instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pppol2tp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int err;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
err = -EIO;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND)
goto end;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
err = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto end;
if (len > skb->len)
len = skb->len;
else if (len < skb->len)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, len);
if (likely(err == 0))
err = len;
kfree_skb(skb);
end:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcEstablishConnection(ClientPtr client)
{
const char *reason;
char *auth_proto, *auth_string;
xConnClientPrefix *prefix;
REQUEST(xReq);
prefix = (xConnClientPrefix *) ((char *) stuff + sz_xReq);
auth_proto = (char *) prefix + sz_xConnClientPrefix;
auth_string = auth_proto + pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto);
if ((prefix->majorVersion != X_PROTOCOL) ||
(prefix->minorVersion != X_PROTOCOL_REVISION))
reason = "Protocol version mismatch";
else
return (SendConnSetup(client, reason));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing extra length validation in ProcEstablishConnection function allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mp4client_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char c;
const char *str;
int ret_val = 0;
u32 i, times[100], nb_times, dump_mode;
u32 simulation_time_in_ms = 0;
u32 initial_service_id = 0;
Bool auto_exit = GF_FALSE;
Bool logs_set = GF_FALSE;
Bool start_fs = GF_FALSE;
Bool use_rtix = GF_FALSE;
Bool pause_at_first = GF_FALSE;
Bool no_cfg_save = GF_FALSE;
Bool is_cfg_only = GF_FALSE;
Double play_from = 0;
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
GF_MemTrackerType mem_track = GF_MemTrackerNone;
#endif
Double fps = GF_IMPORT_DEFAULT_FPS;
Bool fill_ar, visible, do_uncache, has_command;
char *url_arg, *out_arg, *the_cfg, *rti_file, *views, *mosaic;
FILE *logfile = NULL;
Float scale = 1;
#ifndef WIN32
dlopen(NULL, RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL);
#endif
/*by default use current dir*/
strcpy(the_url, ".");
memset(&user, 0, sizeof(GF_User));
dump_mode = DUMP_NONE;
fill_ar = visible = do_uncache = has_command = GF_FALSE;
url_arg = out_arg = the_cfg = rti_file = views = mosaic = NULL;
nb_times = 0;
times[0] = 0;
/*first locate config file if specified*/
for (i=1; i<(u32) argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "-c") || !strcmp(arg, "-cfg")) {
the_cfg = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-mem-track") || !strcmp(arg, "-mem-track-stack")) {
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
mem_track = !strcmp(arg, "-mem-track-stack") ? GF_MemTrackerBackTrace : GF_MemTrackerSimple;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING - GPAC not compiled with Memory Tracker - ignoring \"%s\"\n", arg);
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-gui")) {
gui_mode = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-guid")) {
gui_mode = 2;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-h") || !strcmp(arg, "-help")) {
PrintUsage();
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
gf_sys_init(mem_track);
#else
gf_sys_init(GF_MemTrackerNone);
#endif
gf_sys_set_args(argc, (const char **) argv);
cfg_file = gf_cfg_init(the_cfg, NULL);
if (!cfg_file) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Configuration File not found\n");
return 1;
}
/*if logs are specified, use them*/
if (gf_log_set_tools_levels( gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "Logs") ) != GF_OK) {
return 1;
}
if( gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "Logs") != NULL ) {
logs_set = GF_TRUE;
}
if (!gui_mode) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "ForceGUI");
if (str && !strcmp(str, "yes")) gui_mode = 1;
}
for (i=1; i<(u32) argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "-rti")) {
rti_file = argv[i+1];
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rtix")) {
rti_file = argv[i+1];
i++;
use_rtix = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!stricmp(arg, "-size")) {
/*usage of %ud breaks sscanf on MSVC*/
if (sscanf(argv[i+1], "%dx%d", &forced_width, &forced_height) != 2) {
forced_width = forced_height = 0;
}
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-quiet")) {
be_quiet = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-strict-error")) {
gf_log_set_strict_error(1);
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-file") || !strcmp(arg, "-lf")) {
logfile = gf_fopen(argv[i+1], "wt");
gf_log_set_callback(logfile, on_gpac_log);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-logs") ) {
if (gf_log_set_tools_levels(argv[i+1]) != GF_OK) {
return 1;
}
logs_set = GF_TRUE;
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-clock") || !strcmp(arg, "-lc")) {
log_time_start = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-utc") || !strcmp(arg, "-lu")) {
log_utc_time = 1;
}
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-thread")) threading_flags = 0;
#else
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-thread")) threading_flags = GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD | GF_TERM_WINDOW_NO_THREAD;
#endif
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-cthread") || !strcmp(arg, "-no-compositor-thread")) threading_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-audio")) no_audio = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-regulation")) no_regulation = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-fs")) start_fs = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-opt")) {
set_cfg_option(argv[i+1]);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-conf")) {
set_cfg_option(argv[i+1]);
is_cfg_only=GF_TRUE;
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ifce")) {
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "Network", "DefaultMCastInterface", argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-help")) {
PrintUsage();
return 1;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-noprog")) {
no_prog=1;
gf_set_progress_callback(NULL, progress_quiet);
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-no-save") || !stricmp(arg, "--no-save") /*old versions used --n-save ...*/) {
no_cfg_save=1;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-ntp-shift")) {
s32 shift = atoi(argv[i+1]);
i++;
gf_net_set_ntp_shift(shift);
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-run-for")) {
simulation_time_in_ms = atoi(argv[i+1]) * 1000;
if (!simulation_time_in_ms)
simulation_time_in_ms = 1; /*1ms*/
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-out")) {
out_arg = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-fps")) {
fps = atof(argv[i+1]);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-avi") || !strcmp(arg, "-sha")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
if (!strcmp(arg, "-sha")) dump_mode |= DUMP_SHA1;
else dump_mode |= DUMP_AVI;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) {
if (!strcmp(arg, "-avi") && (nb_times!=2) ) {
fprintf(stderr, "Only one time arg found for -avi - check usage\n");
return 1;
}
i++;
}
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rgbds")) { /*get dump in rgbds pixel format*/
dump_mode |= DUMP_RGB_DEPTH_SHAPE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rgbd")) { /*get dump in rgbd pixel format*/
dump_mode |= DUMP_RGB_DEPTH;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-depth")) {
dump_mode |= DUMP_DEPTH_ONLY;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-bmp")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_BMP;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-png")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_PNG;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-raw")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_RAW;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!stricmp(arg, "-scale")) {
sscanf(argv[i+1], "%f", &scale);
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-c") || !strcmp(arg, "-cfg")) {
/* already parsed */
i++;
}
/*arguments only used in non-gui mode*/
if (!gui_mode) {
if (arg[0] != '-') {
if (url_arg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Several input URLs provided (\"%s\", \"%s\"). Check your command-line.\n", url_arg, arg);
return 1;
}
url_arg = arg;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-loop")) loop_at_end = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-bench")) bench_mode = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-vbench")) bench_mode = 2;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-sbench")) bench_mode = 3;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-addon")) enable_add_ons = GF_FALSE;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-pause")) pause_at_first = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-play-from")) {
play_from = atof((const char *) argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-speed")) {
playback_speed = FLT2FIX( atof((const char *) argv[i+1]) );
if (playback_speed <= 0) playback_speed = FIX_ONE;
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-wnd")) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_WINDOWLESS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-back")) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_WINDOW_TRANSPARENT;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-align")) {
if (argv[i+1][0]=='m') align_mode = 1;
else if (argv[i+1][0]=='b') align_mode = 2;
align_mode <<= 8;
if (argv[i+1][1]=='m') align_mode |= 1;
else if (argv[i+1][1]=='r') align_mode |= 2;
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-fill")) {
fill_ar = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-show")) {
visible = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-uncache")) {
do_uncache = GF_TRUE;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-exit")) auto_exit = GF_TRUE;
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-views")) {
views = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-mosaic")) {
mosaic = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-com")) {
has_command = GF_TRUE;
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-service")) {
initial_service_id = atoi(argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
}
}
if (is_cfg_only) {
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC Config updated\n");
return 0;
}
if (do_uncache) {
const char *cache_dir = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "CacheDirectory");
do_flatten_cache(cache_dir);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC Cache dir %s flattened\n", cache_dir);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
return 0;
}
if (dump_mode && !url_arg ) {
FILE *test;
url_arg = (char *)gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile");
test = url_arg ? gf_fopen(url_arg, "rt") : NULL;
if (!test) url_arg = NULL;
else gf_fclose(test);
if (!url_arg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for dump\n");
PrintUsage();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
}
if (!gui_mode && !url_arg && (gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile") != NULL)) {
gui_mode=1;
}
#ifdef WIN32
if (gui_mode==1) {
const char *opt;
TCHAR buffer[1024];
DWORD res = GetCurrentDirectory(1024, buffer);
buffer[res] = 0;
opt = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "ModulesDirectory");
if (strstr(opt, buffer)) {
gui_mode=1;
} else {
gui_mode=2;
}
}
#endif
if (gui_mode==1) {
hide_shell(1);
}
if (gui_mode) {
no_prog=1;
gf_set_progress_callback(NULL, progress_quiet);
}
if (!url_arg && simulation_time_in_ms)
simulation_time_in_ms += gf_sys_clock();
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
carbon_init();
#endif
if (dump_mode) rti_file = NULL;
if (!logs_set) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_ALL, GF_LOG_WARNING);
}
if (rti_file || logfile || log_utc_time || log_time_start)
gf_log_set_callback(NULL, on_gpac_log);
if (rti_file) init_rti_logs(rti_file, url_arg, use_rtix);
{
GF_SystemRTInfo rti;
if (gf_sys_get_rti(0, &rti, 0))
fprintf(stderr, "System info: %d MB RAM - %d cores\n", (u32) (rti.physical_memory/1024/1024), rti.nb_cores);
}
/*setup dumping options*/
if (dump_mode) {
user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_REGULATION;
if (!visible)
user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_INIT_HIDE;
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "Audio", "DriverName", "Raw Audio Output");
no_cfg_save=GF_TRUE;
} else {
init_w = forced_width;
init_h = forced_height;
}
user.modules = gf_modules_new(NULL, cfg_file);
if (user.modules) i = gf_modules_get_count(user.modules);
if (!i || !user.modules) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no modules found - exiting\n");
if (user.modules) gf_modules_del(user.modules);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Modules Found : %d \n", i);
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "GPACVersion");
if (!str || strcmp(str, GPAC_FULL_VERSION)) {
gf_cfg_del_section(cfg_file, "PluginsCache");
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "General", "GPACVersion", GPAC_FULL_VERSION);
}
user.config = cfg_file;
user.EventProc = GPAC_EventProc;
/*dummy in this case (global vars) but MUST be non-NULL*/
user.opaque = user.modules;
if (threading_flags) user.init_flags |= threading_flags;
if (no_audio) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_AUDIO;
if (no_regulation) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_REGULATION;
if (threading_flags & (GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD|GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD) ) term_step = GF_TRUE;
if (dump_mode) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_USE_AUDIO_HW_CLOCK;
if (bench_mode) {
gf_cfg_discard_changes(user.config);
auto_exit = GF_TRUE;
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Audio", "DriverName", "Raw Audio Output");
if (bench_mode!=2) {
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Video", "DriverName", "Raw Video Output");
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "RAWVideo", "RawOutput", "null");
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "OpenGLMode", "disable");
} else {
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Video", "DisableVSync", "yes");
}
}
{
char dim[50];
sprintf(dim, "%d", forced_width);
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "DefaultWidth", forced_width ? dim : NULL);
sprintf(dim, "%d", forced_height);
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "DefaultHeight", forced_height ? dim : NULL);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Loading GPAC Terminal\n");
i = gf_sys_clock();
term = gf_term_new(&user);
if (!term) {
fprintf(stderr, "\nInit error - check you have at least one video out and one rasterizer...\nFound modules:\n");
list_modules(user.modules);
gf_modules_del(user.modules);
gf_cfg_discard_changes(cfg_file);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Terminal Loaded in %d ms\n", gf_sys_clock()-i);
if (bench_mode) {
display_rti = 2;
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_BENCH, (bench_mode==3) ? 2 : 1);
if (bench_mode==1) bench_mode=2;
}
if (dump_mode) {
if (fill_ar) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_FILL_SCREEN);
} else {
/*check video output*/
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "Video", "DriverName");
if (!bench_mode && !strcmp(str, "Raw Video Output")) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: using raw output video (memory only) - no display used\n");
/*check audio output*/
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "Audio", "DriverName");
if (!str || !strcmp(str, "No Audio Output Available")) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: no audio output available - make sure no other program is locking the sound card\n");
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "NoMIMETypeFetch");
no_mime_check = (str && !stricmp(str, "yes")) ? 1 : 0;
}
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "HTTPProxy", "Enabled");
if (str && !strcmp(str, "yes")) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "HTTPProxy", "Name");
if (str) fprintf(stderr, "HTTP Proxy %s enabled\n", str);
}
if (rti_file) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "RTIRefreshPeriod");
if (str) {
rti_update_time_ms = atoi(str);
} else {
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "General", "RTIRefreshPeriod", "200");
}
UpdateRTInfo("At GPAC load time\n");
}
Run = 1;
if (dump_mode) {
if (!nb_times) {
times[0] = 0;
nb_times++;
}
ret_val = dump_file(url_arg, out_arg, dump_mode, fps, forced_width, forced_height, scale, times, nb_times);
Run = 0;
}
else if (views) {
}
/*connect if requested*/
else if (!gui_mode && url_arg) {
char *ext;
strcpy(the_url, url_arg);
ext = strrchr(the_url, '.');
if (ext && (!stricmp(ext, ".m3u") || !stricmp(ext, ".pls"))) {
GF_Err e = GF_OK;
fprintf(stderr, "Opening Playlist %s\n", the_url);
strcpy(pl_path, the_url);
/*this is not clean, we need to have a plugin handle playlist for ourselves*/
if (!strncmp("http:", the_url, 5)) {
GF_DownloadSession *sess = gf_dm_sess_new(term->downloader, the_url, GF_NETIO_SESSION_NOT_THREADED, NULL, NULL, &e);
if (sess) {
e = gf_dm_sess_process(sess);
if (!e) strcpy(the_url, gf_dm_sess_get_cache_name(sess));
gf_dm_sess_del(sess);
}
}
playlist = e ? NULL : gf_fopen(the_url, "rt");
readonly_playlist = 1;
if (playlist) {
request_next_playlist_item = GF_TRUE;
} else {
if (e)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open playlist %s: %s\n", the_url, gf_error_to_string(e) );
fprintf(stderr, "Hit 'h' for help\n\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
if (pause_at_first) fprintf(stderr, "[Status: Paused]\n");
gf_term_connect_from_time(term, the_url, (u64) (play_from*1000), pause_at_first);
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Hit 'h' for help\n\n");
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile");
if (str) {
strcpy(the_url, "MP4Client "GPAC_FULL_VERSION);
gf_term_connect(term, str);
startup_file = 1;
is_connected = 1;
}
}
if (gui_mode==2) gui_mode=0;
if (start_fs) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_FULLSCREEN, 1);
if (views) {
char szTemp[4046];
sprintf(szTemp, "views://%s", views);
gf_term_connect(term, szTemp);
}
if (mosaic) {
char szTemp[4046];
sprintf(szTemp, "mosaic://%s", mosaic);
gf_term_connect(term, szTemp);
}
if (bench_mode) {
rti_update_time_ms = 500;
bench_mode_start = gf_sys_clock();
}
while (Run) {
/*we don't want getchar to block*/
if ((gui_mode==1) || !gf_prompt_has_input()) {
if (reload) {
reload = 0;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
gf_term_connect(term, startup_file ? gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile") : the_url);
}
if (restart && gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_IS_OVER)) {
restart = 0;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, 0, 0);
}
if (request_next_playlist_item) {
c = '\n';
request_next_playlist_item = 0;
goto force_input;
}
if (has_command && is_connected) {
has_command = GF_FALSE;
for (i=0; i<(u32)argc; i++) {
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-com")) {
gf_term_scene_update(term, NULL, argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
}
}
if (initial_service_id && is_connected) {
GF_ObjectManager *root_od = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (root_od) {
gf_term_select_service(term, root_od, initial_service_id);
initial_service_id = 0;
}
}
if (!use_rtix || display_rti) UpdateRTInfo(NULL);
if (term_step) {
gf_term_process_step(term);
} else {
gf_sleep(rti_update_time_ms);
}
if (auto_exit && eos_seen && gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_IS_OVER)) {
Run = GF_FALSE;
}
/*sim time*/
if (simulation_time_in_ms
&& ( (gf_term_get_elapsed_time_in_ms(term)>simulation_time_in_ms) || (!url_arg && gf_sys_clock()>simulation_time_in_ms))
) {
Run = GF_FALSE;
}
continue;
}
c = gf_prompt_get_char();
force_input:
switch (c) {
case 'q':
{
GF_Event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(GF_Event));
evt.type = GF_EVENT_QUIT;
gf_term_send_event(term, &evt);
}
break;
case 'X':
exit(0);
break;
case 'Q':
break;
case 'o':
startup_file = 0;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
fprintf(stderr, "Enter the absolute URL\n");
if (1 > scanf("%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read absolute URL, aborting\n");
break;
}
if (rti_file) init_rti_logs(rti_file, the_url, use_rtix);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
break;
case 'O':
gf_term_disconnect(term);
fprintf(stderr, "Enter the absolute URL to the playlist\n");
if (1 > scanf("%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read the absolute URL, aborting.\n");
break;
}
playlist = gf_fopen(the_url, "rt");
if (playlist) {
if (1 > fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read any URL from playlist, aborting.\n");
gf_fclose( playlist);
break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
}
break;
case '\n':
case 'N':
if (playlist) {
int res;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
res = fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url);
if ((res == EOF) && loop_at_end) {
fseek(playlist, 0, SEEK_SET);
res = fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url);
}
if (res == EOF) {
fprintf(stderr, "No more items - exiting\n");
Run = 0;
} else if (the_url[0] == '#') {
request_next_playlist_item = GF_TRUE;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect_with_path(term, the_url, pl_path);
}
}
break;
case 'P':
if (playlist) {
u32 count;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
if (1 > scanf("%u", &count)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read number, aborting.\n");
break;
}
while (count) {
if (fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to read line, aborting\n");
break;
}
count--;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
}
break;
case 'r':
if (is_connected)
reload = 1;
break;
case 'D':
if (is_connected) gf_term_disconnect(term);
break;
case 'p':
if (is_connected) {
Bool is_pause = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE);
fprintf(stderr, "[Status: %s]\n", is_pause ? "Playing" : "Paused");
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE, is_pause ? GF_STATE_PLAYING : GF_STATE_PAUSED);
}
break;
case 's':
if (is_connected) {
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE, GF_STATE_STEP_PAUSE);
fprintf(stderr, "Step time: ");
PrintTime(gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
break;
case 'z':
case 'T':
if (!CanSeek || (Duration<=2000)) {
fprintf(stderr, "scene not seekable\n");
} else {
Double res;
s32 seekTo;
fprintf(stderr, "Duration: ");
PrintTime(Duration);
res = gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term);
if (c=='z') {
res *= 100;
res /= (s64)Duration;
fprintf(stderr, " (current %.2f %%)\nEnter Seek percentage:\n", res);
if (scanf("%d", &seekTo) == 1) {
if (seekTo > 100) seekTo = 100;
res = (Double)(s64)Duration;
res /= 100;
res *= seekTo;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, (u64) (s64) res, 0);
}
} else {
u32 r, h, m, s;
fprintf(stderr, " - Current Time: ");
PrintTime((u64) res);
fprintf(stderr, "\nEnter seek time (Format: s, m:s or h:m:s):\n");
h = m = s = 0;
r =scanf("%d:%d:%d", &h, &m, &s);
if (r==2) {
s = m;
m = h;
h = 0;
}
else if (r==1) {
s = h;
m = h = 0;
}
if (r && (r<=3)) {
u64 time = h*3600 + m*60 + s;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, time*1000, 0);
}
}
}
break;
case 't':
{
if (is_connected) {
fprintf(stderr, "Current Time: ");
PrintTime(gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term));
fprintf(stderr, " - Duration: ");
PrintTime(Duration);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
break;
case 'w':
if (is_connected) PrintWorldInfo(term);
break;
case 'v':
if (is_connected) PrintODList(term, NULL, 0, 0, "Root");
break;
case 'i':
if (is_connected) {
u32 ID;
fprintf(stderr, "Enter OD ID (0 for main OD): ");
fflush(stderr);
if (scanf("%ud", &ID) == 1) {
ViewOD(term, ID, (u32)-1, NULL);
} else {
char str_url[GF_MAX_PATH];
if (scanf("%s", str_url) == 1)
ViewOD(term, 0, (u32)-1, str_url);
}
}
break;
case 'j':
if (is_connected) {
u32 num;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter OD number (0 for main OD): ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%ud", &num));
ViewOD(term, (u32)-1, num, NULL);
}
break;
case 'b':
if (is_connected) ViewODs(term, 1);
break;
case 'm':
if (is_connected) ViewODs(term, 0);
break;
case 'l':
list_modules(user.modules);
break;
case 'n':
if (is_connected) set_navigation();
break;
case 'x':
if (is_connected) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_NAVIGATION_TYPE, 0);
break;
case 'd':
if (is_connected) {
GF_ObjectManager *odm = NULL;
char radname[GF_MAX_PATH], *sExt;
GF_Err e;
u32 i, count, odid;
Bool xml_dump, std_out;
radname[0] = 0;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter Inline OD ID if any or 0 : ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%ud", &odid));
if (odid) {
GF_ObjectManager *root_odm = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (!root_odm) break;
count = gf_term_get_object_count(term, root_odm);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_MediaInfo info;
odm = gf_term_get_object(term, root_odm, i);
if (gf_term_get_object_info(term, odm, &info) == GF_OK) {
if (info.od->objectDescriptorID==odid) break;
}
odm = NULL;
}
}
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter file radical name (+\'.x\' for XML dumping) - \"std\" for stderr: ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%s", radname));
sExt = strrchr(radname, '.');
xml_dump = 0;
if (sExt) {
if (!stricmp(sExt, ".x")) xml_dump = 1;
sExt[0] = 0;
}
std_out = strnicmp(radname, "std", 3) ? 0 : 1;
e = gf_term_dump_scene(term, std_out ? NULL : radname, NULL, xml_dump, 0, odm);
fprintf(stderr, "Dump done (%s)\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'c':
PrintGPACConfig();
break;
case '3':
{
Bool use_3d = !gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_USE_OPENGL);
if (gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_USE_OPENGL, use_3d)==GF_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "Using %s for 2D drawing\n", use_3d ? "OpenGL" : "2D rasterizer");
}
}
break;
case 'k':
{
Bool opt = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_STRESS_MODE);
opt = !opt;
fprintf(stderr, "Turning stress mode %s\n", opt ? "on" : "off");
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_STRESS_MODE, opt);
}
break;
case '4':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_4_3);
break;
case '5':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_16_9);
break;
case '6':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_FILL_SCREEN);
break;
case '7':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_KEEP);
break;
case 'C':
switch (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)) {
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED:
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED);
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED:
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED);
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache is running - please stop it first\n");
continue;
}
switch (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)) {
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Enabled\n");
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Disabled\n");
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Running\n");
break;
}
break;
case 'S':
case 'A':
if (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)==GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING) {
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, (c=='S') ? GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED : GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISCARD);
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache stopped\n");
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache not running\n");
}
break;
case 'R':
display_rti = !display_rti;
ResetCaption();
break;
case 'F':
if (display_rti) display_rti = 0;
else display_rti = 2;
ResetCaption();
break;
case 'u':
{
GF_Err e;
char szCom[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter command to send:\n");
fflush(stdin);
szCom[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szCom)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read command to send, aborting.\n");
break;
}
e = gf_term_scene_update(term, NULL, szCom);
if (e) fprintf(stderr, "Processing command failed: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'e':
{
GF_Err e;
char jsCode[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter JavaScript code to evaluate:\n");
fflush(stdin);
jsCode[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", jsCode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read code to evaluate, aborting.\n");
break;
}
e = gf_term_scene_update(term, "application/ecmascript", jsCode);
if (e) fprintf(stderr, "Processing JS code failed: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'L':
{
char szLog[1024], *cur_logs;
cur_logs = gf_log_get_tools_levels();
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new log level (current tools %s):\n", cur_logs);
gf_free(cur_logs);
if (scanf("%s", szLog) < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read new log level, aborting.\n");
break;
}
gf_log_modify_tools_levels(szLog);
}
break;
case 'g':
{
GF_SystemRTInfo rti;
gf_sys_get_rti(rti_update_time_ms, &rti, 0);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC allocated memory "LLD"\n", rti.gpac_memory);
}
break;
case 'M':
{
u32 size;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new video cache memory in kBytes (current %ud):\n", gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_CACHE_SIZE));
} while (1 > scanf("%ud", &size));
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_CACHE_SIZE, size);
}
break;
case 'H':
{
u32 http_bitrate = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_HTTP_MAX_RATE);
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new http bitrate in bps (0 for none) - current limit: %d\n", http_bitrate);
} while (1 > scanf("%ud", &http_bitrate));
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_HTTP_MAX_RATE, http_bitrate);
}
break;
case 'E':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_RELOAD_CONFIG, 1);
break;
case 'B':
switch_bench(!bench_mode);
break;
case 'Y':
{
char szOpt[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter option to set (Section:Name=Value):\n");
fflush(stdin);
szOpt[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szOpt)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read option\n");
break;
}
set_cfg_option(szOpt);
}
break;
/*extract to PNG*/
case 'Z':
{
char szFileName[100];
u32 nb_pass, nb_views, offscreen_view = 0;
GF_VideoSurface fb;
GF_Err e;
nb_pass = 1;
nb_views = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_NUM_STEREO_VIEWS);
if (nb_views>1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Auto-stereo mode detected - type number of view to dump (0 is main output, 1 to %d offscreen view, %d for all offscreen, %d for all offscreen and main)\n", nb_views, nb_views+1, nb_views+2);
if (scanf("%d", &offscreen_view) != 1) {
offscreen_view = 0;
}
if (offscreen_view==nb_views+1) {
offscreen_view = 1;
nb_pass = nb_views;
}
else if (offscreen_view==nb_views+2) {
offscreen_view = 0;
nb_pass = nb_views+1;
}
}
while (nb_pass) {
nb_pass--;
if (offscreen_view) {
sprintf(szFileName, "view%d_dump.png", offscreen_view);
e = gf_term_get_offscreen_buffer(term, &fb, offscreen_view-1, 0);
} else {
sprintf(szFileName, "gpac_video_dump_"LLU".png", gf_net_get_utc() );
e = gf_term_get_screen_buffer(term, &fb);
}
offscreen_view++;
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error dumping screen buffer %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) );
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
u32 dst_size = fb.width*fb.height*4;
char *dst = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*dst_size);
e = gf_img_png_enc(fb.video_buffer, fb.width, fb.height, fb.pitch_y, fb.pixel_format, dst, &dst_size);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error encoding PNG %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) );
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
FILE *png = gf_fopen(szFileName, "wb");
if (!png) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error writing file %s\n", szFileName);
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
gf_fwrite(dst, dst_size, 1, png);
gf_fclose(png);
fprintf(stderr, "Dump to %s\n", szFileName);
}
}
if (dst) gf_free(dst);
gf_term_release_screen_buffer(term, &fb);
#endif //GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Done: %s\n", szFileName);
}
break;
case 'G':
{
GF_ObjectManager *root_od, *odm;
u32 index;
char szOpt[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter 0-based index of object to select or service ID:\n");
fflush(stdin);
szOpt[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szOpt)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read OD ID\n");
break;
}
index = atoi(szOpt);
odm = NULL;
root_od = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (root_od) {
if ( gf_term_find_service(term, root_od, index)) {
gf_term_select_service(term, root_od, index);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find service %d - trying with object index\n", index);
odm = gf_term_get_object(term, root_od, index);
if (odm) {
gf_term_select_object(term, odm);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find object at index %d\n", index);
}
}
}
}
break;
case 'h':
PrintHelp();
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (bench_mode) {
PrintAVInfo(GF_TRUE);
}
/*FIXME: we have an issue in cleaning up after playing in bench mode and run-for 0 (buildbot tests). We for now disable error checks after run-for is done*/
if (simulation_time_in_ms) {
gf_log_set_strict_error(0);
}
i = gf_sys_clock();
gf_term_disconnect(term);
if (rti_file) UpdateRTInfo("Disconnected\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Deleting terminal... ");
if (playlist) gf_fclose(playlist);
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
carbon_uninit();
#endif
gf_term_del(term);
fprintf(stderr, "done (in %d ms) - ran for %d ms\n", gf_sys_clock() - i, gf_sys_clock());
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC cleanup ...\n");
gf_modules_del(user.modules);
if (no_cfg_save)
gf_cfg_discard_changes(cfg_file);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (rti_logs) gf_fclose(rti_logs);
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
if (gui_mode) {
hide_shell(2);
}
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
if (mem_track && (gf_memory_size() || gf_file_handles_count() )) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_MEMORY, GF_LOG_INFO);
gf_memory_print();
return 2;
}
#endif
return ret_val;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: GPAC version 0.7.1 and earlier has a buffer overflow vulnerability in the cat_multiple_files function in applications/mp4box/fileimport.c when MP4Box is used for a local directory containing crafted filenames.
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
|
Medium
| 169,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: grub_ext4_find_leaf (struct grub_ext2_data *data, char *buf,
struct grub_ext4_extent_header *ext_block,
grub_uint32_t fileblock)
{
struct grub_ext4_extent_idx *index;
while (1)
{
int i;
grub_disk_addr_t block;
index = (struct grub_ext4_extent_idx *) (ext_block + 1);
if (grub_le_to_cpu16(ext_block->magic) != EXT4_EXT_MAGIC)
return 0;
if (ext_block->depth == 0)
return ext_block;
for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (ext_block->entries); i++)
{
if (fileblock < grub_le_to_cpu32(index[i].block))
break;
}
if (--i < 0)
return 0;
block = grub_le_to_cpu16 (index[i].leaf_hi);
block = (block << 32) + grub_le_to_cpu32 (index[i].leaf);
if (grub_disk_read (data->disk,
block << LOG2_EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE (data),
0, EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE(data), buf))
return 0;
ext_block = (struct grub_ext4_extent_header *) buf;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The grub_ext2_read_block function in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB before 2013-11-12, as used in shlr/grub/fs/ext2.c in radare2 1.5.0, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive stack use and application crash) via a crafted binary file, related to use of a variable-size stack array.
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
|
Low
| 168,088
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int udp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, sin, msg->msg_name);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udp_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv_offset(msg, skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
/* starting over for a new packet, but check if we need to yield */
cond_resched();
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: udp.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via UDP traffic that triggers an unsafe second checksum calculation during execution of a recv system call with the MSG_PEEK flag.
Commit Message: udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,479
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
vstart += verdef->vd_aux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof(Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef function in libr/bin/format/elf/elf.c in radare2 2.0.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (r_read_le16 invalid write and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Fix #8685 - Crash in ELF version parsing
|
Medium
| 167,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __u8 *cp_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
unsigned long quirks = (unsigned long)hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
unsigned int i;
if (!(quirks & CP_RDESC_SWAPPED_MIN_MAX))
return rdesc;
for (i = 0; i < *rsize - 4; i++)
if (rdesc[i] == 0x29 && rdesc[i + 2] == 0x19) {
rdesc[i] = 0x19;
rdesc[i + 2] = 0x29;
swap(rdesc[i + 3], rdesc[i + 1]);
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The cp_report_fixup function in drivers/hid/hid-cypress.c in the Linux kernel 4.x before 4.9.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (integer underflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted HID report.
Commit Message: HID: hid-cypress: validate length of report
Make sure we have enough of a report structure to validate before
looking at it.
Reported-by: Benoit Camredon <benoit.camredon@airbus.com>
Tested-by: Benoit Camredon <benoit.camredon@airbus.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 168,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: recv_and_process_client_pkt(void /*int fd*/)
{
ssize_t size;
len_and_sockaddr *to;
struct sockaddr *from;
msg_t msg;
uint8_t query_status;
l_fixedpt_t query_xmttime;
to = get_sock_lsa(G_listen_fd);
from = xzalloc(to->len);
size = recv_from_to(G_listen_fd, &msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_DONTWAIT, from, &to->u.sa, to->len);
if (size != NTP_MSGSIZE_NOAUTH && size != NTP_MSGSIZE) {
char *addr;
if (size < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN)
goto bail;
bb_perror_msg_and_die("recv");
}
addr = xmalloc_sockaddr2dotted_noport(from);
bb_error_msg("malformed packet received from %s: size %u", addr, (int)size);
free(addr);
goto bail;
}
query_status = msg.m_status;
query_xmttime = msg.m_xmttime;
msg.m_ppoll = G.poll_exp;
msg.m_precision_exp = G_precision_exp;
/* this time was obtained between poll() and recv() */
msg.m_rectime = d_to_lfp(G.cur_time);
msg.m_xmttime = d_to_lfp(gettime1900d()); /* this instant */
if (G.peer_cnt == 0) {
/* we have no peers: "stratum 1 server" mode. reftime = our own time */
G.reftime = G.cur_time;
}
msg.m_reftime = d_to_lfp(G.reftime);
msg.m_orgtime = query_xmttime;
msg.m_rootdelay = d_to_sfp(G.rootdelay);
msg.m_rootdisp = d_to_sfp(G.rootdisp);
msg.m_refid = G.refid; // (version > (3 << VERSION_SHIFT)) ? G.refid : G.refid3;
/* We reply from the local address packet was sent to,
* this makes to/from look swapped here: */
do_sendto(G_listen_fd,
/*from:*/ &to->u.sa, /*to:*/ from, /*addrlen:*/ to->len,
&msg, size);
bail:
free(to);
free(from);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The recv_and_process_client_pkt function in networking/ntpd.c in busybox allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and bandwidth consumption) via a forged NTP packet, which triggers a communication loop.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LogoService::SetClockForTests(std::unique_ptr<base::Clock> clock) {
clock_for_test_ = std::move(clock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
|
Medium
| 171,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jbig2_end_of_stripe(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const uint8_t *segment_data)
{
Jbig2Page page = ctx->pages[ctx->current_page];
int end_row;
end_row = jbig2_get_int32(segment_data);
if (end_row < page.end_row) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number,
"end of stripe segment with non-positive end row advance" " (new end row %d vs current end row %d)", end_row, page.end_row);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "end of stripe: advancing end row to %d", end_row);
}
page.end_row = end_row;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int http_proxy_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
char hostname[1024], hoststr[1024];
char auth[1024], pathbuf[1024], *path;
char lower_url[100];
int port, ret = 0, attempts = 0;
HTTPAuthType cur_auth_type;
char *authstr;
int new_loc;
if( s->seekable == 1 )
h->is_streamed = 0;
else
h->is_streamed = 1;
av_url_split(NULL, 0, auth, sizeof(auth), hostname, sizeof(hostname), &port,
pathbuf, sizeof(pathbuf), uri);
ff_url_join(hoststr, sizeof(hoststr), NULL, NULL, hostname, port, NULL);
path = pathbuf;
if (*path == '/')
path++;
ff_url_join(lower_url, sizeof(lower_url), "tcp", NULL, hostname, port,
NULL);
redo:
ret = ffurl_open_whitelist(&s->hd, lower_url, AVIO_FLAG_READ_WRITE,
&h->interrupt_callback, NULL,
h->protocol_whitelist, h->protocol_blacklist, h);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
authstr = ff_http_auth_create_response(&s->proxy_auth_state, auth,
path, "CONNECT");
snprintf(s->buffer, sizeof(s->buffer),
"CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: %s\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n"
"%s%s"
"\r\n",
path,
hoststr,
authstr ? "Proxy-" : "", authstr ? authstr : "");
av_freep(&authstr);
if ((ret = ffurl_write(s->hd, s->buffer, strlen(s->buffer))) < 0)
goto fail;
s->buf_ptr = s->buffer;
s->buf_end = s->buffer;
s->line_count = 0;
s->filesize = -1;
cur_auth_type = s->proxy_auth_state.auth_type;
/* Note: This uses buffering, potentially reading more than the
* HTTP header. If tunneling a protocol where the server starts
* the conversation, we might buffer part of that here, too.
* Reading that requires using the proper ffurl_read() function
* on this URLContext, not using the fd directly (as the tls
* protocol does). This shouldn't be an issue for tls though,
* since the client starts the conversation there, so there
* is no extra data that we might buffer up here.
*/
ret = http_read_header(h, &new_loc);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
attempts++;
if (s->http_code == 407 &&
(cur_auth_type == HTTP_AUTH_NONE || s->proxy_auth_state.stale) &&
s->proxy_auth_state.auth_type != HTTP_AUTH_NONE && attempts < 2) {
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
goto redo;
}
if (s->http_code < 400)
return 0;
ret = ff_http_averror(s->http_code, AVERROR(EIO));
fail:
http_proxy_close(h);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
|
Low
| 168,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_marker */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct connectdata *conn, const ssize_t nread)
{
/* When sending a SMTP payload we must detect CRLF. sequences making sure
they are sent as CRLF.. instead, as a . on the beginning of a line will
be deleted by the server when not part of an EOB terminator and a
genuine CRLF.CRLF which isn't escaped will wrongly be detected as end of
data by the server
*/
ssize_t i;
ssize_t si;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
char *scratch = data->state.scratch;
char *newscratch = NULL;
char *oldscratch = NULL;
size_t eob_sent;
/* Do we need to allocate a scratch buffer? */
if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) {
oldscratch = scratch;
scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * data->set.buffer_size);
if(!newscratch) {
failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
/* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */
eob_sent = smtp->eob;
/* This loop can be improved by some kind of Boyer-Moore style of
approach but that is saved for later... */
for(i = 0, si = 0; i < nread; i++) {
if(SMTP_EOB[smtp->eob] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i]) {
smtp->eob++;
/* Is the EOB potentially the terminating CRLF? */
if(2 == smtp->eob || SMTP_EOB_LEN == smtp->eob)
smtp->trailing_crlf = TRUE;
else
smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE;
}
else if(smtp->eob) {
/* A previous substring matched so output that first */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent);
si += smtp->eob - eob_sent;
/* Then compare the first byte */
if(SMTP_EOB[0] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i])
smtp->eob = 1;
else
smtp->eob = 0;
eob_sent = 0;
/* Reset the trailing CRLF flag as there was more data */
smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE;
}
/* Do we have a match for CRLF. as per RFC-5321, sect. 4.5.2 */
if(SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN == smtp->eob) {
/* Copy the replacement data to the target buffer */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB_REPL[eob_sent],
SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent);
si += SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent;
smtp->eob = 0;
eob_sent = 0;
}
else if(!smtp->eob)
scratch[si++] = data->req.upload_fromhere[i];
}
if(smtp->eob - eob_sent) {
/* A substring matched before processing ended so output that now */
memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent);
si += smtp->eob - eob_sent;
}
/* Only use the new buffer if we replaced something */
if(si != nread) {
/* Upload from the new (replaced) buffer instead */
data->req.upload_fromhere = scratch;
/* Save the buffer so it can be freed later */
data->state.scratch = scratch;
/* Free the old scratch buffer */
free(oldscratch);
/* Set the new amount too */
data->req.upload_present = si;
}
else
free(newscratch);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Curl_smtp_escape_eob in lib/smtp.c in curl 7.54.1 to and including curl 7.60.0 has a heap-based buffer overflow that might be exploitable by an attacker who can control the data that curl transmits over SMTP with certain settings (i.e., use of a nonstandard --limit-rate argument or CURLOPT_BUFFERSIZE value).
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
|
Low
| 169,365
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebPage::touchEvent(const Platform::TouchEvent& event)
{
#if DEBUG_TOUCH_EVENTS
BBLOG(LogLevelCritical, "%s", event.toString().c_str());
#endif
#if ENABLE(TOUCH_EVENTS)
if (!d->m_mainFrame)
return false;
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return false;
PluginView* pluginView = d->m_fullScreenPluginView.get();
if (pluginView)
return d->dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin(pluginView, event);
Platform::TouchEvent tEvent = event;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < event.m_points.size(); i++) {
tEvent.m_points[i].m_pos = d->mapFromTransformed(tEvent.m_points[i].m_pos);
tEvent.m_points[i].m_screenPos = tEvent.m_points[i].m_screenPos;
}
if (event.isSingleTap())
d->m_pluginMayOpenNewTab = true;
else if (tEvent.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchStart || tEvent.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel)
d->m_pluginMayOpenNewTab = false;
if (tEvent.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchStart) {
d->clearCachedHitTestResult();
d->m_touchEventHandler->doFatFingers(tEvent.m_points[0]);
Element* elementUnderFatFinger = d->m_touchEventHandler->lastFatFingersResult().nodeAsElementIfApplicable();
if (elementUnderFatFinger)
d->m_touchEventHandler->drawTapHighlight();
}
bool handled = false;
if (!event.m_type != Platform::TouchEvent::TouchInjected)
handled = d->m_mainFrame->eventHandler()->handleTouchEvent(PlatformTouchEvent(&tEvent));
if (d->m_preventDefaultOnTouchStart) {
if (tEvent.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchEnd || tEvent.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel)
d->m_preventDefaultOnTouchStart = false;
return true;
}
if (handled) {
if (tEvent.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchStart)
d->m_preventDefaultOnTouchStart = true;
return true;
}
if (event.isTouchHold())
d->m_touchEventHandler->doFatFingers(tEvent.m_points[0]);
#endif
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,766
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftAMR::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
continue;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumSamplesOutput = 0;
}
const uint8_t *inputPtr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int32_t numBytesRead;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: NB expected output buffer %zu bytes vs %u",
kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t), outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27662364");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorOverflow, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
int16 mode = ((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f);
size_t frameSize = WmfDecBytesPerFrame[mode] + 1;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < frameSize) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: expected %zu bytes vs %u", frameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
numBytesRead =
AMRDecode(mState,
(Frame_Type_3GPP)((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f),
(UWord8 *)&inputPtr[1],
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
MIME_IETF);
if (numBytesRead == -1) {
ALOGE("PV AMR decoder AMRDecode() call failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
++numBytesRead; // Include the frame type header byte.
if (static_cast<size_t>(numBytesRead) > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
} else {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: WB expected output buffer %zu bytes vs %u",
kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t), outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27662364");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorOverflow, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
int16 mode = ((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f);
if (mode >= 10 && mode <= 13) {
ALOGE("encountered illegal frame type %d in AMR WB content.",
mode);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mode);
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < frameSize) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: expected %zu bytes vs %u", frameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
int16_t *outPtr = (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer;
if (mode >= 9) {
memset(outPtr, 0, kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t));
} else if (mode < 9) {
int16 frameType;
RX_State_wb rx_state;
mime_unsorting(
const_cast<uint8_t *>(&inputPtr[1]),
mInputSampleBuffer,
&frameType, &mode, 1, &rx_state);
int16_t numSamplesOutput;
pvDecoder_AmrWb(
mode, mInputSampleBuffer,
outPtr,
&numSamplesOutput,
mDecoderBuf, frameType, mDecoderCookie);
CHECK_EQ((int)numSamplesOutput, (int)kNumSamplesPerFrameWB);
for (int i = 0; i < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB; ++i) {
/* Delete the 2 LSBs (14-bit output) */
outPtr[i] &= 0xfffC;
}
}
numBytesRead = frameSize;
}
inHeader->nOffset += numBytesRead;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= numBytesRead;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateNB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameNB;
} else {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateWB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameWB;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: codecs/amrnb/dec/SoftAMR.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bugs 27662364 and 27843673.
Commit Message: Fix AMR decoder
Previous change caused EOS to be ignored.
Bug: 27843673
Related-to-bug: 27662364
Change-Id: Ia148a88abc861a9b393f42bc7cd63d8d3ae349bc
|
Medium
| 174,230
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (!mp)
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
umount_tree(mnt, 0);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 processes MNT_DETACH umount2 system calls without verifying that the MNT_LOCKED flag is unset, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and navigate to filesystem locations beneath a mount by calling umount2 within a user namespace.
Commit Message: mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Low
| 167,588
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
enum bpf_type *type)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
void *raw;
int ret;
ret = kern_path(pathname->name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
ret = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = bpf_inode_type(inode, type);
if (ret)
goto out;
raw = bpf_any_get(inode->i_private, *type);
touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
return raw;
out:
path_put(&path);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The BPF subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 mishandles reference counts, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application on (1) a system with more than 32 Gb of memory, related to the program reference count or (2) a 1 Tb system, related to the map reference count.
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 167,251
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map[ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE];
struct xfs_mount *mp = args->dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_dablk_t lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
__uint8_t *dst = args->value;
int valuelen = args->valuelen;
int nmap;
int error;
int blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
int i;
int offset = 0;
trace_xfs_attr_rmtval_get(args);
ASSERT(!(args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL));
while (valuelen > 0) {
nmap = ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE;
error = xfs_bmapi_read(args->dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt, map, &nmap,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
if (error)
return error;
ASSERT(nmap >= 1);
for (i = 0; (i < nmap) && (valuelen > 0); i++) {
xfs_daddr_t dblkno;
int dblkcnt;
ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, NULL, mp->m_ddev_targp,
dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, &bp,
&xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino,
&offset, &valuelen,
&dst);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
if (error)
return error;
/* roll attribute extent map forwards */
lblkno += map[i].br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map[i].br_blockcount;
}
}
ASSERT(valuelen == 0);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
|
Low
| 166,739
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void OffscreenCanvas::Dispose() {
if (context_) {
context_->DetachHost();
context_ = nullptr;
}
if (HasPlaceholderCanvas() && GetTopExecutionContext() &&
GetTopExecutionContext()->IsWorkerGlobalScope()) {
WorkerAnimationFrameProvider* animation_frame_provider =
To<WorkerGlobalScope>(GetTopExecutionContext())
->GetAnimationFrameProvider();
if (animation_frame_provider)
animation_frame_provider->DeregisterOffscreenCanvas(this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-garbage-collection in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
|
Medium
| 173,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *iplist = NULL;
plist_t root_node = NULL;
char *plist_out = NULL;
uint32_t size = 0;
int read_size = 0;
char *plist_entire = NULL;
struct stat filestats;
options_t *options = parse_arguments(argc, argv);
if (!options)
{
print_usage(argc, argv);
return 0;
}
iplist = fopen(options->in_file, "rb");
if (!iplist) {
free(options);
return 1;
}
stat(options->in_file, &filestats);
plist_entire = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char) * (filestats.st_size + 1));
read_size = fread(plist_entire, sizeof(char), filestats.st_size, iplist);
fclose(iplist);
if (memcmp(plist_entire, "bplist00", 8) == 0)
{
plist_from_bin(plist_entire, read_size, &root_node);
plist_to_xml(root_node, &plist_out, &size);
}
else
{
plist_from_xml(plist_entire, read_size, &root_node);
plist_to_bin(root_node, &plist_out, &size);
}
plist_free(root_node);
free(plist_entire);
if (plist_out)
{
if (options->out_file != NULL)
{
FILE *oplist = fopen(options->out_file, "wb");
if (!oplist) {
free(options);
return 1;
}
fwrite(plist_out, size, sizeof(char), oplist);
fclose(oplist);
}
else
fwrite(plist_out, size, sizeof(char), stdout);
free(plist_out);
}
else
printf("ERROR: Failed to convert input file.\n");
free(options);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The main function in plistutil.c in libimobiledevice libplist through 1.12 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via Apple Property List data that is too short.
Commit Message: plistutil: Prevent OOB heap buffer read by checking input size
As pointed out in #87 plistutil would do a memcmp with a heap buffer
without checking the size. If the size is less than 8 it would read
beyond the bounds of this heap buffer. This commit prevents that.
|
Low
| 168,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Draw(cc::PaintCanvas* canvas,
const cc::PaintFlags& flags,
const FloatRect& dst_rect,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
RespectImageOrientationEnum,
ImageClampingMode image_clamping_mode,
ImageDecodingMode decode_mode) {
auto paint_image = PaintImageForCurrentFrame();
if (!paint_image)
return;
auto paint_image_decoding_mode = ToPaintImageDecodingMode(decode_mode);
if (paint_image.decoding_mode() != paint_image_decoding_mode) {
paint_image = PaintImageBuilder::WithCopy(std::move(paint_image))
.set_decoding_mode(paint_image_decoding_mode)
.TakePaintImage();
}
StaticBitmapImage::DrawHelper(canvas, flags, dst_rect, src_rect,
image_clamping_mode, paint_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rpmPackageFilesInstall(rpmts ts, rpmte te, rpmfiles files,
rpmpsm psm, char ** failedFile)
{
FD_t payload = rpmtePayload(te);
rpmfi fi = rpmfiNewArchiveReader(payload, files, RPMFI_ITER_READ_ARCHIVE);
rpmfs fs = rpmteGetFileStates(te);
rpmPlugins plugins = rpmtsPlugins(ts);
struct stat sb;
int saveerrno = errno;
int rc = 0;
int nodigest = (rpmtsFlags(ts) & RPMTRANS_FLAG_NOFILEDIGEST) ? 1 : 0;
int nofcaps = (rpmtsFlags(ts) & RPMTRANS_FLAG_NOCAPS) ? 1 : 0;
int firsthardlink = -1;
int skip;
rpmFileAction action;
char *tid = NULL;
const char *suffix;
char *fpath = NULL;
if (fi == NULL) {
rc = RPMERR_BAD_MAGIC;
goto exit;
}
/* transaction id used for temporary path suffix while installing */
rasprintf(&tid, ";%08x", (unsigned)rpmtsGetTid(ts));
/* Detect and create directories not explicitly in package. */
rc = fsmMkdirs(files, fs, plugins);
while (!rc) {
/* Read next payload header. */
rc = rpmfiNext(fi);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ITER_END)
rc = 0;
break;
}
action = rpmfsGetAction(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
skip = XFA_SKIPPING(action);
suffix = S_ISDIR(rpmfiFMode(fi)) ? NULL : tid;
if (action != FA_TOUCH) {
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, suffix);
} else {
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, "");
}
/* Remap file perms, owner, and group. */
rc = rpmfiStat(fi, 1, &sb);
fsmDebug(fpath, action, &sb);
/* Exit on error. */
if (rc)
break;
/* Run fsm file pre hook for all plugins */
rc = rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePre(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action);
if (rc) {
skip = 1;
} else {
setFileState(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
}
if (!skip) {
int setmeta = 1;
/* Directories replacing something need early backup */
if (!suffix) {
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
}
/* Assume file does't exist when tmp suffix is in use */
if (!suffix) {
rc = fsmVerify(fpath, fi);
} else {
rc = (action == FA_TOUCH) ? 0 : RPMERR_ENOENT;
}
if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMkfile(fi, fpath, files, psm, nodigest,
&setmeta, &firsthardlink);
}
} else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
mode_t mode = sb.st_mode;
mode &= ~07777;
mode |= 00700;
rc = fsmMkdir(fpath, mode);
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmSymlink(rpmfiFLink(fi), fpath);
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(sb.st_mode)) {
/* This mimics cpio S_ISSOCK() behavior but probably isn't right */
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMkfifo(fpath, 0000);
}
} else if (S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode) ||
S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) ||
S_ISSOCK(sb.st_mode))
{
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMknod(fpath, sb.st_mode, sb.st_rdev);
}
} else {
/* XXX Special case /dev/log, which shouldn't be packaged anyways */
if (!IS_DEV_LOG(fpath))
rc = RPMERR_UNKNOWN_FILETYPE;
}
/* Set permissions, timestamps etc for non-hardlink entries */
if (!rc && setmeta) {
rc = fsmSetmeta(fpath, fi, plugins, action, &sb, nofcaps);
}
} else if (firsthardlink >= 0 && rpmfiArchiveHasContent(fi)) {
/* we skip the hard linked file containing the content */
/* write the content to the first used instead */
char *fn = rpmfilesFN(files, firsthardlink);
rc = expandRegular(fi, fn, psm, 0, nodigest, 0);
firsthardlink = -1;
free(fn);
}
if (rc) {
if (!skip) {
/* XXX only erase if temp fn w suffix is in use */
if (suffix && (action != FA_TOUCH)) {
(void) fsmRemove(fpath, sb.st_mode);
}
errno = saveerrno;
}
} else {
/* Notify on success. */
rpmpsmNotify(psm, RPMCALLBACK_INST_PROGRESS, rpmfiArchiveTell(fi));
if (!skip) {
/* Backup file if needed. Directories are handled earlier */
if (suffix)
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
if (!rc)
rc = fsmCommit(&fpath, fi, action, suffix);
}
}
if (rc)
*failedFile = xstrdup(fpath);
/* Run fsm file post hook for all plugins */
rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePost(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action, rc);
fpath = _free(fpath);
}
rpmswAdd(rpmtsOp(ts, RPMTS_OP_UNCOMPRESS), fdOp(payload, FDSTAT_READ));
rpmswAdd(rpmtsOp(ts, RPMTS_OP_DIGEST), fdOp(payload, FDSTAT_DIGEST));
exit:
/* No need to bother with close errors on read */
rpmfiArchiveClose(fi);
rpmfiFree(fi);
Fclose(payload);
free(tid);
free(fpath);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: It was found that rpm did not properly handle RPM installations when a destination path was a symbolic link to a directory, possibly changing ownership and permissions of an arbitrary directory, and RPM files being placed in an arbitrary destination. An attacker, with write access to a directory in which a subdirectory will be installed, could redirect that directory to an arbitrary location and gain root privilege.
Commit Message: Restrict following symlinks to directories by ownership (CVE-2017-7500)
Only follow directory symlinks owned by target directory owner or root.
This prevents privilege escalation from user-writable directories via
directory symlinks to privileged directories on package upgrade, while
still allowing admin to arrange disk usage with symlinks.
The rationale is that if you can create symlinks owned by user X you *are*
user X (or root), and if you also own directory Y you can do whatever with
it already, including change permissions. So when you create a symlink to
that directory, the link ownership acts as a simple stamp of authority that
you indeed want rpm to treat this symlink as it were the directory that
you own. Such a permission can only be given by you or root, which
is just the way we want it. Plus it's almost ridiculously simple as far
as rules go, compared to trying to calculate something from the
source vs destination directory permissions etc.
In the normal case, the user arranging diskspace with symlinks is indeed
root so nothing changes, the only real change here is to links created by
non-privileged users which should be few and far between in practise.
Unfortunately our test-suite runs as a regular user via fakechroot and
thus the testcase for this fails under the new rules. Adjust the testcase
to get the ownership straight and add a second case for the illegal
behavior, basically the same as the old one but with different expectations.
|
Low
| 170,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_acomp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_acomp racomp;
strlcpy(racomp.type, "acomp", sizeof(racomp.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_ACOMP,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_acomp), &racomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.3. crypto_report_one() and related functions in crypto/crypto_user.c (the crypto user configuration API) do not fully initialize structures that are copied to userspace, potentially leaking sensitive memory to user programs. NOTE: this is a CVE-2013-2547 regression but with easier exploitability because the attacker does not need a capability (however, the system must have the CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER kconfig option).
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
???
| 168,963
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bgp_attr_parse_ret_t bgp_attr_parse(struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr,
bgp_size_t size, struct bgp_nlri *mp_update,
struct bgp_nlri *mp_withdraw)
{
bgp_attr_parse_ret_t ret;
uint8_t flag = 0;
uint8_t type = 0;
bgp_size_t length;
uint8_t *startp, *endp;
uint8_t *attr_endp;
uint8_t seen[BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE];
/* we need the as4_path only until we have synthesized the as_path with
* it */
/* same goes for as4_aggregator */
struct aspath *as4_path = NULL;
as_t as4_aggregator = 0;
struct in_addr as4_aggregator_addr = {.s_addr = 0};
/* Initialize bitmap. */
memset(seen, 0, BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE);
/* End pointer of BGP attribute. */
endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer) + size;
/* Get attributes to the end of attribute length. */
while (BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer) < endp) {
/* Check remaining length check.*/
if (endp - BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer) < BGP_ATTR_MIN_LEN) {
/* XXX warning: long int format, int arg (arg 5) */
flog_warn(
EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTE_TOO_SMALL,
"%s: error BGP attribute length %lu is smaller than min len",
peer->host,
(unsigned long)(endp
- stream_pnt(BGP_INPUT(peer))));
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Fetch attribute flag and type. */
startp = BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer);
/* "The lower-order four bits of the Attribute Flags octet are
unused. They MUST be zero when sent and MUST be ignored when
received." */
flag = 0xF0 & stream_getc(BGP_INPUT(peer));
type = stream_getc(BGP_INPUT(peer));
/* Check whether Extended-Length applies and is in bounds */
if (CHECK_FLAG(flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN)
&& ((endp - startp) < (BGP_ATTR_MIN_LEN + 1))) {
flog_warn(
EC_BGP_EXT_ATTRIBUTE_TOO_SMALL,
"%s: Extended length set, but just %lu bytes of attr header",
peer->host,
(unsigned long)(endp
- stream_pnt(BGP_INPUT(peer))));
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Check extended attribue length bit. */
if (CHECK_FLAG(flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN))
length = stream_getw(BGP_INPUT(peer));
else
length = stream_getc(BGP_INPUT(peer));
/* If any attribute appears more than once in the UPDATE
message, then the Error Subcode is set to Malformed Attribute
List. */
if (CHECK_BITMAP(seen, type)) {
flog_warn(
EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTE_REPEATED,
"%s: error BGP attribute type %d appears twice in a message",
peer->host, type);
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_ATTR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Set type to bitmap to check duplicate attribute. `type' is
unsigned char so it never overflow bitmap range. */
SET_BITMAP(seen, type);
/* Overflow check. */
attr_endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer) + length;
if (attr_endp > endp) {
flog_warn(
EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTE_TOO_LARGE,
"%s: BGP type %d length %d is too large, attribute total length is %d. attr_endp is %p. endp is %p",
peer->host, type, length, size, attr_endp,
endp);
/*
* RFC 4271 6.3
* If any recognized attribute has an Attribute
* Length that conflicts with the expected length
* (based on the attribute type code), then the
* Error Subcode MUST be set to Attribute Length
* Error. The Data field MUST contain the erroneous
* attribute (type, length, and value).
* ----------
* We do not currently have a good way to determine the
* length of the attribute independent of the length
* received in the message. Instead we send the
* minimum between the amount of data we have and the
* amount specified by the attribute length field.
*
* Instead of directly passing in the packet buffer and
* offset we use the stream_get* functions to read into
* a stack buffer, since they perform bounds checking
* and we are working with untrusted data.
*/
unsigned char ndata[BGP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE];
memset(ndata, 0x00, sizeof(ndata));
size_t lfl =
CHECK_FLAG(flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN) ? 2 : 1;
/* Rewind to end of flag field */
stream_forward_getp(BGP_INPUT(peer), -(1 + lfl));
/* Type */
stream_get(&ndata[0], BGP_INPUT(peer), 1);
/* Length */
stream_get(&ndata[1], BGP_INPUT(peer), lfl);
/* Value */
size_t atl = attr_endp - startp;
size_t ndl = MIN(atl, STREAM_READABLE(BGP_INPUT(peer)));
stream_get(&ndata[lfl + 1], BGP_INPUT(peer), ndl);
bgp_notify_send_with_data(
peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR, ndata,
ndl + lfl + 1);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
struct bgp_attr_parser_args attr_args = {
.peer = peer,
.length = length,
.attr = attr,
.type = type,
.flags = flag,
.startp = startp,
.total = attr_endp - startp,
};
/* If any recognized attribute has Attribute Flags that conflict
with the Attribute Type Code, then the Error Subcode is set
to
Attribute Flags Error. The Data field contains the erroneous
attribute (type, length and value). */
if (bgp_attr_flag_invalid(&attr_args)) {
ret = bgp_attr_malformed(
&attr_args, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_FLAG_ERR,
attr_args.total);
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED)
continue;
return ret;
}
/* OK check attribute and store it's value. */
switch (type) {
case BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN:
ret = bgp_attr_origin(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH:
ret = bgp_attr_aspath(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AS4_PATH:
ret = bgp_attr_as4_path(&attr_args, &as4_path);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP:
ret = bgp_attr_nexthop(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
ret = bgp_attr_med(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_LOCAL_PREF:
ret = bgp_attr_local_pref(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
ret = bgp_attr_atomic(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR:
ret = bgp_attr_aggregator(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AS4_AGGREGATOR:
ret = bgp_attr_as4_aggregator(&attr_args,
&as4_aggregator,
&as4_aggregator_addr);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES:
ret = bgp_attr_community(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES:
ret = bgp_attr_large_community(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_ORIGINATOR_ID:
ret = bgp_attr_originator_id(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST:
ret = bgp_attr_cluster_list(&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ret = bgp_mp_reach_parse(&attr_args, mp_update);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ret = bgp_mp_unreach_parse(&attr_args, mp_withdraw);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES:
ret = bgp_attr_ext_communities(&attr_args);
break;
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
case BGP_ATTR_VNC:
#endif
case BGP_ATTR_ENCAP:
ret = bgp_attr_encap(type, peer, length, attr, flag,
startp);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_PREFIX_SID:
ret = bgp_attr_prefix_sid(length,
&attr_args, mp_update);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_PMSI_TUNNEL:
ret = bgp_attr_pmsi_tunnel(&attr_args);
break;
default:
ret = bgp_attr_unknown(&attr_args);
break;
}
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR_NOTIFYPLS) {
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_ATTR);
ret = BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_EOR) {
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return ret;
}
/* If hard error occurred immediately return to the caller. */
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR) {
flog_warn(EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTE_PARSE_ERROR,
"%s: Attribute %s, parse error", peer->host,
lookup_msg(attr_str, type, NULL));
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return ret;
}
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW) {
flog_warn(
EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTE_PARSE_WITHDRAW,
"%s: Attribute %s, parse error - treating as withdrawal",
peer->host, lookup_msg(attr_str, type, NULL));
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return ret;
}
/* Check the fetched length. */
if (BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer) != attr_endp) {
flog_warn(EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTE_FETCH_ERROR,
"%s: BGP attribute %s, fetch error",
peer->host, lookup_msg(attr_str, type, NULL));
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
}
/* Check final read pointer is same as end pointer. */
if (BGP_INPUT_PNT(peer) != endp) {
flog_warn(EC_BGP_ATTRIBUTES_MISMATCH,
"%s: BGP attribute %s, length mismatch", peer->host,
lookup_msg(attr_str, type, NULL));
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Check all mandatory well-known attributes are present */
if ((ret = bgp_attr_check(peer, attr)) < 0) {
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return ret;
}
/*
* At this place we can see whether we got AS4_PATH and/or
* AS4_AGGREGATOR from a 16Bit peer and act accordingly.
* We can not do this before we've read all attributes because
* the as4 handling does not say whether AS4_PATH has to be sent
* after AS_PATH or not - and when AS4_AGGREGATOR will be send
* in relationship to AGGREGATOR.
* So, to be defensive, we are not relying on any order and read
* all attributes first, including these 32bit ones, and now,
* afterwards, we look what and if something is to be done for as4.
*
* It is possible to not have AS_PATH, e.g. GR EoR and sole
* MP_UNREACH_NLRI.
*/
/* actually... this doesn't ever return failure currently, but
* better safe than sorry */
if (CHECK_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH))
&& bgp_attr_munge_as4_attrs(peer, attr, as4_path, as4_aggregator,
&as4_aggregator_addr)) {
bgp_notify_send(peer, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_ATTR);
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern(&as4_path);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* At this stage, we have done all fiddling with as4, and the
* resulting info is in attr->aggregator resp. attr->aspath
* so we can chuck as4_aggregator and as4_path alltogether in
* order to save memory
*/
if (as4_path) {
aspath_unintern(&as4_path); /* unintern - it is in the hash */
/* The flag that we got this is still there, but that does not
* do any trouble
*/
}
/*
* The "rest" of the code does nothing with as4_aggregator.
* there is no memory attached specifically which is not part
* of the attr.
* so ignoring just means do nothing.
*/
/*
* Finally do the checks on the aspath we did not do yet
* because we waited for a potentially synthesized aspath.
*/
if (attr->flag & (ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH))) {
ret = bgp_attr_aspath_check(peer, attr);
if (ret != BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED)
return ret;
}
/* Finally intern unknown attribute. */
if (attr->transit)
attr->transit = transit_intern(attr->transit);
if (attr->encap_subtlvs)
attr->encap_subtlvs =
encap_intern(attr->encap_subtlvs, ENCAP_SUBTLV_TYPE);
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
if (attr->vnc_subtlvs)
attr->vnc_subtlvs =
encap_intern(attr->vnc_subtlvs, VNC_SUBTLV_TYPE);
#endif
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: bgpd in FRRouting FRR (aka Free Range Routing) 2.x and 3.x before 3.0.4, 4.x before 4.0.1, 5.x before 5.0.2, and 6.x before 6.0.2 (not affecting Cumulus Linux or VyOS), when ENABLE_BGP_VNC is used for Virtual Network Control, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (peering session flap) via attribute 255 in a BGP UPDATE packet. This occurred during Disco in January 2019 because FRR does not implement RFC 7606, and therefore the packets with 255 were considered invalid VNC data and the BGP session was closed.
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
|
???
| 169,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HistogramsCallback() {
MockHistogramsCallback();
QuitMessageLoop();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux relies on an IFRAME source URL to identify an associated extension, which allows remote attackers to conduct extension-bindings injection attacks by leveraging script access to a resource that initially has the about:blank URL.
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
|
Medium
| 172,050
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
__update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The check_alu_op function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect sign extension.
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,660
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copyMultiCh16(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i];
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
Medium
| 174,018
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer(const WebRTCSessionDescriptionRequest& request, const WebMediaConstraints& constraints)
{
WebString shouldSucceed;
if (constraints.getMandatoryConstraintValue("succeed", shouldSucceed) && shouldSucceed == "true") {
WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor sessionDescription;
sessionDescription.initialize("offer", "Some SDP here");
postTask(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestSuccededTask(this, request, sessionDescription));
} else
postTask(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestFailedTask(this, request));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ip6_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int ret, parent = 0;
struct mif6ctl vif;
struct mf6cctl mfc;
mifi_t mifi;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table ? : RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
if (optname != MRT6_INIT) {
if (sk != mrt->mroute6_sk && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
switch (optname) {
case MRT6_INIT:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
return ip6mr_sk_init(mrt, sk);
case MRT6_DONE:
return ip6mr_sk_done(sk);
case MRT6_ADD_MIF:
if (optlen < sizeof(vif))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&vif, optval, sizeof(vif)))
return -EFAULT;
if (vif.mif6c_mifi >= MAXMIFS)
return -ENFILE;
rtnl_lock();
ret = mif6_add(net, mrt, &vif, sk == mrt->mroute6_sk);
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
case MRT6_DEL_MIF:
if (optlen < sizeof(mifi_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&mifi, optval, sizeof(mifi_t)))
return -EFAULT;
rtnl_lock();
ret = mif6_delete(mrt, mifi, NULL);
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
/*
* Manipulate the forwarding caches. These live
* in a sort of kernel/user symbiosis.
*/
case MRT6_ADD_MFC:
case MRT6_DEL_MFC:
parent = -1;
case MRT6_ADD_MFC_PROXY:
case MRT6_DEL_MFC_PROXY:
if (optlen < sizeof(mfc))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&mfc, optval, sizeof(mfc)))
return -EFAULT;
if (parent == 0)
parent = mfc.mf6cc_parent;
rtnl_lock();
if (optname == MRT6_DEL_MFC || optname == MRT6_DEL_MFC_PROXY)
ret = ip6mr_mfc_delete(mrt, &mfc, parent);
else
ret = ip6mr_mfc_add(net, mrt, &mfc,
sk == mrt->mroute6_sk, parent);
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
/*
* Control PIM assert (to activate pim will activate assert)
*/
case MRT6_ASSERT:
{
int v;
if (optlen != sizeof(v))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(v, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
mrt->mroute_do_assert = v;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MRT6_PIM:
{
int v;
if (optlen != sizeof(v))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(v, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
v = !!v;
rtnl_lock();
ret = 0;
if (v != mrt->mroute_do_pim) {
mrt->mroute_do_pim = v;
mrt->mroute_do_assert = v;
}
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
case MRT6_TABLE:
{
u32 v;
if (optlen != sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(v, (u32 __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
/* "pim6reg%u" should not exceed 16 bytes (IFNAMSIZ) */
if (v != RT_TABLE_DEFAULT && v >= 100000000)
return -EINVAL;
if (sk == mrt->mroute6_sk)
return -EBUSY;
rtnl_lock();
ret = 0;
if (!ip6mr_new_table(net, v))
ret = -ENOMEM;
raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table = v;
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}
#endif
/*
* Spurious command, or MRT6_VERSION which you cannot
* set.
*/
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in net/ipv6/ip6mr.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11. By setting a specific socket option, an attacker can control a pointer in kernel land and cause an inet_csk_listen_stop general protection fault, or potentially execute arbitrary code under certain circumstances. The issue can be triggered as root (e.g., inside a default LXC container or with the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability) or after namespace unsharing. This occurs because sk_type and protocol are not checked in the appropriate part of the ip6_mroute_* functions. NOTE: this affects Linux distributions that use 4.9.x longterm kernels before 4.9.187.
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,858
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::CommitPendingTransaction(
SwapCompletionCallback completion_callback,
PresentationCallback present_callback) {
DCHECK(pending_transaction_);
ResourceRefs resources_to_release;
resources_to_release.swap(current_frame_resources_);
current_frame_resources_.clear();
current_frame_resources_.swap(pending_frame_resources_);
pending_frame_resources_.clear();
SurfaceControl::Transaction::OnCompleteCb callback = base::BindOnce(
&GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::OnTransactionAckOnGpuThread,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(completion_callback),
std::move(present_callback), std::move(resources_to_release));
pending_transaction_->SetOnCompleteCb(std::move(callback), gpu_task_runner_);
pending_transaction_->Apply();
pending_transaction_.reset();
DCHECK_GE(surface_list_.size(), pending_surfaces_count_);
surface_list_.resize(pending_surfaces_count_);
pending_surfaces_count_ = 0u;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
Medium
| 172,108
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_many_stringify (MyObject *obj, GHashTable /* char * -> GValue * */ *vals, GHashTable /* char * -> GValue * */ **ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal,
g_free, unset_and_free_gvalue);
g_hash_table_foreach (vals, hash_foreach_stringify, *ret);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,112
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
aacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip, cs;
u16 old_cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc;
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_cs, &old_desc, NULL,
VCPU_SREG_CS);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_RET,
&new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
WARN_ON(ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, old_cs, &old_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.12 does not properly initialize Code Segment (CS) in certain error cases, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: Memory leak in the ReadPSDLayers function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.6-3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak.
|
Medium
| 168,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static FILE *open_log_file(void)
{
if(log_fp) /* keep it open unless we rotate */
return log_fp;
log_fp = fopen(log_file, "a+");
if(log_fp == NULL) {
if (daemon_mode == FALSE) {
printf("Warning: Cannot open log file '%s' for writing\n", log_file);
}
return NULL;
}
(void)fcntl(fileno(log_fp), F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
return log_fp;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: base/logging.c in Nagios Core before 4.2.4 allows local users with access to an account in the nagios group to gain root privileges via a symlink attack on the log file. NOTE: this can be leveraged by remote attackers using CVE-2016-9565.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'maint'
|
Low
| 166,860
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos;
struct usb_dev_cap_header *cap;
unsigned char *buffer;
int length, total_len, num, i;
int ret;
bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_bos_descriptor), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Get BOS descriptor */
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, bos, USB_DT_BOS_SIZE);
if (ret < USB_DT_BOS_SIZE) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
kfree(bos);
return ret;
}
length = bos->bLength;
total_len = le16_to_cpu(bos->wTotalLength);
num = bos->bNumDeviceCaps;
kfree(bos);
if (total_len < length)
return -EINVAL;
dev->bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_host_bos), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Now let's get the whole BOS descriptor set */
buffer = kzalloc(total_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
dev->bos->desc = (struct usb_bos_descriptor *)buffer;
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, buffer, total_len);
if (ret < total_len) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor set\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
goto err;
}
total_len -= length;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
buffer += length;
cap = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buffer;
length = cap->bLength;
if (total_len < length)
break;
total_len -= length;
if (cap->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) {
dev_warn(ddev, "descriptor type invalid, skip\n");
continue;
}
switch (cap->bDevCapabilityType) {
case USB_CAP_TYPE_WIRELESS_USB:
/* Wireless USB cap descriptor is handled by wusb */
break;
case USB_CAP_TYPE_EXT:
dev->bos->ext_cap =
(struct usb_ext_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SS_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_cap =
(struct usb_ss_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SSP_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ssp_cap =
(struct usb_ssp_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case CONTAINER_ID_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_id =
(struct usb_ss_container_id_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_PTM_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ptm_cap =
(struct usb_ptm_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
err:
usb_release_bos_descriptor(dev);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The usb_get_bos_descriptor function in drivers/usb/core/config.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
format,
magick[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*value;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumAny
pixel;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register unsigned char
*pixels,
*q;
size_t
extent,
imageListLength,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
QuantumAny
max_value;
/*
Write PNM file header.
*/
max_value=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
packet_size=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image_info->magick,MaxTextExtent);
switch (magick[1])
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
format='7';
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
format='F';
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
format='f';
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
format='6';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='3';
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"P%c\n",format);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Write comments to file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p);
if ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r'))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (format != '7')
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
/*
PAM header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"WIDTH %.20g\nHEIGHT %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_type=GetQuantumType(image,&image->exception);
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
packet_size=4;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"CMYK",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
packet_size=1;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"GRAYSCALE",MaxTextExtent);
if (IdentifyImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"BLACKANDWHITE",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
packet_size=3;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"RGB",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
packet_size++;
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"_ALPHA",MaxTextExtent);
}
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"DEPTH %.20g\nMAXVAL %.20g\n",(double) packet_size,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"TUPLTYPE %s\nENDHDR\n",
type);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
/*
Convert to PNM raster pixels.
*/
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0) ?
'0' : '1');
*q++=' ';
if ((q-pixels+1) >= (ssize_t) sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '2':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToChar(index));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToShort(index));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToLong(index));
extent=(size_t) count;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '3':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(p)));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelBlue(p)));
extent=(size_t) count;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
image->depth=1;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '5':
{
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,GrayQuantum);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 8)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 32)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '6':
{
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
/*
Convert image to a PAM.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,image->endian == LSBEndian ? "-1.0\n" :
"1.0\n");
image->depth=32;
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo((const ImageInfo *) NULL,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of a misplaced assignment.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1614
|
Medium
| 170,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeOSSendHandwritingStroke(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->SendHandwritingStroke(stroke);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void cJSON_InitHooks(cJSON_Hooks* hooks)
{
if ( ! hooks ) {
/* Reset hooks. */
cJSON_malloc = malloc;
cJSON_free = free;
return;
}
cJSON_malloc = (hooks->malloc_fn) ? hooks->malloc_fn : malloc;
cJSON_free = (hooks->free_fn) ? hooks->free_fn : free;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,290
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
{
__u32 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
* (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
* Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
* then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
*/
hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
seq += keyptr->count;
/*
* As close as possible to RFC 793, which
* suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
* Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
* For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
* For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
* we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
* overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
* Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
*/
seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
return seq;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,768
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t AMRSource::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
*out = NULL;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
size_t size;
int64_t seekFrame = seekTimeUs / 20000ll; // 20ms per frame.
mCurrentTimeUs = seekFrame * 20000ll;
size_t index = seekFrame < 0 ? 0 : seekFrame / 50;
if (index >= mOffsetTableLength) {
index = mOffsetTableLength - 1;
}
mOffset = mOffsetTable[index] + (mIsWide ? 9 : 6);
for (size_t i = 0; i< seekFrame - index * 50; i++) {
status_t err;
if ((err = getFrameSizeByOffset(mDataSource, mOffset,
mIsWide, &size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
mOffset += size;
}
}
uint8_t header;
ssize_t n = mDataSource->readAt(mOffset, &header, 1);
if (n < 1) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (header & 0x83) {
ALOGE("padding bits must be 0, header is 0x%02x", header);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
unsigned FT = (header >> 3) & 0x0f;
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mIsWide, FT);
if (frameSize == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *buffer;
status_t err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&buffer);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
n = mDataSource->readAt(mOffset, buffer->data(), frameSize);
if (n != (ssize_t)frameSize) {
buffer->release();
buffer = NULL;
if (n < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
} else {
mOffset += n;
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
}
buffer->set_range(0, frameSize);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, mCurrentTimeUs);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
mOffset += frameSize;
mCurrentTimeUs += 20000; // Each frame is 20ms
*out = buffer;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as Moderate because it requires an uncommon device configuration. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35763994.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
|
High
| 174,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gss_accept_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_name_t * src_name;
gss_OID * mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_status, temp_minor_status;
OM_uint32 temp_ret_flags = 0;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id = NULL;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_cred_id_t tmp_d_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_name_t internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_name_t tmp_src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_OID_desc token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID token_mech_type = &token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID selected_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID public_mech;
gss_mechanism mech = NULL;
gss_union_cred_t uc;
int i;
status = val_acc_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (input_token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/* Get the token mech type */
status = gssint_get_mech_type(token_mech_type, input_token_buffer);
if (status)
return status;
/*
* An interposer calling back into the mechglue can't pass in a special
* mech, so we have to recognize it using verifier_cred_handle. Use
* the mechanism for which we have matching creds, if available.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
uc = (gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle;
for (i = 0; i < uc->count; i++) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(&uc->mechs_array[i]);
if (public_mech && g_OID_equal(token_mech_type, public_mech)) {
selected_mech = &uc->mechs_array[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (selected_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, token_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status)
return status;
}
} else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
selected_mech = union_ctx_id->mech_type;
}
/* Now create a new context if we didn't get one. */
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (!union_ctx_id)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
return (status);
}
/* set the new context handle to caller's data */
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
input_cred_handle =
gssint_get_mechanism_cred((gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle,
selected_mech);
if (input_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
/* verifier credential specified but no acceptor credential found */
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
} else if (!allow_mech_by_default(selected_mech)) {
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
/*
* now select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech && mech->gss_accept_sec_context) {
status = mech->gss_accept_sec_context(minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
input_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name ? &internal_name : NULL,
&actual_mech,
output_token,
&temp_ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred ? &tmp_d_cred : NULL);
/* If there's more work to do, keep going... */
if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
/* if the call failed, return with failure */
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
map_error(minor_status, mech);
goto error_out;
}
/*
* if src_name is non-NULL,
* convert internal_name into a union name equivalent
* First call the mechanism specific display_name()
* then call gss_import_name() to create
* the union name struct cast to src_name
*/
if (src_name != NULL) {
if (internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
/* consumes internal_name regardless of success */
temp_status = gssint_convert_name_to_union_name(
&temp_minor_status, mech,
internal_name, &tmp_src_name);
if (temp_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
status = temp_status;
*minor_status = temp_minor_status;
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (output_token->length)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
output_token);
goto error_out;
}
*src_name = tmp_src_name;
} else
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
#define g_OID_prefix_equal(o1, o2) \
(((o1)->length >= (o2)->length) && \
(memcmp((o1)->elements, (o2)->elements, (o2)->length) == 0))
/* Ensure we're returning correct creds format */
if ((temp_ret_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) &&
tmp_d_cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech);
if (actual_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
public_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
!g_OID_prefix_equal(actual_mech, public_mech)) {
*d_cred = tmp_d_cred; /* unwrapped pseudo-mech */
} else {
gss_union_cred_t d_u_cred = NULL;
d_u_cred = malloc(sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
if (d_u_cred == NULL) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
(void) memset(d_u_cred, 0, sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
d_u_cred->count = 1;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech,
&d_u_cred->mechs_array);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(d_u_cred);
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->cred_array = malloc(sizeof(gss_cred_id_t));
if (d_u_cred->cred_array != NULL) {
d_u_cred->cred_array[0] = tmp_d_cred;
} else {
free(d_u_cred);
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->loopback = d_u_cred;
*d_cred = (gss_cred_id_t)d_u_cred;
}
}
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = gssint_get_public_oid(actual_mech);
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = temp_ret_flags;
return (status);
} else {
status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
error_out:
if (union_ctx_id) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements)
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
}
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id && mech &&
mech->gss_delete_sec_context) {
mech->gss_delete_sec_context(&temp_minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
free(union_ctx_id);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (src_name)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (tmp_src_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
(gss_buffer_t)tmp_src_name);
return (status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,011
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ShellWindowFrameView::Init(views::Widget* frame) {
frame_ = frame;
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
close_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR).ToImageSkia());
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_H).ToImageSkia());
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_P).ToImageSkia());
close_button_->SetAccessibleName(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_ACCNAME_CLOSE));
AddChildView(close_button_);
#if defined(USE_ASH)
aura::Window* window = frame->GetNativeWindow();
int outside_bounds = ui::GetDisplayLayout() == ui::LAYOUT_TOUCH ?
kResizeOutsideBoundsSizeTouch :
kResizeOutsideBoundsSize;
window->set_hit_test_bounds_override_outer(
gfx::Insets(-outside_bounds, -outside_bounds,
-outside_bounds, -outside_bounds));
window->set_hit_test_bounds_override_inner(
gfx::Insets(kResizeInsideBoundsSize, kResizeInsideBoundsSize,
kResizeInsideBoundsSize, kResizeInsideBoundsSize));
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving frames, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,715
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: create_spnego_ctx(void)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof (spnego_gss_ctx_id_rec));
if (spnego_ctx == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
spnego_ctx->magic_num = SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID;
spnego_ctx->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
spnego_ctx->mech_set = NULL;
spnego_ctx->internal_mech = NULL;
spnego_ctx->optionStr = NULL;
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length = 0;
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.value = NULL;
spnego_ctx->default_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 0;
spnego_ctx->mic_sent = 0;
spnego_ctx->mic_rcvd = 0;
spnego_ctx->mech_complete = 0;
spnego_ctx->nego_done = 0;
spnego_ctx->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
spnego_ctx->actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
check_spnego_options(spnego_ctx);
return (spnego_ctx);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,649
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DocumentWriter::setDecoder(TextResourceDecoder* decoder)
{
m_decoder = decoder;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to *ruby / table style handing.*
Commit Message: Remove DocumentWriter::setDecoder as a grep of WebKit shows no callers
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67803
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Smells like dead code.
* loader/DocumentWriter.cpp:
* loader/DocumentWriter.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@94800 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct dst_entry *inet_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
struct rtable *rt;
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ip_options *opt = inet_rsk(req)->opt;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_mark,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
sk->sk_protocol, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->loc_addr, ireq->rmt_port, inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (opt && opt->is_strictroute && rt->rt_dst != rt->rt_gateway)
goto route_err;
return &rt->dst;
route_err:
ip_rt_put(rt);
no_route:
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cliprdr_process(STREAM s)
{
uint16 type, status;
uint32 length, format;
uint8 *data;
in_uint16_le(s, type);
in_uint16_le(s, status);
in_uint32_le(s, length);
data = s->p;
logger(Clipboard, Debug, "cliprdr_process(), type=%d, status=%d, length=%d", type, status,
length);
if (status == CLIPRDR_ERROR)
{
switch (type)
{
case CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ACK:
/* FIXME: We seem to get this when we send an announce while the server is
still processing a paste. Try sending another announce. */
cliprdr_send_native_format_announce(last_formats,
last_formats_length);
break;
case CLIPRDR_DATA_RESPONSE:
ui_clip_request_failed();
break;
default:
logger(Clipboard, Warning,
"cliprdr_process(), unhandled error (type=%d)", type);
}
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case CLIPRDR_CONNECT:
ui_clip_sync();
break;
case CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ANNOUNCE:
ui_clip_format_announce(data, length);
cliprdr_send_packet(CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ACK, CLIPRDR_RESPONSE, NULL, 0);
return;
case CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ACK:
break;
case CLIPRDR_DATA_REQUEST:
in_uint32_le(s, format);
ui_clip_request_data(format);
break;
case CLIPRDR_DATA_RESPONSE:
ui_clip_handle_data(data, length);
break;
case 7: /* TODO: W2K3 SP1 sends this on connect with a value of 1 */
break;
default:
logger(Clipboard, Warning, "cliprdr_process(), unhandled packet type %d",
type);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
Low
| 169,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaymentRequest::CanMakePayment() {
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnCanMakePaymentCalled();
if (!delegate_->GetPrefService()->GetBoolean(kCanMakePaymentEnabled) ||
!state_) {
CanMakePaymentCallback(/*can_make_payment=*/false);
} else {
state_->CanMakePayment(
base::BindOnce(&PaymentRequest::CanMakePaymentCallback,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
|
Medium
| 173,080
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: explicit MountState(DriveFsHost* host)
: host_(host),
mojo_connection_delegate_(
host_->delegate_->CreateMojoConnectionDelegate()),
pending_token_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
binding_(this) {
source_path_ = base::StrCat({kMountScheme, pending_token_.ToString()});
std::string datadir_option = base::StrCat(
{"datadir=",
host_->profile_path_.Append(kDataPath)
.Append(host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey())
.value()});
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->MountPath(
source_path_, "",
base::StrCat(
{"drivefs-", host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey()}),
{datadir_option}, chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE,
chromeos::MOUNT_ACCESS_MODE_READ_WRITE);
auto bootstrap =
mojo::MakeProxy(mojo_connection_delegate_->InitializeMojoConnection());
mojom::DriveFsDelegatePtr delegate;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&delegate));
bootstrap->Init(
{base::in_place, host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail()},
mojo::MakeRequest(&drivefs_), std::move(delegate));
PendingConnectionManager::Get().ExpectOpenIpcChannel(
pending_token_,
base::BindOnce(&DriveFsHost::MountState::AcceptMojoConnection,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.80 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
Low
| 171,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LockScreenMediaControlsView::LockScreenMediaControlsView(
service_manager::Connector* connector,
const Callbacks& callbacks)
: connector_(connector),
hide_controls_timer_(new base::OneShotTimer()),
media_controls_enabled_(callbacks.media_controls_enabled),
hide_media_controls_(callbacks.hide_media_controls),
show_media_controls_(callbacks.show_media_controls) {
DCHECK(callbacks.media_controls_enabled);
DCHECK(callbacks.hide_media_controls);
DCHECK(callbacks.show_media_controls);
Shell::Get()->media_controller()->SetMediaControlsDismissed(false);
middle_spacing_ = std::make_unique<NonAccessibleView>();
middle_spacing_->set_owned_by_client();
set_notify_enter_exit_on_child(true);
contents_view_ = AddChildView(std::make_unique<views::View>());
contents_view_->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kVertical));
contents_view_->SetBackground(views::CreateRoundedRectBackground(
kMediaControlsBackground, kMediaControlsCornerRadius));
contents_view_->SetPaintToLayer(); // Needed for opacity animation.
contents_view_->layer()->SetFillsBoundsOpaquely(false);
auto close_button_row = std::make_unique<NonAccessibleView>();
views::GridLayout* close_button_layout =
close_button_row->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::GridLayout>());
views::ColumnSet* columns = close_button_layout->AddColumnSet(0);
columns->AddPaddingColumn(0, kCloseButtonOffset);
columns->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::CENTER, views::GridLayout::CENTER, 0,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
close_button_layout->StartRowWithPadding(
0, 0, 0, 5 /* padding between close button and top of view */);
auto close_button = CreateVectorImageButton(this);
SetImageFromVectorIcon(close_button.get(), vector_icons::kCloseRoundedIcon,
kCloseButtonIconSize, gfx::kGoogleGrey700);
close_button->SetPreferredSize(kCloseButtonSize);
close_button->SetFocusBehavior(View::FocusBehavior::ALWAYS);
base::string16 close_button_label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_CLOSE));
close_button->SetAccessibleName(close_button_label);
close_button_ = close_button_layout->AddView(std::move(close_button));
close_button_->SetVisible(false);
contents_view_->AddChildView(std::move(close_button_row));
header_row_ =
contents_view_->AddChildView(std::make_unique<MediaControlsHeaderView>());
auto session_artwork = std::make_unique<views::ImageView>();
session_artwork->SetPreferredSize(
gfx::Size(kArtworkViewWidth, kArtworkViewHeight));
session_artwork->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kArtworkInsets));
session_artwork_ = contents_view_->AddChildView(std::move(session_artwork));
progress_ = contents_view_->AddChildView(
std::make_unique<media_message_center::MediaControlsProgressView>(
base::BindRepeating(&LockScreenMediaControlsView::SeekTo,
base::Unretained(this))));
auto button_row = std::make_unique<NonAccessibleView>();
auto* button_row_layout =
button_row->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kHorizontal, kButtonRowInsets,
kMediaButtonRowSeparator));
button_row_layout->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CrossAxisAlignment::kCenter);
button_row_layout->set_main_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::MainAxisAlignment::kCenter);
button_row->SetPreferredSize(kMediaControlsButtonRowSize);
button_row_ = contents_view_->AddChildView(std::move(button_row));
CreateMediaButton(
kChangeTrackIconSize, MediaSessionAction::kPreviousTrack,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_PREVIOUS_TRACK));
CreateMediaButton(
kSeekingIconsSize, MediaSessionAction::kSeekBackward,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_SEEK_BACKWARD));
auto play_pause_button = views::CreateVectorToggleImageButton(this);
play_pause_button->set_tag(static_cast<int>(MediaSessionAction::kPause));
play_pause_button->SetPreferredSize(kMediaButtonSize);
play_pause_button->SetFocusBehavior(views::View::FocusBehavior::ALWAYS);
play_pause_button->SetTooltipText(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_PAUSE));
play_pause_button->SetToggledTooltipText(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_PLAY));
play_pause_button_ = button_row_->AddChildView(std::move(play_pause_button));
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(
play_pause_button_,
GetVectorIconForMediaAction(MediaSessionAction::kPause),
kPlayPauseIconSize, kMediaButtonColor);
views::SetToggledImageFromVectorIcon(
play_pause_button_,
GetVectorIconForMediaAction(MediaSessionAction::kPlay),
kPlayPauseIconSize, kMediaButtonColor);
CreateMediaButton(
kSeekingIconsSize, MediaSessionAction::kSeekForward,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_SEEK_FORWARD));
CreateMediaButton(kChangeTrackIconSize, MediaSessionAction::kNextTrack,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_NEXT_TRACK));
MediaSessionMetadataChanged(base::nullopt);
MediaSessionPositionChanged(base::nullopt);
MediaControllerImageChanged(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kSourceIcon, SkBitmap());
SetArtwork(base::nullopt);
if (!connector_)
return;
mojo::Remote<media_session::mojom::MediaControllerManager>
controller_manager_remote;
connector_->Connect(media_session::mojom::kServiceName,
controller_manager_remote.BindNewPipeAndPassReceiver());
controller_manager_remote->CreateActiveMediaController(
media_controller_remote_.BindNewPipeAndPassReceiver());
media_controller_remote_->AddObserver(
observer_receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote());
media_controller_remote_->ObserveImages(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kArtwork,
kMinimumArtworkSize, kDesiredArtworkSize,
artwork_observer_receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote());
media_controller_remote_->ObserveImages(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kSourceIcon,
kMinimumIconSize, kDesiredIconSize,
icon_observer_receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 172,339
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Track::Info::Clear()
{
delete[] nameAsUTF8;
nameAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] language;
language = NULL;
delete[] codecId;
codecId = NULL;
delete[] codecPrivate;
codecPrivate = NULL;
codecPrivateSize = 0;
delete[] codecNameAsUTF8;
codecNameAsUTF8 = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,247
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __be32 nfsd3_proc_setacl(struct svc_rqst * rqstp,
struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp,
struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp)
{
struct inode *inode;
svc_fh *fh;
__be32 nfserr = 0;
int error;
fh = fh_copy(&resp->fh, &argp->fh);
nfserr = fh_verify(rqstp, &resp->fh, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
inode = d_inode(fh->fh_dentry);
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode) || !inode->i_op->set_acl) {
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_errno;
}
error = fh_want_write(fh);
if (error)
goto out_errno;
error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, argp->acl_access, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (error)
goto out_drop_write;
error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, argp->acl_default,
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
out_drop_write:
fh_drop_write(fh);
out_errno:
nfserr = nfserrno(error);
out:
/* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs. */
posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: nfsd in the Linux kernel through 4.6.3 allows local users to bypass intended file-permission restrictions by setting a POSIX ACL, related to nfs2acl.c, nfs3acl.c, and nfs4acl.c.
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: standard_row_validate(standard_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
int iImage, int iDisplay, png_uint_32 y)
{
int where;
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
/* The row must be pre-initialized to the magic number here for the size
* tests to pass:
*/
memset(std, 178, sizeof std);
standard_row(pp, std, dp->id, y);
/* At the end both the 'row' and 'display' arrays should end up identical.
* In earlier passes 'row' will be partially filled in, with only the pixels
* that have been read so far, but 'display' will have those pixels
* replicated to fill the unread pixels while reading an interlaced image.
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10506
* The side effect inside the libpng sequential reader is that the 'row'
* array retains the correct values for unwritten pixels within the row
* bytes, while the 'display' array gets bits off the end of the image (in
* the last byte) trashed. Unfortunately in the progressive reader the
* row bytes are always trashed, so we always do a pixel_cmp here even though
* a memcmp of all cbRow bytes will succeed for the sequential reader.
#endif
*/
if (iImage >= 0 &&
(where = pixel_cmp(std, store_image_row(dp->ps, pp, iImage, y),
dp->bit_width)) != 0)
{
char msg[64];
sprintf(msg, "PNG image row[%lu][%d] changed from %.2x to %.2x",
(unsigned long)y, where-1, std[where-1],
store_image_row(dp->ps, pp, iImage, y)[where-1]);
png_error(pp, msg);
}
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10506
/* In this case use pixel_cmp because we need to compare a partial
* byte at the end of the row if the row is not an exact multiple
* of 8 bits wide. (This is fixed in libpng-1.5.6 and pixel_cmp is
* changed to match!)
*/
#endif
if (iDisplay >= 0 &&
(where = pixel_cmp(std, store_image_row(dp->ps, pp, iDisplay, y),
dp->bit_width)) != 0)
{
char msg[64];
sprintf(msg, "display row[%lu][%d] changed from %.2x to %.2x",
(unsigned long)y, where-1, std[where-1],
store_image_row(dp->ps, pp, iDisplay, y)[where-1]);
png_error(pp, msg);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,701
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static jboolean enableNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jboolean result = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return result;
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->enable();
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS || ret == BT_STATUS_DONE) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows local users to gain privileges by establishing a pairing that remains present during a session of the primary user, aka internal bug 27410683.
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
|
Medium
| 174,161
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned int subpel_variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, int xoff, int yoff,
unsigned int *sse_ptr) {
int se = 0;
unsigned int sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w, h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
const int a1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 0];
const int a2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 0) + x + 1];
const int b1 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 0];
const int b2 = ref[(w + 1) * (y + 1) + x + 1];
const int a = a1 + (((a2 - a1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int b = b1 + (((b2 - b1) * xoff + 8) >> 4);
const int r = a + (((b - a) * yoff + 8) >> 4);
int diff = r - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
}
}
*sse_ptr = sse;
return sse - (((int64_t) se * se) >> (l2w + l2h));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GDataFile* AddFile(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service,
int sequence_id) {
GDataFile* file = new GDataFile(NULL, directory_service);
const std::string title = "file" + base::IntToString(sequence_id);
const std::string resource_id = std::string("file_resource_id:") +
title;
file->set_title(title);
file->set_resource_id(resource_id);
file->set_file_md5(std::string("file_md5:") + title);
GDataFileError error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
FilePath moved_file_path;
directory_service->MoveEntryToDirectory(
parent->GetFilePath(),
file,
base::Bind(&test_util::CopyResultsFromFileMoveCallback,
&error,
&moved_file_path));
test_util::RunBlockingPoolTask();
EXPECT_EQ(GDATA_FILE_OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(parent->GetFilePath().AppendASCII(title), moved_file_path);
return file;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kg_unseal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 code;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM) != NULL) {
code = kg_unseal_stream_iov(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
} else {
code = kg_unseal_iov_token(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
}
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonCommonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 || !pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 || !pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "(\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/* #3521 */
if (bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* \"");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~ \"");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '"';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in MapServer before 6.0.6, 6.2.x before 6.2.4, 6.4.x before 6.4.5, and 7.0.x before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via vectors involving WFS get feature requests.
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
|
Low
| 168,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tt_size_reset( TT_Size size,
FT_Bool only_height )
{
TT_Face face;
FT_Size_Metrics* metrics;
size->ttmetrics.valid = FALSE;
face = (TT_Face)size->root.face;
metrics = &size->metrics;
/* copy the result from base layer */
/* This bit flag, if set, indicates that the ppems must be */
/* rounded to integers. Nearly all TrueType fonts have this bit */
/* set, as hinting won't work really well otherwise. */
/* */
if ( face->header.Flags & 8 )
{
metrics->ascender =
FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.ascender, metrics->y_scale ) );
metrics->descender =
FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.descender, metrics->y_scale ) );
metrics->height =
FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.height, metrics->y_scale ) );
}
size->ttmetrics.valid = TRUE;
if ( only_height )
return FT_Err_Ok;
if ( face->header.Flags & 8 )
{
metrics->x_scale = FT_DivFix( metrics->x_ppem << 6,
face->root.units_per_EM );
metrics->y_scale = FT_DivFix( metrics->y_ppem << 6,
face->root.units_per_EM );
metrics->max_advance =
FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.max_advance_width,
metrics->x_scale ) );
}
/* compute new transformation */
if ( metrics->x_ppem >= metrics->y_ppem )
{
size->ttmetrics.scale = metrics->x_scale;
size->ttmetrics.ppem = metrics->x_ppem;
size->ttmetrics.x_ratio = 0x10000L;
size->ttmetrics.y_ratio = FT_DivFix( metrics->y_ppem,
metrics->x_ppem );
}
else
{
size->ttmetrics.scale = metrics->y_scale;
size->ttmetrics.ppem = metrics->y_ppem;
size->ttmetrics.x_ratio = FT_DivFix( metrics->x_ppem,
metrics->y_ppem );
size->ttmetrics.y_ratio = 0x10000L;
}
#ifdef TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
size->cvt_ready = -1;
#endif /* TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER */
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeType 2 before 2017-02-02 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the tt_size_reset function in truetype/ttobjs.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, bool presented,
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
uint32 sync_point = 0;
if (compositor) {
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
sync_point = factory->InsertSyncPoint();
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
route_id, gpu_host_id, presented, sync_point);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0)
return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
}
return cl;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in mruby 1.4.1. There is a NULL pointer dereference in mrb_class_real because *class BasicObject* is not properly supported in class.c.
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
|
Low
| 169,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_wddx_process_data(void *user_data, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (!wddx_stack_is_empty(stack) && !stack->done) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent);
switch (ent->type) {
case ST_STRING:
if (Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) == 0) {
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
} else {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) + len + 1);
memcpy(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) + Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data), s, len);
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) += len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data)[Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data)] = '\0';
}
break;
case ST_BINARY:
if (Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) == 0) {
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len + 1);
} else {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) + len + 1);
memcpy(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) + Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data), s, len);
}
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) += len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data)[Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data)] = '\0';
break;
case ST_NUMBER:
Z_TYPE_P(ent->data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
convert_scalar_to_number(ent->data TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case ST_BOOLEAN:
if(!ent->data) {
break;
}
if (!strcmp(s, "true")) {
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(s, "false")) {
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 0;
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent->data);
if (ent->varname) {
efree(ent->varname);
ent->varname = NULL;
}
ent->data = NULL;
}
break;
case ST_DATETIME: {
char *tmp;
tmp = emalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(tmp, s, len);
tmp[len] = '\0';
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = php_parse_date(tmp, NULL);
/* date out of range < 1969 or > 2038 */
if (Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) == -1) {
Z_TYPE_P(ent->data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
}
efree(tmp);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The php_wddx_process_data function in ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an invalid ISO 8601 time value, as demonstrated by a wddx_deserialize call that mishandles a dateTime element in a wddxPacket XML document.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72749: wddx_deserialize allows illegal memory access
|
Low
| 166,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool TokenExitsSVG(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
return DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(token.Data(),
SVGNames::foreignObjectTag.LocalName());
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Insufficient data validation in HTML parser in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
|
Medium
| 173,255
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void save_text_if_changed(const char *name, const char *new_value)
{
/* a text value can't be change if the file is not loaded */
/* returns NULL if the name is not found; otherwise nonzero */
if (!g_hash_table_lookup(g_loaded_texts, name))
return;
const char *old_value = g_cd ? problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd, name) : "";
if (!old_value)
old_value = "";
if (strcmp(new_value, old_value) != 0)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
dd_save_text(dd, name, new_value);
dd_close(dd);
problem_data_reload_from_dump_dir();
update_gui_state_from_problem_data(/* don't update selected event */ 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: libreport 2.0.7 before 2.6.3 only saves changes to the first file when editing a crash report, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors related to the (1) backtrace, (2) cmdline, (3) environ, (4) open_fds, (5) maps, (6) smaps, (7) hostname, (8) remote, (9) ks.cfg, or (10) anaconda-tb file attachment included in a Red Hat Bugzilla bug report.
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AppCacheDispatcherHost::AppCacheDispatcherHost(
ChromeAppCacheService* appcache_service,
int process_id)
: BrowserMessageFilter(AppCacheMsgStart),
appcache_service_(appcache_service),
frontend_proxy_(this),
process_id_(process_id) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in content/browser/appcache/appcache_dispatcher_host.cc in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect pointer maintenance associated with certain callbacks.
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930}
|
Low
| 171,744
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RegisterClientProcess(
mojom::ClientProcessPtr client_process_ptr,
mojom::ProcessType process_type) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
mojom::ClientProcess* client_process = client_process_ptr.get();
client_process_ptr.set_connection_error_handler(
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::UnregisterClientProcess,
base::Unretained(this), client_process));
auto identity = GetClientIdentityForCurrentRequest();
auto client_info = std::make_unique<ClientInfo>(
std::move(identity), std::move(client_process_ptr), process_type);
auto iterator_and_inserted =
clients_.emplace(client_process, std::move(client_info));
DCHECK(iterator_and_inserted.second);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
|
Medium
| 173,215
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl(
ANativeWindow* window,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner)
: root_surface_(new SurfaceControl::Surface(window, kRootSurfaceName)),
gpu_task_runner_(std::move(task_runner)),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
Medium
| 172,109
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: validate_T(void)
/* Validate the above table - this just builds the above values */
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R)
read_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_W)
write_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
}
/* Reversible transforms are those which are supported on both read and
* write.
*/
rw_transforms = read_transforms & write_transforms;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_pps(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
WORD32 pps_id;
pps_t *ps_pps;
sps_t *ps_sps;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
UEV_PARSE("pic_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
pps_id = value;
if((pps_id >= MAX_PPS_CNT) || (pps_id < 0))
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pps_done)
return IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_PPS_ID;
else
pps_id = 0;
}
ps_pps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps_base + MAX_PPS_CNT - 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
UEV_PARSE("seq_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = value;
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = CLIP3(ps_pps->i1_sps_id, 0, MAX_SPS_CNT - 2);
ps_sps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + ps_pps->i1_sps_id);
/* If the SPS that is being referred to has not been parsed,
* copy an existing SPS to the current location */
if(0 == ps_sps->i1_sps_valid)
{
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
/*
sps_t *ps_sps_ref = ps_codec->ps_sps_base;
while(0 == ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_valid)
ps_sps_ref++;
ihevcd_copy_sps(ps_codec, ps_pps->i1_sps_id, ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_id);
*/
}
BITS_PARSE("dependent_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_dependent_slice_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("output_flag_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_output_flag_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("num_extra_slice_header_bits", value, ps_bitstrm, 3);
ps_pps->i1_num_extra_slice_header_bits = value;
BITS_PARSE("sign_data_hiding_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_sign_data_hiding_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cabac_init_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cabac_init_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l0_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_default_active = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l1_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_default_active = value + 1;
SEV_PARSE("pic_init_qp_minus26", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_init_qp = value + 26;
BITS_PARSE("constrained_intra_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_constrained_intra_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transform_skip_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transform_skip_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("diff_cu_qp_delta_depth", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = value;
}
else
{
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = 0;
}
ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size = ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size - ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cb_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cb_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cr_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cr_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
BITS_PARSE("slicelevel_chroma_qp_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_bipred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_bipred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transquant_bypass_enable_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transquant_bypass_enable_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag = value;
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_columns_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_rows_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = value + 1;
if((ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
BITS_PARSE("uniform_spacing_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = value;
{
WORD32 start;
WORD32 i, j;
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("column_width_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + j * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + i;
ps_tile->u1_pos_x = start;
ps_tile->u2_wd = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows); i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("row_height_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + i * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + j;
ps_tile->u1_pos_y = start;
ps_tile->u2_ht = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
}
else
{
/* If tiles are not present, set first tile in each PPS to have tile
width and height equal to picture width and height */
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = 1;
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = 1;
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = 1;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_x = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_y = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_wd = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_ht = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_control_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag = value;
/* Default values */
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = 0;
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = value;
if(!ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("pps_beta_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = value;
SEV_PARSE("pps_tc_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = value;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag)
{
COPY_DEFAULT_SCALING_LIST(ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
ihevcd_scaling_list_data(ps_codec, ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
}
BITS_PARSE("lists_modification_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_lists_modification_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("log2_parallel_merge_level_minus2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_log2_parallel_merge_level = value + 2;
BITS_PARSE("slice_header_extension_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_slice_header_extension_present_flag = value;
/* Not present in HM */
BITS_PARSE("pps_extension_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_codec->i4_pps_done = 1;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process.Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34064500.
Commit Message: Correct Tiles rows and cols check
Bug: 36231493
Bug: 34064500
Change-Id: Ib17b2c68360685c5a2c019e1497612a130f9f76a
(cherry picked from commit 07ef4e7138e0e13d61039530358343a19308b188)
|
Medium
| 174,000
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, setCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = ',', enclosure = '"', escape='\\';
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sss", &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 3:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 0:
break;
}
intern->u.file.delimiter = delimiter;
intern->u.file.enclosure = enclosure;
intern->u.file.escape = escape;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,063
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void pipe_advance(struct iov_iter *i, size_t size)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = i->pipe;
struct pipe_buffer *buf;
int idx = i->idx;
size_t off = i->iov_offset, orig_sz;
if (unlikely(i->count < size))
size = i->count;
orig_sz = size;
if (size) {
if (off) /* make it relative to the beginning of buffer */
size += off - pipe->bufs[idx].offset;
while (1) {
buf = &pipe->bufs[idx];
if (size <= buf->len)
break;
size -= buf->len;
idx = next_idx(idx, pipe);
}
buf->len = size;
i->idx = idx;
off = i->iov_offset = buf->offset + size;
}
if (off)
idx = next_idx(idx, pipe);
if (pipe->nrbufs) {
int unused = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
/* [curbuf,unused) is in use. Free [idx,unused) */
while (idx != unused) {
pipe_buf_release(pipe, &pipe->bufs[idx]);
idx = next_idx(idx, pipe);
pipe->nrbufs--;
}
}
i->count -= orig_sz;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Off-by-one error in the pipe_advance function in lib/iov_iter.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.5 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from uninitialized heap-memory locations in opportunistic circumstances by reading from a pipe after an incorrect buffer-release decision.
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 168,388
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: decode_bundle(bool load, const struct nx_action_bundle *nab,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map, uint64_t *tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
static struct vlog_rate_limit rl = VLOG_RATE_LIMIT_INIT(1, 5);
struct ofpact_bundle *bundle;
uint32_t slave_type;
size_t slaves_size, i;
enum ofperr error;
bundle = ofpact_put_BUNDLE(ofpacts);
bundle->n_slaves = ntohs(nab->n_slaves);
bundle->basis = ntohs(nab->basis);
bundle->fields = ntohs(nab->fields);
bundle->algorithm = ntohs(nab->algorithm);
slave_type = ntohl(nab->slave_type);
slaves_size = ntohs(nab->len) - sizeof *nab;
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
if (!flow_hash_fields_valid(bundle->fields)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported fields %d", (int) bundle->fields);
} else if (bundle->n_slaves > BUNDLE_MAX_SLAVES) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "too many slaves");
} else if (bundle->algorithm != NX_BD_ALG_HRW
&& bundle->algorithm != NX_BD_ALG_ACTIVE_BACKUP) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported algorithm %d", (int) bundle->algorithm);
} else if (slave_type != mf_nxm_header(MFF_IN_PORT)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported slave type %"PRIu16, slave_type);
} else {
error = 0;
}
if (!is_all_zeros(nab->zero, sizeof nab->zero)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "reserved field is nonzero");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (load) {
bundle->dst.ofs = nxm_decode_ofs(nab->ofs_nbits);
bundle->dst.n_bits = nxm_decode_n_bits(nab->ofs_nbits);
error = mf_vl_mff_mf_from_nxm_header(ntohl(nab->dst), vl_mff_map,
&bundle->dst.field, tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (bundle->dst.n_bits < 16) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "bundle_load action requires at least 16 bit "
"destination.");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
} else {
if (nab->ofs_nbits || nab->dst) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "bundle action has nonzero reserved fields");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
if (slaves_size < bundle->n_slaves * sizeof(ovs_be16)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "Nicira action %s only has %"PRIuSIZE" bytes "
"allocated for slaves. %"PRIuSIZE" bytes are required "
"for %"PRIu16" slaves.",
load ? "bundle_load" : "bundle", slaves_size,
bundle->n_slaves * sizeof(ovs_be16), bundle->n_slaves);
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_LEN;
}
for (i = 0; i < bundle->n_slaves; i++) {
ofp_port_t ofp_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(((ovs_be16 *)(nab + 1))[i]));
ofpbuf_put(ofpacts, &ofp_port, sizeof ofp_port);
bundle = ofpacts->header;
}
ofpact_finish_BUNDLE(ofpacts, &bundle);
if (!error) {
error = bundle_check(bundle, OFPP_MAX, NULL);
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in Open vSwitch (OvS) 2.7.x through 2.7.6. The decode_bundle function inside lib/ofp-actions.c is affected by a buffer over-read issue during BUNDLE action decoding.
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
|
???
| 169,023
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RecordResourceCompletionUMA(bool image_complete,
bool css_complete,
bool xhr_complete) {
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Image",
image_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Css",
css_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Xhr",
xhr_complete);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow during image processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
|
Medium
| 172,483
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setStrokeStyle(
const StringOrCanvasGradientOrCanvasPattern& style) {
DCHECK(!style.IsNull());
String color_string;
CanvasStyle* canvas_style = nullptr;
if (style.IsString()) {
color_string = style.GetAsString();
if (color_string == GetState().UnparsedStrokeColor())
return;
Color parsed_color = 0;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(parsed_color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().StrokeStyle()->IsEquivalentRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb())) {
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
return;
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb());
} else if (style.IsCanvasGradient()) {
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromGradient(style.GetAsCanvasGradient());
} else if (style.IsCanvasPattern()) {
CanvasPattern* canvas_pattern = style.GetAsCanvasPattern();
if (OriginClean() && !canvas_pattern->OriginClean()) {
SetOriginTainted();
ClearResolvedFilters();
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromPattern(canvas_pattern);
}
DCHECK(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetStrokeStyle(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
ModifiableState().ClearResolvedFilter();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Displacement map filters being applied to cross-origin images in Blink SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
|
Medium
| 172,909
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient() {
if (IsMus())
return;
cc::FrameSinkId frame_sink_id =
host_->AllocateFrameSinkId(is_guest_view_hack_);
if (!delegated_frame_host_client_) {
delegated_frame_host_client_ =
base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHostClientAura>(this);
}
delegated_frame_host_ = base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHost>(
frame_sink_id, delegated_frame_host_client_.get());
if (renderer_compositor_frame_sink_) {
delegated_frame_host_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_);
}
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
if (host_->delegate() && host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()) {
host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()->AddFrameSinkIdOwner(
GetFrameSinkId(), this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The Omnibox implementation in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82 allows remote attackers to spoof a document's origin via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
Medium
| 172,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jpc_qmfb_split_col(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register int n;
register int m;
int hstartcol;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
m = numrows - hstartcol;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
++dstptr;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += stride;
++srcptr;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap-buffer overflow vulnerability was found in QMFB code in JPC codec caused by buffer being allocated with too small size. jasper versions before 2.0.0 are affected.
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
|
Medium
| 169,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int wrmsr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 2;
if (svm_set_msr(&svm->vcpu, &msr)) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(&svm->vcpu, 0);
} else {
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The WRMSR processing functionality in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly handle the writing of a non-canonical address to a model-specific register, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging guest OS privileges, related to the wrmsr_interception function in arch/x86/kvm/svm.c and the handle_wrmsr function in arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_,
log2height_, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,586
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
to += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The (1) pipe_read and (2) pipe_write implementations in fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16 do not properly consider the side effects of failed __copy_to_user_inatomic and __copy_from_user_inatomic calls, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application, aka an *I/O vector array overrun.*
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,686
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(
Segment* pSegment,
long idx,
long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment,
idx,
element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
{
int flags;
int32_t fid;
int64_t size;
ssize_t err = 0;
V9fsString name;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *file_fidp;
V9fsFidState *xattr_fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsqd", &fid, &name, &size, &flags);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrcreate(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, size, flags);
file_fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (file_fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
/* Make the file fid point to xattr */
xattr_fidp = file_fidp;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = 0;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
err = offset;
put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the v9fs_xattrcreate function in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and QEMU process crash) via a large number of Txattrcreate messages with the same fid number.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,909
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Cues::DoneParsing() const
{
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
return (m_pos >= stop);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,267
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(readgzfile)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
int flags = REPORT_ERRORS;
php_stream *stream;
int size;
long use_include_path = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &filename, &filename_len, &use_include_path) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (use_include_path) {
flags |= USE_PATH;
}
stream = php_stream_gzopen(NULL, filename, "rb", flags, NULL, NULL STREAMS_CC TSRMLS_CC);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size = php_stream_passthru(stream);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_LONG(size);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Failure to disallow PWA installation from CSP sandboxed pages in AppManifest in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to access privileged APIs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
|
Medium
| 172,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void TearDownTestCase() {
vpx_free(source_data_);
source_data_ = NULL;
vpx_free(reference_data_);
reference_data_ = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,579
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadEMFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BITMAPINFO
DIBinfo;
HBITMAP
hBitmap,
hOldBitmap;
HDC
hDC;
HENHMETAFILE
hemf;
Image
*image;
RECT
rect;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
RGBQUAD
*pBits,
*ppBits;
ssize_t
height,
width,
y;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
hemf=ReadEnhMetaFile(image_info->filename,&width,&height);
if (hemf == (HENHMETAFILE) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
double
y_resolution,
x_resolution;
y_resolution=DefaultResolution;
x_resolution=DefaultResolution;
if (image->y_resolution > 0)
{
y_resolution=image->y_resolution;
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
y_resolution*=CENTIMETERS_INCH;
}
if (image->x_resolution > 0)
{
x_resolution=image->x_resolution;
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
x_resolution*=CENTIMETERS_INCH;
}
image->rows=(size_t) ((height/1000.0/CENTIMETERS_INCH)*y_resolution+0.5);
image->columns=(size_t) ((width/1000.0/CENTIMETERS_INCH)*
x_resolution+0.5);
}
if (image_info->size != (char *) NULL)
{
ssize_t
x;
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
x=0;
y=0;
(void) GetGeometry(image_info->size,&x,&y,&image->columns,&image->rows);
}
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
{
char
*geometry;
register char
*p;
MagickStatusType
flags;
ssize_t
sans;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(image_info->page);
p=strchr(geometry,'>');
if (p == (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseMetaGeometry(geometry,&sans,&sans,&image->columns,
&image->rows);
if (image->x_resolution != 0.0)
image->columns=(size_t) floor((image->columns*image->x_resolution)+
0.5);
if (image->y_resolution != 0.0)
image->rows=(size_t) floor((image->rows*image->y_resolution)+0.5);
}
else
{
*p='\0';
flags=ParseMetaGeometry(geometry,&sans,&sans,&image->columns,
&image->rows);
if (image->x_resolution != 0.0)
image->columns=(size_t) floor(((image->columns*image->x_resolution)/
DefaultResolution)+0.5);
if (image->y_resolution != 0.0)
image->rows=(size_t) floor(((image->rows*image->y_resolution)/
DefaultResolution)+0.5);
}
(void) flags;
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
hDC=GetDC(NULL);
if (hDC == (HDC) NULL)
{
DeleteEnhMetaFile(hemf);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToCreateADC");
}
/*
Initialize the bitmap header info.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&DIBinfo,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) image->columns;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) image->rows;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biBitCount=32;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
hBitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&DIBinfo,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &ppBits,NULL,
0);
ReleaseDC(NULL,hDC);
if (hBitmap == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteEnhMetaFile(hemf);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
hDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
if (hDC == (HDC) NULL)
{
DeleteEnhMetaFile(hemf);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToCreateADC");
}
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hDC,hBitmap);
if (hOldBitmap == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteEnhMetaFile(hemf);
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
/*
Initialize the bitmap to the image background color.
*/
pBits=ppBits;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pBits->rgbRed=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.red);
pBits->rgbGreen=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.green);
pBits->rgbBlue=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.blue);
pBits++;
}
}
rect.top=0;
rect.left=0;
rect.right=(LONG) image->columns;
rect.bottom=(LONG) image->rows;
/*
Convert metafile pixels.
*/
PlayEnhMetaFile(hDC,hemf,&rect);
pBits=ppBits;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
pBits++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteEnhMetaFile(hemf);
SelectObject(hDC,hOldBitmap);
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,562
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FrameImpl::FrameImpl(std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> web_contents,
chromium::web::FrameObserverPtr observer)
: web_contents_(std::move(web_contents)), observer_(std::move(observer)) {
Observe(web_contents.get());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,152
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xps_true_callback_glyph_name function in xps/xpsttf.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (Segmentation Violation and application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,784
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void tcp_illinois_info(struct sock *sk, u32 ext,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
if (ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO - 1))) {
struct tcpvegas_info info = {
.tcpv_enabled = 1,
.tcpv_rttcnt = ca->cnt_rtt,
.tcpv_minrtt = ca->base_rtt,
};
u64 t = ca->sum_rtt;
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
info.tcpv_rtt = t;
nla_put(skb, INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The tcp_illinois_info function in net/ipv4/tcp_illinois.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.19, when the net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control illinois setting is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and OOPS) by reading TCP stats.
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
{
const ptrdiff_t result = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
assert(result >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (siz->tilexoff >= siz->width || siz->tileyoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("all tiles are outside the image area\n");
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The jas_seq2d_create function in jas_seq.c in JasPer before 1.900.17 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Added some missing sanity checks on the data in a SIZ marker segment.
|
Medium
| 168,731
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int pdf_load_xrefs(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, ver, is_linear;
long pos, pos_count;
char x, *c, buf[256];
c = NULL;
/* Count number of xrefs */
pdf->n_xrefs = 0;
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (get_next_eof(fp) >= 0)
++pdf->n_xrefs;
if (!pdf->n_xrefs)
return 0;
/* Load in the start/end positions */
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
pdf->xrefs = calloc(1, sizeof(xref_t) * pdf->n_xrefs);
ver = 1;
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
/* Seek to %%EOF */
if ((pos = get_next_eof(fp)) < 0)
break;
/* Set and increment the version */
pdf->xrefs[i].version = ver++;
/* Rewind until we find end of "startxref" */
pos_count = 0;
while (SAFE_F(fp, ((x = fgetc(fp)) != 'f')))
fseek(fp, pos - (++pos_count), SEEK_SET);
/* Suck in end of "startxref" to start of %%EOF */
if (pos_count >= sizeof(buf)) {
ERR("Failed to locate the startxref token. "
"This might be a corrupt PDF.\n");
return -1;
}
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, pos_count, fp), pos_count,
"Failed to read startxref.\n");
c = buf;
while (*c == ' ' || *c == '\n' || *c == '\r')
++c;
/* xref start position */
pdf->xrefs[i].start = atol(c);
/* If xref is 0 handle linear xref table */
if (pdf->xrefs[i].start == 0)
get_xref_linear_skipped(fp, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
/* Non-linear, normal operation, so just find the end of the xref */
else
{
/* xref end position */
pos = ftell(fp);
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
pdf->xrefs[i].end = get_next_eof(fp);
/* Look for next EOF and xref data */
fseek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
}
/* Check validity */
if (!is_valid_xref(fp, pdf, &pdf->xrefs[i]))
{
is_linear = pdf->xrefs[i].is_linear;
memset(&pdf->xrefs[i], 0, sizeof(xref_t));
pdf->xrefs[i].is_linear = is_linear;
rewind(fp);
get_next_eof(fp);
continue;
}
/* Load the entries from the xref */
load_xref_entries(fp, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
}
/* Now we have all xref tables, if this is linearized, we need
* to make adjustments so that things spit out properly
*/
if (pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear)
resolve_linearized_pdf(pdf);
/* Ok now we have all xref data. Go through those versions of the
* PDF and try to obtain creator information
*/
load_creator(fp, pdf);
return pdf->n_xrefs;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in PDFResurrect before 0.18. pdf_load_pages_kids in pdf.c doesn't validate a certain size value, which leads to a malloc failure and out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
|
Medium
| 169,572
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
uint64 surface_handle) {
DCHECK(image_transport_clients_.find(surface_handle) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
if (current_surface_ == surface_handle) {
current_surface_ = 0;
UpdateExternalTexture();
}
image_transport_clients_.erase(surface_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,375
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void iwjpeg_scan_exif_ifd(struct iwjpegrcontext *rctx,
struct iw_exif_state *e, iw_uint32 ifd)
{
unsigned int tag_count;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int tag_pos;
unsigned int tag_id;
unsigned int v;
double v_dbl;
if(ifd<8 || ifd>e->d_len-18) return;
tag_count = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[ifd],e->endian);
if(tag_count>1000) return; // Sanity check.
for(i=0;i<tag_count;i++) {
tag_pos = ifd+2+i*12;
if(tag_pos+12 > e->d_len) return; // Avoid overruns.
tag_id = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos],e->endian);
switch(tag_id) {
case 274: // 274 = Orientation
if(get_exif_tag_int_value(e,tag_pos,&v)) {
rctx->exif_orientation = v;
}
break;
case 296: // 296 = ResolutionUnit
if(get_exif_tag_int_value(e,tag_pos,&v)) {
rctx->exif_density_unit = v;
}
break;
case 282: // 282 = XResolution
if(get_exif_tag_dbl_value(e,tag_pos,&v_dbl)) {
rctx->exif_density_x = v_dbl;
}
break;
case 283: // 283 = YResolution
if(get_exif_tag_dbl_value(e,tag_pos,&v_dbl)) {
rctx->exif_density_y = v_dbl;
}
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The iw_get_ui16be function in imagew-util.c:422:24 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted image, related to imagew-jpeg.c.
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
|
Medium
| 168,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> GetConfigResponse(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(config_.SerializeAsString());
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
if (config_run_loop_)
config_run_loop_->Quit();
return response;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
Medium
| 172,414
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperPlatformVideoCapture::GetMediaDeviceManager() {
RenderFrameImpl* const render_frame =
RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(render_frame_id_);
return render_frame ?
PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(render_frame) : NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
|
Low
| 171,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mapi_attr_read (size_t len, unsigned char *buf)
{
size_t idx = 0;
uint32 i,j;
assert(len > 4);
uint32 num_properties = GETINT32(buf+idx);
MAPI_Attr** attrs = CHECKED_XMALLOC (MAPI_Attr*, (num_properties + 1));
idx += 4;
if (!attrs) return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < num_properties; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr* a = attrs[i] = CHECKED_XCALLOC(MAPI_Attr, 1);
MAPI_Value* v = NULL;
CHECKINT16(idx, len); a->type = GETINT16(buf+idx); idx += 2;
CHECKINT16(idx, len); a->name = GETINT16(buf+idx); idx += 2;
/* handle special case of GUID prefixed properties */
if (a->name & GUID_EXISTS_FLAG)
{
/* copy GUID */
a->guid = CHECKED_XMALLOC(GUID, 1);
copy_guid_from_buf(a->guid, buf+idx, len);
idx += sizeof (GUID);
CHECKINT32(idx, len); a->num_names = GETINT32(buf+idx); idx += 4;
if (a->num_names > 0)
{
/* FIXME: do something useful here! */
size_t i;
a->names = CHECKED_XCALLOC(VarLenData, a->num_names);
for (i = 0; i < a->num_names; i++)
{
size_t j;
CHECKINT32(idx, len); a->names[i].len = GETINT32(buf+idx); idx += 4;
/* read the data into a buffer */
a->names[i].data
= CHECKED_XMALLOC(unsigned char, a->names[i].len);
for (j = 0; j < (a->names[i].len >> 1); j++)
a->names[i].data[j] = (buf+idx)[j*2];
/* But what are we going to do with it? */
idx += pad_to_4byte(a->names[i].len);
}
}
else
{
/* get the 'real' name */
CHECKINT32(idx, len); a->name = GETINT32(buf+idx); idx+= 4;
}
}
/*
* Multi-value types and string/object/binary types have
* multiple values
*/
if (a->type & MULTI_VALUE_FLAG ||
a->type == szMAPI_STRING ||
a->type == szMAPI_UNICODE_STRING ||
a->type == szMAPI_OBJECT ||
a->type == szMAPI_BINARY)
{
CHECKINT32(idx, len); a->num_values = GETINT32(buf+idx);
idx += 4;
}
else
{
a->num_values = 1;
}
/* Amend the type in case of multi-value type */
if (a->type & MULTI_VALUE_FLAG)
{
a->type -= MULTI_VALUE_FLAG;
}
v = alloc_mapi_values (a);
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
switch (a->type)
{
case szMAPI_SHORT: /* 2 bytes */
v->len = 2;
CHECKINT16(idx, len); v->data.bytes2 = GETINT16(buf+idx);
idx += 4; /* assume padding of 2, advance by 4! */
break;
case szMAPI_INT: /* 4 bytes */
v->len = 4;
CHECKINT32(idx, len); v->data.bytes4 = GETINT32(buf+idx);
idx += 4;
v++;
break;
case szMAPI_FLOAT: /* 4 bytes */
case szMAPI_BOOLEAN: /* this should be 2 bytes + 2 padding */
v->len = 4;
CHECKINT32(idx, len); v->data.bytes4 = GETINT32(buf+idx);
idx += v->len;
break;
case szMAPI_SYSTIME: /* 8 bytes */
v->len = 8;
CHECKINT32(idx, len); v->data.bytes8[0] = GETINT32(buf+idx);
CHECKINT32(idx+4, len); v->data.bytes8[1] = GETINT32(buf+idx+4);
idx += 8;
v++;
break;
case szMAPI_DOUBLE: /* 8 bytes */
case szMAPI_APPTIME:
case szMAPI_CURRENCY:
case szMAPI_INT8BYTE:
v->len = 8;
CHECKINT32(idx, len); v->data.bytes8[0] = GETINT32(buf+idx);
CHECKINT32(idx+4, len); v->data.bytes8[1] = GETINT32(buf+idx+4);
idx += v->len;
break;
case szMAPI_CLSID:
v->len = sizeof (GUID);
copy_guid_from_buf(&v->data.guid, buf+idx, len);
idx += v->len;
break;
case szMAPI_STRING:
case szMAPI_UNICODE_STRING:
case szMAPI_OBJECT:
case szMAPI_BINARY:
CHECKINT32(idx, len); v->len = GETINT32(buf+idx); idx += 4;
if (a->type == szMAPI_UNICODE_STRING)
{
v->data.buf = (unsigned char*)unicode_to_utf8(v->len, buf+idx);
}
else
{
v->data.buf = CHECKED_XMALLOC(unsigned char, v->len);
memmove (v->data.buf, buf+idx, v->len);
}
idx += pad_to_4byte(v->len);
v++;
break;
case szMAPI_NULL: /* illegal in input tnef streams */
case szMAPI_ERROR:
case szMAPI_UNSPECIFIED:
fprintf (stderr,
"Invalid attribute, input file may be corrupted\n");
if (!ENCODE_SKIP) exit (1);
return NULL;
default: /* should never get here */
fprintf (stderr,
"Undefined attribute, input file may be corrupted\n");
if (!ENCODE_SKIP) exit (1);
return NULL;
}
if (DEBUG_ON) mapi_attr_dump (attrs[i]);
}
}
attrs[i] = NULL;
return attrs;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Two OOB Writes have been identified in src/mapi_attr.c:mapi_attr_read(). These might lead to invalid read and write operations, controlled by an attacker.
Commit Message: Use asserts on lengths to prevent invalid reads/writes.
|
Medium
| 168,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned long Segment::GetCount() const
{
return m_clusterCount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *cp;
u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (state->packet_discard)
return 0;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context,
&state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
return 0;
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
} else if (state->packlen == 0) {
/*
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
return 0;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context,
state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
goto out;
}
DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
if (aadlen) {
/* only the payload is encrypted */
need = state->packlen;
} else {
/*
* the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
* have a partial packet of block_size bytes
*/
need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
}
DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
" aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
if (need % block_size != 0) {
logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
}
/*
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet:
* 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
* 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
* 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
* 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
/* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
maclen)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
/* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
goto out;
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
}
/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
/* get padlen */
padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
else
r = 0;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
/* do we need to rekey? */
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via an out-of-sequence NEWKEYS message, as demonstrated by Honggfuzz, related to kex.c and packet.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,484
|
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