_left = 0;
}
}
} // End of Process_ipfix_template_withdraw
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: nfdump 1.6.17 and earlier is affected by an integer overflow in the function Process_ipfix_template_withdraw in ipfix.c that can be abused in order to crash the process remotely (denial of service).
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
|
Low
| 169,583
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
__update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
insn->imm);
} else {
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
(u32)insn->imm);
}
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging register truncation mishandling.
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect tracking of register size truncation
Properly handle register truncation to a smaller size.
The old code first mirrors the clearing of the high 32 bits in the bitwise
tristate representation, which is correct. But then, it computes the new
arithmetic bounds as the intersection between the old arithmetic bounds and
the bounds resulting from the bitwise tristate representation. Therefore,
when coerce_reg_to_32() is called on a number with bounds
[0xffff'fff8, 0x1'0000'0007], the verifier computes
[0xffff'fff8, 0xffff'ffff] as bounds of the truncated number.
This is incorrect: The truncated number could also be in the range [0, 7],
and no meaningful arithmetic bounds can be computed in that case apart from
the obvious [0, 0xffff'ffff].
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16996 for this issue.
v2:
- flip the mask during arithmetic bounds calculation (Ben Hutchings)
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,658
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/122
|
Medium
| 168,802
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: is_link_trusted (NautilusFile *file,
gboolean is_launcher)
{
GFile *location;
gboolean res;
if (!is_launcher)
{
return TRUE;
}
if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file))
{
return TRUE;
}
res = FALSE;
if (nautilus_file_is_local (file))
{
location = nautilus_file_get_location (file);
res = nautilus_is_in_system_dir (location);
g_object_unref (location);
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
Low
| 167,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
void* object,
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PageCaptureCustomBindings::PageCaptureCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("CreateBlob",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::CreateBlob,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("SendResponseAck",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::SendResponseAck,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,277
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl(
ExtensionInstallPromptShowParams* show_params,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog =
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(show_params->profile(),
show_params->GetParentWebContents(),
delegate,
prompt);
constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, show_params->GetParentWindow())->Show();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The Web Store inline-installer implementation in the Extensions UI in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not block installations upon deletion of an installation frame, which makes it easier for remote attackers to trick a user into believing that an installation request originated from the user's next navigation target via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
|
Medium
| 172,208
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_asymm_verify(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *data, size_t data_len,
const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
size_t hash_size;
int salt_len = 0;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
uint32_t hash_algo;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_VERIFY)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t)data, data_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t)sig, sig_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * num_params);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo)) {
case TEE_MAIN_ALGO_RSA:
if (cs->algo != TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5) {
hash_algo = TEE_DIGEST_HASH_TO_ALGO(cs->algo);
res = tee_hash_get_digest_size(hash_algo, &hash_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
break;
if (data_len != hash_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params,
hash_size);
}
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_verify(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
data, data_len, sig,
sig_len);
break;
case TEE_MAIN_ALGO_DSA:
hash_algo = TEE_DIGEST_HASH_TO_ALGO(cs->algo);
res = tee_hash_get_digest_size(hash_algo, &hash_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
break;
/*
* Depending on the DSA algorithm (NIST), the digital signature
* output size may be truncated to the size of a key pair
* (Q prime size). Q prime size must be less or equal than the
* hash output length of the hash algorithm involved.
*/
if (data_len > hash_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_verify(cs->algo, o->attr, data,
data_len, sig, sig_len);
break;
case TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDSA:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_verify(cs->algo, o->attr, data,
data_len, sig, sig_len);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Code execution in the context of TEE core (kernel). The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
Low
| 169,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MessageLoop::DoWork() {
if (!nestable_tasks_allowed_) {
return false;
}
for (;;) {
ReloadWorkQueue();
if (work_queue_.empty())
break;
do {
PendingTask pending_task = std::move(work_queue_.front());
work_queue_.pop();
if (pending_task.task.IsCancelled()) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DecrementHighResTaskCountIfNeeded(pending_task);
#endif
} else if (!pending_task.delayed_run_time.is_null()) {
int sequence_num = pending_task.sequence_num;
TimeTicks delayed_run_time = pending_task.delayed_run_time;
AddToDelayedWorkQueue(std::move(pending_task));
if (delayed_work_queue_.top().sequence_num == sequence_num)
pump_->ScheduleDelayedWork(delayed_run_time);
} else {
if (DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task)))
return true;
}
} while (!work_queue_.empty());
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
Low
| 171,864
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 2);
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
CHECK(args[1]->IsFunction());
int frame_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
content::RenderFrame* frame = content::RenderFrame::FromRoutingID(frame_id);
if (!frame) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No render frame found to register LoadWatcher.";
return;
}
new LoadWatcher(context(), frame, args[1].As<v8::Function>());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: extensions/renderer/render_frame_observer_natives.cc in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly consider object lifetimes and re-entrancy issues during OnDocumentElementCreated handling, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
|
Low
| 172,146
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::UpdateCompositingLayersAfterScroll() {
PaintLayerCompositor* compositor = GetLayoutBox()->View()->Compositor();
if (!compositor->InCompositingMode())
return;
if (UsesCompositedScrolling()) {
DCHECK(Layer()->HasCompositedLayerMapping());
ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator = GetScrollingCoordinator();
bool handled_scroll =
Layer()->IsRootLayer() && scrolling_coordinator &&
scrolling_coordinator->UpdateCompositedScrollOffset(this);
if (!handled_scroll) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping()->SetNeedsGraphicsLayerUpdate(
kGraphicsLayerUpdateSubtree);
}
compositor->SetNeedsCompositingUpdate(
kCompositingUpdateAfterGeometryChange);
}
if (Layer()->IsRootLayer()) {
LocalFrame* frame = GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->View() &&
frame->View()->HasViewportConstrainedObjects()) {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
} else {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, mishandles deferred page loads, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
|
Medium
| 172,047
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct netlink_callback *cb;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
int alloc_min_size;
int alloc_size;
mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (!nlk->cb_running) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto errout_skb;
}
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
goto errout_skb;
/* NLMSG_GOODSIZE is small to avoid high order allocations being
* required, but it makes sense to _attempt_ a 16K bytes allocation
* to reduce number of system calls on dump operations, if user
* ever provided a big enough buffer.
*/
cb = &nlk->cb;
alloc_min_size = max_t(int, cb->min_dump_alloc, NLMSG_GOODSIZE);
if (alloc_min_size < nlk->max_recvmsg_len) {
alloc_size = nlk->max_recvmsg_len;
skb = alloc_skb(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL |
__GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
}
if (!skb) {
alloc_size = alloc_min_size;
skb = alloc_skb(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!skb)
goto errout_skb;
/* Trim skb to allocated size. User is expected to provide buffer as
* large as max(min_dump_alloc, 16KiB (mac_recvmsg_len capped at
* netlink_recvmsg())). dump will pack as many smaller messages as
* could fit within the allocated skb. skb is typically allocated
* with larger space than required (could be as much as near 2x the
* requested size with align to next power of 2 approach). Allowing
* dump to use the excess space makes it difficult for a user to have a
* reasonable static buffer based on the expected largest dump of a
* single netdev. The outcome is MSG_TRUNC error.
*/
skb_reserve(skb, skb_tailroom(skb) - alloc_size);
netlink_skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
len = cb->dump(skb, cb);
if (len > 0) {
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
else
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
return 0;
}
nlh = nlmsg_put_answer(skb, cb, NLMSG_DONE, sizeof(len), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (!nlh)
goto errout_skb;
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlh);
memcpy(nlmsg_data(nlh), &len, sizeof(len));
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
else
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
if (cb->done)
cb->done(cb);
nlk->cb_running = false;
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
module_put(cb->module);
consume_skb(cb->skb);
return 0;
errout_skb:
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Race condition in the netlink_dump function in net/netlink/af_netlink.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (double free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that makes sendmsg system calls, leading to a free operation associated with a new dump that started earlier than anticipated.
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,844
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_decode(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 proc_idx = 0;
WORD32 prev_proc_idx = 0;
/* Initialize error code */
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size; //Restore size field
}
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT_REACHED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* If reset flag is set, flush the existing buffers */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 1;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
/* In case the decoder is not in flush mode check for input buffer validity */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN)
{
if((WORD32)ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes > 0)
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
else
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
#ifdef APPLY_CONCEALMENT
{
WORD32 num_mbs;
num_mbs = (ps_codec->i4_wd * ps_codec->i4_ht + 255) >> 8;
/* Reset MB Count at the beginning of every process call */
ps_codec->mb_count = 0;
memset(ps_codec->mb_map, 0, ((num_mbs + 7) >> 3));
}
#endif
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf && ps_codec->i4_header_mode == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_codec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_codec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
if(ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ihevc_disp_mgr_get(
(disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, &ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id);
/* In case of non-shared mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
&& ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
|| (IV_YUV_420P
== ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx];
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
/* Output buffer check */
ret = ihevcd_check_out_buf_size(ps_codec);
RETURN_IF((ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS), ret);
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], 0,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
if(NULL == ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
{
/* If in flush mode and there are no more buffers to flush,
* check for the reset flag and reset the decoder */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
/* In case of shared mode, check if there is a free buffer for reconstruction */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_header_mode) && (1 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf))
{
WORD32 buf_status;
buf_status = 1;
if(ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr)
buf_status = ihevc_buf_mgr_check_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
/* If there is no free buffer, then return with an error code */
if(0 == buf_status)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pic_present = 0;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = NULL;
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
ithread_set_affinity(0);
}
while(MIN_START_CODE_LEN < ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining)
{
WORD32 nal_len;
WORD32 nal_ofst;
WORD32 bits_len;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
WORD32 next_slice_addr = ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x +
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y * ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx == next_slice_addr)
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
if(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic)
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic;
}
else
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_static;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_static;
}
nal_ofst = ihevcd_nal_search_start_code(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf,
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining);
ps_codec->i4_nal_ofst = nal_ofst;
{
WORD32 bytes_remaining = ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - nal_ofst;
bytes_remaining = MIN((UWORD32)bytes_remaining, ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size);
ihevcd_nal_remv_emuln_bytes(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf + nal_ofst,
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bytes_remaining,
&nal_len, &bits_len);
/* Decoder may read upto 8 extra bytes at the end of frame */
/* These are not used, but still set them to zero to avoid uninitialized reads */
if(bits_len < (WORD32)(ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size - 8))
{
memset(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf + bits_len, 0, 2 * sizeof(UWORD32));
}
}
/* This may be used to update the offsets for tiles and entropy sync row offsets */
ps_codec->i4_num_emln_bytes = nal_len - bits_len;
ps_codec->i4_nal_len = nal_len;
ihevcd_bits_init(&ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm, ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bits_len);
ret = ihevcd_nal_unit(ps_codec);
/* If the frame is incomplete and
* the bytes remaining is zero or a header is received,
* complete the frame treating it to be in error */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx != ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb))
{
if((ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN) ||
(ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
continue;
}
}
if(IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE == ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = MAX(0, (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx - 1));
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
continue;
}
if((IVD_RES_CHANGED == ret) ||
(IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED == ret))
{
break;
}
/* Update bytes remaining and bytes consumed and input bitstream pointer */
/* Do not consume the NAL in the following cases */
/* Slice header reached during header decode mode */
/* TODO: Next picture's slice reached */
if(ret != IHEVCD_SLICE_IN_HEADER_MODE)
{
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_slice_error) ||
(ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN))
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
}
if(ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
break;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
break;
}
else
{
ret = IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
break;
}
/* Allocate dynamic bitstream buffer once SPS is decoded */
if((ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done == 0) && ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
WORD32 ret;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->i4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
BREAK_AFTER_SLICE_NAL();
}
if((ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt == 0) && (ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS))
{
ps_codec->i4_error_code = ret;
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(1 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
WORD32 i;
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 1;
/*TODO temporary fix: end_of_frame is checked before adding format conversion to job queue */
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1 && ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
{
/* Add job queue for format conversion / frame copy for each ctb row */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) &&
((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
/* If format conversion jobs were not issued in pic_init() add them here */
if((0 == ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead) ||
(ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id == ps_proc->i4_cur_pic_buf_id))
for(i = 0; i < ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb; i++)
{
proc_job_t s_job;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i2_ctb_cnt = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_x = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_y = i;
s_job.i2_slice_idx = 0;
s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst = 0;
ret = ihevcd_jobq_queue((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq,
&s_job, sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if(ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
return (WORD32)ret;
}
}
/* Reached end of frame : Signal terminate */
/* The terminate flag is checked only after all the jobs are dequeued */
ret = ihevcd_jobq_terminate((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq);
while(1)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
proc_job_t s_job;
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
ret = ihevcd_jobq_dequeue((jobq_t *)ps_proc->pv_proc_jobq, &s_job,
sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret)
break;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_cnt = s_job.i2_ctb_cnt;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_x = s_job.i2_ctb_x;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_y = s_job.i2_ctb_y;
ps_proc->i4_cur_slice_idx = s_job.i2_slice_idx;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst);
ihevcd_process(ps_proc);
}
else if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
WORD32 num_rows = 1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
num_rows = MIN(num_rows, (ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - (s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)));
if(num_rows < 0)
num_rows = 0;
ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size,
num_rows);
}
}
}
/* In case of non-shared mode and while running in single core mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
else if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) && ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) ||
(IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)) &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx];
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht
- ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
if(ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows < 0)
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = 0;
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row,
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows);
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row += ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows;
}
DEBUG_DUMP_MV_MAP(ps_codec);
/* Mark MV Buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_mv_bank_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Insert the current picture as short term reference */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_insert_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].ps_cur_pic,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id);
/* If a frame was displayed (in non-shared mode), then release it from display manager */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) && (ps_codec->ps_disp_buf))
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Wait for threads */
for(i = 0; i < (ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i])
{
ithread_join(ps_codec->apv_process_thread_handle[i], NULL);
ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i] = 0;
}
}
DEBUG_VALIDATE_PADDED_REGION(&ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx]);
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt > 0)
{
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_PU(ps_codec);
}
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_BUFFERS(ps_codec);
/* Increment the number of pictures decoded */
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt++;
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: A vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63045918.
Commit Message: Fix slice decrement for skipped slices
Test: run the poc with and without the patch
Bug: 63045918
Change-Id: I27804d42c55480c25303d1a5dbb43b1d86d7fa94
(cherry picked from commit 272f2c23c8ba8579adb0618b4124163b9bf086fb)
|
Low
| 173,975
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UpdatePolicyForEvent(const WebInputEvent* input_event,
NavigationPolicy* policy) {
if (!input_event)
return;
unsigned short button_number = 0;
if (input_event->GetType() == WebInputEvent::kMouseUp) {
const WebMouseEvent* mouse_event =
static_cast<const WebMouseEvent*>(input_event);
switch (mouse_event->button) {
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft:
button_number = 0;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kMiddle:
button_number = 1;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kRight:
button_number = 2;
break;
default:
return;
}
} else if ((WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(input_event->GetType()) &&
static_cast<const WebKeyboardEvent*>(input_event)
->windows_key_code == VKEY_RETURN) ||
WebInputEvent::IsGestureEventType(input_event->GetType())) {
button_number = 0;
} else {
return;
}
bool ctrl = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kControlKey;
bool shift = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kShiftKey;
bool alt = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kAltKey;
bool meta = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kMetaKey;
NavigationPolicy user_policy = *policy;
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(button_number, ctrl, shift, alt, meta,
&user_policy);
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload &&
*policy != kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return;
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyNewWindow &&
*policy == kNavigationPolicyNewPopup)
return;
*policy = user_policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A missing check for JS-simulated input events in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to download arbitrary files with no user input via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
|
???
| 173,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
__uint128_t tmp;
void *valp = &tmp;
u64 off;
int err = 0;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) > sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(valp, uaddr, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (off == KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.pstate)) {
u32 mode = (*(u32 *)valp) & PSR_AA32_MODE_MASK;
switch (mode) {
case PSR_AA32_MODE_USR:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_FIQ:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_IRQ:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_UND:
case PSR_MODE_EL0t:
case PSR_MODE_EL1t:
case PSR_MODE_EL1h:
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
memcpy((u32 *)regs + off, valp, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id));
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c in KVM in the Linux kernel before 4.18.12 on the arm64 platform mishandles the KVM_SET_ON_REG ioctl. This is exploitable by attackers who can create virtual machines. An attacker can arbitrarily redirect the hypervisor flow of control (with full register control). An attacker can also cause a denial of service (hypervisor panic) via an illegal exception return. This occurs because of insufficient restrictions on userspace access to the core register file, and because PSTATE.M validation does not prevent unintended execution modes.
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
Low
| 169,012
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,770
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
unsigned char arg[128];
int ret = 0;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*len < get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("get_ctl: len %u < %u\n",
*len, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_GET_VERSION:
{
char buf[64];
sprintf(buf, "IP Virtual Server version %d.%d.%d (size=%d)",
NVERSION(IP_VS_VERSION_CODE), IP_VS_CONN_TAB_SIZE);
if (copy_to_user(user, buf, strlen(buf)+1) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
*len = strlen(buf)+1;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_INFO:
{
struct ip_vs_getinfo info;
info.version = IP_VS_VERSION_CODE;
info.size = IP_VS_CONN_TAB_SIZE;
info.num_services = ip_vs_num_services;
if (copy_to_user(user, &info, sizeof(info)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_SERVICES:
{
struct ip_vs_get_services *get;
int size;
get = (struct ip_vs_get_services *)arg;
size = sizeof(*get) +
sizeof(struct ip_vs_service_entry) * get->num_services;
if (*len != size) {
pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = __ip_vs_get_service_entries(get, user);
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_SERVICE:
{
struct ip_vs_service_entry *entry;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
union nf_inet_addr addr;
entry = (struct ip_vs_service_entry *)arg;
addr.ip = entry->addr;
if (entry->fwmark)
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(AF_INET, entry->fwmark);
else
svc = __ip_vs_service_get(AF_INET, entry->protocol,
&addr, entry->port);
if (svc) {
ip_vs_copy_service(entry, svc);
if (copy_to_user(user, entry, sizeof(*entry)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
} else
ret = -ESRCH;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_DESTS:
{
struct ip_vs_get_dests *get;
int size;
get = (struct ip_vs_get_dests *)arg;
size = sizeof(*get) +
sizeof(struct ip_vs_dest_entry) * get->num_dests;
if (*len != size) {
pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = __ip_vs_get_dest_entries(get, user);
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT:
{
struct ip_vs_timeout_user t;
__ip_vs_get_timeouts(&t);
if (copy_to_user(user, &t, sizeof(t)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_DAEMON:
{
struct ip_vs_daemon_user d[2];
memset(&d, 0, sizeof(d));
if (ip_vs_sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) {
d[0].state = IP_VS_STATE_MASTER;
strlcpy(d[0].mcast_ifn, ip_vs_master_mcast_ifn, sizeof(d[0].mcast_ifn));
d[0].syncid = ip_vs_master_syncid;
}
if (ip_vs_sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) {
d[1].state = IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP;
strlcpy(d[1].mcast_ifn, ip_vs_backup_mcast_ifn, sizeof(d[1].mcast_ifn));
d[1].syncid = ip_vs_backup_syncid;
}
if (copy_to_user(user, &d, sizeof(d)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33, when CONFIG_IP_VS is used, allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for (1) a getsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_get_ctl function, or (2) a setsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_set_ctl function.
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
|
Medium
| 165,957
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void _xml_characterDataHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
if (parser->characterDataHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(s, len, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->characterDataHandler, parser->characterDataPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
int i;
int doprint = 0;
char *decoded_value;
int decoded_len;
decoded_value = xml_utf8_decode(s,len,&decoded_len,parser->target_encoding);
for (i = 0; i < decoded_len; i++) {
switch (decoded_value[i]) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
continue;
default:
doprint = 1;
break;
}
if (doprint) {
break;
}
}
if (doprint || (! parser->skipwhite)) {
if (parser->lastwasopen) {
zval **myval;
/* check if the current tag already has a value - if yes append to that! */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(parser->ctag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
} else {
add_assoc_string(*(parser->ctag),"value",decoded_value,0);
}
} else {
zval *tag;
zval **curtag, **mytype, **myval;
HashPosition hpos=NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_end_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), &hpos);
if (hpos && (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), (void **) &curtag, &hpos) == SUCCESS)) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"type",sizeof("type"),(void **) &mytype) == SUCCESS) {
if (!strcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(mytype), "cdata")) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
return;
}
}
}
}
if (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
array_init(tag);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset,1);
add_assoc_string(tag,"value",decoded_value,0);
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","cdata",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
} else if (parser->level == (XML_MAXLEVEL + 1)) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Maximum depth exceeded - Results truncated");
}
}
} else {
efree(decoded_value);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,040
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static aura::Window* OpenTestWindow(aura::Window* parent, bool modal) {
DCHECK(!modal || (modal && parent));
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::CreateWindowWithParent(new TestWindow(modal), parent);
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: FFmpeg, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79, does not properly handle OGG containers, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors, related to a *wild pointer* issue.
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,802
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GDataDirectory::GDataDirectory(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service)
: GDataEntry(parent, directory_service) {
file_info_.is_directory = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,489
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_supported_key_sizes)
{
int i, count = 0;
int *key_sizes;
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
array_init(return_value);
key_sizes = mcrypt_module_get_algo_supported_key_sizes(module, dir, &count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
add_index_long(return_value, i, key_sizes[i]);
}
mcrypt_free(key_sizes);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,101
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateFixedAttribs(
const char* function_name,
GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated, GLsizei primcount) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
if (!vertex_attrib_manager_->HaveFixedAttribs()) {
return true;
}
PerformanceWarning(
"GL_FIXED attributes have a signficant performance penalty");
GLuint elements_needed = 0;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfoList& infos =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetEnabledVertexAttribInfos();
for (VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfoList::const_iterator it =
infos.begin(); it != infos.end(); ++it) {
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info = *it;
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::VertexAttribInfo* attrib_info =
current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(info->index());
GLuint max_accessed = info->MaxVertexAccessed(primcount,
max_vertex_accessed);
GLuint num_vertices = max_accessed + 1;
if (num_vertices == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
if (attrib_info &&
info->CanAccess(max_accessed) &&
info->type() == GL_FIXED) {
GLuint elements_used = 0;
if (!SafeMultiply(num_vertices,
static_cast<GLuint>(info->size()), &elements_used) ||
!SafeAdd(elements_needed, elements_used, &elements_needed)) {
SetGLError(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
}
}
const GLuint kSizeOfFloat = sizeof(float); // NOLINT
GLuint size_needed = 0;
if (!SafeMultiply(elements_needed, kSizeOfFloat, &size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, fixed_attrib_buffer_id_);
if (static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > fixed_attrib_buffer_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SetGLError(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "simulating GL_FIXED attribs");
return false;
}
}
GLintptr offset = 0;
for (VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfoList::const_iterator it =
infos.begin(); it != infos.end(); ++it) {
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info = *it;
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::VertexAttribInfo* attrib_info =
current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(info->index());
GLuint max_accessed = info->MaxVertexAccessed(primcount,
max_vertex_accessed);
GLuint num_vertices = max_accessed + 1;
if (num_vertices == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
if (attrib_info &&
info->CanAccess(max_accessed) &&
info->type() == GL_FIXED) {
int num_elements = info->size() * kSizeOfFloat;
int size = num_elements * num_vertices;
scoped_array<float> data(new float[size]);
const int32* src = reinterpret_cast<const int32 *>(
info->buffer()->GetRange(info->offset(), size));
const int32* end = src + num_elements;
float* dst = data.get();
while (src != end) {
*dst++ = static_cast<float>(*src++) / 65536.0f;
}
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, offset, size, data.get());
glVertexAttribPointer(
info->index(), info->size(), GL_FLOAT, false, 0,
reinterpret_cast<GLvoid*>(offset));
offset += size;
}
}
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 on Mac OS X allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader =
port->mBuffers.editItemAt(mNumSamplesOutput & 1).mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
++mInputBufferCount;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
uint8_t *bitstream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
uint32_t *start_code = (uint32_t *)bitstream;
bool volHeader = *start_code == 0xB0010000;
if (volHeader) {
PVCleanUpVideoDecoder(mHandle);
mInitialized = false;
}
if (!mInitialized) {
uint8_t *vol_data[1];
int32_t vol_size = 0;
vol_data[0] = NULL;
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) || volHeader) {
vol_data[0] = bitstream;
vol_size = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
MP4DecodingMode mode =
(mMode == MODE_MPEG4) ? MPEG4_MODE : H263_MODE;
Bool success = PVInitVideoDecoder(
mHandle, vol_data, &vol_size, 1,
outputBufferWidth(), outputBufferHeight(), mode);
if (!success) {
ALOGW("PVInitVideoDecoder failed. Unsupported content?");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
MP4DecodingMode actualMode = PVGetDecBitstreamMode(mHandle);
if (mode != actualMode) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
PVSetPostProcType((VideoDecControls *) mHandle, 0);
bool hasFrameData = false;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else if (volHeader) {
hasFrameData = true;
}
mInitialized = true;
if (mode == MPEG4_MODE && handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
if (!hasFrameData) {
continue;
}
}
if (!mFramesConfigured) {
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = port->mBuffers.editItemAt(1).mHeader;
OMX_U32 yFrameSize = sizeof(uint8) * mHandle->size;
if ((outHeader->nAllocLen < yFrameSize) ||
(outHeader->nAllocLen - yFrameSize < yFrameSize / 2)) {
ALOGE("Too small output buffer for reference frame: %zu bytes",
outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "30033990");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
PVSetReferenceYUV(mHandle, outHeader->pBuffer);
mFramesConfigured = true;
}
uint32_t useExtTimestamp = (inHeader->nOffset == 0);
uint32_t timestamp = 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (useExtTimestamp) {
mPvToOmxTimeMap.add(mPvTime, inHeader->nTimeStamp);
timestamp = mPvTime;
mPvTime++;
}
int32_t bufferSize = inHeader->nFilledLen;
int32_t tmp = bufferSize;
OMX_U32 frameSize;
OMX_U64 yFrameSize = (OMX_U64)mWidth * (OMX_U64)mHeight;
if (yFrameSize > ((OMX_U64)UINT32_MAX / 3) * 2) {
ALOGE("Frame size too large");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
frameSize = (OMX_U32)(yFrameSize + (yFrameSize / 2));
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
ALOGE("Insufficient output buffer size");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (PVDecodeVideoFrame(
mHandle, &bitstream, ×tamp, &tmp,
&useExtTimestamp,
outHeader->pBuffer) != PV_TRUE) {
ALOGE("failed to decode video frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mPvToOmxTimeMap.valueFor(timestamp);
mPvToOmxTimeMap.removeItem(timestamp);
inHeader->nOffset += bufferSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
++mInputBufferCount;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mNumSamplesOutput;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The SoftMPEG4 component in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30033990.
Commit Message: Fix build breakage caused by commit
940829f69b52d6038db66a9c727534636ecc456d.
Change-Id: I4776db4a26fb3c31bb994d48788373fe569c812a
(cherry picked from commit baa9146401e28c5acf54dea21ddd197f0d3a8fcd)
|
Medium
| 174,148
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, unlinkArchive)
{
char *fname, *error, *zname, *arch, *entry;
size_t fname_len;
int zname_len, arch_len, entry_len;
phar_archive_data *phar;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!fname_len) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Unknown phar archive \"\"");
return;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_open_from_filename(fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, REPORT_ERRORS, &phar, &error)) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Unknown phar archive \"%s\": %s", fname, error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Unknown phar archive \"%s\"", fname);
}
return;
}
zname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename();
zname_len = strlen(zname);
if (zname_len > 7 && !memcmp(zname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(zname, zname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
if (arch_len == fname_len && !memcmp(arch, fname, arch_len)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar archive \"%s\" cannot be unlinked from within itself", fname);
efree(arch);
efree(entry);
return;
}
efree(arch);
efree(entry);
}
if (phar->is_persistent) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar archive \"%s\" is in phar.cache_list, cannot unlinkArchive()", fname);
return;
}
if (phar->refcount) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar archive \"%s\" has open file handles or objects. fclose() all file handles, and unset() all objects prior to calling unlinkArchive()", fname);
return;
}
fname = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
phar_archive_delref(phar);
unlink(fname);
efree(fname);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,061
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_accept(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char **origins, int32_t n_origins)
{
int32_t e;
e = uncurl_read_header(ucc);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Upgrade", "websocket");
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Connection", "Upgrade");
char *origin = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Origin", &origin);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
bool origin_ok = false;
for (int32_t x = 0; x < n_origins; x++)
if (strstr(origin, origins[x])) {origin_ok = true; break;}
if (!origin_ok) return UNCURL_WS_ERR_ORIGIN;
char *sec_key = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Key", &sec_key);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
char *accept_key = ws_create_accept_key(sec_key);
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", accept_key);
free(accept_key);
e = uncurl_write_header(ucc, "101", "Switching Protocols", UNCURL_RESPONSE);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
ucc->ws_mask = 0;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-352
Summary: In the uncurl_ws_accept function in uncurl.c in uncurl before 0.07, as used in Parsec before 140-3, insufficient Origin header validation (accepting an arbitrary substring match) for WebSocket API requests allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. In Parsec, this means full control over the victim's computer.
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
|
Medium
| 169,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
debug,
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFErrorHandler
error_handler,
warning_handler;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) MagickSetThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
error_handler=TIFFSetErrorHandler(TIFFErrors);
warning_handler=TIFFSetWarningHandler(TIFFWarnings);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
(void) TIFFSetWarningHandler(warning_handler);
(void) TIFFSetErrorHandler(error_handler);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point");
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SGILOGDATAFMT,SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown");
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric"));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb");
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb");
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->x_resolution=x_resolution;
image->y_resolution=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->x_resolution-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->y_resolution-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MaxTextExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MaxTextExtent,"%dx%d",
horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified");
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated");
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated");
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%u",(unsigned int)
rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJpegMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE))
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
}
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)));
SetPixelMagenta(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)));
SetPixelYellow(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)));
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)*(p+3)));
q++;
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
size_t
number_pixels;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
number_pixels=columns*rows;
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_pixels,
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
PixelPacket
*tile;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q+=image->columns-1;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetB(*p)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetA(*p)));
p--;
q--;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
(void) TIFFSetWarningHandler(warning_handler);
(void) TIFFSetErrorHandler(error_handler);
TIFFClose(tiff);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,609
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: size_t NormalPage::objectPayloadSizeForTesting() {
size_t objectPayloadSize = 0;
Address headerAddress = payload();
markAsSwept();
ASSERT(headerAddress != payloadEnd());
do {
HeapObjectHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(headerAddress);
if (!header->isFree()) {
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
objectPayloadSize += header->payloadSize();
}
ASSERT(header->size() < blinkPagePayloadSize());
headerAddress += header->size();
ASSERT(headerAddress <= payloadEnd());
} while (headerAddress < payloadEnd());
return objectPayloadSize;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
Medium
| 172,713
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AXTree::PopulateOrderedSetItems(const AXNode* ordered_set,
const AXNode* local_parent,
std::vector<const AXNode*>& items,
bool node_is_radio_button) const {
if (!(ordered_set == local_parent)) {
if (local_parent->data().role == ordered_set->data().role)
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < local_parent->child_count(); ++i) {
const AXNode* child = local_parent->GetUnignoredChildAtIndex(i);
if (node_is_radio_button &&
child->data().role == ax::mojom::Role::kRadioButton)
items.push_back(child);
if (!node_is_radio_button && child->SetRoleMatchesItemRole(ordered_set))
items.push_back(child);
if (child->data().role == ax::mojom::Role::kGenericContainer ||
child->data().role == ax::mojom::Role::kIgnored) {
PopulateOrderedSetItems(ordered_set, child, items, node_is_radio_button);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the opj_tcd_init_tile function in tcd.c in OpenJPEG, as used in PDFium in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG 2000 data.
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
|
Medium
| 172,061
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::CreateConnectedIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* client_out,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* server_out) {
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy> server;
if (!CreateIpcChannel(channel_name, kDaemonIpcSecurityDescriptor,
io_task_runner_, delegate, &server)) {
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL;
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = TRUE;
ScopedHandle client;
client.Set(CreateFile(UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0,
&security_attributes,
OPEN_EXISTING,
SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION |
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED,
NULL));
if (!client.IsValid())
return false;
*client_out = client.Pass();
*server_out = server.Pass();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,544
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: transform_display_init(transform_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST image_transform *transform_list)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->transform_list = transform_list;
/* Local variable fields */
dp->output_colour_type = 255; /* invalid */
dp->output_bit_depth = 255; /* invalid */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,712
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
const char *server,
const char *share,
const struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
bool show_sessetup,
bool force_encrypt,
int max_protocol,
int port,
int name_type,
struct cli_state **pcli)
{
struct cli_state *c = NULL;
char *servicename;
char *sharename;
char *newserver, *newshare;
const char *username;
const char *password;
const char *domain;
NTSTATUS status;
int flags = 0;
/* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
sharename += 2;
if (server == NULL) {
server = sharename;
}
sharename = strchr_m(sharename,'\\');
if (!sharename) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*sharename = 0;
sharename++;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Samba 3.x and 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3 supports connections that are encrypted but unsigned, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct encrypted-to-unencrypted downgrade attacks by modifying the client-server data stream, related to clidfs.c, libsmb_server.c, and smbXcli_base.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,676
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union {
struct tpacket_hdr *h1;
struct tpacket2_hdr *h2;
void *raw;
} h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_LOSING|TP_STATUS_USER;
unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
struct timeval tv;
struct timespec ts;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps = skb_hwtstamps(skb);
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK)
goto drop;
sk = pt->af_packet_priv;
po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk)))
goto drop;
if (dev->header_ops) {
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
else if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING) {
/* Special case: outgoing packets have ll header at head */
skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
}
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
snaplen = skb->len;
res = run_filter(skb, sk, snaplen);
if (!res)
goto drop_n_restore;
if (snaplen > res)
snaplen = res;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
macoff = netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen) + 16 +
po->tp_reserve;
} else {
unsigned maclen = skb_network_offset(skb);
netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
(maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
po->tp_reserve;
macoff = netoff - maclen;
}
if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
if (po->copy_thresh &&
atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize <
(unsigned)sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
copy_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
copy_skb = skb_get(skb);
skb_head = skb->data;
}
if (copy_skb)
skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
}
snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
if ((int)snaplen < 0)
snaplen = 0;
}
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
h.raw = packet_current_frame(po, &po->rx_ring, TP_STATUS_KERNEL);
if (!h.raw)
goto ring_is_full;
packet_increment_head(&po->rx_ring);
po->stats.tp_packets++;
if (copy_skb) {
status |= TP_STATUS_COPY;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, copy_skb);
}
if (!po->stats.tp_drops)
status &= ~TP_STATUS_LOSING;
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, h.raw + macoff, snaplen);
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
h.h1->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h1->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h1->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h1->tp_net = netoff;
if ((po->tp_tstamp & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE)
&& shhwtstamps->syststamp.tv64)
tv = ktime_to_timeval(shhwtstamps->syststamp);
else if ((po->tp_tstamp & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE)
&& shhwtstamps->hwtstamp.tv64)
tv = ktime_to_timeval(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp);
else if (skb->tstamp.tv64)
tv = ktime_to_timeval(skb->tstamp);
else
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
h.h1->tp_sec = tv.tv_sec;
h.h1->tp_usec = tv.tv_usec;
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h1);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
h.h2->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h2->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h2->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h2->tp_net = netoff;
if ((po->tp_tstamp & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE)
&& shhwtstamps->syststamp.tv64)
ts = ktime_to_timespec(shhwtstamps->syststamp);
else if ((po->tp_tstamp & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE)
&& shhwtstamps->hwtstamp.tv64)
ts = ktime_to_timespec(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp);
else if (skb->tstamp.tv64)
ts = ktime_to_timespec(skb->tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&ts);
h.h2->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h2->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb);
status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID;
} else {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = 0;
}
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h2);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
sll = h.raw + TPACKET_ALIGN(hdrlen);
sll->sll_halen = dev_parse_header(skb, sll->sll_addr);
sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
sll->sll_protocol = skb->protocol;
sll->sll_pkttype = skb->pkt_type;
if (unlikely(po->origdev))
sll->sll_ifindex = orig_dev->ifindex;
else
sll->sll_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
__packet_set_status(po, h.raw, status);
smp_mb();
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
{
u8 *start, *end;
end = (u8 *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)h.raw + macoff + snaplen);
for (start = h.raw; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(start));
}
#endif
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
drop_n_restore:
if (skb_head != skb->data && skb_shared(skb)) {
skb->data = skb_head;
skb->len = skb_len;
}
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
ring_is_full:
po->stats.tp_drops++;
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
kfree_skb(copy_skb);
goto drop_n_restore;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.3 does not properly restrict user-space access to certain packet data structures associated with VLAN Tag Control Information, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information via a crafted application.
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOL png2pnm (FILE *png_file, FILE *pnm_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL raw, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte buf[8];
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
png_uint_32 width;
png_uint_32 height;
int bit_depth;
int channels;
int color_type;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
int ret;
int i;
long dep_16;
/* read and check signature in PNG file */
ret = fread (buf, 1, 8, png_file);
if (ret != 8)
return FALSE;
ret = png_sig_cmp (buf, 0, 8);
if (ret)
return FALSE;
/* create png and info structures */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct (PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
}
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* set up the input control for C streams */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
png_set_sig_bytes (png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
/* read the file information */
png_read_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get size and bit-depth of the PNG-image */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr,
&width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* set-up the transformations */
/* transform paletted images into full-color rgb */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* expand images to bit-depth 8 (only applicable for grayscale images) */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* transform transparency maps into full alpha-channel */
if (png_get_valid (png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_tRNS))
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
#ifdef NJET
/* downgrade 16-bit images to 8 bit */
if (bit_depth == 16)
png_set_strip_16 (png_ptr);
/* transform grayscale images into full-color */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
png_set_gray_to_rgb (png_ptr);
/* only if file has a file gamma, we do a correction */
if (png_get_gAMA (png_ptr, info_ptr, &file_gamma))
png_set_gamma (png_ptr, (double) 2.2, file_gamma);
#endif
/* all transformations have been registered; now update info_ptr data,
* get rowbytes and channels, and allocate image memory */
png_read_update_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get the new color-type and bit-depth (after expansion/stripping) */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* check for 16-bit files */
if (bit_depth == 16)
{
raw = FALSE;
#ifdef __TURBOC__
pnm_file->flags &= ~((unsigned) _F_BIN);
#endif
}
/* calculate new number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should never happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
/* check if alpha is expected to be present in file */
if (alpha && !alpha_present)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: PNG-file doesn't contain alpha channel\n");
exit (1);
}
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = png_get_rowbytes (png_ptr, info_ptr);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *) malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL) {
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **) malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
png_read_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* read rest of file, and get additional chunks in info_ptr - REQUIRED */
png_read_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the read, and free any memory allocated - REQUIRED */
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
/* write header of PNM file */
if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
else if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P6" : "P3");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if ((alpha) &&
((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)))
{
fprintf (alpha_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (alpha_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write data to PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < height; row++)
{
for (col = 0; col < width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , pnm_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + ((long) *pix_ptr++));
}
else
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
if (alpha_present)
{
if (!alpha)
{
pix_ptr++; /* alpha */
if (bit_depth == 16)
pix_ptr++;
}
else /* output alpha-channel as pgm file */
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , alpha_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
else
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
} /* if alpha_present */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 == 3)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for col */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 != 0)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for row */
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of source */
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,723
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void btif_av_event_deep_copy(uint16_t event, char* p_dest, char* p_src) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
tBTA_AV* av_src = (tBTA_AV*)p_src;
tBTA_AV* av_dest = (tBTA_AV*)p_dest;
maybe_non_aligned_memcpy(av_dest, av_src, sizeof(*av_src));
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT:
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_data && av_src->meta_msg.len) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_data = (uint8_t*)osi_calloc(av_src->meta_msg.len);
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_data, av_src->meta_msg.p_data,
av_src->meta_msg.len);
}
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_msg) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg = (tAVRC_MSG*)osi_calloc(sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg, av_src->meta_msg.p_msg,
sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_src = av_src->meta_msg.p_msg;
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_dest = av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg;
if ((p_msg_src->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) &&
(p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data && p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len)) {
p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data =
(uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
memcpy(p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data,
p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data, p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In avrc_pars_browsing_cmd of avrc_pars_tg.cc, there is a possible use-after-free due to improper locking. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege in the Bluetooth service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android ID: A-109699112
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
|
Low
| 174,100
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() != enabled) {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.SetValue(enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
Medium
| 172,558
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
const CompressionType compression,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,compression,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,next_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
memset(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: In ImageMagick before 7.0.8-25, a memory leak exists in WritePSDChannel in coders/psd.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
|
Low
| 169,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev2_sa_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext1,
u_int osa_length, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth)
{
const struct isakmp_gen *ext;
struct isakmp_gen e;
u_int sa_length;
const u_char *cp;
int i;
int pcount;
u_char np;
u_int item_len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext1);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext1, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, "sa", e.critical);
/*
* ikev2_sub0_print() guarantees that this is >= 4.
*/
osa_length= ntohs(e.len);
sa_length = osa_length - 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", sa_length));
/*
* Print the payloads.
*/
cp = (const u_char *)(ext1 + 1);
pcount = 0;
for (np = ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P; np != 0; np = e.np) {
pcount++;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
if (sa_length < sizeof(*ext))
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
* Since we can't have a payload length of less than 4 bytes,
* we need to bail out here if the generic header is nonsensical
* or truncated, otherwise we could loop forever processing
* zero-length items or otherwise misdissect the packet.
*/
item_len = ntohs(e.len);
if (item_len <= 4)
goto trunc;
if (sa_length < item_len)
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, item_len);
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
if (np == ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P) {
cp = ikev2_p_print(ndo, np, pcount, ext, item_len,
ep, depth);
if (cp == NULL) {
/* error, already reported */
return NULL;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", NPSTR(np)));
cp += item_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
sa_length -= item_len;
}
return cp;
toolong:
/*
* Skip the rest of the SA.
*/
cp += sa_length;
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,801
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
if (!view_) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
false,
0);
return;
}
GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params gpu_params;
gpu_params.surface_id = surface_id;
gpu_params.surface_handle = surface_handle;
gpu_params.route_id = route_id;
gpu_params.size = size;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
gpu_params.window = gfx::kNullPluginWindow;
#endif
view_->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(gpu_params,
gpu_process_host_id);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,367
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PixelChannels **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
PixelChannels
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
columns,
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(PixelChannels **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (PixelChannels **) NULL)
return((PixelChannels **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
pixels[i]=(PixelChannels *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (PixelChannels *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
{
register ssize_t
k;
for (k=0; k < MaxPixelChannels; k++)
pixels[i][j].channel[k]=0.0;
}
}
return(pixels);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c in EvaluateImages because of mishandling rows.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
|
Medium
| 170,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, long elements)
{
zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
zval fname;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval), elements, 1)) {
/* We've got partially constructed object on our hands here. Wipe it. */
if(Z_TYPE_PP(rval) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_hash_clean(Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval));
}
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_OBJCE_PP(rval) != PHP_IC_ENTRY &&
zend_hash_exists(&Z_OBJCE_PP(rval)->function_table, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup"))) {
INIT_PZVAL(&fname);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1, 0);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), rval, &fname, &retval_ptr, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
BG(serialize_lock)--;
}
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.6.26 mishandles object-deserialization failures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an unserialize call that references a partially constructed object.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
|
Low
| 166,940
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::UpdatePrintSettings(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings, bool is_preview) {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings(routing_id(),
print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie, job_settings, &settings));
if (settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || !settings.params.document_cookie) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_UPDATING_PRINT_SETTINGS);
return false;
}
if (is_preview) {
if (!job_settings.GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr,
&(settings.params.preview_ui_addr)) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID,
&(settings.params.preview_request_id)) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest,
&(settings.params.is_first_request))) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
if (settings.params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
settings.params.display_header_footer = false;
}
PageSizeMargins default_page_layout;
GetPageSizeAndMarginsInPoints(NULL, -1, settings.params,
&default_page_layout);
if (!old_print_pages_params_.get() ||
!PageLayoutIsEqual(*old_print_pages_params_, settings)) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetDefaultPageLayout(routing_id(),
default_page_layout));
}
SetCustomMarginsIfSelected(job_settings, &settings);
if (settings.params.display_header_footer) {
header_footer_info_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterDate,
settings.params.date);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL,
settings.params.url);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
settings.params.title);
}
}
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetDocumentCookie(routing_id(),
settings.params.document_cookie));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Event");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0);
sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
}
policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
}
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,912
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
int i, err;
struct net_device *dev;
struct virtnet_info *vi;
u16 max_queue_pairs;
if (!vdev->config->get) {
dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!virtnet_validate_features(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
/* Find if host supports multiqueue virtio_net device */
err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ,
struct virtio_net_config,
max_virtqueue_pairs, &max_queue_pairs);
/* We need at least 2 queue's */
if (err || max_queue_pairs < VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MIN ||
max_queue_pairs > VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MAX ||
!virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ))
max_queue_pairs = 1;
/* Allocate ourselves a network device with room for our info */
dev = alloc_etherdev_mq(sizeof(struct virtnet_info), max_queue_pairs);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Set up network device as normal. */
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_UNICAST_FLT | IFF_LIVE_ADDR_CHANGE;
dev->netdev_ops = &virtnet_netdev;
dev->features = NETIF_F_HIGHDMA;
dev->ethtool_ops = &virtnet_ethtool_ops;
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &vdev->dev);
/* Do we support "hardware" checksums? */
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CSUM)) {
/* This opens up the world of extra features. */
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST;
if (csum)
dev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GSO)) {
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_UFO
| NETIF_F_TSO_ECN | NETIF_F_TSO6;
}
/* Individual feature bits: what can host handle? */
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO4))
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO6))
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO6;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_ECN))
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO_ECN;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_UFO))
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_UFO;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST;
if (gso)
dev->features |= dev->hw_features & (NETIF_F_ALL_TSO|NETIF_F_UFO);
/* (!csum && gso) case will be fixed by register_netdev() */
}
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM))
dev->features |= NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features;
/* Configuration may specify what MAC to use. Otherwise random. */
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MAC))
virtio_cread_bytes(vdev,
offsetof(struct virtio_net_config, mac),
dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
else
eth_hw_addr_random(dev);
/* Set up our device-specific information */
vi = netdev_priv(dev);
vi->dev = dev;
vi->vdev = vdev;
vdev->priv = vi;
vi->stats = alloc_percpu(struct virtnet_stats);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (vi->stats == NULL)
goto free;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct virtnet_stats *virtnet_stats;
virtnet_stats = per_cpu_ptr(vi->stats, i);
u64_stats_init(&virtnet_stats->tx_syncp);
u64_stats_init(&virtnet_stats->rx_syncp);
}
INIT_WORK(&vi->config_work, virtnet_config_changed_work);
/* If we can receive ANY GSO packets, we must allocate large ones. */
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) ||
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6) ||
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN) ||
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO))
vi->big_packets = true;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF))
vi->mergeable_rx_bufs = true;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF) ||
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1))
vi->hdr_len = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf);
else
vi->hdr_len = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_ANY_LAYOUT) ||
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1))
vi->any_header_sg = true;
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ))
vi->has_cvq = true;
if (vi->any_header_sg)
dev->needed_headroom = vi->hdr_len;
/* Use single tx/rx queue pair as default */
vi->curr_queue_pairs = 1;
vi->max_queue_pairs = max_queue_pairs;
/* Allocate/initialize the rx/tx queues, and invoke find_vqs */
err = init_vqs(vi);
if (err)
goto free_stats;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
if (vi->mergeable_rx_bufs)
dev->sysfs_rx_queue_group = &virtio_net_mrg_rx_group;
#endif
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(dev, vi->curr_queue_pairs);
netif_set_real_num_rx_queues(dev, vi->curr_queue_pairs);
err = register_netdev(dev);
if (err) {
pr_debug("virtio_net: registering device failed\n");
goto free_vqs;
}
virtio_device_ready(vdev);
/* Last of all, set up some receive buffers. */
for (i = 0; i < vi->curr_queue_pairs; i++) {
try_fill_recv(vi, &vi->rq[i], GFP_KERNEL);
/* If we didn't even get one input buffer, we're useless. */
if (vi->rq[i].vq->num_free ==
virtqueue_get_vring_size(vi->rq[i].vq)) {
free_unused_bufs(vi);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_recv_bufs;
}
}
vi->nb.notifier_call = &virtnet_cpu_callback;
err = register_hotcpu_notifier(&vi->nb);
if (err) {
pr_debug("virtio_net: registering cpu notifier failed\n");
goto free_recv_bufs;
}
/* Assume link up if device can't report link status,
otherwise get link status from config. */
if (virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_STATUS)) {
netif_carrier_off(dev);
schedule_work(&vi->config_work);
} else {
vi->status = VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP;
netif_carrier_on(dev);
}
pr_debug("virtnet: registered device %s with %d RX and TX vq's\n",
dev->name, max_queue_pairs);
return 0;
free_recv_bufs:
vi->vdev->config->reset(vdev);
free_receive_bufs(vi);
unregister_netdev(dev);
free_vqs:
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&vi->refill);
free_receive_page_frags(vi);
virtnet_del_vqs(vi);
free_stats:
free_percpu(vi->stats);
free:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The virtnet_probe function in drivers/net/virtio_net.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2 attempts to support a FRAGLIST feature without proper memory allocation, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and memory corruption) via a crafted sequence of fragmented packets.
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Log(const SkBitmap& p, std::string* l) {
l->append("<SkBitmap>");
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
|
Medium
| 172,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix (buffer *b, int qs, int i)
{
char * const s = b->ptr;
const int blen = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const int used = qs < 0 ? blen : qs;
int j = i;
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
s[j] = s[i];
if (s[i] == '%' && s[i+1] == '2' && s[i+2] == 'F') {
s[j] = '/';
i+=2;
}
}
if (qs >= 0) {
memmove(s+j, s+qs, blen - qs);
j += blen - qs;
}
buffer_string_set_length(b, j);
return qs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** lighttpd before 1.4.54 has a signed integer overflow, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a malicious HTTP GET request, as demonstrated by mishandling of /%2F? in burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix in burl.c. NOTE: The developer states *The feature which can be abused to cause the crash is a new feature in lighttpd 1.4.50, and is not enabled by default. It must be explicitly configured in the config file (e.g. lighttpd.conf). Certain input will trigger an abort() in lighttpd when that feature is enabled. lighttpd detects the underflow or realloc() will fail (in both 32-bit and 64-bit executables), also detected in lighttpd. Either triggers an explicit abort() by lighttpd. This is not exploitable beyond triggering the explicit abort() with subsequent application exit.*
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
|
Low
| 169,709
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::ContentCompression()
: algo(0),
settings(NULL),
settings_len(0) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close_locked(s);
goto restart;
}
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
|
High
| 174,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void cipso_v4_sock_delattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int hdr_delta;
struct ip_options *opt;
struct inet_sock *sk_inet;
sk_inet = inet_sk(sk);
opt = sk_inet->opt;
if (opt == NULL || opt->cipso == 0)
return;
hdr_delta = cipso_v4_delopt(&sk_inet->opt);
if (sk_inet->is_icsk && hdr_delta > 0) {
struct inet_connection_sock *sk_conn = inet_csk(sk);
sk_conn->icsk_ext_hdr_len -= hdr_delta;
sk_conn->icsk_sync_mss(sk, sk_conn->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,549
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool cgroupfs_mount_cgroup(void *hdata, const char *root, int type)
{
size_t bufsz = strlen(root) + sizeof("/sys/fs/cgroup");
char *path = NULL;
char **parts = NULL;
char *dirname = NULL;
char *abs_path = NULL;
char *abs_path2 = NULL;
struct cgfs_data *cgfs_d;
struct cgroup_process_info *info, *base_info;
int r, saved_errno = 0;
cgfs_d = hdata;
if (!cgfs_d)
return false;
base_info = cgfs_d->info;
/* If we get passed the _NOSPEC types, we default to _MIXED, since we don't
* have access to the lxc_conf object at this point. It really should be up
* to the caller to fix this, but this doesn't really hurt.
*/
if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_NOSPEC)
type = LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED;
else if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC)
type = LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MIXED;
if (type < LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RO || type > LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED) {
ERROR("could not mount cgroups into container: invalid type specified internally");
errno = EINVAL;
return false;
}
path = calloc(1, bufsz);
if (!path)
return false;
snprintf(path, bufsz, "%s/sys/fs/cgroup", root);
r = mount("cgroup_root", path, "tmpfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_RELATIME, "size=10240k,mode=755");
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not mount tmpfs to /sys/fs/cgroup in the container");
return false;
}
/* now mount all the hierarchies we care about */
for (info = base_info; info; info = info->next) {
size_t subsystem_count, i;
struct cgroup_mount_point *mp = info->designated_mount_point;
if (!mp)
mp = lxc_cgroup_find_mount_point(info->hierarchy, info->cgroup_path, true);
if (!mp) {
SYSERROR("could not find original mount point for cgroup hierarchy while trying to mount cgroup filesystem");
goto out_error;
}
subsystem_count = lxc_array_len((void **)info->hierarchy->subsystems);
parts = calloc(subsystem_count + 1, sizeof(char *));
if (!parts)
goto out_error;
for (i = 0; i < subsystem_count; i++) {
if (!strncmp(info->hierarchy->subsystems[i], "name=", 5))
parts[i] = info->hierarchy->subsystems[i] + 5;
else
parts[i] = info->hierarchy->subsystems[i];
}
dirname = lxc_string_join(",", (const char **)parts, false);
if (!dirname)
goto out_error;
/* create subsystem directory */
abs_path = lxc_append_paths(path, dirname);
if (!abs_path)
goto out_error;
r = mkdir_p(abs_path, 0755);
if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
SYSERROR("could not create cgroup subsystem directory /sys/fs/cgroup/%s", dirname);
goto out_error;
}
abs_path2 = lxc_append_paths(abs_path, info->cgroup_path);
if (!abs_path2)
goto out_error;
if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RO || type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RW || type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED) {
/* bind-mount the cgroup entire filesystem there */
if (strcmp(mp->mount_prefix, "/") != 0) {
/* FIXME: maybe we should just try to remount the entire hierarchy
* with a regular mount command? may that works? */
ERROR("could not automatically mount cgroup-full to /sys/fs/cgroup/%s: host has no mount point for this cgroup filesystem that has access to the root cgroup", dirname);
goto out_error;
}
r = mount(mp->mount_point, abs_path, "none", MS_BIND, 0);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error bind-mounting %s to %s", mp->mount_point, abs_path);
goto out_error;
}
/* main cgroup path should be read-only */
if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RO || type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED) {
r = mount(NULL, abs_path, NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error re-mounting %s readonly", abs_path);
goto out_error;
}
}
/* own cgroup should be read-write */
if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED) {
r = mount(abs_path2, abs_path2, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error bind-mounting %s onto itself", abs_path2);
goto out_error;
}
r = mount(NULL, abs_path2, NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error re-mounting %s readwrite", abs_path2);
goto out_error;
}
}
} else {
/* create path for container's cgroup */
r = mkdir_p(abs_path2, 0755);
if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
SYSERROR("could not create cgroup directory /sys/fs/cgroup/%s%s", dirname, info->cgroup_path);
goto out_error;
}
/* for read-only and mixed cases, we have to bind-mount the tmpfs directory
* that points to the hierarchy itself (i.e. /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu etc.) onto
* itself and then bind-mount it read-only, since we keep the tmpfs itself
* read-write (see comment below)
*/
if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MIXED || type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RO) {
r = mount(abs_path, abs_path, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error bind-mounting %s onto itself", abs_path);
goto out_error;
}
r = mount(NULL, abs_path, NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error re-mounting %s readonly", abs_path);
goto out_error;
}
}
free(abs_path);
abs_path = NULL;
/* bind-mount container's cgroup to that directory */
abs_path = cgroup_to_absolute_path(mp, info->cgroup_path, NULL);
if (!abs_path)
goto out_error;
r = mount(abs_path, abs_path2, "none", MS_BIND, 0);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error bind-mounting %s to %s", abs_path, abs_path2);
goto out_error;
}
if (type == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RO) {
r = mount(NULL, abs_path2, NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
SYSERROR("error re-mounting %s readonly", abs_path2);
goto out_error;
}
}
}
free(abs_path);
free(abs_path2);
abs_path = NULL;
abs_path2 = NULL;
/* add symlinks for every single subsystem */
if (subsystem_count > 1) {
for (i = 0; i < subsystem_count; i++) {
abs_path = lxc_append_paths(path, parts[i]);
if (!abs_path)
goto out_error;
r = symlink(dirname, abs_path);
if (r < 0)
WARN("could not create symlink %s -> %s in /sys/fs/cgroup of container", parts[i], dirname);
free(abs_path);
abs_path = NULL;
}
}
free(dirname);
free(parts);
dirname = NULL;
parts = NULL;
}
/* We used to remount the entire tmpfs readonly if any :ro or
* :mixed mode was specified. However, Ubuntu's mountall has the
* unfortunate behavior to block bootup if /sys/fs/cgroup is
* mounted read-only and cannot be remounted read-write.
* (mountall reads /lib/init/fstab and tries to (re-)mount all of
* these if they are not already mounted with the right options;
* it contains an entry for /sys/fs/cgroup. In case it can't do
* that, it prompts for the user to either manually fix it or
* boot anyway. But without user input, booting of the container
* hangs.)
*
* Instead of remounting the entire tmpfs readonly, we only
* remount the paths readonly that are part of the cgroup
* hierarchy.
*/
free(path);
return true;
out_error:
saved_errno = errno;
free(path);
free(dirname);
free(parts);
free(abs_path);
free(abs_path2);
errno = saved_errno;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,709
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main (int argc,
char **argv)
{
mode_t old_umask;
cleanup_free char *base_path = NULL;
int clone_flags;
char *old_cwd = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int event_fd = -1;
int child_wait_fd = -1;
const char *new_cwd;
uid_t ns_uid;
gid_t ns_gid;
struct stat sbuf;
uint64_t val;
int res UNUSED;
real_uid = getuid ();
real_gid = getgid ();
/* Get the (optional) privileges we need */
acquire_privs ();
/* Never gain any more privs during exec */
if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_CAPS) failed");
/* The initial code is run with high permissions
(i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so take lots of care. */
read_overflowids ();
argv0 = argv[0];
if (isatty (1))
host_tty_dev = ttyname (1);
argv++;
argc--;
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
parse_args (&argc, &argv);
/* We have to do this if we weren't installed setuid (and we're not
* root), so let's just DWIM */
if (!is_privileged && getuid () != 0)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
if (opt_unshare_user_try &&
stat ("/proc/self/ns/user", &sbuf) == 0)
{
bool disabled = FALSE;
/* RHEL7 has a kernel module parameter that lets you enable user namespaces */
if (stat ("/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable", &sbuf) == 0)
{
cleanup_free char *enable = NULL;
enable = load_file_at (AT_FDCWD, "/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable");
if (enable != NULL && enable[0] == 'N')
disabled = TRUE;
}
/* Debian lets you disable *unprivileged* user namespaces. However this is not
a problem if we're privileged, and if we're not opt_unshare_user is TRUE
already, and there is not much we can do, its just a non-working setup. */
if (!disabled)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
}
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
__debug__ (("Creating root mount point\n"));
if (opt_sandbox_uid == -1)
opt_sandbox_uid = real_uid;
if (opt_sandbox_gid == -1)
opt_sandbox_gid = real_gid;
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_uid != real_uid)
die ("Specifying --uid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_gid != real_gid)
die ("Specifying --gid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_uts && opt_sandbox_hostname != NULL)
die ("Specifying --hostname requires --unshare-uts");
/* We need to read stuff from proc during the pivot_root dance, etc.
Lets keep a fd to it open */
proc_fd = open ("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_PATH);
if (proc_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't open /proc");
/* We need *some* mountpoint where we can mount the root tmpfs.
We first try in /run, and if that fails, try in /tmp. */
base_path = xasprintf ("/run/user/%d/.bubblewrap", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
{
free (base_path);
base_path = xasprintf ("/tmp/.bubblewrap-%d", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
die_with_error ("Creating root mountpoint failed");
}
__debug__ (("creating new namespace\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid)
{
event_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC | EFD_NONBLOCK);
if (event_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
}
/* We block sigchild here so that we can use signalfd in the monitor. */
block_sigchild ();
clone_flags = SIGCHLD | CLONE_NEWNS;
if (opt_unshare_user)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
if (opt_unshare_pid)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
if (opt_unshare_net)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
if (opt_unshare_ipc)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;
if (opt_unshare_uts)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;
if (opt_unshare_cgroup)
{
if (stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
die ("Cannot create new cgroup namespace because the kernel does not support it");
else
die_with_error ("stat on /proc/self/ns/cgroup failed");
}
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
}
if (opt_unshare_cgroup_try)
if (!stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
child_wait_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
if (child_wait_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
pid = raw_clone (clone_flags, NULL);
if (pid == -1)
{
if (opt_unshare_user)
{
if (errno == EINVAL)
die ("Creating new namespace failed, likely because the kernel does not support user namespaces. bwrap must be installed setuid on such systems.");
else if (errno == EPERM && !is_privileged)
die ("No permissions to creating new namespace, likely because the kernel does not allow non-privileged user namespaces. On e.g. debian this can be enabled with 'sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1'.");
}
die_with_error ("Creating new namespace failed");
}
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Parent, outside sandbox, privileged (initially) */
if (is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* We're running as euid 0, but the uid we want to map is
* not 0. This means we're not allowed to write this from
* the child user namespace, so we do it from the parent.
*
* Also, we map uid/gid 0 in the namespace (to overflowuid)
* if opt_needs_devpts is true, because otherwise the mount
* of devpts fails due to root not being mapped.
*/
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
pid, TRUE, opt_needs_devpts);
}
/* Initial launched process, wait for exec:ed command to exit */
/* We don't need any privileges in the launcher, drop them immediately. */
drop_privs ();
/* Let child run now that the uid maps are set up */
val = 1;
res = write (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
/* Ignore res, if e.g. the child died and closed child_wait_fd we don't want to error out here */
close (child_wait_fd);
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *output = xasprintf ("{\n \"child-pid\": %i\n}\n", pid);
size_t len = strlen (output);
if (write (opt_info_fd, output, len) != len)
die_with_error ("Write to info_fd");
close (opt_info_fd);
}
monitor_child (event_fd);
exit (0); /* Should not be reached, but better safe... */
}
/* Child, in sandbox, privileged in the parent or in the user namespace (if --unshare-user).
*
* Note that for user namespaces we run as euid 0 during clone(), so
* the child user namespace is owned by euid 0., This means that the
* regular user namespace parent (with uid != 0) doesn't have any
* capabilities in it, which is nice as we can't exploit those. In
* particular the parent user namespace doesn't have CAP_PTRACE
* which would otherwise allow the parent to hijack of the child
* after this point.
*
* Unfortunately this also means you can't ptrace the final
* sandboxed process from outside the sandbox either.
*/
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
close (opt_info_fd);
/* Wait for the parent to init uid/gid maps and drop caps */
res = read (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
close (child_wait_fd);
/* At this point we can completely drop root uid, but retain the
* required permitted caps. This allow us to do full setup as
* the user uid, which makes e.g. fuse access work.
*/
switch_to_user_with_privs ();
if (opt_unshare_net && loopback_setup () != 0)
die ("Can't create loopback device");
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (!is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* In the unprivileged case we have to write the uid/gid maps in
* the child, because we have no caps in the parent */
if (opt_needs_devpts)
{
/* This is a bit hacky, but we need to first map the real uid/gid to
0, otherwise we can't mount the devpts filesystem because root is
not mapped. Later we will create another child user namespace and
map back to the real uid */
ns_uid = 0;
ns_gid = 0;
}
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
-1, TRUE, FALSE);
}
old_umask = umask (0);
/* Need to do this before the chroot, but after we're the real uid */
resolve_symlinks_in_ops ();
/* Mark everything as slave, so that we still
* receive mounts from the real root, but don't
* propagate mounts to the real root. */
if (mount (NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make / slave");
/* Create a tmpfs which we will use as / in the namespace */
if (mount ("", base_path, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV | MS_NOSUID, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to mount tmpfs");
old_cwd = get_current_dir_name ();
/* Chdir to the new root tmpfs mount. This will be the CWD during
the entire setup. Access old or new root via "oldroot" and "newroot". */
if (chdir (base_path) != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir base_path");
/* We create a subdir "$base_path/newroot" for the new root, that
* way we can pivot_root to base_path, and put the old root at
* "$base_path/oldroot". This avoids problems accessing the oldroot
* dir if the user requested to bind mount something over / */
if (mkdir ("newroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating newroot failed");
if (mkdir ("oldroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating oldroot failed");
if (pivot_root (base_path, "oldroot"))
die_with_error ("pivot_root");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir / (base path)");
if (is_privileged)
{
pid_t child;
int privsep_sockets[2];
if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, privsep_sockets) != 0)
die_with_error ("Can't create privsep socket");
child = fork ();
if (child == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork unprivileged helper");
if (child == 0)
{
/* Unprivileged setup process */
drop_privs ();
close (privsep_sockets[0]);
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, privsep_sockets[1]);
exit (0);
}
else
{
int status;
uint32_t buffer[2048]; /* 8k, but is int32 to guarantee nice alignment */
uint32_t op, flags;
const char *arg1, *arg2;
cleanup_fd int unpriv_socket = -1;
unpriv_socket = privsep_sockets[0];
close (privsep_sockets[1]);
do
{
op = read_priv_sec_op (unpriv_socket, buffer, sizeof (buffer),
&flags, &arg1, &arg2);
privileged_op (-1, op, flags, arg1, arg2);
if (write (unpriv_socket, buffer, 1) != 1)
die ("Can't write to op_socket");
}
while (op != PRIV_SEP_OP_DONE);
waitpid (child, &status, 0);
/* Continue post setup */
}
}
else
{
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, -1);
}
/* The old root better be rprivate or we will send unmount events to the parent namespace */
if (mount ("oldroot", "oldroot", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make old root rprivate");
if (umount2 ("oldroot", MNT_DETACH))
die_with_error ("unmount old root");
if (opt_unshare_user &&
(ns_uid != opt_sandbox_uid || ns_gid != opt_sandbox_gid))
{
/* Now that devpts is mounted and we've no need for mount
permissions we can create a new userspace and map our uid
1:1 */
if (unshare (CLONE_NEWUSER))
die_with_error ("unshare user ns");
write_uid_gid_map (opt_sandbox_uid, ns_uid,
opt_sandbox_gid, ns_gid,
-1, FALSE, FALSE);
}
/* Now make /newroot the real root */
if (chdir ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir newroot");
if (chroot ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chroot /newroot");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir /");
/* All privileged ops are done now, so drop it */
drop_privs ();
if (opt_block_fd != -1)
{
char b[1];
read (opt_block_fd, b, 1);
close (opt_block_fd);
}
if (opt_seccomp_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *seccomp_data = NULL;
size_t seccomp_len;
struct sock_fprog prog;
seccomp_data = load_file_data (opt_seccomp_fd, &seccomp_len);
if (seccomp_data == NULL)
die_with_error ("Can't read seccomp data");
if (seccomp_len % 8 != 0)
die ("Invalid seccomp data, must be multiple of 8");
prog.len = seccomp_len / 8;
prog.filter = (struct sock_filter *) seccomp_data;
close (opt_seccomp_fd);
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) != 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
}
umask (old_umask);
new_cwd = "/";
if (opt_chdir_path)
{
if (chdir (opt_chdir_path))
die_with_error ("Can't chdir to %s", opt_chdir_path);
new_cwd = opt_chdir_path;
}
else if (chdir (old_cwd) == 0)
{
/* If the old cwd is mapped in the sandbox, go there */
new_cwd = old_cwd;
}
else
{
/* If the old cwd is not mapped, go to home */
const char *home = getenv ("HOME");
if (home != NULL &&
chdir (home) == 0)
new_cwd = home;
}
xsetenv ("PWD", new_cwd, 1);
free (old_cwd);
__debug__ (("forking for child\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid || lock_files != NULL || opt_sync_fd != -1)
{
/* We have to have a pid 1 in the pid namespace, because
* otherwise we'll get a bunch of zombies as nothing reaps
* them. Alternatively if we're using sync_fd or lock_files we
* need some process to own these.
*/
pid = fork ();
if (pid == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork for pid 1");
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Close fds in pid 1, except stdio and optionally event_fd
(for syncing pid 2 lifetime with monitor_child) and
opt_sync_fd (for syncing sandbox lifetime with outside
process).
Any other fds will been passed on to the child though. */
{
int dont_close[3];
int j = 0;
if (event_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = event_fd;
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = opt_sync_fd;
dont_close[j++] = -1;
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
}
return do_init (event_fd, pid);
}
}
__debug__ (("launch executable %s\n", argv[0]));
if (proc_fd != -1)
close (proc_fd);
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
close (opt_sync_fd);
/* We want sigchild in the child */
unblock_sigchild ();
if (label_exec (opt_exec_label) == -1)
die_with_error ("label_exec %s", argv[0]);
if (execvp (argv[0], argv) == -1)
die_with_error ("execvp %s", argv[0]);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: When executing a program via the bubblewrap sandbox, the nonpriv session can escape to the parent session by using the TIOCSTI ioctl to push characters into the terminal's input buffer, allowing an attacker to escape the sandbox.
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters
|
Low
| 168,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _asn1_extract_der_octet (asn1_node node, const unsigned char *der,
int der_len, unsigned flags)
{
int len2, len3;
int counter, counter_end;
int result;
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len3);
if (len2 < -1)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
counter = len3 + 1;
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
if (len2 == -1)
counter_end = der_len - 2;
else
counter_end = der_len;
while (counter < counter_end)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, 1);
if (len2 >= 0)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, len2+len3);
_asn1_append_value (node, der + counter + len3, len2);
}
else
{ /* indefinite */
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
result =
_asn1_extract_der_octet (node, der + counter + len3,
der_len, flags);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
return result;
len2 = 0;
}
counter += len2 + len3 + 1;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
cleanup:
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The _asn1_extract_der_octet function in lib/decoding.c in GNU Libtasn1 before 4.8, when used without the ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER flag, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite recursion) via a crafted certificate.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) jas_realloc function in base/jas_malloc.c and (2) mem_resize function in base/jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.22 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image, which triggers use after free vulnerabilities.
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
|
Medium
| 168,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo::IdentityInfo()
: identity_status(PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_UNKNOWN),
safe_browsing_status(PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_NONE),
connection_status(PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNKNOWN),
show_ssl_decision_revoke_button(false),
show_change_password_buttons(false) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
|
Low
| 172,441
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cdf_file_summary_info(struct magic_set *ms, const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_stream_t *sst, const uint64_t clsid[2])
{
cdf_summary_info_header_t si;
cdf_property_info_t *info;
size_t count;
int m;
if (cdf_unpack_summary_info(sst, h, &si, &info, &count) == -1)
return -1;
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
const char *str;
if (file_printf(ms, "Composite Document File V2 Document")
== -1)
return -1;
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s Endian",
si.si_byte_order == 0xfffe ? "Little" : "Big") == -1)
return -2;
switch (si.si_os) {
case 2:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os: Windows, Version %d.%d",
si.si_os_version & 0xff,
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8) == -1)
return -2;
break;
case 1:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os: MacOS, Version %d.%d",
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8,
si.si_os_version & 0xff) == -1)
return -2;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os %d, Version: %d.%d", si.si_os,
si.si_os_version & 0xff,
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8) == -1)
return -2;
break;
}
str = cdf_clsid_to_mime(clsid, clsid2desc);
if (str)
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s", str) == -1)
return -2;
}
m = cdf_file_property_info(ms, info, count, clsid);
free(info);
return m == -1 ? -2 : m;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdf_read_short_sector function in cdf.c in file before 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted CDF file.
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions)
|
Medium
| 166,446
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AddChunk(const TransformPaintPropertyNode* t,
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c,
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* e,
const FloatRect& bounds = FloatRect(0, 0, 100, 100)) {
auto record = sk_make_sp<PaintRecord>();
record->push<cc::DrawRectOp>(bounds, cc::PaintFlags());
AddChunk(std::move(record), t, c, e, bounds);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,825
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
const gpu::Mailbox& mailbox,
const gpu::SyncToken& sync_token,
unsigned texture_id,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper>&&
context_provider_wrapper,
IntSize mailbox_size)
: paint_image_content_id_(cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId()) {
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
mailbox, sync_token, texture_id, std::move(context_provider_wrapper),
mailbox_size);
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,589
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
{
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
REQUEST(xScreenSaverUnsetAttributesReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw;
int rc, i;
rc = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (rc != Success)
for (i = PanoramiXNumScreens - 1; i > 0; i--) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
stuff->drawable = draw->info[0].id;
}
#endif
return ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in RENDER extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init ipip_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(banner);
if (xfrm4_tunnel_register(&ipip_handler, AF_INET)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ipip init: can't register tunnel\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ipip_net_ops);
if (err)
xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&ipip_handler, AF_INET);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,876
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
/* I18n */
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
#if ENABLE_NLS
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
#endif
abrt_init(argv);
/* Can't keep these strings/structs static: _() doesn't support that */
const char *program_usage_string = _(
"& [-y] [-i BUILD_IDS_FILE|-i -] [-e PATH[:PATH]...]\n"
"\t[-r REPO]\n"
"\n"
"Installs debuginfo packages for all build-ids listed in BUILD_IDS_FILE to\n"
"ABRT system cache."
);
enum {
OPT_v = 1 << 0,
OPT_y = 1 << 1,
OPT_i = 1 << 2,
OPT_e = 1 << 3,
OPT_r = 1 << 4,
OPT_s = 1 << 5,
};
const char *build_ids = "build_ids";
const char *exact = NULL;
const char *repo = NULL;
const char *size_mb = NULL;
struct options program_options[] = {
OPT__VERBOSE(&g_verbose),
OPT_BOOL ('y', "yes", NULL, _("Noninteractive, assume 'Yes' to all questions")),
OPT_STRING('i', "ids", &build_ids, "BUILD_IDS_FILE", _("- means STDIN, default: build_ids")),
OPT_STRING('e', "exact", &exact, "EXACT", _("Download only specified files")),
OPT_STRING('r', "repo", &repo, "REPO", _("Pattern to use when searching for repos, default: *debug*")),
OPT_STRING('s', "size_mb", &size_mb, "SIZE_MB", _("Ignored option")),
OPT_END()
};
const unsigned opts = parse_opts(argc, argv, program_options, program_usage_string);
const gid_t egid = getegid();
const gid_t rgid = getgid();
const uid_t euid = geteuid();
const gid_t ruid = getuid();
/* We need to open the build ids file under the caller's UID/GID to avoid
* information disclosures when reading files with changed UID.
* Unfortunately, we cannot replace STDIN with the new fd because ABRT uses
* STDIN to communicate with the caller. So, the following code opens a
* dummy file descriptor to the build ids file and passes the new fd's proc
* path to the wrapped program in the ids argument.
* The new fd remains opened, the OS will close it for us. */
char *build_ids_self_fd = NULL;
if (strcmp("-", build_ids) != 0)
{
if (setregid(egid, rgid) < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("setregid(egid, rgid)");
if (setreuid(euid, ruid) < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("setreuid(euid, ruid)");
const int build_ids_fd = open(build_ids, O_RDONLY);
if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("setregid(rgid, egid)");
if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0 )
perror_msg_and_die("setreuid(ruid, euid)");
if (build_ids_fd < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("Failed to open file '%s'", build_ids);
/* We are not going to free this memory. There is no place to do so. */
build_ids_self_fd = xasprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", build_ids_fd);
}
/* name, -v, --ids, -, -y, -e, EXACT, -r, REPO, --, NULL */
const char *args[11];
{
const char *verbs[] = { "", "-v", "-vv", "-vvv" };
unsigned i = 0;
args[i++] = EXECUTABLE;
args[i++] = "--ids";
args[i++] = (build_ids_self_fd != NULL) ? build_ids_self_fd : "-";
if (g_verbose > 0)
args[i++] = verbs[g_verbose <= 3 ? g_verbose : 3];
if ((opts & OPT_y))
args[i++] = "-y";
if ((opts & OPT_e))
{
args[i++] = "--exact";
args[i++] = exact;
}
if ((opts & OPT_r))
{
args[i++] = "--repo";
args[i++] = repo;
}
args[i++] = "--";
args[i] = NULL;
}
/* Switch real user/group to effective ones.
* Otherwise yum library gets confused - gets EPERM (why??).
*/
/* do setregid only if we have to, to not upset selinux needlessly */
if (egid != rgid)
IGNORE_RESULT(setregid(egid, egid));
if (euid != ruid)
{
IGNORE_RESULT(setreuid(euid, euid));
/* We are suid'ed! */
/* Prevent malicious user from messing up with suid'ed process: */
#if 1
static const char *whitelist[] = {
"REPORT_CLIENT_SLAVE", // Check if the app is being run as a slave
"LANG",
};
const size_t wlsize = sizeof(whitelist)/sizeof(char*);
char *setlist[sizeof(whitelist)/sizeof(char*)] = { 0 };
char *p = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < wlsize; i++)
if ((p = getenv(whitelist[i])) != NULL)
setlist[i] = xstrdup(p);
clearenv();
for (size_t i = 0; i < wlsize; i++)
if (setlist[i] != NULL)
{
xsetenv(whitelist[i], setlist[i]);
free(setlist[i]);
}
#else
/* Clear dangerous stuff from env */
static const char forbid[] =
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH" "\0"
"LD_PRELOAD" "\0"
"LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS" "\0"
"LD_BIND_NOW" "\0"
"LD_AOUT_LIBRARY_PATH" "\0"
"LD_AOUT_PRELOAD" "\0"
"LD_NOWARN" "\0"
"LD_KEEPDIR" "\0"
;
const char *p = forbid;
do {
unsetenv(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
} while (*p);
#endif
/* Set safe PATH */
char path_env[] = "PATH=/usr/sbin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin:"BIN_DIR":"SBIN_DIR;
if (euid != 0)
strcpy(path_env, "PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:"BIN_DIR);
putenv(path_env);
/* Use safe umask */
umask(0022);
}
execvp(EXECUTABLE, (char **)args);
error_msg_and_die("Can't execute %s", EXECUTABLE);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: The abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users to write to arbitrary files via a symlink attack on unpacked.cpio in a pre-created directory with a predictable name in /var/tmp.
Commit Message: a-a-i-d-to-abrt-cache: make own random temporary directory
The set-user-ID wrapper must use own new temporary directory in order to
avoid security issues with unpacking specially crafted debuginfo
packages that might be used to create files or symlinks anywhere on the
file system as the abrt user.
Withot the forking code the temporary directory would remain on the
filesystem in the case where all debuginfo data are already available.
This is caused by the fact that the underlying libreport functionality
accepts path to a desired temporary directory and creates it only if
necessary. Otherwise, the directory is not touched at all.
This commit addresses CVE-2015-5273
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,609
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long field;
u64 field_value;
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t gva = 0;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (!nested_vmx_check_vmcs12(vcpu))
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
/* Decode instruction info and find the field to read */
field = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
/* Read the field, zero-extended to a u64 field_value */
if (vmcs12_read_any(vcpu, field, &field_value) < 0) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
/*
* Now copy part of this value to register or memory, as requested.
* Note that the number of bits actually copied is 32 or 64 depending
* on the guest's mode (32 or 64 bit), not on the given field's length.
*/
if (vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 10)) {
kvm_register_writel(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 3) & 0xf),
field_value);
} else {
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &gva))
return 1;
/* _system ok, as hardware has verified cpl=0 */
kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva,
&field_value, (is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4), NULL);
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the Linux kernel before 4.17.2, when nested virtualization is used, local attackers could cause L1 KVM guests to VMEXIT, potentially allowing privilege escalations and denial of service attacks due to lack of checking of CPL.
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 169,175
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *child_tidptr,
struct pid *pid,
int trace)
{
int retval;
struct task_struct *p;
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Shared signal handlers imply shared VM. By way of the above,
* thread groups also imply shared VM. Blocking this case allows
* for various simplifications in other code.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Siblings of global init remain as zombies on exit since they are
* not reaped by their parent (swapper). To solve this and to avoid
* multi-rooted process trees, prevent global and container-inits
* from creating siblings.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT) &&
current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* If the new process will be in a different pid namespace
* don't allow the creation of threads.
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_NEWPID)) &&
(task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->nsproxy->pid_ns))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current);
if (!p)
goto fork_out;
ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
get_seccomp_filter(p);
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER)
goto bad_fork_free;
}
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free;
/*
* If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
* triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
* to stop root fork bombs.
*/
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (nr_threads >= max_threads)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
if (!try_module_get(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
p->did_exec = 0;
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
copy_flags(clone_flags, p);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
rcu_copy_process(p);
p->vfork_done = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&p->alloc_lock);
init_sigpending(&p->pending);
p->utime = p->stime = p->gtime = 0;
p->utimescaled = p->stimescaled = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
p->prev_cputime.utime = p->prev_cputime.stime = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
seqlock_init(&p->vtime_seqlock);
p->vtime_snap = 0;
p->vtime_snap_whence = VTIME_SLEEPING;
#endif
#if defined(SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING)
memset(&p->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(p->rss_stat));
#endif
p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
acct_clear_integrals(p);
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_change_begin(current);
cgroup_fork(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(p->mempolicy);
p->mempolicy = NULL;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup;
}
mpol_fix_fork_child_flag(p);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUSETS
p->cpuset_mem_spread_rotor = NUMA_NO_NODE;
p->cpuset_slab_spread_rotor = NUMA_NO_NODE;
seqcount_init(&p->mems_allowed_seq);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
p->irq_events = 0;
p->hardirqs_enabled = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_ip = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_disable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->hardirq_disable_event = 0;
p->softirqs_enabled = 1;
p->softirq_enable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->softirq_enable_event = 0;
p->softirq_disable_ip = 0;
p->softirq_disable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_context = 0;
p->softirq_context = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
p->lockdep_depth = 0; /* no locks held yet */
p->curr_chain_key = 0;
p->lockdep_recursion = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
p->blocked_on = NULL; /* not blocked yet */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
p->memcg_batch.do_batch = 0;
p->memcg_batch.memcg = NULL;
#endif
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched_fork(p);
retval = perf_event_init_task(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
retval = audit_alloc(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
/* copy all the process information */
retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
retval = copy_signal(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns);
if (!pid)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
}
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
p->tgid = p->pid;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->tgid = current->tgid;
p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
/*
* Clear TID on mm_release()?
*/
p->clear_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
p->plug = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
uprobe_copy_process(p);
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
p->sas_ss_sp = p->sas_ss_size = 0;
/*
* Syscall tracing and stepping should be turned off in the
* child regardless of CLONE_PTRACE.
*/
user_disable_single_step(p);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
clear_all_latency_tracing(p);
/* ok, now we should be set up.. */
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->exit_signal = -1;
else if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT)
p->exit_signal = current->group_leader->exit_signal;
else
p->exit_signal = (clone_flags & CSIGNAL);
p->pdeath_signal = 0;
p->exit_state = 0;
p->nr_dirtied = 0;
p->nr_dirtied_pause = 128 >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
p->dirty_paused_when = 0;
/*
* Ok, make it visible to the rest of the system.
* We dont wake it up yet.
*/
p->group_leader = p;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->thread_group);
p->task_works = NULL;
/* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling! */
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD)) {
p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
p->parent_exec_id = current->parent_exec_id;
} else {
p->real_parent = current;
p->parent_exec_id = current->self_exec_id;
}
spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
* parent before the fork or both the parent and the child after the
* fork. Restart if a signal comes in before we add the new process to
* it's process group.
* A fatal signal pending means that current will exit, so the new
* thread can't slip out of an OOM kill (or normal SIGKILL).
*/
recalc_sigpending();
if (signal_pending(current)) {
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
current->signal->nr_threads++;
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->live);
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->sigcnt);
p->group_leader = current->group_leader;
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_group, &p->group_leader->thread_group);
}
if (likely(p->pid)) {
ptrace_init_task(p, (clone_flags & CLONE_PTRACE) || trace);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
if (is_child_reaper(pid)) {
ns_of_pid(pid)->child_reaper = p;
p->signal->flags |= SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
}
p->signal->leader_pid = pid;
p->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, task_pgrp(current));
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID, task_session(current));
list_add_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->tasks, &init_task.tasks);
__this_cpu_inc(process_counts);
}
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
nr_threads++;
}
total_forks++;
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_fork_connector(p);
cgroup_post_fork(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_change_end(current);
perf_event_fork(p);
trace_task_newtask(p, clone_flags);
return p;
bad_fork_free_pid:
if (pid != &init_struct_pid)
free_pid(pid);
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
if (p->io_context)
exit_io_context(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm)
mmput(p->mm);
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
free_signal_struct(p->signal);
bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:
__cleanup_sighand(p->sighand);
bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
exit_fs(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_files:
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_sem(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
audit_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
perf_event_free_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(p->mempolicy);
bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup:
#endif
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_change_end(current);
cgroup_exit(p, 0);
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
exit_creds(p);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The clone system-call implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8.3 does not properly handle a combination of the CLONE_NEWUSER and CLONE_FS flags, which allows local users to gain privileges by calling chroot and leveraging the sharing of the / directory between a parent process and a child process.
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,107
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void flush_end_io(struct request *flush_rq, int error)
{
struct request_queue *q = flush_rq->q;
struct list_head *running;
bool queued = false;
struct request *rq, *n;
unsigned long flags = 0;
struct blk_flush_queue *fq = blk_get_flush_queue(q, flush_rq->mq_ctx);
if (q->mq_ops) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&fq->mq_flush_lock, flags);
flush_rq->tag = -1;
}
running = &fq->flush_queue[fq->flush_running_idx];
BUG_ON(fq->flush_pending_idx == fq->flush_running_idx);
/* account completion of the flush request */
fq->flush_running_idx ^= 1;
if (!q->mq_ops)
elv_completed_request(q, flush_rq);
/* and push the waiting requests to the next stage */
list_for_each_entry_safe(rq, n, running, flush.list) {
unsigned int seq = blk_flush_cur_seq(rq);
BUG_ON(seq != REQ_FSEQ_PREFLUSH && seq != REQ_FSEQ_POSTFLUSH);
queued |= blk_flush_complete_seq(rq, fq, seq, error);
}
/*
* Kick the queue to avoid stall for two cases:
* 1. Moving a request silently to empty queue_head may stall the
* queue.
* 2. When flush request is running in non-queueable queue, the
* queue is hold. Restart the queue after flush request is finished
* to avoid stall.
* This function is called from request completion path and calling
* directly into request_fn may confuse the driver. Always use
* kblockd.
*/
if (queued || fq->flush_queue_delayed) {
WARN_ON(q->mq_ops);
blk_run_queue_async(q);
}
fq->flush_queue_delayed = 0;
if (q->mq_ops)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fq->mq_flush_lock, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In blk_mq_tag_to_rq in blk-mq.c in the upstream kernel, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition when a request has been previously freed by blk_mq_complete_request. This could lead to local escalation of privilege. Product: Android. Versions: Android kernel. Android ID: A-63083046.
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
|
Medium
| 169,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::clearDeviceOrientationOverride(ErrorString* error)
{
setDeviceOrientationOverride(error, 0, 0, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,402
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DownloadManagerImpl::InterceptDownload(
const download::DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
WebContents* web_contents = WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(
info.render_process_id, info.render_frame_id);
if (info.is_new_download &&
info.result ==
download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_SERVER_CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT) {
if (web_contents) {
std::vector<GURL> url_chain(info.url_chain);
GURL url = url_chain.back();
url_chain.pop_back();
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = info.has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = Referrer(
info.referrer_url, Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
info.referrer_policy));
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
if (info.request_handle)
info.request_handle->CancelRequest(false);
return true;
}
if (!delegate_ ||
!delegate_->InterceptDownloadIfApplicable(
info.url(), info.mime_type, info.request_origin, web_contents)) {
return false;
}
if (info.request_handle)
info.request_handle->CancelRequest(false);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
|
Medium
| 173,023
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<File> DOMFileSystemSync::createFile(const FileEntrySync* fileEntry, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL fileSystemURL = createFileSystemURL(fileEntry);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileHelper::CreateFileResult> result(CreateFileHelper::CreateFileResult::create());
fileSystem()->createSnapshotFileAndReadMetadata(fileSystemURL, CreateFileHelper::create(result, fileEntry->name(), fileSystemURL, type()));
if (result->m_failed) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(result->m_code, "Could not create '" + fileEntry->name() + "'.");
return nullptr;
}
return result->m_file.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,415
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main(int argc, char **argv)
{
png_uint_32 opts = FAST_WRITE;
format_list formats;
const char *touch = NULL;
int log_pass = 0;
int redundant = 0;
int stride_extra = 0;
int retval = 0;
int c;
init_sRGB_to_d();
#if 0
init_error_via_linear();
#endif
format_init(&formats);
for (c=1; c<argc; ++c)
{
const char *arg = argv[c];
if (strcmp(arg, "--log") == 0)
log_pass = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--fresh") == 0)
{
memset(gpc_error, 0, sizeof gpc_error);
memset(gpc_error_via_linear, 0, sizeof gpc_error_via_linear);
}
else if (strcmp(arg, "--file") == 0)
# ifdef PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED
opts |= READ_FILE;
# else
return 77; /* skipped: no support */
# endif
else if (strcmp(arg, "--memory") == 0)
opts &= ~READ_FILE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--stdio") == 0)
# ifdef PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED
opts |= USE_STDIO;
# else
return 77; /* skipped: no support */
# endif
else if (strcmp(arg, "--name") == 0)
opts &= ~USE_STDIO;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--verbose") == 0)
opts |= VERBOSE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--quiet") == 0)
opts &= ~VERBOSE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--preserve") == 0)
opts |= KEEP_TMPFILES;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--nopreserve") == 0)
opts &= ~KEEP_TMPFILES;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--keep-going") == 0)
opts |= KEEP_GOING;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--fast") == 0)
opts |= FAST_WRITE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--slow") == 0)
opts &= ~FAST_WRITE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--accumulate") == 0)
opts |= ACCUMULATE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--redundant") == 0)
redundant = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--stop") == 0)
opts &= ~KEEP_GOING;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--strict") == 0)
opts |= STRICT;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--sRGB-16bit") == 0)
opts |= sRGB_16BIT;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--linear-16bit") == 0)
opts &= ~sRGB_16BIT;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--tmpfile") == 0)
{
if (c+1 < argc)
{
if (strlen(argv[++c]) >= sizeof tmpf)
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is too long for a temp file prefix\n",
argv[0], argv[c]);
exit(99);
}
/* Safe: checked above */
strcpy(tmpf, argv[c]);
}
else
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s requires a temporary file prefix\n",
argv[0], arg);
exit(99);
}
}
else if (strcmp(arg, "--touch") == 0)
{
if (c+1 < argc)
touch = argv[++c];
else
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s requires a file name argument\n",
argv[0], arg);
exit(99);
}
}
else if (arg[0] == '+')
{
png_uint_32 format = formatof(arg+1);
if (format > FORMAT_COUNT)
exit(99);
format_set(&formats, format);
}
else if (arg[0] == '-' && arg[1] != 0 && (arg[1] != '0' || arg[2] != 0))
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option: %s\n", argv[0], arg);
exit(99);
}
else
{
if (format_is_initial(&formats))
format_default(&formats, redundant);
if (arg[0] == '-')
{
const int term = (arg[1] == '0' ? 0 : '\n');
unsigned int ich = 0;
/* Loop reading files, use a static buffer to simplify this and just
* stop if the name gets to long.
*/
static char buffer[4096];
do
{
int ch = getchar();
/* Don't allow '\0' in file names, and terminate with '\n' or,
* for -0, just '\0' (use -print0 to find to make this work!)
*/
if (ch == EOF || ch == term || ch == 0)
{
buffer[ich] = 0;
if (ich > 0 && !test_one_file(buffer, &formats, opts,
stride_extra, log_pass))
retval = 1;
if (ch == EOF)
break;
ich = 0;
--ich; /* so that the increment below sets it to 0 again */
}
else
buffer[ich] = (char)ch;
} while (++ich < sizeof buffer);
if (ich)
{
buffer[32] = 0;
buffer[4095] = 0;
fprintf(stderr, "%s...%s: file name too long\n", buffer,
buffer+(4096-32));
exit(99);
}
}
else if (!test_one_file(arg, &formats, opts, stride_extra, log_pass))
retval = 1;
}
}
if (opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
unsigned int in;
printf("static png_uint_16 gpc_error[16/*in*/][16/*out*/][4/*a*/] =\n");
printf("{\n");
for (in=0; in<16; ++in)
{
unsigned int out;
printf(" { /* input: %s */\n ", format_names[in]);
for (out=0; out<16; ++out)
{
unsigned int alpha;
printf(" {");
for (alpha=0; alpha<4; ++alpha)
{
printf(" %d", gpc_error[in][out][alpha]);
if (alpha < 3) putchar(',');
}
printf(" }");
if (out < 15)
{
putchar(',');
if (out % 4 == 3) printf("\n ");
}
}
printf("\n }");
if (in < 15)
putchar(',');
else
putchar('\n');
}
printf("};\n");
printf("static png_uint_16 gpc_error_via_linear[16][4/*out*/][4] =\n");
printf("{\n");
for (in=0; in<16; ++in)
{
unsigned int out;
printf(" { /* input: %s */\n ", format_names[in]);
for (out=0; out<4; ++out)
{
unsigned int alpha;
printf(" {");
for (alpha=0; alpha<4; ++alpha)
{
printf(" %d", gpc_error_via_linear[in][out][alpha]);
if (alpha < 3) putchar(',');
}
printf(" }");
if (out < 3)
putchar(',');
}
printf("\n }");
if (in < 15)
putchar(',');
else
putchar('\n');
}
printf("};\n");
printf("static png_uint_16 gpc_error_to_colormap[8/*i*/][8/*o*/][4] =\n");
printf("{\n");
for (in=0; in<8; ++in)
{
unsigned int out;
printf(" { /* input: %s */\n ", format_names[in]);
for (out=0; out<8; ++out)
{
unsigned int alpha;
printf(" {");
for (alpha=0; alpha<4; ++alpha)
{
printf(" %d", gpc_error_to_colormap[in][out][alpha]);
if (alpha < 3) putchar(',');
}
printf(" }");
if (out < 7)
{
putchar(',');
if (out % 4 == 3) printf("\n ");
}
}
printf("\n }");
if (in < 7)
putchar(',');
else
putchar('\n');
}
printf("};\n");
}
if (retval == 0 && touch != NULL)
{
FILE *fsuccess = fopen(touch, "wt");
if (fsuccess != NULL)
{
int error = 0;
fprintf(fsuccess, "PNG simple API tests succeeded\n");
fflush(fsuccess);
error = ferror(fsuccess);
if (fclose(fsuccess) || error)
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: write failed\n", touch);
exit(99);
}
}
else
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: open failed\n", touch);
exit(99);
}
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
if (OMX_GetExtensionIndex(
mHandle,
const_cast<OMX_STRING>("OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2"),
&index) == OMX_ErrorNone) {
return useGraphicBuffer2_l(portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_VERSIONTYPE ver;
ver.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
ver.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
ver.s.nRevision = 0;
ver.s.nStep = 0;
UseAndroidNativeBufferParams params = {
sizeof(UseAndroidNativeBufferParams), ver, portIndex, bufferMeta,
&header, graphicBuffer,
};
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u meta=%p GB=%p", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, bufferMeta, graphicBuffer->handle);
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "GB=%p", graphicBuffer->handle));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,534
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not limit process-memory usage, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28615448.
Commit Message: limit mediaserver memory
Limit mediaserver using rlimit, to prevent it from bringing down the system
via the low memory killer.
Default max is 65% of total RAM, but can be customized via system property.
Bug: 28471206
Bug: 28615448
Change-Id: Ic84137435d1ef0a6883e9789a4b4f399e4283f05
|
Low
| 173,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = (url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)) &&
(url.GetOrigin() != extension_url_.GetOrigin());
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.75 incorrectly relies on GetOrigin method calls for origin comparisons, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and obtain sensitive information via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
|
Medium
| 172,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void free_user(struct kref *ref)
{
struct ipmi_user *user = container_of(ref, struct ipmi_user, refcount);
kfree(user);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.20.5, attackers can trigger a drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c use-after-free and OOPS by arranging for certain simultaneous execution of the code, as demonstrated by a *service ipmievd restart* loop.
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
|
Low
| 169,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didFail(const ResourceError& error)
{
if (m_error)
return;
if (error.isCancellation()) {
m_exceptionCode = AbortError;
abortError();
return;
}
if (error.isTimeout()) {
didTimeout();
return;
}
if (error.domain() == errorDomainWebKitInternal)
logConsoleError(scriptExecutionContext(), "XMLHttpRequest cannot load " + error.failingURL() + ". " + error.localizedDescription());
m_exceptionCode = NetworkError;
networkError();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger multiple conflicting uses of the same XMLHttpRequest object.
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_ccm_auth(struct aead_request *req, struct scatterlist *plain,
unsigned int cryptlen)
{
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ahreq, ctx->mac);
unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
struct scatterlist sg[3];
u8 odata[16];
u8 idata[16];
int ilen, err;
/* format control data for input */
err = format_input(odata, req, cryptlen);
if (err)
goto out;
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], odata, 16);
/* format associated data and compute into mac */
if (assoclen) {
ilen = format_adata(idata, assoclen);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], idata, ilen);
sg_chain(sg, 3, req->src);
} else {
ilen = 0;
sg_chain(sg, 2, req->src);
}
ahash_request_set_tfm(ahreq, ctx->mac);
ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, pctx->flags, NULL, NULL);
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, sg, NULL, assoclen + ilen + 16);
err = crypto_ahash_init(ahreq);
if (err)
goto out;
err = crypto_ahash_update(ahreq);
if (err)
goto out;
/* we need to pad the MAC input to a round multiple of the block size */
ilen = 16 - (assoclen + ilen) % 16;
if (ilen < 16) {
memset(idata, 0, ilen);
sg_init_table(sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], idata, ilen);
if (plain)
sg_chain(sg, 2, plain);
plain = sg;
cryptlen += ilen;
}
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, plain, pctx->odata, cryptlen);
err = crypto_ahash_finup(ahreq);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: crypto/ccm.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x through 4.10.12 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 168,221
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline const unsigned char *ReadResourceLong(const unsigned char *p,
unsigned int *quantum)
{
*quantum=(size_t) (*p++ << 24);
*quantum|=(size_t) (*p++ << 16);
*quantum|=(size_t) (*p++ << 8);
*quantum|=(size_t) (*p++ << 0);
return(p);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information via vectors involving the q variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
Low
| 169,947
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: size_t OpenMP4Source(char *filename, uint32_t traktype, uint32_t traksubtype) //RAW or within MP4
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)malloc(sizeof(mp4object));
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
memset(mp4, 0, sizeof(mp4object));
#ifdef _WINDOWS
fopen_s(&mp4->mediafp, filename, "rb");
#else
mp4->mediafp = fopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
if (mp4->mediafp)
{
uint32_t qttag, qtsize32, skip, type = 0, subtype = 0, num;
size_t len;
int32_t nest = 0;
uint64_t nestsize[MAX_NEST_LEVEL] = { 0 };
uint64_t lastsize = 0, qtsize;
do
{
len = fread(&qtsize32, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&qttag, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
if (len == 8)
{
if (!VALID_FOURCC(qttag))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, lastsize - 8 - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(lastsize - 8);
continue;
}
qtsize32 = BYTESWAP32(qtsize32);
if (qtsize32 == 1) // 64-bit Atom
{
fread(&qtsize, 1, 8, mp4->mediafp);
qtsize = BYTESWAP64(qtsize) - 8;
}
else
qtsize = qtsize32;
nest++;
if (qtsize < 8) break;
if (nest >= MAX_NEST_LEVEL) break;
nestsize[nest] = qtsize;
lastsize = qtsize;
#if PRINT_MP4_STRUCTURE
for (int i = 1; i < nest; i++) printf(" ");
printf("%c%c%c%c (%lld)\n", (qttag & 0xff), ((qttag >> 8) & 0xff), ((qttag >> 16) & 0xff), ((qttag >> 24) & 0xff), qtsize);
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'a', 't') ||
qttag == MAKEID('f', 't', 'y', 'p') ||
qttag == MAKEID('u', 'd', 't', 'a'))
{
LONGSEEK(mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
#else
if (qttag != MAKEID('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && //skip over all but these atoms
qttag != MAKEID('m', 'v', 'h', 'd') &&
qttag != MAKEID('t', 'r', 'a', 'k') &&
qttag != MAKEID('m', 'd', 'i', 'a') &&
qttag != MAKEID('m', 'd', 'h', 'd') &&
qttag != MAKEID('m', 'i', 'n', 'f') &&
qttag != MAKEID('g', 'm', 'i', 'n') &&
qttag != MAKEID('d', 'i', 'n', 'f') &&
qttag != MAKEID('a', 'l', 'i', 's') &&
qttag != MAKEID('s', 't', 's', 'd') &&
qttag != MAKEID('a', 'l', 'i', 's') &&
qttag != MAKEID('a', 'l', 'i', 's') &&
qttag != MAKEID('s', 't', 'b', 'l') &&
qttag != MAKEID('s', 't', 't', 's') &&
qttag != MAKEID('s', 't', 's', 'c') &&
qttag != MAKEID('s', 't', 's', 'z') &&
qttag != MAKEID('s', 't', 'c', 'o') &&
qttag != MAKEID('c', 'o', '6', '4') &&
qttag != MAKEID('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else
#endif
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'v', 'h', 'd')) //mvhd movie header
{
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&mp4->clockdemon, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp); mp4->clockdemon = BYTESWAP32(mp4->clockdemon);
len += fread(&mp4->clockcount, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp); mp4->clockcount = BYTESWAP32(mp4->clockcount);
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over mvhd
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'h', 'd')) //mdhd media header
{
media_header md;
len = fread(&md, 1, sizeof(md), mp4->mediafp);
if (len == sizeof(md))
{
md.creation_time = BYTESWAP32(md.creation_time);
md.modification_time = BYTESWAP32(md.modification_time);
md.time_scale = BYTESWAP32(md.time_scale);
md.duration = BYTESWAP32(md.duration);
mp4->trak_clockdemon = md.time_scale;
mp4->trak_clockcount = md.duration;
if (mp4->videolength == 0.0) // Get the video length from the first track
{
mp4->videolength = (float)((double)mp4->trak_clockcount / (double)mp4->trak_clockdemon);
}
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over mvhd
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('h', 'd', 'l', 'r')) //hldr
{
uint32_t temp;
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&temp, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp); // type will be 'meta' for the correct trak.
if (temp != MAKEID('a', 'l', 'i', 's'))
type = temp;
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over hldr
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('s', 't', 's', 'd')) //read the sample decription to determine the type of metadata
{
if (type == traktype) //like meta
{
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&subtype, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp); // type will be 'meta' for the correct trak.
if (len == 16)
{
if (subtype != traksubtype) // MP4 metadata
{
type = 0; // MP4
}
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over stsd
}
else
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('s', 't', 's', 'c')) // metadata stsc - offset chunks
{
if (type == traktype) // meta
{
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&num, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
num = BYTESWAP32(num);
if (num * 12 <= qtsize - 8 - len)
{
mp4->metastsc_count = num;
if (mp4->metastsc) free(mp4->metastsc);
mp4->metastsc = (SampleToChunk *)malloc(num * 12);
if (mp4->metastsc)
{
uint32_t total_stsc = num;
len += fread(mp4->metastsc, 1, num * sizeof(SampleToChunk), mp4->mediafp);
do
{
num--;
mp4->metastsc[num].chunk_num = BYTESWAP32(mp4->metastsc[num].chunk_num);
mp4->metastsc[num].samples = BYTESWAP32(mp4->metastsc[num].samples);
mp4->metastsc[num].id = BYTESWAP32(mp4->metastsc[num].id);
} while (num > 0);
}
if (mp4->metastsc_count == 1 && mp4->metastsc[0].samples == 1) // Simplify if the stsc is not reporting any grouped chunks.
{
if (mp4->metastsc) free(mp4->metastsc);
mp4->metastsc = NULL;
mp4->metastsc_count = 0;
}
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over stsx
}
else
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('s', 't', 's', 'z')) // metadata stsz - sizes
{
if (type == traktype) // meta
{
uint32_t equalsamplesize;
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&equalsamplesize, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&num, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
num = BYTESWAP32(num);
if (num * 4 <= qtsize - 8 - len)
{
mp4->metasize_count = num;
if (mp4->metasizes) free(mp4->metasizes);
mp4->metasizes = (uint32_t *)malloc(num * 4);
if (mp4->metasizes)
{
if (equalsamplesize == 0)
{
len += fread(mp4->metasizes, 1, num * 4, mp4->mediafp);
do
{
num--;
mp4->metasizes[num] = BYTESWAP32(mp4->metasizes[num]);
} while (num > 0);
}
else
{
equalsamplesize = BYTESWAP32(equalsamplesize);
do
{
num--;
mp4->metasizes[num] = equalsamplesize;
} while (num > 0);
}
}
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over stsz
}
else
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('s', 't', 'c', 'o')) // metadata stco - offsets
{
if (type == traktype) // meta
{
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&num, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
num = BYTESWAP32(num);
if (num * 4 <= qtsize - 8 - len)
{
if (mp4->metastsc_count > 0 && num != mp4->metasize_count)
{
mp4->indexcount = mp4->metasize_count;
if (mp4->metaoffsets) free(mp4->metaoffsets);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->metasize_count * 8);
if (mp4->metaoffsets)
{
uint32_t *metaoffsets32 = NULL;
metaoffsets32 = (uint32_t *)malloc(num * 4);
if (metaoffsets32)
{
uint64_t fileoffset = 0;
int stsc_pos = 0;
int stco_pos = 0;
int repeat = 1;
len += fread(metaoffsets32, 1, num * 4, mp4->mediafp);
do
{
num--;
metaoffsets32[num] = BYTESWAP32(metaoffsets32[num]);
} while (num > 0);
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = fileoffset = metaoffsets32[stco_pos];
num = 1;
while (num < mp4->metasize_count)
{
if (stsc_pos + 1 < (int)mp4->metastsc_count && num == stsc_pos)
{
stco_pos++; stsc_pos++;
fileoffset = (uint64_t)metaoffsets32[stco_pos];
repeat = 1;
}
else if (repeat == mp4->metastsc[stsc_pos].samples)
{
stco_pos++;
fileoffset = (uint64_t)metaoffsets32[stco_pos];
repeat = 1;
}
else
{
fileoffset += (uint64_t)mp4->metasizes[num - 1];
repeat++;
}
mp4->metaoffsets[num] = fileoffset;
num++;
}
if (mp4->metastsc) free(mp4->metastsc);
mp4->metastsc = NULL;
mp4->metastsc_count = 0;
free(metaoffsets32);
}
}
}
else
{
mp4->indexcount = num;
if (mp4->metaoffsets) free(mp4->metaoffsets);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(num * 8);
if (mp4->metaoffsets)
{
uint32_t *metaoffsets32 = NULL;
metaoffsets32 = (uint32_t *)malloc(num * 4);
if (metaoffsets32)
{
size_t readlen = fread(metaoffsets32, 1, num * 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += readlen;
do
{
num--;
mp4->metaoffsets[num] = BYTESWAP32(metaoffsets32[num]);
} while (num > 0);
free(metaoffsets32);
}
}
}
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over stco
}
else
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('c', 'o', '6', '4')) // metadata stco - offsets
{
if (type == traktype) // meta
{
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&num, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
num = BYTESWAP32(num);
if (num * 8 <= qtsize - 8 - len)
{
if (mp4->metastsc_count > 0 && num != mp4->metasize_count)
{
mp4->indexcount = mp4->metasize_count;
if (mp4->metaoffsets) free(mp4->metaoffsets);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->metasize_count * 8);
if (mp4->metaoffsets)
{
uint64_t *metaoffsets64 = NULL;
metaoffsets64 = (uint64_t *)malloc(num * 8);
if (metaoffsets64)
{
uint64_t fileoffset = 0;
int stsc_pos = 0;
int stco_pos = 0;
len += fread(metaoffsets64, 1, num * 8, mp4->mediafp);
do
{
num--;
metaoffsets64[num] = BYTESWAP64(metaoffsets64[num]);
} while (num > 0);
fileoffset = metaoffsets64[0];
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = fileoffset;
num = 1;
while (num < mp4->metasize_count)
{
if (num != mp4->metastsc[stsc_pos].chunk_num - 1 && 0 == (num - (mp4->metastsc[stsc_pos].chunk_num - 1)) % mp4->metastsc[stsc_pos].samples)
{
stco_pos++;
fileoffset = (uint64_t)metaoffsets64[stco_pos];
}
else
{
fileoffset += (uint64_t)mp4->metasizes[num - 1];
}
mp4->metaoffsets[num] = fileoffset;
num++;
}
if (mp4->metastsc) free(mp4->metastsc);
mp4->metastsc = NULL;
mp4->metastsc_count = 0;
free(metaoffsets64);
}
}
}
else
{
mp4->indexcount = num;
if (mp4->metaoffsets) free(mp4->metaoffsets);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(num * 8);
if (mp4->metaoffsets)
{
len += fread(mp4->metaoffsets, 1, num * 8, mp4->mediafp);
do
{
num--;
mp4->metaoffsets[num] = BYTESWAP64(mp4->metaoffsets[num]);
} while (num > 0);
}
}
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over stco
}
else
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else if (qttag == MAKEID('s', 't', 't', 's')) // time to samples
{
if (type == traktype) // meta
{
uint32_t totaldur = 0, samples = 0;
int32_t entries = 0;
len = fread(&skip, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&num, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
num = BYTESWAP32(num);
if (num * 8 <= qtsize - 8 - len)
{
entries = num;
mp4->meta_clockdemon = mp4->trak_clockdemon;
mp4->meta_clockcount = mp4->trak_clockcount;
while (entries > 0)
{
int32_t samplecount;
int32_t duration;
len += fread(&samplecount, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
samplecount = BYTESWAP32(samplecount);
len += fread(&duration, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
duration = BYTESWAP32(duration);
samples += samplecount;
entries--;
totaldur += duration;
mp4->metadatalength += (double)((double)samplecount * (double)duration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
}
mp4->basemetadataduration = mp4->metadatalength * (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon / (double)samples;
}
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8 - len, SEEK_CUR); // skip over stco
}
else
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
}
else
{
NESTSIZE(8);
}
}
else
{
break;
}
} while (len > 0);
}
else
{
free(mp4);
mp4 = NULL;
}
return (size_t)mp4;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
|
Medium
| 169,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int imagetobmp(opj_image_t * image, const char *outfile) {
int w, h;
int i, pad;
FILE *fdest = NULL;
int adjustR, adjustG, adjustB;
if (image->comps[0].prec < 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported number of components: %d\n", image->comps[0].prec);
return 1;
}
if (image->numcomps >= 3 && image->comps[0].dx == image->comps[1].dx
&& image->comps[1].dx == image->comps[2].dx
&& image->comps[0].dy == image->comps[1].dy
&& image->comps[1].dy == image->comps[2].dy
&& image->comps[0].prec == image->comps[1].prec
&& image->comps[1].prec == image->comps[2].prec) {
/* -->> -->> -->> -->>
24 bits color
<<-- <<-- <<-- <<-- */
fdest = fopen(outfile, "wb");
if (!fdest) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR -> failed to open %s for writing\n", outfile);
return 1;
}
w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
fprintf(fdest, "BM");
/* FILE HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c",
(OPJ_UINT8) (h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (54) & 0xff, ((54) >> 8) & 0xff,((54) >> 16) & 0xff, ((54) >> 24) & 0xff);
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (40) & 0xff, ((40) >> 8) & 0xff, ((40) >> 16) & 0xff, ((40) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((w) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((h) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (1) & 0xff, ((1) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (24) & 0xff, ((24) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (3 * h * w + 3 * h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
if (image->comps[0].prec > 8) {
adjustR = (int)image->comps[0].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 0 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[0].prec);
}
else
adjustR = 0;
if (image->comps[1].prec > 8) {
adjustG = (int)image->comps[1].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 1 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[1].prec);
}
else
adjustG = 0;
if (image->comps[2].prec > 8) {
adjustB = (int)image->comps[2].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 2 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[2].prec);
}
else
adjustB = 0;
for (i = 0; i < w * h; i++) {
OPJ_UINT8 rc, gc, bc;
int r, g, b;
r = image->comps[0].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
r += (image->comps[0].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[0].prec - 1) : 0);
r = ((r >> adjustR)+((r >> (adjustR-1))%2));
if(r > 255) r = 255; else if(r < 0) r = 0;
rc = (OPJ_UINT8)r;
g = image->comps[1].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
g += (image->comps[1].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[1].prec - 1) : 0);
g = ((g >> adjustG)+((g >> (adjustG-1))%2));
if(g > 255) g = 255; else if(g < 0) g = 0;
gc = (OPJ_UINT8)g;
b = image->comps[2].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
b += (image->comps[2].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[2].prec - 1) : 0);
b = ((b >> adjustB)+((b >> (adjustB-1))%2));
if(b > 255) b = 255; else if(b < 0) b = 0;
bc = (OPJ_UINT8)b;
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c", bc, gc, rc);
if ((i + 1) % w == 0) {
for (pad = ((3 * w) % 4) ? (4 - (3 * w) % 4) : 0; pad > 0; pad--) /* ADD */
fprintf(fdest, "%c", 0);
}
}
fclose(fdest);
} else { /* Gray-scale */
/* -->> -->> -->> -->>
8 bits non code (Gray scale)
<<-- <<-- <<-- <<-- */
fdest = fopen(outfile, "wb");
if (!fdest) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR -> failed to open %s for writing\n", outfile);
return 1;
}
w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
fprintf(fdest, "BM");
/* FILE HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + w * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (54 + 1024) & 0xff, ((54 + 1024) >> 8) & 0xff,
((54 + 1024) >> 16) & 0xff,
((54 + 1024) >> 24) & 0xff);
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (40) & 0xff, ((40) >> 8) & 0xff, ((40) >> 16) & 0xff, ((40) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((w) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((h) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (1) & 0xff, ((1) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (8) & 0xff, ((8) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (h * w + h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (256) & 0xff, ((256) >> 8) & 0xff, ((256) >> 16) & 0xff, ((256) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (256) & 0xff, ((256) >> 8) & 0xff, ((256) >> 16) & 0xff, ((256) >> 24) & 0xff);
if (image->comps[0].prec > 8) {
adjustR = (int)image->comps[0].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 0 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[0].prec);
}else
adjustR = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", i, i, i, 0);
}
for (i = 0; i < w * h; i++) {
int r;
r = image->comps[0].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
r += (image->comps[0].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[0].prec - 1) : 0);
r = ((r >> adjustR)+((r >> (adjustR-1))%2));
if(r > 255) r = 255; else if(r < 0) r = 0;
fprintf(fdest, "%c", (OPJ_UINT8)r);
if ((i + 1) % w == 0) {
for ((pad = w % 4) ? (4 - w % 4) : 0; pad > 0; pad--) /* ADD */
fprintf(fdest, "%c", 0);
}
}
fclose(fdest);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sycc422_t_rgb function in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted jpeg2000 file.
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
|
Medium
| 168,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort || ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpIncomplete)
{
res.flags.IpOK = FALSE;
res.flags.IpFailed = TRUE;
return res;
}
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 170,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
{
memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_text),
(unsigned long)__bss_stop - (unsigned long)_text);
early_reserve_initrd();
/*
* At this point everything still needed from the boot loader
* or BIOS or kernel text should be early reserved or marked not
* RAM in e820. All other memory is free game.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
memcpy(&boot_cpu_data, &new_cpu_data, sizeof(new_cpu_data));
/*
* copy kernel address range established so far and switch
* to the proper swapper page table
*/
clone_pgd_range(swapper_pg_dir + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
initial_page_table + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
load_cr3(swapper_pg_dir);
/*
* Note: Quark X1000 CPUs advertise PGE incorrectly and require
* a cr3 based tlb flush, so the following __flush_tlb_all()
* will not flush anything because the cpu quirk which clears
* X86_FEATURE_PGE has not been invoked yet. Though due to the
* load_cr3() above the TLB has been flushed already. The
* quirk is invoked before subsequent calls to __flush_tlb_all()
* so proper operation is guaranteed.
*/
__flush_tlb_all();
#else
printk(KERN_INFO "Command line: %s\n", boot_command_line);
#endif
/*
* If we have OLPC OFW, we might end up relocating the fixmap due to
* reserve_top(), so do this before touching the ioremap area.
*/
olpc_ofw_detect();
early_trap_init();
early_cpu_init();
early_ioremap_init();
setup_olpc_ofw_pgd();
ROOT_DEV = old_decode_dev(boot_params.hdr.root_dev);
screen_info = boot_params.screen_info;
edid_info = boot_params.edid_info;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
apm_info.bios = boot_params.apm_bios_info;
ist_info = boot_params.ist_info;
#endif
saved_video_mode = boot_params.hdr.vid_mode;
bootloader_type = boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader;
if ((bootloader_type >> 4) == 0xe) {
bootloader_type &= 0xf;
bootloader_type |= (boot_params.hdr.ext_loader_type+0x10) << 4;
}
bootloader_version = bootloader_type & 0xf;
bootloader_version |= boot_params.hdr.ext_loader_ver << 4;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM
rd_image_start = boot_params.hdr.ram_size & RAMDISK_IMAGE_START_MASK;
rd_prompt = ((boot_params.hdr.ram_size & RAMDISK_PROMPT_FLAG) != 0);
rd_doload = ((boot_params.hdr.ram_size & RAMDISK_LOAD_FLAG) != 0);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
if (!strncmp((char *)&boot_params.efi_info.efi_loader_signature,
EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)&boot_params.efi_info.efi_loader_signature,
EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
set_bit(EFI_64BIT, &efi.flags);
}
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_memblock_x86_reserve_range();
#endif
x86_init.oem.arch_setup();
iomem_resource.end = (1ULL << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits) - 1;
setup_memory_map();
parse_setup_data();
copy_edd();
if (!boot_params.hdr.root_flags)
root_mountflags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
init_mm.start_code = (unsigned long) _text;
init_mm.end_code = (unsigned long) _etext;
init_mm.end_data = (unsigned long) _edata;
init_mm.brk = _brk_end;
mpx_mm_init(&init_mm);
code_resource.start = __pa_symbol(_text);
code_resource.end = __pa_symbol(_etext)-1;
data_resource.start = __pa_symbol(_etext);
data_resource.end = __pa_symbol(_edata)-1;
bss_resource.start = __pa_symbol(__bss_start);
bss_resource.end = __pa_symbol(__bss_stop)-1;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL
#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
#else
if (builtin_cmdline[0]) {
/* append boot loader cmdline to builtin */
strlcat(builtin_cmdline, " ", COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
strlcat(builtin_cmdline, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
}
#endif
#endif
strlcpy(command_line, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
*cmdline_p = command_line;
/*
* x86_configure_nx() is called before parse_early_param() to detect
* whether hardware doesn't support NX (so that the early EHCI debug
* console setup can safely call set_fixmap()). It may then be called
* again from within noexec_setup() during parsing early parameters
* to honor the respective command line option.
*/
x86_configure_nx();
parse_early_param();
x86_report_nx();
/* after early param, so could get panic from serial */
memblock_x86_reserve_range_setup_data();
if (acpi_mps_check()) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
disable_apic = 1;
#endif
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_APIC);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
if (pci_early_dump_regs)
early_dump_pci_devices();
#endif
/* update the e820_saved too */
e820_reserve_setup_data();
finish_e820_parsing();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
dmi_scan_machine();
dmi_memdev_walk();
dmi_set_dump_stack_arch_desc();
/*
* VMware detection requires dmi to be available, so this
* needs to be done after dmi_scan_machine, for the BP.
*/
init_hypervisor_platform();
x86_init.resources.probe_roms();
/* after parse_early_param, so could debug it */
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &code_resource);
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &data_resource);
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &bss_resource);
e820_add_kernel_range();
trim_bios_range();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (ppro_with_ram_bug()) {
e820_update_range(0x70000000ULL, 0x40000ULL, E820_RAM,
E820_RESERVED);
sanitize_e820_map(e820.map, ARRAY_SIZE(e820.map), &e820.nr_map);
printk(KERN_INFO "fixed physical RAM map:\n");
e820_print_map("bad_ppro");
}
#else
early_gart_iommu_check();
#endif
/*
* partially used pages are not usable - thus
* we are rounding upwards:
*/
max_pfn = e820_end_of_ram_pfn();
/* update e820 for memory not covered by WB MTRRs */
mtrr_bp_init();
if (mtrr_trim_uncached_memory(max_pfn))
max_pfn = e820_end_of_ram_pfn();
max_possible_pfn = max_pfn;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* max_low_pfn get updated here */
find_low_pfn_range();
#else
check_x2apic();
/* How many end-of-memory variables you have, grandma! */
/* need this before calling reserve_initrd */
if (max_pfn > (1UL<<(32 - PAGE_SHIFT)))
max_low_pfn = e820_end_of_low_ram_pfn();
else
max_low_pfn = max_pfn;
high_memory = (void *)__va(max_pfn * PAGE_SIZE - 1) + 1;
#endif
/*
* Find and reserve possible boot-time SMP configuration:
*/
find_smp_config();
reserve_ibft_region();
early_alloc_pgt_buf();
/*
* Need to conclude brk, before memblock_x86_fill()
* it could use memblock_find_in_range, could overlap with
* brk area.
*/
reserve_brk();
cleanup_highmap();
memblock_set_current_limit(ISA_END_ADDRESS);
memblock_x86_fill();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
efi_fake_memmap();
efi_find_mirror();
}
/*
* The EFI specification says that boot service code won't be called
* after ExitBootServices(). This is, in fact, a lie.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
efi_reserve_boot_services();
/* preallocate 4k for mptable mpc */
early_reserve_e820_mpc_new();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION
setup_bios_corruption_check();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
printk(KERN_DEBUG "initial memory mapped: [mem 0x00000000-%#010lx]\n",
(max_pfn_mapped<<PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
#endif
reserve_real_mode();
trim_platform_memory_ranges();
trim_low_memory_range();
init_mem_mapping();
early_trap_pf_init();
setup_real_mode();
memblock_set_current_limit(get_max_mapped());
/*
* NOTE: On x86-32, only from this point on, fixmaps are ready for use.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVIDE_OHCI1394_DMA_INIT
if (init_ohci1394_dma_early)
init_ohci1394_dma_on_all_controllers();
#endif
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
reserve_initrd();
#if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) && defined(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD)
acpi_initrd_override((void *)initrd_start, initrd_end - initrd_start);
#endif
vsmp_init();
io_delay_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SECURELEVEL
if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
set_securelevel(1);
}
#endif
/*
* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
*/
acpi_boot_table_init();
early_acpi_boot_init();
initmem_init();
dma_contiguous_reserve(max_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT);
/*
* Reserve memory for crash kernel after SRAT is parsed so that it
* won't consume hotpluggable memory.
*/
reserve_crashkernel();
memblock_find_dma_reserve();
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
kvmclock_init();
#endif
x86_init.paging.pagetable_init();
kasan_init();
if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level >= 0) {
/* A CPU has %cr4 if and only if it has CPUID */
mmu_cr4_features = __read_cr4();
if (trampoline_cr4_features)
*trampoline_cr4_features = mmu_cr4_features;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* sync back kernel address range */
clone_pgd_range(initial_page_table + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
swapper_pg_dir + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
/*
* sync back low identity map too. It is used for example
* in the 32-bit EFI stub.
*/
clone_pgd_range(initial_page_table,
swapper_pg_dir + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY,
min(KERNEL_PGD_PTRS, KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY));
#endif
tboot_probe();
map_vsyscall();
generic_apic_probe();
early_quirks();
/*
* Read APIC and some other early information from ACPI tables.
*/
acpi_boot_init();
sfi_init();
x86_dtb_init();
/*
* get boot-time SMP configuration:
*/
if (smp_found_config)
get_smp_config();
prefill_possible_map();
init_cpu_to_node();
init_apic_mappings();
io_apic_init_mappings();
kvm_guest_init();
e820_reserve_resources();
e820_mark_nosave_regions(max_low_pfn);
x86_init.resources.reserve_resources();
e820_setup_gap();
#ifdef CONFIG_VT
#if defined(CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE)
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) || (efi_mem_type(0xa0000) != EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY))
conswitchp = &vga_con;
#elif defined(CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE)
conswitchp = &dummy_con;
#endif
#endif
x86_init.oem.banner();
x86_init.timers.wallclock_init();
mcheck_init();
arch_init_ideal_nops();
register_refined_jiffies(CLOCK_TICK_RATE);
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_apply_memmap_quirks();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel, as used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.2 and Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2 and when booted with UEFI Secure Boot enabled, allows local users to bypass intended Secure Boot restrictions and execute untrusted code by appending ACPI tables to the initrd.
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
Medium
| 167,346
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebRunnerMainDelegate::WebRunnerMainDelegate(zx::channel context_channel)
: context_channel_(std::move(context_channel)) {}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,202
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ng_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
{
git_pkt_ng *pkt;
const char *ptr;
size_t alloclen;
pkt = git__malloc(sizeof(*pkt));
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt);
pkt->ref = NULL;
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_NG;
line += 3; /* skip "ng " */
if (!(ptr = strchr(line, ' ')))
goto out_err;
len = ptr - line;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, len, 1);
pkt->ref = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt->ref);
memcpy(pkt->ref, line, len);
pkt->ref[len] = '\0';
line = ptr + 1;
if (!(ptr = strchr(line, '\n')))
goto out_err;
len = ptr - line;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, len, 1);
pkt->msg = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt->msg);
memcpy(pkt->msg, line, len);
pkt->msg[len] = '\0';
*out = (git_pkt *)pkt;
return 0;
out_err:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "invalid packet line");
git__free(pkt->ref);
git__free(pkt);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In ng_pkt in transports/smart_pkt.c in libgit2 before 0.26.6 and 0.27.x before 0.27.4, a remote attacker can send a crafted smart-protocol *ng* packet that lacks a '0' byte to trigger an out-of-bounds read that leads to DoS.
Commit Message: smart_pkt: fix potential OOB-read when processing ng packet
OSS-fuzz has reported a potential out-of-bounds read when processing a
"ng" smart packet:
==1==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6310000249c0 at pc 0x000000493a92 bp 0x7ffddc882cd0 sp 0x7ffddc882480
READ of size 65529 at 0x6310000249c0 thread T0
SCARINESS: 26 (multi-byte-read-heap-buffer-overflow)
#0 0x493a91 in __interceptor_strchr.part.35 /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:673
#1 0x813960 in ng_pkt libgit2/src/transports/smart_pkt.c:320:14
#2 0x810f79 in git_pkt_parse_line libgit2/src/transports/smart_pkt.c:478:9
#3 0x82c3c9 in git_smart__store_refs libgit2/src/transports/smart_protocol.c:47:12
#4 0x6373a2 in git_smart__connect libgit2/src/transports/smart.c:251:15
#5 0x57688f in git_remote_connect libgit2/src/remote.c:708:15
#6 0x52e59b in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /src/download_refs_fuzzer.cc:145:9
#7 0x52ef3f in ExecuteFilesOnyByOne(int, char**) /src/libfuzzer/afl/afl_driver.cpp:301:5
#8 0x52f4ee in main /src/libfuzzer/afl/afl_driver.cpp:339:12
#9 0x7f6c910db82f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-Cl5G7W/glibc-2.23/csu/libc-start.c:291
#10 0x41d518 in _start
When parsing an "ng" packet, we keep track of both the current position
as well as the remaining length of the packet itself. But instead of
taking care not to exceed the length, we pass the current pointer's
position to `strchr`, which will search for a certain character until
hitting NUL. It is thus possible to create a crafted packet which
doesn't contain a NUL byte to trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Fix the issue by instead using `memchr`, passing the remaining length as
restriction. Furthermore, verify that we actually have enough bytes left
to produce a match at all.
OSS-Fuzz-Issue: 9406
|
Low
| 169,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tight_filter_gradient24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, int w, int h)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix32;
int shift[3];
int *prev;
int here[3], upper[3], left[3], upperleft[3];
int prediction;
int x, y, c;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
memset(vs->tight.gradient.buffer, 0, w * 3 * sizeof(int));
if ((vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG)) {
shift[0] = vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
} else {
shift[0] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
}
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upper[c] = 0;
here[c] = 0;
}
prev = (int *)vs->tight.gradient.buffer;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
pix32 = *buf32++;
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upperleft[c] = upper[c];
left[c] = here[c];
upper[c] = *prev;
here[c] = (int)(pix32 >> shift[c] & 0xFF);
*prev++ = here[c];
prediction = left[c] + upper[c] - upperleft[c];
if (prediction < 0) {
prediction = 0;
} else if (prediction > 0xFF) {
prediction = 0xFF;
}
*buf++ = (char)(here[c] - prediction);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,467
|
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