instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hugetlbfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct inode * inode;
struct dentry * root;
int ret;
struct hugetlbfs_config config;
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo;
save_mount_options(sb, data);
config.nr_blocks = -1; /* No limit on size by default */
config.nr_inodes = -1; /* No limit on number of inodes by default */
config.uid = current_fsuid();
config.gid = current_fsgid();
config.mode = 0755;
config.hstate = &default_hstate;
ret = hugetlbfs_parse_options(data, &config);
if (ret)
return ret;
sbinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hugetlbfs_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
sb->s_fs_info = sbinfo;
sbinfo->hstate = config.hstate;
spin_lock_init(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
sbinfo->max_blocks = config.nr_blocks;
sbinfo->free_blocks = config.nr_blocks;
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(config.hstate);
sb->s_blocksize_bits = huge_page_shift(config.hstate);
sb->s_magic = HUGETLBFS_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &hugetlbfs_ops;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
inode = hugetlbfs_get_root(sb, &config);
if (!inode)
goto out_free;
root = d_alloc_root(inode);
if (!root) {
iput(inode);
goto out_free;
}
sb->s_root = root;
return 0;
out_free:
kfree(sbinfo);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6, when huge pages are enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges by interacting with a hugetlbfs filesystem, as demonstrated by a umount operation that triggers improper handling of quota data.
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int omninet_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct usb_serial_port *wport;
wport = serial->port[1];
tty_port_tty_set(&wport->port, tty);
return usb_serial_generic_open(tty, port);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The omninet_open function in drivers/usb/serial/omninet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (tty exhaustion) by leveraging reference count mishandling.
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 168,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,309
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SafeAlphaCompositeSolidMask_nx8x8888(
CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca;
CARD32 *dstLine, *dst, d, dstMask;
CARD8 *maskLine, *mask, m;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
dstMask = FbFullMask (pDst->pDrawable->depth);
srca = src >> 24;
if (src == 0)
return;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD32, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD8, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
if (dstMask == FB_ALLONES && pDst->pDrawable->bitsPerPixel == 32 &&
width * height > rootless_CompositePixels_threshold &&
SCREENREC(pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)->imp->CompositePixels)
{
void *srcp[2], *destp[2];
unsigned int dest_rowbytes[2];
unsigned int fn;
srcp[0] = &src; srcp[1] = &src;
/* null rowbytes pointer means use first value as a constant */
destp[0] = dstLine; destp[1] = dstLine;
dest_rowbytes[0] = dstStride * 4; dest_rowbytes[1] = dest_rowbytes[0];
fn = RL_COMPOSITE_FUNCTION(RL_COMPOSITE_OVER, RL_DEPTH_ARGB8888,
RL_DEPTH_A8, RL_DEPTH_ARGB8888);
if (SCREENREC(pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)->imp->CompositePixels(
width, height, fn, srcp, NULL,
maskLine, maskStride,
destp, dest_rowbytes) == Success)
{
return;
}
}
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
}
void
SafeAlphaComposite (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
RegionRec region;
int n;
BoxPtr pbox;
CompositeFunc func = 0;
Bool srcRepeat = pSrc->repeat;
Bool maskRepeat = FALSE;
Bool srcAlphaMap = pSrc->alphaMap != 0;
Bool maskAlphaMap = FALSE;
Bool dstAlphaMap = pDst->alphaMap != 0;
int x_msk, y_msk, x_src, y_src, x_dst, y_dst;
int w, h, w_this, h_this;
int dstDepth = pDst->pDrawable->depth;
int oldFormat = pDst->format;
xDst += pDst->pDrawable->x;
yDst += pDst->pDrawable->y;
xSrc += pSrc->pDrawable->x;
ySrc += pSrc->pDrawable->y;
if (pMask)
{
xMask += pMask->pDrawable->x;
yMask += pMask->pDrawable->y;
maskRepeat = pMask->repeat;
maskAlphaMap = pMask->alphaMap != 0;
}
/*
* We can use the more optimized fbpict code, but it sets bits above
* the depth to zero. Temporarily adjust destination depth if needed.
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
{
pDst->pDrawable->depth = 32;
}
/* For rootless preserve the alpha in x8r8g8b8 which really is
* a8r8g8b8
*/
int n;
{
pDst->format = PICT_a8r8g8b8;
}
if (!pSrc->transform && !(pMask && pMask->transform))
if (!maskAlphaMap && !srcAlphaMap && !dstAlphaMap)
switch (op) {
case PictOpSrc:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (!pMask && pSrc->format == pDst->format &&
pSrc->pDrawable != pDst->pDrawable)
{
func = fbCompositeCopyAreammx;
}
#endif
break;
case PictOpOver:
if (pMask)
{
if (srcRepeat &&
pSrc->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pSrc->pDrawable->height == 1)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (PICT_FORMAT_COLOR(pSrc->format)) {
switch (pMask->format) {
case PICT_a8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
case PICT_b5g6r5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0565mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0565;
break;
case PICT_r8g8b8:
case PICT_b8g8r8:
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0888;
break;
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
func = SafeAlphaCompositeSolidMask_nx8x8888;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
if (pMask->componentAlpha) {
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888C;
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565C;
break;
}
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
if (pMask->componentAlpha) {
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888C;
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565C;
break;
}
}
break;
case PICT_a1:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
case PICT_b5g6r5:
case PICT_r8g8b8:
case PICT_b8g8r8:
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx1xn;
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
else /* has mask and non-repeating source */
{
if (pSrc->pDrawable == pMask->pDrawable &&
xSrc == xMask && ySrc == yMask &&
!pMask->componentAlpha)
{
/* source == mask: non-premultiplied data */
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
switch (pMask->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx8888mmx;
#endif
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx0565mmx;
#endif
break;
}
break;
}
break;
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
switch (pMask->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx8888mmx;
#endif
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx0565mmx;
#endif
break;
}
break;
}
break;
}
break;
}
else
{
/* non-repeating source, repeating mask => translucent window */
if (maskRepeat &&
pMask->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pMask->pDrawable->height == 1)
{
if (pSrc->format == PICT_x8r8g8b8 &&
pDst->format == PICT_x8r8g8b8 &&
pMask->format == PICT_a8)
{
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8x8888mmx;
#endif
}
}
}
}
}
else /* no mask */
{
if (srcRepeat &&
pSrc->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pSrc->pDrawable->height == 1)
{
/* no mask and repeating source */
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
func = fbCompositeSolid_nx8888mmx;
}
#endif
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
func = fbCompositeSolid_nx0565mmx;
}
#endif
break;
}
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888;
break;
case PICT_r8g8b8:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0888;
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0565;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeCopyAreammx;
#endif
break;
}
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeCopyAreammx;
#endif
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888;
break;
case PICT_b8g8r8:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0888;
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0565;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_0565x0565;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_b5g6r5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_0565x0565;
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
break;
case PictOpAdd:
if (pMask == 0)
{
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8000x8000mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8000x8000;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a1:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a1:
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_1000x1000;
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (!func) {
/* no fast path, use the general code */
fbCompositeGeneral(op, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc, xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height);
pDst->pDrawable->depth = dstDepth;
pDst->format = oldFormat;
return;
}
if (!miComputeCompositeRegion (®ion,
pSrc,
pMask,
pDst,
xSrc,
ySrc,
xMask,
yMask,
xDst,
yDst,
width,
height))
return;
n = REGION_NUM_RECTS (®ion);
pbox = REGION_RECTS (®ion);
while (n--)
{
h = pbox->y2 - pbox->y1;
y_src = pbox->y1 - yDst + ySrc;
y_msk = pbox->y1 - yDst + yMask;
y_dst = pbox->y1;
while (h)
{
h_this = h;
w = pbox->x2 - pbox->x1;
x_src = pbox->x1 - xDst + xSrc;
x_msk = pbox->x1 - xDst + xMask;
x_dst = pbox->x1;
if (maskRepeat)
{
y_msk = mod (y_msk, pMask->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk)
h_this = pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
y_src = mod (y_src, pSrc->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src)
h_this = pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src;
}
while (w)
{
w_this = w;
if (maskRepeat)
{
x_msk = mod (x_msk, pMask->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk)
w_this = pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
x_src = mod (x_src, pSrc->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src)
w_this = pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src;
}
(*func) (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
x_src, y_src, x_msk, y_msk, x_dst, y_dst,
w_this, h_this);
w -= w_this;
x_src += w_this;
x_msk += w_this;
x_dst += w_this;
}
h -= h_this;
y_src += h_this;
y_msk += h_this;
y_dst += h_this;
}
pbox++;
}
REGION_UNINIT (pDst->pDrawable->pScreen, ®ion);
pDst->pDrawable->depth = dstDepth;
pDst->format = oldFormat;
}
}
/* For rootless preserve the alpha in x8r8g8b8 which really is
* a8r8g8b8
*/
if (oldFormat == PICT_x8r8g8b8)
{
pDst->format = PICT_a8r8g8b8;
}
if (!pSrc->transform && !(pMask && pMask->transform))
if (!maskAlphaMap && !srcAlphaMap && !dstAlphaMap)
switch (op) {
case PictOpSrc:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (!pMask && pSrc->format == pDst->format &&
pSrc->pDrawable != pDst->pDrawable)
{
func = fbCompositeCopyAreammx;
}
#endif
break;
case PictOpOver:
if (pMask)
{
if (srcRepeat &&
pSrc->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pSrc->pDrawable->height == 1)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (PICT_FORMAT_COLOR(pSrc->format)) {
switch (pMask->format) {
case PICT_a8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
case PICT_b5g6r5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0565mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0565;
break;
case PICT_r8g8b8:
case PICT_b8g8r8:
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0888;
break;
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
func = SafeAlphaCompositeSolidMask_nx8x8888;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
if (pMask->componentAlpha) {
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888C;
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565C;
break;
}
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
if (pMask->componentAlpha) {
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888C;
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565C;
break;
}
}
break;
case PICT_a1:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
case PICT_b5g6r5:
case PICT_r8g8b8:
case PICT_b8g8r8:
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx1xn;
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
else /* has mask and non-repeating source */
{
if (pSrc->pDrawable == pMask->pDrawable &&
xSrc == xMask && ySrc == yMask &&
!pMask->componentAlpha)
{
/* source == mask: non-premultiplied data */
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
switch (pMask->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx8888mmx;
#endif
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx0565mmx;
#endif
break;
}
break;
}
break;
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
switch (pMask->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx8888mmx;
#endif
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888RevNPx0565mmx;
#endif
break;
}
break;
}
break;
}
break;
}
else
{
/* non-repeating source, repeating mask => translucent window */
if (maskRepeat &&
pMask->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pMask->pDrawable->height == 1)
{
if (pSrc->format == PICT_x8r8g8b8 &&
pDst->format == PICT_x8r8g8b8 &&
pMask->format == PICT_a8)
{
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8x8888mmx;
#endif
}
}
}
}
}
else /* no mask */
{
if (srcRepeat &&
pSrc->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pSrc->pDrawable->height == 1)
{
/* no mask and repeating source */
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
func = fbCompositeSolid_nx8888mmx;
}
#endif
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
func = fbCompositeSolid_nx0565mmx;
}
#endif
break;
}
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888;
break;
case PICT_r8g8b8:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0888;
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0565;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeCopyAreammx;
#endif
break;
}
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeCopyAreammx;
#endif
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888;
break;
case PICT_b8g8r8:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0888;
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_8888x0565;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_r5g6b5:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_0565x0565;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_b5g6r5:
func = fbCompositeSrc_0565x0565;
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
break;
case PictOpAdd:
if (pMask == 0)
{
switch (pSrc->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a8:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8000x8000mmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_8000x8000;
break;
}
break;
case PICT_a1:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a1:
func = fbCompositeSrcAdd_1000x1000;
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (!func) {
/* no fast path, use the general code */
fbCompositeGeneral(op, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc, xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height);
pDst->pDrawable->depth = dstDepth;
pDst->format = oldFormat;
return;
}
if (!miComputeCompositeRegion (®ion,
pSrc,
pMask,
pDst,
xSrc,
ySrc,
xMask,
yMask,
xDst,
yDst,
width,
height))
return;
n = REGION_NUM_RECTS (®ion);
pbox = REGION_RECTS (®ion);
while (n--)
{
h = pbox->y2 - pbox->y1;
y_src = pbox->y1 - yDst + ySrc;
y_msk = pbox->y1 - yDst + yMask;
y_dst = pbox->y1;
while (h)
{
h_this = h;
w = pbox->x2 - pbox->x1;
x_src = pbox->x1 - xDst + xSrc;
x_msk = pbox->x1 - xDst + xMask;
x_dst = pbox->x1;
if (maskRepeat)
{
y_msk = mod (y_msk, pMask->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk)
h_this = pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
y_src = mod (y_src, pSrc->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src)
h_this = pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src;
}
while (w)
{
w_this = w;
if (maskRepeat)
{
x_msk = mod (x_msk, pMask->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk)
w_this = pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
x_src = mod (x_src, pSrc->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src)
w_this = pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src;
}
(*func) (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
x_src, y_src, x_msk, y_msk, x_dst, y_dst,
w_this, h_this);
w -= w_this;
x_src += w_this;
x_msk += w_this;
x_dst += w_this;
}
h -= h_this;
y_src += h_this;
y_msk += h_this;
y_dst += h_this;
}
pbox++;
}
REGION_UNINIT (pDst->pDrawable->pScreen, ®ion);
pDst->pDrawable->depth = dstDepth;
pDst->format = oldFormat;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The fbComposite function in fbpict.c in the Render extension in the X server in X.Org X11R7.1 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted request, related to an incorrect macro definition.
Commit Message:
|
High
| 165,131
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
struct zip_entry *rsrc)
{
struct zip *zip = (struct zip *)a->format->data;
unsigned char *metadata, *mp;
int64_t offset = archive_filter_bytes(&a->archive, 0);
size_t remaining_bytes, metadata_bytes;
ssize_t hsize;
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK, eof;
switch(rsrc->compression) {
case 0: /* No compression. */
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
case 8: /* Deflate compression. */
#endif
break;
default: /* Unsupported compression. */
/* Return a warning. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unsupported ZIP compression method (%s)",
compression_name(rsrc->compression));
/* We can't decompress this entry, but we will
* be able to skip() it and try the next entry. */
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (rsrc->uncompressed_size > (4 * 1024 * 1024)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Mac metadata is too large: %jd > 4M bytes",
(intmax_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
metadata = malloc((size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
if (metadata == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Mac metadata");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (offset < rsrc->local_header_offset)
__archive_read_consume(a, rsrc->local_header_offset - offset);
else if (offset != rsrc->local_header_offset) {
__archive_read_seek(a, rsrc->local_header_offset, SEEK_SET);
}
hsize = zip_get_local_file_header_size(a, 0);
__archive_read_consume(a, hsize);
remaining_bytes = (size_t)rsrc->compressed_size;
metadata_bytes = (size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size;
mp = metadata;
eof = 0;
while (!eof && remaining_bytes) {
const unsigned char *p;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
size_t bytes_used;
p = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (p == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated ZIP file header");
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
goto exit_mac_metadata;
}
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > remaining_bytes)
bytes_avail = remaining_bytes;
switch(rsrc->compression) {
case 0: /* No compression. */
memcpy(mp, p, bytes_avail);
bytes_used = (size_t)bytes_avail;
metadata_bytes -= bytes_used;
mp += bytes_used;
if (metadata_bytes == 0)
eof = 1;
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
case 8: /* Deflate compression. */
{
int r;
ret = zip_deflate_init(a, zip);
if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK)
goto exit_mac_metadata;
zip->stream.next_in =
(Bytef *)(uintptr_t)(const void *)p;
zip->stream.avail_in = (uInt)bytes_avail;
zip->stream.total_in = 0;
zip->stream.next_out = mp;
zip->stream.avail_out = (uInt)metadata_bytes;
zip->stream.total_out = 0;
r = inflate(&zip->stream, 0);
switch (r) {
case Z_OK:
break;
case Z_STREAM_END:
eof = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Out of memory for ZIP decompression");
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
goto exit_mac_metadata;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"ZIP decompression failed (%d)", r);
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
goto exit_mac_metadata;
}
bytes_used = zip->stream.total_in;
metadata_bytes -= zip->stream.total_out;
mp += zip->stream.total_out;
break;
}
#endif
default:
bytes_used = 0;
break;
}
__archive_read_consume(a, bytes_used);
remaining_bytes -= bytes_used;
}
archive_entry_copy_mac_metadata(entry, metadata,
(size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size - metadata_bytes);
exit_mac_metadata:
__archive_read_seek(a, offset, SEEK_SET);
zip->decompress_init = 0;
free(metadata);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the zip_read_mac_metadata function in archive_read_support_format_zip.c in libarchive before 3.2.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted entry-size values in a ZIP archive.
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
|
Medium
| 167,446
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_remote_perform_op(cib_t * cib, const char *op, const char *host, const char *section,
xmlNode * data, xmlNode ** output_data, int call_options, const char *name)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
xmlNode *op_msg = NULL;
xmlNode *op_reply = NULL;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
if (sync_timer == NULL) {
sync_timer = calloc(1, sizeof(struct timer_rec_s));
}
if (cib->state == cib_disconnected) {
return -ENOTCONN;
}
if (output_data != NULL) {
*output_data = NULL;
}
if (op == NULL) {
crm_err("No operation specified");
return -EINVAL;
}
cib->call_id++;
/* prevent call_id from being negative (or zero) and conflicting
* with the cib_errors enum
* use 2 because we use it as (cib->call_id - 1) below
*/
if (cib->call_id < 1) {
cib->call_id = 1;
}
op_msg =
cib_create_op(cib->call_id, private->callback.token, op, host, section, data, call_options,
NULL);
if (op_msg == NULL) {
return -EPROTO;
}
crm_trace("Sending %s message to CIB service", op);
crm_send_remote_msg(private->command.session, op_msg, private->command.encrypted);
free_xml(op_msg);
if ((call_options & cib_discard_reply)) {
crm_trace("Discarding reply");
return pcmk_ok;
} else if (!(call_options & cib_sync_call)) {
return cib->call_id;
}
crm_trace("Waiting for a syncronous reply");
if (cib->call_timeout > 0) {
/* We need this, even with msgfromIPC_timeout(), because we might
* get other/older replies that don't match the active request
*/
timer_expired = FALSE;
sync_timer->call_id = cib->call_id;
sync_timer->timeout = cib->call_timeout * 1000;
sync_timer->ref = g_timeout_add(sync_timer->timeout, cib_timeout_handler, sync_timer);
}
while (timer_expired == FALSE) {
int reply_id = -1;
int msg_id = cib->call_id;
op_reply = crm_recv_remote_msg(private->command.session, private->command.encrypted);
if (op_reply == NULL) {
break;
}
crm_element_value_int(op_reply, F_CIB_CALLID, &reply_id);
CRM_CHECK(reply_id > 0, free_xml(op_reply);
if (sync_timer->ref > 0) {
g_source_remove(sync_timer->ref); sync_timer->ref = 0;}
return -ENOMSG) ;
if (reply_id == msg_id) {
break;
} else if (reply_id < msg_id) {
crm_debug("Received old reply: %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
crm_log_xml_trace(op_reply, "Old reply");
} else if ((reply_id - 10000) > msg_id) {
/* wrap-around case */
crm_debug("Received old reply: %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
crm_log_xml_trace(op_reply, "Old reply");
} else {
crm_err("Received a __future__ reply:" " %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
}
free_xml(op_reply);
op_reply = NULL;
}
if (sync_timer->ref > 0) {
g_source_remove(sync_timer->ref);
sync_timer->ref = 0;
}
if (timer_expired) {
return -ETIME;
}
/* if(IPC_ISRCONN(native->command_channel) == FALSE) { */
/* crm_err("CIB disconnected: %d", */
/* native->command_channel->ch_status); */
/* cib->state = cib_disconnected; */
/* } */
if (op_reply == NULL) {
crm_err("No reply message - empty");
return -ENOMSG;
}
crm_trace("Syncronous reply received");
/* Start processing the reply... */
if (crm_element_value_int(op_reply, F_CIB_RC, &rc) != 0) {
rc = -EPROTO;
}
if (rc == -pcmk_err_diff_resync) {
/* This is an internal value that clients do not and should not care about */
rc = pcmk_ok;
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EPERM) {
crm_log_xml_debug(op_reply, "passed");
} else {
/* } else if(rc == -ETIME) { */
crm_err("Call failed: %s", pcmk_strerror(rc));
crm_log_xml_warn(op_reply, "failed");
}
if (output_data == NULL) {
/* do nothing more */
} else if (!(call_options & cib_discard_reply)) {
xmlNode *tmp = get_message_xml(op_reply, F_CIB_CALLDATA);
if (tmp == NULL) {
crm_trace("No output in reply to \"%s\" command %d", op, cib->call_id - 1);
} else {
*output_data = copy_xml(tmp);
}
}
free_xml(op_reply);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,152
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DOMWindow* CreateWindow(const String& url_string,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
const String& window_features_string,
LocalDOMWindow& calling_window,
LocalFrame& first_frame,
LocalFrame& opener_frame,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
LocalFrame* active_frame = calling_window.GetFrame();
DCHECK(active_frame);
KURL completed_url = url_string.IsEmpty()
? KURL(kParsedURLString, g_empty_string)
: first_frame.GetDocument()->CompleteURL(url_string);
if (!completed_url.IsEmpty() && !completed_url.IsValid()) {
UseCounter::Count(active_frame, WebFeature::kWindowOpenWithInvalidURL);
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kSyntaxError, "Unable to open a window with invalid URL '" +
completed_url.GetString() + "'.\n");
return nullptr;
}
WebWindowFeatures window_features =
GetWindowFeaturesFromString(window_features_string);
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(calling_window.document(),
ResourceRequest(completed_url), frame_name);
frame_request.SetShouldSetOpener(window_features.noopener ? kNeverSetOpener
: kMaybeSetOpener);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeAuxiliary);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetRequestorOrigin(
SecurityOrigin::Create(active_frame->GetDocument()->Url()));
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHTTPReferrer(
SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
active_frame->GetDocument()->GetReferrerPolicy(), completed_url,
active_frame->GetDocument()->OutgoingReferrer()));
bool has_user_gesture = UserGestureIndicator::ProcessingUserGesture();
bool created;
Frame* new_frame = CreateWindowHelper(
opener_frame, *active_frame, opener_frame, frame_request, window_features,
kNavigationPolicyIgnore, created);
if (!new_frame)
return nullptr;
if (new_frame->DomWindow()->IsInsecureScriptAccess(calling_window,
completed_url))
return window_features.noopener ? nullptr : new_frame->DomWindow();
if (created) {
FrameLoadRequest request(calling_window.document(),
ResourceRequest(completed_url));
request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(has_user_gesture);
new_frame->Navigate(request);
} else if (!url_string.IsEmpty()) {
new_frame->Navigate(*calling_window.document(), completed_url, false,
has_user_gesture ? UserGestureStatus::kActive
: UserGestureStatus::kNone);
}
return window_features.noopener ? nullptr : new_frame->DomWindow();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficient enforcement of Content Security Policy in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to open javascript: URL windows when they should not be allowed to via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: CSP now prevents opening javascript url windows when they're not allowed
spec: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate
which leads to: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#should-block-navigation-request
Bug: 756040
Change-Id: I5fd62ebfb6fe1d767694b0ed6cf427c8ea95994a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/632580
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497338}
|
Medium
| 172,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadVIPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
*metadata;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
n;
unsigned int
channels,
marker;
VIPSBandFormat
format;
VIPSCoding
coding;
VIPSType
type;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
marker=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (marker == VIPS_MAGIC_LSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else if (marker == VIPS_MAGIC_MSB)
image->endian=MSBEndian;
else
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) ReadBlobLong(image);
image->rows=(size_t) ReadBlobLong(image);
channels=ReadBlobLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLong(image); /* Legacy */
format=(VIPSBandFormat) ReadBlobLong(image);
switch(format)
{
case VIPSBandFormatUCHAR:
case VIPSBandFormatCHAR:
image->depth=8;
break;
case VIPSBandFormatUSHORT:
case VIPSBandFormatSHORT:
image->depth=16;
break;
case VIPSBandFormatUINT:
case VIPSBandFormatINT:
case VIPSBandFormatFLOAT:
image->depth=32;
break;
case VIPSBandFormatDOUBLE:
image->depth=64;
break;
default:
case VIPSBandFormatCOMPLEX:
case VIPSBandFormatDPCOMPLEX:
case VIPSBandFormatNOTSET:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"Unsupported band format");
}
coding=(VIPSCoding) ReadBlobLong(image);
type=(VIPSType) ReadBlobLong(image);
switch(type)
{
case VIPSTypeCMYK:
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (channels == 5)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
break;
case VIPSTypeB_W:
case VIPSTypeGREY16:
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (channels == 2)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
break;
case VIPSTypeRGB:
case VIPSTypeRGB16:
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (channels == 4)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
break;
case VIPSTypesRGB:
SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (channels == 4)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
break;
default:
case VIPSTypeFOURIER:
case VIPSTypeHISTOGRAM:
case VIPSTypeLAB:
case VIPSTypeLABS:
case VIPSTypeLABQ:
case VIPSTypeLCH:
case VIPSTypeMULTIBAND:
case VIPSTypeUCS:
case VIPSTypeXYZ:
case VIPSTypeYXY:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"Unsupported colorspace");
}
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=ReadBlobFloat(image)*10;
image->y_resolution=ReadBlobFloat(image)*10;
/*
Legacy, offsets, future
*/
(void) ReadBlobLongLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLongLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLongLong(image);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
return(image);
if (IsSupportedCombination(format,type) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,
"Unsupported combination of band format and colorspace");
if (channels == 0 || channels > 5)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"Unsupported number of channels");
if (coding == VIPSCodingNONE)
status=ReadVIPSPixelsNONE(image,format,type,channels,exception);
else
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"Unsupported coding");
metadata=(char *) NULL;
while ((n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent-1,(unsigned char *) buffer)) != 0)
{
buffer[n]='\0';
if (metadata == (char *) NULL)
metadata=ConstantString(buffer);
else
(void) ConcatenateString(&metadata,buffer);
}
if (metadata != (char *) NULL)
SetImageProperty(image,"vips:metadata",metadata);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,618
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int create_fixed_stream_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
struct audioformat *fp;
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int stream, err;
unsigned *rate_table = NULL;
fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp) {
usb_audio_err(chip, "cannot memdup\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) {
kfree(fp);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fp->nr_rates > 0) {
rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table,
sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rate_table) {
kfree(fp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
fp->rate_table = rate_table;
}
stream = (fp->endpoint & USB_DIR_IN)
? SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE : SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK;
err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return err;
}
if (fp->iface != get_iface_desc(&iface->altsetting[0])->bInterfaceNumber ||
fp->altset_idx >= iface->num_altsetting) {
kfree(fp);
kfree(rate_table);
return -EINVAL;
}
alts = &iface->altsetting[fp->altset_idx];
altsd = get_iface_desc(alts);
fp->protocol = altsd->bInterfaceProtocol;
if (fp->datainterval == 0)
fp->datainterval = snd_usb_parse_datainterval(chip, alts);
if (fp->maxpacksize == 0)
fp->maxpacksize = le16_to_cpu(get_endpoint(alts, 0)->wMaxPacketSize);
usb_set_interface(chip->dev, fp->iface, 0);
snd_usb_init_pitch(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp);
snd_usb_init_sample_rate(chip, fp->iface, alts, fp, fp->rate_max);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The create_fixed_stream_quirk function in sound/usb/quirks.c in the snd-usb-audio driver in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or double free, and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,434
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: JBIG2Bitmap::JBIG2Bitmap(Guint segNumA, JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap):
JBIG2Segment(segNumA)
{
w = bitmap->w;
h = bitmap->h;
line = bitmap->line;
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0 || line <= 0 || h >= (INT_MAX - 1) / line) {
error(-1, "invalid width/height");
data = NULL;
return;
}
data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(h * line + 1);
memcpy(data, bitmap->data, h * line);
data[h * line] = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,613
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the opj_t2_read_packet_data function in fxcodec/fx_libopenjpeg/libopenjpeg20/t2.c in OpenJPEG in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long segment in a JPEG image.
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
|
Low
| 171,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int udp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
bool slow;
/*
* Check any passed addresses
*/
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb,
sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udp_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
if (noblock)
return -EAGAIN;
/* starting over for a new packet */
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,479
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,911
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline unsigned char unimap_bsearch(const uni_to_enc *table, unsigned code_key_a, size_t num)
{
const uni_to_enc *l = table,
*h = &table[num-1],
*m;
unsigned short code_key;
/* we have no mappings outside the BMP */
if (code_key_a > 0xFFFFU)
return 0;
code_key = (unsigned short) code_key_a;
while (l <= h) {
m = l + (h - l) / 2;
if (code_key < m->un_code_point)
h = m - 1;
else if (code_key > m->un_code_point)
l = m + 1;
else
return m->cs_code;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,180
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SessionManager::Remove(const std::string& id) {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::iterator it;
Session* session;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end()) {
VLOG(1) << "No such session with ID " << id;
return false;
}
session = it->second;
map_.erase(it);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,464
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret;
gss_OID_set supported_mechSet;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
*mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
supported_mechSet = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
*negState = REJECT;
*minor_status = 0;
/* A hint request must be the first token received. */
if (*ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&supported_mechSet);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = make_NegHints(minor_status, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sc = create_spnego_ctx();
if (sc == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
if (put_mech_set(supported_mechSet, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->internal_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
sc->firstpass = 1;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &supported_mechSet);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,647
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcPseudoramiXGetScreenSize(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
WindowPtr pWin;
xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply rep;
register int rc;
TRACE;
if (stuff->screen >= pseudoramiXNumScreens)
return BadMatch;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep.type = X_Reply;
rep.length = 0;
rep.sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
/* screen dimensions */
rep.width = pseudoramiXScreens[stuff->screen].w;
rep.height = pseudoramiXScreens[stuff->screen].h;
rep.window = stuff->window;
rep.screen = stuff->screen;
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.width);
swapl(&rep.height);
swapl(&rep.window);
swapl(&rep.screen);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply),&rep);
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in RENDER extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadDIBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DIBInfo
dib_info;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
ssize_t
bit,
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a DIB file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&dib_info,0,sizeof(dib_info));
dib_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (dib_info.size!=40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Microsoft Windows 3.X DIB image file.
*/
dib_info.width=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.height=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS) &&
((dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32)))
{
dib_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
}
image->matte=dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.height);
image->depth=8;
if ((dib_info.number_colors != 0) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=dib_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << dib_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image_info->size)
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->size,&geometry);
if (flags & WidthValue)
if ((geometry.width != 0) && (geometry.width < image->columns))
image->columns=geometry.width;
if (flags & HeightValue)
if ((geometry.height != 0) && (geometry.height < image->rows))
image->rows=geometry.height;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
length,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*dib_colormap;
/*
Read DIB raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) image->colors;
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
4*sizeof(*dib_colormap));
if (dib_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=4;
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,dib_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=dib_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(dib_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
dib_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*dib_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=bytes_per_line*image->rows;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->rows,MagickMax(
bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
status=DecodeImage(image,dib_info.compression ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,
pixels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=(double) dib_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->y_resolution=(double) dib_info.y_pixels/100.0;
/*
Convert DIB raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (dib_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
word;
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8)
bytes_per_line=2*image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
word=(*p++);
word|=(*p++ << 8);
if (dib_info.red_mask == 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 10) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 11) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor6to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x3f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (dib_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,557
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EmulationHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
host_ = frame_host;
if (touch_emulation_enabled_)
UpdateTouchEventEmulationState();
UpdateDeviceEmulationState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: uint64 Clipboard::GetSequenceNumber(Buffer buffer) {
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not prevent monitoring of the clipboard after a paste event, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseChunk(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *chunk, int size,
int terminate) {
int end_in_lf = 0;
int remain = 0;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(ctxt->errNo);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_START)
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
if ((size > 0) && (chunk != NULL) && (!terminate) &&
(chunk[size - 1] == '\r')) {
end_in_lf = 1;
size--;
}
xmldecl_done:
if ((size > 0) && (chunk != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL) && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
int base = ctxt->input->base - ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
int cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
int res;
/*
* Specific handling if we autodetected an encoding, we should not
* push more than the first line ... which depend on the encoding
* And only push the rest once the final encoding was detected
*/
if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_START) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL) && (ctxt->input->buf->encoder != NULL)) {
unsigned int len = 45;
if ((xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UTF-16")) ||
(xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UTF16")))
len = 90;
else if ((xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UCS-4")) ||
(xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UCS4")))
len = 180;
if (ctxt->input->buf->rawconsumed < len)
len -= ctxt->input->buf->rawconsumed;
/*
* Change size for reading the initial declaration only
* if size is greater than len. Otherwise, memmove in xmlBufferAdd
* will blindly copy extra bytes from memory.
*/
if (size > len) {
remain = size - len;
size = len;
} else {
remain = 0;
}
}
res =xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, size, chunk);
if (res < 0) {
ctxt->errNo = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
return (XML_PARSER_EOF);
}
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content + base;
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + cur;
ctxt->input->end =
&ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content[ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use];
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: pushed %d\n", size);
#endif
} else if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && ctxt->input->buf != NULL) {
xmlParserInputBufferPtr in = ctxt->input->buf;
if ((in->encoder != NULL) && (in->buffer != NULL) &&
(in->raw != NULL)) {
int nbchars;
nbchars = xmlCharEncInFunc(in->encoder, in->buffer, in->raw);
if (nbchars < 0) {
/* TODO 2.6.0 */
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlParseChunk: encoder error\n");
return(XML_ERR_INVALID_ENCODING);
}
}
}
}
if (remain != 0)
xmlParseTryOrFinish(ctxt, 0);
else
xmlParseTryOrFinish(ctxt, terminate);
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(ctxt->errNo);
if (remain != 0) {
chunk += size;
size = remain;
remain = 0;
goto xmldecl_done;
}
if ((end_in_lf == 1) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL)) {
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, 1, "\r");
}
if (terminate) {
/*
* Check for termination
*/
int avail = 0;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
if ((ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
(ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EPILOG)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EPILOG) && (avail > 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
}
return((xmlParserErrors) ctxt->errNo);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,277
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp)
{
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < tp.m_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > tp.m_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__attribute__ ((aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t))));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int err, ctl_len, iov_size, total_len;
err = -EFAULT;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
return -EFAULT;
/* do not move before msg_sys is valid */
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
goto out;
/* Check whether to allocate the iovec area */
err = -ENOMEM;
iov_size = msg_sys->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
iov = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, iov_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
goto out;
}
/* This will also move the address data into kernel space */
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = verify_compat_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
} else
err = verify_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, iov, iov_size);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The __sys_sendmsg function in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via crafted use of the sendmmsg system call, leading to an incorrect pointer dereference.
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltApplyTemplates(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemApplyTemplatesPtr comp =
(xsltStyleItemApplyTemplatesPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
int i;
xmlNodePtr cur, delNode = NULL, oldContextNode;
xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL, oldList;
xsltStackElemPtr withParams = NULL;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
const xmlChar *oldMode, *oldModeURI;
xmlDocPtr oldXPDoc;
xsltDocumentPtr oldDocInfo;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:apply-templates : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (comp == NULL))
return;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if ((node != NULL) && (node->name != NULL))
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyTemplates: node: '%s'\n", node->name));
#endif
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
/*
* Save context states.
*/
oldContextNode = ctxt->node;
oldMode = ctxt->mode;
oldModeURI = ctxt->modeURI;
oldDocInfo = ctxt->document;
oldList = ctxt->nodeList;
/*
* The xpath context size and proximity position, as
* well as the xpath and context documents, may be changed
* so we save their initial state and will restore on exit
*/
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
/*
* Set up contexts.
*/
ctxt->mode = comp->mode;
ctxt->modeURI = comp->modeURI;
if (comp->select != NULL) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
if (comp->comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:apply-templates : compilation failed\n");
goto error;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyTemplates: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
/*
* Set up XPath.
*/
xpctxt->node = node; /* Set the "context node" */
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, xpctxt);
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type == XPATH_NODESET) {
list = res->nodesetval; /* consume the node set */
res->nodesetval = NULL;
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"The 'select' expression did not evaluate to a "
"node set.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
goto error;
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
/*
* Note: An xsl:apply-templates with a 'select' attribute,
* can change the current source doc.
*/
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Failed to evaluate the 'select' expression.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if (list == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyTemplates: select didn't evaluate to a node list\n"));
#endif
goto exit;
}
/*
*
* NOTE: Previously a document info (xsltDocument) was
* created and attached to the Result Tree Fragment.
* But such a document info is created on demand in
* xsltKeyFunction() (functions.c), so we need to create
* it here beforehand.
* In order to take care of potential keys we need to
* do some extra work for the case when a Result Tree Fragment
* is converted into a nodeset (e.g. exslt:node-set()) :
* We attach a "pseudo-doc" (xsltDocument) to _private.
* This xsltDocument, together with the keyset, will be freed
* when the Result Tree Fragment is freed.
*
*/
#if 0
if ((ctxt->nbKeys > 0) &&
(list->nodeNr != 0) &&
(list->nodeTab[0]->doc != NULL) &&
XSLT_IS_RES_TREE_FRAG(list->nodeTab[0]->doc))
{
/*
* NOTE that it's also OK if @effectiveDocInfo will be
* set to NULL.
*/
isRTF = 1;
effectiveDocInfo = list->nodeTab[0]->doc->_private;
}
#endif
} else {
/*
* Build an XPath node set with the children
*/
list = xmlXPathNodeSetCreate(NULL);
if (list == NULL)
goto error;
if (node->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
cur = node->children;
else
cur = NULL;
while (cur != NULL) {
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
if ((IS_BLANK_NODE(cur)) &&
(cur->parent != NULL) &&
(cur->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(ctxt->style->stripSpaces != NULL)) {
const xmlChar *val;
if (cur->parent->ns != NULL) {
val = (const xmlChar *)
xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->stripSpaces,
cur->parent->name,
cur->parent->ns->href);
if (val == NULL) {
val = (const xmlChar *)
xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->stripSpaces,
BAD_CAST "*",
cur->parent->ns->href);
}
} else {
val = (const xmlChar *)
xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->stripSpaces,
cur->parent->name, NULL);
}
if ((val != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(val, (xmlChar *) "strip"))) {
delNode = cur;
break;
}
}
/* no break on purpose */
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(list, cur);
break;
case XML_DTD_NODE:
/* Unlink the DTD, it's still reachable
* using doc->intSubset */
if (cur->next != NULL)
cur->next->prev = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL)
cur->prev->next = cur->next;
break;
case XML_NAMESPACE_DECL:
break;
default:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyTemplates: skipping cur type %d\n",
cur->type));
#endif
delNode = cur;
}
cur = cur->next;
if (delNode != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyTemplates: removing ignorable blank cur\n"));
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(delNode);
xmlFreeNode(delNode);
delNode = NULL;
}
}
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (list != NULL)
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyTemplates: list of %d nodes\n", list->nodeNr));
#endif
if ((list == NULL) || (list->nodeNr == 0))
goto exit;
/*
* Set the context's node set and size; this is also needed for
* for xsltDoSortFunction().
*/
ctxt->nodeList = list;
/*
* Process xsl:with-param and xsl:sort instructions.
* (The code became so verbose just to avoid the
* xmlNodePtr sorts[XSLT_MAX_SORT] if there's no xsl:sort)
* BUG TODO: We are not using namespaced potentially defined on the
* xsl:sort or xsl:with-param elements; XPath expression might fail.
*/
if (inst->children) {
xsltStackElemPtr param;
cur = inst->children;
while (cur) {
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (ctxt->debugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(cur, node, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
if (ctxt->state == XSLT_STATE_STOPPED)
break;
if (cur->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
if (! IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur))
break;
if (IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "with-param")) {
param = xsltParseStylesheetCallerParam(ctxt, cur);
if (param != NULL) {
param->next = withParams;
withParams = param;
}
}
if (IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "sort")) {
xsltTemplatePtr oldCurTempRule =
ctxt->currentTemplateRule;
int nbsorts = 0;
xmlNodePtr sorts[XSLT_MAX_SORT];
sorts[nbsorts++] = cur;
while (cur) {
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (ctxt->debugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(cur, node, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
if (ctxt->state == XSLT_STATE_STOPPED)
break;
if (cur->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
if (! IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur))
break;
if (IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "with-param")) {
param = xsltParseStylesheetCallerParam(ctxt, cur);
if (param != NULL) {
param->next = withParams;
withParams = param;
}
}
if (IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "sort")) {
if (nbsorts >= XSLT_MAX_SORT) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"The number (%d) of xsl:sort instructions exceeds the "
"maximum allowed by this processor's settings.\n",
nbsorts);
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
break;
} else {
sorts[nbsorts++] = cur;
}
}
cur = cur->next;
}
/*
* The "current template rule" is cleared for xsl:sort.
*/
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = NULL;
/*
* Sort.
*/
xsltDoSortFunction(ctxt, sorts, nbsorts);
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = oldCurTempRule;
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
}
xpctxt->contextSize = list->nodeNr;
/*
* Apply templates for all selected source nodes.
*/
for (i = 0; i < list->nodeNr; i++) {
cur = list->nodeTab[i];
/*
* The node becomes the "current node".
*/
ctxt->node = cur;
/*
* An xsl:apply-templates can change the current context doc.
* OPTIMIZE TODO: Get rid of the need to set the context doc.
*/
if ((cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) && (cur->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = cur->doc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = i + 1;
/*
* Find and apply a template for this node.
*/
xsltProcessOneNode(ctxt, cur, withParams);
}
exit:
error:
/*
* Free the parameter list.
*/
if (withParams != NULL)
xsltFreeStackElemList(withParams);
if (list != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeNodeSet(list);
/*
* Restore context states.
*/
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
ctxt->document = oldDocInfo;
ctxt->nodeList = oldList;
ctxt->node = oldContextNode;
ctxt->mode = oldMode;
ctxt->modeURI = oldModeURI;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sync_lockstate_on_connect(btif_hh_device_t *p_dev)
{
int keylockstates;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: Syncing keyboard lock states after "\
"reconnect...",__FUNCTION__);
/*If the device is connected, update keyboard state */
update_keyboard_lockstates(p_dev);
/*Check if the lockstate of caps,scroll,num is set.
If so, send a report to the kernel
so the lockstate is in sync */
keylockstates = get_keylockstates();
if (keylockstates)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Sending hid report to kernel "\
"indicating lock key state 0x%x",__FUNCTION__,
keylockstates);
usleep(200000);
toggle_os_keylockstates(p_dev->fd, keylockstates);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: NOT sending hid report to kernel "\
"indicating lock key state 0x%x",__FUNCTION__,
keylockstates);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
int room;
struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb_in);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
struct net *net;
struct sock *sk;
if (!rt)
goto out;
net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
/*
* Find the original header. It is expected to be valid, of course.
* Check this, icmp_send is called from the most obscure devices
* sometimes.
*/
iph = ip_hdr(skb_in);
if ((u8 *)iph < skb_in->head ||
(skb_in->network_header + sizeof(*iph)) > skb_in->tail)
goto out;
/*
* No replies to physical multicast/broadcast
*/
if (skb_in->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto out;
/*
* Now check at the protocol level
*/
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST))
goto out;
/*
* Only reply to fragment 0. We byte re-order the constant
* mask for efficiency.
*/
if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET))
goto out;
/*
* If we send an ICMP error to an ICMP error a mess would result..
*/
if (icmp_pointers[type].error) {
/*
* We are an error, check if we are replying to an
* ICMP error
*/
if (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
u8 _inner_type, *itp;
itp = skb_header_pointer(skb_in,
skb_network_header(skb_in) +
(iph->ihl << 2) +
offsetof(struct icmphdr,
type) -
skb_in->data,
sizeof(_inner_type),
&_inner_type);
if (itp == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* Assume any unknown ICMP type is an error. This
* isn't specified by the RFC, but think about it..
*/
if (*itp > NR_ICMP_TYPES ||
icmp_pointers[*itp].error)
goto out;
}
}
sk = icmp_xmit_lock(net);
if (sk == NULL)
return;
/*
* Construct source address and options.
*/
saddr = iph->daddr;
if (!(rt->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL)) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr)
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, rt->rt_iif);
if (dev)
saddr = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_LINK);
else
saddr = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
tos = icmp_pointers[type].error ? ((iph->tos & IPTOS_TOS_MASK) |
IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL) :
iph->tos;
if (ip_options_echo(&icmp_param.replyopts, skb_in))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Prepare data for ICMP header.
*/
icmp_param.data.icmph.type = type;
icmp_param.data.icmph.code = code;
icmp_param.data.icmph.un.gateway = info;
icmp_param.data.icmph.checksum = 0;
icmp_param.skb = skb_in;
icmp_param.offset = skb_network_offset(skb_in);
inet_sk(sk)->tos = tos;
ipc.addr = iph->saddr;
ipc.opt = &icmp_param.replyopts;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
rt = icmp_route_lookup(net, skb_in, iph, saddr, tos,
type, code, &icmp_param);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out_unlock;
if (!icmpv4_xrlim_allow(net, rt, type, code))
goto ende;
/* RFC says return as much as we can without exceeding 576 bytes. */
room = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (room > 576)
room = 576;
room -= sizeof(struct iphdr) + icmp_param.replyopts.optlen;
room -= sizeof(struct icmphdr);
icmp_param.data_len = skb_in->len - icmp_param.offset;
if (icmp_param.data_len > room)
icmp_param.data_len = room;
icmp_param.head_len = sizeof(struct icmphdr);
icmp_push_reply(&icmp_param, &ipc, &rt);
ende:
ip_rt_put(rt);
out_unlock:
icmp_xmit_unlock(sk);
out:;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
defaultoptions(&h);
lua_settop(L, 2);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res);
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f);
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d);
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format `c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size);
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1);
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1);
return lua_gettop(L) - 2;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An Integer Overflow issue was discovered in the struct library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2, leading to a failure of bounds checking.
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
|
Low
| 170,163
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void prefetch_dec(void)
{
prefetch_table((const void *)&dec_tables, sizeof(dec_tables));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
|
Medium
| 170,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TransportDIB* TransportDIB::Create(size_t size, uint32 sequence_num) {
const int shmkey = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, size, 0666);
if (shmkey == -1) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create SysV shared memory region"
<< " errno:" << errno;
return NULL;
}
void* address = shmat(shmkey, NULL /* desired address */, 0 /* flags */);
shmctl(shmkey, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (address == kInvalidAddress)
return NULL;
TransportDIB* dib = new TransportDIB;
dib->key_.shmkey = shmkey;
dib->address_ = address;
dib->size_ = size;
return dib;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 on Linux uses weak permissions for shared memory segments, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Track::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
assert(pBlockEntry);
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
assert(pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pBlock || pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::loadSimpleDefaultStyle()
{
ASSERT(!defaultStyle);
ASSERT(!simpleDefaultStyleSheet);
defaultStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultPrintStyle = defaultStyle;
defaultQuirksStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
simpleDefaultStyleSheet = parseUASheet(simpleUserAgentStyleSheet, strlen(simpleUserAgentStyleSheet));
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(simpleDefaultStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(parseUASheet(ViewportStyle::viewportStyleSheet()), screenEval());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(
RenderFrame* render_frame) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* handler =
PepperMediaDeviceManager::Get(render_frame);
if (!handler)
handler = new PepperMediaDeviceManager(render_frame);
return handler;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
|
Low
| 171,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = calloc(1, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = ts_incr(now, polent.pw_max_life);
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
ret = krb5_copy_principal(handle->context, entry->principal, &kdb->princ);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-90
Summary: MIT krb5 1.6 or later allows an authenticated kadmin with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database to circumvent a DN containership check by supplying both a *linkdn* and *containerdn* database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within the container DN.
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
|
Low
| 169,350
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::GetEncryptionByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count = encryption_entries_end_ - encryption_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return encryption_entries_[idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> fooCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.Float64Array.foo");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
Float64Array* imp = V8Float64Array::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Float32Array*, array, V8Float32Array::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8Float32Array::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
return toV8(imp->foo(array), args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AvailableSpaceQueryTask(
QuotaManager* manager,
const AvailableSpaceCallback& callback)
: QuotaThreadTask(manager, manager->db_thread_),
profile_path_(manager->profile_path_),
space_(-1),
get_disk_space_fn_(manager->get_disk_space_fn_),
callback_(callback) {
DCHECK(get_disk_space_fn_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVG implementation in WebKit, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.94, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,668
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::clip(const Path& path)
{
#ifdef __WXMAC__
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
CGContextRef context = (CGContextRef)gc->GetNativeContext();
if (!context)
return;
CGPathRef nativePath = (CGPathRef)path.platformPath()->GetNativePath();
if (path.isEmpty())
CGContextClipToRect(context, CGRectZero);
else if (nativePath) {
CGContextBeginPath(context);
CGContextAddPath(context, nativePath);
CGContextClip(context);
}
#else
notImplemented();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,421
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ipxitf_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
int rc = -EINVAL;
struct ifreq ifr;
int val;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFADDR: {
struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx;
struct ipx_interface_definition f;
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (sipx->sipx_family != AF_IPX)
break;
f.ipx_network = sipx->sipx_network;
memcpy(f.ipx_device, ifr.ifr_name,
sizeof(f.ipx_device));
memcpy(f.ipx_node, sipx->sipx_node, IPX_NODE_LEN);
f.ipx_dlink_type = sipx->sipx_type;
f.ipx_special = sipx->sipx_special;
if (sipx->sipx_action == IPX_DLTITF)
rc = ipxitf_delete(&f);
else
rc = ipxitf_create(&f);
break;
}
case SIOCGIFADDR: {
struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx;
struct ipx_interface *ipxif;
struct net_device *dev;
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(&init_net, ifr.ifr_name);
rc = -ENODEV;
if (!dev)
break;
ipxif = ipxitf_find_using_phys(dev,
ipx_map_frame_type(sipx->sipx_type));
rc = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipxif)
break;
sipx->sipx_family = AF_IPX;
sipx->sipx_network = ipxif->if_netnum;
memcpy(sipx->sipx_node, ipxif->if_node,
sizeof(sipx->sipx_node));
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ifr, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
ipxitf_put(ipxif);
rc = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCAIPXITFCRT:
rc = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(val, (unsigned char __user *) arg))
break;
rc = 0;
ipxcfg_auto_create_interfaces = val;
break;
case SIOCAIPXPRISLT:
rc = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(val, (unsigned char __user *) arg))
break;
rc = 0;
ipxcfg_set_auto_select(val);
break;
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The ipxitf_ioctl function in net/ipx/af_ipx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 mishandles reference counts, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a failed SIOCGIFADDR ioctl call for an IPX interface.
Commit Message: ipx: call ipxitf_put() in ioctl error path
We should call ipxitf_put() if the copy_to_user() fails.
Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while ( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error)
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case QUANT_MATRIX_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_quant_matrix_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case COPYRIGHT_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_copyright_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_pic_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case CAMERA_PARAM_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_cam_param_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case ITU_T_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_itu_t_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_SPATIAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
case PIC_TEMPORAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABLITY_NOT_SUP;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
|
Low
| 173,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
{
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*/
dd = dd_create(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir && strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0) ? rootdir : NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s'", full_core_basename);
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, full_core_basename, (long long)core_size);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) allows local users to read, change the ownership of, or have other unspecified impact on arbitrary files via a symlink attack on (1) /var/tmp/abrt/*/maps, (2) /tmp/jvm-*/hs_error.log, (3) /proc/*/exe, (4) /etc/os-release in a chroot, or (5) an unspecified root directory related to librpm.
Commit Message: ccpp: stop reading hs_error.log from /tmp
The file might contain anything and there is no way to verify its
contents.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::RetainOriginalSkImage() {
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsSkiaTextureHolder());
original_skia_image_ = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
original_skia_image_context_provider_wrapper_ = ContextProviderWrapper();
DCHECK(original_skia_image_);
Thread* thread = Platform::Current()->CurrentThread();
original_skia_image_thread_id_ = thread->ThreadId();
original_skia_image_task_runner_ = thread->GetTaskRunner();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
int ret = 0;
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply reply;
void *p = au->reply_buf;
void *end = p + sizeof(au->reply_buf);
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, au->service);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &reply, sizeof(reply));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret != sizeof(reply))
return -EPERM;
if (au->nonce + 1 != le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = 0;
dout("verify_authorizer_reply nonce %llx got %llx ret %d\n",
au->nonce, le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one), ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/ceph/auth_x.c in Ceph, as used in the Linux kernel before 3.16.3, does not properly validate auth replies, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data from the IP address of a Ceph Monitor.
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void reference_32x32_dct_1d(const double in[32], double out[32], int stride) {
const double kInvSqrt2 = 0.707106781186547524400844362104;
for (int k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
out[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 32; n++)
out[k] += in[n] * cos(kPi * (2 * n + 1) * k / 64.0);
if (k == 0)
out[k] = out[k] * kInvSqrt2;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DetachWebContentsTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* first_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* second_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &first_lifecycle_unit,
&second_lifecycle_unit);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> owned_contents =
tab_strip_model_->DetachWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivialAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
NoUnloadListenerTabStripModelDelegate other_tab_strip_model_delegate;
TabStripModel other_tab_strip_model(&other_tab_strip_model_delegate,
profile());
other_tab_strip_model.AddObserver(source_);
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_));
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(CreateTestWebContents(),
/*foreground=*/true);
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(std::move(owned_contents), false);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE, first_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
first_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
first_lifecycle_unit);
CloseTabsAndExpectNotifications(&other_tab_strip_model,
{first_lifecycle_unit});
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
Medium
| 172,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DefaultTabHandler::CanCloseContentsAt(int index) {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->CanCloseContentsAt(index);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows user-assisted remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via vectors related to *unusual user interaction.*
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,301
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php_binary) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
for (p = val; p < endptr; ) {
zval **tmp;
namelen = ((unsigned char)(*p)) & (~PS_BIN_UNDEF);
if (namelen < 0 || namelen > PS_BIN_MAX || (p + namelen) >= endptr) {
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
has_value = *p & PS_BIN_UNDEF ? 0 : 1;
name = estrndup(p + 1, namelen);
p += namelen + 1;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
efree(name);
continue;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &p, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
efree(name);
}
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-74
Summary: ext/session/session.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 skips invalid session names in a way that triggers incorrect parsing, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary-type session data by leveraging control of a session name, as demonstrated by object injection.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them
|
Low
| 166,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jas_matrix_cmp(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1)
{
int i;
int j;
if (mat0->numrows_ != mat1->numrows_ || mat0->numcols_ !=
mat1->numcols_) {
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < mat0->numcols_; j++) {
if (jas_matrix_get(mat0, i, j) != jas_matrix_get(mat1, i, j)) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,701
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_terminate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
g_main_loop_quit (loop);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
struct xregs_state *xsave;
int ret;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
return -ENODEV;
/*
* A whole standard-format XSAVE buffer is needed:
*/
if ((pos != 0) || (count < fpu_user_xstate_size))
return -EFAULT;
xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
fpu__activate_fpstate_write(fpu);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) {
if (kbuf)
ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(xsave, kbuf);
else
ret = copy_user_to_xstate(xsave, ubuf);
} else {
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xsave, 0, -1);
}
/*
* In case of failure, mark all states as init:
*/
if (ret)
fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
/*
* mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons.
*/
xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
xsave->header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask;
/*
* These bits must be zero.
*/
memset(&xsave->header.reserved, 0, 48);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The x86/fpu (Floating Point Unit) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, when a processor supports the xsave feature but not the xsaves feature, does not correctly handle attempts to set reserved bits in the xstate header via the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system call, allowing local users to read the FPU registers of other processes on the system, related to arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c and arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c.
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 167,718
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NetworkHandler::NetworkHandler(const std::string& host_id)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Network::Metainfo::domainName),
process_(nullptr),
host_(nullptr),
enabled_(false),
host_id_(host_id),
bypass_service_worker_(false),
cache_disabled_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
static bool have_configured_service_worker_context = false;
if (have_configured_service_worker_context)
return;
have_configured_service_worker_context = true;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ConfigureServiceWorkerContextOnIO));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __forceinline void draw_line(float *output, int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int n)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int ady = abs(dy);
int base;
int x=x0,y=y0;
int err = 0;
int sy;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (adx < DIVTAB_DENOM && ady < DIVTAB_NUMER) {
if (dy < 0) {
base = -integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base-1;
} else {
base = integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base+1;
}
} else {
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
}
#else
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
#endif
ady -= abs(base) * adx;
if (x1 > n) x1 = n;
if (x < x1) {
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
for (++x; x < x1; ++x) {
err += ady;
if (err >= adx) {
err -= adx;
y += sy;
} else
y += base;
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
|
Medium
| 169,614
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) < 0)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(dest, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chmod");
unlink(src);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix
|
Low
| 170,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
" [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-426
Summary: Untrusted search path vulnerability in ssh-agent.c in ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary local PKCS#11 modules by leveraging control over a forwarded agent-socket.
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
|
Low
| 168,665
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SegmentInfo::SegmentInfo(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8(NULL),
m_pWritingAppAsUTF8(NULL),
m_pTitleAsUTF8(NULL)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
const char *cipher_str;
int keysize;
u8 *raw_key = NULL;
int res;
res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
if (res)
return res;
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
retry:
crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
if (crypt_info) {
if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
return 0;
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
goto retry;
}
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
if (res < 0) {
if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
inode->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(inode))
return res;
/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
return -EINVAL;
if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
return -EINVAL;
crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!crypt_info)
return -ENOMEM;
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
res = determine_cipher_type(crypt_info, inode, &cipher_str, &keysize);
if (res)
goto out;
/*
* This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
* crypto API as part of key derivation.
*/
res = -ENOMEM;
raw_key = kmalloc(FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
if (!raw_key)
goto out;
res = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX);
if (res && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
int res2 = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix);
if (res2) {
if (res2 == -ENOKEY)
res = -ENOKEY;
goto out;
}
} else if (res) {
goto out;
}
ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
if (!ctfm || IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
res = ctfm ? PTR_ERR(ctfm) : -ENOMEM;
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"%s: error %d (inode %u) allocating crypto tfm\n",
__func__, res, (unsigned) inode->i_ino);
goto out;
}
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctfm, ~0);
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, keysize);
if (res)
goto out;
kzfree(raw_key);
raw_key = NULL;
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
goto retry;
}
return 0;
out:
if (res == -ENOKEY)
res = 0;
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
kzfree(raw_key);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
|
Low
| 168,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jbig2_sd_list_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
Jbig2SymbolDict **dicts;
int n_dicts = jbig2_sd_count_referred(ctx, segment);
int dindex = 0;
dicts = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict *, n_dicts);
if (dicts == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate referred list of symbol dictionaries");
return NULL;
}
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) && rsegment->result &&
(((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL)) {
/* add this referred to symbol dictionary */
dicts[dindex++] = (Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result;
}
}
if (dindex != n_dicts) {
/* should never happen */
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "counted %d symbol dictionaries but built a list with %d.\n", n_dicts, dindex);
}
return (dicts);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,501
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ntlm_write_message_header(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header)
{
Stream_Write(s, header->Signature, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, header->MessageType);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_msgtype2str, "MSGTYPE-#%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,896
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void cs_cmd_flags(sourceinfo_t *si, int parc, char *parv[])
{
chanacs_t *ca;
mowgli_node_t *n;
char *channel = parv[0];
char *target = sstrdup(parv[1]);
char *flagstr = parv[2];
const char *str1;
unsigned int addflags, removeflags, restrictflags;
hook_channel_acl_req_t req;
mychan_t *mc;
if (parc < 1)
{
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, STR_INSUFFICIENT_PARAMS, "FLAGS");
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, _("Syntax: FLAGS <channel> [target] [flags]"));
return;
}
mc = mychan_find(channel);
if (!mc)
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("Channel \2%s\2 is not registered."), channel);
return;
}
if (metadata_find(mc, "private:close:closer") && (target || !has_priv(si, PRIV_CHAN_AUSPEX)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("\2%s\2 is closed."), channel);
return;
}
if (!target || (target && target[0] == '+' && flagstr == NULL))
{
unsigned int flags = (target != NULL) ? flags_to_bitmask(target, 0) : 0;
do_list(si, mc, flags);
return;
}
/*
* following conditions are for compatibility with Anope just to avoid a whole clusterfuck
* of confused users caused by their 'innovation.' yeah, that's a word for it alright.
*
* anope 1.9's shiny new FLAGS command has:
*
* FLAGS #channel LIST
* FLAGS #channel MODIFY user flagspec
* FLAGS #channel CLEAR
*
* obviously they do not support the atheme syntax, because lets face it, they like to
* 'innovate.' this is, of course, hilarious for obvious reasons. never mind that we
* *invented* the FLAGS system for channel ACLs, so you would think they would find it
* worthwhile to be compatible here. i guess that would have been too obvious or something
* about their whole 'stealing our design' thing that they have been doing in 1.9 since the
* beginning... or do i mean 'innovating?'
*
* anyway we rewrite the commands as appropriate in the two if blocks below so that they
* are processed by the flags code as the user would intend. obviously, we're not really
* capable of handling the anope flag model (which makes honestly zero sense to me, and is
* extremely complex which kind of misses the entire point of the flags UI design...) so if
* some user tries passing anope flags, it will probably be hilarious. the good news is
* most of the anope flags tie up to atheme flags in some weird way anyway (probably because,
* i don't know, they copied the entire design and then fucked it up? yeah. probably that.)
*
* --nenolod
*/
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "LIST") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
do_list(si, mc, 0);
free(target);
return;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "CLEAR") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
free(target);
if (!chanacs_source_has_flag(mc, si, CA_FOUNDER))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, "You are not authorized to perform this operation.");
return;
}
mowgli_node_t *tn;
MOWGLI_ITER_FOREACH_SAFE(n, tn, mc->chanacs.head)
{
ca = n->data;
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER)
continue;
object_unref(ca);
}
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_DO, "CLEAR:FLAGS: \2%s\2", mc->name);
command_success_nodata(si, _("Cleared flags in \2%s\2."), mc->name);
return;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "MODIFY") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
free(target);
if (parc < 3)
{
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, STR_INSUFFICIENT_PARAMS, "FLAGS");
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, _("Syntax: FLAGS <#channel> MODIFY [target] <flags>"));
return;
}
flagstr = strchr(parv[2], ' ');
if (flagstr)
*flagstr++ = '\0';
target = strdup(parv[2]);
}
{
myentity_t *mt;
if (!si->smu)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not logged in."));
return;
}
if (!flagstr)
{
if (!(mc->flags & MC_PUBACL) && !chanacs_source_has_flag(mc, si, CA_ACLVIEW))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not authorized to execute this command."));
return;
}
if (validhostmask(target))
ca = chanacs_find_host_literal(mc, target, 0);
else
{
if (!(mt = myentity_find_ext(target)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("\2%s\2 is not registered."), target);
return;
}
free(target);
target = sstrdup(mt->name);
ca = chanacs_find_literal(mc, mt, 0);
}
if (ca != NULL)
{
str1 = bitmask_to_flags2(ca->level, 0);
command_success_string(si, str1, _("Flags for \2%s\2 in \2%s\2 are \2%s\2."),
target, channel,
str1);
}
else
command_success_string(si, "", _("No flags for \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."),
target, channel);
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_GET, "FLAGS: \2%s\2 on \2%s\2", mc->name, target);
return;
}
/* founder may always set flags -- jilles */
restrictflags = chanacs_source_flags(mc, si);
if (restrictflags & CA_FOUNDER)
restrictflags = ca_all;
else
{
if (!(restrictflags & CA_FLAGS))
{
/* allow a user to remove their own access
* even without +f */
if (restrictflags & CA_AKICK ||
si->smu == NULL ||
irccasecmp(target, entity(si->smu)->name) ||
strcmp(flagstr, "-*"))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not authorized to execute this command."));
return;
}
}
if (irccasecmp(target, entity(si->smu)->name))
restrictflags = allow_flags(mc, restrictflags);
else
restrictflags |= allow_flags(mc, restrictflags);
}
if (*flagstr == '+' || *flagstr == '-' || *flagstr == '=')
{
flags_make_bitmasks(flagstr, &addflags, &removeflags);
if (addflags == 0 && removeflags == 0)
{
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("No valid flags given, use /%s%s HELP FLAGS for a list"), ircd->uses_rcommand ? "" : "msg ", chansvs.me->disp);
return;
}
}
else
{
addflags = get_template_flags(mc, flagstr);
if (addflags == 0)
{
/* Hack -- jilles */
if (*target == '+' || *target == '-' || *target == '=')
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("Usage: FLAGS %s [target] [flags]"), mc->name);
else
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("Invalid template name given, use /%s%s TEMPLATE %s for a list"), ircd->uses_rcommand ? "" : "msg ", chansvs.me->disp, mc->name);
return;
}
removeflags = ca_all & ~addflags;
}
if (!validhostmask(target))
{
if (!(mt = myentity_find_ext(target)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("\2%s\2 is not registered."), target);
return;
}
free(target);
target = sstrdup(mt->name);
ca = chanacs_open(mc, mt, NULL, true, entity(si->smu));
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER && removeflags & CA_FLAGS && !(removeflags & CA_FOUNDER))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You may not remove a founder's +f access."));
return;
}
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER && removeflags & CA_FOUNDER && mychan_num_founders(mc) == 1)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You may not remove the last founder."));
return;
}
if (!(ca->level & CA_FOUNDER) && addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
{
if (mychan_num_founders(mc) >= chansvs.maxfounders)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("Only %d founders allowed per channel."), chansvs.maxfounders);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (!myentity_can_register_channel(mt))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("\2%s\2 has too many channels registered."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (!myentity_allow_foundership(mt))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("\2%s\2 cannot take foundership of a channel."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
}
if (addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
addflags |= CA_FLAGS, removeflags &= ~CA_FLAGS;
/* If NEVEROP is set, don't allow adding new entries
* except sole +b. Adding flags if the current level
* is +b counts as adding an entry.
* -- jilles */
/* XXX: not all entities are users */
if (isuser(mt) && (MU_NEVEROP & user(mt)->flags && addflags != CA_AKICK && addflags != 0 && (ca->level == 0 || ca->level == CA_AKICK)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("\2%s\2 does not wish to be added to channel access lists (NEVEROP set)."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (ca->level == 0 && chanacs_is_table_full(ca))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("Channel %s access list is full."), mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.ca = ca;
req.oldlevel = ca->level;
if (!chanacs_modify(ca, &addflags, &removeflags, restrictflags))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not allowed to set \2%s\2 on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags), mt->name, mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.newlevel = ca->level;
hook_call_channel_acl_change(&req);
chanacs_close(ca);
}
else
{
if (addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
{
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("You may not set founder status on a hostmask."));
return;
}
ca = chanacs_open(mc, NULL, target, true, entity(si->smu));
if (ca->level == 0 && chanacs_is_table_full(ca))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("Channel %s access list is full."), mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.ca = ca;
req.oldlevel = ca->level;
if (!chanacs_modify(ca, &addflags, &removeflags, restrictflags))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not allowed to set \2%s\2 on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags), target, mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.newlevel = ca->level;
hook_call_channel_acl_change(&req);
chanacs_close(ca);
}
if ((addflags | removeflags) == 0)
{
command_fail(si, fault_nochange, _("Channel access to \2%s\2 for \2%s\2 unchanged."), channel, target);
return;
}
flagstr = bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags);
command_success_nodata(si, _("Flags \2%s\2 were set on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), flagstr, target, channel);
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_SET, "FLAGS: \2%s\2 \2%s\2 \2%s\2", mc->name, target, flagstr);
verbose(mc, "\2%s\2 set flags \2%s\2 on \2%s\2", get_source_name(si), flagstr, target);
}
free(target);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: modules/chanserv/flags.c in Atheme before 7.2.7 allows remote attackers to modify the Anope FLAGS behavior by registering and dropping the (1) LIST, (2) CLEAR, or (3) MODIFY keyword nicks.
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397
|
Low
| 167,587
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PreresolveJob::PreresolveJob(PreconnectRequest preconnect_request,
PreresolveInfo* info)
: url(std::move(preconnect_request.origin)),
num_sockets(preconnect_request.num_sockets),
allow_credentials(preconnect_request.allow_credentials),
network_isolation_key(
std::move(preconnect_request.network_isolation_key)),
info(info) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
start_position;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[12],
*pixels;
unsigned int
blue,
green,
offset_bits,
red;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a BMP file.
*/
(void) memset(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
start_position=0;
offset_bits=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
PixelInfo
quantum_bits;
PixelPacket
shift;
/*
Verify BMP identifier.
*/
if (bmp_info.ba_offset == 0)
start_position=TellBlob(image)-2;
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
while (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0)
{
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.ba_offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Magick: %c%c",
magick[0],magick[1]);
if ((count != 2) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," BMP size: %u",
bmp_info.size);
if (bmp_info.size == 12)
{
/*
OS/2 BMP image file.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP2",MagickPathExtent);
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=0;
bmp_info.y_pixels=0;
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.image_size=0;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: OS/2 Bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
}
}
else
{
/*
Microsoft Windows BMP image file.
*/
if (bmp_info.size < 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NonOS2HeaderSizeError");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: MS Windows bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Bits per pixel: %.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE4:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE4");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
case BI_PNG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_PNG");
break;
}
case BI_JPEG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_JPEG");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
bmp_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.size > 40)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Read color management information.
*/
bmp_info.alpha_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colorspace=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
/*
Decode 2^30 fixed point formatted CIE primaries.
*/
# define BMP_DENOM ((double) 0x40000000)
bmp_info.red_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
gamma=bmp_info.red_primary.x+bmp_info.red_primary.y+
bmp_info.red_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.red_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.red_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=bmp_info.red_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=bmp_info.red_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.green_primary.x+bmp_info.green_primary.y+
bmp_info.green_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.green_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.green_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=bmp_info.green_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=bmp_info.green_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.blue_primary.x+bmp_info.blue_primary.y+
bmp_info.blue_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.blue_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=bmp_info.blue_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=bmp_info.blue_primary.y;
/*
Decode 16^16 fixed point formatted gamma_scales.
*/
bmp_info.gamma_scale.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
/*
Compute a single gamma from the BMP 3-channel gamma.
*/
image->gamma=(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x+bmp_info.gamma_scale.y+
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z)/3.0;
}
else
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP3",MagickPathExtent);
if (bmp_info.size > 108)
{
size_t
intent;
/*
Read BMP Version 5 color management information.
*/
intent=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
switch ((int) intent)
{
case LCS_GM_BUSINESS:
{
image->rendering_intent=SaturationIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_GRAPHICS:
{
image->rendering_intent=RelativeIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_IMAGES:
{
image->rendering_intent=PerceptualIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC:
{
image->rendering_intent=AbsoluteIntent;
break;
}
}
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Profile data */
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Profile size */
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Reserved byte */
}
}
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size > GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",image->filename);
else
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size < GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (bmp_info.width <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.height == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.planes != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"StaticPlanesValueNotEqualToOne");
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 16) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16 &&
bmp_info.number_colors > (1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedNumberOfColors");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 3) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
image->compression=NoCompression;
break;
case BI_RLE8:
case BI_RLE4:
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
case BI_BITFIELDS:
break;
case BI_JPEG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"JPEGCompressNotSupported");
case BI_PNG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"PNGCompressNotSupported");
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.height);
image->depth=bmp_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? bmp_info.bits_per_pixel : 8;
image->alpha_trait=((bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0) &&
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS)) ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=bmp_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
image->resolution.x=(double) bmp_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) bmp_info.y_pixels/100.0;
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
size_t
packet_size;
/*
Read BMP raster colormap.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading colormap of %.20g colors",(double) image->colors);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bmp_info.size == 12) || (bmp_info.size == 64))
packet_size=3;
else
packet_size=4;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+14+bmp_info.size,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,bmp_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (bmp_info.offset_bits == offset_bits)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset_bits=bmp_info.offset_bits;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+bmp_info.offset_bits,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=(size_t) bytes_per_line*image->rows;
if (((MagickSizeType) length/8) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading pixels (%.20g bytes)",(double) length);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
status=DecodeImage(image,bmp_info.compression,pixels,
image->columns*image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
}
/*
Convert BMP raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB)
{
/*
We should ignore the alpha value in BMP3 files but there have been
reports about 32 bit files with alpha. We do a quick check to see if
the alpha channel contains a value that is not zero (default value).
If we find a non zero value we asume the program that wrote the file
wants to use the alpha channel.
*/
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) && (bmp_info.size == 40) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*(p+3) != 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
y=-1;
break;
}
p+=4;
}
}
}
bmp_info.alpha_mask=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
0xff000000U : 0U;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
/*
RGB555.
*/
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
}
}
(void) memset(&shift,0,sizeof(shift));
(void) memset(&quantum_bits,0,sizeof(quantum_bits));
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
register unsigned int
sample;
/*
Get shift and quantum bits info from bitfield masks.
*/
if (bmp_info.red_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << shift.red) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.red++;
if (shift.red >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.green_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << shift.green) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.green++;
if (shift.green >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.blue_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << shift.blue) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.blue++;
if (shift.blue >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << shift.alpha) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.alpha++;
if (shift.alpha >= 32U)
break;
}
sample=shift.red;
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.red=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.red);
sample=shift.green;
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.green=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.green);
sample=shift.blue;
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.blue=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.blue);
sample=shift.alpha;
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.alpha=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.alpha);
}
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0x0f),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) (*p & 0x0f),&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
x++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; --x)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
/*
Convert bitfield encoded 16-bit PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=2*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=(*p++) << 8;
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 5)
red|=((red & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.red <= 8)
red|=((red & 0xff00) >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 5)
green|=((green & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.green == 6)
green|=((green & 0xc000) >> 6);
if (quantum_bits.green <= 8)
green|=((green & 0xff00) >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 5)
blue|=((blue & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.blue <= 8)
blue|=((blue & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha <= 8)
alpha|=((alpha & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*24+31)/32);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert bitfield encoded DirectColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 8);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 16);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 24);
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 8)
red|=(red >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 8)
green|=(green >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 8)
blue|=(blue >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha == 8)
alpha|=(alpha >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (y > 0)
break;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (bmp_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image, flipped_image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
*magick='\0';
if (bmp_info.ba_offset != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) bmp_info.ba_offset,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if ((count == 2) && (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Acquire next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: There is an excessive memory allocation issue in the functions ReadBMPImage of coders/bmp.c and ReadDIBImage of coders/dib.c in ImageMagick 7.0.8-11, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1268
|
Medium
| 169,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Gfx::Gfx(XRef *xrefA, OutputDev *outA, Dict *resDict, Catalog *catalogA,
PDFRectangle *box, PDFRectangle *cropBox,
GBool (*abortCheckCbkA)(void *data),
void *abortCheckCbkDataA)
#ifdef USE_CMS
: iccColorSpaceCache(5)
#endif
{
int i;
xref = xrefA;
catalog = catalogA;
subPage = gTrue;
printCommands = globalParams->getPrintCommands();
profileCommands = globalParams->getProfileCommands();
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
maskHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
mcStack = NULL;
res = new GfxResources(xref, resDict, NULL);
out = outA;
state = new GfxState(72, 72, box, 0, gFalse);
stackHeight = 1;
pushStateGuard();
fontChanged = gFalse;
clip = clipNone;
ignoreUndef = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
baseMatrix[i] = state->getCTM()[i];
}
formDepth = 0;
abortCheckCbk = abortCheckCbkA;
abortCheckCbkData = abortCheckCbkDataA;
if (cropBox) {
state->moveTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y2);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y2);
state->closePath();
state->clip();
out->clip(state);
state->clearPath();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Gfx::getPos function in the PDF parser in xpdf before 3.02pl5, poppler 0.8.7 and possibly other versions up to 0.15.1, CUPS, kdegraphics, and possibly other products allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via unknown vectors that trigger an uninitialized pointer dereference.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void xml_parser_dtor(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)rsrc->ptr;
if (parser->parser) {
XML_ParserFree(parser->parser);
}
if (parser->ltags) {
int inx;
for (inx = 0; ((inx < parser->level) && (inx < XML_MAXLEVEL)); inx++)
efree(parser->ltags[ inx ]);
efree(parser->ltags);
}
if (parser->startElementHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->startElementHandler);
}
if (parser->endElementHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->endElementHandler);
}
if (parser->characterDataHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->characterDataHandler);
}
if (parser->processingInstructionHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->processingInstructionHandler);
}
if (parser->defaultHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->defaultHandler);
}
if (parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->notationDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->notationDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->externalEntityRefHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->externalEntityRefHandler);
}
if (parser->unknownEncodingHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->unknownEncodingHandler);
}
if (parser->startNamespaceDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->startNamespaceDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->endNamespaceDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->endNamespaceDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->baseURI) {
efree(parser->baseURI);
}
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
efree(parser);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,047
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned char *base64decode(const char *buf, size_t *size)
{
if (!buf || !size) return NULL;
size_t len = (*size > 0) ? *size : strlen(buf);
if (len <= 0) return NULL;
unsigned char *outbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc((len/4)*3+3);
const char *ptr = buf;
int p = 0;
size_t l = 0;
do {
ptr += strspn(ptr, "\r\n\t ");
if (*ptr == '\0' || ptr >= buf+len) {
break;
}
l = strcspn(ptr, "\r\n\t ");
if (l > 3 && ptr+l <= buf+len) {
p+=base64decode_block(outbuf+p, ptr, l);
ptr += l;
} else {
break;
}
} while (1);
outbuf[p] = 0;
*size = p;
return outbuf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The base64decode function in base64.c in libimobiledevice libplist through 1.12 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via split encoded Apple Property List data.
Commit Message: base64: Rework base64decode to handle split encoded data correctly
|
Low
| 168,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseStartTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar **pref,
const xmlChar **URI, int *tlen) {
const xmlChar *localname;
const xmlChar *prefix;
const xmlChar *attname;
const xmlChar *aprefix;
const xmlChar *nsname;
xmlChar *attvalue;
const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
int nratts, nbatts, nbdef;
int i, j, nbNs, attval, oldline, oldcol;
const xmlChar *base;
unsigned long cur;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if (RAW != '<') return(NULL);
NEXT1;
/*
* NOTE: it is crucial with the SAX2 API to never call SHRINK beyond that
* point since the attribute values may be stored as pointers to
* the buffer and calling SHRINK would destroy them !
* The Shrinking is only possible once the full set of attribute
* callbacks have been done.
*/
reparse:
SHRINK;
base = ctxt->input->base;
cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
oldline = ctxt->input->line;
oldcol = ctxt->input->col;
nbatts = 0;
nratts = 0;
nbdef = 0;
nbNs = 0;
attval = 0;
/* Forget any namespaces added during an earlier parse of this element. */
ctxt->nsNr = nsNr;
localname = xmlParseQName(ctxt, &prefix);
if (localname == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"StartTag: invalid element name\n");
return(NULL);
}
*tlen = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base - cur;
/*
* Now parse the attributes, it ends up with the ending
*
* (S Attribute)* S?
*/
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
while ((RAW != '>') &&
((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
(IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW))) {
const xmlChar *q = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
int len = -1, alloc = 0;
attname = xmlParseAttribute2(ctxt, prefix, localname,
&aprefix, &attvalue, &len, &alloc);
if (ctxt->input->base != base) {
if ((attvalue != NULL) && (alloc != 0))
xmlFree(attvalue);
attvalue = NULL;
goto base_changed;
}
if ((attname != NULL) && (attvalue != NULL)) {
if (len < 0) len = xmlStrlen(attvalue);
if ((attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) && (aprefix == NULL)) {
const xmlChar *URL = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, attvalue, len);
xmlURIPtr uri;
if (*URL != 0) {
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URL);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI,
"xmlns: '%s' is not a valid URI\n",
URL, NULL, NULL);
} else {
if (uri->scheme == NULL) {
xmlNsWarn(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI_RELATIVE,
"xmlns: URI %s is not absolute\n",
URL, NULL, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
if (URL == ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
if (attname != ctxt->str_xml) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace URI cannot be the default namespace\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
goto skip_default_ns;
}
if ((len == 29) &&
(xmlStrEqual(URL,
BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/"))) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"reuse of the xmlns namespace name is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_default_ns;
}
}
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == NULL)
break;
if (j <= nbNs)
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, NULL, attname);
else
if (nsPush(ctxt, NULL, URL) > 0) nbNs++;
skip_default_ns:
if (alloc != 0) xmlFree(attvalue);
SKIP_BLANKS;
continue;
}
if (aprefix == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
const xmlChar *URL = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, attvalue, len);
xmlURIPtr uri;
if (attname == ctxt->str_xml) {
if (URL != ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace prefix mapped to wrong URI\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* Do not keep a namespace definition node
*/
goto skip_ns;
}
if (URL == ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
if (attname != ctxt->str_xml) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace URI mapped to wrong prefix\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
goto skip_ns;
}
if (attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"redefinition of the xmlns prefix is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_ns;
}
if ((len == 29) &&
(xmlStrEqual(URL,
BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/"))) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"reuse of the xmlns namespace name is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_ns;
}
if ((URL == NULL) || (URL[0] == 0)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xmlns:%s: Empty XML namespace is not allowed\n",
attname, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_ns;
} else {
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URL);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI,
"xmlns:%s: '%s' is not a valid URI\n",
attname, URL, NULL);
} else {
if ((ctxt->pedantic) && (uri->scheme == NULL)) {
xmlNsWarn(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI_RELATIVE,
"xmlns:%s: URI %s is not absolute\n",
attname, URL, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == attname)
break;
if (j <= nbNs)
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, aprefix, attname);
else
if (nsPush(ctxt, attname, URL) > 0) nbNs++;
skip_ns:
if (alloc != 0) xmlFree(attvalue);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
continue;
}
/*
* Add the pair to atts
*/
if ((atts == NULL) || (nbatts + 5 > maxatts)) {
if (xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(ctxt, nbatts + 5) < 0) {
if (attvalue[len] == 0)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
atts = ctxt->atts;
}
ctxt->attallocs[nratts++] = alloc;
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = aprefix;
atts[nbatts++] = NULL; /* the URI will be fetched later */
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
attvalue += len;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
/*
* tag if some deallocation is needed
*/
if (alloc != 0) attval = 1;
} else {
if ((attvalue != NULL) && (attvalue[len] == 0))
xmlFree(attvalue);
}
failed:
GROW
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
break;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"attributes construct error\n");
break;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (q == CUR_PTR) &&
(attname == NULL) && (attvalue == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseStartTag: problem parsing attributes\n");
break;
}
GROW;
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
}
/*
* The attributes defaulting
*/
if (ctxt->attsDefault != NULL) {
xmlDefAttrsPtr defaults;
defaults = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->attsDefault, localname, prefix);
if (defaults != NULL) {
for (i = 0;i < defaults->nbAttrs;i++) {
attname = defaults->values[5 * i];
aprefix = defaults->values[5 * i + 1];
/*
* special work for namespaces defaulted defs
*/
if ((attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) && (aprefix == NULL)) {
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == NULL)
break;
if (j <= nbNs) continue;
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, NULL);
if (nsname != defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) {
if (nsPush(ctxt, NULL,
defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) > 0)
nbNs++;
}
} else if (aprefix == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == attname)
break;
if (j <= nbNs) continue;
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, attname);
if (nsname != defaults->values[2]) {
if (nsPush(ctxt, attname,
defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) > 0)
nbNs++;
}
} else {
/*
* check that it's not a defined attribute
*/
for (j = 0;j < nbatts;j+=5) {
if ((attname == atts[j]) && (aprefix == atts[j+1]))
break;
}
if (j < nbatts) continue;
if ((atts == NULL) || (nbatts + 5 > maxatts)) {
if (xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(ctxt, nbatts + 5) < 0) {
return(NULL);
}
maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
atts = ctxt->atts;
}
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = aprefix;
if (aprefix == NULL)
atts[nbatts++] = NULL;
else
atts[nbatts++] = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, aprefix);
atts[nbatts++] = defaults->values[5 * i + 2];
atts[nbatts++] = defaults->values[5 * i + 3];
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) &&
(defaults->values[5 * i + 4] != NULL)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_STANDALONE_DEFAULTED,
"standalone: attribute %s on %s defaulted from external subset\n",
attname, localname);
}
nbdef++;
}
}
}
}
/*
* The attributes checkings
*/
for (i = 0; i < nbatts;i += 5) {
/*
* The default namespace does not apply to attribute names.
*/
if (atts[i + 1] != NULL) {
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, atts[i + 1]);
if (nsname == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_UNDEFINED_NAMESPACE,
"Namespace prefix %s for %s on %s is not defined\n",
atts[i + 1], atts[i], localname);
}
atts[i + 2] = nsname;
} else
nsname = NULL;
/*
* [ WFC: Unique Att Spec ]
* No attribute name may appear more than once in the same
* start-tag or empty-element tag.
* As extended by the Namespace in XML REC.
*/
for (j = 0; j < i;j += 5) {
if (atts[i] == atts[j]) {
if (atts[i+1] == atts[j+1]) {
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, atts[i+1], atts[i]);
break;
}
if ((nsname != NULL) && (atts[j + 2] == nsname)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED,
"Namespaced Attribute %s in '%s' redefined\n",
atts[i], nsname, NULL);
break;
}
}
}
}
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, prefix);
if ((prefix != NULL) && (nsname == NULL)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_UNDEFINED_NAMESPACE,
"Namespace prefix %s on %s is not defined\n",
prefix, localname, NULL);
}
*pref = prefix;
*URI = nsname;
/*
* SAX: Start of Element !
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->startElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (nbNs > 0)
ctxt->sax->startElementNs(ctxt->userData, localname, prefix,
nsname, nbNs, &ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * nbNs],
nbatts / 5, nbdef, atts);
else
ctxt->sax->startElementNs(ctxt->userData, localname, prefix,
nsname, 0, NULL, nbatts / 5, nbdef, atts);
}
/*
* Free up attribute allocated strings if needed
*/
if (attval != 0) {
for (i = 3,j = 0; j < nratts;i += 5,j++)
if ((ctxt->attallocs[j] != 0) && (atts[i] != NULL))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
return(localname);
base_changed:
/*
* the attribute strings are valid iif the base didn't changed
*/
if (attval != 0) {
for (i = 3,j = 0; j < nratts;i += 5,j++)
if ((ctxt->attallocs[j] != 0) && (atts[i] != NULL))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + cur;
ctxt->input->line = oldline;
ctxt->input->col = oldcol;
if (ctxt->wellFormed == 1) {
goto reparse;
}
return(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,303
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadOnePNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
/* Read one PNG image */
/* To do: Read the tEXt/Creation Time chunk into the date:create property */
Image
*image;
char
im_vers[32],
libpng_runv[32],
libpng_vers[32],
zlib_runv[32],
zlib_vers[32];
int
intent, /* "PNG Rendering intent", which is ICC intent + 1 */
num_raw_profiles,
num_text,
num_text_total,
num_passes,
number_colors,
pass,
ping_bit_depth,
ping_color_type,
ping_file_depth,
ping_interlace_method,
ping_compression_method,
ping_filter_method,
ping_num_trans,
unit_type;
double
file_gamma;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
ping_found_cHRM,
ping_found_gAMA,
ping_found_iCCP,
ping_found_sRGB,
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM,
ping_preserve_iCCP,
status;
MemoryInfo
*volatile pixel_info;
PixelInfo
transparent_color;
PNGErrorInfo
error_info;
png_bytep
ping_trans_alpha;
png_color_16p
ping_background,
ping_trans_color;
png_info
*end_info,
*ping_info;
png_struct
*ping;
png_textp
text;
png_uint_32
ping_height,
ping_width,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
ssize_t
ping_rowbytes,
y;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
size_t
length,
row_offset;
ssize_t
j;
unsigned char
*ping_pixels;
#ifdef PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
png_byte unused_chunks[]=
{
104, 73, 83, 84, (png_byte) '\0', /* hIST */
105, 84, 88, 116, (png_byte) '\0', /* iTXt */
112, 67, 65, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* pCAL */
115, 67, 65, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* sCAL */
115, 80, 76, 84, (png_byte) '\0', /* sPLT */
#if !defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
116, 73, 77, 69, (png_byte) '\0', /* tIME */
#endif
#ifdef PNG_APNG_SUPPORTED /* libpng was built with APNG patch; */
/* ignore the APNG chunks */
97, 99, 84, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* acTL */
102, 99, 84, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* fcTL */
102, 100, 65, 84, (png_byte) '\0', /* fdAT */
#endif
};
#endif
/* Define these outside of the following "if logging()" block so they will
* show in debuggers.
*/
*im_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(im_vers,
MagickLibVersionText,32);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(im_vers,
MagickLibAddendum,32);
*libpng_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(libpng_vers,
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,32);
*libpng_runv='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(libpng_runv,
png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),32);
*zlib_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(zlib_vers,
ZLIB_VERSION,32);
*zlib_runv='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(zlib_runv,
zlib_version,32);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOnePNGImage()\n"
" IM version = %s\n"
" Libpng version = %s",
im_vers, libpng_vers);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (LocaleCompare(libpng_vers,libpng_runv) != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," running with %s",
libpng_runv);
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Zlib version = %s",
zlib_vers);
if (LocaleCompare(zlib_vers,zlib_runv) != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," running with %s",
zlib_runv);
}
}
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10200)
if (image_info->verbose)
printf("Your PNG library (libpng-%s) is rather old.\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING);
#endif
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10400)
# ifndef PNG_TRANSFORM_GRAY_TO_RGB /* Added at libpng-1.4.0beta67 */
if (image_info->verbose)
{
printf("Your PNG library (libpng-%s) is an old beta version.\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING);
printf("Please update it.\n");
}
# endif
#endif
quantum_info = (QuantumInfo *) NULL;
image=mng_info->image;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before reading:\n"
" image->alpha_trait=%d"
" image->rendering_intent=%d\n"
" image->colorspace=%d\n"
" image->gamma=%f",
(int) image->alpha_trait, (int) image->rendering_intent,
(int) image->colorspace, image->gamma);
}
intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(image->rendering_intent);
/* Set to an out-of-range color unless tRNS chunk is present */
transparent_color.red=65537;
transparent_color.green=65537;
transparent_color.blue=65537;
transparent_color.alpha=65537;
number_colors=0;
num_text = 0;
num_text_total = 0;
num_raw_profiles = 0;
ping_found_cHRM = MagickFalse;
ping_found_gAMA = MagickFalse;
ping_found_iCCP = MagickFalse;
ping_found_sRGB = MagickFalse;
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM = MagickFalse;
ping_preserve_iCCP = MagickFalse;
/*
Allocate the PNG structures
*/
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
error_info.image=image;
error_info.exception=exception;
ping=png_create_read_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,&error_info,
MagickPNGErrorHandler,MagickPNGWarningHandler, NULL,
(png_malloc_ptr) Magick_png_malloc,(png_free_ptr) Magick_png_free);
#else
ping=png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,&error_info,
MagickPNGErrorHandler,MagickPNGWarningHandler);
#endif
if (ping == (png_struct *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ping_info=png_create_info_struct(ping);
if (ping_info == (png_info *) NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,(png_info **) NULL,(png_info **) NULL);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
end_info=png_create_info_struct(ping);
if (end_info == (png_info *) NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,(png_info **) NULL);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(ping)))
{
/*
PNG image is corrupt.
*/
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage() with error.");
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/* { For navigation to end of SETJMP-protected block. Within this
* block, use png_error() instead of Throwing an Exception, to ensure
* that libpng is able to clean up, and that the semaphore is unlocked.
*/
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
LockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_BENIGN_ERRORS_SUPPORTED
/* Allow benign errors */
png_set_benign_errors(ping, 1);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
/* Reject images with too many rows or columns */
png_set_user_limits(ping,
(png_uint_32) MagickMin(0x7fffffffL,
GetMagickResourceLimit(WidthResource)),
(png_uint_32) MagickMin(0x7fffffffL,
GetMagickResourceLimit(HeightResource)));
#endif /* PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED */
/*
Prepare PNG for reading.
*/
mng_info->image_found++;
png_set_sig_bytes(ping,8);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
#if defined(PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED)
(void) png_permit_mng_features(ping,PNG_ALL_MNG_FEATURES);
png_set_read_fn(ping,image,png_get_data);
#else
#if defined(PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED)
png_permit_empty_plte(ping,MagickTrue);
png_set_read_fn(ping,image,png_get_data);
#else
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->bytes_in_read_buffer=0;
mng_info->found_empty_plte=MagickFalse;
mng_info->have_saved_bkgd_index=MagickFalse;
png_set_read_fn(ping,mng_info,mng_get_data);
#endif
#endif
}
else
png_set_read_fn(ping,image,png_get_data);
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember("ICC",value) == MagickFalse)
{
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"png:preserve-iCCP");
if (value == NULL)
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"png:preserve-iCCP");
if (value != NULL)
ping_preserve_iCCP=MagickTrue;
#if defined(PNG_SKIP_sRGB_CHECK_PROFILE) && defined(PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED)
/* Don't let libpng check for ICC/sRGB profile because we're going
* to do that anyway. This feature was added at libpng-1.6.12.
* If logging, go ahead and check and issue a warning as appropriate.
*/
if (logging == MagickFalse)
png_set_option(ping, PNG_SKIP_sRGB_CHECK_PROFILE, PNG_OPTION_ON);
#endif
}
#if defined(PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED)
else
{
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 1, (png_bytep) mng_iCCP, 1);
}
#endif
}
#if defined(PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED)
/* Ignore unused chunks and all unknown chunks except for eXIf,
caNv, and vpAg */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700 /* Avoid libpng16 warning */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, NULL, 0);
# else
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 1, NULL, 0);
# endif
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, (png_bytep) mng_eXIf, 1);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, (png_bytep) mng_caNv, 1);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, (png_bytep) mng_vpAg, 1);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 1, unused_chunks,
(int)sizeof(unused_chunks)/5);
/* Callback for other unknown chunks */
png_set_read_user_chunk_fn(ping, image, read_user_chunk_callback);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
# if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10400)
/* Limit the size of the chunk storage cache used for sPLT, text,
* and unknown chunks.
*/
png_set_chunk_cache_max(ping, 32767);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_CHECK_FOR_INVALID_INDEX_SUPPORTED
/* Disable new libpng-1.5.10 feature */
png_set_check_for_invalid_index (ping, 0);
#endif
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10400)
# if defined(PNG_USE_PNGGCCRD) && defined(PNG_ASSEMBLER_CODE_SUPPORTED) && \
(PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10200) && (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10220) && defined(__i386__)
/* Disable thread-unsafe features of pnggccrd */
if (png_access_version_number() >= 10200)
{
png_uint_32 mmx_disable_mask=0;
png_uint_32 asm_flags;
mmx_disable_mask |= ( PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_COMBINE_ROW \
| PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_FILTER_SUB \
| PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_FILTER_AVG \
| PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_FILTER_PAETH );
asm_flags=png_get_asm_flags(ping);
png_set_asm_flags(ping, asm_flags & ~mmx_disable_mask);
}
# endif
#endif
png_read_info(ping,ping_info);
png_get_IHDR(ping,ping_info,&ping_width,&ping_height,
&ping_bit_depth,&ping_color_type,
&ping_interlace_method,&ping_compression_method,
&ping_filter_method);
ping_file_depth = ping_bit_depth;
/* Swap bytes if requested */
if (ping_file_depth == 16)
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"png:swap-bytes");
if (value == NULL)
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"png:swap-bytes");
if (value != NULL)
png_set_swap(ping);
}
/* Save bit-depth and color-type in case we later want to write a PNG00 */
{
char
msg[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) ping_color_type);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.color-type-orig",msg,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) ping_bit_depth);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.bit-depth-orig",msg,exception);
}
(void) png_get_tRNS(ping, ping_info, &ping_trans_alpha, &ping_num_trans,
&ping_trans_color);
(void) png_get_bKGD(ping, ping_info, &ping_background);
if (ping_bit_depth < 8)
{
png_set_packing(ping);
ping_bit_depth = 8;
}
image->depth=ping_bit_depth;
image->depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
image->interlace=ping_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace : NoInterlace;
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
image->rendering_intent=UndefinedIntent;
intent=Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(UndefinedIntent);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&image->chromaticity,0,
sizeof(image->chromaticity));
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG width: %.20g, height: %.20g\n"
" PNG color_type: %d, bit_depth: %d\n"
" PNG compression_method: %d\n"
" PNG interlace_method: %d, filter_method: %d",
(double) ping_width, (double) ping_height,
ping_color_type, ping_bit_depth,
ping_compression_method,
ping_interlace_method,ping_filter_method);
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info, PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
ping_found_iCCP=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG iCCP chunk.");
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_gAMA))
{
ping_found_gAMA=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG gAMA chunk.");
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_cHRM))
{
ping_found_cHRM=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG cHRM chunk.");
}
if (ping_found_iCCP != MagickTrue && png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,
PNG_INFO_sRGB))
{
ping_found_sRGB=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG sRGB chunk.");
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_iCCP_SUPPORTED
if (ping_found_iCCP !=MagickTrue &&
ping_found_sRGB != MagickTrue &&
png_get_valid(ping,ping_info, PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
ping_found_iCCP=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG iCCP chunk.");
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
int
compression;
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500)
png_charp
info;
#else
png_bytep
info;
#endif
png_charp
name;
png_uint_32
profile_length;
(void) png_get_iCCP(ping,ping_info,&name,(int *) &compression,&info,
&profile_length);
if (profile_length != 0)
{
StringInfo
*profile;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG iCCP chunk.");
profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,profile_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
png_warning(ping, "ICC profile is NULL");
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
else
{
if (ping_preserve_iCCP == MagickFalse)
{
int
icheck,
got_crc=0;
png_uint_32
length,
profile_crc=0;
unsigned char
*data;
length=(png_uint_32) GetStringInfoLength(profile);
for (icheck=0; sRGB_info[icheck].len > 0; icheck++)
{
if (length == sRGB_info[icheck].len)
{
if (got_crc == 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Got a %lu-byte ICC profile (potentially sRGB)",
(unsigned long) length);
data=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
profile_crc=crc32(0,data,length);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" with crc=%8x",(unsigned int) profile_crc);
got_crc++;
}
if (profile_crc == sRGB_info[icheck].crc)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" It is sRGB with rendering intent = %s",
Magick_RenderingIntentString_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(
sRGB_info[icheck].intent));
if (image->rendering_intent==UndefinedIntent)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(
sRGB_info[icheck].intent);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (sRGB_info[icheck].len == 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Got %lu-byte ICC profile not recognized as sRGB",
(unsigned long) length);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
}
}
else /* Preserve-iCCP */
{
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
}
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
}
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_READ_sRGB_SUPPORTED)
{
if (ping_found_iCCP==MagickFalse && png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,
PNG_INFO_sRGB))
{
if (png_get_sRGB(ping,ping_info,&intent))
{
if (image->rendering_intent == UndefinedIntent)
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent (intent);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG sRGB chunk: rendering_intent: %d",intent);
}
}
else if (mng_info->have_global_srgb)
{
if (image->rendering_intent == UndefinedIntent)
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent
(mng_info->global_srgb_intent);
}
}
#endif
{
if (!png_get_gAMA(ping,ping_info,&file_gamma))
if (mng_info->have_global_gama)
png_set_gAMA(ping,ping_info,mng_info->global_gamma);
if (png_get_gAMA(ping,ping_info,&file_gamma))
{
image->gamma=(float) file_gamma;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG gAMA chunk: gamma: %f",file_gamma);
}
}
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_cHRM))
{
if (mng_info->have_global_chrm != MagickFalse)
{
(void) png_set_cHRM(ping,ping_info,
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y,
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y,
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y,
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y);
}
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_cHRM))
{
(void) png_get_cHRM(ping,ping_info,
&image->chromaticity.white_point.x,
&image->chromaticity.white_point.y,
&image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,
&image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
&image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,
&image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
&image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,
&image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y);
ping_found_cHRM=MagickTrue;
if (image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f)
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM=MagickTrue;
}
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
{
if (ping_found_sRGB != MagickTrue &&
(ping_found_gAMA != MagickTrue ||
(image->gamma > .45 && image->gamma < .46)) &&
(ping_found_cHRM != MagickTrue ||
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM != MagickFalse) &&
ping_found_iCCP != MagickTrue)
{
png_set_sRGB(ping,ping_info,
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent
(image->rendering_intent));
file_gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
ping_found_sRGB=MagickTrue;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting sRGB as if in input");
}
}
#if defined(PNG_oFFs_SUPPORTED)
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_oFFs))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) png_get_x_offset_pixels(ping, ping_info);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) png_get_y_offset_pixels(ping, ping_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
if (image->page.x || image->page.y)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG oFFs chunk: x: %.20g, y: %.20g.",(double)
image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_pHYs_SUPPORTED)
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs))
{
if (mng_info->have_global_phys)
{
png_set_pHYs(ping,ping_info,
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit,
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit,
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type);
}
}
x_resolution=0;
y_resolution=0;
unit_type=0;
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs))
{
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
(void) png_get_pHYs(ping,ping_info,&x_resolution,&y_resolution,
&unit_type);
image->resolution.x=(double) x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=(double) y_resolution;
if (unit_type == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=(double) x_resolution/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) y_resolution/100.0;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG pHYs chunk: xres: %.20g, yres: %.20g, units: %d.",
(double) x_resolution,(double) y_resolution,unit_type);
}
#endif
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_PLTE))
{
png_colorp
palette;
(void) png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&palette,&number_colors);
if ((number_colors == 0) &&
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte_length)
{
png_set_PLTE(ping,ping_info,mng_info->global_plte,
(int) mng_info->global_plte_length);
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
if (mng_info->global_trns_length)
{
png_warning(ping,
"global tRNS has more entries than global PLTE");
}
else
{
png_set_tRNS(ping,ping_info,mng_info->global_trns,
(int) mng_info->global_trns_length,NULL);
}
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED
if (
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
mng_info->have_saved_bkgd_index ||
#endif
png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD))
{
png_color_16
background;
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
if (mng_info->have_saved_bkgd_index)
background.index=mng_info->saved_bkgd_index;
#endif
if (png_get_valid(ping, ping_info, PNG_INFO_bKGD))
background.index=ping_background->index;
background.red=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].red;
background.green=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].green;
background.blue=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].blue;
background.gray=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].green;
png_set_bKGD(ping,ping_info,&background);
}
#endif
}
else
png_error(ping,"No global PLTE in file");
}
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED
if (mng_info->have_global_bkgd &&
(!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD)))
image->background_color=mng_info->mng_global_bkgd;
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD))
{
unsigned int
bkgd_scale;
/* Set image background color.
* Scale background components to 16-bit, then scale
* to quantum depth
*/
bkgd_scale = 1;
if (ping_file_depth == 1)
bkgd_scale = 255;
else if (ping_file_depth == 2)
bkgd_scale = 85;
else if (ping_file_depth == 4)
bkgd_scale = 17;
if (ping_file_depth <= 8)
bkgd_scale *= 257;
ping_background->red *= bkgd_scale;
ping_background->green *= bkgd_scale;
ping_background->blue *= bkgd_scale;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG bKGD chunk, raw ping_background=(%d,%d,%d)\n"
" bkgd_scale=%d. ping_background=(%d,%d,%d)",
ping_background->red,ping_background->green,
ping_background->blue,
bkgd_scale,ping_background->red,
ping_background->green,ping_background->blue);
}
image->background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum(ping_background->red);
image->background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum(ping_background->green);
image->background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum(ping_background->blue);
image->background_color.alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->background_color=(%.20g,%.20g,%.20g).",
(double) image->background_color.red,
(double) image->background_color.green,
(double) image->background_color.blue);
}
#endif /* PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
/*
Image has a tRNS chunk.
*/
int
max_sample;
size_t
one=1;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG tRNS chunk.");
max_sample = (int) ((one << ping_file_depth) - 1);
if ((ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY &&
(int)ping_trans_color->gray > max_sample) ||
(ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB &&
((int)ping_trans_color->red > max_sample ||
(int)ping_trans_color->green > max_sample ||
(int)ping_trans_color->blue > max_sample)))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Ignoring PNG tRNS chunk with out-of-range sample.");
png_free_data(ping, ping_info, PNG_FREE_TRNS, 0);
png_set_invalid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS);
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else
{
int
scale_to_short;
scale_to_short = 65535L/((1UL << ping_file_depth)-1);
/* Scale transparent_color to short */
transparent_color.red= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->red;
transparent_color.green= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->green;
transparent_color.blue= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->blue;
transparent_color.alpha= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->gray;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Raw tRNS graylevel = %d, scaled graylevel = %d.",
(int) ping_trans_color->gray,(int) transparent_color.alpha);
}
transparent_color.red=transparent_color.alpha;
transparent_color.green=transparent_color.alpha;
transparent_color.blue=transparent_color.alpha;
}
}
}
#if defined(PNG_READ_sBIT_SUPPORTED)
if (mng_info->have_global_sbit)
{
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_sBIT))
png_set_sBIT(ping,ping_info,&mng_info->global_sbit);
}
#endif
num_passes=png_set_interlace_handling(ping);
png_read_update_info(ping,ping_info);
ping_rowbytes=png_get_rowbytes(ping,ping_info);
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
mng_info->image_box.left=0;
mng_info->image_box.right=(ssize_t) ping_width;
mng_info->image_box.top=0;
mng_info->image_box.bottom=(ssize_t) ping_height;
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=ping_width;
mng_info->mng_height=ping_height;
mng_info->frame=mng_info->image_box;
mng_info->clip=mng_info->image_box;
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
image->compression=ZipCompression;
image->columns=ping_width;
image->rows=ping_height;
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
double
image_gamma = image->gamma;
(void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->gamma=%f",(float) image_gamma);
if (image_gamma > 0.75)
{
/* Set image->rendering_intent to Undefined,
* image->colorspace to GRAY, and reset image->chromaticity.
*/
image->intensity = Rec709LuminancePixelIntensityMethod;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
}
else
{
RenderingIntent
save_rendering_intent = image->rendering_intent;
ChromaticityInfo
save_chromaticity = image->chromaticity;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->rendering_intent = save_rendering_intent;
image->chromaticity = save_chromaticity;
}
image->gamma = image_gamma;
}
(void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->colorspace=%d",(int) image->colorspace);
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ||
((int) ping_bit_depth < 16 &&
(int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY))
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
one=1;
image->colors=one << ping_file_depth;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH == 8)
if (image->colors > 256)
image->colors=256;
#else
if (image->colors > 65536L)
image->colors=65536L;
#endif
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_colorp
palette;
(void) png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&palette,&number_colors);
image->colors=(size_t) number_colors;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG PLTE chunk: number_colors: %d.",number_colors);
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_colorp
palette;
(void) png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&palette,&number_colors);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(palette[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(palette[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(palette[i].blue);
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=0;
image->colormap[i].green=0;
image->colormap[i].blue=0;
}
}
else
{
Quantum
scale;
scale = (Quantum) (65535.0/((1UL << ping_file_depth)-1.0));
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
scale = ScaleShortToQuantum(scale);
#endif
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) (i*scale);
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) (i*scale);
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) (i*scale);
}
}
}
/* Set some properties for reporting by "identify" */
{
char
msg[MagickPathExtent];
/* encode ping_width, ping_height, ping_file_depth, ping_color_type,
ping_interlace_method in value */
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"%d, %d",(int) ping_width, (int) ping_height);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.width,height",msg,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) ping_file_depth);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.bit_depth",msg,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (%s)",
(int) ping_color_type,
Magick_ColorType_from_PNG_ColorType((int)ping_color_type));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.color_type",msg,exception);
if (ping_interlace_method == 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (Not interlaced)",
(int) ping_interlace_method);
}
else if (ping_interlace_method == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (Adam7 method)",
(int) ping_interlace_method);
}
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (Unknown method)",
(int) ping_interlace_method);
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.interlace_method",
msg,exception);
if (number_colors != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) number_colors);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:PLTE.number_colors",msg,
exception);
}
}
#if defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
read_tIME_chunk(image,ping,ping_info,exception);
#endif
/*
Read image scanlines.
*/
if (image->delay != 0)
mng_info->scenes_found++;
if ((mng_info->mng_type == 0 && (image->ping != MagickFalse)) || (
(image_info->number_scenes != 0) && (mng_info->scenes_found > (ssize_t)
(image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))))
{
/* This happens later in non-ping decodes */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->alpha_trait=
(((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))) ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping PNG image data for scene %.20g",(double)
mng_info->scenes_found-1);
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage().");
return(image);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG IDAT chunk(s)");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (num_passes > 1)
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,ping_rowbytes*
sizeof(*ping_pixels));
else
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(ping_rowbytes,sizeof(*ping_pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
ping_pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Converting PNG pixels to pixel packets");
/*
Convert PNG pixels to pixel packets.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Failed to allocate quantum_info");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
{
MagickBooleanType
found_transparent_pixel;
found_transparent_pixel=MagickFalse;
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
image->alpha_trait=
(((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))) ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (num_passes > 1)
row_offset=ping_rowbytes*y;
else
row_offset=0;
png_read_row(ping,ping_pixels+row_offset,NULL);
if (pass < num_passes-1)
continue;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayAlphaQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
RGBAQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
IndexQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else /* ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB */
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
RGBQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
if (found_transparent_pixel == MagickFalse)
{
/* Is there a transparent pixel in the row? */
if (y== 0 && logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Looking for cheap transparent pixel");
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
if ((ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(image,q) != OpaqueAlpha))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ...got one.");
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
break;
}
if ((ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) &&
(ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.red &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.green &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.blue))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ...got one.");
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
if (num_passes == 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y, image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (num_passes != 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,pass,num_passes);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else /* image->storage_class != DirectClass */
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
Quantum
*quantum_scanline;
register Quantum
*r;
/*
Convert grayscale image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Converting grayscale pixels to pixel packets");
image->alpha_trait=ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
quantum_scanline=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
(image->alpha_trait == BlendPixelTrait? 2 : 1)*
sizeof(*quantum_scanline));
if (quantum_scanline == (Quantum *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
Quantum
alpha;
if (num_passes > 1)
row_offset=ping_rowbytes*y;
else
row_offset=0;
png_read_row(ping,ping_pixels+row_offset,NULL);
if (pass < num_passes-1)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=ping_pixels+row_offset;
r=quantum_scanline;
switch (ping_bit_depth)
{
case 8:
{
if (ping_color_type == 4)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
*r++=*p++;
alpha=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)*p++);
SetPixelAlpha(image,alpha,q);
if (alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
*r++=*p++;
break;
}
case 16:
{
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH >= 16)
unsigned short
quantum;
if (image->colors > 256)
quantum=((*p++) << 8);
else
quantum=0;
quantum|=(*p++);
*r=ScaleShortToQuantum(quantum);
r++;
if (ping_color_type == 4)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
quantum=((*p++) << 8);
else
quantum=0;
quantum|=(*p++);
alpha=ScaleShortToQuantum(quantum);
SetPixelAlpha(image,alpha,q);
if (alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
#else /* MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH == 8 */
*r++=(*p++);
p++; /* strip low byte */
if (ping_color_type == 4)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,*p++,q);
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) != OpaqueAlpha)
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
#endif
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
/*
Transfer image scanline.
*/
r=quantum_scanline;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*r++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (num_passes == 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (num_passes != 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,pass,num_passes);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_scanline=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(quantum_scanline);
}
image->alpha_trait=found_transparent_pixel ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (found_transparent_pixel != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found transparent pixel");
else
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No transparent pixel was found");
ping_color_type&=0x03;
}
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
PixelTrait
alpha_trait;
alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
image->alpha_trait=alpha_trait;
}
png_read_end(ping,end_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->storage_class=%d\n",(int) image->storage_class);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0 && mng_info->scenes_found-1 <
(ssize_t) image_info->first_scene && image->delay != 0)
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage() early.");
return(image);
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
ClassType
storage_class;
/*
Image has a transparent background.
*/
storage_class=image->storage_class;
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
/* Balfour fix from imagemagick discourse server, 5 Feb 2010 */
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
for (x=0; x < ping_num_trans; x++)
{
image->colormap[x].alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
image->colormap[x].alpha =
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)ping_trans_alpha[x]);
}
}
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
for (x=0; x < (int) image->colors; x++)
{
if (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[x].red) ==
transparent_color.alpha)
{
image->colormap[x].alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
image->colormap[x].alpha = (Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
}
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
#if 1 /* Should have already been done above, but glennrp problem P10
* needs this.
*/
else
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
image->storage_class=storage_class;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
/* Caution: on a Q8 build, this does not distinguish between
* 16-bit colors that differ only in the low byte
*/
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
if (ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.red &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.green &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.blue)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,TransparentAlpha,q);
}
#if 0 /* I have not found a case where this is needed. */
else
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,q)=(Quantum) OpaqueAlpha;
}
#endif
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
}
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++)
{
if (j == 0)
status = png_get_text(ping,ping_info,&text,&num_text) != 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
else
status = png_get_text(ping,end_info,&text,&num_text) != 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) num_text; i++)
{
/* Check for a profile */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG text chunk");
if (strlen(text[i].key) > 16 &&
memcmp(text[i].key, "Raw profile type ",17) == 0)
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember(text[i].key+17,value) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) Magick_png_read_raw_profile(ping,image,image_info,text,
(int) i,exception);
num_raw_profiles++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Read raw profile %s",text[i].key+17);
}
else
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping raw profile %s",text[i].key+17);
}
}
else
{
char
*value;
length=text[i].text_length;
value=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*value));
if (value == (char *) NULL)
{
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
break;
}
*value='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(value,text[i].text,length+2);
/* Don't save "density" or "units" property if we have a pHYs
* chunk
*/
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs) ||
(LocaleCompare(text[i].key,"density") != 0 &&
LocaleCompare(text[i].key,"units") != 0))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,text[i].key,value,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" length: %lu\n"
" Keyword: %s",
(unsigned long) length,
text[i].key);
}
value=DestroyString(value);
}
}
num_text_total += num_text;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/*
Store the object if necessary.
*/
if (object_id && !mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
if (mng_info->ob[object_id] == (MngBuffer *) NULL)
{
/*
create a new object buffer.
*/
mng_info->ob[object_id]=(MngBuffer *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngBuffer));
if (mng_info->ob[object_id] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
{
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image=(Image *) NULL;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->reference_count=1;
}
}
if ((mng_info->ob[object_id] == (MngBuffer *) NULL) ||
mng_info->ob[object_id]->frozen)
{
if (mng_info->ob[object_id] == (MngBuffer *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
if (mng_info->ob[object_id]->frozen)
png_error(ping,"Cannot overwrite frozen MNG object buffer");
}
else
{
if (mng_info->ob[object_id]->image != (Image *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image=DestroyImage
(mng_info->ob[object_id]->image);
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (mng_info->ob[object_id]->image != (Image *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image->file=(FILE *) NULL;
else
png_error(ping, "Cloning image for object buffer failed");
if (ping_width > 250000L || ping_height > 250000L)
png_error(ping,"PNG Image dimensions are too large.");
mng_info->ob[object_id]->width=ping_width;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->height=ping_height;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->color_type=ping_color_type;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->sample_depth=ping_bit_depth;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->interlace_method=ping_interlace_method;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->compression_method=
ping_compression_method;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->filter_method=ping_filter_method;
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_PLTE))
{
png_colorp
plte;
/*
Copy the PLTE to the object buffer.
*/
png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&plte,&number_colors);
mng_info->ob[object_id]->plte_length=number_colors;
for (i=0; i < number_colors; i++)
{
mng_info->ob[object_id]->plte[i]=plte[i];
}
}
else
mng_info->ob[object_id]->plte_length=0;
}
}
#endif
/* Set image->alpha_trait to MagickTrue if the input colortype supports
* alpha or if a valid tRNS chunk is present, no matter whether there
* is actual transparency present.
*/
image->alpha_trait=(((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))) ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
#if 0 /* I'm not sure what's wrong here but it does not work. */
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleAlphaType,exception);
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteAlphaType,exception);
else
(void) SetImageType(image,TrueColorAlphaType,exception);
}
else
{
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType,exception);
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType,exception);
else
(void) SetImageType(image,TrueColorType,exception);
}
#endif
/* Set more properties for identify to retrieve */
{
char
msg[MagickPathExtent];
if (num_text_total != 0)
{
/* libpng doesn't tell us whether they were tEXt, zTXt, or iTXt */
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"%d tEXt/zTXt/iTXt chunks were found", num_text_total);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:text",msg,
exception);
}
if (num_raw_profiles != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"%d were found", num_raw_profiles);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:text-encoded profiles",msg,
exception);
}
/* cHRM chunk: */
if (ping_found_cHRM != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
"chunk was found (see Chromaticity, above)");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:cHRM",msg,
exception);
}
/* bKGD chunk: */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
"chunk was found (see Background color, above)");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:bKGD",msg,
exception);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
"chunk was found");
#if defined(PNG_iCCP_SUPPORTED)
/* iCCP chunk: */
if (ping_found_iCCP != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:iCCP",msg,
exception);
#endif
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:tRNS",msg,
exception);
#if defined(PNG_sRGB_SUPPORTED)
/* sRGB chunk: */
if (ping_found_sRGB != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"intent=%d (%s)",
(int) intent,
Magick_RenderingIntentString_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(intent));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:sRGB",msg,
exception);
}
#endif
/* gAMA chunk: */
if (ping_found_gAMA != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"gamma=%.8g (See Gamma, above)",
file_gamma);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:gAMA",msg,
exception);
}
#if defined(PNG_pHYs_SUPPORTED)
/* pHYs chunk: */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"x_res=%.10g, y_res=%.10g, units=%d",
(double) x_resolution,(double) y_resolution, unit_type);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:pHYs",msg,
exception);
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_oFFs_SUPPORTED)
/* oFFs chunk: */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_oFFs))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"x_off=%.20g, y_off=%.20g",
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:oFFs",msg,
exception);
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
read_tIME_chunk(image,ping,end_info,exception);
#endif
/* caNv chunk: */
if ((image->page.width != 0 && image->page.width != image->columns) ||
(image->page.height != 0 && image->page.height != image->rows) ||
(image->page.x != 0 || image->page.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"width=%.20g, height=%.20g, x_offset=%.20g, y_offset=%.20g",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:caNv",msg,
exception);
}
/* vpAg chunk: */
if ((image->page.width != 0 && image->page.width != image->columns) ||
(image->page.height != 0 && image->page.height != image->rows))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"width=%.20g, height=%.20g",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:vpAg",msg,
exception);
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage()");
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
/* } for navigation to beginning of SETJMP-protected block, revert to
* Throwing an Exception when an error occurs.
*/
return(image);
/* end of reading one PNG image */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The read_user_chunk_callback function in coderspng.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 Q16 2017-06-21 (beta) has memory leak vulnerabilities via crafted PNG files.
Commit Message: coders/png.c: Stop a memory leak in read_user_chunk_callback() (reference
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/517).
|
Medium
| 168,046
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool __skb_flow_dissect(const struct sk_buff *skb,
struct flow_dissector *flow_dissector,
void *target_container,
void *data, __be16 proto, int nhoff, int hlen)
{
struct flow_dissector_key_control *key_control;
struct flow_dissector_key_basic *key_basic;
struct flow_dissector_key_addrs *key_addrs;
struct flow_dissector_key_ports *key_ports;
struct flow_dissector_key_tags *key_tags;
struct flow_dissector_key_keyid *key_keyid;
u8 ip_proto = 0;
if (!data) {
data = skb->data;
proto = skb->protocol;
nhoff = skb_network_offset(skb);
hlen = skb_headlen(skb);
}
/* It is ensured by skb_flow_dissector_init() that control key will
* be always present.
*/
key_control = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_CONTROL,
target_container);
/* It is ensured by skb_flow_dissector_init() that basic key will
* be always present.
*/
key_basic = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_BASIC,
target_container);
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_ETH_ADDRS)) {
struct ethhdr *eth = eth_hdr(skb);
struct flow_dissector_key_eth_addrs *key_eth_addrs;
key_eth_addrs = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_ETH_ADDRS,
target_container);
memcpy(key_eth_addrs, ð->h_dest, sizeof(*key_eth_addrs));
}
again:
switch (proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP): {
const struct iphdr *iph;
struct iphdr _iph;
ip:
iph = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_iph), data, hlen, &_iph);
if (!iph || iph->ihl < 5)
return false;
nhoff += iph->ihl * 4;
ip_proto = iph->protocol;
if (ip_is_fragment(iph))
ip_proto = 0;
if (!skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS))
break;
key_addrs = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS, target_container);
memcpy(&key_addrs->v4addrs, &iph->saddr,
sizeof(key_addrs->v4addrs));
key_control->addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
break;
}
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6): {
const struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct ipv6hdr _iph;
__be32 flow_label;
ipv6:
iph = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_iph), data, hlen, &_iph);
if (!iph)
return false;
ip_proto = iph->nexthdr;
nhoff += sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS)) {
struct flow_dissector_key_ipv6_addrs *key_ipv6_addrs;
key_ipv6_addrs = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS,
target_container);
memcpy(key_ipv6_addrs, &iph->saddr, sizeof(*key_ipv6_addrs));
key_control->addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS;
}
flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(iph);
if (flow_label) {
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_FLOW_LABEL)) {
key_tags = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_FLOW_LABEL,
target_container);
key_tags->flow_label = ntohl(flow_label);
}
}
break;
}
case htons(ETH_P_8021AD):
case htons(ETH_P_8021Q): {
const struct vlan_hdr *vlan;
struct vlan_hdr _vlan;
vlan = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_vlan), data, hlen, &_vlan);
if (!vlan)
return false;
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_VLANID)) {
key_tags = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_VLANID,
target_container);
key_tags->vlan_id = skb_vlan_tag_get_id(skb);
}
proto = vlan->h_vlan_encapsulated_proto;
nhoff += sizeof(*vlan);
goto again;
}
case htons(ETH_P_PPP_SES): {
struct {
struct pppoe_hdr hdr;
__be16 proto;
} *hdr, _hdr;
hdr = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_hdr), data, hlen, &_hdr);
if (!hdr)
return false;
proto = hdr->proto;
nhoff += PPPOE_SES_HLEN;
switch (proto) {
case htons(PPP_IP):
goto ip;
case htons(PPP_IPV6):
goto ipv6;
default:
return false;
}
}
case htons(ETH_P_TIPC): {
struct {
__be32 pre[3];
__be32 srcnode;
} *hdr, _hdr;
hdr = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_hdr), data, hlen, &_hdr);
if (!hdr)
return false;
key_basic->n_proto = proto;
key_control->thoff = (u16)nhoff;
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_TIPC_ADDRS)) {
key_addrs = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_TIPC_ADDRS,
target_container);
key_addrs->tipcaddrs.srcnode = hdr->srcnode;
key_control->addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_TIPC_ADDRS;
}
return true;
}
case htons(ETH_P_MPLS_UC):
case htons(ETH_P_MPLS_MC): {
struct mpls_label *hdr, _hdr[2];
mpls:
hdr = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_hdr), data,
hlen, &_hdr);
if (!hdr)
return false;
if ((ntohl(hdr[0].entry) & MPLS_LS_LABEL_MASK) >>
MPLS_LS_LABEL_SHIFT == MPLS_LABEL_ENTROPY) {
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_MPLS_ENTROPY)) {
key_keyid = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_MPLS_ENTROPY,
target_container);
key_keyid->keyid = hdr[1].entry &
htonl(MPLS_LS_LABEL_MASK);
}
key_basic->n_proto = proto;
key_basic->ip_proto = ip_proto;
key_control->thoff = (u16)nhoff;
return true;
}
return true;
}
case htons(ETH_P_FCOE):
key_control->thoff = (u16)(nhoff + FCOE_HEADER_LEN);
/* fall through */
default:
return false;
}
ip_proto_again:
switch (ip_proto) {
case IPPROTO_GRE: {
struct gre_hdr {
__be16 flags;
__be16 proto;
} *hdr, _hdr;
hdr = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_hdr), data, hlen, &_hdr);
if (!hdr)
return false;
/*
* Only look inside GRE if version zero and no
* routing
*/
if (hdr->flags & (GRE_VERSION | GRE_ROUTING))
break;
proto = hdr->proto;
nhoff += 4;
if (hdr->flags & GRE_CSUM)
nhoff += 4;
if (hdr->flags & GRE_KEY) {
const __be32 *keyid;
__be32 _keyid;
keyid = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_keyid),
data, hlen, &_keyid);
if (!keyid)
return false;
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_GRE_KEYID)) {
key_keyid = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_GRE_KEYID,
target_container);
key_keyid->keyid = *keyid;
}
nhoff += 4;
}
if (hdr->flags & GRE_SEQ)
nhoff += 4;
if (proto == htons(ETH_P_TEB)) {
const struct ethhdr *eth;
struct ethhdr _eth;
eth = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff,
sizeof(_eth),
data, hlen, &_eth);
if (!eth)
return false;
proto = eth->h_proto;
nhoff += sizeof(*eth);
}
goto again;
}
case NEXTHDR_HOP:
case NEXTHDR_ROUTING:
case NEXTHDR_DEST: {
u8 _opthdr[2], *opthdr;
if (proto != htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
break;
opthdr = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_opthdr),
data, hlen, &_opthdr);
if (!opthdr)
return false;
ip_proto = opthdr[0];
nhoff += (opthdr[1] + 1) << 3;
goto ip_proto_again;
}
case IPPROTO_IPIP:
proto = htons(ETH_P_IP);
goto ip;
case IPPROTO_IPV6:
proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
goto ipv6;
case IPPROTO_MPLS:
proto = htons(ETH_P_MPLS_UC);
goto mpls;
default:
break;
}
key_basic->n_proto = proto;
key_basic->ip_proto = ip_proto;
key_control->thoff = (u16)nhoff;
if (skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS)) {
key_ports = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS,
target_container);
key_ports->ports = __skb_flow_get_ports(skb, nhoff, ip_proto,
data, hlen);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The __skb_flow_dissect function in net/core/flow_dissector.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 does not ensure that n_proto, ip_proto, and thoff are initialized, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a single crafted MPLS packet.
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,785
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr function in hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) by leveraging failure to limit process IO loop to the ring size.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: explicit ElementsAccessorBase(const char* name)
: ElementsAccessor(name) { }
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: In CollectValuesOrEntriesImpl of elements.cc, there is possible remote code execution due to type confusion. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android. Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-111274046
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
|
Medium
| 174,095
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::~ProxyChannelDelegate() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,740
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: acc_ctx_cont(OM_uint32 *minstat,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin;
gss_OID supportedMech;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc;
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *ptr, *bufstart;
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*negState = REJECT;
*minstat = 0;
supportedMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*responseToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
ptr = bufstart = buf->value;
#define REMAIN (buf->length - (ptr - bufstart))
if (REMAIN > INT_MAX)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/*
* Attempt to work with old Sun SPNEGO.
*/
if (*ptr == HEADER_ID) {
ret = g_verify_token_header(gss_mech_spnego,
&len, &ptr, 0, REMAIN);
if (ret) {
*minstat = ret;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
}
if (*ptr != (CONTEXT | 0x01)) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ret = get_negTokenResp(minstat, ptr, REMAIN,
negState, &supportedMech,
responseToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
if (*responseToken == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER &&
*mechListMIC == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->firstpass = 0;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
cleanup:
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &supportedMech);
}
return ret;
#undef REMAIN
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The acc_ctx_cont function in the SPNEGO acceptor in lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.5.x through 1.12.x before 1.12.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an empty continuation token at a certain point during a SPNEGO negotiation.
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
|
Low
| 166,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
cache_filename[MaxTextExtent],
id[MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
*options;
const unsigned char
*p;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
LinkedListInfo
*profiles;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
length;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
signature;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
*id='\0';
(void) ResetMagickMemory(keyword,0,sizeof(keyword));
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Decode image header; header terminates one character beyond a ':'.
*/
profiles=(LinkedListInfo *) NULL;
length=MaxTextExtent;
options=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
signature=GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL);
image->depth=8;
image->compression=NoCompression;
while ((isgraph(c) != MagickFalse) && (c != (int) ':'))
{
register char
*p;
if (c == (int) '{')
{
char
*comment;
/*
Read comment-- any text between { }.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '\\')
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '}'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Get the keyword.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if (c == (int) '=')
break;
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (c != EOF);
*p='\0';
p=options;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '=')
{
/*
Get the keyword value.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while ((c != (int) '}') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-options+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
options=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(options,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*options));
if (options == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=options+strlen(options);
}
if (options == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '\\')
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '}')
{
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (*options != '{')
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
break;
}
}
*p='\0';
if (*options == '{')
(void) CopyMagickString(options,options+1,strlen(options));
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->background_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"border-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->border_color,
exception);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"class") == 0)
{
ssize_t
storage_class;
storage_class=ParseCommandOption(MagickClassOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (storage_class < 0)
break;
image->storage_class=(ClassType) storage_class;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
image->colors=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (colorspace < 0)
break;
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) colorspace;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compression") == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (compression < 0)
break;
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"columns") == 0)
{
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"delay") == 0)
{
image->delay=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dispose") == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (dispose < 0)
break;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endian") == 0)
{
ssize_t
endian;
endian=ParseCommandOption(MagickEndianOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (endian < 0)
break;
image->endian=(EndianType) endian;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"error") == 0)
{
image->error.mean_error_per_pixel=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(id,options,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"iterations") == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick-signature") == 0)
{
signature=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->matte_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maximum-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_maximum_error=StringToDouble(
options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mean-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_mean_error=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"montage") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image->montage,options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opaque") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"orientation") == 0)
{
ssize_t
orientation;
orientation=ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (orientation < 0)
break;
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"page") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pixel-intensity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (intensity < 0)
break;
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
break;
}
if ((LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile:",8) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile-",8) == 0))
{
if (profiles == (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
profiles=NewLinkedList(0);
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList(profiles,
AcquireString(keyword+8));
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,(size_t)
StringToLong(options));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProfile(image,keyword+8,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image->quality=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rendering-intent") == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
break;
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"resolution") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rows") == 0)
{
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scene") == 0)
{
image->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"ticks-per-second") == 0)
{
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) StringToLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile-offset") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"type") == 0)
{
ssize_t
type;
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickTypeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (type < 0)
break;
image->type=(ImageType) type;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'u':
case 'U':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"units") == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (units < 0)
break;
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'w':
case 'W':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white-point") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=
image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
}
}
else
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
options=DestroyString(options);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if ((LocaleCompare(id,"MagickCache") != 0) ||
(image->storage_class == UndefinedClass) ||
(image->compression == UndefinedCompression) || (image->columns == 0) ||
(image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (signature != GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"IncompatibleAPI");
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p;
/*
Image directory.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
image->directory=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
p=image->directory;
do
{
*p='\0';
if ((strlen(image->directory)+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
/*
Allocate more memory for the image directory.
*/
length<<=1;
image->directory=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(image->directory,
length+MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*image->directory));
if (image->directory == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=image->directory+strlen(image->directory);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
*p++=(char) c;
} while (c != (int) '\0');
}
if (profiles != (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
register unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read image profiles.
*/
ResetLinkedListIterator(profiles);
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
count=ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),p);
}
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
}
profiles=DestroyLinkedList(profiles,RelinquishMagickMemory);
}
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Create image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->colors != 0)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read image colormap from file.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (3UL*depth/8UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
packet_size*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=colormap;
switch (depth)
{
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageDepthNotSupported");
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Attach persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=PersistPixelCache(image,cache_filename,MagickTrue,&offset,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"UnableToPersistPixelCache");
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
do
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while ((isgraph(c) == MagickFalse) && (c != EOF));
if (c != EOF)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (c != EOF);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,583
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fill_autodev(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs)
{
int ret;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
int i;
mode_t cmask;
INFO("Creating initial consoles under container /dev");
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/dev", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) {
ERROR("Error calculating container /dev location");
return -1;
}
if (!dir_exists(path)) // ignore, just don't try to fill in
return 0;
INFO("Populating container /dev");
cmask = umask(S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(lxc_devs) / sizeof(lxc_devs[0]); i++) {
const struct lxc_devs *d = &lxc_devs[i];
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/dev/%s", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
ret = mknod(path, d->mode, makedev(d->maj, d->min));
if (ret && errno != EEXIST) {
char hostpath[MAXPATHLEN];
FILE *pathfile;
ret = snprintf(hostpath, MAXPATHLEN, "/dev/%s", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
pathfile = fopen(path, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create device mount target '%s'", path);
return -1;
}
fclose(pathfile);
if (mount(hostpath, path, 0, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) {
SYSERROR("Failed bind mounting device %s from host into container",
d->name);
return -1;
}
}
}
umask(cmask);
INFO("Populated container /dev");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MojoResult Core::UnwrapPlatformSharedBufferHandle(
MojoHandle mojo_handle,
MojoPlatformHandle* platform_handle,
size_t* size,
MojoSharedBufferGuid* guid,
MojoPlatformSharedBufferHandleFlags* flags) {
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher;
MojoResult result = MOJO_RESULT_OK;
{
base::AutoLock lock(handles_->GetLock());
result = handles_->GetAndRemoveDispatcher(mojo_handle, &dispatcher);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
}
if (dispatcher->GetType() != Dispatcher::Type::SHARED_BUFFER) {
dispatcher->Close();
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
SharedBufferDispatcher* shm_dispatcher =
static_cast<SharedBufferDispatcher*>(dispatcher.get());
scoped_refptr<PlatformSharedBuffer> platform_shared_buffer =
shm_dispatcher->PassPlatformSharedBuffer();
DCHECK(platform_shared_buffer);
DCHECK(size);
*size = platform_shared_buffer->GetNumBytes();
base::UnguessableToken token = platform_shared_buffer->GetGUID();
guid->high = token.GetHighForSerialization();
guid->low = token.GetLowForSerialization();
DCHECK(flags);
*flags = MOJO_PLATFORM_SHARED_BUFFER_HANDLE_FLAG_NONE;
if (platform_shared_buffer->IsReadOnly())
*flags |= MOJO_PLATFORM_SHARED_BUFFER_HANDLE_FLAG_READ_ONLY;
ScopedPlatformHandle handle = platform_shared_buffer->PassPlatformHandle();
return ScopedPlatformHandleToMojoPlatformHandle(std::move(handle),
platform_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,882
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int cur, l;
const xmlChar *target;
xmlParserInputState state;
int count = 0;
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) {
xmlParserInputPtr input = ctxt->input;
state = ctxt->instate;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PI;
/*
* this is a Processing Instruction.
*/
SKIP(2);
SHRINK;
/*
* Parse the target name and check for special support like
* namespace.
*/
target = xmlParsePITarget(ctxt);
if (target != NULL) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"PI declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
SKIP(2);
/*
* SAX: PI detected.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->processingInstruction != NULL))
ctxt->sax->processingInstruction(ctxt->userData,
target, NULL);
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
cur = CUR;
if (!IS_BLANK(cur)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"ParsePI: PI %s space expected\n", target);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (IS_CHAR(cur) && /* checked */
((cur != '?') || (NXT(1) != '>'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,cur);
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0) {
SHRINK;
GROW;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != '?') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
"ParsePI: PI %s never end ...\n", target);
} else {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"PI declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
SKIP(2);
#ifdef LIBXML_CATALOG_ENABLED
if (((state == XML_PARSER_MISC) ||
(state == XML_PARSER_START)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(target, XML_CATALOG_PI))) {
xmlCatalogAllow allow = xmlCatalogGetDefaults();
if ((allow == XML_CATA_ALLOW_DOCUMENT) ||
(allow == XML_CATA_ALLOW_ALL))
xmlParseCatalogPI(ctxt, buf);
}
#endif
/*
* SAX: PI detected.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->processingInstruction != NULL))
ctxt->sax->processingInstruction(ctxt->userData,
target, buf);
}
xmlFree(buf);
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
}
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)
ctxt->instate = state;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_handle_bc_reply(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
struct xdr_buf *rcvbuf)
{
struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt = rpcx_to_rdmax(xprt);
struct kvec *dst, *src = &rcvbuf->head[0];
struct rpc_rqst *req;
unsigned long cwnd;
u32 credits;
size_t len;
__be32 xid;
__be32 *p;
int ret;
p = (__be32 *)src->iov_base;
len = src->iov_len;
xid = rmsgp->rm_xid;
#ifdef SVCRDMA_BACKCHANNEL_DEBUG
pr_info("%s: xid=%08x, length=%zu\n",
__func__, be32_to_cpu(xid), len);
pr_info("%s: RPC/RDMA: %*ph\n",
__func__, (int)RPCRDMA_HDRLEN_MIN, rmsgp);
pr_info("%s: RPC: %*ph\n",
__func__, (int)len, p);
#endif
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (src->iov_len < 24)
goto out_shortreply;
spin_lock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock);
req = xprt_lookup_rqst(xprt, xid);
if (!req)
goto out_notfound;
dst = &req->rq_private_buf.head[0];
memcpy(&req->rq_private_buf, &req->rq_rcv_buf, sizeof(struct xdr_buf));
if (dst->iov_len < len)
goto out_unlock;
memcpy(dst->iov_base, p, len);
credits = be32_to_cpu(rmsgp->rm_credit);
if (credits == 0)
credits = 1; /* don't deadlock */
else if (credits > r_xprt->rx_buf.rb_bc_max_requests)
credits = r_xprt->rx_buf.rb_bc_max_requests;
cwnd = xprt->cwnd;
xprt->cwnd = credits << RPC_CWNDSHIFT;
if (xprt->cwnd > cwnd)
xprt_release_rqst_cong(req->rq_task);
ret = 0;
xprt_complete_rqst(req->rq_task, rcvbuf->len);
rcvbuf->len = 0;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock);
out:
return ret;
out_shortreply:
dprintk("svcrdma: short bc reply: xprt=%p, len=%zu\n",
xprt, src->iov_len);
goto out;
out_notfound:
dprintk("svcrdma: unrecognized bc reply: xprt=%p, xid=%08x\n",
xprt, be32_to_cpu(xid));
goto out_unlock;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,158
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Moved EOF check.
|
Medium
| 170,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int cipso_v4_req_setattr(struct request_sock *req,
const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int ret_val = -EPERM;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
u32 buf_len;
u32 opt_len;
struct ip_options *opt = NULL;
struct inet_request_sock *req_inet;
/* We allocate the maximum CIPSO option size here so we are probably
* being a little wasteful, but it makes our life _much_ easier later
* on and after all we are only talking about 40 bytes. */
buf_len = CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX;
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (buf == NULL) {
ret_val = -ENOMEM;
goto req_setattr_failure;
}
ret_val = cipso_v4_genopt(buf, buf_len, doi_def, secattr);
if (ret_val < 0)
goto req_setattr_failure;
buf_len = ret_val;
/* We can't use ip_options_get() directly because it makes a call to
* ip_options_get_alloc() which allocates memory with GFP_KERNEL and
* we won't always have CAP_NET_RAW even though we _always_ want to
* set the IPOPT_CIPSO option. */
opt_len = (buf_len + 3) & ~3;
opt = kzalloc(sizeof(*opt) + opt_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (opt == NULL) {
ret_val = -ENOMEM;
goto req_setattr_failure;
}
memcpy(opt->__data, buf, buf_len);
opt->optlen = opt_len;
opt->cipso = sizeof(struct iphdr);
kfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
req_inet = inet_rsk(req);
opt = xchg(&req_inet->opt, opt);
kfree(opt);
return 0;
req_setattr_failure:
kfree(buf);
kfree(opt);
return ret_val;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
uint64_t maxFrameNumber = data.readUint64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen, maxFrameNumber);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = -1;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = static_cast<uint64_t>(data.readInt64());
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(static_cast<int64_t>(slotMask));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(width, height);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
PixelFormat defaultFormat = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_DATA_SPACE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
android_dataspace defaultDataSpace =
static_cast<android_dataspace>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferDataSpace(defaultDataSpace);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream = getSidebandStream();
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(stream != NULL));
if (stream != NULL) {
reply->writeNativeHandle(stream->handle());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not initialize certain data structures, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, related to IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp and IGraphicBufferProducer.cpp, aka internal bug 27555981.
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
|
Medium
| 173,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
if (prep_frame_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->GetWebView())
return;
blink::WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
blink::WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
blink::WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
blink::WebLocalFrame* plugin_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
blink::WebElement plugin_element = pdf_element;
if (pdf_element.hasHTMLTagName("iframe")) {
plugin_frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::fromFrameOwnerElement(pdf_element);
plugin_element = delegate_->GetPdfElement(plugin_frame);
if (plugin_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
base::AutoReset<bool> set_printing_flag(&print_for_preview_, true);
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(plugin_frame, plugin_element, job_settings)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
print_params.printable_area = gfx::Rect(print_params.page_size);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(plugin_frame, plugin_element)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
|
Low
| 171,873
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
const gfx::GLSurfaceHandle& handle) {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return;
}
context_->deleteTexture(handle.parent_texture_id[0]);
context_->deleteTexture(handle.parent_texture_id[1]);
context_->finish();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PrimitiveInfo *TraceStrokePolygon(const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
typedef struct _LineSegment
{
double
p,
q;
} LineSegment;
LineSegment
dx,
dy,
inverse_slope,
slope,
theta;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
double
delta_theta,
dot_product,
mid,
miterlimit;
PointInfo
box_p[5],
box_q[5],
center,
offset,
*path_p,
*path_q;
PrimitiveInfo
*polygon_primitive,
*stroke_polygon;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments,
max_strokes,
number_vertices;
ssize_t
j,
n,
p,
q;
/*
Allocate paths.
*/
number_vertices=primitive_info->coordinates;
max_strokes=2*number_vertices+6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
number_vertices+2UL,sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL) ||
(polygon_primitive == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL))
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(polygon_primitive,primitive_info,(size_t)
number_vertices*sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
closed_path=
(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.x == primitive_info[0].point.x) &&
(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.y == primitive_info[0].point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin) ||
((draw_info->linejoin == MiterJoin) && (closed_path != MagickFalse)))
{
polygon_primitive[number_vertices]=primitive_info[1];
number_vertices++;
}
polygon_primitive[number_vertices].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
/*
Compute the slope for the first line segment, p.
*/
dx.p=0.0;
dy.p=0.0;
for (n=1; n < (ssize_t) number_vertices; n++)
{
dx.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-polygon_primitive[0].point.x;
dy.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-polygon_primitive[0].point.y;
if ((fabs(dx.p) >= MagickEpsilon) || (fabs(dy.p) >= MagickEpsilon))
break;
}
if (n == (ssize_t) number_vertices)
n=(ssize_t) number_vertices-1L;
slope.p=DrawEpsilonReciprocal(dx.p)*dy.p;
inverse_slope.p=(-1.0*DrawEpsilonReciprocal(slope.p));
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
miterlimit=(double) (draw_info->miterlimit*draw_info->miterlimit*
mid*mid);
if ((draw_info->linecap == SquareCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
TraceSquareLinecap(polygon_primitive,number_vertices,mid);
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.p*inverse_slope.p+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.p);
if ((dy.p*offset.x-dx.p*offset.y) > 0.0)
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
}
else
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
}
/*
Create strokes for the line join attribute: bevel, miter, round.
*/
p=0;
q=0;
path_q[p++]=box_q[0];
path_p[q++]=box_p[0];
for (i=(ssize_t) n+1; i < (ssize_t) number_vertices; i++)
{
/*
Compute the slope for this line segment, q.
*/
dx.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-polygon_primitive[n].point.x;
dy.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-polygon_primitive[n].point.y;
dot_product=dx.q*dx.q+dy.q*dy.q;
if (dot_product < 0.25)
continue;
slope.q=DrawEpsilonReciprocal(dx.q)*dy.q;
inverse_slope.q=(-1.0*DrawEpsilonReciprocal(slope.q));
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.q*inverse_slope.q+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.q);
dot_product=dy.q*offset.x-dx.q*offset.y;
if (dot_product > 0.0)
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
}
else
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
}
if (fabs((double) (slope.p-slope.q)) < MagickEpsilon)
{
box_p[4]=box_p[1];
box_q[4]=box_q[1];
}
else
{
box_p[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_p[0].x-box_p[0].y-slope.q*box_p[3].x+
box_p[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_p[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_p[4].x-box_p[0].x)+box_p[0].y);
box_q[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_q[0].x-box_q[0].y-slope.q*box_q[3].x+
box_q[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_q[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_q[4].x-box_q[0].x)+box_q[0].y);
}
if (q >= (ssize_t) (max_strokes-6*BezierQuantum-360))
{
max_strokes+=6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_p,(size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_q,(size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL))
{
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
}
}
dot_product=dx.q*dy.p-dx.p*dy.q;
if (dot_product <= 0.0)
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_q[1].y-center.y,box_q[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_q[2].y-center.y,box_q[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.q < theta.p)
theta.q+=(double) (2.0*MagickPI);
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.q-theta.p)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_q[q].x=box_q[1].x;
path_q[q].y=box_q[1].y;
q++;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_q[q].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_q[q].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
q++;
}
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
else
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_p[1].y-center.y,box_p[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_p[2].y-center.y,box_p[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.p < theta.q)
theta.p+=(double) (2.0*MagickPI);
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.p-theta.q)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_p[p].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_p[p].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p++;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
slope.p=slope.q;
inverse_slope.p=inverse_slope.q;
box_p[0]=box_p[2];
box_p[1]=box_p[3];
box_q[0]=box_q[2];
box_q[1]=box_q[3];
dx.p=dx.q;
dy.p=dy.q;
n=i;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
/*
Trace stroked polygon.
*/
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(p+q+2UL*closed_path+2UL),sizeof(*stroke_polygon));
if (stroke_polygon != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) p; i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_p[i];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (p+q+closed_path); i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_q[p+q+closed_path-(i+1)];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[p+closed_path].point;
i++;
}
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
stroke_polygon[i].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
stroke_polygon[0].coordinates=(size_t) (p+q+2*closed_path+1);
}
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return(stroke_polygon);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DrawImage function in MagickCore/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 and 7.x before 7.0.1-2 makes an incorrect function call in attempting to locate the next token, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
|
Low
| 167,249
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
CHECK(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree));
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: net/http/http_stream_parser.cc in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 does not properly process HTTP Informational (aka 1xx) status codes, which allows remote web servers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted response.
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
|
Low
| 171,161
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __net_init sctp_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int status;
/*
* 14. Suggested SCTP Protocol Parameter Values
*/
/* The following protocol parameters are RECOMMENDED: */
/* RTO.Initial - 3 seconds */
net->sctp.rto_initial = SCTP_RTO_INITIAL;
/* RTO.Min - 1 second */
net->sctp.rto_min = SCTP_RTO_MIN;
/* RTO.Max - 60 seconds */
net->sctp.rto_max = SCTP_RTO_MAX;
/* RTO.Alpha - 1/8 */
net->sctp.rto_alpha = SCTP_RTO_ALPHA;
/* RTO.Beta - 1/4 */
net->sctp.rto_beta = SCTP_RTO_BETA;
/* Valid.Cookie.Life - 60 seconds */
net->sctp.valid_cookie_life = SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_LIFE;
/* Whether Cookie Preservative is enabled(1) or not(0) */
net->sctp.cookie_preserve_enable = 1;
/* Default sctp sockets to use md5 as their hmac alg */
#if defined (CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_MD5)
net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg = "md5";
#elif defined (CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_SHA1)
net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg = "sha1";
#else
net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg = NULL;
#endif
/* Max.Burst - 4 */
net->sctp.max_burst = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAX_BURST;
/* Association.Max.Retrans - 10 attempts
* Path.Max.Retrans - 5 attempts (per destination address)
* Max.Init.Retransmits - 8 attempts
*/
net->sctp.max_retrans_association = 10;
net->sctp.max_retrans_path = 5;
net->sctp.max_retrans_init = 8;
/* Sendbuffer growth - do per-socket accounting */
net->sctp.sndbuf_policy = 0;
/* Rcvbuffer growth - do per-socket accounting */
net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy = 0;
/* HB.interval - 30 seconds */
net->sctp.hb_interval = SCTP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_HEARTBEAT;
/* delayed SACK timeout */
net->sctp.sack_timeout = SCTP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SACK;
/* Disable ADDIP by default. */
net->sctp.addip_enable = 0;
net->sctp.addip_noauth = 0;
net->sctp.default_auto_asconf = 0;
/* Enable PR-SCTP by default. */
net->sctp.prsctp_enable = 1;
/* Disable AUTH by default. */
net->sctp.auth_enable = 0;
/* Set SCOPE policy to enabled */
net->sctp.scope_policy = SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_ENABLE;
/* Set the default rwnd update threshold */
net->sctp.rwnd_upd_shift = SCTP_DEFAULT_RWND_SHIFT;
/* Initialize maximum autoclose timeout. */
net->sctp.max_autoclose = INT_MAX / HZ;
status = sctp_sysctl_net_register(net);
if (status)
goto err_sysctl_register;
/* Allocate and initialise sctp mibs. */
status = init_sctp_mibs(net);
if (status)
goto err_init_mibs;
/* Initialize proc fs directory. */
status = sctp_proc_init(net);
if (status)
goto err_init_proc;
sctp_dbg_objcnt_init(net);
/* Initialize the control inode/socket for handling OOTB packets. */
if ((status = sctp_ctl_sock_init(net))) {
pr_err("Failed to initialize the SCTP control sock\n");
goto err_ctl_sock_init;
}
/* Initialize the local address list. */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->sctp.local_addr_list);
spin_lock_init(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
sctp_get_local_addr_list(net);
/* Initialize the address event list */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->sctp.addr_waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
spin_lock_init(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
net->sctp.addr_wq_timer.expires = 0;
setup_timer(&net->sctp.addr_wq_timer, sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler,
(unsigned long)net);
return 0;
err_ctl_sock_init:
sctp_dbg_objcnt_exit(net);
sctp_proc_exit(net);
err_init_proc:
cleanup_sctp_mibs(net);
err_init_mibs:
sctp_sysctl_net_unregister(net);
err_sysctl_register:
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sctp_init function in net/sctp/protocol.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.3 has an incorrect sequence of protocol-initialization steps, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic or memory corruption) by creating SCTP sockets before all of the steps have finished.
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static char *print_string_ptr( const char *str )
{
const char *ptr;
char *ptr2, *out;
int len = 0;
unsigned char token;
if ( ! str )
return cJSON_strdup( "" );
ptr = str;
while ( ( token = *ptr ) && ++len ) {
if ( strchr( "\"\\\b\f\n\r\t", token ) )
++len;
else if ( token < 32 )
len += 5;
++ptr;
}
if ( ! ( out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len + 3 ) ) )
return 0;
ptr2 = out;
ptr = str;
*ptr2++ = '\"';
while ( *ptr ) {
if ( (unsigned char) *ptr > 31 && *ptr != '\"' && *ptr != '\\' )
*ptr2++ = *ptr++;
else {
*ptr2++ = '\\';
switch ( token = *ptr++ ) {
case '\\': *ptr2++ = '\\'; break;
case '\"': *ptr2++ = '\"'; break;
case '\b': *ptr2++ = 'b'; break;
case '\f': *ptr2++ = 'f'; break;
case '\n': *ptr2++ = 'n'; break;
case '\r': *ptr2++ = 'r'; break;
case '\t': *ptr2++ = 't'; break;
default:
/* Escape and print. */
sprintf( ptr2, "u%04x", token );
ptr2 += 5;
break;
}
}
}
*ptr2++ = '\"';
*ptr2++ = 0;
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ims_pcu_parse_cdc_data(struct usb_interface *intf, struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
const struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
union_desc = ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(intf);
if (!union_desc)
return -EINVAL;
pcu->ctrl_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bMasterInterface0);
alt = pcu->ctrl_intf->cur_altsetting;
pcu->ep_ctrl = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
pcu->max_ctrl_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_ctrl);
pcu->data_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bSlaveInterface0);
alt = pcu->data_intf->cur_altsetting;
if (alt->desc.bNumEndpoints != 2) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Incorrect number of endpoints on data interface (%d)\n",
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_out = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(pcu->ep_out)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"First endpoint on data interface is not BULK OUT\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_out_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_out);
if (pcu->max_out_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max OUT packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_out_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_in = &alt->endpoint[1].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(pcu->ep_in)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Second endpoint on data interface is not BULK IN\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_in_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_in);
if (pcu->max_in_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max IN packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_in_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ims_pcu_parse_cdc_data function in drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a USB device without both a master and a slave interface.
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 167,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
/* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
|
Medium
| 169,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Track::~Track()
{
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete [] content_encoding_entries_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,472
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackgroundFill(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
bool paint_hover_effect,
SkColor active_color,
SkColor inactive_color,
int fill_id,
int y_inset) const {
const SkPath fill_path =
GetPath(PathType::kFill, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
const float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
canvas->ClipPath(fill_path, true);
if (active || !fill_id) {
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(active ? active_color : inactive_color);
canvas->DrawRect(gfx::ScaleToEnclosingRect(tab_->GetLocalBounds(), scale),
flags);
}
if (fill_id) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scale_scoper(canvas);
canvas->sk_canvas()->scale(scale, scale);
canvas->TileImageInt(*tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetImageSkiaNamed(fill_id),
tab_->GetMirroredX() + tab_->background_offset(), 0, 0,
y_inset, tab_->width(), tab_->height());
}
if (paint_hover_effect) {
SkPoint hover_location(gfx::PointToSkPoint(hover_controller_->location()));
hover_location.scale(SkFloatToScalar(scale));
const SkScalar kMinHoverRadius = 16;
const SkScalar radius =
std::max(SkFloatToScalar(tab_->width() / 4.f), kMinHoverRadius);
DrawHighlight(canvas, hover_location, radius * scale,
SkColorSetA(active_color, hover_controller_->GetAlpha()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,526
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TabStyle::TabColors GM2TabStyle::CalculateColors() const {
const ui::ThemeProvider* theme_provider = tab_->GetThemeProvider();
constexpr float kMinimumActiveContrastRatio = 6.05f;
constexpr float kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio = 4.61f;
constexpr float kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio = 5.02f;
constexpr float kMinimumPressedContrastRatio = 4.41f;
float expected_opacity = 0.0f;
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
expected_opacity = 1.0f;
} else if (tab_->IsSelected()) {
expected_opacity = kSelectedTabOpacity;
} else if (tab_->mouse_hovered()) {
expected_opacity = GetHoverOpacity();
}
const SkColor bg_color = color_utils::AlphaBlend(
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE),
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE),
expected_opacity);
SkColor title_color = tab_->controller()->GetTabForegroundColor(
expected_opacity > 0.5f ? TAB_ACTIVE : TAB_INACTIVE, bg_color);
title_color = color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color, bg_color);
const SkColor base_hovered_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_HOVER);
const SkColor base_pressed_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_PRESSED);
const auto get_color_for_contrast_ratio = [](SkColor fg_color,
SkColor bg_color,
float contrast_ratio) {
const SkAlpha blend_alpha = color_utils::GetBlendValueWithMinimumContrast(
bg_color, fg_color, bg_color, contrast_ratio);
return color_utils::AlphaBlend(fg_color, bg_color, blend_alpha);
};
const SkColor generated_icon_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
title_color, bg_color,
tab_->IsActive() ? kMinimumActiveContrastRatio
: kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_hovered_color, bg_color, kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_pressed_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_pressed_color, bg_color, kMinimumPressedContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_hovered_color);
const SkColor generated_pressed_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_pressed_color);
return {bg_color,
title_color,
generated_icon_color,
generated_hovered_icon_color,
generated_pressed_icon_color,
generated_hovered_color,
generated_pressed_color};
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Medium
| 172,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
{
struct timer_rec_s *timer = data;
timer_expired = TRUE;
crm_err("Call %d timed out after %ds", timer->call_id, timer->timeout);
/* Always return TRUE, never remove the handler
* We do that after the while-loop in cib_native_perform_op()
*/
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseCharRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
unsigned int val = 0;
int count = 0;
unsigned int outofrange = 0;
/*
* Using RAW/CUR/NEXT is okay since we are working on ASCII range here
*/
if ((RAW == '&') && (NXT(1) == '#') &&
(NXT(2) == 'x')) {
SKIP(3);
GROW;
while (RAW != ';') { /* loop blocked by count */
if (count++ > 20) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW >= '0') && (RAW <= '9'))
val = val * 16 + (CUR - '0');
else if ((RAW >= 'a') && (RAW <= 'f') && (count < 20))
val = val * 16 + (CUR - 'a') + 10;
else if ((RAW >= 'A') && (RAW <= 'F') && (count < 20))
val = val * 16 + (CUR - 'A') + 10;
else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_HEX_CHARREF, NULL);
val = 0;
break;
}
if (val > 0x10FFFF)
outofrange = val;
NEXT;
count++;
}
if (RAW == ';') {
/* on purpose to avoid reentrancy problems with NEXT and SKIP */
ctxt->input->col++;
ctxt->nbChars ++;
ctxt->input->cur++;
}
} else if ((RAW == '&') && (NXT(1) == '#')) {
SKIP(2);
GROW;
while (RAW != ';') { /* loop blocked by count */
if (count++ > 20) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW >= '0') && (RAW <= '9'))
val = val * 10 + (CUR - '0');
else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_DEC_CHARREF, NULL);
val = 0;
break;
}
if (val > 0x10FFFF)
outofrange = val;
NEXT;
count++;
}
if (RAW == ';') {
/* on purpose to avoid reentrancy problems with NEXT and SKIP */
ctxt->input->col++;
ctxt->nbChars ++;
ctxt->input->cur++;
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHARREF, NULL);
}
/*
* [ WFC: Legal Character ]
* Characters referred to using character references must match the
* production for Char.
*/
if ((IS_CHAR(val) && (outofrange == 0))) {
return(val);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseCharRef: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
val);
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __glXDispSwap_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->context);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->visual);
return __glXDisp_CreateContext(cl, pc);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The GLX extension in X.Org xserver 1.7.7 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (server crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via (1) a crafted request that triggers a client swap in glx/glxcmdsswap.c; or (2) a crafted length or (3) a negative value in the screen field in a request to glx/glxcmds.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,269
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*alpha_image,
*color_image,
*image,
*jng_image;
ImageInfo
*alpha_image_info,
*color_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
int
unique_filenames;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
png_uint_32
jng_height,
jng_width;
png_byte
jng_color_type,
jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method,
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method;
register const PixelPacket
*s;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
read_JSEP,
reading_idat;
size_t
length;
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
jng_color_type=0;
jng_height=0;
jng_width=0;
alpha_image=(Image *) NULL;
color_image=(Image *) NULL;
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
unique_filenames=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneJNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireNextImage()");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
/*
Signature bytes have already been read.
*/
read_JSEP=MagickFalse;
reading_idat=MagickFalse;
for (;;)
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned char
*chunk;
unsigned int
count;
/*
Read a new JNG chunk.
*/
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(unsigned int) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading JNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX || count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 16)
{
jng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
jng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if ((jng_width == 0) || (jng_height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
jng_color_type=p[8];
jng_image_sample_depth=p[9];
jng_image_compression_method=p[10];
jng_image_interlace_method=p[11];
image->interlace=jng_image_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=p[12];
jng_alpha_compression_method=p[13];
jng_alpha_filter_method=p[14];
jng_alpha_interlace_method=p[15];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_width: %16lu, jng_height: %16lu\n"
" jng_color_type: %16d, jng_image_sample_depth: %3d\n"
" jng_image_compression_method:%3d",
(unsigned long) jng_width, (unsigned long) jng_height,
jng_color_type, jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_image_interlace_method: %3d"
" jng_alpha_sample_depth: %3d",
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_alpha_compression_method:%3d\n"
" jng_alpha_filter_method: %3d\n"
" jng_alpha_interlace_method: %3d",
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((reading_idat == MagickFalse) && (read_JSEP == MagickFalse) &&
((memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0) ||
(memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0)))
{
/*
o create color_image
o open color_blob, attached to color_image
o if (color type has alpha)
open alpha_blob, attached to alpha_image
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating color_blob.");
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetImageInfo(color_image_info);
color_image=AcquireImage(color_image_info);
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(color_image_info,color_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (jng_color_type >= 12))
{
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (alpha_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
GetImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
alpha_image=AcquireImage(alpha_image_info);
if (alpha_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating alpha_blob.");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(alpha_image_info,alpha_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
unsigned char
data[18];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing IHDR chunk to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,8,(const unsigned char *)
"\211PNG\r\n\032\n");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,13L);
PNGType(data,mng_IHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IHDR,13L);
PNGLong(data+4,jng_width);
PNGLong(data+8,jng_height);
data[12]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
data[13]=0; /* color_type gray */
data[14]=0; /* compression method 0 */
data[15]=0; /* filter_method 0 */
data[16]=0; /* interlace_method 0 */
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,17,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,17));
}
}
reading_idat=MagickTrue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0)
{
/* Copy chunk to color_image->blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAT chunk data to color_blob.");
if (length != 0)
{
(void) WriteBlob(color_image,length,chunk);
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
}
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
/* Copy IDAT header and chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying IDAT chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(data,mng_IDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,
crc32(crc32(0,data,4),chunk,(uInt) length));
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0))
{
/* Copy chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAA chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JSEP,4) == 0)
{
read_JSEP=MagickTrue;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 2)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=image->background_color.red;
image->background_color.blue=image->background_color.red;
}
if (length == 6)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[3]);
image->background_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[5]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
image->gamma=((float) mng_get_long(p))*0.00001;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 32)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[12]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[16]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[20]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[24]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[28]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 1)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_oFFs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(p);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] != 0)
{
image->page.x/=10000;
image->page.y/=10000;
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->x_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(p);
image->y_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=image->x_resolution/100.0f;
image->y_resolution=image->y_resolution/100.0f;
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if 0
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#endif
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4))
continue;
break;
}
/* IEND found */
/*
Finish up reading image data:
o read main image from color_blob.
o close color_blob.
o if (color_type has alpha)
if alpha_encoding is PNG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadPNG
if alpha_encoding is JPEG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadJPEG
o close alpha_blob.
o copy intensity of secondary image into
opacity samples of main image.
o destroy the secondary image.
*/
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
assert(color_image == (Image *) NULL);
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SeekBlob(color_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading jng_image from color_blob.");
assert(color_image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(color_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
color_image->filename);
color_image_info->ping=MagickFalse; /* To do: avoid this */
jng_image=ReadImage(color_image_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
color_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(color_image_info);
if (jng_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying jng_image pixels to main image.");
image->columns=jng_width;
image->rows=jng_height;
length=image->columns*sizeof(PixelPacket);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,s,length);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (jng_color_type >= 12)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,0x00000000L);
PNGType(data,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0L);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,4));
}
(void) SeekBlob(alpha_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading opacity from alpha_blob.");
(void) FormatLocaleString(alpha_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",alpha_image->filename);
jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
SetPixelOpacity(q,QuantumRange-
GetPixelRed(s));
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,GetPixelRed(s));
if (GetPixelOpacity(q) != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
}
}
/* Read the JNG image. */
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=jng_width;
mng_info->mng_height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.width == 0 && image->page.height == 0)
{
image->page.width=jng_width;
image->page.height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.x == 0 && image->page.y == 0)
{
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[mng_info->object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
mng_info->image_found++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,2*TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 has a memory leak vulnerability in ReadOneJNGImage in coderspng.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/550
|
Medium
| 167,981
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
int err = 1;
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
bool setting_SaveFullCore;
bool setting_CreateCoreBacktrace;
bool setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData;
bool setting_StandaloneHook;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveFullCore");
setting_SaveFullCore = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "CreateCoreBacktrace");
setting_CreateCoreBacktrace = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveContainerizedPackageData");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = value && string_to_bool(value);
/* Do not call abrt-action-save-package-data with process's root, if ExploreChroots is disabled. */
if (!g_settings_explorechroots)
{
if (setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData)
log_warning("Ignoring SaveContainerizedPackageData because ExploreChroots is disabled");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = false;
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "StandaloneHook");
setting_StandaloneHook = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--config-test"))
return test_configuration(setting_SaveFullCore, setting_CreateCoreBacktrace);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %P %i*/
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME GLOBAL_PID [TID]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t local_pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || local_pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
const char *global_pid_str = argv[8];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[8]);
pid_t tid = -1;
const char *tid_str = argv[9];
if (tid_str)
{
tid = xatoi_positive(tid_str);
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
char *executable = get_executable(pid);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
char *proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid(proc_pid_status);
if (tmp_fsuid < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Uid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
const int fsgid = get_fsgid(proc_pid_status);
if (fsgid < 0)
error_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Gid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
int user_core_fd = -1;
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, fsgid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *signame = NULL;
if (!signal_is_fatal(signal_no, &signame))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); // not a signal we care about
const int abrtd_running = daemon_is_ok();
if (!setting_StandaloneHook && !abrtd_running)
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
if (setting_StandaloneHook)
ensure_writable_dir(g_settings_dump_location, DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION_MODE, "abrt");
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
if (g_settings_debug_level == 0)
{
log_warning("Ignoring crash of %s (SIG%s).",
executable, signame ? signame : signal_str);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
err = 0;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* If you don't want to have fs owner as root then:
*
* - use fsuid instead of uid for fs owner, so we don't expose any
* sensitive information of suided app in /var/(tmp|spool)/abrt
*
* - use dd_create_skeleton() and dd_reset_ownership(), when you finish
* creating the new dump directory, to prevent the real owner to write to
* the directory until the hook is done (avoid race conditions and defend
* hard and symbolic link attacs)
*/
dd = dd_create(path, /*fs owner*/0, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("root");
/* What's wrong on using /proc/[pid]/root every time ?*/
/* It creates os_info_in_root_dir for all crashes. */
char *rootdir = process_has_own_root(pid) ? get_rootdir(pid) : NULL;
/* Reading data from an arbitrary root directory is not secure. */
if (g_settings_explorechroots)
{
/* Yes, test 'rootdir' but use 'source_filename' because 'rootdir' can
* be '/' for a process with own namespace. 'source_filename' is /proc/[pid]/root. */
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir != NULL) ? source_filename : NULL);
}
else
{
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
}
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MAPS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_LIMITS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_CGROUP, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "mountinfo");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MOUNTINFO, source_filename);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd");
dump_fd_info_ext(dest_filename, source_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_NAMESPACES);
dump_namespace_diff_ext(dest_filename, 1, pid, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
char *tmp = NULL;
get_env_variable(pid, "container", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER, tmp);
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
}
get_env_variable(pid, "container_uuid", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_UUID, tmp);
free(tmp);
}
/* There's no need to compare mount namespaces and search for '/' in
* mountifo. Comparison of inodes of '/proc/[pid]/root' and '/' works
* fine. If those inodes do not equal each other, we have to verify
* that '/proc/[pid]/root' is not a symlink to a chroot.
*/
const int containerized = (rootdir != NULL && strcmp(rootdir, "/") == 0);
if (containerized)
{
log_debug("Process %d is considered to be containerized", pid);
pid_t container_pid;
if (get_pid_of_container(pid, &container_pid) == 0)
{
char *container_cmdline = get_cmdline(container_pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_CMDLINE, container_cmdline);
free(container_cmdline);
}
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "abrt-ccpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_GLOBAL_PID, global_pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (tid_str)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TID, tid_str);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
free(rootdir);
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
/* In case of errors, treat the process as if it has locked memory */
long unsigned lck_bytes = ULONG_MAX;
const char *vmlck = strstr(proc_pid_status, "VmLck:");
if (vmlck == NULL)
error_msg("/proc/%s/status does not contain 'VmLck:' line", pid_str);
else if (1 != sscanf(vmlck + 6, "%lu kB\n", &lck_bytes))
error_msg("Failed to parse 'VmLck:' line in /proc/%s/status", pid_str);
if (lck_bytes)
{
log_notice("Process %s of user %lu has locked memory",
pid_str, (long unsigned)uid);
dd_mark_as_notreportable(dd, "The process had locked memory "
"which usually indicates efforts to protect sensitive "
"data (passwords) from being written to disk.\n"
"In order to avoid sensitive information leakages, "
"ABRT will not allow you to report this problem to "
"bug tracking tools");
}
if (setting_SaveBinaryImage)
{
if (save_crashing_binary(pid, dd))
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
off_t core_size = 0;
if (setting_SaveFullCore)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
close_user_core(user_core_fd, core_size);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg("Error writing '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
else
{
/* User core is created even if WriteFullCore is off. */
create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* User core is either written or closed */
user_core_fd = -1;
/*
* ! No other errors should cause removal of the user core !
*/
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* Perform crash-time unwind of the guilty thread. */
if (tid > 0 && setting_CreateCoreBacktrace)
create_core_backtrace(tid, executable, signal_no, dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
dd = NULL;
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
if (abrtd_running && setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData && containerized)
{ /* Do we really need to run rpm from core_pattern hook? */
sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
const char *cmd_args[6];
cmd_args[0] = BIN_DIR"/abrt-action-save-package-data";
cmd_args[1] = "-d";
cmd_args[2] = path;
cmd_args[3] = "-r";
cmd_args[4] = source_filename;
cmd_args[5] = NULL;
pid_t pid = fork_execv_on_steroids(0, (char **)cmd_args, NULL, NULL, path, 0);
int stat;
safe_waitpid(pid, &stat, 0);
}
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
if (core_size > 0)
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)",
(long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (abrtd_running)
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
err = 0;
}
else
{
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
cleanup_and_exit:
if (dd)
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*only files*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: The abrt-hook-ccpp help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users with certain permissions to gain privileges via a symlink attack on a file with a predictable name, as demonstrated by /var/tmp/abrt/abrt-hax-coredump or /var/spool/abrt/abrt-hax-coredump.
Commit Message: ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files
Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a
process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in
DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink,
the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target.
Addresses CVE-2015-5287
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int _mkp_stage_30(struct plugin *p,
struct client_session *cs,
struct session_request *sr)
{
mk_ptr_t referer;
(void) p;
(void) cs;
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Mandril validating URL", cs->socket);
if (mk_security_check_url(sr->uri) < 0) {
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Close connection, blocked URL", cs->socket);
mk_api->header_set_http_status(sr, MK_CLIENT_FORBIDDEN);
return MK_PLUGIN_RET_CLOSE_CONX;
}
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %d] Mandril validating hotlinking", cs->socket);
referer = mk_api->header_get(&sr->headers_toc, "Referer", strlen("Referer"));
if (mk_security_check_hotlink(sr->uri_processed, sr->host, referer) < 0) {
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Close connection, deny hotlinking.", cs->socket);
mk_api->header_set_http_status(sr, MK_CLIENT_FORBIDDEN);
return MK_PLUGIN_RET_CLOSE_CONX;
}
return MK_PLUGIN_RET_NOT_ME;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Mandril security plugin in Monkey HTTP Daemon (monkeyd) before 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions via a crafted URI, as demonstrated by an encoded forward slash.
Commit Message: Mandril: check decoded URI (fix #92)
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
|
Medium
| 166,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestEventTarget::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestEventTarget* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestEventTarget::s_info);
TestEventTarget* impl = static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSValue listener = exec->argument(1);
if (!listener.isObject())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->removeEventListener(ustringToAtomicString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec)), JSEventListener::create(asObject(listener), castedThis, false, currentWorld(exec)).get(), exec->argument(2).toBoolean(exec));
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,573
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Ins_JMPR( INS_ARG )
{
CUR.IP += (Int)(args[0]);
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
* allow for simple cases here by just checking the preceding byte.
* Fonts with this problem are not uncommon.
*/
CUR.IP -= 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Ins_JMPR function in base/ttinterp.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,778
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PP_Bool LaunchSelLdr(PP_Instance instance,
const char* alleged_url,
int socket_count,
void* imc_handles) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> sockets;
IPC::Sender* sender = content::RenderThread::Get();
if (sender == NULL)
sender = g_background_thread_sender.Pointer()->get();
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
if (!sender->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl(
GURL(alleged_url), socket_count, &sockets,
&channel_handle))) {
return PP_FALSE;
}
bool invalid_handle = channel_handle.name.empty();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (!invalid_handle)
invalid_handle = (channel_handle.socket.fd == -1);
#endif
if (!invalid_handle)
g_channel_handle_map.Get()[instance] = channel_handle;
CHECK(static_cast<int>(sockets.size()) == socket_count);
for (int i = 0; i < socket_count; i++) {
static_cast<nacl::Handle*>(imc_handles)[i] =
nacl::ToNativeHandle(sockets[i]);
}
return PP_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcessUDPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
ULONG udpDataStart = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(UDPHeader);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = udpDataStart;
if (len >= udpDataStart)
{
UDPHeader *pUdpHeader = (UDPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
USHORT datagramLength = swap_short(pUdpHeader->udp_length);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
DPrintf(2, ("udp: len %d, datagramLength %d\n", len, datagramLength));
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 168,890
|
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