instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadDDSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status,
cubemap = MagickFalse,
volume = MagickFalse,
matte;
CompressionType
compression;
DDSInfo
dds_info;
DDSDecoder
*decoder;
size_t
n,
num_images;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (ReadDDSInfo(image, &dds_info) != MagickTrue) {
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP)
cubemap = MagickTrue;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_VOLUME && dds_info.depth > 0)
volume = MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image, 128, SEEK_SET);
/*
Determine pixel format
*/
if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_RGB)
{
compression = NoCompression;
if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_ALPHAPIXELS)
{
matte = MagickTrue;
decoder = ReadUncompressedRGBA;
}
else
{
matte = MagickTrue;
decoder = ReadUncompressedRGB;
}
}
else if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_LUMINANCE)
{
compression = NoCompression;
if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_ALPHAPIXELS)
{
/* Not sure how to handle this */
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
else
{
matte = MagickFalse;
decoder = ReadUncompressedRGB;
}
}
else if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_FOURCC)
{
switch (dds_info.pixelformat.fourcc)
{
case FOURCC_DXT1:
{
matte = MagickFalse;
compression = DXT1Compression;
decoder = ReadDXT1;
break;
}
case FOURCC_DXT3:
{
matte = MagickTrue;
compression = DXT3Compression;
decoder = ReadDXT3;
break;
}
case FOURCC_DXT5:
{
matte = MagickTrue;
compression = DXT5Compression;
decoder = ReadDXT5;
break;
}
default:
{
/* Unknown FOURCC */
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
}
}
else
{
/* Neither compressed nor uncompressed... thus unsupported */
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
num_images = 1;
if (cubemap)
{
/*
Determine number of faces defined in the cubemap
*/
num_images = 0;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_POSITIVEX) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_NEGATIVEX) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_POSITIVEY) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_NEGATIVEY) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_POSITIVEZ) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_NEGATIVEZ) num_images++;
}
if (volume)
num_images = dds_info.depth;
for (n = 0; n < num_images; n++)
{
if (n != 0)
{
/* Start a new image */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->matte = matte;
image->compression = compression;
image->columns = dds_info.width;
image->rows = dds_info.height;
image->storage_class = DirectClass;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
image->depth = 8;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
if ((decoder)(image, &dds_info, exception) != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return bit_depth > 8;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: chunk_new_with_alloc_size(size_t alloc)
{
chunk_t *ch;
ch = tor_malloc(alloc);
ch->next = NULL;
ch->datalen = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
ch->DBG_alloc = alloc;
#endif
ch->memlen = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(alloc);
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += alloc;
ch->data = &ch->mem[0];
return ch;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Tor before 0.2.8.9 and 0.2.9.x before 0.2.9.4-alpha had internal functions that were entitled to expect that buf_t data had NUL termination, but the implementation of or/buffers.c did not ensure that NUL termination was present, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (client, hidden service, relay, or authority crash) via crafted data.
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
|
Low
| 168,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteINLINEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
*base64,
message[MaxTextExtent];
const MagickInfo
*magick_info;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*write_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
blob_length,
encode_length;
unsigned char
*blob;
/*
Convert image to base64-encoding.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
exception=(&image->exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfo(write_info,1,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(write_info->magick,"INLINE") == 0)
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(write_info->magick,exception);
if ((magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL) ||
(GetMagickMimeType(magick_info) == (const char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,write_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
blob_length=2048;
write_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (write_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(write_info,write_image,&blob_length,
exception);
write_image=DestroyImage(write_image);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
encode_length=0;
base64=Base64Encode(blob,blob_length,&encode_length);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
if (base64 == (char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Write base64-encoded image.
*/
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
base64=DestroyString(base64);
return(status);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"data:%s;base64,",
GetMagickMimeType(magick_info));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,message);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,base64);
base64=DestroyString(base64);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WriteINLINEImage in coders/inline.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/572
|
Medium
| 167,971
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenameFile(const DownloadId& id,
const FilePath& new_path,
const FilePath& unique_path,
net::Error rename_error,
RenameFileState state,
RenameFileOverwrite should_overwrite) {
MockDownloadFile* file = download_file_factory_->GetExistingFile(id);
ASSERT_TRUE(file != NULL);
EXPECT_CALL(*file, Rename(unique_path))
.Times(1)
.WillOnce(Return(rename_error));
if (rename_error != net::OK) {
EXPECT_CALL(*file, BytesSoFar())
.Times(AtLeast(1))
.WillRepeatedly(Return(byte_count_[id]));
EXPECT_CALL(*file, GetHashState())
.Times(AtLeast(1));
EXPECT_CALL(*file, GetDownloadManager())
.Times(AtLeast(1));
} else if (state == COMPLETE) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
EXPECT_CALL(*file, AnnotateWithSourceInformation());
#endif
}
if (state == IN_PROGRESS) {
download_file_manager_->RenameInProgressDownloadFile(
id, new_path, (should_overwrite == OVERWRITE),
base::Bind(&TestDownloadManager::OnDownloadRenamed,
download_manager_, id.local()));
} else { // state == COMPLETE
download_file_manager_->RenameCompletingDownloadFile(
id, new_path, (should_overwrite == OVERWRITE),
base::Bind(&TestDownloadManager::OnDownloadRenamed,
download_manager_, id.local()));
}
if (rename_error != net::OK) {
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_,
OnDownloadInterrupted(
id.local(),
byte_count_[id],
"",
content::ConvertNetErrorToInterruptReason(
rename_error,
content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_FROM_DISK)));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_,
OnDownloadRenamed(id.local(), FilePath()));
ProcessAllPendingMessages();
++error_count_[id];
} else {
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_,
OnDownloadRenamed(id.local(), unique_path));
ProcessAllPendingMessages();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 8;
fwd_txfm_ref = fdct8x8_ref;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,562
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void fpm_child_init(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
fpm_globals.max_requests = wp->config->pm_max_requests;
if (0 > fpm_stdio_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_log_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_status_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_unix_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_signals_init_child() ||
0 > fpm_env_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_php_init_child(wp)) {
zlog(ZLOG_ERROR, "[pool %s] child failed to initialize", wp->config->name);
exit(FPM_EXIT_SOFTWARE);
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in PHP 7.3.x before 7.3.0alpha3, 7.2.x before 7.2.8, and before 7.1.20. The php-fpm master process restarts a child process in an endless loop when using program execution functions (e.g., passthru, exec, shell_exec, or system) with a non-blocking STDIN stream, causing this master process to consume 100% of the CPU, and consume disk space with a large volume of error logs, as demonstrated by an attack by a customer of a shared-hosting facility.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
|
Low
| 169,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WriteFakeData(uint8* audio_data, size_t length) {
Type* output = reinterpret_cast<Type*>(audio_data);
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
output[i] = i % 5 + 10;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,537
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = data.readInt64();
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(slotMask);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(w, h);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t defaultFormat = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact function in libs/gui/IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not initialize a certain slot variable, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering an ATTACH_BUFFER action, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26338113.
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferConsumer: fix ATTACH_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338113
Change-Id: I019c4df2c6adbc944122df96968ddd11a02ebe33
|
Low
| 173,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DocumentModuleScriptFetcher::NotifyFinished(Resource* resource) {
ClearResource();
ScriptResource* script_resource = ToScriptResource(resource);
HeapVector<Member<ConsoleMessage>> error_messages;
if (!WasModuleLoadSuccessful(script_resource, &error_messages)) {
Finalize(WTF::nullopt, error_messages);
return;
}
ModuleScriptCreationParams params(
script_resource->GetResponse().Url(), script_resource->SourceText(),
script_resource->GetResourceRequest().GetFetchCredentialsMode(),
script_resource->CalculateAccessControlStatus());
Finalize(params, error_messages);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Lack of CORS checking by ResourceFetcher/ResourceLoader in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
|
Medium
| 172,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int omx_venc::async_message_process (void *context, void* message)
{
omx_video* omx = NULL;
struct venc_msg *m_sVenc_msg = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* omxhdr = NULL;
struct venc_buffer *temp_buff = NULL;
if (context == NULL || message == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_venc::async_message_process invalid i/p params");
return -1;
}
m_sVenc_msg = (struct venc_msg *)message;
omx = reinterpret_cast<omx_video*>(context);
if (m_sVenc_msg->statuscode != VEN_S_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: async_msg_process() - Error statuscode = %lu",
m_sVenc_msg->statuscode);
if(m_sVenc_msg->msgcode == VEN_MSG_HW_OVERLOAD) {
omx->omx_report_hw_overload();
} else
omx->omx_report_error();
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("omx_venc::async_message_process- msgcode = %lu",
m_sVenc_msg->msgcode);
switch (m_sVenc_msg->msgcode) {
case VEN_MSG_START:
omx->post_event (0,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_START_DONE);
break;
case VEN_MSG_STOP:
omx->post_event (0,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_STOP_DONE);
break;
case VEN_MSG_RESUME:
omx->post_event (0,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_RESUME_DONE);
break;
case VEN_MSG_PAUSE:
omx->post_event (0,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_PAUSE_DONE);
break;
case VEN_MSG_FLUSH_INPUT_DONE:
omx->post_event (0,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT_INPUT_FLUSH);
break;
case VEN_MSG_FLUSH_OUPUT_DONE:
omx->post_event (0,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT_OUTPUT_FLUSH);
break;
case VEN_MSG_INPUT_BUFFER_DONE:
omxhdr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* )\
m_sVenc_msg->buf.clientdata;
if (omxhdr == NULL ||
(((OMX_U32)(omxhdr - omx->m_inp_mem_ptr) > omx->m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) &&
((OMX_U32)(omxhdr - omx->meta_buffer_hdr) > omx->m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual))) {
omxhdr = NULL;
m_sVenc_msg->statuscode = VEN_S_EFAIL;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
omx->omx_release_meta_buffer(omxhdr);
#endif
omx->post_event ((unsigned long)omxhdr,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
break;
case VEN_MSG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_DONE:
omxhdr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*)m_sVenc_msg->buf.clientdata;
if ( (omxhdr != NULL) &&
((OMX_U32)(omxhdr - omx->m_out_mem_ptr) < omx->m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual)) {
if (m_sVenc_msg->buf.len <= omxhdr->nAllocLen) {
omxhdr->nFilledLen = m_sVenc_msg->buf.len;
omxhdr->nOffset = m_sVenc_msg->buf.offset;
omxhdr->nTimeStamp = m_sVenc_msg->buf.timestamp;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p TS = %u", (unsigned int)m_sVenc_msg->buf.timestamp);
omxhdr->nFlags = m_sVenc_msg->buf.flags;
/*Use buffer case*/
if (omx->output_use_buffer && !omx->m_use_output_pmem) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("memcpy() for o/p Heap UseBuffer");
memcpy(omxhdr->pBuffer,
(m_sVenc_msg->buf.ptrbuffer),
m_sVenc_msg->buf.len);
}
} else {
omxhdr->nFilledLen = 0;
}
} else {
omxhdr = NULL;
m_sVenc_msg->statuscode = VEN_S_EFAIL;
}
omx->post_event ((unsigned long)omxhdr,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FBD);
break;
case VEN_MSG_NEED_OUTPUT_BUFFER:
break;
#ifndef _MSM8974_
case VEN_MSG_LTRUSE_FAILED:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("LTRUSE Failed!");
omx->post_event (NULL,m_sVenc_msg->statuscode,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_LTRUSE_FAILED);
break;
#endif
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Unknown msg received : %lu", m_sVenc_msg->msgcode);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The secure-session feature in the mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles heap pointers, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28920116.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
|
Medium
| 173,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long AudioTrack::GetChannels() const
{
return m_channels;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,289
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(void)
{
int fd, len, sock_opt;
int error;
struct cn_msg *message;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct nlmsghdr *incoming_msg;
struct cn_msg *incoming_cn_msg;
struct hv_kvp_msg *hv_msg;
char *p;
char *key_value;
char *key_name;
int op;
int pool;
char *if_name;
struct hv_kvp_ipaddr_value *kvp_ip_val;
daemon(1, 0);
openlog("KVP", 0, LOG_USER);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP starting; pid is:%d", getpid());
/*
* Retrieve OS release information.
*/
kvp_get_os_info();
if (kvp_file_init()) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to initialize the pools");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_CONNECTOR);
if (fd < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink socket creation failed; error:%d", fd);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
addr.nl_pad = 0;
addr.nl_pid = 0;
addr.nl_groups = CN_KVP_IDX;
error = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (error < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bind failed; error:%d", error);
close(fd);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
sock_opt = addr.nl_groups;
setsockopt(fd, 270, 1, &sock_opt, sizeof(sock_opt));
/*
* Register ourselves with the kernel.
*/
message = (struct cn_msg *)kvp_send_buffer;
message->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
message->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)message->data;
hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = KVP_OP_REGISTER1;
message->ack = 0;
message->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, message);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink_send failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
pfd.fd = fd;
while (1) {
struct sockaddr *addr_p = (struct sockaddr *) &addr;
socklen_t addr_l = sizeof(addr);
pfd.events = POLLIN;
pfd.revents = 0;
poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
len = recvfrom(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0,
addr_p, &addr_l);
if (len < 0 || addr.nl_pid) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvfrom failed; pid:%u error:%d %s",
addr.nl_pid, errno, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return -1;
}
incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer;
incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg);
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
/*
* We will use the KVP header information to pass back
* the error from this daemon. So, first copy the state
* and set the error code to success.
*/
op = hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation;
pool = hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool;
hv_msg->error = HV_S_OK;
if ((in_hand_shake) && (op == KVP_OP_REGISTER1)) {
/*
* Driver is registering with us; stash away the version
* information.
*/
in_hand_shake = 0;
p = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
lic_version = malloc(strlen(p) + 1);
if (lic_version) {
strcpy(lic_version, p);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP LIC Version: %s",
lic_version);
} else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc failed");
}
continue;
}
switch (op) {
case KVP_OP_GET_IP_INFO:
kvp_ip_val = &hv_msg->body.kvp_ip_val;
if_name =
kvp_mac_to_if_name((char *)kvp_ip_val->adapter_id);
if (if_name == NULL) {
/*
* We could not map the mac address to an
* interface name; return error.
*/
hv_msg->error = HV_E_FAIL;
break;
}
error = kvp_get_ip_info(
0, if_name, KVP_OP_GET_IP_INFO,
kvp_ip_val,
(MAX_IP_ADDR_SIZE * 2));
if (error)
hv_msg->error = error;
free(if_name);
break;
case KVP_OP_SET_IP_INFO:
kvp_ip_val = &hv_msg->body.kvp_ip_val;
if_name = kvp_get_if_name(
(char *)kvp_ip_val->adapter_id);
if (if_name == NULL) {
/*
* We could not map the guid to an
* interface name; return error.
*/
hv_msg->error = HV_GUID_NOTFOUND;
break;
}
error = kvp_set_ip_info(if_name, kvp_ip_val);
if (error)
hv_msg->error = error;
free(if_name);
break;
case KVP_OP_SET:
if (kvp_key_add_or_modify(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
case KVP_OP_GET:
if (kvp_get_value(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
case KVP_OP_DELETE:
if (kvp_key_delete(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key_size))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (op != KVP_OP_ENUMERATE)
goto kvp_done;
/*
* If the pool is KVP_POOL_AUTO, dynamically generate
* both the key and the value; if not read from the
* appropriate pool.
*/
if (pool != KVP_POOL_AUTO) {
if (kvp_pool_enumerate(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
goto kvp_done;
}
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
key_name = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key;
key_value = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value;
switch (hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index) {
case FullyQualifiedDomainName:
kvp_get_domain_name(key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "FullyQualifiedDomainName");
break;
case IntegrationServicesVersion:
strcpy(key_name, "IntegrationServicesVersion");
strcpy(key_value, lic_version);
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv4:
kvp_get_ip_info(AF_INET, NULL, KVP_OP_ENUMERATE,
key_value, HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv4");
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv6:
kvp_get_ip_info(AF_INET6, NULL, KVP_OP_ENUMERATE,
key_value, HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv6");
break;
case OSBuildNumber:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSBuildNumber");
break;
case OSName:
strcpy(key_value, os_name);
strcpy(key_name, "OSName");
break;
case OSMajorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_major);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMajorVersion");
break;
case OSMinorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_minor);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMinorVersion");
break;
case OSVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_version);
strcpy(key_name, "OSVersion");
break;
case ProcessorArchitecture:
strcpy(key_value, processor_arch);
strcpy(key_name, "ProcessorArchitecture");
break;
default:
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
}
/*
* Send the value back to the kernel. The response is
* already in the receive buffer. Update the cn_msg header to
* reflect the key value that has been added to the message
*/
kvp_done:
incoming_cn_msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
incoming_cn_msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
incoming_cn_msg->ack = 0;
incoming_cn_msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, incoming_cn_msg);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "net_link send failed; error:%d", len);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The main function in tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c in hypervkvpd, as distributed in the Linux kernel before 3.8-rc1, allows local users to cause a denial of service (daemon exit) via a crafted application that sends a Netlink message. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2012-2669.
Commit Message: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <thozza@redhat.com>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FindBarController::EndFindSession(SelectionAction action) {
find_bar_->Hide(true);
if (tab_contents_) {
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
find_manager->StopFinding(action);
if (action != kKeepSelection)
find_bar_->ClearResults(find_manager->find_result());
find_bar_->RestoreSavedFocus();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,658
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert4Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert4");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(d*, , V8d::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8d::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert4();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,080
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetElementSize() const
{
return m_element_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t f_hidg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offp)
{
struct f_hidg *hidg = file->private_data;
struct usb_request *req;
unsigned long flags;
ssize_t status = -ENOMEM;
if (!access_ok(buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
#define WRITE_COND (!hidg->write_pending)
try_again:
/* write queue */
while (!WRITE_COND) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(
hidg->write_queue, WRITE_COND))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
}
hidg->write_pending = 1;
req = hidg->req;
count = min_t(unsigned, count, hidg->report_length);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
status = copy_from_user(req->buf, buffer, count);
if (status != 0) {
ERROR(hidg->func.config->cdev,
"copy_from_user error\n");
status = -EINVAL;
goto release_write_pending;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
/* when our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, req);
/*
* TODO
* Should we fail with error here?
*/
goto try_again;
}
req->status = 0;
req->zero = 0;
req->length = count;
req->complete = f_hidg_req_complete;
req->context = hidg;
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status < 0) {
ERROR(hidg->func.config->cdev,
"usb_ep_queue error on int endpoint %zd\n", status);
goto release_write_pending_unlocked;
} else {
status = count;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
return status;
release_write_pending:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
release_write_pending_unlocked:
hidg->write_pending = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
wake_up(&hidg->write_queue);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.16.4, a double-locking error in drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c may potentially cause a deadlock with f_hid.
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
|
Low
| 170,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InitChromeDriverLogging(const CommandLine& command_line) {
bool success = InitLogging(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("chromedriver.log"),
logging::LOG_TO_BOTH_FILE_AND_SYSTEM_DEBUG_LOG,
logging::LOCK_LOG_FILE,
logging::DELETE_OLD_LOG_FILE,
logging::DISABLE_DCHECK_FOR_NON_OFFICIAL_RELEASE_BUILDS);
if (!success) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to initialize logging";
}
logging::SetLogItems(false, // enable_process_id
false, // enable_thread_id
true, // enable_timestamp
false); // enable_tickcount
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kLoggingLevel)) {
std::string log_level = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kLoggingLevel);
int level = 0;
if (base::StringToInt(log_level, &level)) {
logging::SetMinLogLevel(level);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Bad log level: " << log_level;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
|
Low
| 169,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nlmsvc_grant_reply(struct nlm_cookie *cookie, __be32 status)
{
struct nlm_block *block;
dprintk("grant_reply: looking for cookie %x, s=%d \n",
*(unsigned int *)(cookie->data), status);
if (!(block = nlmsvc_find_block(cookie)))
return;
if (block) {
if (status == nlm_lck_denied_grace_period) {
/* Try again in a couple of seconds */
nlmsvc_insert_block(block, 10 * HZ);
} else {
/* Lock is now held by client, or has been rejected.
* In both cases, the block should be removed. */
nlmsvc_unlink_block(block);
}
}
nlmsvc_release_block(block);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,136
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void markPointer(Visitor* visitor, HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
const GCInfo* gcInfo = ThreadHeap::gcInfo(header->gcInfoIndex());
if (gcInfo->hasVTable() && !vTableInitialized(header->payload())) {
visitor->markHeaderNoTracing(header);
ASSERT(isUninitializedMemory(header->payload(), header->payloadSize()));
} else {
visitor->markHeader(header, gcInfo->m_trace);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
Medium
| 172,712
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DevToolsAgentHost::DetachAllClients() {
if (!g_devtools_instances.IsCreated())
return;
DevToolsMap copy = g_devtools_instances.Get();
for (DevToolsMap::iterator it(copy.begin()); it != copy.end(); ++it) {
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host = it->second;
agent_host->ForceDetachAllClients();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,243
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void runTest()
{
webkit_support::PostDelayedTask(CCLayerTreeHostTest::onBeginTest, static_cast<void*>(this), 0);
webkit_support::PostDelayedTask(CCLayerTreeHostTest::testTimeout, static_cast<void*>(this), 5000);
webkit_support::RunMessageLoop();
m_running = false;
bool timedOut = m_timedOut; // Save whether we're timed out in case RunAllPendingMessages has the timeout.
webkit_support::RunAllPendingMessages();
ASSERT(!m_layerTreeHost.get());
m_client.clear();
if (timedOut) {
FAIL() << "Test timed out";
return;
}
afterTest();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,295
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void locationWithCallWithAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithCallWith());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefCallWith(callingDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), enteredDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AttributeSetter function in bindings/templates/attributes.cpp in the bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the document.location value.
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(factory_);
visitor->Trace(resolver_);
visitor->Trace(options_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle management in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
|
Medium
| 173,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int inotify_release(struct inode *ignored, struct file *file)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group = file->private_data;
struct user_struct *user = group->inotify_data.user;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p\n", __func__, group);
fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group(group);
/* free this group, matching get was inotify_init->fsnotify_obtain_group */
fsnotify_put_group(group);
atomic_dec(&user->inotify_devs);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the inotify subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving failed attempts to create files. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2010-4250.
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 3)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->objMethodWithArgs(intArg, strArg, objArg)));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,598
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnSetTcmallocHeapProfiling(
bool profiling, const std::string& filename_prefix) {
#if !defined(OS_WIN)
if (profiling)
HeapProfilerStart(filename_prefix.c_str());
else
HeapProfilerStop();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVG implementation in WebKit, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.94, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,666
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* We don't know yet whether there will be a tRNS chunk, but we know that
* this transformation should do nothing if there already is an alpha
* channel.
*/
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *map,
struct uid_gid_map *parent_map)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_map new_map;
unsigned idx;
struct uid_gid_extent extent;
char *kbuf = NULL, *pos, *next_line;
ssize_t ret;
/* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */
if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
/* Slurp in the user data */
kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(kbuf))
return PTR_ERR(kbuf);
/*
* The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
*
* Any map is only ever written once.
*
* An id map fits within 1 cache line on most architectures.
*
* On read nothing needs to be done unless you are on an
* architecture with a crazy cache coherency model like alpha.
*
* There is a one time data dependency between reading the
* count of the extents and the values of the extents. The
* desired behavior is to see the values of the extents that
* were written before the count of the extents.
*
* To achieve this smp_wmb() is used on guarantee the write
* order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
* architectures returning stale data.
*/
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
memset(&new_map, 0, sizeof(struct uid_gid_map));
ret = -EPERM;
/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
if (map->nr_extents != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target.
*/
if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out;
/* Parse the user data */
ret = -EINVAL;
pos = kbuf;
for (; pos; pos = next_line) {
/* Find the end of line and ensure I don't look past it */
next_line = strchr(pos, '\n');
if (next_line) {
*next_line = '\0';
next_line++;
if (*next_line == '\0')
next_line = NULL;
}
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent.first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent.lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent.count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (*pos && !isspace(*pos))
goto out;
/* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
if (*pos != '\0')
goto out;
/* Verify we have been given valid starting values */
if ((extent.first == (u32) -1) ||
(extent.lower_first == (u32) -1))
goto out;
/* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the
* extent to wrap
*/
if ((extent.first + extent.count) <= extent.first)
goto out;
if ((extent.lower_first + extent.count) <=
extent.lower_first)
goto out;
/* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */
if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, &extent))
goto out;
if ((new_map.nr_extents + 1) == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS &&
(next_line != NULL))
goto out;
ret = insert_extent(&new_map, &extent);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
}
/* Be very certaint the new map actually exists */
if (new_map.nr_extents == 0)
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
/* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */
if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
goto out;
ret = sort_idmaps(&new_map);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
/* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the
* kernel global id space.
*/
for (idx = 0; idx < new_map.nr_extents; idx++) {
struct uid_gid_extent *e;
u32 lower_first;
if (new_map.nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
e = &new_map.extent[idx];
else
e = &new_map.forward[idx];
lower_first = map_id_range_down(parent_map,
e->lower_first,
e->count);
/* Fail if we can not map the specified extent to
* the kernel global id space.
*/
if (lower_first == (u32) -1)
goto out;
e->lower_first = lower_first;
}
/* Install the map */
if (new_map.nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) {
memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent,
new_map.nr_extents * sizeof(new_map.extent[0]));
} else {
map->forward = new_map.forward;
map->reverse = new_map.reverse;
}
smp_wmb();
map->nr_extents = new_map.nr_extents;
*ppos = count;
ret = count;
out:
if (ret < 0 && new_map.nr_extents > UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) {
kfree(new_map.forward);
kfree(new_map.reverse);
map->forward = NULL;
map->reverse = NULL;
map->nr_extents = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
kfree(kbuf);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In the Linux kernel 4.15.x through 4.19.x before 4.19.2, map_write() in kernel/user_namespace.c allows privilege escalation because it mishandles nested user namespaces with more than 5 UID or GID ranges. A user who has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an affected user namespace can bypass access controls on resources outside the namespace, as demonstrated by reading /etc/shadow. This occurs because an ID transformation takes place properly for the namespaced-to-kernel direction but not for the kernel-to-namespaced direction.
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Medium
| 168,998
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
int interlaced = dctx->interlaced;
int cur_field = dctx->cur_field;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
interlaced = (state&2)>>1; /* byte following the 5-byte header prefix */
cur_field = state&1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i >= dctx->remaining && (!dctx->interlaced || dctx->cur_field)) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = cur_field;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The dnxhd decoder in FFmpeg before 3.2.6, and 3.3.x before 3.3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted mov file.
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeArrowFunction(JsVar *funcVar, JsVar *a) {
assert(!a || jsvIsName(a));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION);
funcVar = jspeAddNamedFunctionParameter(funcVar, a);
bool expressionOnly = lex->tk!='{';
jspeFunctionDefinitionInternal(funcVar, expressionOnly);
if (execInfo.thisVar) {
jsvObjectSetChild(funcVar, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_THIS_NAME, execInfo.thisVar);
}
return funcVar;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction() {
JsVar *a = 0;
JsVar *funcVar = 0;
bool allNames = true;
while (lex->tk!=')' && !JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
if (allNames && a) {
funcVar = jspeAddNamedFunctionParameter(funcVar, a);
}
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (!(jsvIsName(a) && jsvIsString(a))) allNames = false;
if (lex->tk!=')') JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(',', jsvUnLock2(a,funcVar), 0);
}
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(')', jsvUnLock2(a,funcVar), 0);
if (allNames && lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION) {
funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(funcVar, a);
jsvUnLock(a);
return funcVar;
} else {
jsvUnLock(funcVar);
return a;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeClassDefinition(bool parseNamedClass) {
JsVar *classFunction = 0;
JsVar *classPrototype = 0;
JsVar *classInternalName = 0;
bool actuallyCreateClass = JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE;
if (actuallyCreateClass)
classFunction = jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_FUNCTION);
if (parseNamedClass && lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
if (classFunction)
classInternalName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
}
if (classFunction) {
JsVar *prototypeName = jsvFindChildFromString(classFunction, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, true);
jspEnsureIsPrototype(classFunction, prototypeName); // make sure it's an object
classPrototype = jsvSkipName(prototypeName);
jsvUnLock(prototypeName);
}
if (lex->tk==LEX_R_EXTENDS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_EXTENDS);
JsVar *extendsFrom = actuallyCreateClass ? jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex))) : 0;
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID,jsvUnLock4(extendsFrom,classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
if (classPrototype) {
if (jsvIsFunction(extendsFrom)) {
jsvObjectSetChild(classPrototype, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, extendsFrom);
jsvObjectSetChildAndUnLock(classFunction, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_CODE_NAME, jsvNewFromString("if(this.__proto__.__proto__)this.__proto__.__proto__.apply(this,arguments)"));
} else
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "'extends' argument should be a function, got %t", extendsFrom);
}
jsvUnLock(extendsFrom);
}
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('{',jsvUnLock3(classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
while ((lex->tk==LEX_ID || lex->tk==LEX_R_STATIC) && !jspIsInterrupted()) {
bool isStatic = lex->tk==LEX_R_STATIC;
if (isStatic) JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_STATIC);
JsVar *funcName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID,jsvUnLock3(classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
JsVar *method = jspeFunctionDefinition(false);
if (classFunction && classPrototype) {
if (jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "get") || jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "set")) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "'get' and 'set' and not supported in Espruino");
} else if (jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "constructor")) {
jswrap_function_replaceWith(classFunction, method);
} else {
funcName = jsvMakeIntoVariableName(funcName, 0);
jsvSetValueOfName(funcName, method);
jsvAddName(isStatic ? classFunction : classPrototype, funcName);
}
}
jsvUnLock2(method,funcName);
}
jsvUnLock(classPrototype);
if (classInternalName)
jsvObjectSetChildAndUnLock(classFunction, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_NAME_NAME, classInternalName);
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('}',jsvUnLock(classFunction),0);
return classFunction;
}
#endif
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeFactor() {
if (lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
JsVar *a = jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL)
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Tagged template literals not supported");
else if (lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION && jsvIsName(a)) {
JsVar *funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(0,a);
jsvUnLock(a);
a=funcVar;
}
#endif
return a;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_INT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromLongInteger(stringToInt(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_INT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_FLOAT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromFloat(stringToFloat(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_FLOAT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk=='(') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('(');
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
JsVar *a = jspeExpression();
if (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) JSP_MATCH_WITH_RETURN(')',a);
return a;
#else
return jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TRUE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_TRUE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(true) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FALSE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FALSE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(false) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_NULL) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_NULL);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_NULL) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_UNDEFINED) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_UNDEFINED);
return 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_STR) {
JsVar *a = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE)
a = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_STR);
return a;
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL) {
return jspeTemplateLiteral();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_REGEX) {
JsVar *a = 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "RegEx are not supported in this version of Espruino\n");
#else
JsVar *regex = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
size_t regexEnd = 0, regexLen = 0;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, regex, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
regexLen++;
if (jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it)=='/')
regexEnd = regexLen;
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
JsVar *flags = 0;
if (regexEnd < regexLen)
flags = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, regexEnd, JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
JsVar *regexSource = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, 1, regexEnd-2);
a = jswrap_regexp_constructor(regexSource, flags);
jsvUnLock3(regex, flags, regexSource);
#endif
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_REGEX);
return a;
} else if (lex->tk=='{') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorObject();
} else if (lex->tk=='[') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorArray();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FUNCTION) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FUNCTION);
return jspeFunctionDefinition(true);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_CLASS) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_CLASS);
return jspeClassDefinition(true);
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_SUPER) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_SUPER);
/* This is kind of nasty, since super appears to do
three different things.
* In the constructor it references the extended class's constructor
* in a method it references the constructor's prototype.
* in a static method it references the extended class's constructor (but this is different)
*/
if (jsvIsObject(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0); // if we're in a method, get __proto__ first
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0; // still in method, get __proto__.__proto__
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
if (lex->tk=='(') return proto2; // eg. used in a constructor
JsVar *proto3 = jsvIsFunction(proto2) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto2, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto2);
return proto3;
} else if (jsvIsFunction(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0);
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
return proto2;
}
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_THIS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_THIS);
return jsvLockAgain( execInfo.thisVar ? execInfo.thisVar : execInfo.root );
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_DELETE) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorDelete();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TYPEOF) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorTypeOf();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_VOID) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_VOID);
jsvUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
return 0;
}
JSP_MATCH(LEX_EOF);
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Unexpected end of Input\n");
return 0;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspePostfixExpression(JsVar *a) {
while (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *oldValue = jsvAsNumberAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a)); // keep the old value (but convert to number)
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(oldValue, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = oldValue;
}
}
return a;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspePostfixExpression() {
JsVar *a;
if (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
a = jspePostfixExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
} else
a = jspeFactorFunctionCall();
return __jspePostfixExpression(a);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeUnaryExpression() {
if (lex->tk=='!' || lex->tk=='~' || lex->tk=='-' || lex->tk=='+') {
short tk = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(tk);
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
return jspeUnaryExpression();
}
if (tk=='!') { // logical not
return jsvNewFromBool(!jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='~') { // bitwise not
return jsvNewFromInteger(~jsvGetIntegerAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='-') { // unary minus
return jsvNegateAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression()); // names already skipped
} else if (tk=='+') { // unary plus (convert to number)
JsVar *v = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
JsVar *r = jsvAsNumber(v); // names already skipped
jsvUnLock(v);
return r;
}
assert(0);
return 0;
} else
return jspePostfixExpression();
}
unsigned int jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(int op) {
switch (op) {
case LEX_OROR: return 1; break;
case LEX_ANDAND: return 2; break;
case '|' : return 3; break;
case '^' : return 4; break;
case '&' : return 5; break;
case LEX_EQUAL:
case LEX_NEQUAL:
case LEX_TYPEEQUAL:
case LEX_NTYPEEQUAL: return 6;
case LEX_LEQUAL:
case LEX_GEQUAL:
case '<':
case '>':
case LEX_R_INSTANCEOF: return 7;
case LEX_R_IN: return (execInfo.execute&EXEC_FOR_INIT)?0:7;
case LEX_LSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED: return 8;
case '+':
case '-': return 9;
case '*':
case '/':
case '%': return 10;
default: return 0;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeBinaryExpression(JsVar *a, unsigned int lastPrecedence) {
/* This one's a bit strange. Basically all the ops have their own precedence, it's not
* like & and | share the same precedence. We don't want to recurse for each one,
* so instead we do this.
*
* We deal with an expression in recursion ONLY if it's of higher precedence
* than the current one, otherwise we stick in the while loop.
*/
unsigned int precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
while (precedence && precedence>lastPrecedence) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (op==LEX_ANDAND || op==LEX_OROR) {
bool aValue = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a));
if ((!aValue && op==LEX_ANDAND) ||
(aValue && op==LEX_OROR)) {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(__jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence));
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
jsvUnLock(a);
a = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
}
} else { // else it's a more 'normal' logical expression - just use Maths
JsVar *b = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
if (op==LEX_R_IN) {
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a); // needle
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b); // haystack
if (jsvIsArray(bv) || jsvIsObject(bv)) { // search keys, NOT values
av = jsvAsArrayIndexAndUnLock(av);
JsVar *varFound = jspGetVarNamedField( bv, av, true);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(varFound!=0);
jsvUnLock(varFound);
} else {// else it will be undefined
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Cannot use 'in' operator to search a %t", bv);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = 0;
}
jsvUnLock2(av, bv);
} else if (op==LEX_R_INSTANCEOF) {
bool inst = false;
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a);
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b);
if (!jsvIsFunction(bv)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Expecting a function on RHS in instanceof check, got %t", bv);
} else {
if (jsvIsObject(av) || jsvIsFunction(av)) {
JsVar *bproto = jspGetNamedField(bv, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, false);
JsVar *proto = jsvObjectGetChild(av, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
while (proto) {
if (proto == bproto) inst=true;
JsVar *childProto = jsvObjectGetChild(proto, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
jsvUnLock(proto);
proto = childProto;
}
if (jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object")) inst = true;
jsvUnLock(bproto);
}
if (!inst) {
const char *name = jswGetBasicObjectName(av);
if (name) {
inst = jspIsConstructor(bv, name);
}
if (!inst && (jsvIsArray(av) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(av)) &&
jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object"))
inst = true;
}
}
jsvUnLock3(av, bv, a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(inst);
} else { // --------------------------------------------- NORMAL
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, b, op);
jsvUnLock(a); a = res;
}
}
jsvUnLock(b);
}
precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
}
return a;
}
JsVar *jspeBinaryExpression() {
return __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),0);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeConditionalExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='?') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('?');
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_MATCH(':');
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
} else {
bool first = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(lhs));
jsvUnLock(lhs);
if (first) {
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
JSP_MATCH(':');
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
JSP_MATCH(':');
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
}
}
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeConditionalExpression() {
return __jspeConditionalExpression(jspeBinaryExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
/* If we're assigning to this and we don't have a parent,
* add it to the symbol table root */
if (!jsvGetRefs(lhs) && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
if (!jsvIsArrayBufferName(lhs) && !jsvIsNewChild(lhs))
jsvAddName(execInfo.root, lhs);
}
jspReplaceWith(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jspReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeAssignmentExpression() {
return __jspeAssignmentExpression(jspeConditionalExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpression() {
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
JsVar *a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (lex->tk!=',') return a;
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(',');
}
return 0;
}
/** Parse a block `{ ... }` but assume brackets are already parsed */
NO_INLINE void jspeBlockNoBrackets() {
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
while (lex->tk && lex->tk!='}') {
JsVar *a = jspeStatement();
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
if (JSP_HAS_ERROR) {
if (lex && !(execInfo.execute&EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED)) {
execInfo.execute = (JsExecFlags)(execInfo.execute | EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED);
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, JSV_STRING_0);
if (stackTrace) {
jsvAppendPrintf(stackTrace, "at ");
jspAppendStackTrace(stackTrace);
jsvUnLock(stackTrace);
}
}
}
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE)
return;
}
} else {
int brackets = 0;
while (lex->tk && (brackets || lex->tk != '}')) {
if (lex->tk == '{') brackets++;
if (lex->tk == '}') brackets--;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(lex->tk);
}
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and a potential Information Disclosure with user crafted input files via a Buffer Overflow or Out-of-bounds Read during syntax parsing of certain for loops in jsparse.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
|
Medium
| 169,208
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui16le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return b[0] | (b[1]<<8);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener before 1.3.1 has *left shift cannot be represented in type int* undefined behavior issues, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c and imagew-util.c.
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
|
Medium
| 168,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::enableNativeBuffers(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL graphic, OMX_BOOL enable) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "%s:%u%s, %d", portString(portIndex), portIndex,
graphic ? ", graphic" : "", enable);
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
graphic ? "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers"
: "OMX.google.android.index.allocateNativeHandle");
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.enable = enable;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable);
if (!graphic) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] =
enable ? kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle : kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
}
} else {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
if (!graphic) {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("media.mediadrmservice.enable", value, NULL)
&& (!strcmp("1", value) || !strcasecmp("true", value))) {
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "system property override: using native-handles");
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
err = OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of a privileged process. This issue is rated as High because it could be used to gain local access to elevated capabilities, which are not normally accessible to a third-party application. Android ID: A-31385713.
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
|
Medium
| 173,385
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void scheduleBeginFrameAndCommit()
{
CCMainThread::postTask(m_proxy->createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int fpm_unix_resolve_socket_premissions(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_config_s *c = wp->config;
/* uninitialized */
wp->socket_uid = -1;
wp->socket_gid = -1;
wp->socket_mode = 0666;
if (!c) {
return 0;
}
if (c->listen_owner && *c->listen_owner) {
struct passwd *pwd;
pwd = getpwnam(c->listen_owner);
if (!pwd) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "[pool %s] cannot get uid for user '%s'", wp->config->name, c->listen_owner);
return -1;
}
wp->socket_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
wp->socket_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
}
if (c->listen_group && *c->listen_group) {
struct group *grp;
grp = getgrnam(c->listen_group);
if (!grp) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "[pool %s] cannot get gid for group '%s'", wp->config->name, c->listen_group);
return -1;
}
wp->socket_gid = grp->gr_gid;
}
if (c->listen_mode && *c->listen_mode) {
wp->socket_mode = strtoul(c->listen_mode, 0, 8);
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_unix.c in the FastCGI Process Manager (FPM) in PHP before 5.4.28 and 5.5.x before 5.5.12 uses 0666 permissions for the UNIX socket, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted FastCGI client.
Commit Message: Fix bug #67060: use default mode of 660
|
Low
| 166,457
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SchedulerObject::setAttribute(std::string key,
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "SetAttribute: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (isSubmissionChange(name.c_str())) {
text = "Changes to submission name not allowed";
return false;
}
if (isKeyword(name.c_str())) {
text = "Attribute name is reserved: " + name;
return false;
}
if (!isValidAttributeName(name,text)) {
return false;
}
if (::SetAttribute(id.cluster,
id.proc,
name.c_str(),
value.c_str())) {
text = "Failed to set attribute " + name + " to " + value;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,835
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TaskService::RunTask(InstanceId instance_id,
RunnerId runner_id,
base::OnceClosure task) {
base::subtle::AutoReadLock task_lock(task_lock_);
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (instance_id != bound_instance_id_)
return;
}
std::move(task).Run();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The LoadIC::UpdateCaches function in ic/ic.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, does not ensure receiver compatibility before performing a cast of an unspecified variable, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
|
Medium
| 172,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: exsltDateCreateDate (exsltDateType type)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = (exsltDateValPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltDateCreateDate: out of memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset (ret, 0, sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (type != EXSLT_UNKNOWN)
ret->type = type;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,291
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cf2_hintmap_build( CF2_HintMap hintmap,
CF2_ArrStack hStemHintArray,
CF2_ArrStack vStemHintArray,
CF2_HintMask hintMask,
CF2_Fixed hintOrigin,
FT_Bool initialMap )
{
FT_Byte* maskPtr;
CF2_Font font = hintmap->font;
CF2_HintMaskRec tempHintMask;
size_t bitCount, i;
FT_Byte maskByte;
/* check whether initial map is constructed */
if ( !initialMap && !cf2_hintmap_isValid( hintmap->initialHintMap ) )
{
/* make recursive call with initialHintMap and temporary mask; */
/* temporary mask will get all bits set, below */
cf2_hintmask_init( &tempHintMask, hintMask->error );
cf2_hintmap_build( hintmap->initialHintMap,
hStemHintArray,
vStemHintArray,
&tempHintMask,
hintOrigin,
TRUE );
}
if ( !cf2_hintmask_isValid( hintMask ) )
{
/* without a hint mask, assume all hints are active */
cf2_hintmask_setAll( hintMask,
cf2_arrstack_size( hStemHintArray ) +
cf2_arrstack_size( vStemHintArray ) );
if ( !cf2_hintmask_isValid( hintMask ) )
return; /* too many stem hints */
}
/* begin by clearing the map */
hintmap->count = 0;
hintmap->lastIndex = 0;
/* make a copy of the hint mask so we can modify it */
tempHintMask = *hintMask;
maskPtr = cf2_hintmask_getMaskPtr( &tempHintMask );
/* use the hStem hints only, which are first in the mask */
/* TODO: compare this to cffhintmaskGetBitCount */
bitCount = cf2_arrstack_size( hStemHintArray );
/* synthetic embox hints get highest priority */
if ( font->blues.doEmBoxHints )
{
cf2_hint_initZero( &dummy ); /* invalid hint map element */
/* ghost bottom */
cf2_hintmap_insertHint( hintmap,
&font->blues.emBoxBottomEdge,
&dummy );
/* ghost top */
cf2_hintmap_insertHint( hintmap,
&dummy,
&font->blues.emBoxTopEdge );
}
/* insert hints captured by a blue zone or already locked (higher */
/* priority) */
for ( i = 0, maskByte = 0x80; i < bitCount; i++ )
{
if ( maskByte & *maskPtr )
{
/* expand StemHint into two `CF2_Hint' elements */
CF2_HintRec bottomHintEdge, topHintEdge;
cf2_hint_init( &bottomHintEdge,
hStemHintArray,
i,
font,
hintOrigin,
hintmap->scale,
TRUE /* bottom */ );
cf2_hint_init( &topHintEdge,
hStemHintArray,
i,
font,
hintOrigin,
hintmap->scale,
FALSE /* top */ );
if ( cf2_hint_isLocked( &bottomHintEdge ) ||
cf2_hint_isLocked( &topHintEdge ) ||
cf2_blues_capture( &font->blues,
&bottomHintEdge,
&topHintEdge ) )
{
/* insert captured hint into map */
cf2_hintmap_insertHint( hintmap, &bottomHintEdge, &topHintEdge );
*maskPtr &= ~maskByte; /* turn off the bit for this hint */
}
}
if ( ( i & 7 ) == 7 )
{
/* move to next mask byte */
maskPtr++;
maskByte = 0x80;
}
else
maskByte >>= 1;
}
/* initial hint map includes only captured hints plus maybe one at 0 */
/*
* TODO: There is a problem here because we are trying to build a
* single hint map containing all captured hints. It is
* possible for there to be conflicts between captured hints,
* either because of darkening or because the hints are in
* separate hint zones (we are ignoring hint zones for the
* initial map). An example of the latter is MinionPro-Regular
* v2.030 glyph 883 (Greek Capital Alpha with Psili) at 15ppem.
* A stem hint for the psili conflicts with the top edge hint
* for the base character. The stem hint gets priority because
* of its sort order. In glyph 884 (Greek Capital Alpha with
* Psili and Oxia), the top of the base character gets a stem
* hint, and the psili does not. This creates different initial
* maps for the two glyphs resulting in different renderings of
* the base character. Will probably defer this either as not
* worth the cost or as a font bug. I don't think there is any
* good reason for an accent to be captured by an alignment
* zone. -darnold 2/12/10
*/
if ( initialMap )
{
/* Apply a heuristic that inserts a point for (0,0), unless it's */
/* already covered by a mapping. This locks the baseline for glyphs */
/* that have no baseline hints. */
if ( hintmap->count == 0 ||
hintmap->edge[0].csCoord > 0 ||
hintmap->edge[hintmap->count - 1].csCoord < 0 )
{
/* all edges are above 0 or all edges are below 0; */
/* construct a locked edge hint at 0 */
CF2_HintRec edge, invalid;
cf2_hint_initZero( &edge );
edge.flags = CF2_GhostBottom |
CF2_Locked |
CF2_Synthetic;
edge.scale = hintmap->scale;
cf2_hint_initZero( &invalid );
cf2_hintmap_insertHint( hintmap, &edge, &invalid );
}
}
else
{
/* insert remaining hints */
maskPtr = cf2_hintmask_getMaskPtr( &tempHintMask );
for ( i = 0, maskByte = 0x80; i < bitCount; i++ )
{
if ( maskByte & *maskPtr )
{
CF2_HintRec bottomHintEdge, topHintEdge;
cf2_hint_init( &bottomHintEdge,
hStemHintArray,
i,
font,
hintOrigin,
hintmap->scale,
TRUE /* bottom */ );
cf2_hint_init( &topHintEdge,
hStemHintArray,
i,
font,
hintOrigin,
hintmap->scale,
FALSE /* top */ );
cf2_hintmap_insertHint( hintmap, &bottomHintEdge, &topHintEdge );
}
if ( ( i & 7 ) == 7 )
{
/* move to next mask byte */
maskPtr++;
maskByte = 0x80;
}
else
maskByte >>= 1;
}
}
/*
* Note: The following line is a convenient place to break when
* debugging hinting. Examine `hintmap->edge' for the list of
* enabled hints, then step over the call to see the effect of
* adjustment. We stop here first on the recursive call that
* creates the initial map, and then on each counter group and
* hint zone.
*/
/* adjust positions of hint edges that are not locked to blue zones */
cf2_hintmap_adjustHints( hintmap );
/* save the position of all hints that were used in this hint map; */
/* if we use them again, we'll locate them in the same position */
if ( !initialMap )
{
for ( i = 0; i < hintmap->count; i++ )
{
if ( !cf2_hint_isSynthetic( &hintmap->edge[i] ) )
{
/* Note: include both valid and invalid edges */
/* Note: top and bottom edges are copied back separately */
CF2_StemHint stemhint = (CF2_StemHint)
cf2_arrstack_getPointer( hStemHintArray,
hintmap->edge[i].index );
if ( cf2_hint_isTop( &hintmap->edge[i] ) )
stemhint->maxDS = hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord;
else
stemhint->minDS = hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord;
stemhint->used = TRUE;
}
}
}
/* hint map is ready to use */
hintmap->isValid = TRUE;
/* remember this mask has been used */
cf2_hintmask_setNew( hintMask, FALSE );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: cff/cf2intrp.c in the CFF CharString interpreter in FreeType before 2.5.4 proceeds with additional hints after the hint mask has been computed, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) via a crafted OpenType font. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-2240.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,863
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Ins_IUP( INS_ARG )
{
IUP_WorkerRec V;
FT_Byte mask;
FT_UInt first_point; /* first point of contour */
FT_UInt end_point; /* end point (last+1) of contour */
FT_UInt first_touched; /* first touched point in contour */
FT_UInt cur_touched; /* current touched point in contour */
FT_UInt point; /* current point */
FT_Short contour; /* current contour */
FT_UNUSED_ARG;
/* ignore empty outlines */
if ( CUR.pts.n_contours == 0 )
return;
if ( CUR.opcode & 1 )
{
mask = FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_X;
V.orgs = CUR.pts.org;
V.curs = CUR.pts.cur;
V.orus = CUR.pts.orus;
}
else
{
mask = FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_Y;
V.orgs = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)CUR.pts.org + 1 );
V.curs = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)CUR.pts.cur + 1 );
V.orus = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)CUR.pts.orus + 1 );
}
V.max_points = CUR.pts.n_points;
contour = 0;
point = 0;
do
{
end_point = CUR.pts.contours[contour] - CUR.pts.first_point;
first_point = point;
if ( CUR.pts.n_points <= end_point )
end_point = CUR.pts.n_points;
while ( point <= end_point && ( CUR.pts.tags[point] & mask ) == 0 )
point++;
if ( point <= end_point )
{
first_touched = point;
cur_touched = point;
point++;
while ( point <= end_point )
{
if ( ( CUR.pts.tags[point] & mask ) != 0 )
{
if ( point > 0 )
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
cur_touched + 1,
point - 1,
cur_touched,
point );
cur_touched = point;
}
point++;
}
if ( cur_touched == first_touched )
_iup_worker_shift( &V, first_point, end_point, cur_touched );
else
{
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
(FT_UShort)( cur_touched + 1 ),
end_point,
cur_touched,
first_touched );
if ( first_touched > 0 )
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
first_point,
first_touched - 1,
cur_touched,
first_touched );
}
}
contour++;
} while ( contour < CUR.pts.n_contours );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the Ins_IUP function in truetype/ttinterp.c in FreeType before 2.4.0, when TrueType bytecode support is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message:
|
High
| 165,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
unsigned int maxw, maxh, max;
int offset, upb;
unsigned int i, j;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i=0U; i < (maxh & ~(unsigned int)1U); i += 2U)
{
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
for(j=0; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < maxh)
{
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
#if defined(USE_JPWL) || defined(USE_MJ2)
img->comps[1].w = maxw; img->comps[1].h = maxh;
img->comps[2].w = maxw; img->comps[2].h = maxh;
#else
img->comps[1].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[1].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
img->comps[2].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[2].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
#endif
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
return;
fails:
if(r) free(r);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sycc422_t_rgb function in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted jpeg2000 file.
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
|
Medium
| 168,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int snd_card_new(struct device *parent, int idx, const char *xid,
struct module *module, int extra_size,
struct snd_card **card_ret)
{
struct snd_card *card;
int err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card_ret))
return -EINVAL;
*card_ret = NULL;
if (extra_size < 0)
extra_size = 0;
card = kzalloc(sizeof(*card) + extra_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!card)
return -ENOMEM;
if (extra_size > 0)
card->private_data = (char *)card + sizeof(struct snd_card);
if (xid)
strlcpy(card->id, xid, sizeof(card->id));
err = 0;
mutex_lock(&snd_card_mutex);
if (idx < 0) /* first check the matching module-name slot */
idx = get_slot_from_bitmask(idx, module_slot_match, module);
if (idx < 0) /* if not matched, assign an empty slot */
idx = get_slot_from_bitmask(idx, check_empty_slot, module);
if (idx < 0)
err = -ENODEV;
else if (idx < snd_ecards_limit) {
if (test_bit(idx, snd_cards_lock))
err = -EBUSY; /* invalid */
} else if (idx >= SNDRV_CARDS)
err = -ENODEV;
if (err < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
dev_err(parent, "cannot find the slot for index %d (range 0-%i), error: %d\n",
idx, snd_ecards_limit - 1, err);
kfree(card);
return err;
}
set_bit(idx, snd_cards_lock); /* lock it */
if (idx >= snd_ecards_limit)
snd_ecards_limit = idx + 1; /* increase the limit */
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
card->dev = parent;
card->number = idx;
card->module = module;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&card->devices);
init_rwsem(&card->controls_rwsem);
rwlock_init(&card->ctl_files_rwlock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&card->controls);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&card->ctl_files);
spin_lock_init(&card->files_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&card->files_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
mutex_init(&card->power_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&card->power_sleep);
#endif
device_initialize(&card->card_dev);
card->card_dev.parent = parent;
card->card_dev.class = sound_class;
card->card_dev.release = release_card_device;
card->card_dev.groups = card_dev_attr_groups;
err = kobject_set_name(&card->card_dev.kobj, "card%d", idx);
if (err < 0)
goto __error;
/* the control interface cannot be accessed from the user space until */
/* snd_cards_bitmask and snd_cards are set with snd_card_register */
err = snd_ctl_create(card);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(parent, "unable to register control minors\n");
goto __error;
}
err = snd_info_card_create(card);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(parent, "unable to create card info\n");
goto __error_ctl;
}
*card_ret = card;
return 0;
__error_ctl:
snd_device_free_all(card);
__error:
put_device(&card->card_dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the tlv handler functionality in the snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv function in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Medium
| 166,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The do_write_pids function in lxcfs.c in LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly check permissions, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a pid to the tasks file.
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,701
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
V8StringResource<> cppValue = v8Value;
if (!cppValue.prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the opj_t2_read_packet_data function in fxcodec/fx_libopenjpeg/libopenjpeg20/t2.c in OpenJPEG in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long segment in a JPEG image.
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
|
Low
| 171,598
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record function in d1_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate records for the next epoch, leading to failure of replay detection.
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 166,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::DidFinishPrinting(PrintingResult result) {
bool store_print_pages_params = true;
if (result == FAIL_PRINT) {
DisplayPrintJobError();
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_ && print_pages_params_.get()) {
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintingFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
}
} else if (result == FAIL_PREVIEW) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
store_print_pages_params = false;
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_)
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
else
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewCancelled(routing_id(), cookie));
print_preview_context_.Failed(notify_browser_of_print_failure_);
}
if (print_web_view_) {
print_web_view_->close();
print_web_view_ = NULL;
}
if (store_print_pages_params) {
old_print_pages_params_.reset(print_pages_params_.release());
} else {
print_pages_params_.reset();
old_print_pages_params_.reset();
}
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,258
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int hwahc_security_create(struct hwahc *hwahc)
{
int result;
struct wusbhc *wusbhc = &hwahc->wusbhc;
struct usb_device *usb_dev = hwahc->wa.usb_dev;
struct device *dev = &usb_dev->dev;
struct usb_security_descriptor *secd;
struct usb_encryption_descriptor *etd;
void *itr, *top;
size_t itr_size, needed, bytes;
u8 index;
char buf[64];
/* Find the host's security descriptors in the config descr bundle */
index = (usb_dev->actconfig - usb_dev->config) /
sizeof(usb_dev->config[0]);
itr = usb_dev->rawdescriptors[index];
itr_size = le16_to_cpu(usb_dev->actconfig->desc.wTotalLength);
top = itr + itr_size;
result = __usb_get_extra_descriptor(usb_dev->rawdescriptors[index],
le16_to_cpu(usb_dev->actconfig->desc.wTotalLength),
USB_DT_SECURITY, (void **) &secd);
if (result == -1) {
dev_warn(dev, "BUG? WUSB host has no security descriptors\n");
return 0;
}
needed = sizeof(*secd);
if (top - (void *)secd < needed) {
dev_err(dev, "BUG? Not enough data to process security "
"descriptor header (%zu bytes left vs %zu needed)\n",
top - (void *) secd, needed);
return 0;
}
needed = le16_to_cpu(secd->wTotalLength);
if (top - (void *)secd < needed) {
dev_err(dev, "BUG? Not enough data to process security "
"descriptors (%zu bytes left vs %zu needed)\n",
top - (void *) secd, needed);
return 0;
}
/* Walk over the sec descriptors and store CCM1's on wusbhc */
itr = (void *) secd + sizeof(*secd);
top = (void *) secd + le16_to_cpu(secd->wTotalLength);
index = 0;
bytes = 0;
while (itr < top) {
etd = itr;
if (top - itr < sizeof(*etd)) {
dev_err(dev, "BUG: bad host security descriptor; "
"not enough data (%zu vs %zu left)\n",
top - itr, sizeof(*etd));
break;
}
if (etd->bLength < sizeof(*etd)) {
dev_err(dev, "BUG: bad host encryption descriptor; "
"descriptor is too short "
"(%zu vs %zu needed)\n",
(size_t)etd->bLength, sizeof(*etd));
break;
}
itr += etd->bLength;
bytes += snprintf(buf + bytes, sizeof(buf) - bytes,
"%s (0x%02x) ",
wusb_et_name(etd->bEncryptionType),
etd->bEncryptionValue);
wusbhc->ccm1_etd = etd;
}
dev_info(dev, "supported encryption types: %s\n", buf);
if (wusbhc->ccm1_etd == NULL) {
dev_err(dev, "E: host doesn't support CCM-1 crypto\n");
return 0;
}
/* Pretty print what we support */
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.9. The USB subsystem mishandles size checks during the reading of an extra descriptor, related to __usb_get_extra_descriptor in drivers/usb/core/usb.c.
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: device_has_capability (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceCapabilities caps)
{
{
static guint32 devcount = 0;
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (priv->path == NULL);
priv->path = g_strdup_printf ("/org/freedesktop/NetworkManager/Devices/%d", devcount++);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "exported as %s", priv->path);
nm_dbus_manager_register_object (nm_dbus_manager_get (), priv->path, self);
}
const char *
nm_device_get_path (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->path;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_udi (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->udi;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_iface (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), 0);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->iface;
}
int
nm_device_get_ifindex (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, 0);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->ifindex;
}
gboolean
nm_device_is_software (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
return priv->is_software;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_ip_iface (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
/* If it's not set, default to iface */
return priv->ip_iface ? priv->ip_iface : priv->iface;
}
int
nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, 0);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
/* If it's not set, default to iface */
return priv->ip_iface ? priv->ip_ifindex : priv->ifindex;
}
void
nm_device_set_ip_iface (NMDevice *self, const char *iface)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
char *old_ip_iface;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (!g_strcmp0 (iface, priv->ip_iface))
return;
old_ip_iface = priv->ip_iface;
priv->ip_ifindex = 0;
priv->ip_iface = g_strdup (iface);
if (priv->ip_iface) {
priv->ip_ifindex = nm_platform_link_get_ifindex (priv->ip_iface);
if (priv->ip_ifindex > 0) {
if (nm_platform_check_support_user_ipv6ll ())
nm_platform_link_set_user_ipv6ll_enabled (priv->ip_ifindex, TRUE);
if (!nm_platform_link_is_up (priv->ip_ifindex))
nm_platform_link_set_up (priv->ip_ifindex);
} else {
/* Device IP interface must always be a kernel network interface */
_LOGW (LOGD_HW, "failed to look up interface index");
}
}
/* We don't care about any saved values from the old iface */
g_hash_table_remove_all (priv->ip6_saved_properties);
/* Emit change notification */
if (g_strcmp0 (old_ip_iface, priv->ip_iface))
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IP_IFACE);
g_free (old_ip_iface);
}
static gboolean
get_ip_iface_identifier (NMDevice *self, NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId *out_iid)
{
NMLinkType link_type;
const guint8 *hwaddr = NULL;
size_t hwaddr_len = 0;
int ifindex;
gboolean success;
/* If we get here, we *must* have a kernel netdev, which implies an ifindex */
ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
g_assert (ifindex);
link_type = nm_platform_link_get_type (ifindex);
g_return_val_if_fail (link_type > NM_LINK_TYPE_UNKNOWN, 0);
hwaddr = nm_platform_link_get_address (ifindex, &hwaddr_len);
if (!hwaddr_len)
return FALSE;
success = nm_utils_get_ipv6_interface_identifier (link_type,
hwaddr,
hwaddr_len,
out_iid);
if (!success) {
_LOGW (LOGD_HW, "failed to generate interface identifier "
"for link type %u hwaddr_len %zu", link_type, hwaddr_len);
}
return success;
}
static gboolean
nm_device_get_ip_iface_identifier (NMDevice *self, NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId *iid)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->get_ip_iface_identifier (self, iid);
}
const char *
nm_device_get_driver (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->driver;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_driver_version (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->driver_version;
}
NMDeviceType
nm_device_get_device_type (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->type;
}
/**
* nm_device_get_priority():
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: the device's routing priority. Lower numbers means a "better"
* device, eg higher priority.
*/
int
nm_device_get_priority (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), 1000);
/* Device 'priority' is used for the default route-metric and is based on
* the device type. The settings ipv4.route-metric and ipv6.route-metric
* can overwrite this default.
*
* Currently for both IPv4 and IPv6 we use the same default values.
*
* The route-metric is used for the metric of the routes of device.
* This also applies to the default route. Therefore it affects also
* which device is the "best".
*
* For comparison, note that iproute2 by default adds IPv4 routes with
* metric 0, and IPv6 routes with metric 1024. The latter is the IPv6
* "user default" in the kernel (NM_PLATFORM_ROUTE_METRIC_DEFAULT_IP6).
* In kernel, the full uint32_t range is available for route
* metrics (except for IPv6, where 0 means 1024).
*/
switch (nm_device_get_device_type (self)) {
/* 50 is reserved for VPN (NM_VPN_ROUTE_METRIC_DEFAULT) */
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_ETHERNET:
return 100;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_INFINIBAND:
return 150;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_ADSL:
return 200;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_WIMAX:
return 250;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_BOND:
return 300;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_TEAM:
return 350;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_VLAN:
return 400;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_BRIDGE:
return 425;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_MODEM:
return 450;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_BT:
return 550;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_WIFI:
return 600;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_OLPC_MESH:
return 650;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_GENERIC:
return 950;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
return 10000;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNUSED1:
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNUSED2:
/* omit default: to get compiler warning about missing switch cases */
break;
}
return 11000;
}
guint32
nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (NMDevice *self)
{
NMConnection *connection;
gint64 route_metric = -1;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), G_MAXUINT32);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (connection)
route_metric = nm_setting_ip_config_get_route_metric (nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection));
return route_metric >= 0 ? route_metric : nm_device_get_priority (self);
}
guint32
nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (NMDevice *self)
{
NMConnection *connection;
gint64 route_metric = -1;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), G_MAXUINT32);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (connection)
route_metric = nm_setting_ip_config_get_route_metric (nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection));
return route_metric >= 0 ? route_metric : nm_device_get_priority (self);
}
const NMPlatformIP4Route *
nm_device_get_ip4_default_route (NMDevice *self, gboolean *out_is_assumed)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), NULL);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (out_is_assumed)
*out_is_assumed = priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed;
return priv->default_route.v4_has ? &priv->default_route.v4 : NULL;
}
const NMPlatformIP6Route *
nm_device_get_ip6_default_route (NMDevice *self, gboolean *out_is_assumed)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), NULL);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (out_is_assumed)
*out_is_assumed = priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed;
return priv->default_route.v6_has ? &priv->default_route.v6 : NULL;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_type_desc (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->type_desc;
}
gboolean
nm_device_has_carrier (NMDevice *self)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->carrier;
}
NMActRequest *
nm_device_get_act_request (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->act_request;
}
NMConnection *
nm_device_get_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
return priv->act_request ? nm_act_request_get_connection (priv->act_request) : NULL;
}
RfKillType
nm_device_get_rfkill_type (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->rfkill_type;
}
static const char *
nm_device_get_physical_port_id (NMDevice *self)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->physical_port_id;
}
/***********************************************************/
static gboolean
nm_device_uses_generated_assumed_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
if ( priv->act_request
&& nm_active_connection_get_assumed (NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request))) {
connection = nm_act_request_get_connection (priv->act_request);
if ( connection
&& nm_settings_connection_get_nm_generated_assumed (NM_SETTINGS_CONNECTION (connection)))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
gboolean
nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if ( priv->act_request
&& nm_active_connection_get_assumed (NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request)))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
static SlaveInfo *
find_slave_info (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
SlaveInfo *info;
GSList *iter;
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
info = iter->data;
if (info->slave == slave)
return info;
}
return NULL;
}
static void
free_slave_info (SlaveInfo *info)
{
g_signal_handler_disconnect (info->slave, info->watch_id);
g_clear_object (&info->slave);
memset (info, 0, sizeof (*info));
g_free (info);
}
/**
* nm_device_enslave_slave:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: the slave device to enslave
* @connection: (allow-none): the slave device's connection
*
* If @self is capable of enslaving other devices (ie it's a bridge, bond, team,
* etc) then this function enslaves @slave.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on success, %FALSE on failure or if this device cannot enslave
* other devices.
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_enslave_slave (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave, NMConnection *connection)
{
SlaveInfo *info;
gboolean success = FALSE;
gboolean configure;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (slave != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->enslave_slave != NULL, FALSE);
info = find_slave_info (self, slave);
if (!info)
return FALSE;
if (info->enslaved)
success = TRUE;
else {
configure = (info->configure && connection != NULL);
if (configure)
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_device_get_state (slave) >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED, FALSE);
success = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->enslave_slave (self, slave, connection, configure);
info->enslaved = success;
}
nm_device_slave_notify_enslave (info->slave, success);
/* Ensure the device's hardware address is up-to-date; it often changes
* when slaves change.
*/
nm_device_update_hw_address (self);
/* Restart IP configuration if we're waiting for slaves. Do this
* after updating the hardware address as IP config may need the
* new address.
*/
if (success) {
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->ip4_state == IP_WAIT)
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip4_start (self);
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->ip6_state == IP_WAIT)
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip6_start (self);
}
return success;
}
/**
* nm_device_release_one_slave:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: the slave device to release
* @configure: whether @self needs to actually release @slave
* @reason: the state change reason for the @slave
*
* If @self is capable of enslaving other devices (ie it's a bridge, bond, team,
* etc) then this function releases the previously enslaved @slave and/or
* updates the state of @self and @slave to reflect its release.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on success, %FALSE on failure, if this device cannot enslave
* other devices, or if @slave was never enslaved.
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_release_one_slave (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave, gboolean configure, NMDeviceStateReason reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
SlaveInfo *info;
gboolean success = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (slave != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->release_slave != NULL, FALSE);
info = find_slave_info (self, slave);
if (!info)
return FALSE;
priv->slaves = g_slist_remove (priv->slaves, info);
if (info->enslaved) {
success = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->release_slave (self, slave, configure);
/* The release_slave() implementation logs success/failure (in the
* correct device-specific log domain), so we don't have to do anything.
*/
}
if (!configure) {
g_warn_if_fail (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE || reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_REMOVED);
reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
} else if (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE) {
g_warn_if_reached ();
reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_UNKNOWN;
}
nm_device_slave_notify_release (info->slave, reason);
free_slave_info (info);
/* Ensure the device's hardware address is up-to-date; it often changes
* when slaves change.
*/
nm_device_update_hw_address (self);
return success;
}
static gboolean
is_software_external (NMDevice *self)
{
return nm_device_is_software (self)
&& !nm_device_get_is_nm_owned (self);
}
/**
* nm_device_finish_init:
* @self: the master device
*
* Whatever needs to be done post-initialization, when the device has a DBus
* object name.
*/
void
nm_device_finish_init (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_assert (priv->initialized == FALSE);
/* Do not manage externally created software devices until they are IFF_UP */
if ( is_software_external (self)
&& !nm_platform_link_is_up (priv->ifindex)
&& priv->ifindex > 0)
nm_device_set_initial_unmanaged_flag (self, NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN, TRUE);
if (priv->master)
nm_device_enslave_slave (priv->master, self, NULL);
priv->initialized = TRUE;
}
static void
carrier_changed (NMDevice *self, gboolean carrier)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (!nm_device_get_managed (self))
return;
nm_device_recheck_available_connections (self);
/* ignore-carrier devices ignore all carrier-down events */
if (priv->ignore_carrier && !carrier)
return;
if (priv->is_master) {
/* Bridge/bond/team carrier does not affect its own activation,
* but when carrier comes on, if there are slaves waiting,
* it will restart them.
*/
if (!carrier)
return;
if (nm_device_activate_ip4_state_in_wait (self))
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip4_start (self);
if (nm_device_activate_ip6_state_in_wait (self))
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip6_start (self);
return;
} else if (nm_device_get_enslaved (self) && !carrier) {
/* Slaves don't deactivate when they lose carrier; for
* bonds/teams in particular that would be actively
* counterproductive.
*/
return;
}
if (carrier) {
g_warn_if_fail (priv->state >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE);
if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE) {
nm_device_queue_state (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CARRIER);
} else if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* If the device is already in DISCONNECTED state without a carrier
* (probably because it is tagged for carrier ignore) ensure that
* when the carrier appears, auto connections are rechecked for
* the device.
*/
nm_device_emit_recheck_auto_activate (self);
}
} else {
g_return_if_fail (priv->state >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE);
if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE) {
if (nm_device_queued_state_peek (self) >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED)
nm_device_queued_state_clear (self);
} else {
nm_device_queue_state (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CARRIER);
}
}
}
#define LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY 4
static gboolean
link_disconnect_action_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (calling deferred action) (id=%u)", priv->carrier_defer_id);
priv->carrier_defer_id = 0;
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (calling deferred action)");
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->carrier_changed (self, FALSE);
return FALSE;
}
static void
link_disconnect_action_cancel (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->carrier_defer_id) {
g_source_remove (priv->carrier_defer_id);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (canceling deferred action) (id=%u)", priv->carrier_defer_id);
priv->carrier_defer_id = 0;
}
}
void
nm_device_set_carrier (NMDevice *self, gboolean carrier)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMDeviceClass *klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
NMDeviceState state = nm_device_get_state (self);
if (priv->carrier == carrier)
return;
priv->carrier = carrier;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_CARRIER);
if (priv->carrier) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link connected");
link_disconnect_action_cancel (self);
klass->carrier_changed (self, TRUE);
if (priv->carrier_wait_id) {
g_source_remove (priv->carrier_wait_id);
priv->carrier_wait_id = 0;
nm_device_remove_pending_action (self, "carrier wait", TRUE);
_carrier_wait_check_queued_act_request (self);
}
} else if (state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected");
klass->carrier_changed (self, FALSE);
} else {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (deferring action for %d seconds)", LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY);
priv->carrier_defer_id = g_timeout_add_seconds (LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY,
link_disconnect_action_cb, self);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (deferring action for %d seconds) (id=%u)",
LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY, priv->carrier_defer_id);
}
}
static void
update_for_ip_ifname_change (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_hash_table_remove_all (priv->ip6_saved_properties);
if (priv->dhcp4_client) {
if (!nm_device_dhcp4_renew (self, FALSE)) {
nm_device_state_changed (self,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_FAILED);
return;
}
}
if (priv->dhcp6_client) {
if (!nm_device_dhcp6_renew (self, FALSE)) {
nm_device_state_changed (self,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_FAILED);
return;
}
}
if (priv->rdisc) {
/* FIXME: todo */
}
if (priv->dnsmasq_manager) {
/* FIXME: todo */
}
}
static void
device_set_master (NMDevice *self, int ifindex)
{
NMDevice *master;
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
master = nm_manager_get_device_by_ifindex (nm_manager_get (), ifindex);
if (master && NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (master)->enslave_slave) {
g_clear_object (&priv->master);
priv->master = g_object_ref (master);
nm_device_master_add_slave (master, self, FALSE);
} else if (master) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "enslaved to non-master-type device %s; ignoring",
nm_device_get_iface (master));
} else {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE, "enslaved to unknown device %d %s",
ifindex,
nm_platform_link_get_name (ifindex));
}
}
static void
device_link_changed (NMDevice *self, NMPlatformLink *info)
{
NMDeviceClass *klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId token_iid;
gboolean ip_ifname_changed = FALSE;
if (info->udi && g_strcmp0 (info->udi, priv->udi)) {
/* Update UDI to what udev gives us */
g_free (priv->udi);
priv->udi = g_strdup (info->udi);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_UDI);
}
/* Update MTU if it has changed. */
if (priv->mtu != info->mtu) {
priv->mtu = info->mtu;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_MTU);
}
if (info->name[0] && strcmp (priv->iface, info->name) != 0) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "interface index %d renamed iface from '%s' to '%s'",
priv->ifindex, priv->iface, info->name);
g_free (priv->iface);
priv->iface = g_strdup (info->name);
/* If the device has no explicit ip_iface, then changing iface changes ip_iface too. */
ip_ifname_changed = !priv->ip_iface;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IFACE);
if (ip_ifname_changed)
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IP_IFACE);
/* Re-match available connections against the new interface name */
nm_device_recheck_available_connections (self);
/* Let any connections that use the new interface name have a chance
* to auto-activate on the device.
*/
nm_device_emit_recheck_auto_activate (self);
}
/* Update slave status for external changes */
if (priv->enslaved && info->master != nm_device_get_ifindex (priv->master))
nm_device_release_one_slave (priv->master, self, FALSE, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
if (info->master && !priv->enslaved) {
device_set_master (self, info->master);
if (priv->master)
nm_device_enslave_slave (priv->master, self, NULL);
}
if (priv->rdisc && nm_platform_link_get_ipv6_token (priv->ifindex, &token_iid)) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "IPv6 tokenized identifier present on device %s", priv->iface);
if (nm_rdisc_set_iid (priv->rdisc, token_iid))
nm_rdisc_start (priv->rdisc);
}
if (klass->link_changed)
klass->link_changed (self, info);
/* Update DHCP, etc, if needed */
if (ip_ifname_changed)
update_for_ip_ifname_change (self);
if (priv->up != info->up) {
priv->up = info->up;
/* Manage externally-created software interfaces only when they are IFF_UP */
g_assert (priv->ifindex > 0);
if (is_software_external (self)) {
gboolean external_down = nm_device_get_unmanaged_flag (self, NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN);
if (external_down && info->up) {
if (nm_device_get_state (self) < NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* Ensure the assume check is queued before any queued state changes
* from the transition to UNAVAILABLE.
*/
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (self);
/* Resetting the EXTERNAL_DOWN flag may change the device's state
* to UNAVAILABLE. To ensure that the state change doesn't touch
* the device before assumption occurs, pass
* NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CONNECTION_ASSUMED as the reason.
*/
nm_device_set_unmanaged (self,
NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN,
FALSE,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CONNECTION_ASSUMED);
} else {
/* Don't trigger a state change; if the device is in a
* state higher than UNAVAILABLE, it is already IFF_UP
* or an explicit activation request was received.
*/
priv->unmanaged_flags &= ~NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN;
}
} else if (!external_down && !info->up && nm_device_get_state (self) <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* If the device is already disconnected and is set !IFF_UP,
* unmanage it.
*/
nm_device_set_unmanaged (self,
NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN,
TRUE,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_USER_REQUESTED);
}
}
}
}
static void
device_ip_link_changed (NMDevice *self, NMPlatformLink *info)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (info->name[0] && g_strcmp0 (priv->ip_iface, info->name)) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "interface index %d renamed ip_iface (%d) from '%s' to '%s'",
priv->ifindex, nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self),
priv->ip_iface, info->name);
g_free (priv->ip_iface);
priv->ip_iface = g_strdup (info->name);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IP_IFACE);
update_for_ip_ifname_change (self);
}
}
static void
link_changed_cb (NMPlatform *platform,
int ifindex,
NMPlatformLink *info,
NMPlatformSignalChangeType change_type,
NMPlatformReason reason,
NMDevice *self)
{
if (change_type != NM_PLATFORM_SIGNAL_CHANGED)
return;
/* We don't filter by 'reason' because we are interested in *all* link
* changes. For example a call to nm_platform_link_set_up() may result
* in an internal carrier change (i.e. we ask the kernel to set IFF_UP
* and it results in also setting IFF_LOWER_UP.
*/
if (ifindex == nm_device_get_ifindex (self))
device_link_changed (self, info);
else if (ifindex == nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self))
device_ip_link_changed (self, info);
}
static void
link_changed (NMDevice *self, NMPlatformLink *info)
{
/* Update carrier from link event if applicable. */
if ( device_has_capability (self, NM_DEVICE_CAP_CARRIER_DETECT)
&& !device_has_capability (self, NM_DEVICE_CAP_NONSTANDARD_CARRIER))
nm_device_set_carrier (self, info->connected);
}
/**
* nm_device_notify_component_added():
* @self: the #NMDevice
* @component: the component being added by a plugin
*
* Called by the manager to notify the device that a new component has
* been found. The device implementation should return %TRUE if it
* wishes to claim the component, or %FALSE if it cannot.
*
* Returns: %TRUE to claim the component, %FALSE if the component cannot be
* claimed.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_notify_component_added (NMDevice *self, GObject *component)
{
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->component_added)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->component_added (self, component);
return FALSE;
}
/**
* nm_device_owns_iface():
* @self: the #NMDevice
* @iface: an interface name
*
* Called by the manager to ask if the device or any of its components owns
* @iface. For example, a WWAN implementation would return %TRUE for an
* ethernet interface name that was owned by the WWAN device's modem component,
* because that ethernet interface is controlled by the WWAN device and cannot
* be used independently of the WWAN device.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if @self or it's components owns the interface name,
* %FALSE if not
*/
gboolean
nm_device_owns_iface (NMDevice *self, const char *iface)
{
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->owns_iface)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->owns_iface (self, iface);
return FALSE;
}
NMConnection *
nm_device_new_default_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->new_default_connection)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->new_default_connection (self);
return NULL;
}
static void
slave_state_changed (NMDevice *slave,
NMDeviceState slave_new_state,
NMDeviceState slave_old_state,
NMDeviceStateReason reason,
NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
gboolean release = FALSE;
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "slave %s state change %d (%s) -> %d (%s)",
nm_device_get_iface (slave),
slave_old_state,
state_to_string (slave_old_state),
slave_new_state,
state_to_string (slave_new_state));
/* Don't try to enslave slaves until the master is ready */
if (priv->state < NM_DEVICE_STATE_CONFIG)
return;
if (slave_new_state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG)
nm_device_enslave_slave (self, slave, nm_device_get_connection (slave));
else if (slave_new_state > NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED)
release = TRUE;
else if ( slave_new_state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED
&& slave_old_state > NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* Catch failures due to unavailable or unmanaged */
release = TRUE;
}
if (release) {
nm_device_release_one_slave (self, slave, TRUE, reason);
/* Bridge/bond/team interfaces are left up until manually deactivated */
if (priv->slaves == NULL && priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED)
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "last slave removed; remaining activated");
}
}
/**
* nm_device_master_add_slave:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: the slave device to enslave
* @configure: pass %TRUE if the slave should be configured by the master, or
* %FALSE if it is already configured outside NetworkManager
*
* If @self is capable of enslaving other devices (ie it's a bridge, bond, team,
* etc) then this function adds @slave to the slave list for later enslavement.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on success, %FALSE on failure
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_master_add_slave (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave, gboolean configure)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
SlaveInfo *info;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (slave != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->enslave_slave != NULL, FALSE);
if (configure)
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_device_get_state (slave) >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED, FALSE);
if (!find_slave_info (self, slave)) {
info = g_malloc0 (sizeof (SlaveInfo));
info->slave = g_object_ref (slave);
info->configure = configure;
info->watch_id = g_signal_connect (slave, "state-changed",
G_CALLBACK (slave_state_changed), self);
priv->slaves = g_slist_append (priv->slaves, info);
}
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (self);
return TRUE;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_get_slaves:
* @self: the master device
*
* Returns: any slaves of which @self is the master. Caller owns returned list.
*/
GSList *
nm_device_master_get_slaves (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
GSList *slaves = NULL, *iter;
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter))
slaves = g_slist_prepend (slaves, ((SlaveInfo *) iter->data)->slave);
return slaves;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_get_slave_by_ifindex:
* @self: the master device
* @ifindex: the slave's interface index
*
* Returns: the slave with the given @ifindex of which @self is the master,
* or %NULL if no device with @ifindex is a slave of @self.
*/
NMDevice *
nm_device_master_get_slave_by_ifindex (NMDevice *self, int ifindex)
{
GSList *iter;
for (iter = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
SlaveInfo *info = iter->data;
if (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (info->slave) == ifindex)
return info->slave;
}
return NULL;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_check_slave_physical_port:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: a slave device
* @log_domain: domain to log a warning in
*
* Checks if @self already has a slave with the same #NMDevice:physical-port-id
* as @slave, and logs a warning if so.
*/
void
nm_device_master_check_slave_physical_port (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave,
guint64 log_domain)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
const char *slave_physical_port_id, *existing_physical_port_id;
SlaveInfo *info;
GSList *iter;
slave_physical_port_id = nm_device_get_physical_port_id (slave);
if (!slave_physical_port_id)
return;
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = iter->next) {
info = iter->data;
if (info->slave == slave)
continue;
existing_physical_port_id = nm_device_get_physical_port_id (info->slave);
if (!g_strcmp0 (slave_physical_port_id, existing_physical_port_id)) {
_LOGW (log_domain, "slave %s shares a physical port with existing slave %s",
nm_device_get_ip_iface (slave),
nm_device_get_ip_iface (info->slave));
/* Since this function will get called for every slave, we only have
* to warn about the first match we find; if there are other matches
* later in the list, we will have already warned about them matching
* @existing earlier.
*/
return;
}
}
}
/* release all slaves */
static void
nm_device_master_release_slaves (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMDeviceStateReason reason;
/* Don't release the slaves if this connection doesn't belong to NM. */
if (nm_device_uses_generated_assumed_connection (self))
return;
reason = priv->state_reason;
if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED)
reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DEPENDENCY_FAILED;
while (priv->slaves) {
SlaveInfo *info = priv->slaves->data;
nm_device_release_one_slave (self, info->slave, TRUE, reason);
}
}
/**
* nm_device_get_master:
* @self: the device
*
* If @self has been enslaved by another device, this returns that
* device. Otherwise it returns %NULL. (In particular, note that if
* @self is in the process of activating as a slave, but has not yet
* been enslaved by its master, this will return %NULL.)
*
* Returns: (transfer none): @self's master, or %NULL
*/
NMDevice *
nm_device_get_master (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->enslaved)
return priv->master;
else
return NULL;
}
/**
* nm_device_slave_notify_enslave:
* @self: the slave device
* @success: whether the enslaving operation succeeded
*
* Notifies a slave that either it has been enslaved, or else its master tried
* to enslave it and failed.
*/
static void
nm_device_slave_notify_enslave (NMDevice *self, gboolean success)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
gboolean activating = (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG);
g_assert (priv->master);
if (!priv->enslaved) {
if (success) {
if (activating) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: connection '%s' enslaved, continuing activation",
nm_connection_get_id (connection));
} else
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "enslaved to %s", nm_device_get_iface (priv->master));
priv->enslaved = TRUE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_MASTER);
} else if (activating) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: connection '%s' could not be enslaved",
nm_connection_get_id (connection));
}
}
if (activating) {
priv->ip4_state = IP_DONE;
priv->ip6_state = IP_DONE;
nm_device_queue_state (self,
success ? NM_DEVICE_STATE_SECONDARIES : NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
} else
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (self);
}
/**
* nm_device_slave_notify_release:
* @self: the slave device
* @reason: the reason associated with the state change
*
* Notifies a slave that it has been released, and why.
*/
static void
nm_device_slave_notify_release (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
NMDeviceState new_state;
const char *master_status;
if ( reason != NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE
&& priv->state > NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED
&& priv->state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED) {
if (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DEPENDENCY_FAILED) {
new_state = NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED;
master_status = "failed";
} else if (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_USER_REQUESTED) {
new_state = NM_DEVICE_STATE_DEACTIVATING;
master_status = "deactivated by user request";
} else {
new_state = NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED;
master_status = "deactivated";
}
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: connection '%s' master %s",
nm_connection_get_id (connection),
master_status);
nm_device_queue_state (self, new_state, reason);
} else if (priv->master)
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "released from master %s", nm_device_get_iface (priv->master));
else
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "released from master%s", priv->enslaved ? "" : " (was not enslaved)");
if (priv->enslaved) {
priv->enslaved = FALSE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_MASTER);
}
}
/**
* nm_device_get_enslaved:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device is enslaved to a master device (eg bridge or
* bond or team), %FALSE if not
*/
gboolean
nm_device_get_enslaved (NMDevice *self)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->enslaved;
}
/**
* nm_device_removed:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Called by the manager when the device was removed. Releases the device from
* the master in case it's enslaved.
*/
void
nm_device_removed (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->enslaved)
nm_device_release_one_slave (priv->master, self, FALSE, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_REMOVED);
}
static gboolean
is_available (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceCheckDevAvailableFlags flags)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->carrier || priv->ignore_carrier)
return TRUE;
if (NM_FLAGS_HAS (flags, NM_DEVICE_CHECK_DEV_AVAILABLE_IGNORE_CARRIER))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
/**
* nm_device_is_available:
* @self: the #NMDevice
* @flags: additional flags to influence the check. Flags have the
* meaning to increase the availability of a device.
*
* Checks if @self would currently be capable of activating a
* connection. In particular, it checks that the device is ready (eg,
* is not missing firmware), that it has carrier (if necessary), and
* that any necessary external software (eg, ModemManager,
* wpa_supplicant) is available.
*
* @self can only be in a state higher than
* %NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE when nm_device_is_available() returns
* %TRUE. (But note that it can still be %NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNMANAGED
* when it is available.)
*
* Returns: %TRUE or %FALSE
*/
gboolean
nm_device_is_available (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceCheckDevAvailableFlags flags)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->firmware_missing)
return FALSE;
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->is_available (self, flags);
}
gboolean
nm_device_get_enabled (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->get_enabled)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->get_enabled (self);
return TRUE;
}
void
nm_device_set_enabled (NMDevice *self, gboolean enabled)
{
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->set_enabled)
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->set_enabled (self, enabled);
}
/**
* nm_device_get_autoconnect:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device allows autoconnect connections, or %FALSE if the
* device is explicitly blocking all autoconnect connections. Does not take
* into account transient conditions like companion devices that may wish to
* block the device.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_get_autoconnect (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->autoconnect;
}
static void
nm_device_set_autoconnect (NMDevice *self, gboolean autoconnect)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->autoconnect == autoconnect)
return;
if (autoconnect) {
/* Default-unmanaged devices never autoconnect */
if (!nm_device_get_default_unmanaged (self)) {
priv->autoconnect = TRUE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_AUTOCONNECT);
}
} else {
priv->autoconnect = FALSE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_AUTOCONNECT);
}
}
static gboolean
autoconnect_allowed_accumulator (GSignalInvocationHint *ihint,
GValue *return_accu,
const GValue *handler_return, gpointer data)
{
if (!g_value_get_boolean (handler_return))
g_value_set_boolean (return_accu, FALSE);
return TRUE;
}
/**
* nm_device_autoconnect_allowed:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device can be auto-connected immediately, taking
* transient conditions into account (like companion devices that may wish to
* block autoconnect for a time).
*/
gboolean
nm_device_autoconnect_allowed (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
GValue instance = G_VALUE_INIT;
GValue retval = G_VALUE_INIT;
if (priv->state < NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED || !priv->autoconnect)
return FALSE;
/* The 'autoconnect-allowed' signal is emitted on a device to allow
* other listeners to block autoconnect on the device if they wish.
* This is mainly used by the OLPC Mesh devices to block autoconnect
* on their companion WiFi device as they share radio resources and
* cannot be connected at the same time.
*/
g_value_init (&instance, G_TYPE_OBJECT);
g_value_set_object (&instance, self);
g_value_init (&retval, G_TYPE_BOOLEAN);
if (priv->autoconnect)
g_value_set_boolean (&retval, TRUE);
else
g_value_set_boolean (&retval, FALSE);
/* Use g_signal_emitv() rather than g_signal_emit() to avoid the return
* value being changed if no handlers are connected */
g_signal_emitv (&instance, signals[AUTOCONNECT_ALLOWED], 0, &retval);
g_value_unset (&instance);
return g_value_get_boolean (&retval);
}
static gboolean
can_auto_connect (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
char **specific_object)
{
NMSettingConnection *s_con;
s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection);
if (!nm_setting_connection_get_autoconnect (s_con))
return FALSE;
return nm_device_check_connection_available (self, connection, NM_DEVICE_CHECK_CON_AVAILABLE_NONE, NULL);
}
/**
* nm_device_can_auto_connect:
* @self: an #NMDevice
* @connection: a #NMConnection
* @specific_object: (out) (transfer full): on output, the path of an
* object associated with the returned connection, to be passed to
* nm_manager_activate_connection(), or %NULL.
*
* Checks if @connection can be auto-activated on @self right now.
* This requires, at a minimum, that the connection be compatible with
* @self, and that it have the #NMSettingConnection:autoconnect property
* set, and that the device allow auto connections. Some devices impose
* additional requirements. (Eg, a Wi-Fi connection can only be activated
* if its SSID was seen in the last scan.)
*
* Returns: %TRUE, if the @connection can be auto-activated.
**/
gboolean
nm_device_can_auto_connect (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
char **specific_object)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_CONNECTION (connection), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (specific_object && !*specific_object, FALSE);
if (nm_device_autoconnect_allowed (self))
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->can_auto_connect (self, connection, specific_object);
return FALSE;
}
static gboolean
device_has_config (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
/* Check for IP configuration. */
if (priv->ip4_config && nm_ip4_config_get_num_addresses (priv->ip4_config))
return TRUE;
if (priv->ip6_config && nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (priv->ip6_config))
return TRUE;
/* The existence of a software device is good enough. */
if (nm_device_is_software (self))
return TRUE;
/* Slaves are also configured by definition */
if (nm_platform_link_get_master (priv->ifindex) > 0)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_update_slave_connection:
* @self: the master #NMDevice
* @slave: the slave #NMDevice
* @connection: the #NMConnection to update with the slave settings
* @GError: (out): error description
*
* Reads the slave configuration for @slave and updates @connection with those
* properties. This invokes a virtual function on the master device @self.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the configuration was read and @connection updated,
* %FALSE on failure.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_master_update_slave_connection (NMDevice *self,
NMDevice *slave,
NMConnection *connection,
GError **error)
{
NMDeviceClass *klass;
gboolean success;
g_return_val_if_fail (self, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (slave, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (connection, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (!error || !*error, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_device_get_iface (self), FALSE);
klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
if (klass->master_update_slave_connection) {
success = klass->master_update_slave_connection (self, slave, connection, error);
g_return_val_if_fail (!error || (success && !*error) || *error, success);
return success;
}
g_set_error (error,
NM_DEVICE_ERROR,
NM_DEVICE_ERROR_FAILED,
"master device '%s' cannot update a slave connection for slave device '%s' (master type not supported?)",
nm_device_get_iface (self), nm_device_get_iface (slave));
return FALSE;
}
NMConnection *
nm_device_generate_connection (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *master)
{
NMDeviceClass *klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
const char *ifname = nm_device_get_iface (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMSetting *s_con;
NMSetting *s_ip4;
NMSetting *s_ip6;
gs_free char *uuid = NULL;
const char *ip4_method, *ip6_method;
GError *error = NULL;
/* If update_connection() is not implemented, just fail. */
if (!klass->update_connection)
return NULL;
/* Return NULL if device is unconfigured. */
if (!device_has_config (self)) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "device has no existing configuration");
return NULL;
}
connection = nm_simple_connection_new ();
s_con = nm_setting_connection_new ();
uuid = nm_utils_uuid_generate ();
g_object_set (s_con,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_UUID, uuid,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_ID, ifname,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_AUTOCONNECT, FALSE,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_INTERFACE_NAME, ifname,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_TIMESTAMP, (guint64) time (NULL),
NULL);
if (klass->connection_type)
g_object_set (s_con, NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_TYPE, klass->connection_type, NULL);
nm_connection_add_setting (connection, s_con);
/* If the device is a slave, update various slave settings */
if (master) {
if (!nm_device_master_update_slave_connection (master,
self,
connection,
&error))
{
_LOGE (LOGD_DEVICE, "master device '%s' failed to update slave connection: %s",
nm_device_get_iface (master), error ? error->message : "(unknown error)");
g_error_free (error);
g_object_unref (connection);
return NULL;
}
} else {
/* Only regular and master devices get IP configuration; slaves do not */
s_ip4 = nm_ip4_config_create_setting (priv->ip4_config);
nm_connection_add_setting (connection, s_ip4);
s_ip6 = nm_ip6_config_create_setting (priv->ip6_config);
nm_connection_add_setting (connection, s_ip6);
}
klass->update_connection (self, connection);
/* Check the connection in case of update_connection() bug. */
if (!nm_connection_verify (connection, &error)) {
_LOGE (LOGD_DEVICE, "Generated connection does not verify: %s", error->message);
g_clear_error (&error);
g_object_unref (connection);
return NULL;
}
/* Ignore the connection if it has no IP configuration,
* no slave configuration, and is not a master interface.
*/
ip4_method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
ip6_method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
if ( g_strcmp0 (ip4_method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED) == 0
&& g_strcmp0 (ip6_method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_IGNORE) == 0
&& !nm_setting_connection_get_master (NM_SETTING_CONNECTION (s_con))
&& !priv->slaves) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "ignoring generated connection (no IP and not in master-slave relationship)");
g_object_unref (connection);
connection = NULL;
}
return connection;
}
gboolean
nm_device_complete_connection (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
const char *specific_object,
const GSList *existing_connections,
GError **error)
{
gboolean success = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (connection != NULL, FALSE);
if (!NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->complete_connection) {
g_set_error (error, NM_DEVICE_ERROR, NM_DEVICE_ERROR_INVALID_CONNECTION,
"Device class %s had no complete_connection method",
G_OBJECT_TYPE_NAME (self));
return FALSE;
}
success = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->complete_connection (self,
connection,
specific_object,
existing_connections,
error);
if (success)
success = nm_connection_verify (connection, error);
return success;
}
static gboolean
check_connection_compatible (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection)
{
NMSettingConnection *s_con;
const char *config_iface, *device_iface;
s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection);
g_assert (s_con);
config_iface = nm_setting_connection_get_interface_name (s_con);
device_iface = nm_device_get_iface (self);
if (config_iface && strcmp (config_iface, device_iface) != 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
/**
* nm_device_check_connection_compatible:
* @self: an #NMDevice
* @connection: an #NMConnection
*
* Checks if @connection could potentially be activated on @self.
* This means only that @self has the proper capabilities, and that
* @connection is not locked to some other device. It does not
* necessarily mean that @connection could be activated on @self
* right now. (Eg, it might refer to a Wi-Fi network that is not
* currently available.)
*
* Returns: #TRUE if @connection could potentially be activated on
* @self.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_check_connection_compatible (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_CONNECTION (connection), FALSE);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->check_connection_compatible (self, connection);
}
/**
* nm_device_can_assume_connections:
* @self: #NMDevice instance
*
* This is a convenience function to determine whether connection assumption
* is available for this device.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device is capable of assuming connections, %FALSE if not
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_can_assume_connections (NMDevice *self)
{
return !!NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->update_connection;
}
/**
* nm_device_can_assume_active_connection:
* @self: #NMDevice instance
*
* This is a convenience function to determine whether the device's active
* connection can be assumed if NetworkManager restarts. This method returns
* %TRUE if and only if the device can assume connections, and the device has
* an active connection, and that active connection can be assumed.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device's active connection can be assumed, or %FALSE
* if there is no active connection or the active connection cannot be
* assumed.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_can_assume_active_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
const char *method;
const char *assumable_ip6_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_IGNORE,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_MANUAL,
NULL
};
const char *assumable_ip4_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_MANUAL,
NULL
};
if (!nm_device_can_assume_connections (self))
return FALSE;
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (!connection)
return FALSE;
/* Can't assume connections that aren't yet configured
* FIXME: what about bridges/bonds waiting for slaves?
*/
if (priv->state < NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG)
return FALSE;
if (priv->ip4_state != IP_DONE && priv->ip6_state != IP_DONE)
return FALSE;
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
if (!_nm_utils_string_in_list (method, assumable_ip6_methods))
return FALSE;
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
if (!_nm_utils_string_in_list (method, assumable_ip4_methods))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean
nm_device_emit_recheck_assume (gpointer self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
priv->recheck_assume_id = 0;
if (!nm_device_get_act_request (self)) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "emit RECHECK_ASSUME signal");
g_signal_emit (self, signals[RECHECK_ASSUME], 0);
}
return G_SOURCE_REMOVE;
}
void
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (nm_device_can_assume_connections (self) && !priv->recheck_assume_id)
priv->recheck_assume_id = g_idle_add (nm_device_emit_recheck_assume, self);
}
void
nm_device_emit_recheck_auto_activate (NMDevice *self)
{
g_signal_emit (self, signals[RECHECK_AUTO_ACTIVATE], 0);
}
static void
dnsmasq_state_changed_cb (NMDnsMasqManager *manager, guint32 status, gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
switch (status) {
case NM_DNSMASQ_STATUS_DEAD:
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_SHARED_START_FAILED);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static void
activation_source_clear (NMDevice *self, gboolean remove_source, int family)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
guint *act_source_id;
gpointer *act_source_func;
if (family == AF_INET6) {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source6_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source6_func;
} else {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source_func;
}
if (*act_source_id) {
if (remove_source)
g_source_remove (*act_source_id);
*act_source_id = 0;
*act_source_func = NULL;
}
}
static void
activation_source_schedule (NMDevice *self, GSourceFunc func, int family)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
guint *act_source_id;
gpointer *act_source_func;
if (family == AF_INET6) {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source6_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source6_func;
} else {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source_func;
}
if (*act_source_id)
_LOGE (LOGD_DEVICE, "activation stage already scheduled");
/* Don't bother rescheduling the same function that's about to
* run anyway. Fixes issues with crappy wireless drivers sending
* streams of associate events before NM has had a chance to process
* the first one.
*/
if (!*act_source_id || (*act_source_func != func)) {
activation_source_clear (self, TRUE, family);
*act_source_id = g_idle_add (func, self);
*act_source_func = func;
}
}
static gboolean
get_ip_config_may_fail (NMDevice *self, int family)
{
NMConnection *connection;
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip = NULL;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, TRUE);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
/* Fail the connection if the failed IP method is required to complete */
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
s_ip = nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection);
break;
case AF_INET6:
s_ip = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
return nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip);
}
static void
master_ready_cb (NMActiveConnection *active,
GParamSpec *pspec,
NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActiveConnection *master;
g_assert (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_PREPARE);
/* Notify a master device that it has a new slave */
g_assert (nm_active_connection_get_master_ready (active));
master = nm_active_connection_get_master (active);
priv->master = g_object_ref (nm_active_connection_get_device (master));
nm_device_master_add_slave (priv->master,
self,
nm_active_connection_get_assumed (active) ? FALSE : TRUE);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "master connection ready; master device %s",
nm_device_get_iface (priv->master));
if (priv->master_ready_id) {
g_signal_handler_disconnect (active, priv->master_ready_id);
priv->master_ready_id = 0;
}
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config (self);
}
static NMActStageReturn
act_stage1_prepare (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_stage1_device_prepare
*
* Prepare for device activation
*
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_activate_stage1_device_prepare (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActStageReturn ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
NMActiveConnection *active = NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request);
/* Clear the activation source ID now that this stage has run */
activation_source_clear (self, FALSE, 0);
priv->ip4_state = priv->ip6_state = IP_NONE;
/* Notify the new ActiveConnection along with the state change */
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_ACTIVE_CONNECTION);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) started...");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_PREPARE, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
/* Assumed connections were already set up outside NetworkManager */
if (!nm_active_connection_get_assumed (active)) {
ret = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->act_stage1_prepare (self, &reason);
if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE) {
goto out;
} else if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE) {
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
goto out;
}
g_assert (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS);
}
if (nm_active_connection_get_master (active)) {
/* If the master connection is ready for slaves, attach ourselves */
if (nm_active_connection_get_master_ready (active))
master_ready_cb (active, NULL, self);
else {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "waiting for master connection to become ready");
/* Attach a signal handler and wait for the master connection to begin activating */
g_assert (priv->master_ready_id == 0);
priv->master_ready_id = g_signal_connect (active,
"notify::" NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION_INT_MASTER_READY,
(GCallback) master_ready_cb,
self);
/* Postpone */
}
} else
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config (self);
out:
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) complete.");
return FALSE;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_schedule_stage1_device_prepare
*
* Prepare a device for activation
*
*/
void
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage1_device_prepare (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (priv->act_request);
activation_source_schedule (self, nm_device_activate_stage1_device_prepare, 0);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) scheduled...");
}
static NMActStageReturn
act_stage2_config (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
/* Nothing to do */
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_stage2_device_config
*
* Determine device parameters and set those on the device, ie
* for wireless devices, set SSID, keys, etc.
*
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_activate_stage2_device_config (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActStageReturn ret;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
gboolean no_firmware = FALSE;
NMActiveConnection *active = NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request);
GSList *iter;
/* Clear the activation source ID now that this stage has run */
activation_source_clear (self, FALSE, 0);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) starting...");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_CONFIG, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
/* Assumed connections were already set up outside NetworkManager */
if (!nm_active_connection_get_assumed (active)) {
if (!nm_device_bring_up (self, FALSE, &no_firmware)) {
if (no_firmware)
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_FIRMWARE_MISSING);
else
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CONFIG_FAILED);
goto out;
}
ret = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->act_stage2_config (self, &reason);
if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE)
goto out;
else if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE) {
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
goto out;
}
g_assert (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS);
}
/* If we have slaves that aren't yet enslaved, do that now */
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
SlaveInfo *info = iter->data;
NMDeviceState slave_state = nm_device_get_state (info->slave);
if (slave_state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG)
nm_device_enslave_slave (self, info->slave, nm_device_get_connection (info->slave));
else if ( nm_device_uses_generated_assumed_connection (self)
&& slave_state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED)
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (info->slave);
}
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) successful.");
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage3_ip_config_start (self);
out:
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) complete.");
return FALSE;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config
*
* Schedule setup of the hardware device
*
*/
void
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (priv->act_request);
activation_source_schedule (self, nm_device_activate_stage2_device_config, 0);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) scheduled...");
}
/*********************************************/
/* avahi-autoipd stuff */
static void
aipd_timeout_remove (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->aipd_timeout) {
g_source_remove (priv->aipd_timeout);
priv->aipd_timeout = 0;
}
}
static void
aipd_cleanup (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->aipd_watch) {
g_source_remove (priv->aipd_watch);
priv->aipd_watch = 0;
}
if (priv->aipd_pid > 0) {
nm_utils_kill_child_sync (priv->aipd_pid, SIGKILL, LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd", NULL, 0, 0);
priv->aipd_pid = -1;
}
aipd_timeout_remove (self);
}
static NMIP4Config *
aipd_get_ip4_config (NMDevice *self, guint32 lla)
{
NMIP4Config *config = NULL;
NMPlatformIP4Address address;
NMPlatformIP4Route route;
config = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
g_assert (config);
memset (&address, 0, sizeof (address));
address.address = lla;
address.plen = 16;
address.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_IP4LL;
nm_ip4_config_add_address (config, &address);
/* Add a multicast route for link-local connections: destination= 224.0.0.0, netmask=240.0.0.0 */
memset (&route, 0, sizeof (route));
route.network = htonl (0xE0000000L);
route.plen = 4;
route.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_IP4LL;
route.metric = nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self);
nm_ip4_config_add_route (config, &route);
return config;
}
#define IPV4LL_NETWORK (htonl (0xA9FE0000L))
#define IPV4LL_NETMASK (htonl (0xFFFF0000L))
void
nm_device_handle_autoip4_event (NMDevice *self,
const char *event,
const char *address)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection = NULL;
const char *method;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
g_return_if_fail (event != NULL);
if (priv->act_request == NULL)
return;
connection = nm_act_request_get_connection (priv->act_request);
g_assert (connection);
/* Ignore if the connection isn't an AutoIP connection */
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
if (g_strcmp0 (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL) != 0)
return;
if (strcmp (event, "BIND") == 0) {
guint32 lla;
NMIP4Config *config;
if (inet_pton (AF_INET, address, &lla) <= 0) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "invalid address %s received from avahi-autoipd.", address);
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_ERROR);
return;
}
if ((lla & IPV4LL_NETMASK) != IPV4LL_NETWORK) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "invalid address %s received from avahi-autoipd (not link-local).", address);
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_ERROR);
return;
}
config = aipd_get_ip4_config (self, lla);
if (config == NULL) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "failed to get autoip config");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE);
return;
}
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF) {
aipd_timeout_remove (self);
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_result (self, config);
} else if (priv->ip4_state == IP_DONE) {
if (!ip4_config_merge_and_apply (self, config, TRUE, &reason)) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "failed to update IP4 config for autoip change.");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
}
} else
g_assert_not_reached ();
g_object_unref (config);
} else {
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "autoip address %s no longer valid because '%s'.", address, event);
/* The address is gone; terminate the connection or fail activation */
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
}
}
static void
aipd_watch_cb (GPid pid, gint status, gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMDeviceState state;
if (!priv->aipd_watch)
return;
priv->aipd_watch = 0;
if (WIFEXITED (status))
_LOGD (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd exited with error code %d", WEXITSTATUS (status));
else if (WIFSTOPPED (status))
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd stopped unexpectedly with signal %d", WSTOPSIG (status));
else if (WIFSIGNALED (status))
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd died with signal %d", WTERMSIG (status));
else
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd died from an unknown cause");
aipd_cleanup (self);
state = nm_device_get_state (self);
if (nm_device_is_activating (self) || (state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED))
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_FAILED);
}
static gboolean
aipd_timeout_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->aipd_timeout) {
_LOGI (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd timed out.");
priv->aipd_timeout = 0;
aipd_cleanup (self);
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_timeout (self);
}
return FALSE;
}
/* default to installed helper, but can be modified for testing */
const char *nm_device_autoipd_helper_path = LIBEXECDIR "/nm-avahi-autoipd.action";
static NMActStageReturn
aipd_start (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
const char *argv[6];
char *cmdline;
const char *aipd_binary;
int i = 0;
GError *error = NULL;
aipd_cleanup (self);
/* Find avahi-autoipd */
aipd_binary = nm_utils_find_helper ("avahi-autoipd", NULL, NULL);
if (!aipd_binary) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_AUTOIP4,
"Activation: Stage 3 of 5 (IP Configure Start) failed"
" to start avahi-autoipd: not found");
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_START_FAILED;
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
}
argv[i++] = aipd_binary;
argv[i++] = "--script";
argv[i++] = nm_device_autoipd_helper_path;
if (nm_logging_enabled (LOGL_DEBUG, LOGD_AUTOIP4))
argv[i++] = "--debug";
argv[i++] = nm_device_get_ip_iface (self);
argv[i++] = NULL;
cmdline = g_strjoinv (" ", (char **) argv);
_LOGD (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "running: %s", cmdline);
g_free (cmdline);
if (!g_spawn_async ("/", (char **) argv, NULL, G_SPAWN_DO_NOT_REAP_CHILD,
nm_utils_setpgid, NULL, &(priv->aipd_pid), &error)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_AUTOIP4,
"Activation: Stage 3 of 5 (IP Configure Start) failed"
" to start avahi-autoipd: %s",
error && error->message ? error->message : "(unknown)");
g_clear_error (&error);
aipd_cleanup (self);
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
}
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_AUTOIP4,
"Activation: Stage 3 of 5 (IP Configure Start) started"
" avahi-autoipd...");
/* Monitor the child process so we know when it dies */
priv->aipd_watch = g_child_watch_add (priv->aipd_pid, aipd_watch_cb, self);
/* Start a timeout to bound the address attempt */
priv->aipd_timeout = g_timeout_add_seconds (20, aipd_timeout_cb, self);
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE;
}
/*********************************************/
static gboolean
_device_get_default_route_from_platform (NMDevice *self, int addr_family, NMPlatformIPRoute *out_route)
{
gboolean success = FALSE;
int ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
GArray *routes;
if (addr_family == AF_INET)
routes = nm_platform_ip4_route_get_all (ifindex, NM_PLATFORM_GET_ROUTE_MODE_ONLY_DEFAULT);
else
routes = nm_platform_ip6_route_get_all (ifindex, NM_PLATFORM_GET_ROUTE_MODE_ONLY_DEFAULT);
if (routes) {
guint route_metric = G_MAXUINT32, m;
const NMPlatformIPRoute *route = NULL, *r;
guint i;
/* if there are several default routes, find the one with the best metric */
for (i = 0; i < routes->len; i++) {
if (addr_family == AF_INET) {
r = (const NMPlatformIPRoute *) &g_array_index (routes, NMPlatformIP4Route, i);
m = r->metric;
} else {
r = (const NMPlatformIPRoute *) &g_array_index (routes, NMPlatformIP6Route, i);
m = nm_utils_ip6_route_metric_normalize (r->metric);
}
if (!route || m < route_metric) {
route = r;
route_metric = m;
}
}
if (route) {
if (addr_family == AF_INET)
*((NMPlatformIP4Route *) out_route) = *((NMPlatformIP4Route *) route);
else
*((NMPlatformIP6Route *) out_route) = *((NMPlatformIP6Route *) route);
success = TRUE;
}
g_array_free (routes, TRUE);
}
return success;
}
/*********************************************/
static void
ensure_con_ipx_config (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
int ip_ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
NMConnection *connection;
g_assert (!!priv->con_ip4_config == !!priv->con_ip6_config);
if (priv->con_ip4_config)
return;
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (!connection)
return;
priv->con_ip4_config = nm_ip4_config_new (ip_ifindex);
priv->con_ip6_config = nm_ip6_config_new (ip_ifindex);
nm_ip4_config_merge_setting (priv->con_ip4_config,
nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection),
nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self));
nm_ip6_config_merge_setting (priv->con_ip6_config,
nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection),
nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (self));
if (nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (self)) {
/* For assumed connections ignore all addresses and routes. */
nm_ip4_config_reset_addresses (priv->con_ip4_config);
nm_ip4_config_reset_routes (priv->con_ip4_config);
nm_ip6_config_reset_addresses (priv->con_ip6_config);
nm_ip6_config_reset_routes (priv->con_ip6_config);
}
}
/*********************************************/
/* DHCPv4 stuff */
static void
dhcp4_cleanup (NMDevice *self, gboolean stop, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->dhcp4_client) {
/* Stop any ongoing DHCP transaction on this device */
if (priv->dhcp4_state_sigid) {
g_signal_handler_disconnect (priv->dhcp4_client, priv->dhcp4_state_sigid);
priv->dhcp4_state_sigid = 0;
}
nm_device_remove_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP4, FALSE);
if (stop)
nm_dhcp_client_stop (priv->dhcp4_client, release);
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp4_client);
}
if (priv->dhcp4_config) {
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp4_config);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP4_CONFIG);
}
}
static gboolean
ip4_config_merge_and_apply (NMDevice *self,
NMIP4Config *config,
gboolean commit,
NMDeviceStateReason *out_reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
gboolean success;
NMIP4Config *composite;
gboolean has_direct_route;
const guint32 default_route_metric = nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self);
guint32 gateway;
/* Merge all the configs into the composite config */
if (config) {
g_clear_object (&priv->dev_ip4_config);
priv->dev_ip4_config = g_object_ref (config);
}
composite = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
ensure_con_ipx_config (self);
if (priv->dev_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->dev_ip4_config);
if (priv->vpn4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->vpn4_config);
if (priv->ext_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->ext_ip4_config);
/* Merge WWAN config *last* to ensure modem-given settings overwrite
* any external stuff set by pppd or other scripts.
*/
if (priv->wwan_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->wwan_ip4_config);
/* Merge user overrides into the composite config. For assumed connection,
* con_ip4_config is empty. */
if (priv->con_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->con_ip4_config);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
/* Add the default route.
*
* We keep track of the default route of a device in a private field.
* NMDevice needs to know the default route at this point, because the gateway
* might require a direct route (see below).
*
* But also, we don't want to add the default route to priv->ip4_config,
* because the default route from the setting might not be the same that
* NMDefaultRouteManager eventually configures (because the it might
* tweak the effective metric).
*/
/* unless we come to a different conclusion below, we have no default route and
* the route is assumed. */
priv->default_route.v4_has = FALSE;
priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed = TRUE;
if (!commit) {
/* during a non-commit event, we always pickup whatever is configured. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
if (nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (self))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
/* we are about to commit (for a non-assumed connection). Enforce whatever we have
* configured. */
priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed = FALSE;
if ( !connection
|| !nm_default_route_manager_ip4_connection_has_default_route (nm_default_route_manager_get (), connection))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
if (!nm_ip4_config_get_num_addresses (composite)) {
/* without addresses we can have no default route. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
gateway = nm_ip4_config_get_gateway (composite);
if ( !gateway
&& nm_device_get_device_type (self) != NM_DEVICE_TYPE_MODEM)
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
has_direct_route = ( gateway == 0
|| nm_ip4_config_get_subnet_for_host (composite, gateway)
|| nm_ip4_config_get_direct_route_for_host (composite, gateway));
priv->default_route.v4_has = TRUE;
memset (&priv->default_route.v4, 0, sizeof (priv->default_route.v4));
priv->default_route.v4.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_USER;
priv->default_route.v4.gateway = gateway;
priv->default_route.v4.metric = default_route_metric;
priv->default_route.v4.mss = nm_ip4_config_get_mss (composite);
if (!has_direct_route) {
NMPlatformIP4Route r = priv->default_route.v4;
/* add a direct route to the gateway */
r.network = gateway;
r.plen = 32;
r.gateway = 0;
nm_ip4_config_add_route (composite, &r);
}
END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE:
if (priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed) {
/* If above does not explicitly assign a default route, we always pick up the
* default route based on what is currently configured.
* That means that even managed connections with never-default, can
* get a default route (if configured externally).
*/
priv->default_route.v4_has = _device_get_default_route_from_platform (self, AF_INET, (NMPlatformIPRoute *) &priv->default_route.v4);
}
/* Allow setting MTU etc */
if (commit) {
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip4_config_pre_commit)
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip4_config_pre_commit (self, composite);
}
success = nm_device_set_ip4_config (self, composite, default_route_metric, commit, out_reason);
g_object_unref (composite);
return success;
}
static void
dhcp4_lease_change (NMDevice *self, NMIP4Config *config)
{
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
g_return_if_fail (config != NULL);
if (!ip4_config_merge_and_apply (self, config, TRUE, &reason)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP4, "failed to update IPv4 config for DHCP change.");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
} else {
/* Notify dispatcher scripts of new DHCP4 config */
nm_dispatcher_call (DISPATCHER_ACTION_DHCP4_CHANGE,
nm_device_get_connection (self),
self,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
}
}
static void
dhcp4_fail (NMDevice *self, gboolean timeout)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
dhcp4_cleanup (self, TRUE, FALSE);
if (timeout || (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF))
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_timeout (self);
else if (priv->ip4_state == IP_DONE)
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
else
g_warn_if_reached ();
}
static void
dhcp4_update_config (NMDevice *self, NMDhcp4Config *config, GHashTable *options)
{
GHashTableIter iter;
const char *key, *value;
/* Update the DHCP4 config object with new DHCP options */
nm_dhcp4_config_reset (config);
g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, options);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, (gpointer) &key, (gpointer) &value))
nm_dhcp4_config_add_option (config, key, value);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP4_CONFIG);
}
static void
dhcp4_state_changed (NMDhcpClient *client,
NMDhcpState state,
NMIP4Config *ip4_config,
GHashTable *options,
gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (nm_dhcp_client_get_ipv6 (client) == FALSE);
g_return_if_fail (!ip4_config || NM_IS_IP4_CONFIG (ip4_config));
_LOGD (LOGD_DHCP4, "new DHCPv4 client state %d", state);
switch (state) {
case NM_DHCP_STATE_BOUND:
if (!ip4_config) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP4, "failed to get IPv4 config in response to DHCP event.");
nm_device_state_changed (self,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE);
break;
}
dhcp4_update_config (self, priv->dhcp4_config, options);
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_result (self, ip4_config);
else if (priv->ip4_state == IP_DONE)
dhcp4_lease_change (self, ip4_config);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_TIMEOUT:
dhcp4_fail (self, TRUE);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_EXPIRE:
/* Ignore expiry before we even have a lease (NAK, old lease, etc) */
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF)
break;
/* Fall through */
case NM_DHCP_STATE_DONE:
case NM_DHCP_STATE_FAIL:
dhcp4_fail (self, FALSE);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static NMActStageReturn
dhcp4_start (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip4;
const guint8 *hw_addr;
size_t hw_addr_len = 0;
GByteArray *tmp = NULL;
s_ip4 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection);
/* Clear old exported DHCP options */
if (priv->dhcp4_config)
g_object_unref (priv->dhcp4_config);
priv->dhcp4_config = nm_dhcp4_config_new ();
hw_addr = nm_platform_link_get_address (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self), &hw_addr_len);
if (hw_addr_len) {
tmp = g_byte_array_sized_new (hw_addr_len);
g_byte_array_append (tmp, hw_addr, hw_addr_len);
}
/* Begin DHCP on the interface */
g_warn_if_fail (priv->dhcp4_client == NULL);
priv->dhcp4_client = nm_dhcp_manager_start_ip4 (nm_dhcp_manager_get (),
nm_device_get_ip_iface (self),
nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self),
tmp,
nm_connection_get_uuid (connection),
nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_send_hostname (s_ip4),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_hostname (s_ip4),
nm_setting_ip4_config_get_dhcp_client_id (NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG (s_ip4)),
priv->dhcp_timeout,
priv->dhcp_anycast_address,
NULL);
if (tmp)
g_byte_array_free (tmp, TRUE);
if (!priv->dhcp4_client) {
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_START_FAILED;
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
}
priv->dhcp4_state_sigid = g_signal_connect (priv->dhcp4_client,
NM_DHCP_CLIENT_SIGNAL_STATE_CHANGED,
G_CALLBACK (dhcp4_state_changed),
self);
nm_device_add_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP4, TRUE);
/* DHCP devices will be notified by the DHCP manager when stuff happens */
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE;
}
gboolean
nm_device_dhcp4_renew (NMDevice *self, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActStageReturn ret;
NMDeviceStateReason reason;
NMConnection *connection;
g_return_val_if_fail (priv->dhcp4_client != NULL, FALSE);
_LOGI (LOGD_DHCP4, "DHCPv4 lease renewal requested");
/* Terminate old DHCP instance and release the old lease */
dhcp4_cleanup (self, TRUE, release);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
/* Start DHCP again on the interface */
ret = dhcp4_start (self, connection, &reason);
return (ret != NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE);
}
/*********************************************/
static GHashTable *shared_ips = NULL;
static void
release_shared_ip (gpointer data)
{
g_hash_table_remove (shared_ips, data);
}
static gboolean
reserve_shared_ip (NMDevice *self, NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip4, NMPlatformIP4Address *address)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY (shared_ips == NULL))
shared_ips = g_hash_table_new (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal);
memset (address, 0, sizeof (*address));
if (s_ip4 && nm_setting_ip_config_get_num_addresses (s_ip4)) {
/* Use the first user-supplied address */
NMIPAddress *user = nm_setting_ip_config_get_address (s_ip4, 0);
g_assert (user);
nm_ip_address_get_address_binary (user, &address->address);
address->plen = nm_ip_address_get_prefix (user);
} else {
/* Find an unused address in the 10.42.x.x range */
guint32 start = (guint32) ntohl (0x0a2a0001); /* 10.42.0.1 */
guint32 count = 0;
while (g_hash_table_lookup (shared_ips, GUINT_TO_POINTER (start + count))) {
count += ntohl (0x100);
if (count > ntohl (0xFE00)) {
_LOGE (LOGD_SHARING, "ran out of shared IP addresses!");
return FALSE;
}
}
address->address = start + count;
address->plen = 24;
g_hash_table_insert (shared_ips,
GUINT_TO_POINTER (address->address),
GUINT_TO_POINTER (TRUE));
}
return TRUE;
}
static NMIP4Config *
shared4_new_config (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMIP4Config *config = NULL;
NMPlatformIP4Address address;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
if (!reserve_shared_ip (self, nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection), &address)) {
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE;
return NULL;
}
config = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
address.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_SHARED;
nm_ip4_config_add_address (config, &address);
/* Remove the address lock when the object gets disposed */
g_object_set_data_full (G_OBJECT (config), "shared-ip",
GUINT_TO_POINTER (address.address),
release_shared_ip);
return config;
}
/*********************************************/
static gboolean
connection_ip4_method_requires_carrier (NMConnection *connection,
gboolean *out_ip4_enabled)
{
const char *method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
static const char *ip4_carrier_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL,
NULL
};
if (out_ip4_enabled)
*out_ip4_enabled = !!strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED);
return _nm_utils_string_in_list (method, ip4_carrier_methods);
}
static gboolean
connection_ip6_method_requires_carrier (NMConnection *connection,
gboolean *out_ip6_enabled)
{
const char *method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
static const char *ip6_carrier_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL,
NULL
};
if (out_ip6_enabled)
*out_ip6_enabled = !!strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_IGNORE);
return _nm_utils_string_in_list (method, ip6_carrier_methods);
}
static gboolean
connection_requires_carrier (NMConnection *connection)
{
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip4, *s_ip6;
gboolean ip4_carrier_wanted, ip6_carrier_wanted;
gboolean ip4_used = FALSE, ip6_used = FALSE;
ip4_carrier_wanted = connection_ip4_method_requires_carrier (connection, &ip4_used);
if (ip4_carrier_wanted) {
/* If IPv4 wants a carrier and cannot fail, the whole connection
* requires a carrier regardless of the IPv6 method.
*/
s_ip4 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection);
if (s_ip4 && !nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip4))
return TRUE;
}
ip6_carrier_wanted = connection_ip6_method_requires_carrier (connection, &ip6_used);
if (ip6_carrier_wanted) {
/* If IPv6 wants a carrier and cannot fail, the whole connection
* requires a carrier regardless of the IPv4 method.
*/
s_ip6 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
if (s_ip6 && !nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip6))
return TRUE;
}
/* If an IP version wants a carrier and and the other IP version isn't
* used, the connection requires carrier since it will just fail without one.
*/
if (ip4_carrier_wanted && !ip6_used)
return TRUE;
if (ip6_carrier_wanted && !ip4_used)
return TRUE;
/* If both want a carrier, the whole connection wants a carrier */
return ip4_carrier_wanted && ip6_carrier_wanted;
}
static gboolean
have_any_ready_slaves (NMDevice *self, const GSList *slaves)
{
const GSList *iter;
/* Any enslaved slave is "ready" in the generic case as it's
* at least >= NM_DEVCIE_STATE_IP_CONFIG and has had Layer 2
* properties set up.
*/
for (iter = slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
if (nm_device_get_enslaved (iter->data))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
static gboolean
ip4_requires_slaves (NMConnection *connection)
{
const char *method;
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
return strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO) == 0;
}
static NMActStageReturn
act_stage3_ip4_config_start (NMDevice *self,
NMIP4Config **out_config,
NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMActStageReturn ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
const char *method;
GSList *slaves;
gboolean ready_slaves;
g_return_val_if_fail (reason != NULL, NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
if ( connection_ip4_method_requires_carrier (connection, NULL)
&& priv->is_master
&& !priv->carrier) {
_LOGI (LOGD_IP4 | LOGD_DEVICE,
"IPv4 config waiting until carrier is on");
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_WAIT;
}
if (priv->is_master && ip4_requires_slaves (connection)) {
/* If the master has no ready slaves, and depends on slaves for
* a successful IPv4 attempt, then postpone IPv4 addressing.
*/
slaves = nm_device_master_get_slaves (self);
ready_slaves = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->have_any_ready_slaves (self, slaves);
g_slist_free (slaves);
if (ready_slaves == FALSE) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_IP4,
"IPv4 config waiting until slaves are ready");
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_WAIT;
}
}
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
/* Start IPv4 addressing based on the method requested */
if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO) == 0)
ret = dhcp4_start (self, connection, reason);
else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL) == 0)
ret = aipd_start (self, reason);
else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_MANUAL) == 0) {
/* Use only IPv4 config from the connection data */
*out_config = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
g_assert (*out_config);
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_SHARED) == 0) {
*out_config = shared4_new_config (self, connection, reason);
if (*out_config) {
priv->dnsmasq_manager = nm_dnsmasq_manager_new (nm_device_get_ip_iface (self));
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
} else
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED) == 0) {
/* Nothing to do... */
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_STOP;
} else
_LOGW (LOGD_IP4, "unhandled IPv4 config method '%s'; will fail", method);
return ret;
}
/*********************************************/
/* DHCPv6 stuff */
static void
dhcp6_cleanup (NMDevice *self, gboolean stop, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
priv->dhcp6_mode = NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_NONE;
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
if (priv->dhcp6_client) {
if (priv->dhcp6_state_sigid) {
g_signal_handler_disconnect (priv->dhcp6_client, priv->dhcp6_state_sigid);
priv->dhcp6_state_sigid = 0;
}
if (stop)
nm_dhcp_client_stop (priv->dhcp6_client, release);
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_client);
}
nm_device_remove_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP6, FALSE);
if (priv->dhcp6_config) {
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_config);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP6_CONFIG);
}
}
static gboolean
ip6_config_merge_and_apply (NMDevice *self,
gboolean commit,
NMDeviceStateReason *out_reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
gboolean success;
NMIP6Config *composite;
gboolean has_direct_route;
const struct in6_addr *gateway;
/* If no config was passed in, create a new one */
composite = nm_ip6_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
ensure_con_ipx_config (self);
g_assert (composite);
/* Merge all the IP configs into the composite config */
if (priv->ac_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->ac_ip6_config);
if (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
if (priv->vpn6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->vpn6_config);
if (priv->ext_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->ext_ip6_config);
/* Merge WWAN config *last* to ensure modem-given settings overwrite
* any external stuff set by pppd or other scripts.
*/
if (priv->wwan_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->wwan_ip6_config);
/* Merge user overrides into the composite config. For assumed connections,
* con_ip6_config is empty. */
if (priv->con_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->con_ip6_config);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
/* Add the default route.
*
* We keep track of the default route of a device in a private field.
* NMDevice needs to know the default route at this point, because the gateway
* might require a direct route (see below).
*
* But also, we don't want to add the default route to priv->ip6_config,
* because the default route from the setting might not be the same that
* NMDefaultRouteManager eventually configures (because the it might
* tweak the effective metric).
*/
/* unless we come to a different conclusion below, we have no default route and
* the route is assumed. */
priv->default_route.v6_has = FALSE;
priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed = TRUE;
if (!commit) {
/* during a non-commit event, we always pickup whatever is configured. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
if (nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (self))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
/* we are about to commit (for a non-assumed connection). Enforce whatever we have
* configured. */
priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed = FALSE;
if ( !connection
|| !nm_default_route_manager_ip6_connection_has_default_route (nm_default_route_manager_get (), connection))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
if (!nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (composite)) {
/* without addresses we can have no default route. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
gateway = nm_ip6_config_get_gateway (composite);
if (!gateway)
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
has_direct_route = nm_ip6_config_get_direct_route_for_host (composite, gateway) != NULL;
priv->default_route.v6_has = TRUE;
memset (&priv->default_route.v6, 0, sizeof (priv->default_route.v6));
priv->default_route.v6.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_USER;
priv->default_route.v6.gateway = *gateway;
priv->default_route.v6.metric = nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (self);
priv->default_route.v6.mss = nm_ip6_config_get_mss (composite);
if (!has_direct_route) {
NMPlatformIP6Route r = priv->default_route.v6;
/* add a direct route to the gateway */
r.network = *gateway;
r.plen = 128;
r.gateway = in6addr_any;
nm_ip6_config_add_route (composite, &r);
}
END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE:
if (priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed) {
/* If above does not explicitly assign a default route, we always pick up the
* default route based on what is currently configured.
* That means that even managed connections with never-default, can
* get a default route (if configured externally).
*/
priv->default_route.v6_has = _device_get_default_route_from_platform (self, AF_INET6, (NMPlatformIPRoute *) &priv->default_route.v6);
}
nm_ip6_config_addresses_sort (composite,
priv->rdisc ? priv->rdisc_use_tempaddr : NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_PRIVACY_UNKNOWN);
/* Allow setting MTU etc */
if (commit) {
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip6_config_pre_commit)
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip6_config_pre_commit (self, composite);
}
success = nm_device_set_ip6_config (self, composite, commit, out_reason);
g_object_unref (composite);
return success;
}
static void
dhcp6_lease_change (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
if (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config == NULL) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP6, "failed to get DHCPv6 config for rebind");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
return;
}
g_assert (priv->dhcp6_client); /* sanity check */
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
/* Apply the updated config */
if (ip6_config_merge_and_apply (self, TRUE, &reason) == FALSE) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP6, "failed to update IPv6 config in response to DHCP event.");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
} else {
/* Notify dispatcher scripts of new DHCPv6 config */
nm_dispatcher_call (DISPATCHER_ACTION_DHCP6_CHANGE, connection, self, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
}
static void
dhcp6_fail (NMDevice *self, gboolean timeout)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
dhcp6_cleanup (self, TRUE, FALSE);
if (priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_MANAGED) {
if (timeout || (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF))
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
else if (priv->ip6_state == IP_DONE)
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
else
g_warn_if_reached ();
} else {
/* not a hard failure; just live with the RA info */
if (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
}
}
static void
dhcp6_timeout (NMDevice *self, NMDhcpClient *client)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_MANAGED)
dhcp6_fail (self, TRUE);
else {
/* not a hard failure; just live with the RA info */
dhcp6_cleanup (self, TRUE, FALSE);
if (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
}
}
static void
dhcp6_update_config (NMDevice *self, NMDhcp6Config *config, GHashTable *options)
{
GHashTableIter iter;
const char *key, *value;
/* Update the DHCP6 config object with new DHCP options */
nm_dhcp6_config_reset (config);
g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, options);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, (gpointer) &key, (gpointer) &value))
nm_dhcp6_config_add_option (config, key, value);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP6_CONFIG);
}
static void
dhcp6_state_changed (NMDhcpClient *client,
NMDhcpState state,
NMIP6Config *ip6_config,
GHashTable *options,
gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (nm_dhcp_client_get_ipv6 (client) == TRUE);
g_return_if_fail (!ip6_config || NM_IS_IP6_CONFIG (ip6_config));
_LOGD (LOGD_DHCP6, "new DHCPv6 client state %d", state);
switch (state) {
case NM_DHCP_STATE_BOUND:
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
if (ip6_config) {
priv->dhcp6_ip6_config = g_object_ref (ip6_config);
dhcp6_update_config (self, priv->dhcp6_config, options);
}
if (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF) {
if (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config == NULL) {
/* FIXME: Initial DHCP failed; should we fail IPv6 entirely then? */
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_FAILED);
break;
}
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
} else if (priv->ip6_state == IP_DONE)
dhcp6_lease_change (self);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_TIMEOUT:
dhcp6_timeout (self, client);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_EXPIRE:
/* Ignore expiry before we even have a lease (NAK, old lease, etc) */
if (priv->ip6_state != IP_CONF)
dhcp6_fail (self, FALSE);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_DONE:
/* In IPv6 info-only mode, the client doesn't handle leases so it
* may exit right after getting a response from the server. That's
* normal. In that case we just ignore the exit.
*/
if (priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_OTHERCONF)
break;
/* Otherwise, fall through */
case NM_DHCP_STATE_FAIL:
dhcp6_fail (self, FALSE);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static gboolean
dhcp6_start_with_link_ready (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip6;
GByteArray *tmp = NULL;
const guint8 *hw_addr;
size_t hw_addr_len = 0;
g_assert (connection);
s_ip6 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
g_assert (s_ip6);
hw_addr = nm_platform_link_get_address (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self), &hw_addr_len);
if (hw_addr_len) {
tmp = g_byte_array_sized_new (hw_addr_len);
g_byte_array_append (tmp, hw_addr, hw_addr_len);
}
priv->dhcp6_client = nm_dhcp_manager_start_ip6 (nm_dhcp_manager_get (),
nm_device_get_ip_iface (self),
nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self),
tmp,
nm_connection_get_uuid (connection),
nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (self),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_send_hostname (s_ip6),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_hostname (s_ip6),
priv->dhcp_timeout,
priv->dhcp_anycast_address,
(priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_OTHERCONF) ? TRUE : FALSE,
nm_setting_ip6_config_get_ip6_privacy (NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG (s_ip6)));
if (tmp)
g_byte_array_free (tmp, TRUE);
if (priv->dhcp6_client) {
priv->dhcp6_state_sigid = g_signal_connect (priv->dhcp6_client,
NM_DHCP_CLIENT_SIGNAL_STATE_CHANGED,
G_CALLBACK (dhcp6_state_changed),
self);
}
return !!priv->dhcp6_client;
}
static gboolean
dhcp6_start (NMDevice *self, gboolean wait_for_ll, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip6;
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_config);
priv->dhcp6_config = nm_dhcp6_config_new ();
g_warn_if_fail (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config == NULL);
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
s_ip6 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
if (!nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip6) ||
!strcmp (nm_setting_ip_config_get_method (s_ip6), NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP))
nm_device_add_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP6, TRUE);
if (wait_for_ll) {
NMActStageReturn ret;
/* ensure link local is ready... */
ret = linklocal6_start (self);
if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE) {
/* success; wait for the LL address to show up */
return TRUE;
}
/* success; already have the LL address; kick off DHCP */
g_assert (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS);
}
if (!dhcp6_start_with_link_ready (self, connection)) {
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_START_FAILED;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean
nm_device_dhcp6_renew (NMDevice *self, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_val_if_fail (priv->dhcp6_client != NULL, FALSE);
_LOGI (LOGD_DHCP6, "DHCPv6 lease renewal requested");
/* Terminate old DHCP instance and release the old lease */
dhcp6_cleanup (self, TRUE, release);
/* Start DHCP again on the interface */
return dhcp6_start (self, FALSE, NULL);
}
/******************************************/
static gboolean
have_ip6_address (const NMIP6Config *ip6_config, gboolean linklocal)
{
guint i;
if (!ip6_config)
return FALSE;
linklocal = !!linklocal;
for (i = 0; i < nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (ip6_config); i++) {
const NMPlatformIP6Address *addr = nm_ip6_config_get_address (ip6_config, i);
if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL (&addr->address) == linklocal) &&
!(addr->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
static void
linklocal6_cleanup (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->linklocal6_timeout_id) {
g_source_remove (priv->linklocal6_timeout_id);
priv->linklocal6_timeout_id = 0;
}
}
static gboolean
linklocal6_timeout_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = user_data;
linklocal6_cleanup (self);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "linklocal6: waiting for link-local addresses failed due to timeout");
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
return G_SOURCE_REMOVE;
}
static void
linklocal6_complete (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
const char *method;
g_assert (priv->linklocal6_timeout_id);
g_assert (have_ip6_address (priv->ip6_config, TRUE));
linklocal6_cleanup (self);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "linklocal6: waiting for link-local addresses successful, continue with method %s", method);
if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO) == 0) {
if (!addrconf6_start_with_link_ready (self)) {
/* Time out IPv6 instead of failing the entire activation */
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
}
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP) == 0) {
if (!dhcp6_start_with_link_ready (self, connection)) {
/* Time out IPv6 instead of failing the entire activation */
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
}
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL) == 0)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
else
g_return_if_fail (FALSE);
}
static void
check_and_add_ipv6ll_addr (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
int ip_ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId iid;
struct in6_addr lladdr;
guint i, n;
if (priv->nm_ipv6ll == FALSE)
return;
if (priv->ip6_config) {
n = nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (priv->ip6_config);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
const NMPlatformIP6Address *addr;
addr = nm_ip6_config_get_address (priv->ip6_config, i);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL (&addr->address)) {
/* Already have an LL address, nothing to do */
return;
}
}
}
if (!nm_device_get_ip_iface_identifier (self, &iid)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_IP6, "failed to get interface identifier; IPv6 may be broken");
return;
}
memset (&lladdr, 0, sizeof (lladdr));
lladdr.s6_addr16[0] = htons (0xfe80);
nm_utils_ipv6_addr_set_interface_identfier (&lladdr, iid);
_LOGD (LOGD_IP6, "adding IPv6LL address %s", nm_utils_inet6_ntop (&lladdr, NULL));
if (!nm_platform_ip6_address_add (ip_ifindex,
lladdr,
in6addr_any,
64,
NM_PLATFORM_LIFETIME_PERMANENT,
NM_PLATFORM_LIFETIME_PERMANENT,
0)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_IP6, "failed to add IPv6 link-local address %s",
nm_utils_inet6_ntop (&lladdr, NULL));
}
}
static NMActStageReturn
linklocal6_start (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
const char *method;
linklocal6_cleanup (self);
if (have_ip6_address (priv->ip6_config, TRUE))
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "linklocal6: starting IPv6 with method '%s', but the device has no link-local addresses configured. Wait.", method);
check_and_add_ipv6ll_addr (self);
priv->linklocal6_timeout_id = g_timeout_add_seconds (5, linklocal6_timeout_cb, self);
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE;
}
/******************************************/
static void
print_support_extended_ifa_flags (NMSettingIP6ConfigPrivacy use_tempaddr)
{
static gint8 warn = 0;
static gint8 s_libnl = -1, s_kernel;
if (warn >= 2)
return;
if (s_libnl == -1) {
s_libnl = !!nm_platform_check_support_libnl_extended_ifa_flags ();
s_kernel = !!nm_platform_check_support_kernel_extended_ifa_flags ();
if (s_libnl && s_kernel) {
nm_log_dbg (LOGD_IP6, "kernel and libnl support extended IFA_FLAGS (needed by NM for IPv6 private addresses)");
warn = 2;
return;
}
}
if ( use_tempaddr != NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_PRIVACY_PREFER_TEMP_ADDR
&& use_tempaddr != NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_PRIVACY_PREFER_PUBLIC_ADDR) {
if (warn == 0) {
nm_log_dbg (LOGD_IP6, "%s%s%s %s not support extended IFA_FLAGS (needed by NM for IPv6 private addresses)",
!s_kernel ? "kernel" : "",
!s_kernel && !s_libnl ? " and " : "",
!s_libnl ? "libnl" : "",
!s_kernel && !s_libnl ? "do" : "does");
warn = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!s_libnl && !s_kernel) {
nm_log_warn (LOGD_IP6, "libnl and the kernel do not support extended IFA_FLAGS needed by NM for "
"IPv6 private addresses. This feature is not available");
} else if (!s_libnl) {
nm_log_warn (LOGD_IP6, "libnl does not support extended IFA_FLAGS needed by NM for "
"IPv6 private addresses. This feature is not available");
} else if (!s_kernel) {
nm_log_warn (LOGD_IP6, "The kernel does not support extended IFA_FLAGS needed by NM for "
"IPv6 private addresses. This feature is not available");
}
warn = 2;
}
static void
rdisc_config_changed (NMRDisc *rdisc, NMRDiscConfigMap changed, NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
warn = 2;
}
static void
rdisc_config_changed (NMRDisc *rdisc, NMRDiscConfigMap changed, NMDevice *self)
{
address.preferred = discovered_address->preferred;
if (address.preferred > address.lifetime)
address.preferred = address.lifetime;
address.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_RDISC;
address.flags = ifa_flags;
nm_ip6_config_add_address (priv->ac_ip6_config, &address);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME NetworkManager allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (IPv6 traffic disruption) via a crafted MTU value in an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) message, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-8215.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,814
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gstd_accept(int fd, char **display_creds, char **export_name, char **mech)
{
gss_name_t client;
gss_OID mech_oid;
struct gstd_tok *tok;
gss_ctx_id_t ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
OM_uint32 maj, min;
int ret;
*display_creds = NULL;
*export_name = NULL;
out.length = 0;
in.length = 0;
read_packet(fd, &in, 60000, 1);
again:
while ((ret = read_packet(fd, &in, 60000, 0)) == -2)
;
if (ret < 1)
return NULL;
maj = gss_accept_sec_context(&min, &ctx, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
&in, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &client, &mech_oid, &out, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
if (out.length && write_packet(fd, &out)) {
gss_release_buffer(&min, &out);
return NULL;
}
GSTD_GSS_ERROR(maj, min, NULL, "gss_accept_sec_context");
if (maj & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
goto again;
*display_creds = gstd_get_display_name(client);
*export_name = gstd_get_export_name(client);
*mech = gstd_get_mech(mech_oid);
gss_release_name(&min, &client);
SETUP_GSTD_TOK(tok, ctx, fd, "gstd_accept");
return tok;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The read_packet function in knc (Kerberised NetCat) before 1.11-1 is vulnerable to denial of service (memory exhaustion) that can be exploited remotely without authentication, possibly affecting another services running on the targeted host.
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 169,432
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,j,ok;
long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (1 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
* also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len=4;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has
* sent an invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int rv;
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0)
{
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int num;
unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
q+=size;
j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The ssl3_get_key_exchange function in s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote SSL servers to conduct ECDHE-to-ECDH downgrade attacks and trigger a loss of forward secrecy by omitting the ServerKeyExchange message.
Commit Message: ECDH downgrade bug fix.
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 166,826
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
int a1_len, a2_len;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_error_handling error_handling;
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, NULL, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch(version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,972
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static noinline int btrfs_mksubvol(struct path *parent,
char *name, int namelen,
struct btrfs_root *snap_src,
u64 *async_transid, bool readonly,
struct btrfs_qgroup_inherit **inherit)
{
struct inode *dir = parent->dentry->d_inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
mutex_lock_nested(&dir->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent->dentry, namelen);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
goto out_unlock;
error = -EEXIST;
if (dentry->d_inode)
goto out_dput;
error = btrfs_may_create(dir, dentry);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
down_read(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
if (btrfs_root_refs(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->root_item) == 0)
goto out_up_read;
if (snap_src) {
error = create_snapshot(snap_src, dentry, name, namelen,
async_transid, readonly, inherit);
} else {
error = create_subvol(BTRFS_I(dir)->root, dentry,
name, namelen, async_transid, inherit);
}
if (!error)
fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
out_up_read:
up_read(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
out_dput:
dput(dentry);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->i_mutex);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The CRC32C feature in the Btrfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8-rc1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (prevention of file creation) by leveraging the ability to write to a directory important to the victim, and creating a file with a crafted name that is associated with a specific CRC32C hash value.
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
|
High
| 166,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
char *buf;
char *new_master_desc = NULL;
const char *format = NULL;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret = 0;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = valid_master_desc(new_master_desc, epayload->master_desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
goto out;
}
__ekey_init(new_epayload, epayload->format, new_master_desc,
epayload->datalen);
memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
memcpy(new_epayload->payload_data, epayload->payload_data,
epayload->payload_datalen);
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (BUG) via crafted keyctl commands that negatively instantiate a key, related to security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c, security/keys/trusted.c, and security/keys/user_defined.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 167,533
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
if (IsSameOriginOrCORSSuccessful())
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Lack of CORS checking by ResourceFetcher/ResourceLoader in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
|
Medium
| 172,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DelayedExecutor::delayedExecute(const QString &udi)
{
Solid::Device device(udi);
QString exec = m_service.exec();
MacroExpander mx(device);
mx.expandMacros(exec);
KRun::runCommand(exec, QString(), m_service.icon(), 0);
deleteLater();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: An issue was discovered in soliduiserver/deviceserviceaction.cpp in KDE Plasma Workspace before 5.12.0. When a vfat thumbdrive that contains `` or $() in its volume label is plugged in and mounted through the device notifier, it's interpreted as a shell command, leading to a possibility of arbitrary command execution. An example of an offending volume label is "$(touch b)" -- this will create a file called b in the home folder.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,024
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestEventTarget::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestEventTarget* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestEventTarget::s_info);
TestEventTarget* impl = static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSValue listener = exec->argument(1);
if (!listener.isObject())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->addEventListener(ustringToAtomicString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec)), JSEventListener::create(asObject(listener), castedThis, false, currentWorld(exec)), exec->argument(2).toBoolean(exec));
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_wbxml_attribute_list_defined (proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint32 offset, guint32 str_tbl, guint8 level, guint8 *codepage_attr,
const wbxml_decoding *map)
{
guint32 tvb_len = tvb_reported_length (tvb);
guint32 off = offset;
guint32 len;
guint str_len;
guint32 ent;
guint32 idx;
guint8 peek;
guint8 attr_save_known = 0; /* Will contain peek & 0x3F (attr identity) */
const char *attr_save_literal = NULL; /* Will contain the LITERAL attr identity */
DebugLog(("parse_wbxml_attr_defined (level = %u, offset = %u)\n",
level, offset));
/* Parse attributes */
while (off < tvb_len) {
peek = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off);
DebugLog(("ATTR: (top of while) level = %3u, peek = 0x%02X, "
"off = %u, tvb_len = %u\n", level, peek, off, tvb_len));
if ((peek & 0x3F) < 5) switch (peek) { /* Global tokens
in state = ATTR */
case 0x00: /* SWITCH_PAGE */
*codepage_attr = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 2,
" | Attr | A -->%3d "
"| SWITCH_PAGE (Attr code page) |",
*codepage_attr);
off += 2;
break;
case 0x01: /* END */
/* BEWARE
* The Attribute END token means either ">" or "/>"
* and as a consequence both must be treated separately.
* This is done in the TAG state parser.
*/
off++;
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
case 0x02: /* ENTITY */
ent = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| ENTITY "
"| %s'&#%u;'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level), ent);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x03: /* STR_I */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| STR_I (Inline string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x04: /* LITERAL */
/* ALWAYS means the start of a new attribute,
* and may only contain the NAME of the attribute.
*/
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
attr_save_known = 0;
attr_save_literal = tvb_format_text (tvb,
str_tbl+idx, str_len-1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| LITERAL (Literal Attribute) "
"| %s<%s />",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
attr_save_literal);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x40: /* EXT_I_0 */
case 0x41: /* EXT_I_1 */
case 0x42: /* EXT_I_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_I_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(%s: \'%s\')",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
map_token (map->global, 0, peek),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
/* 0x43 impossible in ATTR state */
/* 0x44 impossible in ATTR state */
case 0x80: /* EXT_T_0 */
case 0x81: /* EXT_T_1 */
case 0x82: /* EXT_T_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
{ char *s;
if (map->ext_t[peek & 0x03])
s = (map->ext_t[peek & 0x03])(tvb, idx, str_tbl);
else
s = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "EXT_T_%1x (%s)", peek & 0x03,
map_token (map->global, 0, peek));
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| EXT_T_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s%s)",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
s);
}
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x83: /* STR_T */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| STR_T (Tableref string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, str_tbl+idx, str_len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
/* 0x84 impossible in ATTR state */
case 0xC0: /* EXT_0 */
case 0xC1: /* EXT_1 */
case 0xC2: /* EXT_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(%s)",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
map_token (map->global, 0, peek));
off++;
break;
case 0xC3: /* OPAQUE - WBXML 1.1 and newer */
if (tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, 0)) { /* WBXML 1.x (x > 0) */
char *str;
if (attr_save_known) { /* Knwon attribute */
if (map->opaque_binary_attr) {
str = map->opaque_binary_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_known, *codepage_attr, &len);
} else {
str = default_opaque_binary_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_known, *codepage_attr, &len);
}
} else { /* lITERAL attribute */
if (map->opaque_literal_tag) {
str = map->opaque_literal_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_literal, *codepage_attr, &len);
} else {
str = default_opaque_literal_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_literal, *codepage_attr, &len);
}
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1 + len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| OPAQUE (Opaque data) "
"| %s%s",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level), str);
off += 1 + len;
} else { /* WBXML 1.0 - RESERVED_2 token (invalid) */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| RESERVED_2 (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML 1.0 parsing stops here.",
level, *codepage_attr);
/* Stop processing as it is impossible to parse now */
off = tvb_len;
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
break;
/* 0xC4 impossible in ATTR state */
default:
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| %-10s (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML parsing stops here.",
level, *codepage_attr,
val_to_str_ext (peek, &vals_wbxml1x_global_tokens_ext, "(unknown 0x%x)"));
/* Move to end of buffer */
off = tvb_len;
break;
} else { /* Known atribute token */
if (peek & 0x80) { /* attrValue */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| Known attrValue 0x%02X "
"| %s%s",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x7f, Indent (level),
map_token (map->attrValue, *codepage_attr, peek));
off++;
} else { /* attrStart */
attr_save_known = peek & 0x7f;
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| Known attrStart 0x%02X "
"| %s%s",
level, *codepage_attr, attr_save_known, Indent (level),
map_token (map->attrStart, *codepage_attr, peek));
off++;
}
}
} /* End WHILE */
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u (end of function body)\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-wbxml.c in the WBXML dissector in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 mishandles offsets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and infinite loop) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
|
Medium
| 167,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidCreateInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& instance_data) {
PepperRendererInstanceData data = instance_data;
data.render_process_id = render_process_id_;
in_process_host_->AddInstance(instance, data);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
|
Medium
| 172,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintInactiveTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const SkPath& clip) const {
bool has_custom_image;
int fill_id = tab_->controller()->GetBackgroundResourceId(&has_custom_image);
if (!has_custom_image)
fill_id = 0;
PaintTabBackground(canvas, false /* active */, fill_id, 0,
tab_->controller()->MaySetClip() ? &clip : nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,523
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedResponse(
const ResourceResponseInfo& info) {
if (!client_)
return;
WebURLResponse response;
response.initialize();
PopulateURLResponse(request_.url(), info, &response);
bool show_raw_listing = (GURL(request_.url()).query() == "raw");
if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir") {
if (show_raw_listing) {
response.setMIMEType("text/plain");
} else {
response.setMIMEType("text/html");
}
}
client_->didReceiveResponse(loader_, response);
if (!client_)
return;
DCHECK(!ftp_listing_delegate_.get());
DCHECK(!multipart_delegate_.get());
if (info.headers && info.mime_type == "multipart/x-mixed-replace") {
std::string content_type;
info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "content-type", &content_type);
std::string mime_type;
std::string charset;
bool had_charset = false;
std::string boundary;
net::HttpUtil::ParseContentType(content_type, &mime_type, &charset,
&had_charset, &boundary);
TrimString(boundary, " \"", &boundary);
if (!boundary.empty()) {
multipart_delegate_.reset(
new MultipartResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response, boundary));
}
} else if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir" &&
!show_raw_listing) {
ftp_listing_delegate_.reset(
new FtpDirectoryListingResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a 404 HTTP status code during the loading of resources.
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __kvm_migrate_pit_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
struct hrtimer *timer;
if (!kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) || !pit)
return;
timer = &pit->pit_state.timer;
if (hrtimer_cancel(timer))
hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the __kvm_migrate_pit_timer function in arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging incorrect PIT emulation.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
Medium
| 172,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask */
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct ipt_entry *e = (struct ipt_entry *)(entry0 + pos);
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)ipt_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
pr_err("iptables: loop hook %u pos %u %08X.\n",
hook, pos, e->comefrom);
return 0;
}
e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
"negative verdict (%i)\n",
t->verdict);
return 0;
}
/* Return: backtrack through the last
big jump. */
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_INET_NUMHOOKS);
#ifdef DEBUG_IP_FIREWALL_USER
if (e->comefrom
& (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
duprintf("Back unset "
"on hook %u "
"rule %u\n",
hook, pos);
}
#endif
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos);
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
if (newpos > newinfo->size -
sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
"bad verdict (%i)\n",
newpos);
return 0;
}
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
}
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next:
duprintf("Finished chain %u\n", hook);
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TabGroupHeader::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
constexpr SkColor kPlaceholderColor = SkColorSetRGB(0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC);
gfx::Rect fill_bounds(GetLocalBounds());
fill_bounds.Inset(TabStyle::GetTabOverlap(), 0);
canvas->FillRect(fill_bounds, kPlaceholderColor);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,518
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::Deserialize(const void* data,
size_t num_bytes,
const ports::PortName* ports,
size_t num_ports,
PlatformHandle* handles,
size_t num_handles) {
if (num_ports != 1 || num_handles != 1 ||
num_bytes != sizeof(SerializedState)) {
return nullptr;
}
const SerializedState* state = static_cast<const SerializedState*>(data);
if (!state->options.capacity_num_bytes || !state->options.element_num_bytes ||
state->options.capacity_num_bytes < state->options.element_num_bytes) {
return nullptr;
}
NodeController* node_controller = Core::Get()->GetNodeController();
ports::PortRef port;
if (node_controller->node()->GetPort(ports[0], &port) != ports::OK)
return nullptr;
auto region_handle = CreateSharedMemoryRegionHandleFromPlatformHandles(
std::move(handles[0]), PlatformHandle());
auto region = base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Take(
std::move(region_handle),
base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Mode::kUnsafe,
state->options.capacity_num_bytes,
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(state->buffer_guid_high,
state->buffer_guid_low));
auto ring_buffer =
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion::Deserialize(std::move(region));
if (!ring_buffer.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to deserialize shared buffer handle.";
return nullptr;
}
scoped_refptr<DataPipeConsumerDispatcher> dispatcher =
new DataPipeConsumerDispatcher(node_controller, port,
std::move(ring_buffer), state->options,
state->pipe_id);
{
base::AutoLock lock(dispatcher->lock_);
dispatcher->read_offset_ = state->read_offset;
dispatcher->bytes_available_ = state->bytes_available;
dispatcher->new_data_available_ = state->bytes_available > 0;
dispatcher->peer_closed_ = state->flags & kFlagPeerClosed;
if (!dispatcher->InitializeNoLock())
return nullptr;
dispatcher->UpdateSignalsStateNoLock();
}
return dispatcher;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Missing validation in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
|
Medium
| 173,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
struct iocb __user *__user *iocbpp, bool compat)
{
struct kioctx *ctx;
long ret = 0;
int i = 0;
struct blk_plug plug;
struct kiocb_batch batch;
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_submit: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
kiocb_batch_init(&batch, nr);
blk_start_plug(&plug);
/*
* AKPM: should this return a partial result if some of the IOs were
* successfully submitted?
*/
for (i=0; i<nr; i++) {
struct iocb __user *user_iocb;
struct iocb tmp;
if (unlikely(__get_user(user_iocb, iocbpp + i))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(&tmp, user_iocb, sizeof(tmp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret = io_submit_one(ctx, user_iocb, &tmp, &batch, compat);
if (ret)
break;
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
kiocb_batch_free(&batch);
put_ioctx(ctx);
return i ? i : ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The kiocb_batch_free function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) via vectors that trigger incorrect iocb management.
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
Low
| 165,652
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
gctx->taglen = -1;
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
if (arg <= 0)
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
if (gctx->iv == NULL)
return 0;
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
gctx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
/* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
if (arg == -1) {
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
* 8.
*/
if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
return 0;
if (arg)
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
&& RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
return 0;
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
return 0;
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
arg = gctx->ivlen;
memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
/*
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
{
unsigned int len =
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out);
if (gctx->gcm.key) {
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
else {
gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
}
default:
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305; users should upgrade to 1.1.0d. For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k.
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 168,431
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
base::WeakPtr<SSLErrorHandler::Delegate> delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
const ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal) {
DCHECK(delegate);
DVLOG(1) << "OnSSLCertificateError() cert_error: "
<< net::MapCertStatusToNetError(ssl_info.cert_status)
<< " id: " << id.child_id << "," << id.request_id
<< " resource_type: " << resource_type
<< " url: " << url.spec()
<< " render_process_id: " << render_process_id
<< " render_view_id: " << render_view_id
<< " cert_status: " << std::hex << ssl_info.cert_status;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SSLCertErrorHandler::Dispatch,
new SSLCertErrorHandler(delegate,
id,
resource_type,
url,
render_process_id,
render_view_id,
ssl_info,
fatal)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,996
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSGIImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
SGIInfo
iris_info;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y,
z;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SGI raster header.
*/
iris_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SGI identifier.
*/
if (iris_info.magic != 0x01DA)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.storage=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
switch (iris_info.storage)
{
case 0x00: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case 0x01: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((iris_info.bytes_per_pixel == 0) || (iris_info.bytes_per_pixel > 2))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.dimension=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((iris_info.depth == 0) || (iris_info.depth > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.minimum_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
iris_info.maximum_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
iris_info.sans=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(iris_info.name),(unsigned char *)
iris_info.name);
iris_info.name[sizeof(iris_info.name)-1]='\0';
if (*iris_info.name != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",iris_info.name);
iris_info.pixel_format=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (iris_info.pixel_format != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(iris_info.filler),iris_info.filler);
(void) count;
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
image->depth=(size_t) MagickMin(iris_info.depth,MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
if (iris_info.pixel_format == 0)
image->depth=(size_t) MagickMin((size_t) 8*
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel,MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
if (iris_info.depth < 3)
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=iris_info.bytes_per_pixel > 1 ? 65535 : 256;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Allocate SGI pixels.
*/
bytes_per_pixel=(size_t) iris_info.bytes_per_pixel;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) iris_info.columns*iris_info.rows;
if ((4*bytes_per_pixel*number_pixels) != ((MagickSizeType) (size_t)
(4*bytes_per_pixel*number_pixels)))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(iris_info.columns,iris_info.rows*4*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((int) iris_info.storage != 0x01)
{
unsigned char
*scanline;
/*
Read standard image format.
*/
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(iris_info.columns,
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
p=pixels+bytes_per_pixel*z;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*iris_info.columns,scanline);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) iris_info.columns; x++)
{
*p=scanline[2*x];
*(p+1)=scanline[2*x+1];
p+=8;
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) iris_info.columns; x++)
{
*p=scanline[x];
p+=4;
}
}
}
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
}
else
{
MemoryInfo
*packet_info;
size_t
*runlength;
ssize_t
offset,
*offsets;
unsigned char
*packets;
unsigned int
data_order;
/*
Read runlength-encoded image format.
*/
offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) iris_info.rows,
iris_info.depth*sizeof(*offsets));
runlength=(size_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(iris_info.rows,
iris_info.depth*sizeof(*runlength));
packet_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) iris_info.columns+10UL,4UL*
sizeof(*packets));
if ((offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL) ||
(runlength == (size_t *) NULL) ||
(packet_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
if (runlength == (size_t *) NULL)
runlength=(size_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
if (packet_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
packet_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(packet_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
packets=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(packet_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (iris_info.rows*iris_info.depth); i++)
offsets[i]=(int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (iris_info.rows*iris_info.depth); i++)
{
runlength[i]=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (runlength[i] > (4*(size_t) iris_info.columns+10))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Check data order.
*/
offset=0;
data_order=0;
for (y=0; ((y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows) && (data_order == 0)); y++)
for (z=0; ((z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth) && (data_order == 0)); z++)
{
if (offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows] < offset)
data_order=1;
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
}
offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
if (data_order == 1)
{
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
if (offset != offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows])
{
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows],
packets);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
offset+=(ssize_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows];
status=SGIDecode(bytes_per_pixel,(ssize_t)
(runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows]/bytes_per_pixel),packets,
1L*iris_info.columns,p+bytes_per_pixel*z);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
p+=(iris_info.columns*4*bytes_per_pixel);
}
}
}
else
{
MagickOffsetType
position;
position=TellBlob(image);
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
if (offset != offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows])
{
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows],
packets);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
offset+=(ssize_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows];
status=SGIDecode(bytes_per_pixel,(ssize_t)
(runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows]/bytes_per_pixel),packets,
1L*iris_info.columns,p+bytes_per_pixel*z);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
p+=(iris_info.columns*4*bytes_per_pixel);
}
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,position,SEEK_SET);
}
packet_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(packet_info);
runlength=(size_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->matte=iris_info.depth == 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
/*
Convert SGI raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Convert SGI image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*8*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+0) << 8) | (*(p+1)))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+2) << 8) | (*(p+3)))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+4) << 8) | (*(p+5)))));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+6) << 8) | (*(p+7)))));
p+=8;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*4*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
q->green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+1));
q->blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+3)));
p+=4;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create grayscale map.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Convert SGI image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*8*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
quantum=(*p << 8);
quantum|=(*(p+1));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,quantum);
p+=8;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*4*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p);
p+=4;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
iris_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (iris_info.magic == 0x01DA)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (iris_info.magic == 0x01DA);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base(random_factor);
if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor);
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The arch_pick_mmap_layout function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not properly randomize the legacy base address, which makes it easier for local users to defeat the intended restrictions on the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE flag, and bypass the ASLR protection mechanism for a setuid or setgid program, by disabling stack-consumption resource limits.
Commit Message: x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32
Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
(libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the
libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.
By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.
This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.
The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
allowed for too long.
Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
flags.
This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 167,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations(double timestamp) {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (!doc || display_blurred_ || !scripted_animation_controller_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "VRDisplay::OnVSync", "frame", vr_frame_id_);
AutoReset<bool> animating(&in_animation_frame_, true);
pending_raf_ = false;
scripted_animation_controller_->ServiceScriptedAnimations(timestamp);
if (is_presenting_ && !capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE, WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledWindowAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timestamp));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
|
Low
| 171,998
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool decode(const SharedBuffer& data, bool onlySize)
{
m_decodingSizeOnly = onlySize;
unsigned newByteCount = data.size() - m_bufferLength;
unsigned readOffset = m_bufferLength - m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer;
m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer += newByteCount;
m_info.src->next_input_byte = (JOCTET*)(data.data()) + readOffset;
if (m_bytesToSkip)
skipBytes(m_bytesToSkip);
m_bufferLength = data.size();
if (setjmp(m_err.setjmp_buffer))
return m_decoder->setFailed();
switch (m_state) {
case JPEG_HEADER:
if (jpeg_read_header(&m_info, true) == JPEG_SUSPENDED)
return false; // I/O suspension.
switch (m_info.jpeg_color_space) {
case JCS_GRAYSCALE:
case JCS_RGB:
case JCS_YCbCr:
m_info.out_color_space = rgbOutputColorSpace();
#if defined(TURBO_JPEG_RGB_SWIZZLE)
if (m_info.saw_JFIF_marker)
break;
if (m_info.saw_Adobe_marker && !m_info.Adobe_transform)
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_RGB;
#endif
break;
case JCS_CMYK:
case JCS_YCCK:
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_CMYK;
break;
default:
return m_decoder->setFailed();
}
m_state = JPEG_START_DECOMPRESS;
if (!m_decoder->setSize(m_info.image_width, m_info.image_height))
return false;
m_decoder->setOrientation(readImageOrientation(info()));
#if ENABLE(IMAGE_DECODER_DOWN_SAMPLING) && defined(TURBO_JPEG_RGB_SWIZZLE)
if (m_decoder->willDownSample() && turboSwizzled(m_info.out_color_space))
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_RGB;
#endif
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
if (!m_decoder->ignoresGammaAndColorProfile()) {
ColorProfile colorProfile = readColorProfile(info());
createColorTransform(colorProfile, colorSpaceHasAlpha(m_info.out_color_space));
#if defined(TURBO_JPEG_RGB_SWIZZLE)
if (m_transform && m_info.out_color_space == JCS_EXT_BGRA)
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_EXT_RGBA;
#endif
}
#endif
m_info.buffered_image = jpeg_has_multiple_scans(&m_info);
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&m_info);
m_samples = (*m_info.mem->alloc_sarray)((j_common_ptr) &m_info, JPOOL_IMAGE, m_info.output_width * 4, 1);
if (m_decodingSizeOnly) {
m_bufferLength -= m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer;
m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
return true;
}
case JPEG_START_DECOMPRESS:
m_info.dct_method = dctMethod();
m_info.dither_mode = ditherMode();
m_info.do_fancy_upsampling = doFancyUpsampling();
m_info.enable_2pass_quant = false;
m_info.do_block_smoothing = true;
if (!jpeg_start_decompress(&m_info))
return false; // I/O suspension.
m_state = (m_info.buffered_image) ? JPEG_DECOMPRESS_PROGRESSIVE : JPEG_DECOMPRESS_SEQUENTIAL;
case JPEG_DECOMPRESS_SEQUENTIAL:
if (m_state == JPEG_DECOMPRESS_SEQUENTIAL) {
if (!m_decoder->outputScanlines())
return false; // I/O suspension.
ASSERT(m_info.output_scanline == m_info.output_height);
m_state = JPEG_DONE;
}
case JPEG_DECOMPRESS_PROGRESSIVE:
if (m_state == JPEG_DECOMPRESS_PROGRESSIVE) {
int status;
do {
status = jpeg_consume_input(&m_info);
} while ((status != JPEG_SUSPENDED) && (status != JPEG_REACHED_EOI));
for (;;) {
if (!m_info.output_scanline) {
int scan = m_info.input_scan_number;
if (!m_info.output_scan_number && (scan > 1) && (status != JPEG_REACHED_EOI))
--scan;
if (!jpeg_start_output(&m_info, scan))
return false; // I/O suspension.
}
if (m_info.output_scanline == 0xffffff)
m_info.output_scanline = 0;
if (!m_decoder->outputScanlines()) {
if (!m_info.output_scanline)
m_info.output_scanline = 0xffffff;
return false; // I/O suspension.
}
if (m_info.output_scanline == m_info.output_height) {
if (!jpeg_finish_output(&m_info))
return false; // I/O suspension.
if (jpeg_input_complete(&m_info) && (m_info.input_scan_number == m_info.output_scan_number))
break;
m_info.output_scanline = 0;
}
}
m_state = JPEG_DONE;
}
case JPEG_DONE:
return jpeg_finish_decompress(&m_info);
case JPEG_ERROR:
return m_decoder->setFailed();
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8 before 3.14.5.3, as used in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52, does not properly implement garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,590
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
Rec2.RecordLength = 0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(BImgBuff,i,image,bpp);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 has a large loop vulnerability in ReadWPGImage in coders/wpg.c, causing CPU exhaustion via a crafted wpg image file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/654
|
Medium
| 167,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static double calcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Error in the linear composition arithmetic - only relevant when
* composition actually happens (0 < alpha < 1).
*/
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxcalc16;
else if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations)
return pm->maxcalcG;
else
return pm->maxcalc8;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_create_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
size_t pos;
UINT status;
UINT32 ChannelId;
wStream* data_out;
UINT channel_status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_CHANNEL_HANDLE;
if (drdynvc->state == DRDYNVC_STATE_CAPABILITIES)
{
/**
* For some reason the server does not always send the
* capabilities pdu as it should. When this happens,
* send a capabilities response.
*/
drdynvc->version = 3;
if ((status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "drdynvc_send_capability_response failed!");
return status;
}
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
}
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
pos = Stream_GetPosition(s);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "process_create_request: ChannelId=%"PRIu32" ChannelName=%s",
ChannelId,
Stream_Pointer(s));
channel_status = dvcman_create_channel(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId,
(char*) Stream_Pointer(s));
data_out = Stream_New(NULL, pos + 4);
if (!data_out)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
Stream_Write_UINT8(data_out, 0x10 | cbChId);
Stream_SetPosition(s, 1);
Stream_Copy(s, data_out, pos - 1);
if (channel_status == CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "channel created");
Stream_Write_UINT32(data_out, 0);
}
else
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "no listener");
Stream_Write_UINT32(data_out, (UINT32)0xC0000001); /* same code used by mstsc */
}
status = drdynvc_send(drdynvc, data_out);
if (status != CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "VirtualChannelWriteEx failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(status), status);
return status;
}
if (channel_status == CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
if ((status = dvcman_open_channel(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_open_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", status);
return status;
}
}
else
{
if ((status = dvcman_close_channel(drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_close_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", status);
}
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: FreeRDP FreeRDP 2.0.0-rc3 released version before commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3 contains a Other/Unknown vulnerability in channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c, drdynvc_process_capability_request that can result in The RDP server can read the client's memory.. This attack appear to be exploitable via RDPClient must connect the rdp server with echo option. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3.
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
|
Low
| 168,936
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
{
/* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the Cirrus VGA emulator (hw/display/cirrus_vga.c) in QEMU before 2.2.0 allows local guest users to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to blit regions. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because an incomplete fix for CVE-2007-1320.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
char buf[20];
int ret;
uid_t uid;
user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
cred = current_cred();
user = cred->user;
uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
if (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {
kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
return 0;
}
mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
ret = 0;
if (!user->uid_keyring) {
/* get the UID-specific keyring
* - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
* pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
* may have been destroyed by setuid */
sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
goto error;
}
}
/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
* already) */
sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
}
/* we install a link from the user session keyring to
* the user keyring */
ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_release_both;
}
/* install the keyrings */
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
}
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
error_release_both:
key_put(session_keyring);
error_release:
key_put(uid_keyring);
error:
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a local user could create keyrings for other users via keyctl commands, setting unwanted defaults or causing a denial of service.
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 169,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
/* Flush temporal reference */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,10);
/* Picture type */
ps_dec->e_pic_type = (e_pic_type_t)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
if((ps_dec->e_pic_type < I_PIC) || (ps_dec->e_pic_type > D_PIC))
{
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, PICTURE_START_CODE);
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_PIC_TYPE;
}
/* Flush vbv_delay */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,16);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == P_PIC || ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
}
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
}
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 == 0)
{
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][0] = ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][1] = ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code;
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][0] = ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][1] = ps_dec->u2_back_f_code;
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the extra bit value */
/* */
/* while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() == '1') */
/* { */
/* extra_bit_picture 1 */
/* extra_information_picture 8 */
/* } */
/* extra_bit_picture 1 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1 &&
ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,9);
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libmpeg2). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-64550583.
Commit Message: Adding Error Check for f_code Parameters
In MPEG1, the valid range for the forward and backward f_code parameters
is [1, 7]. Adding a check to enforce this. Without the check, the value
could be 0. We read (f_code - 1) bits from the stream and reading a
negative number of bits from the stream is undefined.
Bug: 64550583
Test: monitored temp ALOGD() output
Change-Id: Ia452cd43a28e9d566401f515947164635361782f
(cherry picked from commit 71d734b83d72e8a59f73f1230982da97615d2689)
|
Low
| 174,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ip_expire(unsigned long arg)
{
struct ipq *qp;
struct net *net;
qp = container_of((struct inet_frag_queue *) arg, struct ipq, q);
net = container_of(qp->q.net, struct net, ipv4.frags);
spin_lock(&qp->q.lock);
if (qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto out;
ipq_kill(qp);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMTIMEOUT);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
if ((qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN) && qp->q.fragments != NULL) {
struct sk_buff *head = qp->q.fragments;
rcu_read_lock();
head->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, qp->iif);
if (!head->dev)
goto out_rcu_unlock;
/*
* Only search router table for the head fragment,
* when defraging timeout at PRE_ROUTING HOOK.
*/
if (qp->user == IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_IN && !skb_dst(head)) {
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(head);
int err = ip_route_input(head, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
iph->tos, head->dev);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
/*
* Only an end host needs to send an ICMP
* "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message, per RFC792.
*/
if (skb_rtable(head)->rt_type != RTN_LOCAL)
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
/* Send an ICMP "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message. */
icmp_send(head, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_FRAGTIME, 0);
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
out:
spin_unlock(&qp->q.lock);
ipq_put(qp);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ip_expire function in net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly construct ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED packets after a timeout, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via crafted fragmented packets.
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,873
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ff_jpeg2000_cleanup(Jpeg2000Component *comp, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty)
{
int reslevelno, bandno, precno;
for (reslevelno = 0;
comp->reslevel && reslevelno < codsty->nreslevels;
reslevelno++) {
Jpeg2000ResLevel *reslevel = comp->reslevel + reslevelno;
for (bandno = 0; bandno < reslevel->nbands; bandno++) {
Jpeg2000Band *band = reslevel->band + bandno;
for (precno = 0; precno < reslevel->num_precincts_x * reslevel->num_precincts_y; precno++) {
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
av_freep(&prec->zerobits);
av_freep(&prec->cblkincl);
av_freep(&prec->cblk);
}
av_freep(&band->prec);
}
av_freep(&reslevel->band);
}
ff_dwt_destroy(&comp->dwt);
av_freep(&comp->reslevel);
av_freep(&comp->i_data);
av_freep(&comp->f_data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: libavcodec/jpeg2000.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data.
Commit Message: jpeg2000: fix dereferencing invalid pointers
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PPB_URLLoader_Impl::~PPB_URLLoader_Impl() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.97 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the URL loader.
Commit Message: Break path whereby AssociatedURLLoader::~AssociatedURLLoader() is re-entered on top of itself.
BUG=159429
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11359222
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168150 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,670
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IndexedDBCursor::~IndexedDBCursor() {
Close();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in IndexedDB in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Android, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
|
Medium
| 172,308
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionServiceBackend::OnExtensionInstalled(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (frontend_.get())
frontend_->OnExtensionInstalled(extension);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not ensure that developer-mode NPAPI extension installations are confirmed by a browser dialog, which makes it easier for remote attackers to modify the product's functionality via a Trojan horse extension.
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,408
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static boolean str_fill_input_buffer(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
{
int c;
struct str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
if (src->abort) return FALSE;
if (src->index == 0) {
c = 0xFF;
src->index++;
src->index++;
}
else if (src->index == 1) {
c = 0xD8;
src->index++;
}
else c = src->str->getChar();
if (c != EOF)
{
src->buffer = c;
src->pub.next_input_byte = &src->buffer;
src->pub.bytes_in_buffer = 1;
return TRUE;
}
else return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: DCTStream.cc in Poppler before 0.13.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,395
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ReadUserLogState::SetState( const ReadUserLog::FileState &state )
{
const ReadUserLogFileState::FileState *istate;
if ( !convertState(state, istate) ) {
return false;
}
if ( strcmp( istate->m_signature, FileStateSignature ) ) {
m_init_error = true;
return false;
}
if ( istate->m_version != FILESTATE_VERSION ) {
m_init_error = true;
return false;
}
m_base_path = istate->m_base_path;
m_max_rotations = istate->m_max_rotations;
Rotation( istate->m_rotation, false, true );
m_log_type = istate->m_log_type;
m_uniq_id = istate->m_uniq_id;
m_sequence = istate->m_sequence;
m_stat_buf.st_ino = istate->m_inode;
m_stat_buf.st_ctime = istate->m_ctime;
m_stat_buf.st_size = istate->m_size.asint;
m_stat_valid = true;
m_offset = istate->m_offset.asint;
m_event_num = istate->m_event_num.asint;
m_log_position = istate->m_log_position.asint;
m_log_record = istate->m_log_record.asint;
m_update_time = istate->m_update_time;
m_initialized = true;
MyString str;
GetStateString( str, "Restored reader state" );
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, str.Value() );
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,387
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_user_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
{
int change;
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
change = memcmp(&ucontrol->value, ue->elem_data, ue->elem_data_size) != 0;
if (change)
memcpy(ue->elem_data, &ucontrol->value, ue->elem_data_size);
return change;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the tlv handler functionality in the snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv function in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Medium
| 166,298
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Write(base::Pickle* m, const SkBitmap& p) {
size_t fixed_size = sizeof(SkBitmap_Data);
SkBitmap_Data bmp_data;
bmp_data.InitSkBitmapDataForTransfer(p);
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&bmp_data),
static_cast<int>(fixed_size));
size_t pixel_size = p.computeByteSize();
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(p.getPixels()),
static_cast<int>(pixel_size));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
|
Medium
| 172,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType EqualizeImage(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define EqualizeImageTag "Equalize/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
double
black[CompositePixelChannel+1],
*equalize_map,
*histogram,
*map,
white[CompositePixelChannel+1];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize histogram arrays.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
if (AccelerateEqualizeImage(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
#endif
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
equalize_map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,
GetPixelChannels(image)*sizeof(*equalize_map));
histogram=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*map));
if ((equalize_map == (double *) NULL) || (histogram == (double *) NULL) ||
(map == (double *) NULL))
{
if (map != (double *) NULL)
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (histogram != (double *) NULL)
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
if (equalize_map != (double *) NULL)
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
/*
Form histogram.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(histogram,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
intensity=p[i];
if ((image->channel_mask & SyncChannels) != 0)
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(image,p);
histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*ScaleQuantumToMap(intensity)+i]++;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
/*
Integrate the histogram to get the equalization map.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
register ssize_t
j;
intensity=0.0;
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
{
intensity+=histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i];
map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=intensity;
}
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(equalize_map,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*equalize_map));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(black,0,sizeof(*black));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(white,0,sizeof(*white));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
black[i]=map[i];
white[i]=map[GetPixelChannels(image)*MaxMap+i];
if (black[i] != white[i])
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=(double)
ScaleMapToQuantum((double) ((MaxMap*(map[
GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]-black[i]))/(white[i]-black[i])));
}
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
j;
/*
Equalize colormap.
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->colors; j++)
{
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,RedPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].red=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].red))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
GreenPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].green=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].green))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,BluePixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].blue=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].blue))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
AlphaPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].alpha=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].alpha))+
channel];
}
}
}
/*
Equalize image.
*/
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelWriteMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if (((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0) || (black[j] == white[j]))
continue;
q[j]=ClampToQuantum(equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(q[j])+j]);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_EqualizeImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,EqualizeImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in enhance.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
|
Medium
| 167,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string SanitizeRemoteFrontendURL(const std::string& value) {
GURL url(net::UnescapeURLComponent(value,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES | net::UnescapeRule::PATH_SEPARATORS |
net::UnescapeRule::URL_SPECIAL_CHARS_EXCEPT_PATH_SEPARATORS |
net::UnescapeRule::REPLACE_PLUS_WITH_SPACE));
std::string path = url.path();
std::vector<std::string> parts = base::SplitString(
path, "/", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
std::string revision = parts.size() > 2 ? parts[2] : "";
revision = SanitizeRevision(revision);
std::string filename = parts.size() ? parts[parts.size() - 1] : "";
if (filename != "devtools.html")
filename = "inspector.html";
path = base::StringPrintf("/serve_rev/%s/%s",
revision.c_str(), filename.c_str());
std::string sanitized = SanitizeFrontendURL(url, url::kHttpsScheme,
kRemoteFrontendDomain, path, true).spec();
return net::EscapeQueryParamValue(sanitized, false);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
Medium
| 172,463
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromObject( object, string ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int http_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags,
AVDictionary **options)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int ret;
if( s->seekable == 1 )
h->is_streamed = 0;
else
h->is_streamed = 1;
s->filesize = -1;
s->location = av_strdup(uri);
if (!s->location)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (options)
av_dict_copy(&s->chained_options, *options, 0);
if (s->headers) {
int len = strlen(s->headers);
if (len < 2 || strcmp("\r\n", s->headers + len - 2)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"No trailing CRLF found in HTTP header.\n");
ret = av_reallocp(&s->headers, len + 3);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->headers[len] = '\r';
s->headers[len + 1] = '\n';
s->headers[len + 2] = '\0';
}
}
if (s->listen) {
return http_listen(h, uri, flags, options);
}
ret = http_open_cnx(h, options);
if (ret < 0)
av_dict_free(&s->chained_options);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
|
Low
| 168,498
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nfsd_dispatch(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp)
{
struct svc_procedure *proc;
kxdrproc_t xdr;
__be32 nfserr;
__be32 *nfserrp;
dprintk("nfsd_dispatch: vers %d proc %d\n",
rqstp->rq_vers, rqstp->rq_proc);
proc = rqstp->rq_procinfo;
/*
* Give the xdr decoder a chance to change this if it wants
* (necessary in the NFSv4.0 compound case)
*/
rqstp->rq_cachetype = proc->pc_cachetype;
/* Decode arguments */
xdr = proc->pc_decode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, (__be32*)rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_base,
rqstp->rq_argp)) {
dprintk("nfsd: failed to decode arguments!\n");
*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
return 1;
}
/* Check whether we have this call in the cache. */
switch (nfsd_cache_lookup(rqstp)) {
case RC_DROPIT:
return 0;
case RC_REPLY:
return 1;
case RC_DOIT:;
/* do it */
}
/* need to grab the location to store the status, as
* nfsv4 does some encoding while processing
*/
nfserrp = rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_base
+ rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len;
rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len += sizeof(__be32);
/* Now call the procedure handler, and encode NFS status. */
nfserr = proc->pc_func(rqstp, rqstp->rq_argp, rqstp->rq_resp);
nfserr = map_new_errors(rqstp->rq_vers, nfserr);
if (nfserr == nfserr_dropit || test_bit(RQ_DROPME, &rqstp->rq_flags)) {
dprintk("nfsd: Dropping request; may be revisited later\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
return 0;
}
if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
*nfserrp++ = nfserr;
/* Encode result.
* For NFSv2, additional info is never returned in case of an error.
*/
if (!(nfserr && rqstp->rq_vers == 2)) {
xdr = proc->pc_encode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, nfserrp,
rqstp->rq_resp)) {
/* Failed to encode result. Release cache entry */
dprintk("nfsd: failed to encode result!\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
*statp = rpc_system_err;
return 1;
}
}
/* Store reply in cache. */
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, rqstp->rq_cachetype, statp + 1);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NFSv2/NFSv3 server in the nfsd subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.10.11 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a long RPC reply, related to net/sunrpc/svc.c, fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c, and fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c.
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_snmp_getvalue(struct variable_list *vars, zval *snmpval TSRMLS_DC, int valueretrieval)
{
zval *val;
char sbuf[512];
char *buf = &(sbuf[0]);
char *dbuf = (char *)NULL;
int buflen = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
int val_len = vars->val_len;
/* use emalloc() for large values, use static array otherwize */
/* There is no way to know the size of buffer snprint_value() needs in order to print a value there.
* So we are forced to probe it
*/
while ((valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) == 0) {
*buf = '\0';
if (snprint_value(buf, buflen, vars->name, vars->name_length, vars) == -1) {
if (val_len > 512*1024) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "snprint_value() asks for a buffer more than 512k, Net-SNMP bug?");
break;
}
/* buffer is not long enough to hold full output, double it */
val_len *= 2;
} else {
break;
}
if (buf == dbuf) {
dbuf = (char *)erealloc(dbuf, val_len + 1);
} else {
dbuf = (char *)emalloc(val_len + 1);
}
if (!dbuf) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed: %s, fallback to static buffer", strerror(errno));
buf = &(sbuf[0]);
buflen = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
break;
}
buf = dbuf;
buflen = val_len;
}
if((valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) && val_len > buflen){
if ((dbuf = (char *)emalloc(val_len + 1))) {
buf = dbuf;
buflen = val_len;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed: %s, fallback to static buffer", strerror(errno));
}
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
if (valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) {
*buf = 0;
switch (vars->type) {
case ASN_BIT_STR: /* 0x03, asn1.h */
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, (char *)vars->val.bitstring, vars->val_len, 1);
break;
case ASN_OCTET_STR: /* 0x04, asn1.h */
case ASN_OPAQUE: /* 0x44, snmp_impl.h */
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, (char *)vars->val.string, vars->val_len, 1);
break;
case ASN_NULL: /* 0x05, asn1.h */
ZVAL_NULL(val);
break;
case ASN_OBJECT_ID: /* 0x06, asn1.h */
snprint_objid(buf, buflen, vars->val.objid, vars->val_len / sizeof(oid));
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_IPADDRESS: /* 0x40, snmp_impl.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
(vars->val.string)[0], (vars->val.string)[1],
(vars->val.string)[2], (vars->val.string)[3]);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_COUNTER: /* 0x41, snmp_impl.h */
case ASN_GAUGE: /* 0x42, snmp_impl.h */
/* ASN_UNSIGNED is the same as ASN_GAUGE */
case ASN_TIMETICKS: /* 0x43, snmp_impl.h */
case ASN_UINTEGER: /* 0x47, snmp_impl.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%lu", *vars->val.integer);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_INTEGER: /* 0x02, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%ld", *vars->val.integer);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
#if defined(NETSNMP_WITH_OPAQUE_SPECIAL_TYPES) || defined(OPAQUE_SPECIAL_TYPES)
case ASN_OPAQUE_FLOAT: /* 0x78, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%f", *vars->val.floatVal);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_DOUBLE: /* 0x79, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%Lf", *vars->val.doubleVal);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_I64: /* 0x80, asn1.h */
printI64(buf, vars->val.counter64);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_U64: /* 0x81, asn1.h */
#endif
case ASN_COUNTER64: /* 0x46, snmp_impl.h */
printU64(buf, vars->val.counter64);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
default:
ZVAL_STRING(val, "Unknown value type", 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown value type: %u", vars->type);
break;
}
} else /* use Net-SNMP value translation */ {
/* we have desired string in buffer, just use it */
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
}
if (valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_OBJECT) {
object_init(snmpval);
add_property_long(snmpval, "type", vars->type);
add_property_zval(snmpval, "value", val);
} else {
*snmpval = *val;
zval_copy_ctor(snmpval);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&val);
if(dbuf){ /* malloc was used to store value */
efree(dbuf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,975
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebContents* TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::GetWebContentsForID(
int window_id,
std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(chrome_details_, window_id, &browser, error))
return nullptr;
WebContents* contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
*error = "No active web contents to capture";
return nullptr;
}
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(contents).id(), error)) {
return nullptr;
}
return contents;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
|
Medium
| 173,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetMultipleIntegervCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetMultipleIntegervCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint count = c.count;
uint32 pnames_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(count, sizeof(GLenum), &pnames_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLenum* pnames = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLenum*>(
c.pnames_shm_id, c.pnames_shm_offset, pnames_size);
if (pnames == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
scoped_array<GLenum> enums(new GLenum[count]);
memcpy(enums.get(), pnames, pnames_size);
uint32 num_results = 0;
for (GLuint ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
uint32 num = util_.GLGetNumValuesReturned(enums[ii]);
if (num == 0) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glGetMulitpleCHROMIUM", enums[ii], "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK_LE(num, 4u);
if (!SafeAdd(num_results, num, &num_results)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
uint32 result_size = 0;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_results, sizeof(GLint), &result_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result_size != static_cast<uint32>(c.size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetMulitpleCHROMIUM", "bad size GL_INVALID_VALUE");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint* results = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLint*>(
c.results_shm_id, c.results_shm_offset, result_size);
if (results == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
for (uint32 ii = 0; ii < num_results; ++ii) {
if (results[ii]) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
}
GLint* start = results;
for (GLuint ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
GLsizei num_written = 0;
if (!GetHelper(enums[ii], results, &num_written)) {
glGetIntegerv(enums[ii], results);
}
results += num_written;
}
if (static_cast<uint32>(results - start) != num_results) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 on Mac OS X allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,748
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mrb_io_initialize_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value copy)
{
mrb_value orig;
mrb_value buf;
struct mrb_io *fptr_copy;
struct mrb_io *fptr_orig;
mrb_bool failed = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &orig);
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)DATA_PTR(copy);
if (fptr_copy != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, fptr_copy, FALSE);
mrb_free(mrb, fptr_copy);
}
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr_orig = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, orig);
DATA_TYPE(copy) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(copy) = fptr_copy;
buf = mrb_iv_get(mrb, orig, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, copy, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), buf);
fptr_copy->fd = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd, &failed);
if (failed) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd);
if (fptr_orig->fd2 != -1) {
fptr_copy->fd2 = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd2, &failed);
if (failed) {
close(fptr_copy->fd);
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd2);
}
fptr_copy->pid = fptr_orig->pid;
fptr_copy->readable = fptr_orig->readable;
fptr_copy->writable = fptr_orig->writable;
fptr_copy->sync = fptr_orig->sync;
fptr_copy->is_socket = fptr_orig->is_socket;
return copy;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In versions of mruby up to and including 1.4.0, a use-after-free vulnerability exists in src/io.c::File#initilialize_copy(). An attacker that can cause Ruby code to be run can possibly use this to execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
|
Low
| 169,255
|
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