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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: main (int argc _GL_UNUSED, char **argv)
{
struct timespec result;
struct timespec result2;
struct timespec expected;
struct timespec now;
const char *p;
int i;
long gmtoff;
time_t ref_time = 1304250918;
/* Set the time zone to US Eastern time with the 2012 rules. This
should disable any leap second support. Otherwise, there will be
a problem with glibc on sites that default to leap seconds; see
<http://bugs.gnu.org/12206>. */
setenv ("TZ", "EST5EDT,M3.2.0,M11.1.0", 1);
gmtoff = gmt_offset (ref_time);
/* ISO 8601 extended date and time of day representation,
'T' separator, local time zone */
p = "2011-05-01T11:55:18";
expected.tv_sec = ref_time - gmtoff;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601 extended date and time of day representation,
' ' separator, local time zone */
p = "2011-05-01 11:55:18";
expected.tv_sec = ref_time - gmtoff;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601, extended date and time of day representation,
'T' separator, UTC */
p = "2011-05-01T11:55:18Z";
expected.tv_sec = ref_time;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601, extended date and time of day representation,
' ' separator, UTC */
p = "2011-05-01 11:55:18Z";
expected.tv_sec = ref_time;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601 extended date and time of day representation,
'T' separator, w/UTC offset */
p = "2011-05-01T11:55:18-07:00";
expected.tv_sec = 1304276118;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601 extended date and time of day representation,
' ' separator, w/UTC offset */
p = "2011-05-01 11:55:18-07:00";
expected.tv_sec = 1304276118;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601 extended date and time of day representation,
'T' separator, w/hour only UTC offset */
p = "2011-05-01T11:55:18-07";
expected.tv_sec = 1304276118;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* ISO 8601 extended date and time of day representation,
' ' separator, w/hour only UTC offset */
p = "2011-05-01 11:55:18-07";
expected.tv_sec = 1304276118;
expected.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, 0));
LOG (p, expected, result);
ASSERT (expected.tv_sec == result.tv_sec
&& expected.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "now";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
ASSERT (now.tv_sec == result.tv_sec && now.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "tomorrow";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
ASSERT (now.tv_sec + 24 * 60 * 60 == result.tv_sec
&& now.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "yesterday";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
ASSERT (now.tv_sec - 24 * 60 * 60 == result.tv_sec
&& now.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "4 hours";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
ASSERT (now.tv_sec + 4 * 60 * 60 == result.tv_sec
&& now.tv_nsec == result.tv_nsec);
/* test if timezone is not being ignored for day offset */
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+400 +24 hours";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC+400 +1 day";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
/* test if several time zones formats are handled same way */
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+14:00";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC+14";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
p = "UTC+1400";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC-14:00";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC-14";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
p = "UTC-1400";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+0:15";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC+0015";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC-1:30";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC-130";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
/* TZ out of range should cause parse_datetime failure */
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+25:00";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
/* Check for several invalid countable dayshifts */
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+4:00 +40 yesterday";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
p = "UTC+4:00 next yesterday";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
p = "UTC+4:00 tomorrow ago";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
p = "UTC+4:00 tomorrow hence";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
p = "UTC+4:00 40 now ago";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
p = "UTC+4:00 last tomorrow";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
p = "UTC+4:00 -4 today";
ASSERT (!parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
/* And check correct usage of dayshifts */
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+400 tomorrow";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC+400 +1 day";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
p = "UTC+400 1 day hence";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+400 yesterday";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC+400 1 day ago";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
now.tv_sec = 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
p = "UTC+400 now";
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
p = "UTC+400 +0 minutes"; /* silly, but simple "UTC+400" is different*/
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result2, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result2);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == result2.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == result2.tv_nsec);
/* Check that some "next Monday", "last Wednesday", etc. are correct. */
setenv ("TZ", "UTC0", 1);
for (i = 0; day_table[i]; i++)
{
unsigned int thur2 = 7 * 24 * 3600; /* 2nd thursday */
char tmp[32];
sprintf (tmp, "NEXT %s", day_table[i]);
now.tv_sec = thur2 + 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, tmp, &now));
LOG (tmp, now, result);
ASSERT (result.tv_nsec == 0);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == thur2 + (i == 4 ? 7 : (i + 3) % 7) * 24 * 3600);
sprintf (tmp, "LAST %s", day_table[i]);
now.tv_sec = thur2 + 4711;
now.tv_nsec = 1267;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, tmp, &now));
LOG (tmp, now, result);
ASSERT (result.tv_nsec == 0);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == thur2 + ((i + 3) % 7 - 7) * 24 * 3600);
}
p = "THURSDAY UTC+00"; /* The epoch was on Thursday. */
now.tv_sec = 0;
now.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == now.tv_sec
&& result.tv_nsec == now.tv_nsec);
p = "FRIDAY UTC+00";
now.tv_sec = 0;
now.tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT (parse_datetime (&result, p, &now));
LOG (p, now, result);
ASSERT (result.tv_sec == 24 * 3600
&& result.tv_nsec == now.tv_nsec);
/* Exercise a sign-extension bug. Before July 2012, an input
starting with a high-bit-set byte would be treated like "0". */
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "\xb0", &now));
/* Exercise TZ="" parsing code. */
/* These two would infloop or segfault before Feb 2014. */
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\"\"", &now));
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\" \"", &now));
/* Exercise invalid patterns. */
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"", &now));
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\\\"", &now));
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\\n", &now));
ASSERT ( ! parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\\n\"", &now));
/* Exercise valid patterns. */
ASSERT ( parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\"", &now));
ASSERT ( parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\" ", &now));
ASSERT ( parse_datetime (&result, " TZ=\"\"", &now));
ASSERT ( parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\\\\\"", &now));
ASSERT ( parse_datetime (&result, "TZ=\"\\\"\"", &now));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Gnulib before 2017-04-26 has a heap-based buffer overflow with the TZ environment variable. The error is in the save_abbr function in time_rz.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckFramebufferValid(
Framebuffer* framebuffer,
GLenum target, const char* func_name) {
if (!framebuffer) {
if (backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_) {
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
offscreen_target_color_format_) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
glClearStencil(0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
glClearDepth(1.0f);
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_);
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ = 0;
RestoreClearState();
}
return true;
}
if (framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
return true;
}
GLenum completeness = framebuffer->IsPossiblyComplete();
if (completeness != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name, "framebuffer incomplete");
return false;
}
if (renderbuffer_manager()->HaveUnclearedRenderbuffers() ||
texture_manager()->HaveUnclearedMips()) {
if (!framebuffer->IsCleared()) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (clear)");
return false;
}
ClearUnclearedAttachments(target, framebuffer);
}
}
if (!framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (check)");
return false;
}
framebuffer_manager()->MarkAsComplete(framebuffer);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not ensure that clear calls interact properly with the state of a draw buffer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via a crafted CANVAS element, related to gpu/command_buffer/service/framebuffer_manager.cc and gpu/command_buffer/service/gles2_cmd_decoder.cc.
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_tlv_ioctl(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_tlv __user *_tlv,
int op_flag)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_tlv tlv;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&tlv, _tlv, sizeof(tlv)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tlv.length < sizeof(unsigned int) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_numid(card, tlv.numid);
if (kctl == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (kctl->tlv.p == NULL) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
vd = &kctl->vd[tlv.numid - kctl->id.numid];
if ((op_flag == 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ) == 0) ||
(op_flag > 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_WRITE) == 0) ||
(op_flag < 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_COMMAND) == 0)) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK) {
if (vd->owner != NULL && vd->owner != file) {
err = -EPERM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
err = kctl->tlv.c(kctl, op_flag, tlv.length, _tlv->tlv);
if (err > 0) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV, &kctl->id);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (op_flag) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
len = kctl->tlv.p[1] + 2 * sizeof(unsigned int);
if (tlv.length < len) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (copy_to_user(_tlv->tlv, kctl->tlv.p, len))
err = -EFAULT;
}
__kctl_end:
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 does not ensure possession of a read/write lock, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) and obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 166,295
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FormAssociatedElement::formRemovedFromTree(const Node* formRoot)
{
ASSERT(m_form);
if (toHTMLElement(this)->highestAncestor() != formRoot)
setForm(0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The OneClickSigninBubbleView::WindowClosing function in browser/ui/views/sync/one_click_signin_bubble_view.cc in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allows attackers to trigger a sync with an arbitrary Google account by leveraging improper handling of the closing of an untrusted signin confirm dialog.
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,718
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
assert((cc0%rowsize)==0);
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,879
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dhcp6opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct dhcp6opt *dh6o;
const u_char *tp;
size_t i;
uint16_t opttype;
size_t optlen;
uint8_t auth_proto;
u_int authinfolen, authrealmlen;
int remain_len; /* Length of remaining options */
int label_len; /* Label length */
uint16_t subopt_code;
uint16_t subopt_len;
if (cp == ep)
return;
while (cp < ep) {
if (ep < cp + sizeof(*dh6o))
goto trunc;
dh6o = (const struct dhcp6opt *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(*dh6o);
optlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh6o->dh6opt_len);
if (ep < cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen)
goto trunc;
opttype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh6o->dh6opt_type);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s", tok2str(dh6opt_str, "opt_%u", opttype)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(cp + sizeof(*dh6o)), optlen);
switch (opttype) {
case DH6OPT_CLIENTID:
case DH6OPT_SERVERID:
if (optlen < 2) {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)) {
case 1:
if (optlen >= 2 + 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hwaddr/time type %u time %u ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[2]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[4])));
for (i = 8; i < optlen; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
}
break;
case 2:
if (optlen >= 2 + 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " vid "));
for (i = 2; i < 2 + 8; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
}
break;
case 3:
if (optlen >= 2 + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hwaddr type %u ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[2])));
for (i = 4; i < optlen; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type %d)", EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)));
break;
}
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_ADDR:
if (optlen < 24) {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[0])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pltime:%u vltime:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[16]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[20])));
if (optlen > 24) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 24, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_ORO:
case DH6OPT_ERO:
if (optlen % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
for (i = 0; i < optlen; i += 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
tok2str(dh6opt_str, "opt_%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[i]))));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_PREFERENCE:
if (optlen != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d)", *tp));
break;
case DH6OPT_ELAPSED_TIME:
if (optlen != 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d)", EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)));
break;
case DH6OPT_RELAY_MSG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
dhcp6_print(ndo, tp, optlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTH:
if (optlen < 11) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
auth_proto = *tp;
switch (auth_proto) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_DELAYED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " proto: delayed"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_RECONFIG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " proto: reconfigure"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " proto: %d", auth_proto));
break;
}
tp++;
switch (*tp) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHALG_HMACMD5:
/* XXX: may depend on the protocol */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", alg: HMAC-MD5"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", alg: %d", *tp));
break;
}
tp++;
switch (*tp) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHRDM_MONOCOUNTER:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RDM: mono"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RDM: %d", *tp));
break;
}
tp++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RD:"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, tp += 2)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)));
/* protocol dependent part */
authinfolen = optlen - 11;
switch (auth_proto) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_DELAYED:
if (authinfolen == 0)
break;
if (authinfolen < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ??"));
break;
}
authrealmlen = authinfolen - 20;
if (authrealmlen > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", realm: "));
}
for (i = 0; i < authrealmlen; i++, tp++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *tp));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", key ID: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
tp += 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", HMAC-MD5:"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, tp+= 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_RECONFIG:
if (authinfolen != 17) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ??"));
break;
}
switch (*tp++) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHRECONFIG_KEY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reconfig-key"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTHRECONFIG_HMACMD5:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type: HMAC-MD5"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type: ??"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " value:"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, tp+= 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ??"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_RAPID_COMMIT: /* nothing todo */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_INTERFACE_ID:
case DH6OPT_SUBSCRIBER_ID:
/*
* Since we cannot predict the encoding, print hex dump
* at most 10 characters.
*/
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen && i < 10; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
break;
case DH6OPT_RECONF_MSG:
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
switch (*tp) {
case DH6_RENEW:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for renew)"));
break;
case DH6_INFORM_REQ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for inf-req)"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for ?\?\?(%02x))", *tp));
break;
}
break;
case DH6OPT_RECONF_ACCEPT: /* nothing todo */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_SIP_SERVER_A:
case DH6OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_SNTP_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_NIS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_NISP_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_BCMCS_SERVER_A:
case DH6OPT_PANA_AGENT:
case DH6OPT_LQ_CLIENT_LINK:
if (optlen % 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
for (i = 0; i < optlen; i += 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[i])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_SIP_SERVER_D:
case DH6OPT_DOMAIN_LIST:
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
while (tp < cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_STATUS_CODE:
if (optlen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s)", dhcp6stcode(EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[0]))));
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_NA:
case DH6OPT_IA_PD:
if (optlen < 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " IAID:%u T1:%u T2:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[4]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[8])));
if (optlen > 12) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 12, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_TA:
if (optlen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " IAID:%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
if (optlen > 4) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 4, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_PD_PREFIX:
if (optlen < 25) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s/%d", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[9]), tp[8]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pltime:%u vltime:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[4])));
if (optlen > 25) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 25, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_LIFETIME:
case DH6OPT_CLT_TIME:
if (optlen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d)", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
break;
case DH6OPT_REMOTE_ID:
if (optlen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d ", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
/*
* Print hex dump first 10 characters.
*/
for (i = 4; i < optlen && i < 14; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
break;
case DH6OPT_LQ_QUERY:
if (optlen < 17) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
switch (*tp) {
case 1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " by-address"));
break;
case 2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " by-clientID"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type_%d", (int)*tp));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[1])));
if (optlen > 17) {
/* there are query-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 17, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_CLIENT_DATA:
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
if (optlen > 0) {
/* there are encapsulated options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_LQ_RELAY_DATA:
if (optlen < 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s ", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[0])));
/*
* Print hex dump first 10 characters.
*/
for (i = 16; i < optlen && i < 26; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
break;
case DH6OPT_NTP_SERVER:
if (optlen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
while (tp < cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen - 4) {
subopt_code = EXTRACT_16BITS(tp);
tp += 2;
subopt_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tp);
tp += 2;
if (tp + subopt_len > cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subopt:%d", subopt_code));
switch (subopt_code) {
case DH6OPT_NTP_SUBOPTION_SRV_ADDR:
case DH6OPT_NTP_SUBOPTION_MC_ADDR:
if (subopt_len != 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[0])));
break;
case DH6OPT_NTP_SUBOPTION_SRV_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (ns_nprint(ndo, tp, tp + subopt_len) == NULL)
goto trunc;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?"));
break;
}
tp += subopt_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AFTR_NAME:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
remain_len = optlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
/* Encoding is described in section 3.1 of RFC 1035 */
while (remain_len && *tp) {
label_len = *tp++;
if (label_len < remain_len - 1) {
(void)fn_printn(ndo, tp, label_len, NULL);
tp += label_len;
remain_len -= (label_len + 1);
if(*tp) ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?"));
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_NEW_POSIX_TIMEZONE: /* all three of these options */
case DH6OPT_NEW_TZDB_TIMEZONE: /* are encoded similarly */
case DH6OPT_MUDURL: /* although GMT might not work */
if (optlen < 5) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "="));
(void)fn_printn(ndo, tp, (u_int)optlen, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
}
cp += sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|dhcp6ext]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The DHCPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-dhcp6.c:dhcp6opt_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13017/DHCPv6: Add a missing option length check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,875
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::ResumeAttachOrDestroy(
int32_t element_instance_id,
int32_t plugin_frame_routing_id) {
auto it = frame_navigation_helpers_.find(element_instance_id);
if (it == frame_navigation_helpers_.end()) {
return;
}
auto* plugin_rfh = content::RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_id_,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
auto* helper = it->second.get();
auto* guest_view = helper->GetGuestView();
if (!guest_view)
return;
if (plugin_rfh) {
DCHECK(
guest_view->web_contents()->CanAttachToOuterContentsFrame(plugin_rfh));
guest_view->AttachToOuterWebContentsFrame(plugin_rfh, element_instance_id,
helper->is_full_page_plugin());
} else {
guest_view->GetEmbedderFrame()->Send(
new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_DestroyFrameContainer(element_instance_id));
guest_view->Destroy(true);
}
frame_navigation_helpers_.erase(element_instance_id);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,048
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element& element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
result.append('\n');
MarkupFormatter::appendComment(result, String::format(" saved from url=(%04d)%s ",
static_cast<int>(document().url().string().utf8().length()),
document().url().string().utf8().data()));
result.append('\n');
}
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.appendLiteral("<base href=\".\"");
if (!document().baseTarget().isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral(" target=\"");
MarkupFormatter::appendAttributeValue(result, document().baseTarget(), document().isHTMLDocument());
result.append('"');
}
if (document().isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral(" />");
else
result.appendLiteral(">");
} else {
SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The page serializer in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 mishandles Mark of the Web (MOTW) comments for URLs containing a *--* sequence, which might allow remote attackers to inject HTML via a crafted URL, as demonstrated by an initial http://example.com?-- substring.
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
|
Medium
| 171,785
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: exsltFuncFunctionComp (xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
xmlChar *name, *prefix;
xmlNsPtr ns;
xmlHashTablePtr data;
exsltFuncFunctionData *func;
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
{
xmlChar *qname;
qname = xmlGetProp(inst, (const xmlChar *) "name");
name = xmlSplitQName2 (qname, &prefix);
xmlFree(qname);
}
if ((name == NULL) || (prefix == NULL)) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"func:function: not a QName\n");
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
return;
}
/* namespace lookup */
ns = xmlSearchNs (inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"func:function: undeclared prefix %s\n",
prefix);
xmlFree(name);
xmlFree(prefix);
return;
}
xmlFree(prefix);
xsltParseTemplateContent(style, inst);
/*
* Create function data
*/
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
func->content = inst->children;
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(func->content) &&
IS_XSLT_NAME(func->content, "param")) {
func->content = func->content->next;
func->nargs++;
}
/*
* Register the function data such that it can be retrieved
* by exslFuncFunctionFunction
*/
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Ensure that the hash table will be stored in the *current*
* stylesheet level in order to correctly evaluate the
* import precedence.
*/
data = (xmlHashTablePtr)
xsltStyleStylesheetLevelGetExtData(style,
EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
#else
data = (xmlHashTablePtr)
xsltStyleGetExtData (style, EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
#endif
if (data == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionComp: no stylesheet data\n");
xmlFree(name);
return;
}
if (xmlHashAddEntry2 (data, ns->href, name, func) < 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
ns->href, name);
style->errors++;
} else {
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionComp: register {%s}%s\n",
ns->href, name);
}
xmlFree(name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void WritePixel(struct ngiflib_img * i, struct ngiflib_decode_context * context, u8 v) {
struct ngiflib_gif * p = i->parent;
if(v!=i->gce.transparent_color || !i->gce.transparent_flag) {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
*context->frbuff_p.p8 = v;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else
*context->frbuff_p.p32 =
GifIndexToTrueColor(i->palette, v);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
if(--(context->Xtogo) <= 0) {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(p->line_cb) p->line_cb(p, context->line_p, context->curY);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
context->Xtogo = i->width;
switch(context->pass) {
case 0:
context->curY++;
break;
case 1: /* 1st pass : every eighth row starting from 0 */
context->curY += 8;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 4;
}
break;
case 2: /* 2nd pass : every eighth row starting from 4 */
context->curY += 8;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 2;
}
break;
case 3: /* 3rd pass : every fourth row starting from 2 */
context->curY += 4;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 1;
}
break;
case 4: /* 4th pass : every odd row */
context->curY += 2;
break;
}
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p8 = context->line_p.p8 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p32 = context->line_p.p32 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
} else {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
context->frbuff_p.p8++;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
context->frbuff_p.p32++;
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ngiflib 0.4 has a heap-based buffer overflow in WritePixels() in ngiflib.c when called from DecodeGifImg, because deinterlacing for small pictures is mishandled.
Commit Message: fix deinterlacing for small pictures
fixes #12
|
Medium
| 169,511
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_write_init_3(png_structpp ptr_ptr, png_const_charp user_png_ver,
png_size_t png_struct_size)
{
png_structp png_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* to save current jump buffer */
#endif
int i = 0;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
do
{
if (user_png_ver[i] != png_libpng_ver[i])
{
#ifdef PNG_LEGACY_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_LIBRARY_MISMATCH;
#else
png_ptr->warning_fn = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Application uses deprecated png_write_init() and should be recompiled.");
#endif
}
i++;
} while (png_libpng_ver[i] != 0 && user_png_ver[i] != 0);
png_debug(1, "in png_write_init_3");
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Save jump buffer and error functions */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
if (png_sizeof(png_struct) > png_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(png_ptr);
png_ptr = (png_structp)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_PNG);
*ptr_ptr = png_ptr;
}
/* Reset all variables to 0 */
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
/* Added at libpng-1.2.6 */
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->user_width_max = PNG_USER_WIDTH_MAX;
png_ptr->user_height_max = PNG_USER_HEIGHT_MAX;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Restore jump buffer */
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
png_set_write_fn(png_ptr, png_voidp_NULL, png_rw_ptr_NULL,
png_flush_ptr_NULL);
/* Initialize zbuf - compression buffer */
png_ptr->zbuf_size = PNG_ZBUF_SIZE;
png_ptr->zbuf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_set_filter_heuristics(png_ptr, PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_DEFAULT,
1, png_doublep_NULL, png_doublep_NULL);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,190
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseStringEntityRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar ** str) {
xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *ptr;
xmlChar cur;
xmlEntityPtr ent = NULL;
if ((str == NULL) || (*str == NULL))
return(NULL);
ptr = *str;
cur = *ptr;
if (cur != '&')
return(NULL);
ptr++;
name = xmlParseStringName(ctxt, &ptr);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseStringEntityRef: no name\n");
*str = ptr;
return(NULL);
}
if (*ptr != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(NULL);
}
ptr++;
/*
* Predefined entites override any extra definition
*/
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) == 0) {
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if (ent != NULL) {
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(ent);
}
}
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Ask first SAX for entity resolution, otherwise try the
* entities which may have stored in the parser context.
*/
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL)
ent = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((ent == NULL) && (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX))
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if ((ent == NULL) && (ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
ent = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", the
* Name given in the entity reference must match that in an
* entity declaration, except that well-formed documents
* need not declare any of the following entities: amp, lt,
* gt, apos, quot.
* The declaration of a parameter entity must precede any
* reference to it.
* Similarly, the declaration of a general entity must
* precede any reference to it which appears in a default
* value in an attribute-list declaration. Note that if
* entities are declared in the external subset or in
* external parameter entities, a non-validating processor
* is not obligated to read and process their declarations;
* for such documents, the rule that an entity must be
* declared is a well-formedness constraint only if
* standalone='yes'.
*/
if (ent == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
} else {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n",
name);
}
/* TODO ? check regressions ctxt->valid = 0; */
}
/*
* [ WFC: Parsed Entity ]
* An entity reference must not contain the name of an
* unparsed entity
*/
else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNPARSED_ENTITY,
"Entity reference to unparsed entity %s\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No External Entity References ]
* Attribute values cannot contain direct or indirect
* entity references to external entities.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_EXTERNAL,
"Attribute references external entity '%s'\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No < in Attribute Values ]
* The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or
* indirectly in an attribute value (other than "<") must
* not contain a <.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent != NULL) && (ent->content != NULL) &&
(ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(xmlStrchr(ent->content, '<'))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE,
"'<' in entity '%s' is not allowed in attributes values\n",
name);
}
/*
* Internal check, no parameter entities here ...
*/
else {
switch (ent->etype) {
case XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
case XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_PARAMETER,
"Attempt to reference the parameter entity '%s'\n",
name);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: No Recursion ]
* A parsed entity must not contain a recursive reference
* to itself, either directly or indirectly.
* Done somewhere else
*/
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(ent);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int ret, needed_blocks;
handle_t *handle;
int retries = 0;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index;
unsigned from, to;
trace_ext4_write_begin(inode, pos, len, flags);
/*
* Reserve one block more for addition to orphan list in case
* we allocate blocks but write fails for some reason
*/
needed_blocks = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode) + 1;
index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
to = from + len;
retry:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, needed_blocks);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
/* We cannot recurse into the filesystem as the transaction is already
* started */
flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!page) {
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*pagep = page;
ret = block_write_begin(file, mapping, pos, len, flags, pagep, fsdata,
ext4_get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page),
from, to, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access);
}
if (ret) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
/*
* block_write_begin may have instantiated a few blocks
* outside i_size. Trim these off again. Don't need
* i_size_read because we hold i_mutex.
*
* Add inode to orphan list in case we crash before
* truncate finishes
*/
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might
* still be on the orphan list; we need to
* make sure the inode is removed from the
* orphan list in that case.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
}
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry;
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual uint8_t* GetReference(int block_idx) {
return reference_data_ + block_idx * kDataBlockSize;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,573
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary() {
WebContentsImpl* old_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (old_contents == this)
return;
GetOutermostWebContents()->node_.SetFocusedWebContents(this);
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(this) && browser_plugin_guest_)
return;
if (old_contents)
old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(false);
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate())
GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()->SetFocusedFrame();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost()
->SetPageFocus(true);
} else {
GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(true);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
|
Low
| 173,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2:
ctxt->_eip = (u16)dst;
break;
case 4:
ctxt->_eip = (u32)dst;
break;
case 8:
ctxt->_eip = dst;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported eip assignment size\n");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 169,908
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int iwch_cxgb3_ofld_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int error = 0;
struct cxio_rdev *rdev;
rdev = (struct cxio_rdev *)tdev->ulp;
if (cxio_fatal_error(rdev)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
error = cxgb3_ofld_send(tdev, skb);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not properly identify error conditions, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = 0;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = pinctrl_register(&amd_pinctrl_desc,
&pdev->dev, gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
goto out1;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
out1:
pinctrl_unregister(gpio_dev->pctrl);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.7, the amd_gpio_remove function in drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c calls the pinctrl_unregister function, leading to a double free.
Commit Message: pinctrl: amd: Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pinctrl registration
Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pin control registration and clean
error path.
Signed-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
|
Low
| 170,172
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
Medium
| 170,087
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PassRefPtr<Uint8Array> copySkImageData(SkImage* input,
const SkImageInfo& info) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer =
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(width * input->height(), info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
input->readPixels(info, dstPixels->data(), width * info.bytesPerPixel(), 0,
0);
return dstPixels;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDAT_list_extend(struct IDAT_list *tail)
{
/* Use the previous cached value if available. */
struct IDAT_list *next = tail->next;
if (next == NULL)
{
/* Insert a new, malloc'ed, block of IDAT information buffers, this
* one twice as large as the previous one:
*/
unsigned int length = 2 * tail->length;
if (length < tail->length) /* arithmetic overflow */
length = tail->length;
next = png_voidcast(IDAT_list*, malloc(IDAT_list_size(NULL, length)));
CLEAR(*next);
/* The caller must handle this: */
if (next == NULL)
return NULL;
next->next = NULL;
next->length = length;
tail->next = next;
}
return next;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fs/pnode.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.4 does not properly traverse a mount propagation tree in a certain case involving a slave mount, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted series of mount system calls.
Commit Message: propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave
When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
> IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
> task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
> RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
> FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
> ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
> [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
> [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
> [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
> [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
> RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
> CR2: 0000000000000010
> ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience.
To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
is encountered.
Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
it is clear what is going on.
The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
tree do not make sense.
To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Low
| 167,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPinCode(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const std::string& pincode) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPinCode: " << pincode;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PINCODE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPinCode(this, pincode);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Chapters::Display::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) { // ChapterString ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037C) { // ChapterLanguage ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037E) { // ChapterCountry ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,841
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
{
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
if(ret != 0)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The H.264 decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not initialize certain slice data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28165661.
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize slice parameters before concealing error MBs
Also memset ps_dec_op structure to zero.
For error input, this ensures dimensions are initialized to zero
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I66eb2ddc5e02e74b7ff04da5f749443920f37141
|
Low
| 174,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResourceMultiBufferDataProvider::DidReceiveResponse(
const WebURLResponse& response) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
std::string version;
switch (response.HttpVersion()) {
case WebURLResponse::kHTTPVersion_0_9:
version = "0.9";
break;
case WebURLResponse::kHTTPVersion_1_0:
version = "1.0";
break;
case WebURLResponse::kHTTPVersion_1_1:
version = "1.1";
break;
case WebURLResponse::kHTTPVersion_2_0:
version = "2.1";
break;
case WebURLResponse::kHTTPVersionUnknown:
version = "unknown";
break;
}
DVLOG(1) << "didReceiveResponse: HTTP/" << version << " "
<< response.HttpStatusCode();
#endif
DCHECK(active_loader_);
scoped_refptr<UrlData> destination_url_data(url_data_);
if (!redirects_to_.is_empty()) {
destination_url_data =
url_data_->url_index()->GetByUrl(redirects_to_, cors_mode_);
redirects_to_ = GURL();
}
base::Time last_modified;
if (base::Time::FromString(
response.HttpHeaderField("Last-Modified").Utf8().data(),
&last_modified)) {
destination_url_data->set_last_modified(last_modified);
}
destination_url_data->set_etag(
response.HttpHeaderField("ETag").Utf8().data());
destination_url_data->set_valid_until(base::Time::Now() +
GetCacheValidUntil(response));
uint32_t reasons = GetReasonsForUncacheability(response);
destination_url_data->set_cacheable(reasons == 0);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Media.CacheUseful", reasons == 0);
int shift = 0;
int max_enum = base::bits::Log2Ceiling(kMaxReason);
while (reasons) {
DCHECK_LT(shift, max_enum); // Sanity check.
if (reasons & 0x1) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_EXACT_LINEAR("Media.UncacheableReason", shift,
max_enum); // PRESUBMIT_IGNORE_UMA_MAX
}
reasons >>= 1;
++shift;
}
int64_t content_length = response.ExpectedContentLength();
bool end_of_file = false;
bool do_fail = false;
bytes_to_discard_ = 0;
if (destination_url_data->url().SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
bool partial_response = (response.HttpStatusCode() == kHttpPartialContent);
bool ok_response = (response.HttpStatusCode() == kHttpOK);
std::string accept_ranges =
response.HttpHeaderField("Accept-Ranges").Utf8();
if (accept_ranges.find("bytes") != std::string::npos)
destination_url_data->set_range_supported();
if (partial_response &&
VerifyPartialResponse(response, destination_url_data)) {
destination_url_data->set_range_supported();
} else if (ok_response) {
destination_url_data->set_length(content_length);
bytes_to_discard_ = byte_pos();
} else if (response.HttpStatusCode() == kHttpRangeNotSatisfiable) {
end_of_file = true;
} else {
active_loader_.reset();
do_fail = true;
}
} else {
destination_url_data->set_range_supported();
if (content_length != kPositionNotSpecified) {
destination_url_data->set_length(content_length + byte_pos());
}
}
if (!do_fail) {
destination_url_data =
url_data_->url_index()->TryInsert(destination_url_data);
}
destination_url_data->set_has_opaque_data(
network::cors::IsCORSCrossOriginResponseType(response.GetType()));
if (destination_url_data != url_data_) {
scoped_refptr<UrlData> old_url_data(url_data_);
destination_url_data->Use();
std::unique_ptr<DataProvider> self(
url_data_->multibuffer()->RemoveProvider(this));
url_data_ = destination_url_data.get();
url_data_->multibuffer()->AddProvider(std::move(self));
old_url_data->RedirectTo(destination_url_data);
}
if (do_fail) {
destination_url_data->Fail();
return; // "this" may be deleted now.
}
const GURL& original_url = response.WasFetchedViaServiceWorker()
? response.OriginalURLViaServiceWorker()
: response.Url();
if (!url_data_->ValidateDataOrigin(original_url.GetOrigin())) {
active_loader_.reset();
url_data_->Fail();
return; // "this" may be deleted now.
}
if (end_of_file) {
fifo_.push_back(DataBuffer::CreateEOSBuffer());
url_data_->multibuffer()->OnDataProviderEvent(this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,626
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XOpenDevice(
register Display *dpy,
register XID id)
{
register long rlen; /* raw length */
xOpenDeviceReq *req;
xOpenDeviceReply rep;
XDevice *dev;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return NULL;
GetReq(OpenDevice, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_OpenDevice;
req->deviceid = id;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XDevice *) NULL;
return (XDevice *) NULL;
}
rlen = rep.length << 2;
dev = (XDevice *) Xmalloc(sizeof(XDevice) + rep.num_classes *
sizeof(XInputClassInfo));
if (dev) {
int dlen; /* data length */
_XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen - dlen);
} else
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: X.org libXi before 1.7.7 allows remote X servers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors involving length fields.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRequestRedirected(
const net::RedirectInfo& redirect_info,
const scoped_refptr<network::ResourceResponse>& response) {
response_ = response;
ssl_info_ = response->head.ssl_info;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::WeakPtr<NavigationRequest> this_ptr(weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
bool should_override_url_loading = false;
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldOverrideUrlLoading(
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), browser_initiated_,
redirect_info.new_url, redirect_info.new_method,
false, true, frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(),
common_params_.transition, &should_override_url_loading)) {
return;
}
if (!this_ptr)
return;
if (should_override_url_loading) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
common_params_.url = redirect_info.new_url;
common_params_.method = redirect_info.new_method;
navigation_handle_->UpdateStateFollowingRedirect(
GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer),
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
#endif
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanRedirectToURL(
redirect_info.new_url)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Denied redirect for "
<< redirect_info.new_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (!browser_initiated_ && source_site_instance() &&
!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanRequestURL(
source_site_instance()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
redirect_info.new_url)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Denied unauthorized redirect for "
<< redirect_info.new_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (redirect_info.new_method != "POST")
common_params_.post_data = nullptr;
if (commit_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_start.is_null()) {
commit_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_start =
commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start;
}
commit_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_end = base::TimeTicks::Now();
commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start = base::TimeTicks::Now();
commit_params_.redirect_response.push_back(response->head);
commit_params_.redirect_infos.push_back(redirect_info);
if (commit_params_.origin_to_commit)
commit_params_.origin_to_commit.reset();
commit_params_.redirects.push_back(common_params_.url);
common_params_.url = redirect_info.new_url;
common_params_.method = redirect_info.new_method;
common_params_.referrer.url = GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer);
common_params_.referrer =
Referrer::SanitizeForRequest(common_params_.url, common_params_.referrer);
net::Error net_error =
CheckContentSecurityPolicy(true /* has_followed_redirect */,
redirect_info.insecure_scheme_was_upgraded,
false /* is_response_check */);
if (net_error != net::OK) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net_error), false /*skip_throttles*/,
base::nullopt /*error_page_content*/, false /*collapse_frame*/);
return;
}
if (CheckCredentialedSubresource() ==
CredentialedSubresourceCheckResult::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
CheckLegacyProtocolInSubresource() ==
LegacyProtocolInSubresourceCheckResult::BLOCK_REQUEST) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net::ERR_ABORTED),
false /*skip_throttles*/, base::nullopt /*error_page_content*/,
false /*collapse_frame*/);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> site_instance =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
*this);
speculative_site_instance_ =
site_instance->HasProcess() ? site_instance : nullptr;
if (!site_instance->HasProcess()) {
RenderProcessHostImpl::NotifySpareManagerAboutRecentlyUsedBrowserContext(
site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
}
common_params_.previews_state =
GetContentClient()->browser()->DetermineAllowedPreviews(
common_params_.previews_state, navigation_handle_.get(),
common_params_.url);
RenderProcessHost* expected_process =
site_instance->HasProcess() ? site_instance->GetProcess() : nullptr;
navigation_handle_->WillRedirectRequest(
common_params_.referrer.url, expected_process,
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of cancelled requests in Navigation in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
|
Medium
| 173,034
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tap_if_up(const char *devname, const bt_bdaddr_t *addr)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int sk, err;
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sk < 0)
return -1;
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IFNAMSIZ - 1);
err = ioctl(sk, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &ifr);
if (err < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Could not get network hardware for interface:%s, errno:%s", devname, strerror(errno));
close(sk);
return -1;
}
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IFNAMSIZ - 1);
memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, addr->address, 6);
/* The IEEE has specified that the most significant bit of the most significant byte is used to
* determine a multicast address. If its a 1, that means multicast, 0 means unicast.
* Kernel returns an error if we try to set a multicast address for the tun-tap ethernet interface.
* Mask this bit to avoid any issue with auto generated address.
*/
if (ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data[0] & 0x01) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("Not a unicast MAC address, force multicast bit flipping");
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data[0] &= ~0x01;
}
err = ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFHWADDR, (caddr_t)&ifr);
if (err < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Could not set bt address for interface:%s, errno:%s", devname, strerror(errno));
close(sk);
return -1;
}
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IF_NAMESIZE - 1);
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_MULTICAST;
err = ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr);
if (err < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Could not bring up network interface:%s, errno:%d", devname, errno);
close(sk);
return -1;
}
close(sk);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("network interface: %s is up", devname);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,449
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return d_url;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie function in the transparent cookie-encryption feature in the Suhosin extension before 0.9.33 for PHP, when suhosin.cookie.encrypt and suhosin.multiheader are enabled, might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long string that is used in a Set-Cookie HTTP header.
Commit Message: Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory)
|
High
| 165,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BlockEntry::~BlockEntry()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int needs_empty_write(sector_t block, struct inode *inode)
{
int error;
struct buffer_head bh_map = { .b_state = 0, .b_blocknr = 0 };
bh_map.b_size = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
error = gfs2_block_map(inode, block, &bh_map, 0);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
return !buffer_mapped(&bh_map);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The fallocate implementation in the GFS2 filesystem in the Linux kernel before 3.2 relies on the page cache, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service by preallocating blocks in certain situations involving insufficient memory.
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,214
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_list_algorithms)
{
char **modules;
char *lib_dir = MCG(algorithms_dir);
int lib_dir_len;
int i, count;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s",
&lib_dir, &lib_dir_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
modules = mcrypt_list_algorithms(lib_dir, &count);
if (count == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No algorithms found in module dir");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
add_index_string(return_value, i, modules[i], 1);
}
mcrypt_free_p(modules, count);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,102
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuffer_for_cpu(ring, meta->dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
skb = meta->skb;
rxhdr = (struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *)skb->data;
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
if (len == 0) {
int i = 0;
do {
udelay(2);
barrier();
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
} while (len == 0 && i++ < 5);
if (unlikely(len == 0)) {
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
}
if (unlikely(b43_rx_buffer_is_poisoned(ring, skb))) {
/* Something went wrong with the DMA.
* The device did not touch the buffer and did not overwrite the poison. */
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: Dropping poisoned buffer.\n");
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
if (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize)) {
/* The data did not fit into one descriptor buffer
* and is split over multiple buffers.
* This should never happen, as we try to allocate buffers
* big enough. So simply ignore this packet.
*/
int cnt = 0;
s32 tmp = len;
while (1) {
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
/* recycle the descriptor buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, meta->skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize);
*slot = next_slot(ring, *slot);
cnt++;
tmp -= ring->rx_buffersize;
if (tmp <= 0)
break;
}
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX buffer too small "
"(len: %u, buffer: %u, nr-dropped: %d)\n",
len, ring->rx_buffersize, cnt);
goto drop;
}
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
err = setup_rx_descbuffer(ring, desc, meta, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(err)) {
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: setup_rx_descbuffer() failed\n");
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
unmap_descbuffer(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
skb_put(skb, len + ring->frameoffset);
skb_pull(skb, ring->frameoffset);
b43_rx(ring->dev, skb, rxhdr);
drop:
return;
drop_recycle_buffer:
/* Poison and recycle the RX buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dma_rx function in drivers/net/wireless/b43/dma.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly allocate receive buffers, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted frame.
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
High
| 165,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SetManualFallbacks(bool enabled) {
std::vector<std::string> features = {
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling.name,
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFillingStandalone
.name,
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksGeneration.name};
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitFromCommandLine(base::JoinString(features, ","),
std::string());
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitFromCommandLine(std::string(),
base::JoinString(features, ","));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The provisional-load commit implementation in WebKit/Source/bindings/core/v8/WindowProxy.cpp in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy by leveraging a delay in window proxy clearing.
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
|
Low
| 171,749
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: expand_string_integer(uschar *string, BOOL isplus)
{
int_eximarith_t value;
uschar *s = expand_string(string);
uschar *msg = US"invalid integer \"%s\"";
uschar *endptr;
/* If expansion failed, expand_string_message will be set. */
if (s == NULL) return -1;
/* On an overflow, strtol() returns LONG_MAX or LONG_MIN, and sets errno
to ERANGE. When there isn't an overflow, errno is not changed, at least on some
systems, so we set it zero ourselves. */
errno = 0;
expand_string_message = NULL; /* Indicates no error */
/* Before Exim 4.64, strings consisting entirely of whitespace compared
equal to 0. Unfortunately, people actually relied upon that, so preserve
the behaviour explicitly. Stripping leading whitespace is a harmless
noop change since strtol skips it anyway (provided that there is a number
to find at all). */
if (isspace(*s))
{
while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
if (*s == '\0')
{
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("treating blank string as number 0\n");
return 0;
}
}
value = strtoll(CS s, CSS &endptr, 10);
if (endptr == s)
{
msg = US"integer expected but \"%s\" found";
}
else if (value < 0 && isplus)
{
msg = US"non-negative integer expected but \"%s\" found";
}
else
{
switch (tolower(*endptr))
{
default:
break;
case 'k':
if (value > EXIM_ARITH_MAX/1024 || value < EXIM_ARITH_MIN/1024) errno = ERANGE;
else value *= 1024;
endptr++;
break;
case 'm':
if (value > EXIM_ARITH_MAX/(1024*1024) || value < EXIM_ARITH_MIN/(1024*1024)) errno = ERANGE;
else value *= 1024*1024;
endptr++;
break;
case 'g':
if (value > EXIM_ARITH_MAX/(1024*1024*1024) || value < EXIM_ARITH_MIN/(1024*1024*1024)) errno = ERANGE;
else value *= 1024*1024*1024;
endptr++;
break;
}
if (errno == ERANGE)
msg = US"absolute value of integer \"%s\" is too large (overflow)";
else
{
while (isspace(*endptr)) endptr++;
if (*endptr == 0) return value;
}
}
expand_string_message = string_sprintf(CS msg, s);
return -2;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: expand.c in Exim before 4.83 expands mathematical comparisons twice, which allows local users to gain privileges and execute arbitrary commands via a crafted lookup value.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_pbm_integer(j_compress_ptr cinfo, FILE *infile, unsigned int maxval)
/* Read an unsigned decimal integer from the PPM file */
/* Swallows one trailing character after the integer */
/* Note that on a 16-bit-int machine, only values up to 64k can be read. */
/* This should not be a problem in practice. */
{
register int ch;
register unsigned int val;
/* Skip any leading whitespace */
do {
ch = pbm_getc(infile);
if (ch == EOF)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
} while (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\r');
if (ch < '0' || ch > '9')
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_NONNUMERIC);
val = ch - '0';
while ((ch = pbm_getc(infile)) >= '0' && ch <= '9') {
val *= 10;
val += ch - '0';
}
if (val > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
return val;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: get_8bit_row in rdbmp.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.5.90 and MozJPEG through 3.3.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted 8-bit BMP in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the number of palette entries.
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
|
Medium
| 169,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
return false;
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,373
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
int value;
UINT error;
UINT32 ChannelId;
wStream* data_out;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "process_close_request: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32"",
Sp,
cbChId, ChannelId);
if ((error = dvcman_close_channel(drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_close_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
return error;
}
data_out = Stream_New(NULL, 4);
if (!data_out)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
value = (CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU << 4) | (cbChId & 0x03);
Stream_Write_UINT8(data_out, value);
drdynvc_write_variable_uint(data_out, ChannelId);
error = drdynvc_send(drdynvc, data_out);
if (error)
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "VirtualChannelWriteEx failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(error), error);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: FreeRDP FreeRDP 2.0.0-rc3 released version before commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3 contains a Other/Unknown vulnerability in channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c, drdynvc_process_capability_request that can result in The RDP server can read the client's memory.. This attack appear to be exploitable via RDPClient must connect the rdp server with echo option. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3.
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
|
Low
| 168,935
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
swapl(&stuff->numSpecs);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(specs[0]));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in RENDER extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,435
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::RouteFunction(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& feature_name,
const HandlerFunction& handler_function) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context_->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = v8::Object::New(isolate);
SetPrivate(data, kHandlerFunction,
v8::External::New(isolate, new HandlerFunction(handler_function)));
SetPrivate(data, kFeatureName,
v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, feature_name));
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> function_template =
v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, Router, data);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate>::New(isolate, object_template_)
->Set(isolate, name.c_str(), function_template);
router_data_.Append(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,278
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_cfb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "cfb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,109
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xps_encode_font_char_imp(xps_font_t *font, int code)
{
byte *table;
/* no cmap selected: return identity */
if (font->cmapsubtable <= 0)
return code;
table = font->data + font->cmapsubtable;
switch (u16(table))
{
case 0: /* Apple standard 1-to-1 mapping. */
return table[code + 6];
case 4: /* Microsoft/Adobe segmented mapping. */
{
int segCount2 = u16(table + 6);
byte *endCount = table + 14;
byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2;
byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2;
byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2;
int i2;
for (i2 = 0; i2 < segCount2 - 3; i2 += 2)
{
int delta, roff;
int start = u16(startCount + i2);
continue;
delta = s16(idDelta + i2);
roff = s16(idRangeOffset + i2);
if ( roff == 0 )
{
return ( code + delta ) & 0xffff; /* mod 65536 */
return 0;
}
if ( roff == 0 )
{
return ( code + delta ) & 0xffff; /* mod 65536 */
return 0;
}
glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((code - start) << 1));
return (glyph == 0 ? 0 : glyph + delta);
}
case 6: /* Single interval lookup. */
{
int firstCode = u16(table + 6);
int entryCount = u16(table + 8);
if ( code < firstCode || code >= firstCode + entryCount )
return 0;
return u16(table + 10 + ((code - firstCode) << 1));
}
case 10: /* Trimmed array (like 6) */
{
int startCharCode = u32(table + 12);
int numChars = u32(table + 16);
if ( code < startCharCode || code >= startCharCode + numChars )
return 0;
return u32(table + 20 + (code - startCharCode) * 4);
}
case 12: /* Segmented coverage. (like 4) */
{
int nGroups = u32(table + 12);
byte *group = table + 16;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nGroups; i++)
{
int startCharCode = u32(group + 0);
int endCharCode = u32(group + 4);
int startGlyphID = u32(group + 8);
if ( code < startCharCode )
return 0;
if ( code <= endCharCode )
return startGlyphID + (code - startCharCode);
group += 12;
}
return 0;
}
case 2: /* High-byte mapping through table. */
case 8: /* Mixed 16-bit and 32-bit coverage (like 2) */
default:
gs_warn1("unknown cmap format: %d\n", u16(table));
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Given a GID, reverse the CMAP subtable lookup to turn it back into a character code
* We need a Unicode return value, so we might need to do some fixed tables for
* certain kinds of CMAP subtables (ie non-Unicode ones). That would be a future enhancement
* if we ever encounter such a beast.
*/
static int
xps_decode_font_char_imp(xps_font_t *font, int code)
{
byte *table;
/* no cmap selected: return identity */
if (font->cmapsubtable <= 0)
return code;
table = font->data + font->cmapsubtable;
switch (u16(table))
{
case 0: /* Apple standard 1-to-1 mapping. */
{
int i, length = u16(&table[2]) - 6;
if (length < 0 || length > 256)
return gs_error_invalidfont;
for (i=0;i<length;i++) {
if (table[6 + i] == code)
return i;
}
}
return 0;
case 4: /* Microsoft/Adobe segmented mapping. */
{
int segCount2 = u16(table + 6);
byte *endCount = table + 14;
byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2;
byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2;
byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2;
int i2;
if (segCount2 < 3 || segCount2 > 65535)
return gs_error_invalidfont;
byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2;
byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2;
byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2;
int i2;
if (segCount2 < 3 || segCount2 > 65535)
return gs_error_invalidfont;
for (i2 = 0; i2 < segCount2 - 3; i2 += 2)
if (roff == 0) {
glyph = (i + delta) & 0xffff;
} else {
glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((i - start) << 1));
}
if (glyph == code) {
return i;
}
}
}
if (roff == 0) {
glyph = (i + delta) & 0xffff;
} else {
glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((i - start) << 1));
}
if (glyph == code) {
return i;
ch = u16(&table[10 + (i * 2)]);
if (ch == code)
return (firstCode + i);
}
}
return 0;
case 10: /* Trimmed array (like 6) */
{
unsigned int ch, i, length = u32(&table[20]);
int firstCode = u32(&table[16]);
for (i=0;i<length;i++) {
ch = u16(&table[10 + (i * 2)]);
if (ch == code)
return (firstCode + i);
}
}
return 0;
case 12: /* Segmented coverage. (like 4) */
{
unsigned int nGroups = u32(&table[12]);
int Group;
for (Group=0;Group<nGroups;Group++)
{
int startCharCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12)]);
int endCharCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12) + 4]);
int startGlyphCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12) + 8]);
if (code >= startGlyphCode && code <= (startGlyphCode + (endCharCode - startCharCode))) {
return startGlyphCode + (code - startCharCode);
}
}
}
return 0;
case 2: /* High-byte mapping through table. */
case 8: /* Mixed 16-bit and 32-bit coverage (like 2) */
default:
gs_warn1("unknown cmap format: %d\n", u16(table));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_decode_font_char_imp function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
image->xhot = head.xhot;
image->yhot = head.yhot;
image->delay = head.delay;
n = image->width * image->height;
p = image->pixels;
while (n--)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, p))
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: libXcursor before 1.1.15 has various integer overflows that could lead to heap buffer overflows when processing malicious cursors, e.g., with programs like GIMP. It is also possible that an attack vector exists against the related code in cursor/xcursor.c in Wayland through 1.14.0.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::hasContentEditableAttributeSet() const {
const AtomicString& contentEditableValue = getAttribute(contenteditableAttr);
if (contentEditableValue.isNull())
return false;
return contentEditableValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringCase(contentEditableValue, "true");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: string DecodeFile(const string& filename, int num_threads) {
libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource video(filename);
video.Init();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = {0};
cfg.threads = num_threads;
libvpx_test::VP9Decoder decoder(cfg, 0);
libvpx_test::MD5 md5;
for (video.Begin(); video.cxdata(); video.Next()) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
decoder.DecodeFrame(video.cxdata(), video.frame_size());
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << decoder.DecodeError();
break;
}
libvpx_test::DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder.GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next())) {
md5.Add(img);
}
}
return string(md5.Get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,598
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool NavigationController::RendererDidNavigate(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params,
int extra_invalidate_flags,
LoadCommittedDetails* details) {
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->url();
details->previous_entry_index = last_committed_entry_index();
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
if (pending_entry_index_ >= 0 && !pending_entry_->site_instance()) {
DCHECK(pending_entry_->restore_type() != NavigationEntry::RESTORE_NONE);
pending_entry_->set_site_instance(tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance());
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(NavigationEntry::RESTORE_NONE);
}
details->is_in_page = IsURLInPageNavigation(params.url);
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(params);
switch (details->type) {
case NavigationType::NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(params, &(details->did_replace_entry));
break;
case NavigationType::EXISTING_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(params);
break;
case NavigationType::SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(params);
break;
case NavigationType::IN_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateInPage(params, &(details->did_replace_entry));
break;
case NavigationType::NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(params);
break;
case NavigationType::AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(params))
return false;
break;
case NavigationType::NAV_IGNORE:
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
DCHECK(!params.content_state.empty());
NavigationEntry* active_entry = GetActiveEntry();
active_entry->set_content_state(params.content_state);
DCHECK(active_entry->site_instance() == tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance());
details->is_auto = (PageTransition::IsRedirect(params.transition) &&
!pending_entry()) ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureAuto;
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = PageTransition::IsMainFrame(params.transition);
details->serialized_security_info = params.security_info;
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details, extra_invalidate_flags);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The drag-and-drop implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 on Linux does not properly enforce permissions for files, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params_in_pixel,
int gpu_host_id) {
surface_route_id_ = params_in_pixel.route_id;
if (params_in_pixel.protection_state_id &&
params_in_pixel.protection_state_id != protection_state_id_) {
DCHECK(!current_surface_);
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, false, NULL);
return;
}
if (ShouldFastACK(params_in_pixel.surface_handle)) {
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, false, NULL);
return;
}
current_surface_ = params_in_pixel.surface_handle;
released_front_lock_ = NULL;
DCHECK(current_surface_);
UpdateExternalTexture();
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
if (!compositor) {
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, NULL);
} else {
DCHECK(image_transport_clients_.find(params_in_pixel.surface_handle) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
gfx::Size surface_size_in_pixel =
image_transport_clients_[params_in_pixel.surface_handle]->size();
gfx::Rect rect_to_paint = ConvertRectToDIP(this, gfx::Rect(
params_in_pixel.x,
surface_size_in_pixel.height() - params_in_pixel.y -
params_in_pixel.height,
params_in_pixel.width,
params_in_pixel.height));
rect_to_paint.Inset(-1, -1);
rect_to_paint.Intersect(window_->bounds());
window_->SchedulePaintInRect(rect_to_paint);
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_COMMIT;
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.push_back(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK,
params_in_pixel.route_id,
gpu_host_id,
true));
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: init_rc(void)
{
int i;
struct stat st;
FILE *f;
if (rc_dir != NULL)
goto open_rc;
rc_dir = expandPath(RC_DIR);
i = strlen(rc_dir);
if (i > 1 && rc_dir[i - 1] == '/')
rc_dir[i - 1] = '\0';
#ifdef USE_M17N
display_charset_str = wc_get_ces_list();
document_charset_str = display_charset_str;
system_charset_str = display_charset_str;
#endif
if (stat(rc_dir, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) { /* no directory */
if (do_mkdir(rc_dir, 0700) < 0) {
/* fprintf(stderr, "Can't create config directory (%s)!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
else {
stat(rc_dir, &st);
}
}
else {
/* fprintf(stderr, "Can't open config directory (%s)!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
}
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
/* not a directory */
/* fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a directory!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
if (!(st.st_mode & S_IWUSR)) {
/* fprintf(stderr, "%s is not writable!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
no_rc_dir = FALSE;
tmp_dir = rc_dir;
if (config_file == NULL)
config_file = rcFile(CONFIG_FILE);
create_option_search_table();
open_rc:
/* open config file */
if ((f = fopen(etcFile(W3MCONFIG), "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
if ((f = fopen(confFile(CONFIG_FILE), "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
if (config_file && (f = fopen(config_file, "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
return;
rc_dir_err:
no_rc_dir = TRUE;
if (((tmp_dir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0') &&
((tmp_dir = getenv("TMP")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0') &&
((tmp_dir = getenv("TEMP")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0'))
tmp_dir = "/tmp";
create_option_search_table();
goto open_rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: w3m through 0.5.3 does not properly handle temporary files when the ~/.w3m directory is unwritable, which allows a local attacker to craft a symlink attack to overwrite arbitrary files.
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
Medium
| 169,346
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long SeekHead::Parse()
{
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) //SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) //Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop)
{
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) //SeekEntry ID
{
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry))
{
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
}
else if (id == 0x6C) //Void ID
{
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,413
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SelectionController::SetNonDirectionalSelectionIfNeeded(
const SelectionInFlatTree& passed_selection,
TextGranularity granularity,
EndPointsAdjustmentMode endpoints_adjustment_mode,
HandleVisibility handle_visibility) {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection =
CreateVisibleSelection(passed_selection);
const PositionInFlatTree& base_position =
original_base_in_flat_tree_.GetPosition();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& original_base =
base_position.IsConnected() ? CreateVisiblePosition(base_position)
: VisiblePositionInFlatTree();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& base =
original_base.IsNotNull() ? original_base
: CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base());
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& extent =
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Extent());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
endpoints_adjustment_mode == kAdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary
? AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(base, extent)
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(base.DeepEquivalent(),
extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder builder(new_selection.AsSelection());
if (adjusted_selection.Base() != base.DeepEquivalent() ||
adjusted_selection.Extent() != extent.DeepEquivalent()) {
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = base.ToPositionWithAffinity();
SetContext(&GetDocument());
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(adjusted_selection.Base(),
adjusted_selection.Extent());
} else if (original_base.IsNotNull()) {
if (CreateVisiblePosition(
Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Base())
.DeepEquivalent() ==
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base()).DeepEquivalent()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(original_base.DeepEquivalent(),
new_selection.Extent());
}
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = PositionInFlatTreeWithAffinity();
}
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(handle_visibility == HandleVisibility::kVisible);
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree = builder.Build();
if (Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() ==
CreateVisibleSelection(selection_in_flat_tree) &&
Selection().IsHandleVisible() == selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
return;
Selection().SetSelection(
ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetCursorAlignOnScroll(CursorAlignOnScroll::kIfNeeded)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.Build());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
Low
| 171,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
uint32 width, uint16 spp,
struct dump_opts *dump)
{
int i, j, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint16 bps, nstrips, planar, strips_per_sample;
uint32 src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, rows_processed, rps;
uint32 rows_this_strip = 0;
tsample_t s;
tstrip_t strip;
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
unsigned char *srcbuffs[MAX_SAMPLES];
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
if (obuf == NULL)
{
TIFFError("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer","Invalid buffer argument");
return (0);
}
memset (srcbuffs, '\0', sizeof(srcbuffs));
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
if (rps > length)
rps = length;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
src_rowsize = ((bps * width) + 7) / 8;
dst_rowsize = ((bps * width * spp) + 7) / 8;
dst = obuf;
if ((dump->infile != NULL) && (dump->level == 3))
{
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Image width %d, length %d, Scanline size, %4d bytes",
width, length, scanlinesize);
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d, Shift width %d",
bps, spp, shift_width);
}
/* Libtiff seems to assume/require that data for separate planes are
* written one complete plane after another and not interleaved in any way.
* Multiple scanlines and possibly strips of the same plane must be
* written before data for any other plane.
*/
nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
strips_per_sample = nstrips /spp;
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
srcbuffs[s] = NULL;
buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if (!buff)
{
TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer",
"Unable to allocate strip read buffer for sample %d", s);
for (i = 0; i < s; i++)
_TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]);
return 0;
}
srcbuffs[s] = buff;
}
rows_processed = 0;
for (j = 0; (j < strips_per_sample) && (result == 1); j++)
{
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
strip = (s * strips_per_sample) + j;
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, buff, stripsize);
rows_this_strip = bytes_read / src_rowsize;
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu for sample %d",
(unsigned long) strip, s + 1);
result = 0;
break;
}
#ifdef DEVELMODE
TIFFError("", "Strip %2d, read %5d bytes for %4d scanlines, shift width %d",
strip, bytes_read, rows_this_strip, shift_width);
#endif
}
if (rps > rows_this_strip)
rps = rows_this_strip;
dst = obuf + (dst_rowsize * rows_processed);
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
{
if (combineSeparateSamplesBytes (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (shift_width)
{
case 1: if (combineSeparateSamples8bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 2: if (combineSeparateSamples16bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 3: if (combineSeparateSamples24bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: if (combineSeparateSamples32bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
default: TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth: %d", bps);
result = 0;
break;
}
}
if ((rows_processed + rps) > length)
{
rows_processed = length;
rps = length - rows_processed;
}
else
rows_processed += rps;
}
/* free any buffers allocated for each plane or scanline and
* any temporary buffers
*/
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
if (buff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(buff);
}
return (result);
} /* end readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 reads an undefined buffer in readContigStripsIntoBuffer() because of a uint16 integer overflow. Reported as MSVR 35100.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
|
Low
| 166,867
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 16;
fwd_txfm_ref = fht16x16_ref;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
{
u64 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
return seq;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RegisterProperties(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
current_ime_properties_ = prop_list;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,501
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
struct inode **delegated_inode, unsigned int flags)
{
int error;
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
const unsigned char *old_name;
struct inode *source = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *target = new_dentry->d_inode;
bool new_is_dir = false;
unsigned max_links = new_dir->i_sb->s_max_links;
if (source == target)
return 0;
error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
if (error)
return error;
if (!target) {
error = may_create(new_dir, new_dentry);
} else {
new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
else
error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, new_is_dir);
}
if (error)
return error;
if (!old_dir->i_op->rename)
return -EPERM;
/*
* If we are going to change the parent - check write permissions,
* we'll need to flip '..'.
*/
if (new_dir != old_dir) {
if (is_dir) {
error = inode_permission(source, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && new_is_dir) {
error = inode_permission(target, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
}
error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry,
flags);
if (error)
return error;
old_name = fsnotify_oldname_init(old_dentry->d_name.name);
dget(new_dentry);
if (!is_dir || (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
lock_two_nondirectories(source, target);
else if (target)
inode_lock(target);
error = -EBUSY;
if (is_local_mountpoint(old_dentry) || is_local_mountpoint(new_dentry))
goto out;
if (max_links && new_dir != old_dir) {
error = -EMLINK;
if (is_dir && !new_is_dir && new_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
goto out;
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !is_dir && new_is_dir &&
old_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
goto out;
}
if (is_dir && !(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target)
shrink_dcache_parent(new_dentry);
if (!is_dir) {
error = try_break_deleg(source, delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if (target && !new_is_dir) {
error = try_break_deleg(target, delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out;
}
error = old_dir->i_op->rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
if (error)
goto out;
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target) {
if (is_dir)
target->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
dont_mount(new_dentry);
detach_mounts(new_dentry);
}
if (!(old_dir->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE)) {
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
d_move(old_dentry, new_dentry);
else
d_exchange(old_dentry, new_dentry);
}
out:
if (!is_dir || (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
unlock_two_nondirectories(source, target);
else if (target)
inode_unlock(target);
dput(new_dentry);
if (!error) {
fsnotify_move(old_dir, new_dir, old_name, is_dir,
!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) ? target : NULL, old_dentry);
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
fsnotify_move(new_dir, old_dir, old_dentry->d_name.name,
new_is_dir, NULL, new_dentry);
}
}
fsnotify_oldname_free(old_name);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the fsnotify implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.12.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted application that leverages simultaneous execution of the inotify_handle_event and vfs_rename functions.
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,263
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool UnpackOriginPermissions(const std::vector<std::string>& origins_input,
const PermissionSet& required_permissions,
const PermissionSet& optional_permissions,
bool allow_file_access,
UnpackPermissionSetResult* result,
std::string* error) {
int user_script_schemes = UserScript::ValidUserScriptSchemes();
int explicit_schemes = Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes;
if (!allow_file_access) {
user_script_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
explicit_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
}
for (const auto& origin_str : origins_input) {
URLPattern explicit_origin(explicit_schemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = explicit_origin.Parse(origin_str);
if (URLPattern::ParseResult::kSuccess != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin, origin_str,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
bool used_origin = false;
if (required_permissions.explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(
explicit_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->required_explicit_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
} else if (optional_permissions.explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(
explicit_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->optional_explicit_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
}
URLPattern scriptable_origin(user_script_schemes);
if (scriptable_origin.Parse(origin_str) ==
URLPattern::ParseResult::kSuccess &&
required_permissions.scriptable_hosts().ContainsPattern(
scriptable_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->required_scriptable_hosts.AddPattern(scriptable_origin);
}
if (!used_origin)
result->unlisted_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: A missing case for handling special schemes in permission request checks in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass extension permission checks for privileged pages via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
|
Medium
| 173,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Automation::InitWithBrowserPath(const FilePath& browser_exe,
const CommandLine& options,
Error** error) {
if (!file_util::PathExists(browser_exe)) {
std::string message = base::StringPrintf(
"Could not find Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, message);
return;
}
CommandLine command(browser_exe);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableHangMonitor);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePromptOnRepost);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDomAutomationController);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kHomePage, chrome::kAboutBlankURL);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoDefaultBrowserCheck);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoFirstRun);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, "webdriver");
command.AppendArguments(options, false);
launcher_.reset(new AnonymousProxyLauncher(false));
ProxyLauncher::LaunchState launch_props = {
false, // clear_profile
FilePath(), // template_user_data
ProxyLauncher::DEFAULT_THEME,
command,
true, // include_testing_id
true // show_window
};
std::string chrome_details = base::StringPrintf(
"Using Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
VLOG(1) << chrome_details;
if (!launcher_->LaunchBrowserAndServer(launch_props, true)) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"Unable to either launch or connect to Chrome. Please check that "
"ChromeDriver is up-to-date. " + chrome_details);
return;
}
launcher_->automation()->set_action_timeout_ms(base::kNoTimeout);
VLOG(1) << "Chrome launched successfully. Version: "
<< automation()->server_version();
bool has_automation_version = false;
*error = CompareVersion(730, 0, &has_automation_version);
if (*error)
return;
chrome_details += ", version (" + automation()->server_version() + ")";
if (has_automation_version) {
int version = 0;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendGetChromeDriverAutomationVersion(
automation(), &version, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg + " " + chrome_details);
return;
}
if (version > automation::kChromeDriverAutomationVersion) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"ChromeDriver is not compatible with this version of Chrome. " +
chrome_details);
return;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,452
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pppoe_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int error = 0;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
error = -EIO;
goto end;
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &error);
if (error < 0)
goto end;
m->msg_namelen = 0;
if (skb) {
total_len = min_t(size_t, total_len, skb->len);
error = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, total_len);
if (error == 0) {
consume_skb(skb);
return total_len;
}
}
kfree_skb(skb);
end:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
//// return includes terminator; if unterminated, returns > limit
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strlen((const char *)start) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0') {
n += 2;
}
return n + 2;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in id3/ID3.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32377688.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
|
Medium
| 174,061
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void usb_serial_console_disconnect(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
if (serial->port[0] == usbcons_info.port) {
usb_serial_console_exit();
usb_serial_put(serial);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The usb_serial_console_disconnect function in drivers/usb/serial/console.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device, related to disconnection and failed setup.
Commit Message: USB: serial: console: fix use-after-free on disconnect
A clean-up patch removing two redundant NULL-checks from the console
disconnect handler inadvertently also removed a third check. This could
lead to the struct usb_serial being prematurely freed by the console
code when a driver accepts but does not register any ports for an
interface which also lacks endpoint descriptors.
Fixes: 0e517c93dc02 ("USB: serial: console: clean up sanity checks")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 170,012
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
#if !defined(TIFFDefaultStripSize)
#define TIFFDefaultStripSize(tiff,request) (8192UL/TIFFScanlineSize(tiff))
#endif
const char
*mode,
*option;
CompressionType
compression;
EndianType
endian_type;
MagickBooleanType
debug,
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFInfo
tiff_info;
uint16
bits_per_sample,
compress_tag,
endian,
photometric;
uint32
rows_per_strip;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open TIFF file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,&image->exception);
endian_type=UndefinedEndian;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:endian");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"msb",3) == 0)
endian_type=MSBEndian;
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"lsb",3) == 0)
endian_type=LSBEndian;;
}
switch (endian_type)
{
case LSBEndian: mode="wl"; break;
case MSBEndian: mode="wb"; break;
default: mode="w"; break;
}
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"TIFF64") == 0)
switch (endian_type)
{
case LSBEndian: mode="wl8"; break;
case MSBEndian: mode="wb8"; break;
default: mode="w8"; break;
}
#endif
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,mode,(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
scene=0;
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
do
{
/*
Initialize TIFF fields.
*/
if ((image_info->type != UndefinedType) &&
(image_info->type != OptimizeType))
(void) SetImageType(image,image_info->type);
compression=UndefinedCompression;
if (image->compression != JPEGCompression)
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,1);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,8);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((image->storage_class != PseudoClass) && (image->depth >= 32) &&
(quantum_info->format == UndefinedQuantumFormat) &&
(IsHighDynamicRangeImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") == 0) &&
(GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_REDUCEDIMAGE);
if ((image->columns != (uint32) image->columns) ||
(image->rows != (uint32) image->rows))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,(uint32) image->rows);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,(uint32) image->columns);
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3;
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
break;
}
case Group4Compression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4;
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_JBIG)
case JBIG1Compression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_JBIG;
break;
}
#endif
case JPEGCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_JPEG;
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case LZMACompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_LZMA;
break;
}
#endif
case LZWCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_LZW;
break;
}
case RLECompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_PACKBITS;
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE;
break;
}
case NoCompression:
default:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CompressionNotSupported","`%s'",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,(ssize_t) compression));
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
}
#else
switch (compress_tag)
{
#if defined(CCITT_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
#endif
#if defined(YCBCR_SUPPORT) && defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
#endif
#if defined(LZMA_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
#endif
#if defined(LZW_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
#endif
#if defined(PACKBITS_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_PACKBITS:
#endif
#if defined(ZIP_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
#endif
case COMPRESSION_NONE:
break;
default:
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CompressionNotSupported","`%s'",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,(ssize_t) compression));
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
break;
}
}
#endif
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,4);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_INKSET,INKSET_CMYK);
}
else
{
/*
Full color TIFF raster.
*/
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB;
EncodeLabImage(image,&image->exception);
}
else
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,1,1);
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,8);
}
else
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_RGB;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,3);
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(image_info->type != TrueColorMatteType))
{
if ((image_info->type != PaletteType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
photometric=(uint16) (quantum_info->min_is_white !=
MagickFalse ? PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE :
PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,1);
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->matte == MagickFalse))
SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception);
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
depth;
/*
Colormapped TIFF raster.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,1);
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE;
depth=1;
while ((GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < image->colors)
depth<<=1;
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,depth);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian);
if ((compress_tag == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
}
else
if ((compress_tag == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:fill-order");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"msb",3) == 0)
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"lsb",3) == 0)
endian=FILLORDER_LSB2MSB;
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,compress_tag);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,endian);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,quantum_info->depth);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
uint16
extra_samples,
sample_info[1],
samples_per_pixel;
/*
TIFF has a matte channel.
*/
extra_samples=1;
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:alpha");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"associated") == 0)
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA;
else
if (LocaleCompare(option,"unspecified") == 0)
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_UNSPECIFIED;
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,samples_per_pixel+1);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (sample_info[0] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,AssociatedQuantumAlpha);
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,photometric);
switch (quantum_info->format)
{
case FloatingPointQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SMINSAMPLEVALUE,quantum_info->minimum);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SMAXSAMPLEVALUE,quantum_info->maximum);
break;
}
case SignedQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_INT);
break;
}
case UnsignedQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB)
if ((image_info->interlace == PlaneInterlace) ||
(image_info->interlace == PartitionInterlace))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE);
rows_per_strip=TIFFDefaultStripSize(tiff,0);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:rows-per-strip");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
rows_per_strip=(size_t) strtol(option,(char **) NULL,10);
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
const char
*sampling_factor;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
rows_per_strip+=(16-(rows_per_strip % 16));
if (image_info->quality != UndefinedCompressionQuality)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,image_info->quality);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE,JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*value;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE,JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
sampling_factor=(const char *) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
sampling_factor=value;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Input sampling-factors=%s",sampling_factor);
}
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (char *) NULL)
sampling_factor=image_info->sampling_factor;
if (sampling_factor != (const char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(sampling_factor,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,(uint16)
geometry_info.rho,(uint16) geometry_info.sigma);
}
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (bits_per_sample == 12)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE,JPEGTABLESMODE_QUANT);
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
{
rows_per_strip=(uint32) image->rows;
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,(long) (
image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 7 :
MagickMin((ssize_t) image_info->quality/10,9)));
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
{
/*
Byte-aligned EOL.
*/
rows_per_strip=(uint32) image->rows;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS,4);
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
{
rows_per_strip=(uint32) image->rows;
break;
}
#if defined(LZMA_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
{
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_LZMAPRESET,(long) (
image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 7 :
MagickMin((ssize_t) image_info->quality/10,9)));
break;
}
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
{
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (rows_per_strip < 1)
rows_per_strip=1;
if ((image->rows/rows_per_strip) >= (1UL << 15))
rows_per_strip=(uint32) (image->rows >> 15);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,rows_per_strip);
if ((image->x_resolution != 0.0) && (image->y_resolution != 0.0))
{
unsigned short
units;
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
units=RESUNIT_NONE;
if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
units=RESUNIT_INCH;
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
units=RESUNIT_CENTIMETER;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,(uint16) units);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,image->x_resolution);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,image->y_resolution);
if ((image->page.x < 0) || (image->page.y < 0))
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"TIFF: negative image positions unsupported","%s",
image->filename);
if ((image->page.x > 0) && (image->x_resolution > 0.0))
{
/*
Set horizontal image position.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,(float) image->page.x/
image->x_resolution);
}
if ((image->page.y > 0) && (image->y_resolution > 0.0))
{
/*
Set vertical image position.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,(float) image->page.y/
image->y_resolution);
}
}
if (image->chromaticity.white_point.x != 0.0)
{
float
chromaticity[6];
/*
Set image chromaticity.
*/
chromaticity[0]=(float) image->chromaticity.red_primary.x;
chromaticity[1]=(float) image->chromaticity.red_primary.y;
chromaticity[2]=(float) image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
chromaticity[3]=(float) image->chromaticity.green_primary.y;
chromaticity[4]=(float) image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
chromaticity[5]=(float) image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,chromaticity);
chromaticity[0]=(float) image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
chromaticity[1]=(float) image->chromaticity.white_point.y;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,chromaticity);
}
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") != 0) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) > 1))
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_PAGE);
if (image->scene != 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,(uint16) image->scene,
GetImageListLength(image));
}
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,(uint16) image->orientation);
(void) TIFFSetProfiles(tiff,image);
{
uint16
page,
pages;
page=(uint16) scene;
pages=(uint16) GetImageListLength(image);
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") != 0) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) && (pages > 1))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_PAGE);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,page,pages);
}
(void) TIFFSetProperties(tiff,image_info,image);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0)
RestoreMSCWarning
(void) TIFFSetEXIFProperties(tiff,image);
/*
Write image scanlines.
*/
if (GetTIFFInfo(image_info,tiff,&tiff_info) == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
tiff_info.scanline=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
/*
RGB TIFF image.
*/
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: RRRRRR...GGGGGG...BBBBBB...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,100,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,1,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,200,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,2,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,300,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,3,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,400,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
/*
CMYK TIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
uint16
*blue,
*green,
*red;
/*
Colormapped TIFF image.
*/
red=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*red));
green=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*green));
blue=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*blue));
if ((red == (uint16 *) NULL) || (green == (uint16 *) NULL) ||
(blue == (uint16 *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize TIFF colormap.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(red,0,65536*sizeof(*red));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(green,0,65536*sizeof(*green));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(blue,0,65536*sizeof(*blue));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
red[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red);
green[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green);
blue[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,red,green,blue);
red=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(red);
green=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(green);
blue=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blue);
}
default:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packets to contiguous grayscale scanlines.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE)
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
else
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
}
else
if (photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE)
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
DecodeLabImage(image,&image->exception);
DestroyTIFFInfo(&tiff_info);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
RestoreMSCWarning
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
(void) TIFFWriteDirectory(tiff);
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The WriteTIFFImage function in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix TIFF divide by zero (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
|
Medium
| 168,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool __oom_reap_task_mm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct mmu_gather tlb;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
bool ret = true;
/*
* We have to make sure to not race with the victim exit path
* and cause premature new oom victim selection:
* __oom_reap_task_mm exit_mm
* mmget_not_zero
* mmput
* atomic_dec_and_test
* exit_oom_victim
* [...]
* out_of_memory
* select_bad_process
* # no TIF_MEMDIE task selects new victim
* unmap_page_range # frees some memory
*/
mutex_lock(&oom_lock);
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
ret = false;
trace_skip_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
goto unlock_oom;
}
/*
* If the mm has notifiers then we would need to invalidate them around
* unmap_page_range and that is risky because notifiers can sleep and
* what they do is basically undeterministic. So let's have a short
* sleep to give the oom victim some more time.
* TODO: we really want to get rid of this ugly hack and make sure that
* notifiers cannot block for unbounded amount of time and add
* mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_{start,end} around unmap_page_range
*/
if (mm_has_notifiers(mm)) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
schedule_timeout_idle(HZ);
goto unlock_oom;
}
/*
* MMF_OOM_SKIP is set by exit_mmap when the OOM reaper can't
* work on the mm anymore. The check for MMF_OOM_SKIP must run
* under mmap_sem for reading because it serializes against the
* down_write();up_write() cycle in exit_mmap().
*/
if (test_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags)) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
trace_skip_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
goto unlock_oom;
}
trace_start_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
/*
* Tell all users of get_user/copy_from_user etc... that the content
* is no longer stable. No barriers really needed because unmapping
* should imply barriers already and the reader would hit a page fault
* if it stumbled over a reaped memory.
*/
set_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &mm->flags);
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1);
for (vma = mm->mmap ; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!can_madv_dontneed_vma(vma))
continue;
/*
* Only anonymous pages have a good chance to be dropped
* without additional steps which we cannot afford as we
* are OOM already.
*
* We do not even care about fs backed pages because all
* which are reclaimable have already been reclaimed and
* we do not want to block exit_mmap by keeping mm ref
* count elevated without a good reason.
*/
if (vma_is_anonymous(vma) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
unmap_page_range(&tlb, vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
NULL);
}
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, 0, -1);
pr_info("oom_reaper: reaped process %d (%s), now anon-rss:%lukB, file-rss:%lukB, shmem-rss:%lukB\n",
task_pid_nr(tsk), tsk->comm,
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES)),
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_FILEPAGES)),
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_SHMEMPAGES)));
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
trace_finish_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
unlock_oom:
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The __oom_reap_task_mm function in mm/oom_kill.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.4 mishandles gather operations, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (TLB entry leak or use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a copy_to_user call within a certain time window.
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer_proxy(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_U8 *pmem_data_buf = NULL;
int push_cnt = 0;
unsigned nBufIndex = 0;
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
encoder_media_buffer_type *media_buffer = NULL;
#ifdef _MSM8974_
int fd = 0;
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETBProxy: buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer->pBuffer);
if (buffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Invalid buffer[%p]", buffer);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (meta_mode_enable && !mUsesColorConversion) {
bool met_error = false;
nBufIndex = buffer - meta_buffer_hdr;
if (nBufIndex >= m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Invalid meta-bufIndex = %u", nBufIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
media_buffer = (encoder_media_buffer_type *)meta_buffer_hdr[nBufIndex].pBuffer;
if (media_buffer) {
if (media_buffer->buffer_type != kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource &&
media_buffer->buffer_type != kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
met_error = true;
} else {
if (media_buffer->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource) {
if (media_buffer->meta_handle == NULL)
met_error = true;
else if ((media_buffer->meta_handle->numFds != 1 &&
media_buffer->meta_handle->numInts != 2))
met_error = true;
}
}
} else
met_error = true;
if (met_error) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unkown source/metahandle in ETB call");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else {
nBufIndex = buffer - ((OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (nBufIndex >= m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Invalid bufIndex = %u", nBufIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
pending_input_buffers++;
if (input_flush_progress == true) {
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Input flush in progress");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (!meta_mode_enable) {
fd = m_pInput_pmem[nBufIndex].fd;
}
#endif
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable && !mUseProxyColorFormat) {
struct pmem Input_pmem_info;
if (!media_buffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: invalid media_buffer",__FUNCTION__);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (media_buffer->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource) {
Input_pmem_info.buffer = media_buffer;
Input_pmem_info.fd = media_buffer->meta_handle->data[0];
#ifdef _MSM8974_
fd = Input_pmem_info.fd;
#endif
Input_pmem_info.offset = media_buffer->meta_handle->data[1];
Input_pmem_info.size = media_buffer->meta_handle->data[2];
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (meta-Camera) fd = %d, offset = %d, size = %d",
Input_pmem_info.fd, Input_pmem_info.offset,
Input_pmem_info.size);
} else {
private_handle_t *handle = (private_handle_t *)media_buffer->meta_handle;
Input_pmem_info.buffer = media_buffer;
Input_pmem_info.fd = handle->fd;
#ifdef _MSM8974_
fd = Input_pmem_info.fd;
#endif
Input_pmem_info.offset = 0;
Input_pmem_info.size = handle->size;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (meta-gralloc) fd = %d, offset = %d, size = %d",
Input_pmem_info.fd, Input_pmem_info.offset,
Input_pmem_info.size);
}
if (dev_use_buf(&Input_pmem_info,PORT_INDEX_IN,0) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: in dev_use_buf");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (meta_mode_enable && !mUsesColorConversion) {
if (media_buffer->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
private_handle_t *handle = (private_handle_t *)media_buffer->meta_handle;
fd = handle->fd;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (opaque-gralloc) fd = %d, size = %d",
fd, handle->size);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid bufferType for buffer with Opaque"
" color format");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (input_use_buffer && !m_use_input_pmem)
#else
if (input_use_buffer && !m_use_input_pmem)
#endif
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Heap UseBuffer case, so memcpy the data");
pmem_data_buf = (OMX_U8 *)m_pInput_pmem[nBufIndex].buffer;
memcpy (pmem_data_buf, (buffer->pBuffer + buffer->nOffset),
buffer->nFilledLen);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("memcpy() done in ETBProxy for i/p Heap UseBuf");
} else if (mUseProxyColorFormat) {
fd = m_pInput_pmem[nBufIndex].fd;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (color-converted) fd = %d, size = %u",
fd, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
} else if (m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat ==
OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
if (!dev_color_align(buffer, m_sInPortDef.format.video.nFrameWidth,
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to adjust buffer color");
post_event((unsigned long)buffer, 0, OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (dev_empty_buf(buffer, pmem_data_buf,nBufIndex,fd) != true)
#else
if (dev_empty_buf(buffer, pmem_data_buf,0,0) != true)
#endif
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: dev_empty_buf failed");
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
omx_release_meta_buffer(buffer);
#endif
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
/*Generate an async error and move to invalid state*/
pending_input_buffers--;
if (hw_overload) {
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27903498.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
|
Low
| 173,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
if (c < 0)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.
Commit Message: ...
|
Medium
| 170,236
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: psf_binheader_writef (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const char *format, ...)
{ va_list argptr ;
sf_count_t countdata ;
unsigned long longdata ;
unsigned int data ;
float floatdata ;
double doubledata ;
void *bindata ;
size_t size ;
char c, *strptr ;
int count = 0, trunc_8to4 ;
trunc_8to4 = SF_FALSE ;
va_start (argptr, format) ;
while ((c = *format++))
{ switch (c)
{ case ' ' : /* Do nothing. Just used to space out format string. */
break ;
case 'e' : /* All conversions are now from LE to host. */
psf->rwf_endian = SF_ENDIAN_LITTLE ;
break ;
case 'E' : /* All conversions are now from BE to host. */
psf->rwf_endian = SF_ENDIAN_BIG ;
break ;
case 't' : /* All 8 byte values now get written as 4 bytes. */
trunc_8to4 = SF_TRUE ;
break ;
case 'T' : /* All 8 byte values now get written as 8 bytes. */
trunc_8to4 = SF_FALSE ;
break ;
case 'm' :
data = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int) ;
header_put_marker (psf, data) ;
count += 4 ;
break ;
case '1' :
data = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int) ;
header_put_byte (psf, data) ;
count += 1 ;
break ;
case '2' :
data = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
{ header_put_be_short (psf, data) ;
}
else
{ header_put_le_short (psf, data) ;
} ;
count += 2 ;
break ;
case '3' : /* tribyte */
data = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
{ header_put_be_3byte (psf, data) ;
}
else
{ header_put_le_3byte (psf, data) ;
} ;
count += 3 ;
break ;
case '4' :
data = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
{ header_put_be_int (psf, data) ;
}
else
{ header_put_le_int (psf, data) ;
} ;
count += 4 ;
break ;
case '8' :
countdata = va_arg (argptr, sf_count_t) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG && trunc_8to4 == SF_FALSE)
{ header_put_be_8byte (psf, countdata) ;
count += 8 ;
}
else if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_LITTLE && trunc_8to4 == SF_FALSE)
{ header_put_le_8byte (psf, countdata) ;
count += 8 ;
}
else if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG && trunc_8to4 == SF_TRUE)
{ longdata = countdata & 0xFFFFFFFF ;
header_put_be_int (psf, longdata) ;
count += 4 ;
}
else if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_LITTLE && trunc_8to4 == SF_TRUE)
{ longdata = countdata & 0xFFFFFFFF ;
header_put_le_int (psf, longdata) ;
count += 4 ;
}
break ;
case 'f' :
/* Floats are passed as doubles. Is this always true? */
floatdata = (float) va_arg (argptr, double) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
float32_be_write (floatdata, psf->header + psf->headindex) ;
else
float32_le_write (floatdata, psf->header + psf->headindex) ;
psf->headindex += 4 ;
count += 4 ;
break ;
case 'd' :
doubledata = va_arg (argptr, double) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
double64_be_write (doubledata, psf->header + psf->headindex) ;
else
double64_le_write (doubledata, psf->header + psf->headindex) ;
psf->headindex += 8 ;
count += 8 ;
break ;
case 's' :
/* Write a C string (guaranteed to have a zero terminator). */
strptr = va_arg (argptr, char *) ;
size = strlen (strptr) + 1 ;
size += (size & 1) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
header_put_be_int (psf, size) ;
else
header_put_le_int (psf, size) ;
memcpy (&(psf->header [psf->headindex]), strptr, size) ;
psf->headindex += size ;
psf->header [psf->headindex - 1] = 0 ;
count += 4 + size ;
break ;
case 'S' :
/*
** Write an AIFF style string (no zero terminator but possibly
** an extra pad byte if the string length is odd).
*/
strptr = va_arg (argptr, char *) ;
size = strlen (strptr) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
header_put_be_int (psf, size) ;
else
header_put_le_int (psf, size) ;
memcpy (&(psf->header [psf->headindex]), strptr, size + 1) ;
size += (size & 1) ;
psf->headindex += size ;
psf->header [psf->headindex] = 0 ;
count += 4 + size ;
break ;
case 'p' :
/* Write a PASCAL string (as used by AIFF files).
*/
strptr = va_arg (argptr, char *) ;
size = strlen (strptr) ;
size = (size & 1) ? size : size + 1 ;
size = (size > 254) ? 254 : size ;
header_put_byte (psf, size) ;
memcpy (&(psf->header [psf->headindex]), strptr, size) ;
psf->headindex += size ;
count += 1 + size ;
break ;
case 'b' :
bindata = va_arg (argptr, void *) ;
size = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
if (psf->headindex + size < sizeof (psf->header))
{ memcpy (&(psf->header [psf->headindex]), bindata, size) ;
psf->headindex += size ;
count += size ;
} ;
break ;
case 'z' :
size = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
count += size ;
while (size)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex] = 0 ;
psf->headindex ++ ;
size -- ;
} ;
break ;
case 'h' :
bindata = va_arg (argptr, void *) ;
memcpy (&(psf->header [psf->headindex]), bindata, 16) ;
psf->headindex += 16 ;
count += 16 ;
break ;
case 'j' : /* Jump forwards/backwards by specified amount. */
size = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
psf->headindex += size ;
count += size ;
break ;
case 'o' : /* Jump to specified offset. */
size = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
if (size < sizeof (psf->header))
{ psf->headindex = size ;
count = 0 ;
} ;
break ;
default :
psf_log_printf (psf, "*** Invalid format specifier `%c'\n", c) ;
psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ;
break ;
} ;
} ;
va_end (argptr) ;
return count ;
} /* psf_binheader_writef */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PasswordAutofillManager::OnShowPasswordSuggestions(
int key,
base::i18n::TextDirection text_direction,
const base::string16& typed_username,
int options,
const gfx::RectF& bounds) {
std::vector<autofill::Suggestion> suggestions;
LoginToPasswordInfoMap::const_iterator fill_data_it =
login_to_password_info_.find(key);
if (fill_data_it == login_to_password_info_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
GetSuggestions(fill_data_it->second, typed_username, &suggestions,
(options & autofill::SHOW_ALL) != 0,
(options & autofill::IS_PASSWORD_FIELD) != 0);
form_data_key_ = key;
if (suggestions.empty()) {
autofill_client_->HideAutofillPopup();
return;
}
if (options & autofill::IS_PASSWORD_FIELD) {
autofill::Suggestion password_field_suggestions(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_PASSWORD_FIELD_SUGGESTIONS_TITLE));
password_field_suggestions.frontend_id = autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_TITLE;
suggestions.insert(suggestions.begin(), password_field_suggestions);
}
GURL origin = (fill_data_it->second).origin;
bool is_context_secure = autofill_client_->IsContextSecure() &&
(!origin.is_valid() || !origin.SchemeIs("http"));
if (!is_context_secure && security_state::IsHttpWarningInFormEnabled()) {
std::string icon_str;
if (origin.is_valid() && origin.SchemeIs("http")) {
icon_str = "httpWarning";
} else {
icon_str = "httpsInvalid";
}
autofill::Suggestion http_warning_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_AUTOFILL_LOGIN_HTTP_WARNING_MESSAGE),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_AUTOFILL_HTTP_WARNING_LEARN_MORE),
icon_str, autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_HTTP_NOT_SECURE_WARNING_MESSAGE);
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
suggestions.insert(suggestions.begin(), autofill::Suggestion());
suggestions.front().frontend_id = autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR;
#endif
suggestions.insert(suggestions.begin(), http_warning_suggestion);
if (!did_show_form_not_secure_warning_) {
did_show_form_not_secure_warning_ = true;
metrics_util::LogShowedFormNotSecureWarningOnCurrentNavigation();
}
}
if (ShouldShowManualFallbackForPreLollipop(
autofill_client_->GetSyncService())) {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling) &&
(options & autofill::IS_PASSWORD_FIELD) && password_client_ &&
password_client_->IsFillingFallbackEnabledForCurrentPage()) {
AddSimpleSuggestionWithSeparatorOnTop(
IDS_AUTOFILL_SHOW_ALL_SAVED_FALLBACK,
autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_ENTRY, &suggestions);
show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_ =
metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_PASSWORD;
metrics_util::LogContextOfShowAllSavedPasswordsShown(
show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksGeneration) &&
password_manager_util::GetPasswordSyncState(
autofill_client_->GetSyncService()) == SYNCING_NORMAL_ENCRYPTION) {
AddSimpleSuggestionWithSeparatorOnTop(
IDS_AUTOFILL_GENERATE_PASSWORD_FALLBACK,
autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_GENERATE_PASSWORD_ENTRY, &suggestions);
}
}
autofill_client_->ShowAutofillPopup(bounds,
text_direction,
suggestions,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The provisional-load commit implementation in WebKit/Source/bindings/core/v8/WindowProxy.cpp in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy by leveraging a delay in window proxy clearing.
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
|
Low
| 171,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UriSuite() {
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testDistinction)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpFour)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixPass)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixFail)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUri)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort22_Bug1948038)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_12)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort5)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort6)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostRegname)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFuture)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostEmpty)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents_Bug20070701)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEscaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUnescaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testTrailingSlash)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testAddBase)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString_Bug1950126)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxMaskRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntax)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeCrash_Bug20080224)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFilenameUriConversion)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_FreeUriMembers_Bug20080116)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_Report2418192)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testPervertedQueryString);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryStringEndingInEqualSign_NonBug32);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_MakeOwner_Bug20080207)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryList)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryListPair)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryDissection_Bug3590761)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFreeCrash_Bug20080827)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testParseInvalid_Bug16)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison_RemoveBaseUri_Issue19)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEquals)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testHostTextTermination_Issue15)
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in uriparser before 0.9.0. UriQuery.c allows an out-of-bounds write via a uriComposeQuery* or uriComposeQueryEx* function because the '&' character is mishandled in certain contexts.
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
|
Low
| 168,977
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cp2112_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
buf[1] &= ~(1 << offset);
buf[2] = gpio_push_pull;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
ret = 0;
exit:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return ret <= 0 ? ret : -EIO;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.9 uses a spinlock without considering that sleeping is possible in a USB HID request callback, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 168,208
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *p = argp;
tu = file->private_data;
switch (cmd) {
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PVERSION:
return put_user(SNDRV_TIMER_VERSION, p) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_NEXT_DEVICE:
return snd_timer_user_next_device(argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_TREAD:
{
int xarg;
mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
if (tu->timeri) { /* too late */
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return -EBUSY;
}
if (get_user(xarg, p)) {
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return -EFAULT;
}
tu->tread = xarg ? 1 : 0;
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return 0;
}
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GINFO:
return snd_timer_user_ginfo(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GPARAMS:
return snd_timer_user_gparams(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GSTATUS:
return snd_timer_user_gstatus(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT:
return snd_timer_user_tselect(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_INFO:
return snd_timer_user_info(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS:
return snd_timer_user_params(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STATUS:
return snd_timer_user_status(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_start(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_stop(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_continue(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_pause(file);
}
return -ENOTTY;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 uses an incorrect type of mutex, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (race condition, use-after-free, and system crash) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Medium
| 167,404
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: transform_enable(PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Everything starts out enabled, so if we see an 'enable' disabled
* everything else the first time round.
*/
static int all_disabled = 0;
int found_it = 0;
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 1;
found_it = 1;
}
else if (!all_disabled)
list->enable = 0;
list = list->list;
}
all_disabled = 1;
if (!found_it)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-enable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,713
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: restore_page_device(const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
{
gx_device *dev_old = gs_currentdevice(pgs_old);
gx_device *dev_new;
gx_device *dev_t1;
gx_device *dev_t2;
bool samepagedevice = obj_eq(dev_old->memory, &gs_int_gstate(pgs_old)->pagedevice,
&gs_int_gstate(pgs_new)->pagedevice);
if ((dev_t1 = (*dev_proc(dev_old, get_page_device)) (dev_old)) == 0)
return false;
/* If we are going to putdeviceparams in a callout, we need to */
/* unlock temporarily. The device will be re-locked as needed */
/* by putdeviceparams from the pgs_old->pagedevice dict state. */
dev_old->LockSafetyParams = false;
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
if (dev_old != dev_new) {
if ((dev_t2 = (*dev_proc(dev_new, get_page_device)) (dev_new)) == 0)
return false;
if (dev_t1 != dev_t2)
return true;
}
/*
* The current implementation of setpagedevice just sets new
* parameters in the same device object, so we have to check
* whether the page device dictionaries are the same.
*/
return !samepagedevice;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.25. Incorrect "restoration of privilege" checking when running out of stack during exception handling could be used by attackers able to supply crafted PostScript to execute code using the "pipe" instruction. This is due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-16509.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,690
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebNavigationPolicy RenderViewImpl::decidePolicyForNavigation(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURLRequest& request, WebNavigationType type,
const WebNode&, WebNavigationPolicy default_policy, bool is_redirect) {
if (is_swapped_out_) {
if (request.url() != GURL("about:swappedout"))
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
return default_policy;
}
const GURL& url = request.url();
bool is_content_initiated =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource())->
navigation_state()->is_content_initiated();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation) &&
!frame->parent() && (is_content_initiated || is_redirect)) {
WebString origin_str = frame->document().securityOrigin().toString();
GURL frame_url(origin_str.utf8().data());
if (frame_url.GetOrigin() != url.GetOrigin()) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
}
if (is_content_initiated) {
bool browser_handles_top_level_requests =
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_top_level_requests &&
IsNonLocalTopLevelNavigation(url, frame, type);
if (browser_handles_top_level_requests ||
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_all_requests) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
page_id_ = -1;
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_ = -1;
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
if (!frame->parent() && is_content_initiated &&
!url.SchemeIs(chrome::kAboutScheme)) {
bool send_referrer = false;
int cumulative_bindings =
RenderProcess::current()->GetEnabledBindings();
bool should_fork =
content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url) ||
(cumulative_bindings & content::BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kViewSourceScheme) ||
frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled();
if (!should_fork) {
if (request.httpMethod() == "GET") {
bool is_initial_navigation = page_id_ == -1;
should_fork = content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldFork(
frame, url, is_initial_navigation, &send_referrer);
}
}
if (should_fork) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(
frame, url, send_referrer ? referrer : Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
GURL old_url(frame->dataSource()->request().url());
bool is_fork =
old_url == GURL(chrome::kAboutBlankURL) &&
historyBackListCount() < 1 &&
historyForwardListCount() < 1 &&
frame->opener() == NULL &&
frame->parent() == NULL &&
is_content_initiated &&
default_policy == WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
type == WebKit::WebNavigationTypeOther;
if (is_fork) {
OpenURL(frame, url, Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
return default_policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ntlm_print_message_fields(NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields, const char* name)
{
WLog_DBG(TAG, "%s (Len: %"PRIu16" MaxLen: %"PRIu16" BufferOffset: %"PRIu32")",
name, fields->Len, fields->MaxLen, fields->BufferOffset);
if (fields->Len > 0)
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver::RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info,
base::TimeTicks app_background_time) {
ukm::builders::PageLoad builder(info.source_id);
base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> foreground_duration =
page_load_metrics::GetInitialForegroundDuration(info,
app_background_time);
if (foreground_duration) {
builder.SetPageTiming_ForegroundDuration(
foreground_duration.value().InMilliseconds());
}
metrics::SystemProfileProto::Network::EffectiveConnectionType
proto_effective_connection_type =
metrics::ConvertEffectiveConnectionType(effective_connection_type_);
if (proto_effective_connection_type !=
metrics::SystemProfileProto::Network::EFFECTIVE_CONNECTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
builder.SetNet_EffectiveConnectionType2_OnNavigationStart(
static_cast<int64_t>(proto_effective_connection_type));
}
if (http_response_code_) {
builder.SetNet_HttpResponseCode(
static_cast<int64_t>(http_response_code_.value()));
}
if (http_rtt_estimate_) {
builder.SetNet_HttpRttEstimate_OnNavigationStart(
static_cast<int64_t>(http_rtt_estimate_.value().InMilliseconds()));
}
if (transport_rtt_estimate_) {
builder.SetNet_TransportRttEstimate_OnNavigationStart(
static_cast<int64_t>(transport_rtt_estimate_.value().InMilliseconds()));
}
if (downstream_kbps_estimate_) {
builder.SetNet_DownstreamKbpsEstimate_OnNavigationStart(
static_cast<int64_t>(downstream_kbps_estimate_.value()));
}
builder.SetNavigation_PageTransition(static_cast<int64_t>(page_transition_));
builder.SetNavigation_PageEndReason(
static_cast<int64_t>(info.page_end_reason));
if (info.did_commit && was_cached_) {
builder.SetWasCached(1);
}
builder.Record(ukm::UkmRecorder::Get());
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Leaking of an SVG shadow tree leading to corruption of the DOM tree in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
|
Medium
| 172,496
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len;
const struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid *subtlv_spb_mcid;
int i;
while (len > 2)
{
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_port_cap_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
/*len -= TLV_TYPE_LEN_OFFSET;*/
len = len -2;
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN);
subtlv_spb_mcid = (const struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid *)tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MCID: "));
isis_print_mcid(ndo, &(subtlv_spb_mcid->mcid));
/*tptr += SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len -= SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN; */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AUX-MCID: "));
isis_print_mcid(ndo, &(subtlv_spb_mcid->aux_mcid));
/*tptr += SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len -= SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN; */
tptr = tptr + sizeof(struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid);
len = len - sizeof(struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid);
break;
}
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d V: %d A: %d D: %d",
(*(tptr) >> 5), (((*tptr)>> 4) & 0x01),
((*(tptr) >> 2) & 0x03), ((*tptr) & 0x03)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Digest: "));
for(i=1;i<=8; i++)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x ", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
if (i%4 == 0 && i != 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
tptr = tptr + 4;
}
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN;
break;
}
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), stlv_len);
while (len >= ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ECT: %08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BVID: %d, U:%01x M:%01x ",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 4) ,
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 3) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 2) & 0x01));
tptr = tptr + 2;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO IS-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13026/IS-IS: Clean up processing of subTLVs.
Add bounds checks, do a common check to make sure we captured the entire
subTLV, add checks to make sure the subTLV fits within the TLV.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture files won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update existing tests for changes to IS-IS dissector.
|
Low
| 167,865
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType AnnotateImage(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*p,
primitive[MagickPathExtent],
*text,
**textlist;
DrawInfo
*annotate,
*annotate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register ssize_t
i;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
number_lines;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (draw_info->text == (char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*draw_info->text == '\0')
return(MagickTrue);
annotate=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
text=annotate->text;
annotate->text=(char *) NULL;
annotate_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
number_lines=1;
for (p=text; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (*p == '\n')
number_lines++;
textlist=AcquireQuantumMemory(number_lines+1,sizeof(*textlist));
if (textlist == (char **) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
p=text;
for (i=0; i < number_lines; i++)
{
char
*q;
textlist[i]=p;
for (q=p; *q != '\0'; q++)
if ((*q == '\r') || (*q == '\n'))
break;
if (*q == '\r')
{
*q='\0';
q++;
}
*q='\0';
p=q+1;
}
textlist[i]=(char *) NULL;
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
SetGeometryInfo(&geometry_info);
if (annotate_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) ParsePageGeometry(image,annotate_info->geometry,&geometry,
exception);
(void) ParseGeometry(annotate_info->geometry,&geometry_info);
}
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
(void) memset(&metrics,0,sizeof(metrics));
for (i=0; textlist[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
if (*textlist[i] == '\0')
continue;
/*
Position text relative to image.
*/
annotate_info->affine.tx=geometry_info.xi-image->page.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=geometry_info.psi-image->page.y;
(void) CloneString(&annotate->text,textlist[i]);
if ((metrics.width == 0) || (annotate->gravity != NorthWestGravity))
(void) GetTypeMetrics(image,annotate,&metrics,exception);
height=(ssize_t) (metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+0.5);
switch (annotate->gravity)
{
case UndefinedGravity:
default:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent;
break;
}
case NorthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent)-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
case WestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height+
annotate_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case CenterGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.sy*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+
annotate_info->affine.ry*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width+
annotate_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case SouthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0-
annotate_info->affine.ry*(number_lines-1.0)*height/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width-
annotate_info->affine.ry*(number_lines-1.0)*height-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
}
switch (annotate->align)
{
case LeftAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case CenterAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case RightAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (draw_info->undercolor.alpha != TransparentAlpha)
{
DrawInfo
*undercolor_info;
/*
Text box.
*/
undercolor_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
undercolor_info->fill=draw_info->undercolor;
undercolor_info->affine=draw_info->affine;
undercolor_info->affine.tx=offset.x-draw_info->affine.ry*metrics.ascent;
undercolor_info->affine.ty=offset.y-draw_info->affine.sy*metrics.ascent;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MagickPathExtent,
"rectangle 0.0,0.0 %g,%g",metrics.origin.x,(double) height);
(void) CloneString(&undercolor_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,undercolor_info,exception);
(void) DestroyDrawInfo(undercolor_info);
}
annotate_info->affine.tx=offset.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=offset.y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MagickPathExtent,"stroke-width %g "
"line 0,0 %g,0",metrics.underline_thickness,metrics.width);
if (annotate->decorate == OverlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+
metrics.descent-metrics.underline_position));
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info,exception);
}
else
if (annotate->decorate == UnderlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*
metrics.underline_position);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info,exception);
}
/*
Annotate image with text.
*/
status=RenderType(image,annotate,&offset,&metrics,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (annotate->decorate == LineThroughDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(height+
metrics.underline_position+metrics.descent)/2.0);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info,exception);
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
textlist=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(textlist);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory because of an AnnotateImage error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589
|
Medium
| 169,600
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: fifo_open(notify_fifo_t* fifo, int (*script_exit)(thread_t *), const char *type)
{
int ret;
int sav_errno;
if (fifo->name) {
sav_errno = 0;
if (!(ret = mkfifo(fifo->name, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)))
fifo->created_fifo = true;
else {
sav_errno = errno;
if (sav_errno != EEXIST)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to create %snotify fifo %s", type, fifo->name);
}
if (!sav_errno || sav_errno == EEXIST) {
/* Run the notify script if there is one */
if (fifo->script)
notify_fifo_exec(master, script_exit, fifo, fifo->script);
/* Now open the fifo */
if ((fifo->fd = open(fifo->name, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to open %snotify fifo %s - errno %d", type, fifo->name, errno);
if (fifo->created_fifo) {
unlink(fifo->name);
fifo->created_fifo = false;
}
}
}
if (fifo->fd == -1) {
FREE(fifo->name);
fifo->name = NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,996
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::GetUsageAndQuotaThenRunTask(
const GURL& origin, FileSystemType type,
const base::Closure& task,
const base::Closure& error_callback) {
quota::QuotaManagerProxy* quota_manager_proxy =
file_system_context()->quota_manager_proxy();
if (!quota_manager_proxy ||
!file_system_context()->GetQuotaUtil(type)) {
operation_context_.set_allowed_bytes_growth(kint64max);
task.Run();
return;
}
TaskParamsForDidGetQuota params;
params.origin = origin;
params.type = type;
params.task = task;
params.error_callback = error_callback;
DCHECK(quota_manager_proxy);
DCHECK(quota_manager_proxy->quota_manager());
quota_manager_proxy->quota_manager()->GetUsageAndQuota(
origin,
FileSystemTypeToQuotaStorageType(type),
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask,
base::Unretained(this), params));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,762
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnIPAddressChanged() {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change detected";
if (!observing_ip_address_changes_) {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change dropped.";
return;
}
#if defined (OS_CHROMEOS)
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SyncInternal::OnIPAddressChangedImpl,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
kChromeOSNetworkChangeReactionDelayHackMsec);
#else
OnIPAddressChangedImpl();
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the :first-letter pseudo-element.
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,987
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnManifestDataWriteComplete(int result) {
if (result > 0) {
AppCacheEntry entry(AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST,
manifest_response_writer_->response_id(),
manifest_response_writer_->amount_written());
if (!inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(manifest_url_, entry))
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(entry.response_id());
StoreGroupAndCache();
} else {
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Failed to write the manifest data to storage",
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR, GURL(),
0, false /*is_cross_origin*/),
DISKCACHE_ERROR, GURL());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,997
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadAAIImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
height,
length,
width;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read AAI Dune image.
*/
width=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((width == 0UL) || (height == 0UL))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Convert AAI raster image to pixel packets.
*/
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
image->depth=8;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) 4*image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if ((size_t) count != length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (*p == 254)
*p=255;
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (q->opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
width=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((width != 0UL) && (height != 0UL))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((width != 0UL) && (height != 0UL));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,546
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AutoFillMetrics::Log(QualityMetric metric) const {
DCHECK(metric < NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("AutoFill.Quality", metric,
NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the frame-loader implementation in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,652
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: off_t HFSForkReadStream::Seek(off_t offset, int whence) {
DCHECK_EQ(SEEK_SET, whence);
DCHECK_GE(offset, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<uint64_t>(offset), fork_.logicalSize);
size_t target_block = offset / hfs_->block_size();
size_t block_count = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(fork_.extents); ++i) {
const HFSPlusExtentDescriptor* extent = &fork_.extents[i];
if (extent->startBlock == 0 && extent->blockCount == 0)
break;
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> new_block_count(block_count);
new_block_count += extent->blockCount;
if (!new_block_count.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek offset block count overflows";
return false;
}
if (target_block < new_block_count.ValueOrDie()) {
if (current_extent_ != i) {
read_current_extent_ = false;
current_extent_ = i;
}
auto iterator_block_offset =
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t>(block_count) * hfs_->block_size();
if (!iterator_block_offset.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek block offset overflows";
return false;
}
fork_logical_offset_ = offset;
return offset;
}
block_count = new_block_count.ValueOrDie();
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
|
Low
| 171,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Get(const std::string& addr, int* out_value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
PrintPreviewRequestIdMap::const_iterator it = map_.find(addr);
if (it == map_.end())
return false;
*out_value = it->second;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,831
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T impeg2d_api_entity(iv_obj_t *ps_dechdl,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
iv_obj_t *ps_dec_handle;
dec_state_t *ps_dec_state;
dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core;
impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 bytes_remaining;
pic_buf_t *ps_disp_pic;
ps_dec_ip = (impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
memset(ps_dec_op,0,sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec_handle = (iv_obj_t *)ps_dechdl;
if(ps_dechdl == NULL)
{
return(IV_FAIL);
}
ps_dec_state_multi_core = ps_dec_handle->pv_codec_handle;
ps_dec_state = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf = &(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2];
}
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic = NULL;
ps_dec_state->i4_frame_decoded = 0;
/*rest bytes consumed */
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
if((ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer == NULL)&&(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm==0))
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if (ps_dec_state->u4_num_frames_decoded > NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IMPEG2D_SAMPLE_VERSION_LIMIT_ERR;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(((0 == ps_dec_state->u2_header_done) || (ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header == 1)) && (ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm == 0))
{
impeg2d_dec_hdr(ps_dec_state,ps_dec_ip ,ps_dec_op);
bytes_remaining -= ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed;
}
if((1 != ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header) && ((bytes_remaining > 0) || ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm))
{
if(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1] != NULL)
{
impeg2_disp_mgr_add(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1], ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1]->i4_buf_id);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1] = NULL;
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] = NULL;
}
else if(ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] != NULL)
{
impeg2_disp_mgr_add(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0], ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] = NULL;
}
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
ps_disp_pic = impeg2_disp_mgr_get(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, &ps_dec_state->i4_disp_buf_id);
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic = ps_disp_pic;
if(ps_disp_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
}
else
{
WORD32 fmt_conv;
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_y_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2];
fmt_conv = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_y_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_y;
if(IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_u;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_v;
fmt_conv = 0;
}
else
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec_state->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec_state->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = pu1_buf;
fmt_conv = 1;
}
}
if(fmt_conv == 1)
{
iv_yuv_buf_t *ps_dst;
ps_dst = &(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace && (0 == ps_dec_state->u2_progressive_frame))
{
impeg2d_deinterlace(ps_dec_state,
ps_disp_pic,
ps_dst,
0,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
else
{
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec_state,
ps_disp_pic,
ps_dst,
0,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace)
{
if(ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg,
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic->i4_buf_id,
MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
}
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic = ps_disp_pic;
}
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_disp_buf_id = ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_ts = ps_disp_pic->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_output_format = (IV_COLOR_FORMAT_T)ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_is_ref_flag = (B_PIC != ps_dec_state->e_pic_type);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_size = sizeof(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
switch(ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
case IV_YUV_420SP_UV:
case IV_YUV_420SP_VU:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
break;
case IV_YUV_422ILE:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
if(1 == ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size,
ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
return(IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm = 0;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
}
else if(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm==0)
{
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
if(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes < 4)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(1 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
if(0 == impeg2_buf_mgr_check_free(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg))
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code =
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_output_format = (IV_COLOR_FORMAT_T)ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_is_ref_flag = (B_PIC != ps_dec_state->e_pic_type);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
if (0 == ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = (ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size);
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_size = sizeof(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
switch(ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
case IV_YUV_420SP_UV:
case IV_YUV_420SP_VU:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
break;
case IV_YUV_422ILE:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
if( ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushcnt = 0;
/*************************************************************************/
/* Frame Decode */
/*************************************************************************/
impeg2d_dec_frm(ps_dec_state,ps_dec_ip,ps_dec_op);
if (IVD_ERROR_NONE ==
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code)
{
if(ps_dec_state->u1_first_frame_done == 0)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_first_frame_done = 1;
}
if(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 1;
switch(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->e_pic_type)
{
case I_PIC :
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_I_FRAME;
break;
case P_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_P_FRAME;
break;
case B_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
break;
case D_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_I_FRAME;
break;
default :
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_FRAMETYPE_DEFAULT;
break;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
}
ps_dec_state->u4_num_frames_decoded++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushcnt++;
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_ts = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->u4_ts;
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace)
{
if(ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg,
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic->i4_buf_id,
MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
}
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic;
}
if(1 == ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size,
ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e4_fld_type = ps_dec_state->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
if(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code)
return IV_FAIL;
else
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libmpeg2 in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35219737.
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
|
Medium
| 174,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void gdImageGifCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtxPtr out)
{
gdImagePtr pim = 0, tim = im;
int interlace, BitsPerPixel;
interlace = im->interlace;
if (im->trueColor) {
/* Expensive, but the only way that produces an
acceptable result: mix down to a palette
based temporary image. */
pim = gdImageCreatePaletteFromTrueColor(im, 1, 256);
if (!pim) {
return;
}
tim = pim;
}
BitsPerPixel = colorstobpp(tim->colorsTotal);
/* All set, let's do it. */
GIFEncode(
out, tim->sx, tim->sy, tim->interlace, 0, tim->transparent, BitsPerPixel,
tim->red, tim->green, tim->blue, tim);
if (pim) {
/* Destroy palette based temporary image. */
gdImageDestroy( pim);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
|
Low
| 169,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect
(
fm_config_conx_hdl *hdl,
fm_mgr_type_t mgr
)
{
char s_path[256];
char c_path[256];
char *mgr_prefix;
p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t *mgr_hdl;
pid_t pid;
memset(s_path,0,sizeof(s_path));
memset(c_path,0,sizeof(c_path));
pid = getpid();
switch ( mgr )
{
case FM_MGR_SM:
mgr_prefix = HSM_FM_SCK_SM;
mgr_hdl = &hdl->sm_hdl;
break;
case FM_MGR_PM:
mgr_prefix = HSM_FM_SCK_PM;
mgr_hdl = &hdl->pm_hdl;
break;
case FM_MGR_FE:
mgr_prefix = HSM_FM_SCK_FE;
mgr_hdl = &hdl->fe_hdl;
break;
default:
return FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
}
sprintf(s_path,"%s%s%d",HSM_FM_SCK_PREFIX,mgr_prefix,hdl->instance);
sprintf(c_path,"%s%s%d_C_%lu",HSM_FM_SCK_PREFIX,mgr_prefix,
hdl->instance, (long unsigned)pid);
if ( *mgr_hdl == NULL )
{
if ( hcom_client_init(mgr_hdl,s_path,c_path,32768) != HSM_COM_OK )
{
return FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
}
}
if ( hcom_client_connect(*mgr_hdl) == HSM_COM_OK )
{
hdl->conx_mask |= mgr;
return FM_CONF_OK;
}
return FM_CONF_CONX_ERR;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race conditions in opa-fm before 10.4.0.0.196 and opa-ff before 10.4.0.0.197.
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
|
Medium
| 170,131
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ext4_collapse_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t punch_start, punch_stop;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
loff_t new_size, ioffset;
int ret;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that a
* collapse range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support collapse range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Collapse range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
trace_ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
punch_start = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
punch_stop = (offset + len) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down offset to be aligned with page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* There is no need to overlap collapse range with EOF, in which case
* it is effectively a truncate operation
*/
if (offset + len >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, punch_start,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - punch_start);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, punch_start, punch_stop - 1);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle, punch_stop,
punch_stop - punch_start, SHIFT_LEFT);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
new_size = i_size_read(inode) - len;
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = new_size;
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Medium
| 167,483
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PopupContainer::showPopup(FrameView* view)
{
m_frameView = view;
listBox()->m_focusedNode = m_frameView->frame()->document()->focusedNode();
ChromeClientChromium* chromeClient = chromeClientChromium();
if (chromeClient) {
IntRect popupRect = frameRect();
chromeClient->popupOpened(this, layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect(popupRect.height(), popupRect.location()), false);
m_popupOpen = true;
}
if (!m_listBox->parent())
addChild(m_listBox.get());
m_listBox->setVerticalScrollbarMode(ScrollbarAuto);
m_listBox->scrollToRevealSelection();
invalidate();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Autofill feature in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly restrict field values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (UI corruption) and possibly conduct spoofing attacks via vectors involving long values.
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: scoped_ptr<GDataEntry> GDataDirectoryService::FromProtoString(
const std::string& serialized_proto) {
GDataEntryProto entry_proto;
if (!entry_proto.ParseFromString(serialized_proto))
return scoped_ptr<GDataEntry>();
scoped_ptr<GDataEntry> entry;
if (entry_proto.file_info().is_directory()) {
entry.reset(new GDataDirectory(NULL, this));
if (!entry->FromProto(entry_proto)) {
NOTREACHED() << "FromProto (directory) failed";
entry.reset();
}
} else {
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> file(new GDataFile(NULL, this));
if (file->FromProto(entry_proto)) {
entry.reset(file.release());
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "FromProto (file) failed";
}
}
return entry.Pass();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_image_t *jp2_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
int found;
jas_image_t *image;
jp2_dec_t *dec;
bool samedtype;
int dtype;
unsigned int i;
jp2_cmap_t *cmapd;
jp2_pclr_t *pclrd;
jp2_cdef_t *cdefd;
unsigned int channo;
int newcmptno;
int_fast32_t *lutents;
#if 0
jp2_cdefchan_t *cdefent;
int cmptno;
#endif
jp2_cmapent_t *cmapent;
jas_icchdr_t icchdr;
jas_iccprof_t *iccprof;
dec = 0;
box = 0;
image = 0;
if (!(dec = jp2_dec_create())) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the first box. This should be a JP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot get box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_JP) {
jas_eprintf("error: expecting signature box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->data.jp.magic != JP2_JP_MAGIC) {
jas_eprintf("incorrect magic number\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get the second box. This should be a FTYP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_FTYP) {
jas_eprintf("expecting file type box\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get more boxes... */
found = 0;
while ((box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("box type %s\n", box->info->name);
}
switch (box->type) {
case JP2_BOX_JP2C:
found = 1;
break;
case JP2_BOX_IHDR:
if (!dec->ihdr) {
dec->ihdr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_BPCC:
if (!dec->bpcc) {
dec->bpcc = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CDEF:
if (!dec->cdef) {
dec->cdef = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_PCLR:
if (!dec->pclr) {
dec->pclr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CMAP:
if (!dec->cmap) {
dec->cmap = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_COLR:
if (!dec->colr) {
dec->colr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
}
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
}
if (found) {
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
jas_eprintf("error: no code stream found\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(dec->image = jpc_decode(in, optstr))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot decode code stream\n");
goto error;
}
/* An IHDR box must be present. */
if (!dec->ihdr) {
jas_eprintf("error: missing IHDR box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Does the number of components indicated in the IHDR box match
the value specified in the code stream? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* At least one component must be present. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
/* Determine if all components have the same data type. */
samedtype = true;
dtype = jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, 0);
for (i = 1; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) != dtype) {
samedtype = false;
break;
}
}
/* Is the component data type indicated in the IHDR box consistent
with the data in the code stream? */
if ((samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_DTYPETOBPC(dtype)) ||
(!samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_IHDR_BPCNULL)) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the compression type supported? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.comptype != JP2_IHDR_COMPTYPE) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported compression type\n");
goto error;
}
if (dec->bpcc) {
/* Is the number of components indicated in the BPCC box
consistent with the code stream data? */
if (dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(
dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the component data type information indicated in the BPCC
box consistent with the code stream data? */
if (!samedtype) {
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) !=
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.bpcs[i])) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
}
} else {
jas_eprintf("warning: superfluous BPCC box\n");
}
}
/* A COLR box must be present. */
if (!dec->colr) {
jas_eprintf("error: no COLR box\n");
goto error;
}
switch (dec->colr->data.colr.method) {
case JP2_COLR_ENUM:
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, jp2_getcs(&dec->colr->data.colr));
break;
case JP2_COLR_ICC:
iccprof = jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(dec->colr->data.colr.iccp,
dec->colr->data.colr.iccplen);
if (!iccprof) {
jas_eprintf("error: failed to parse ICC profile\n");
goto error;
}
jas_iccprof_gethdr(iccprof, &icchdr);
jas_eprintf("ICC Profile CS %08x\n", icchdr.colorspc);
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, fromiccpcs(icchdr.colorspc));
dec->image->cmprof_ = jas_cmprof_createfromiccprof(iccprof);
assert(dec->image->cmprof_);
jas_iccprof_destroy(iccprof);
break;
}
/* If a CMAP box is present, a PCLR box must also be present. */
if (dec->cmap && !dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing PCLR box or superfluous CMAP box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->cmap);
dec->cmap = 0;
}
/* If a CMAP box is not present, a PCLR box must not be present. */
if (!dec->cmap && dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing CMAP box or superfluous PCLR box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->pclr);
dec->pclr = 0;
}
/* Determine the number of channels (which is essentially the number
of components after any palette mappings have been applied). */
dec->numchans = dec->cmap ? dec->cmap->data.cmap.numchans :
JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the CMAP box if present. */
if (dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the component number reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].cmptno >= JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid component number in CMAP box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Is the LUT index reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].pcol >=
dec->pclr->data.pclr.numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid CMAP LUT index\n");
goto error;
}
}
}
/* Allocate space for the channel-number to component-number LUT. */
if (!(dec->chantocmptlut = jas_alloc2(dec->numchans,
sizeof(uint_fast16_t)))) {
jas_eprintf("error: no memory\n");
goto error;
}
if (!dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
dec->chantocmptlut[i] = i;
}
} else {
cmapd = &dec->cmap->data.cmap;
pclrd = &dec->pclr->data.pclr;
cdefd = &dec->cdef->data.cdef;
for (channo = 0; channo < cmapd->numchans; ++channo) {
cmapent = &cmapd->ents[channo];
if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_DIRECT) {
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = channo;
} else if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_PALETTE) {
lutents = jas_alloc2(pclrd->numlutents, sizeof(int_fast32_t));
for (i = 0; i < pclrd->numlutents; ++i) {
lutents[i] = pclrd->lutdata[cmapent->pcol + i * pclrd->numchans];
}
newcmptno = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image);
jas_image_depalettize(dec->image, cmapent->cmptno,
pclrd->numlutents, lutents,
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(pclrd->bpc[cmapent->pcol]), newcmptno);
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = newcmptno;
jas_free(lutents);
#if 0
if (dec->cdef) {
cdefent = jp2_cdef_lookup(cdefd, channo);
if (!cdefent) {
abort();
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), cdefent->type, cdefent->assoc));
} else {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, channo + 1));
}
#endif
}
}
}
/* Mark all components as being of unknown type. */
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, i, JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Determine the type of each component. */
if (dec->cdef) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the channel number reasonable? */
if (dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo >= dec->numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid channel number in CDEF box\n");
goto error;
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image,
dec->chantocmptlut[dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image),
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].type,
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].assoc));
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, dec->chantocmptlut[i],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, i + 1));
}
}
/* Delete any components that are not of interest. */
for (i = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image); i > 0; --i) {
if (jas_image_cmpttype(dec->image, i - 1) == JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN) {
jas_image_delcmpt(dec->image, i - 1);
}
}
/* Ensure that some components survived. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
#if 0
jas_eprintf("no of components is %d\n", jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
#endif
/* Prevent the image from being destroyed later. */
image = dec->image;
dec->image = 0;
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
return image;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (dec) {
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_colr_destroy function in libjasper/jp2/jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 1.900.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that resulted in the destruction of JP2 box data that had never
been constructed in the first place.
|
Medium
| 168,754
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixconcat)
{
double m1[6];
double m2[6];
double mr[6];
zval **tmp;
zval *z_m1;
zval *z_m2;
int i, nelems;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "aa", &z_m1, &z_m2) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (((nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1))) != 6) || (nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2))) != 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Affine arrays must have six elements");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m1), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m1[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
m1[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(z_m2), i, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp)) {
case IS_LONG:
m2[i] = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
m2[i] = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %i", i);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (gdAffineConcat (mr, m1, m2) != GD_TRUE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, mr[i]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: ext/gd/gd.c in PHP 5.5.x before 5.5.9 does not check data types, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by using a (1) string or (2) array data type in place of a numeric data type, as demonstrated by an imagecrop function call with a string for the x dimension value, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-7226.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
|
Low
| 166,430
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dissect_ac_if_hdr_body(tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *tree, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
gint offset_start;
guint16 bcdADC;
guint8 ver_major;
double ver;
guint8 if_in_collection, i;
audio_conv_info_t *audio_conv_info;
offset_start = offset;
bcdADC = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
ver_major = USB_AUDIO_BCD44_TO_DEC(bcdADC>>8);
ver = ver_major + USB_AUDIO_BCD44_TO_DEC(bcdADC&0xFF) / 100.0;
proto_tree_add_double_format_value(tree, hf_ac_if_hdr_ver,
tvb, offset, 2, ver, "%2.2f", ver);
audio_conv_info = (audio_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if(!audio_conv_info) {
audio_conv_info = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), audio_conv_info_t);
usb_conv_info->class_data = audio_conv_info;
/* XXX - set reasonable default values for all components
that are not filled in by this function */
}
audio_conv_info->ver_major = ver_major;
offset += 2;
/* version 1 refers to the Basic Audio Device specification,
version 2 is the Audio Device class specification, see above */
if (ver_major==1) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ac_if_hdr_total_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
if_in_collection = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ac_if_hdr_bInCollection,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset++;
for (i=0; i<if_in_collection; i++) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ac_if_hdr_if_num,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset++;
}
}
return offset-offset_start;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The USB subsystem in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles class types, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
|
Medium
| 167,153
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunBeforeUnloadConfirm(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_reload,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->WillRunBeforeUnloadConfirm();
bool suppress_this_message =
!rfhi->is_active() ||
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (suppress_this_message) {
rfhi->JavaScriptDialogClosed(reply_msg, true, base::string16());
return;
}
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunBeforeUnloadDialog(
this, is_reload,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
false));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in modal dialog handling in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to prevent a full screen warning from being displayed via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
Medium
| 172,315
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sd2_parse_rsrc_fork (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ SD2_RSRC rsrc ;
int k, marker, error = 0 ;
psf_use_rsrc (psf, SF_TRUE) ;
memset (&rsrc, 0, sizeof (rsrc)) ;
rsrc.rsrc_len = psf_get_filelen (psf) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "Resource length : %d (0x%04X)\n", rsrc.rsrc_len, rsrc.rsrc_len) ;
if (rsrc.rsrc_len > SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
{ rsrc.rsrc_data = calloc (1, rsrc.rsrc_len) ;
rsrc.need_to_free_rsrc_data = SF_TRUE ;
}
else
{
rsrc.rsrc_data = psf->header ;
rsrc.need_to_free_rsrc_data = SF_FALSE ;
} ;
/* Read in the whole lot. */
psf_fread (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.rsrc_len, 1, psf) ;
/* Reset the header storage because we have changed to the rsrcdes. */
psf->headindex = psf->headend = rsrc.rsrc_len ;
rsrc.data_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0) ;
rsrc.map_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 4) ;
rsrc.data_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 8) ;
rsrc.map_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 12) ;
if (rsrc.data_offset == 0x51607 && rsrc.map_offset == 0x20000)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Trying offset of 0x52 bytes.\n") ;
rsrc.data_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 0) + 0x52 ;
rsrc.map_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 4) + 0x52 ;
rsrc.data_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 8) ;
rsrc.map_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 12) ;
} ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " data offset : 0x%04X\n map offset : 0x%04X\n"
" data length : 0x%04X\n map length : 0x%04X\n",
rsrc.data_offset, rsrc.map_offset, rsrc.data_length, rsrc.map_length) ;
if (rsrc.data_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.data_offset (%d, 0x%x) > len\n", rsrc.data_offset, rsrc.data_offset) ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_DATA_OFFSET ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
if (rsrc.map_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.map_offset > len\n") ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_MAP_OFFSET ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
if (rsrc.data_length > rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.data_length > len\n") ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_DATA_LENGTH ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
if (rsrc.map_length > rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.map_length > len\n") ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_MAP_LENGTH ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
if (rsrc.data_offset + rsrc.data_length != rsrc.map_offset || rsrc.map_offset + rsrc.map_length != rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : This does not look like a MacOSX resource fork.\n") ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
if (rsrc.map_offset + 28 >= rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad map offset (%d + 28 > %d).\n", rsrc.map_offset, rsrc.rsrc_len) ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
rsrc.string_offset = rsrc.map_offset + read_rsrc_short (&rsrc, rsrc.map_offset + 26) ;
if (rsrc.string_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad string offset (%d).\n", rsrc.string_offset) ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
rsrc.type_offset = rsrc.map_offset + 30 ;
rsrc.type_count = read_rsrc_short (&rsrc, rsrc.map_offset + 28) + 1 ;
if (rsrc.type_count < 1)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad type count.\n") ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
rsrc.item_offset = rsrc.type_offset + rsrc.type_count * 8 ;
if (rsrc.item_offset < 0 || rsrc.item_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad item offset (%d).\n", rsrc.item_offset) ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
rsrc.str_index = -1 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < rsrc.type_count ; k ++)
{ marker = read_rsrc_marker (&rsrc, rsrc.type_offset + k * 8) ;
if (marker == STR_MARKER)
{ rsrc.str_index = k ;
rsrc.str_count = read_rsrc_short (&rsrc, rsrc.type_offset + k * 8 + 4) + 1 ;
error = parse_str_rsrc (psf, &rsrc) ;
goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ;
} ;
} ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "No 'STR ' resource.\n") ;
error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup :
psf_use_rsrc (psf, SF_FALSE) ;
if (rsrc.need_to_free_rsrc_data)
free (rsrc.rsrc_data) ;
return error ;
} /* sd2_parse_rsrc_fork */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sd2_parse_rsrc_fork function in sd2.c in libsndfile allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to a (1) map offset or (2) rsrc marker, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: src/sd2.c : Fix two potential buffer read overflows.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/93
|
Low
| 166,784
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static char *pool_strdup(const char *s)
{
char *r = pool_alloc(strlen(s) + 1);
strcpy(r, s);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: revision.c in git before 2.7.4 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 167,428
|
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