instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCommittedFirstRealLoad() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
GetFrame()->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
GetFrame()->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Incorrect handling of timer information during navigation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obtain cross origin URLs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
Medium
| 172,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The cdf_read_property_info function in file before 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14, does not properly validate a stream offset, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted CDF file.
Commit Message: Add missing check offset test (Francisco Alonso, Jan Kaluza at RedHat)
|
Medium
| 166,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The iw_get_ui16be function in imagew-util.c:422:24 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted image, related to imagew-jpeg.c.
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
|
Medium
| 168,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid);
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*
* dd_create_skeleton() creates a new directory and leaves ownership to
* the current user, hence, we have to call dd_reset_ownership() after the
* directory is populated.
*/
dd = dd_create_skeleton(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE, /*no flags*/0);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
}
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* And finally set the right uid and gid */
dd_reset_ownership(dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s' at '%s'", core_basename, user_pwd);
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s at %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, core_basename, user_pwd, (long long)core_size);
}
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 170,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Track* Tracks::GetTrackByIndex(unsigned long idx) const
{
const ptrdiff_t count = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return m_trackEntries[idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetTimeCode() const
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
return m_timecode;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,365
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int gss_iakerbmechglue_init(void)
{
struct gss_mech_config mech_iakerb;
struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = krb5_mechanism;
/* IAKERB mechanism mirrors krb5, but with different context SPIs */
iakerb_mechanism.gss_accept_sec_context = iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context;
iakerb_mechanism.gss_init_sec_context = iakerb_gss_init_sec_context;
iakerb_mechanism.gss_delete_sec_context = iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context;
iakerb_mechanism.gss_acquire_cred = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred;
iakerb_mechanism.gssspi_acquire_cred_with_password
= iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password;
memset(&mech_iakerb, 0, sizeof(mech_iakerb));
mech_iakerb.mech = &iakerb_mechanism;
mech_iakerb.mechNameStr = "iakerb";
mech_iakerb.mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
gssint_register_mechinfo(&mech_iakerb);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted IAKERB packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: grub_ext2_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
int (*hook) (const char *filename,
enum grub_fshelp_filetype filetype,
grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void *closure),
void *closure)
{
unsigned int fpos = 0;
struct grub_fshelp_node *diro = (struct grub_fshelp_node *) dir;
if (! diro->inode_read)
{
grub_ext2_read_inode (diro->data, diro->ino, &diro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
}
/* Search the file. */
if (hook)
while (fpos < grub_le_to_cpu32 (diro->inode.size))
{
struct ext2_dirent dirent;
grub_ext2_read_file (diro, NULL, NULL, 0, fpos, sizeof (dirent),
(char *) &dirent);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
if (dirent.direntlen == 0)
return 0;
if (dirent.namelen != 0)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char filename[dirent.namelen + 1];
#else
char * filename = grub_malloc (dirent.namelen + 1);
#endif
struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_UNKNOWN;
grub_ext2_read_file (diro, 0, 0, 0,
fpos + sizeof (struct ext2_dirent),
dirent.namelen, filename);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
fdiro = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_fshelp_node));
if (! fdiro)
return 0;
fdiro->data = diro->data;
fdiro->ino = grub_le_to_cpu32 (dirent.inode);
filename[dirent.namelen] = '\0';
if (dirent.filetype != FILETYPE_UNKNOWN)
{
fdiro->inode_read = 0;
if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_DIRECTORY)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
else if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_SYMLINK)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK;
else if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_REG)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_REG;
}
else
{
/* The filetype can not be read from the dirent, read
the inode to get more information. */
grub_ext2_read_inode (diro->data,
grub_le_to_cpu32 (dirent.inode),
&fdiro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
{
grub_free (fdiro);
return 0;
}
fdiro->inode_read = 1;
if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_DIRECTORY)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
else if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_SYMLINK)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK;
else if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_REG)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_REG;
}
if (hook (filename, type, fdiro, closure))
return 1;
}
fpos += grub_le_to_cpu16 (dirent.direntlen);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The grub_memmove function in shlr/grub/kern/misc.c in radare2 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer underflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file, possibly related to a buffer underflow in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB 2.02.
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
|
Medium
| 168,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(PVOID buffer, ULONG size, LPCSTR caller)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket((IPHeader *) buffer, size);
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 170,144
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool FakeCentral::IsPowered() const {
switch (state_) {
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_OFF:
return false;
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_ON:
return true;
case mojom::CentralState::ABSENT:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in filter processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
Medium
| 172,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void exitErrorHandler(jpeg_common_struct *error) {
j_decompress_ptr cinfo = (j_decompress_ptr)error;
str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
src->abort = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: DCTStream.cc in Poppler before 0.13.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setNextPlayer(const sp<IMediaPlayer>& player) {
ALOGV("setNextPlayer");
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
sp<Client> c = static_cast<Client*>(player.get());
mNextClient = c;
if (c != NULL) {
if (mAudioOutput != NULL) {
mAudioOutput->setNextOutput(c->mAudioOutput);
} else if ((mPlayer != NULL) && !mPlayer->hardwareOutput()) {
ALOGE("no current audio output");
}
if ((mPlayer != NULL) && (mNextClient->getPlayer() != NULL)) {
mPlayer->setNextPlayer(mNextClient->getPlayer());
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/MediaPlayerService.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 does not validate a certain static_cast operation, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30204103.
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
|
Medium
| 173,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
int n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestActiveDOMObject* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info);
TestActiveDOMObject* impl = static_cast<TestActiveDOMObject*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
const String& message(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->postMessage(message);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HttpAuthFilterWhitelist::SetWhitelist(
const std::string& server_whitelist) {
rules_.ParseFromString(server_whitelist);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Lack of special casing of localhost in WPAD files in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to proxy resources on localhost via a crafted WPAD file.
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
|
Medium
| 172,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::DoUpdateFromElement(BypassMainWorldBehavior bypass_behavior,
UpdateFromElementBehavior update_behavior,
const KURL& url,
ReferrerPolicy referrer_policy,
UpdateType update_type) {
pending_task_.reset();
std::unique_ptr<IncrementLoadEventDelayCount> load_delay_counter;
load_delay_counter.swap(delay_until_do_update_from_element_);
Document& document = element_->GetDocument();
if (!document.IsActive())
return;
AtomicString image_source_url = element_->ImageSourceURL();
ImageResourceContent* new_image_content = nullptr;
if (!url.IsNull() && !url.IsEmpty()) {
ResourceLoaderOptions resource_loader_options;
resource_loader_options.initiator_info.name = GetElement()->localName();
ResourceRequest resource_request(url);
if (update_behavior == kUpdateForcedReload) {
resource_request.SetCacheMode(mojom::FetchCacheMode::kBypassCache);
resource_request.SetPreviewsState(WebURLRequest::kPreviewsNoTransform);
}
if (referrer_policy != kReferrerPolicyDefault) {
resource_request.SetHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
referrer_policy, url, document.OutgoingReferrer()));
}
if (IsHTMLPictureElement(GetElement()->parentNode()) ||
!GetElement()->FastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::srcsetAttr).IsNull()) {
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImageSet);
} else if (IsHTMLObjectElement(GetElement())) {
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextObject);
} else if (IsHTMLEmbedElement(GetElement())) {
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextEmbed);
}
bool page_is_being_dismissed =
document.PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal;
if (page_is_being_dismissed) {
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Cache_Control,
"max-age=0");
resource_request.SetKeepalive(true);
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextPing);
}
FetchParameters params(resource_request, resource_loader_options);
ConfigureRequest(params, bypass_behavior, *element_,
document.GetClientHintsPreferences());
if (update_behavior != kUpdateForcedReload && document.GetFrame())
document.GetFrame()->MaybeAllowImagePlaceholder(params);
new_image_content = ImageResourceContent::Fetch(params, document.Fetcher());
if (page_is_being_dismissed)
new_image_content = nullptr;
ClearFailedLoadURL();
} else {
if (!image_source_url.IsNull()) {
DispatchErrorEvent();
}
NoImageResourceToLoad();
}
ImageResourceContent* old_image_content = image_content_.Get();
if (old_image_content != new_image_content)
RejectPendingDecodes(update_type);
if (update_behavior == kUpdateSizeChanged && element_->GetLayoutObject() &&
element_->GetLayoutObject()->IsImage() &&
new_image_content == old_image_content) {
ToLayoutImage(element_->GetLayoutObject())->IntrinsicSizeChanged();
} else {
if (pending_load_event_.IsActive())
pending_load_event_.Cancel();
if (pending_error_event_.IsActive() && new_image_content)
pending_error_event_.Cancel();
UpdateImageState(new_image_content);
UpdateLayoutObject();
if (new_image_content) {
new_image_content->AddObserver(this);
}
if (old_image_content) {
old_image_content->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
if (LayoutImageResource* image_resource = GetLayoutImageResource())
image_resource->ResetAnimation();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Service Workers can intercept any request made by an <embed> or <object> tag in Fetch API in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
|
???
| 172,703
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t IPCThreadState::executeCommand(int32_t cmd)
{
BBinder* obj;
RefBase::weakref_type* refs;
status_t result = NO_ERROR;
switch ((uint32_t)cmd) {
case BR_ERROR:
result = mIn.readInt32();
break;
case BR_OK:
break;
case BR_ACQUIRE:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
ALOG_ASSERT(refs->refBase() == obj,
"BR_ACQUIRE: object %p does not match cookie %p (expected %p)",
refs, obj, refs->refBase());
obj->incStrong(mProcess.get());
IF_LOG_REMOTEREFS() {
LOG_REMOTEREFS("BR_ACQUIRE from driver on %p", obj);
obj->printRefs();
}
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ACQUIRE_DONE);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)refs);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)obj);
break;
case BR_RELEASE:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
ALOG_ASSERT(refs->refBase() == obj,
"BR_RELEASE: object %p does not match cookie %p (expected %p)",
refs, obj, refs->refBase());
IF_LOG_REMOTEREFS() {
LOG_REMOTEREFS("BR_RELEASE from driver on %p", obj);
obj->printRefs();
}
mPendingStrongDerefs.push(obj);
break;
case BR_INCREFS:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
refs->incWeak(mProcess.get());
mOut.writeInt32(BC_INCREFS_DONE);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)refs);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)obj);
break;
case BR_DECREFS:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
mPendingWeakDerefs.push(refs);
break;
case BR_ATTEMPT_ACQUIRE:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
{
const bool success = refs->attemptIncStrong(mProcess.get());
ALOG_ASSERT(success && refs->refBase() == obj,
"BR_ATTEMPT_ACQUIRE: object %p does not match cookie %p (expected %p)",
refs, obj, refs->refBase());
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ACQUIRE_RESULT);
mOut.writeInt32((int32_t)success);
}
break;
case BR_TRANSACTION:
{
binder_transaction_data tr;
result = mIn.read(&tr, sizeof(tr));
ALOG_ASSERT(result == NO_ERROR,
"Not enough command data for brTRANSACTION");
if (result != NO_ERROR) break;
Parcel buffer;
buffer.ipcSetDataReference(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(tr.data.ptr.buffer),
tr.data_size,
reinterpret_cast<const binder_size_t*>(tr.data.ptr.offsets),
tr.offsets_size/sizeof(binder_size_t), freeBuffer, this);
const pid_t origPid = mCallingPid;
const uid_t origUid = mCallingUid;
const int32_t origStrictModePolicy = mStrictModePolicy;
const int32_t origTransactionBinderFlags = mLastTransactionBinderFlags;
mCallingPid = tr.sender_pid;
mCallingUid = tr.sender_euid;
mLastTransactionBinderFlags = tr.flags;
int curPrio = getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, mMyThreadId);
if (gDisableBackgroundScheduling) {
if (curPrio > ANDROID_PRIORITY_NORMAL) {
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, mMyThreadId, ANDROID_PRIORITY_NORMAL);
}
} else {
if (curPrio >= ANDROID_PRIORITY_BACKGROUND) {
set_sched_policy(mMyThreadId, SP_BACKGROUND);
}
}
Parcel reply;
status_t error;
IF_LOG_TRANSACTIONS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "BR_TRANSACTION thr " << (void*)pthread_self()
<< " / obj " << tr.target.ptr << " / code "
<< TypeCode(tr.code) << ": " << indent << buffer
<< dedent << endl
<< "Data addr = "
<< reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(tr.data.ptr.buffer)
<< ", offsets addr="
<< reinterpret_cast<const size_t*>(tr.data.ptr.offsets) << endl;
}
if (tr.target.ptr) {
sp<BBinder> b((BBinder*)tr.cookie);
error = b->transact(tr.code, buffer, &reply, tr.flags);
} else {
error = the_context_object->transact(tr.code, buffer, &reply, tr.flags);
}
if ((tr.flags & TF_ONE_WAY) == 0) {
LOG_ONEWAY("Sending reply to %d!", mCallingPid);
if (error < NO_ERROR) reply.setError(error);
sendReply(reply, 0);
} else {
LOG_ONEWAY("NOT sending reply to %d!", mCallingPid);
}
mCallingPid = origPid;
mCallingUid = origUid;
mStrictModePolicy = origStrictModePolicy;
mLastTransactionBinderFlags = origTransactionBinderFlags;
IF_LOG_TRANSACTIONS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "BC_REPLY thr " << (void*)pthread_self() << " / obj "
<< tr.target.ptr << ": " << indent << reply << dedent << endl;
}
}
break;
case BR_DEAD_BINDER:
{
BpBinder *proxy = (BpBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
proxy->sendObituary();
mOut.writeInt32(BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)proxy);
} break;
case BR_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION_DONE:
{
BpBinder *proxy = (BpBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
proxy->getWeakRefs()->decWeak(proxy);
} break;
case BR_FINISHED:
result = TIMED_OUT;
break;
case BR_NOOP:
break;
case BR_SPAWN_LOOPER:
mProcess->spawnPooledThread(false);
break;
default:
printf("*** BAD COMMAND %d received from Binder driver\n", cmd);
result = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
break;
}
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
mLastError = result;
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/binder/IPCThreadState.cpp in Binder in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 mishandles object references, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 27252896.
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
|
Medium
| 173,885
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
DOMStringList* listArg(toDOMStringList(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(listArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PropertyTreeManager::EmitClipMaskLayer() {
int clip_id = EnsureCompositorClipNode(current_clip_);
CompositorElementId mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id;
cc::Layer* mask_layer = client_.CreateOrReuseSynthesizedClipLayer(
current_clip_, mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id);
cc::EffectNode& mask_isolation = *GetEffectTree().Node(current_effect_id_);
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<uint64_t>(cc::EffectNode::INVALID_STABLE_ID),
mask_isolation.stable_id);
mask_isolation.stable_id = mask_isolation_id.ToInternalValue();
cc::EffectNode& mask_effect = *GetEffectTree().Node(
GetEffectTree().Insert(cc::EffectNode(), current_effect_id_));
mask_effect.stable_id = mask_effect_id.ToInternalValue();
mask_effect.clip_id = clip_id;
mask_effect.has_render_surface = true;
mask_effect.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
const TransformPaintPropertyNode* clip_space =
current_clip_->LocalTransformSpace();
root_layer_->AddChild(mask_layer);
mask_layer->set_property_tree_sequence_number(sequence_number_);
mask_layer->SetTransformTreeIndex(EnsureCompositorTransformNode(clip_space));
int scroll_id =
EnsureCompositorScrollNode(&clip_space->NearestScrollTranslationNode());
mask_layer->SetScrollTreeIndex(scroll_id);
mask_layer->SetClipTreeIndex(clip_id);
mask_layer->SetEffectTreeIndex(mask_effect.id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,827
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate,
int buffer_size_in_frames,
int total_frames_requested) {
int initial_bytes_enqueued = bytes_enqueued_;
int initial_bytes_buffered = algorithm_.bytes_buffered();
algorithm_.SetPlaybackRate(static_cast<float>(playback_rate));
scoped_array<uint8> buffer(
new uint8[buffer_size_in_frames * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame()]);
if (playback_rate == 0.0) {
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), buffer_size_in_frames);
EXPECT_EQ(0, frames_written);
return;
}
int frames_remaining = total_frames_requested;
while (frames_remaining > 0) {
int frames_requested = std::min(buffer_size_in_frames, frames_remaining);
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), frames_requested);
CHECK_GT(frames_written, 0);
CheckFakeData(buffer.get(), frames_written, playback_rate);
frames_remaining -= frames_written;
}
int bytes_requested = total_frames_requested * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame();
int bytes_consumed = ComputeConsumedBytes(initial_bytes_enqueued,
initial_bytes_buffered);
if (playback_rate == 1.0) {
EXPECT_EQ(bytes_requested, bytes_consumed);
return;
}
static const double kMaxAcceptableDelta = 0.01;
double actual_playback_rate = 1.0 * bytes_consumed / bytes_requested;
double delta = std::abs(1.0 - (actual_playback_rate / playback_rate));
EXPECT_LE(delta, kMaxAcceptableDelta);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *CloneImage(const Image *image,const size_t columns,
const size_t rows,const MagickBooleanType detach,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*clone_image;
double
scale;
size_t
length;
/*
Clone the image.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"NegativeOrZeroImageSize","`%s'",image->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
clone_image=(Image *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_image));
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(clone_image,0,sizeof(*clone_image));
clone_image->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_image->storage_class=image->storage_class;
clone_image->number_channels=image->number_channels;
clone_image->number_meta_channels=image->number_meta_channels;
clone_image->metacontent_extent=image->metacontent_extent;
clone_image->colorspace=image->colorspace;
clone_image->read_mask=image->read_mask;
clone_image->write_mask=image->write_mask;
clone_image->alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
clone_image->columns=image->columns;
clone_image->rows=image->rows;
clone_image->dither=image->dither;
if (image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate and copy the image colormap.
*/
clone_image->colors=image->colors;
length=(size_t) image->colors;
clone_image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
if (clone_image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_image->colormap,image->colormap,length*
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
}
clone_image->image_info=CloneImageInfo(image->image_info);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(clone_image,image);
GetTimerInfo(&clone_image->timer);
if (image->ascii85 != (void *) NULL)
Ascii85Initialize(clone_image);
clone_image->magick_columns=image->magick_columns;
clone_image->magick_rows=image->magick_rows;
clone_image->type=image->type;
clone_image->channel_mask=image->channel_mask;
clone_image->channel_map=ClonePixelChannelMap(image->channel_map);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->filename,image->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
clone_image->progress_monitor=image->progress_monitor;
clone_image->client_data=image->client_data;
clone_image->reference_count=1;
clone_image->next=image->next;
clone_image->previous=image->previous;
clone_image->list=NewImageList();
if (detach == MagickFalse)
clone_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
else
{
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->blob=CloneBlobInfo((BlobInfo *) NULL);
}
clone_image->ping=image->ping;
clone_image->debug=IsEventLogging();
clone_image->semaphore=AcquireSemaphoreInfo();
if ((columns == 0) || (rows == 0))
{
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->montage,image->montage);
if (image->directory != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->directory,image->directory);
clone_image->cache=ReferencePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
scale=1.0;
if (image->columns != 0)
scale=(double) columns/(double) image->columns;
clone_image->page.width=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.width+0.5);
clone_image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.x-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.x-0.5);
scale=1.0;
if (image->rows != 0)
scale=(double) rows/(double) image->rows;
clone_image->page.height=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.height+0.5);
clone_image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.y-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.y-0.5);
clone_image->columns=columns;
clone_image->rows=rows;
clone_image->cache=ClonePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions.
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
|
Medium
| 169,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(name, "tpgt_");
if (!tpgt_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to locate \"tpgt_#\" directory"
" group\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tpgt_str += 5; /* Skip ahead of "tpgt_" */
tpgt = (unsigned short int) simple_strtoul(tpgt_str, &end_ptr, 0);
if (tpgt > TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed tpgt: %hu exceeds TL_TPGS_PER_HBA:"
" %u\n", tpgt, TL_TPGS_PER_HBA);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[tpgt];
tl_tpg->tl_hba = tl_hba;
tl_tpg->tl_tpgt = tpgt;
/*
* Register the tl_tpg as a emulated SAS TCM Target Endpoint
*/
ret = core_tpg_register(&tcm_loop_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
wwn, &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg, tl_tpg,
TRANSPORT_TPG_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
printk(KERN_INFO "TCM_Loop_ConfigFS: Allocated Emulated %s"
" Target Port %s,t,0x%04x\n", tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba),
config_item_name(&wwn->wwn_group.cg_item), tpgt);
return &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 3.1, an off by one in the drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() function could result in at least memory corruption.
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
|
Low
| 169,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int scan(Scanner *s)
{
uchar *cursor = s->cur;
char *str, *ptr = NULL;
std:
s->tok = cursor;
s->len = 0;
#line 311 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
#line 291 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
{
YYCTYPE yych;
unsigned int yyaccept = 0;
static const unsigned char yybm[] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128,
128, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
};
YYDEBUG(0, *YYCURSOR);
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 20) YYFILL(20);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych <= '\n') {
if (yych <= 0x00) goto yy9;
if (yych <= 0x08) goto yy11;
if (yych <= '\t') goto yy7;
goto yy9;
} else {
if (yych == ' ') goto yy7;
if (yych <= '+') goto yy11;
goto yy7;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'O') {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy11;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy7;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy4;
goto yy11;
} else {
if (yych <= 'P') goto yy5;
if (yych != 'R') goto yy11;
}
}
YYDEBUG(2, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((yych = *YYCURSOR) <= '/') goto yy3;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy98;
yy3:
YYDEBUG(3, *YYCURSOR);
#line 424 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
add_error(s, "Unexpected character");
goto std;
}
#line 366 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy4:
YYDEBUG(4, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 0;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy3;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy59;
goto yy3;
yy5:
YYDEBUG(5, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy12;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
yy6:
YYDEBUG(6, *YYCURSOR);
#line 351 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
timelib_sll nr;
int in_time = 0;
DEBUG_OUTPUT("period");
TIMELIB_INIT;
ptr++;
do {
if ( *ptr == 'T' ) {
in_time = 1;
ptr++;
}
if ( *ptr == '\0' ) {
add_error(s, "Missing expected time part");
break;
}
nr = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 12);
switch (*ptr) {
case 'Y': s->period->y = nr; break;
case 'W': s->period->d = nr * 7; break;
case 'D': s->period->d = nr; break;
case 'H': s->period->h = nr; break;
case 'S': s->period->s = nr; break;
case 'M':
if (in_time) {
s->period->i = nr;
} else {
s->period->m = nr;
}
break;
default:
add_error(s, "Undefined period specifier");
break;
}
ptr++;
} while (*ptr);
s->have_period = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 424 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy7:
YYDEBUG(7, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(8, *YYCURSOR);
#line 413 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
goto std;
}
#line 433 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy9:
YYDEBUG(9, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(10, *YYCURSOR);
#line 418 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
s->pos = cursor; s->line++;
goto std;
}
#line 443 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy11:
YYDEBUG(11, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy3;
yy12:
YYDEBUG(12, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych >= '0') goto yy25;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych >= 'W') goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
}
}
yy13:
YYDEBUG(13, *YYCURSOR);
YYCURSOR = YYMARKER;
if (yyaccept <= 0) {
goto yy3;
} else {
goto yy6;
}
yy14:
YYDEBUG(14, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy15;
}
goto yy6;
yy15:
YYDEBUG(15, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(16, *YYCURSOR);
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy15;
}
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych == 'H') goto yy19;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy18;
if (yych != 'S') goto yy13;
}
yy17:
YYDEBUG(17, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy6;
yy18:
YYDEBUG(18, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy22;
goto yy6;
yy19:
YYDEBUG(19, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy6;
yy20:
YYDEBUG(20, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(21, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy20;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy18;
if (yych == 'S') goto yy17;
goto yy13;
}
yy22:
YYDEBUG(22, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(23, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy22;
if (yych == 'S') goto yy17;
goto yy13;
yy24:
YYDEBUG(24, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy25:
YYDEBUG(25, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
goto yy35;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy26:
YYDEBUG(26, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy33;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy27:
YYDEBUG(27, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy31;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy28:
YYDEBUG(28, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy29;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy29:
YYDEBUG(29, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(30, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'D') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy29;
if (yych <= 'C') goto yy13;
goto yy24;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') {
if (yych <= 'L') goto yy13;
goto yy27;
} else {
if (yych == 'W') goto yy26;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy31:
YYDEBUG(31, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(32, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'C') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy31;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy24;
if (yych == 'W') goto yy26;
goto yy13;
}
yy33:
YYDEBUG(33, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(34, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy33;
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
yy35:
YYDEBUG(35, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
YYDEBUG(36, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy39;
YYDEBUG(37, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy40;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy41;
goto yy13;
yy38:
YYDEBUG(38, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
yy39:
YYDEBUG(39, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
goto yy38;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy40:
YYDEBUG(40, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy42;
goto yy13;
yy41:
YYDEBUG(41, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '3') goto yy13;
yy42:
YYDEBUG(42, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(43, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy44;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy45;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy46;
goto yy13;
yy44:
YYDEBUG(44, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy47;
goto yy13;
yy45:
YYDEBUG(45, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy47;
goto yy13;
yy46:
YYDEBUG(46, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy47:
YYDEBUG(47, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(48, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy49;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy50;
goto yy13;
yy49:
YYDEBUG(49, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy51;
goto yy13;
yy50:
YYDEBUG(50, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy51:
YYDEBUG(51, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(52, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(53, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(54, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(55, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(56, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(57, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(58, *YYCURSOR);
#line 393 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
DEBUG_OUTPUT("combinedrep");
TIMELIB_INIT;
s->period->y = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 4);
ptr++;
s->period->m = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->d = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->h = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->i = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->s = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
s->have_period = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 792 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy59:
YYDEBUG(59, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(60, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(61, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych == '-') goto yy64;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= '0') goto yy62;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy63;
goto yy13;
}
yy62:
YYDEBUG(62, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy85;
goto yy13;
yy63:
YYDEBUG(63, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy85;
goto yy13;
yy64:
YYDEBUG(64, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy65;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy66;
goto yy13;
yy65:
YYDEBUG(65, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy13;
yy66:
YYDEBUG(66, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '3') goto yy13;
yy67:
YYDEBUG(67, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(68, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy69;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy70;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy71;
goto yy13;
yy69:
YYDEBUG(69, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy72;
goto yy13;
yy70:
YYDEBUG(70, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy72;
goto yy13;
yy71:
YYDEBUG(71, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy72:
YYDEBUG(72, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(73, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy74;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy75;
goto yy13;
yy74:
YYDEBUG(74, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy76;
goto yy13;
yy75:
YYDEBUG(75, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy76:
YYDEBUG(76, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(77, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(78, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(79, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(80, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(81, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(82, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'Z') goto yy13;
yy83:
YYDEBUG(83, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(84, *YYCURSOR);
#line 327 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
timelib_time *current;
if (s->have_date || s->have_period) {
current = s->end;
s->have_end_date = 1;
} else {
current = s->begin;
s->have_begin_date = 1;
}
DEBUG_OUTPUT("datetimebasic | datetimeextended");
TIMELIB_INIT;
current->y = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 4);
current->m = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->d = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->h = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->i = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->s = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
s->have_date = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_ISO_DATE;
}
#line 944 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy85:
YYDEBUG(85, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy86;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy87;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy88;
goto yy13;
yy86:
YYDEBUG(86, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy89;
goto yy13;
yy87:
YYDEBUG(87, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy89;
goto yy13;
yy88:
YYDEBUG(88, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy89:
YYDEBUG(89, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(90, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy91;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy92;
goto yy13;
yy91:
YYDEBUG(91, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy93;
goto yy13;
yy92:
YYDEBUG(92, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy93:
YYDEBUG(93, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(94, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(95, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(96, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(97, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'Z') goto yy83;
goto yy13;
yy98:
YYDEBUG(98, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(99, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy100;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy98;
yy100:
YYDEBUG(100, *YYCURSOR);
#line 316 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
DEBUG_OUTPUT("recurrences");
TIMELIB_INIT;
ptr++;
s->recurrences = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 9);
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
s->have_recurrences = 1;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 1032 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
}
#line 428 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The scan function in ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c in PHP through 5.5.6 does not properly restrict creation of DateInterval objects, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted interval specification.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,566
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: initpyfribidi (void)
{
PyObject *module;
/* XXX What should be done if we fail here? */
module = Py_InitModule3 ("pyfribidi", PyfribidiMethods,
_pyfribidi__doc__);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "RTL", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "LTR", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "ON", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON);
PyModule_AddStringConstant (module, "__author__",
"Yaacov Zamir and Nir Soffer");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode function in PyFriBidi before 0.11.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a 4-byte utf-8 sequence.
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
|
Low
| 165,639
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
interface_factory_ptr_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
Low
| 171,938
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/* if no number follows "/CharStrings", let's read the next line */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
/* pdftex_warn("no number found after `%s', I assume it's on the next line",
charstringname); */
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
/* t1_getline always appends EOL to t1_line_array; let's change it to
* space before appending the next line
*/
*(strend(t1_buf_array) - 1) = ' ';
t1_getline();
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in t1_check_unusual_charstring functions in writet1.c files in TeX Live before 2018-09-21. A buffer overflow in the handling of Type 1 fonts allows arbitrary code execution when a malicious font is loaded by one of the vulnerable tools: pdflatex, pdftex, dvips, or luatex.
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
Medium
| 169,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_GetArrayItem( cJSON *array, int item )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
while ( c && item > 0 ) {
--item;
c = c->next;
}
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,286
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: process_secondary_order(STREAM s)
{
/* The length isn't calculated correctly by the server.
* For very compact orders the length becomes negative
* so a signed integer must be used. */
uint16 length;
uint16 flags;
uint8 type;
uint8 *next_order;
in_uint16_le(s, length);
in_uint16_le(s, flags); /* used by bmpcache2 */
in_uint8(s, type);
next_order = s->p + (sint16) length + 7;
switch (type)
{
case RDP_ORDER_RAW_BMPCACHE:
process_raw_bmpcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_COLCACHE:
process_colcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_BMPCACHE:
process_bmpcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_FONTCACHE:
process_fontcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_RAW_BMPCACHE2:
process_bmpcache2(s, flags, False); /* uncompressed */
break;
case RDP_ORDER_BMPCACHE2:
process_bmpcache2(s, flags, True); /* compressed */
break;
case RDP_ORDER_BRUSHCACHE:
process_brushcache(s, flags);
break;
default:
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_secondary_order(), unhandled secondary order %d", type);
}
s->p = next_order;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
Low
| 169,801
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int er_supported(ERContext *s)
{
if(s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice ||
!s->cur_pic.f ||
s->cur_pic.field_picture ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO
)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In libavcodec in FFmpeg 4.0.1, improper maintenance of the consistency between the context profile field and studio_profile in libavcodec may trigger an assertion failure while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service, related to error_resilience.c, h263dec.c, and mpeg4videodec.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i;
int insn_processed = 0;
bool do_print_state = false;
env->prev_linfo = NULL;
state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!state)
return -ENOMEM;
state->curframe = 0;
state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!state->frame[0]) {
kfree(state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
env->cur_state = state;
init_func_state(env, state->frame[0],
BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
0 /* frameno */,
0 /* subprogno, zero == main subprog */);
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
int err;
if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
return -EFAULT;
}
insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
verbose(env,
"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
insn_processed);
return -E2BIG;
}
err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 1) {
/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
if (env->log.level) {
if (do_print_state)
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx);
else
verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
}
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
if (signal_pending(current))
return -EAGAIN;
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();
if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) {
if (env->log.level > 1)
verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
else
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:",
env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx);
print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]);
do_print_state = false;
}
if (env->log.level) {
const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
.cb_print = verbose,
.private_data = env,
};
verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
}
if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
env->prev_insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
/* check for reserved fields is already done */
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
* the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
*/
err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
if (err)
return err;
prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
/* saw a valid insn
* dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
* save type to validate intersecting paths
*/
*prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
} else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) {
/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
* dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
* with different pointer types:
* src_reg == ctx in one branch and
* src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
* Reject it.
*/
verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
err = check_xadd(env, env->insn_idx, insn);
if (err)
return err;
env->insn_idx++;
continue;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
if (err)
return err;
prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
} else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) {
verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
insn->dst_reg,
reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 &&
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
else
err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
continue;
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (state->curframe) {
/* exit from nested function */
env->prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
do_print_state = true;
continue;
}
err = check_reference_leak(env);
if (err)
return err;
/* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
* to return the value from eBPF program.
* Make sure that it's readable at this time
* of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
* something into it earlier
*/
err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
return -EACCES;
}
err = check_return_code(env);
if (err)
return err;
process_bpf_exit:
err = pop_stack(env, &env->prev_insn_idx,
&env->insn_idx);
if (err < 0) {
if (err != -ENOENT)
return err;
break;
} else {
do_print_state = true;
continue;
}
} else {
err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
env->insn_idx++;
env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
} else {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
return -EINVAL;
}
env->insn_idx++;
}
verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ",
insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS);
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
verbose(env, "%d", depth);
if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
verbose(env, "+");
}
verbose(env, "\n");
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 170,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_int32 now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(kdb, 0, sizeof(*kdb));
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + polent.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
if ((ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context,
entry->principal, &(kdb->princ))))
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) kadm5_create_principal_3 and (2) kadm5_modify_principal functions in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by specifying KADM5_POLICY with a NULL policy name.
Commit Message: Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630]
In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for
entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask.
CVE-2015-8630:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in
the mask.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8342 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: QuicPacket* ConstructDataPacket(QuicPacketSequenceNumber number,
QuicFecGroupNumber fec_group) {
header_.packet_sequence_number = number;
header_.flags = PACKET_FLAGS_NONE;
header_.fec_group = fec_group;
QuicFrames frames;
QuicFrame frame(&frame1_);
frames.push_back(frame);
QuicPacket* packet;
framer_.ConstructFragementDataPacket(header_, frames, &packet);
return packet;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly manage memory during message handling for plug-ins, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,410
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
height,
pixels_length,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth != 1) && (sun_info.depth != 8) &&
(sun_info.depth != 24) && (sun_info.depth != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
image->matte=sun_info.depth == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (sun_info.length == 0)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) (image->columns*image->rows);
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8UL*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(sun_info.width,sun_info.depth) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.length,
sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
quantum=sun_info.depth == 1 ? 15 : 7;
bytes_per_line+=quantum;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+quantum))
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
bytes_per_line>>=4;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(height,bytes_per_line) != MagickFalse)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixels_length=height*bytes_per_line;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(pixels_length,
sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
ResetMagickMemory(sun_pixels,0,pixels_length*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
status=DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,pixels_length);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
else
{
if (sun_info.length > pixels_length)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(sun_pixels,sun_data,sun_info.length);
}
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+7-bit,((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01));
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+7-bit,(*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01);
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p));
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
bytes_per_pixel++;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(q)].red);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(q)].green);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(q)].blue);
}
q++;
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in ImageMagick 6.9.7. A specially crafted sun file triggers a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/375
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/376
|
Medium
| 168,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline struct sem_array *sem_lock_check(struct ipc_namespace *ns,
int id)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp = ipc_lock_check(&sem_ids(ns), id);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
return ERR_CAST(ipcp);
return container_of(ipcp, struct sem_array, sem_perm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,976
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
int force)
{
char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
struct context context;
int rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
*sid = i;
return 0;
}
}
*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
return 0;
}
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
if (!scontext2)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
if (force) {
/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
rc = -ENOMEM;
str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
if (!str)
goto out;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
context.len = scontext_len;
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
context_destroy(&context);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
out:
kfree(scontext2);
kfree(str);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The security_context_to_sid_core function in security/selinux/ss/services.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability to set a zero-length security context.
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,432
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_packet (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *top_tree,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset, proto_item *top_item)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
nstime_t ts;
tvbuff_t *new_tvb;
guint caplen, len, frame_no;
gint reported_length_remaining;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_packet, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_packet);
ts.secs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ts.nsecs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset + 4) * 1000;
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &ts);
offset += 8;
caplen = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ti = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_caplen, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
len = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_len, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
frame_no = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_npkt, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Frame %u", frame_no);
proto_item_append_text (top_item, " Frame %u", frame_no);
/*
* reported_length_remaining should not be -1, as offset is at
* most right past the end of the available data in the packet.
*/
reported_length_remaining = tvb_reported_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (caplen > (guint)reported_length_remaining) {
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_caplen_too_big);
return;
}
new_tvb = tvb_new_subset (tvb, offset, caplen, len);
if (decode_content && linktype != WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
dissector_try_uint(wtap_encap_dissector_table, linktype, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
if (!info_added) {
/* Only indicate when not added before */
/* Indicate RPCAP in the protocol column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "R|");
/* Indicate RPCAP in the info column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Remote | ");
info_added = TRUE;
register_frame_end_routine(pinfo, rpcap_frame_end);
}
} else {
if (linktype == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Unknown link-layer type");
}
call_dissector (data_handle, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-pktap.c in the Ethernet dissector in Wireshark 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles the packet-header data type, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
|
Medium
| 167,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings*
data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
return data_reduction_proxy_settings &&
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
Medium
| 172,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleUrlFetchCompleted(URLFetcher* fetcher,
int net_error) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
UpdateURLLoaderRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->GetURL();
pending_url_fetches_.erase(url);
NotifyAllProgress(url);
++url_fetches_completed_;
int response_code = net_error == net::OK ? request->GetResponseCode()
: fetcher->redirect_response_code();
AppCacheEntry& entry = url_file_list_.find(url)->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->response_writer()->response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (!inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry))
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(entry.response_id());
} else {
VLOG(1) << "Request error: " << net_error
<< " response code: " << response_code;
if (entry.IsExplicit() || entry.IsFallback() || entry.IsIntercept()) {
if (response_code == 304 && fetcher->existing_entry().has_response_id()) {
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->existing_entry().response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->existing_entry().response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
} else {
const char kFormatString[] = "Resource fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, url, fetcher->result(), response_code);
ResultType result = fetcher->result();
bool is_cross_origin = url.GetOrigin() != manifest_url_.GetOrigin();
switch (result) {
case DISKCACHE_ERROR:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR,
GURL(), 0, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
case NETWORK_ERROR:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_RESOURCE_ERROR,
url, 0, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
default:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_RESOURCE_ERROR,
url, response_code, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
}
return;
}
} else if (response_code == 404 || response_code == 410) {
} else if (update_type_ == UPGRADE_ATTEMPT &&
fetcher->existing_entry().has_response_id()) {
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->existing_entry().response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->existing_entry().response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchUrls();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,996
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AccessibilityOrientation AXNodeObject::orientation() const {
const AtomicString& ariaOrientation =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kOrientation);
AccessibilityOrientation orientation = AccessibilityOrientationUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "horizontal"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "vertical"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
switch (roleValue()) {
case ComboBoxRole:
case ListBoxRole:
case MenuRole:
case ScrollBarRole:
case TreeRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
return orientation;
case MenuBarRole:
case SliderRole:
case SplitterRole:
case TabListRole:
case ToolbarRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
return orientation;
case RadioGroupRole:
case TreeGridRole:
case TableRole:
return orientation;
default:
return AXObject::orientation();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf, int len, int size) {
int q, ql;
int r, rl;
int cur, l;
int count = 0;
int inputid;
inputid = ctxt->input->id;
if (buf == NULL) {
len = 0;
size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
}
GROW; /* Assure there's enough input data */
q = CUR_CHAR(ql);
if (q == 0)
goto not_terminated;
if (!IS_CHAR(q)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseComment: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
q);
xmlFree (buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(ql);
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (r == 0)
goto not_terminated;
if (!IS_CHAR(r)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseComment: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
q);
xmlFree (buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(rl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0)
goto not_terminated;
while (IS_CHAR(cur) && /* checked */
((cur != '>') ||
(r != '-') || (q != '-'))) {
if ((r == '-') && (q == '-')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT, NULL);
}
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *new_buf;
size *= 2;
new_buf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (new_buf == NULL) {
xmlFree (buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
buf = new_buf;
}
COPY_BUF(ql,buf,len,q);
q = r;
ql = rl;
r = cur;
rl = l;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0) {
SHRINK;
GROW;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n<!--%.50s\n", buf);
} else if (!IS_CHAR(cur)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseComment: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
cur);
} else {
if (inputid != ctxt->input->id) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Comment doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->comment != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, buf);
}
xmlFree(buf);
return;
not_terminated:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated\n", NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t v9fs_list_xattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
void *value, size_t vsize)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
void *ovalue = value;
XattrOperations *xops;
char *orig_value, *orig_value_start;
ssize_t xattr_len, parsed_len = 0, attr_len;
char *dirpath, *name;
int dirfd;
/* Get the actual len */
dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
g_free(dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
return -1;
}
name = g_path_get_basename(path);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, value, 0);
if (xattr_len <= 0) {
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return xattr_len;
}
/* Now fetch the xattr and find the actual size */
orig_value = g_malloc(xattr_len);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, orig_value, xattr_len);
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
if (xattr_len < 0) {
return -1;
}
orig_value_start = orig_value;
while (xattr_len > parsed_len) {
xops = get_xattr_operations(ctx->xops, orig_value);
if (!xops) {
goto next_entry;
}
if (!value) {
size += xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
} else {
size = xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
if (size < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
value += size;
vsize -= size;
}
next_entry:
/* Got the next entry */
attr_len = strlen(orig_value) + 1;
parsed_len += attr_len;
orig_value += attr_len;
}
if (value) {
size = value - ovalue;
}
err_out:
g_free(orig_value_start);
return size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the v9fs_list_xattr function in hw/9pfs/9p-xattr.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via vectors involving the orig_value variable.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,885
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewUI::SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
int index,
const base::RefCountedBytes* data) {
print_preview_data_service()->SetDataEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_, index, data);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,843
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,876
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *add_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_shader *vs,
struct vrend_shader *fs,
struct vrend_shader *gs)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *sprog = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_linked_shader_program);
char name[16];
int i;
GLuint prog_id;
GLint lret;
int id;
int last_shader;
if (!sprog)
return NULL;
/* need to rewrite VS code to add interpolation params */
if ((gs && gs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id) ||
(!gs && vs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id)) {
bool ret;
if (gs)
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(gs->glsl_prog,
&gs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, true, fs->key.flatshade);
else
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(vs->glsl_prog,
&vs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, false, fs->key.flatshade);
ret = vrend_compile_shader(ctx, gs ? gs : vs);
if (ret == false) {
glDeleteShader(gs ? gs->id : vs->id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
if (gs)
gs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
else
vs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
}
prog_id = glCreateProgram();
glAttachShader(prog_id, vs->id);
if (gs) {
if (gs->id > 0)
glAttachShader(prog_id, gs->id);
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &gs->sel->sinfo);
}
else
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &vs->sel->sinfo);
glAttachShader(prog_id, fs->id);
if (fs->sel->sinfo.num_outputs > 1) {
if (util_blend_state_is_dual(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0)) {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 1, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = true;
} else {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 1, 0, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
}
} else
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
uint32_t mask = vs->sel->sinfo.attrib_input_mask;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
glBindAttribLocation(prog_id, i, name);
}
}
glLinkProgram(prog_id);
glGetProgramiv(prog_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &lret);
if (lret == GL_FALSE) {
char infolog[65536];
int len;
glGetProgramInfoLog(prog_id, 65536, &len, infolog);
fprintf(stderr,"got error linking\n%s\n", infolog);
/* dump shaders */
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SHADER, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"vert shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", vs->id, vs->glsl_prog);
if (gs)
fprintf(stderr,"geom shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", gs->id, gs->glsl_prog);
fprintf(stderr,"frag shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", fs->id, fs->glsl_prog);
glDeleteProgram(prog_id);
return NULL;
}
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT] = fs;
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] = gs;
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX], &vs->programs);
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT], &fs->programs);
if (gs)
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY], &gs->programs);
last_shader = gs ? PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY : PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT;
sprog->id = prog_id;
list_addtail(&sprog->head, &ctx->sub->programs);
if (fs->key.pstipple_tex)
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "pstipple_sampler");
else
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = -1;
sprog->vs_ws_adjust_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "winsys_adjust");
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask) {
uint32_t mask = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
int nsamp = util_bitcount(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask);
int index;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask;
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask) {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
} else {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
}
sprog->samp_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->samp_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
index = 0;
while(mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "%ssamp%d", prefix, i);
sprog->samp_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask & (1 << i)) {
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadmask%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadadd%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
index++;
}
}
} else {
sprog->samp_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = 0;
}
sprog->samplers_used_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts) {
sprog->const_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->const_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%sconst0[%d]", prefix, i);
sprog->const_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->const_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (!vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs) {
sprog->attrib_locs = calloc(vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->attrib_locs) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
sprog->attrib_locs[i] = glGetAttribLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->attrib_locs = NULL;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos, sizeof(uint32_t));
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%subo%d", prefix, i + 1);
sprog->ubo_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformBlockIndex(prog_id, name);
}
} else
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "clipp[%d]", i);
sprog->clip_locs[i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
return sprog;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the add_shader_program function in vrend_renderer.c in virglrenderer before 0.6.0 allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host memory consumption) via vectors involving the sprog variable.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size(module, dir));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,100
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *map,
struct uid_gid_map *parent_map)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_map new_map;
unsigned idx;
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;
unsigned long page = 0;
char *kbuf, *pos, *next_line;
ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
/*
* The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
*
* Any map is only ever written once.
*
* An id map fits within 1 cache line on most architectures.
*
* On read nothing needs to be done unless you are on an
* architecture with a crazy cache coherency model like alpha.
*
* There is a one time data dependency between reading the
* count of the extents and the values of the extents. The
* desired behavior is to see the values of the extents that
* were written before the count of the extents.
*
* To achieve this smp_wmb() is used on guarantee the write
* order and smp_read_barrier_depends() is guaranteed that we
* don't have crazy architectures returning stale data.
*
*/
mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
ret = -EPERM;
/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
if (map->nr_extents != 0)
goto out;
/* Require the appropriate privilege CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID
* over the user namespace in order to set the id mapping.
*/
if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !ns_capable(ns, cap_setid))
goto out;
/* Get a buffer */
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = __get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
kbuf = (char *) page;
if (!page)
goto out;
/* Only allow <= page size writes at the beginning of the file */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE))
goto out;
/* Slurp in the user data */
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
goto out;
kbuf[count] = '\0';
/* Parse the user data */
ret = -EINVAL;
pos = kbuf;
new_map.nr_extents = 0;
for (;pos; pos = next_line) {
extent = &new_map.extent[new_map.nr_extents];
/* Find the end of line and ensure I don't look past it */
next_line = strchr(pos, '\n');
if (next_line) {
*next_line = '\0';
next_line++;
if (*next_line == '\0')
next_line = NULL;
}
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent->first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent->lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent->count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (*pos && !isspace(*pos))
goto out;
/* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
if (*pos != '\0')
goto out;
/* Verify we have been given valid starting values */
if ((extent->first == (u32) -1) ||
(extent->lower_first == (u32) -1 ))
goto out;
/* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the extent to wrap */
if ((extent->first + extent->count) <= extent->first)
goto out;
if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <= extent->lower_first)
goto out;
/* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */
if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, extent))
goto out;
new_map.nr_extents++;
/* Fail if the file contains too many extents */
if ((new_map.nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS) &&
(next_line != NULL))
goto out;
}
/* Be very certaint the new map actually exists */
if (new_map.nr_extents == 0)
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
/* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */
if (!new_idmap_permitted(ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
goto out;
/* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the
* kernel global id space.
*/
for (idx = 0; idx < new_map.nr_extents; idx++) {
u32 lower_first;
extent = &new_map.extent[idx];
lower_first = map_id_range_down(parent_map,
extent->lower_first,
extent->count);
/* Fail if we can not map the specified extent to
* the kernel global id space.
*/
if (lower_first == (u32) -1)
goto out;
extent->lower_first = lower_first;
}
/* Install the map */
memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent,
new_map.nr_extents*sizeof(new_map.extent[0]));
smp_wmb();
map->nr_extents = new_map.nr_extents;
*ppos = count;
ret = count;
out:
mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
if (page)
free_page(page);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 does not have appropriate capability requirements for the uid_map and gid_map files, which allows local users to gain privileges by opening a file within an unprivileged process and then modifying the file within a privileged process.
Commit Message: userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting the id_map
When we require privilege for setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map or
/proc/<pid>/gid_map no longer allow an unprivileged user to
open the file and pass it to a privileged program to write
to the file.
Instead when privilege is required require both the opener and the
writer to have the necessary capabilities.
I have tested this code and verified that setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map
fails when an unprivileged user opens the file and a privielged user
attempts to set the mapping, that unprivileged users can still map
their own id, and that a privileged users can still setup an arbitrary
mapping.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
|
High
| 166,091
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TPM_RC tpm_kdfa(TSS2_SYS_CONTEXT *sapi_context, TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg,
TPM2B *key, char *label, TPM2B *contextU, TPM2B *contextV, UINT16 bits,
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *resultKey )
{
TPM2B_DIGEST tmpResult;
TPM2B_DIGEST tpm2bLabel, tpm2bBits, tpm2b_i_2;
UINT8 *tpm2bBitsPtr = &tpm2bBits.t.buffer[0];
UINT8 *tpm2b_i_2Ptr = &tpm2b_i_2.t.buffer[0];
TPM2B_DIGEST *bufferList[8];
UINT32 bitsSwizzled, i_Swizzled;
TPM_RC rval;
int i, j;
UINT16 bytes = bits / 8;
resultKey->t .size = 0;
tpm2b_i_2.t.size = 4;
tpm2bBits.t.size = 4;
bitsSwizzled = string_bytes_endian_convert_32( bits );
*(UINT32 *)tpm2bBitsPtr = bitsSwizzled;
for(i = 0; label[i] != 0 ;i++ );
tpm2bLabel.t.size = i+1;
for( i = 0; i < tpm2bLabel.t.size; i++ )
{
tpm2bLabel.t.buffer[i] = label[i];
}
resultKey->t.size = 0;
i = 1;
while( resultKey->t.size < bytes )
{
i_Swizzled = string_bytes_endian_convert_32( i );
*(UINT32 *)tpm2b_i_2Ptr = i_Swizzled;
j = 0;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2b_i_2.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2bLabel.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)contextU;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)contextV;
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(tpm2bBits.b);
bufferList[j++] = (TPM2B_DIGEST *)0;
rval = tpm_hmac(sapi_context, hashAlg, key, (TPM2B **)&( bufferList[0] ), &tmpResult );
if( rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS )
{
return( rval );
}
bool res = string_bytes_concat_buffer(resultKey, &(tmpResult.b));
if (!res) {
return TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
}
}
resultKey->t.size = bytes;
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-522
Summary: tpm2-tools versions before 1.1.1 are vulnerable to a password leak due to transmitting password in plaintext from client to server when generating HMAC.
Commit Message: kdfa: use openssl for hmac not tpm
While not reachable in the current code base tools, a potential
security bug lurked in tpm_kdfa().
If using that routine for an hmac authorization, the hmac was
calculated using the tpm. A user of an object wishing to
authenticate via hmac, would expect that the password is never
sent to the tpm. However, since the hmac calculation relies on
password, and is performed by the tpm, the password ends up
being sent in plain text to the tpm.
The fix is to use openssl to generate the hmac on the host.
Fixes: CVE-2017-7524
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
|
Low
| 168,265
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FrameSelection::MoveCaretSelection(const IntPoint& point) {
DCHECK(!GetDocument().NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
Element* const editable =
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().RootEditableElement();
if (!editable)
return;
const VisiblePosition position =
VisiblePositionForContentsPoint(point, GetFrame());
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder;
builder.SetIsDirectional(GetSelectionInDOMTree().IsDirectional());
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(true);
if (position.IsNotNull())
builder.Collapse(position.ToPositionWithAffinity());
SetSelection(builder.Build(), SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.Build());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
Low
| 171,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
base::MakeUnique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in ChromeVox in Google Chrome OS prior to 62.0.3202.74 allowed a remote attacker in a privileged network position to observe or tamper with certain cleartext HTTP requests by leveraging that position.
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
|
Medium
| 173,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _asn1_ltostr (long v, char *str)
{
long d, r;
char temp[LTOSTR_MAX_SIZE];
int count, k, start;
if (v < 0)
{
str[0] = '-';
start = 1;
v = -v;
}
else
start = 0;
count = 0;
do
{
d = v / 10;
r = v - d * 10;
temp[start + count] = '0' + (char) r;
count++;
v = d;
}
while (v);
for (k = 0; k < count; k++)
str[k + start] = temp[start + count - k - 1];
str[count + start] = 0;
return str;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in asn1_der_decoding in libtasn1 before 4.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
const struct user_desc *info;
if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
(pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
(count % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (kbuf)
info = kbuf;
else if (__copy_from_user(infobuf, ubuf, count))
return -EFAULT;
else
info = infobuf;
set_tls_desc(target,
GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kernel/tls.c in the Thread Local Storage (TLS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 allows local users to bypass the espfix protection mechanism, and consequently makes it easier for local users to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism, via a crafted application that makes a set_thread_area system call and later reads a 16-bit value.
Commit Message: x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 166,247
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void inotify_free_group_priv(struct fsnotify_group *group)
{
/* ideally the idr is empty and we won't hit the BUG in teh callback */
idr_for_each(&group->inotify_data.idr, idr_callback, group);
idr_remove_all(&group->inotify_data.idr);
idr_destroy(&group->inotify_data.idr);
free_uid(group->inotify_data.user);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the inotify subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving failed attempts to create files. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2010-4250.
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: juniper_es_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ipsec_header {
uint8_t sa_index[2];
uint8_t ttl;
uint8_t type;
uint8_t spi[4];
uint8_t src_ip[4];
uint8_t dst_ip[4];
};
u_int rewrite_len,es_type_bundle;
const struct juniper_ipsec_header *ih;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
ih = (const struct juniper_ipsec_header *)p;
switch (ih->type) {
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_ESP_AUTHEN_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_AH_AUTHEN_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 0;
es_type_bundle = 1;
break;
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_AH_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPTION_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 16;
es_type_bundle = 0;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES Invalid type %u, length %u",
ih->type,
l2info.length));
return l2info.header_len;
}
l2info.length-=rewrite_len;
p+=rewrite_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (!es_type_bundle) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), spi %u, Tunnel %s > %s, length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ih->spi),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->src_ip),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->dst_ip),
l2info.length));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
l2info.length));
}
}
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PrintWebViewHelper::PrintWebViewHelper(content::RenderView* render_view,
scoped_ptr<Delegate> delegate)
: content::RenderViewObserver(render_view),
content::RenderViewObserverTracker<PrintWebViewHelper>(render_view),
reset_prep_frame_view_(false),
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_(false),
ignore_css_margins_(false),
is_scripted_printing_blocked_(false),
notify_browser_of_print_failure_(true),
print_for_preview_(false),
delegate_(delegate.Pass()),
print_node_in_progress_(false),
is_loading_(false),
is_scripted_preview_delayed_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (!delegate_->IsPrintPreviewEnabled())
DisablePreview();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
|
Low
| 171,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video) {
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder != NULL);
for (video->Begin(); video->cxdata(); video->Next()) {
PreDecodeFrameHook(*video, decoder);
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size());
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next()))
DecompressedFrameHook(*img, video->frame_number());
}
delete decoder;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index++;
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void acpi_ns_terminate(void)
{
acpi_status status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE(ns_terminate);
#ifdef ACPI_EXEC_APP
{
union acpi_operand_object *prev;
union acpi_operand_object *next;
/* Delete any module-level code blocks */
next = acpi_gbl_module_code_list;
while (next) {
prev = next;
next = next->method.mutex;
prev->method.mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
acpi_ut_remove_reference(prev);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects
* attached to the nodes
*/
acpi_ns_delete_namespace_subtree(acpi_gbl_root_node);
/* Delete any objects attached to the root node */
status = acpi_ut_acquire_mutex(ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
return_VOID;
}
acpi_ns_delete_node(acpi_gbl_root_node);
(void)acpi_ut_release_mutex(ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, "Namespace freed\n"));
return_VOID;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-755
Summary: The acpi_ns_terminate() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12 does not flush the operand cache and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).
But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
|
Low
| 168,010
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ntlm_populate_message_header(NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header, UINT32 MessageType)
{
CopyMemory(header->Signature, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
header->MessageType = MessageType;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,273
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long madvise_remove(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
loff_t offset;
int error;
*prev = NULL; /* tell sys_madvise we drop mmap_sem */
if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_LOCKED|VM_NONLINEAR|VM_HUGETLB))
return -EINVAL;
if (!vma->vm_file || !vma->vm_file->f_mapping
|| !vma->vm_file->f_mapping->host) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED|VM_WRITE)) != (VM_SHARED|VM_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
offset = (loff_t)(start - vma->vm_start)
+ ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
/* filesystem's fallocate may need to take i_mutex */
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
error = do_fallocate(vma->vm_file,
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
offset, end - start);
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the madvise_remove function in mm/madvise.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via vectors involving a (1) munmap or (2) close system call.
Commit Message: mm: Hold a file reference in madvise_remove
Otherwise the code races with munmap (causing a use-after-free
of the vma) or with close (causing a use-after-free of the struct
file).
The bug was introduced by commit 90ed52ebe481 ("[PATCH] holepunch: fix
mmap_sem i_mutex deadlock")
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,581
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ip6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
register int advance;
u_int len;
const u_char *ipend;
register const u_char *cp;
register u_int payload_len;
int nh;
int fragmented = 0;
u_int flow;
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ip6);
if (length < sizeof (struct ip6_hdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-ip6 %u", length));
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP6 "));
if (IP6_VERSION(ip6) != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"version error: %u != 6", IP6_VERSION(ip6)));
return;
}
payload_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen);
len = payload_len + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
if (length < len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-ip6 - %u bytes missing!",
len - length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
flow = EXTRACT_32BITS(&ip6->ip6_flow);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "("));
#if 0
/* rfc1883 */
if (flow & 0x0f000000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "pri 0x%02x, ", (flow & 0x0f000000) >> 24));
if (flow & 0x00ffffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "flowlabel 0x%06x, ", flow & 0x00ffffff));
#else
/* RFC 2460 */
if (flow & 0x0ff00000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "class 0x%02x, ", (flow & 0x0ff00000) >> 20));
if (flow & 0x000fffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "flowlabel 0x%05x, ", flow & 0x000fffff));
#endif
ND_PRINT((ndo, "hlim %u, next-header %s (%u) payload length: %u) ",
ip6->ip6_hlim,
tok2str(ipproto_values,"unknown",ip6->ip6_nxt),
ip6->ip6_nxt,
payload_len));
}
/*
* Cut off the snapshot length to the end of the IP payload.
*/
ipend = bp + len;
if (ipend < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ndo->ndo_snapend = ipend;
cp = (const u_char *)ip6;
advance = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
nh = ip6->ip6_nxt;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && advance > 0) {
cp += advance;
len -= advance;
if (cp == (const u_char *)(ip6 + 1) &&
nh != IPPROTO_TCP && nh != IPPROTO_UDP &&
nh != IPPROTO_DCCP && nh != IPPROTO_SCTP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ", ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst)));
}
switch (nh) {
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
advance = hbhopt_print(ndo, cp);
if (advance < 0)
return;
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
advance = dstopt_print(ndo, cp);
if (advance < 0)
return;
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT:
advance = frag6_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6);
if (advance < 0 || ndo->ndo_snapend <= cp + advance)
return;
nh = *cp;
fragmented = 1;
break;
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY_OLD:
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY:
/*
* XXX - we don't use "advance"; RFC 3775 says that
* the next header field in a mobility header
* should be IPPROTO_NONE, but speaks of
* the possiblity of a future extension in
* which payload can be piggybacked atop a
* mobility header.
*/
advance = mobility_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6);
nh = *cp;
return;
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
advance = rt6_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6);
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_SCTP:
sctp_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_DCCP:
dccp_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_TCP:
tcp_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, fragmented);
return;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
udp_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, fragmented);
return;
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
icmp6_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, fragmented);
return;
case IPPROTO_AH:
advance = ah_print(ndo, cp);
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_ESP:
{
int enh, padlen;
advance = esp_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, &enh, &padlen);
nh = enh & 0xff;
len -= padlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_IPCOMP:
{
ipcomp_print(ndo, cp);
/*
* Either this has decompressed the payload and
* printed it, in which case there's nothing more
* to do, or it hasn't, in which case there's
* nothing more to do.
*/
advance = -1;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_PIM:
pim_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6);
return;
case IPPROTO_OSPF:
ospf6_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_PGM:
pgm_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6);
return;
case IPPROTO_GRE:
gre_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_RSVP:
rsvp_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_NONE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no next header"));
return;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ip-proto-%d %d", nh, len));
return;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ip6]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip6.c:ip6_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12985/IPv6: Check for print routines returning -1 when running past the end.
rt6_print(), ah_print(), and esp_print() return -1 if they run up
against the end of the packet while dissecting; if that happens, stop
dissecting, don't try to fetch the next header value, because 1) *it*
might be past the end of the packet and 2) we won't be using it in any
case, as we'll be exiting the loop.
Also, change mobility_print() to return -1 if it runs up against the
end of the packet, and stop dissecting if it does so.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,930
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.DirectoryEntry.getDirectory");
DirectoryEntry* imp = V8DirectoryEntry::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, path, args[0]);
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->getDirectory(path);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
RefPtr<WebKitFlags> flags;
if (!isUndefinedOrNull(args[1]) && args[1]->IsObject()) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(v8::Handle<v8::Object>, object, v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[1]));
flags = WebKitFlags::create();
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Create = object->Get(v8::String::New("create"));
if (!v8Create.IsEmpty() && !isUndefinedOrNull(v8Create)) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(bool, isCreate, v8Create->BooleanValue());
flags->setCreate(isCreate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Exclusive = object->Get(v8::String::New("exclusive"));
if (!v8Exclusive.IsEmpty() && !isUndefinedOrNull(v8Exclusive)) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(bool, isExclusive, v8Exclusive->BooleanValue());
flags->setExclusive(isExclusive);
}
}
RefPtr<EntryCallback> successCallback;
if (args.Length() > 2 && !args[2]->IsNull() && !args[2]->IsUndefined()) {
if (!args[2]->IsObject())
return throwError(TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
successCallback = V8EntryCallback::create(args[2], getScriptExecutionContext());
}
RefPtr<ErrorCallback> errorCallback;
if (args.Length() > 3 && !args[3]->IsNull() && !args[3]->IsUndefined()) {
if (!args[3]->IsObject())
return throwError(TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
errorCallback = V8ErrorCallback::create(args[3], getScriptExecutionContext());
}
imp->getDirectory(path, flags, successCallback, errorCallback);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MockRenderProcess::MockRenderProcess()
: transport_dib_next_sequence_number_(0) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
int newtype,
struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *newopt, int newoptlen)
{
int tot_len = 0;
char *p;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt2;
int err;
if (opt) {
if (newtype != IPV6_HOPOPTS && opt->hopopt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->hopopt));
if (newtype != IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS && opt->dst0opt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->dst0opt));
if (newtype != IPV6_RTHDR && opt->srcrt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->srcrt));
if (newtype != IPV6_DSTOPTS && opt->dst1opt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt));
}
if (newopt && newoptlen)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(newoptlen);
if (!tot_len)
return NULL;
tot_len += sizeof(*opt2);
opt2 = sock_kmalloc(sk, tot_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!opt2)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->hopopt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_HOPOPTS,
&opt2->hopopt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->dst0opt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS,
&opt2->dst0opt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->srcrt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_RTHDR,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr **)&opt2->srcrt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->dst1opt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_DSTOPTS,
&opt2->dst1opt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
opt2->opt_nflen = (opt2->hopopt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->hopopt) : 0) +
(opt2->dst0opt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->dst0opt) : 0) +
(opt2->srcrt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->srcrt) : 0);
opt2->opt_flen = (opt2->dst1opt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->dst1opt) : 0);
return opt2;
out:
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt2, opt2->tot_len);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed function in lib/gnutls_cipher.c in libgnutls in GnuTLS before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read and crash) via a certain integer value in the Random field in an encrypted Client Hello message within a TLS record with an invalid Record Length, which leads to an invalid cipher padding length, aka GNUTLS-SA-2008-1-3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
int flen)
{
struct ustr *filename, *unifilename;
int len = 0;
filename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!filename)
return 0;
unifilename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!unifilename)
goto out1;
if (udf_build_ustr_exact(unifilename, sname, flen))
goto out2;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_UTF8)) {
if (!udf_CS0toUTF8(filename, unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) {
if (!udf_CS0toNLS(UDF_SB(sb)->s_nls_map, filename,
unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else
goto out2;
len = udf_translate_to_linux(dname, filename->u_name, filename->u_len,
unifilename->u_name, unifilename->u_len);
out2:
kfree(unifilename);
out1:
kfree(filename);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The UDF filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 does not ensure that space is available for storing a symlink target's name along with a trailing 0 character, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information via a crafted filesystem image, related to fs/udf/symlink.c and fs/udf/unicode.c.
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 166,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<BrowserContext> BrowserContextImpl::GetOffTheRecordContext() {
if (!otr_context_) {
OTRBrowserContextImpl* context = new OTRBrowserContextImpl(
this,
static_cast<BrowserContextIODataImpl *>(io_data()));
otr_context_ = context->GetWeakPtr();
}
return make_scoped_refptr(otr_context_.get());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,413
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The bmp_getdata function in libjasper/bmp/bmp_dec.c in JasPer 1.900.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) by calling the imginfo command with a crafted BMP image. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-8690.
Commit Message: Fixed a problem with a null pointer dereference in the BMP decoder.
|
Medium
| 168,755
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
params.enable_ipc_proxy = enable_ipc_proxy_;
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: report_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
report_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
error_prolog (1);
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
if (exit_immediately_on_error)
exit_shell (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap-based buffer overflow exists in GNU Bash before 4.3 when wide characters, not supported by the current locale set in the LC_CTYPE environment variable, are printed through the echo built-in function. A local attacker, who can provide data to print through the "echo -e" built-in function, may use this flaw to crash a script or execute code with the privileges of the bash process. This occurs because ansicstr() in lib/sh/strtrans.c mishandles u32cconv().
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,430
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void APIPermissionInfo::RegisterAllPermissions(
PermissionsInfo* info) {
struct PermissionRegistration {
APIPermission::ID id;
const char* name;
int flags;
int l10n_message_id;
PermissionMessage::ID message_id;
APIPermissionConstructor constructor;
} PermissionsToRegister[] = {
{ APIPermission::kBackground, "background" },
{ APIPermission::kClipboardRead, "clipboardRead", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_CLIPBOARD,
PermissionMessage::kClipboard },
{ APIPermission::kClipboardWrite, "clipboardWrite" },
{ APIPermission::kDeclarativeWebRequest, "declarativeWebRequest" },
{ APIPermission::kDownloads, "downloads", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_DOWNLOADS,
PermissionMessage::kDownloads },
{ APIPermission::kExperimental, "experimental", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kGeolocation, "geolocation", kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_GEOLOCATION,
PermissionMessage::kGeolocation },
{ APIPermission::kNotification, "notifications" },
{ APIPermission::kUnlimitedStorage, "unlimitedStorage",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kAppNotifications, "appNotifications" },
{ APIPermission::kActiveTab, "activeTab" },
{ APIPermission::kAlarms, "alarms" },
{ APIPermission::kBookmark, "bookmarks", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BOOKMARKS,
PermissionMessage::kBookmarks },
{ APIPermission::kBrowsingData, "browsingData" },
{ APIPermission::kContentSettings, "contentSettings", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_CONTENT_SETTINGS,
PermissionMessage::kContentSettings },
{ APIPermission::kContextMenus, "contextMenus" },
{ APIPermission::kCookie, "cookies" },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserHandler, "fileBrowserHandler",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFontSettings, "fontSettings", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kHistory, "history", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BROWSING_HISTORY,
PermissionMessage::kBrowsingHistory },
{ APIPermission::kIdle, "idle" },
{ APIPermission::kInput, "input", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_INPUT,
PermissionMessage::kInput },
{ APIPermission::kManagement, "management", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_MANAGEMENT,
PermissionMessage::kManagement },
{ APIPermission::kPrivacy, "privacy", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_PRIVACY,
PermissionMessage::kPrivacy },
{ APIPermission::kStorage, "storage" },
{ APIPermission::kSyncFileSystem, "syncFileSystem" },
{ APIPermission::kTab, "tabs", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TABS,
PermissionMessage::kTabs },
{ APIPermission::kTopSites, "topSites", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BROWSING_HISTORY,
PermissionMessage::kBrowsingHistory },
{ APIPermission::kTts, "tts", 0, kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kTtsEngine, "ttsEngine", kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TTS_ENGINE,
PermissionMessage::kTtsEngine },
{ APIPermission::kWebNavigation, "webNavigation", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TABS, PermissionMessage::kTabs },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequest, "webRequest" },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequestBlocking, "webRequestBlocking" },
{ APIPermission::kWebView, "webview", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kBookmarkManagerPrivate, "bookmarkManagerPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kChromeosInfoPrivate, "chromeosInfoPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserHandlerInternal, "fileBrowserHandlerInternal",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserPrivate, "fileBrowserPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kManagedModePrivate, "managedModePrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMediaPlayerPrivate, "mediaPlayerPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMetricsPrivate, "metricsPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kSystemPrivate, "systemPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kCloudPrintPrivate, "cloudPrintPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kInputMethodPrivate, "inputMethodPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kEchoPrivate, "echoPrivate", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kRtcPrivate, "rtcPrivate", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kTerminalPrivate, "terminalPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWallpaperPrivate, "wallpaperPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequestInternal, "webRequestInternal" },
{ APIPermission::kWebSocketProxyPrivate, "webSocketProxyPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWebstorePrivate, "webstorePrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesPrivate, "mediaGalleriesPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kDebugger, "debugger",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_DEBUGGER,
PermissionMessage::kDebugger },
{ APIPermission::kDevtools, "devtools",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kPageCapture, "pageCapture",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess },
{ APIPermission::kTabCapture, "tabCapture",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess },
{ APIPermission::kPlugin, "plugin",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagImpliesFullAccess |
kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_FULL_ACCESS,
PermissionMessage::kFullAccess },
{ APIPermission::kProxy, "proxy",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kSerial, "serial", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_SERIAL,
PermissionMessage::kSerial },
{ APIPermission::kSocket, "socket", kFlagCannotBeOptional, 0,
PermissionMessage::kNone, &::CreateAPIPermission<SocketPermission> },
{ APIPermission::kAppCurrentWindowInternal, "app.currentWindowInternal" },
{ APIPermission::kAppRuntime, "app.runtime" },
{ APIPermission::kAppWindow, "app.window" },
{ APIPermission::kAudioCapture, "audioCapture", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_AUDIO_CAPTURE,
PermissionMessage::kAudioCapture },
{ APIPermission::kVideoCapture, "videoCapture", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
PermissionMessage::kVideoCapture },
{ APIPermission::kFileSystem, "fileSystem" },
{ APIPermission::kFileSystemWrite, "fileSystem.write", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_FILE_SYSTEM_WRITE,
PermissionMessage::kFileSystemWrite },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleries, "mediaGalleries" },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesRead, "mediaGalleries.read" },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesAllAutoDetected,
"mediaGalleries.allAutoDetected", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_MEDIA_GALLERIES_ALL_GALLERIES,
PermissionMessage::kMediaGalleriesAllGalleries },
{ APIPermission::kPushMessaging, "pushMessaging", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kBluetooth, "bluetooth", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BLUETOOTH,
PermissionMessage::kBluetooth },
{ APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice, "bluetoothDevice",
kFlagNone, 0, PermissionMessage::kNone,
&::CreateAPIPermission<BluetoothDevicePermission> },
{ APIPermission::kUsb, "usb", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_USB,
PermissionMessage::kUsb },
{ APIPermission::kSystemIndicator, "systemIndicator", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_SYSTEM_INDICATOR,
PermissionMessage::kSystemIndicator },
{ APIPermission::kPointerLock, "pointerLock" },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(PermissionsToRegister); ++i) {
const PermissionRegistration& pr = PermissionsToRegister[i];
info->RegisterPermission(
pr.id, pr.name, pr.l10n_message_id,
pr.message_id ? pr.message_id : PermissionMessage::kNone,
pr.flags,
pr.constructor);
}
info->RegisterAlias("unlimitedStorage", kOldUnlimitedStoragePermission);
info->RegisterAlias("tabs", kWindowsPermission);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly implement web audio nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXTableCell::isRowHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "row") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "rowgroup");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options)
{
char *p;
int rc = 0;
int sig_set = 0;
int cipher_name_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_name_set = 0;
int cipher_key_bytes;
int cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
char *sig_src;
char *cipher_name_dst;
char *cipher_name_src;
char *fn_cipher_name_dst;
char *fn_cipher_name_src;
char *fnek_dst;
char *fnek_src;
char *cipher_key_bytes_src;
char *fn_cipher_key_bytes_src;
if (!options) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(mount_crypt_stat);
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case ecryptfs_opt_sig:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig:
sig_src = args[0].from;
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat,
sig_src, 0);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
sig_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_cipher:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_cipher:
cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->
global_default_cipher_name;
strncpy(cipher_name_dst, cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
cipher_name_dst[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes:
cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(cipher_key_bytes_src,
&cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
cipher_key_bytes;
cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_passthrough:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_xattr_metadata:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_encrypted_view:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fnek_sig:
fnek_src = args[0].from;
fnek_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig;
strncpy(fnek_dst, fnek_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig[
ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(
mount_crypt_stat,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
rc);
goto out;
}
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
(ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES
| ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK);
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher:
fn_cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name;
strncpy(fn_cipher_name_dst, fn_cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name[
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
fn_cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes:
fn_cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(fn_cipher_key_bytes_src,
&fn_cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
fn_cipher_key_bytes;
fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_UNLINK_SIGS;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_mount_auth_tok_only:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_MOUNT_AUTH_TOK_ONLY;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_err:
default:
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: eCryptfs: unrecognized option [%s]\n",
__func__, p);
}
}
if (!sig_set) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply at least one valid "
"auth tok signature as a mount "
"parameter; see the eCryptfs README\n");
goto out;
}
if (!cipher_name_set) {
int cipher_name_len = strlen(ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
BUG_ON(cipher_name_len >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_name_set)
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
if (!cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ecryptfs_tfm_exists(
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name, NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
"properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
out:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Race condition in the ecryptfs_mount function in fs/ecryptfs/main.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to bypass intended file permissions via a mount.ecryptfs_private mount with a mismatched uid.
Commit Message: Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
Medium
| 165,875
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, true);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/*tex If no number follows |/CharStrings|, let's read the next line. */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
t1_getline();
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in t1_check_unusual_charstring functions in writet1.c files in TeX Live before 2018-09-21. A buffer overflow in the handling of Type 1 fonts allows arbitrary code execution when a malicious font is loaded by one of the vulnerable tools: pdflatex, pdftex, dvips, or luatex.
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
Medium
| 169,021
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_resolve_include_path)
{
char *filename, *resolved_path;
int filename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &filename, &filename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
resolved_path = zend_resolve_path(filename, filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (resolved_path) {
RETURN_STRING(resolved_path, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,317
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
*/
return 1;
}
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <
0)
return -1;
}
}
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Anti-Replay feature in the DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 mishandles early use of a new epoch number in conjunction with a large sequence number, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (false-positive packet drops) via spoofed DTLS records, related to rec_layer_d1.c and ssl3_record.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
context,
prf_key,
prf_in,
desired_output_len,
prf_out);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::clipOut(const Path&)
{
notImplemented();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: selReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char *selname;
char linebuf[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 sy, sx, cy, cx, i, j, version, ignore;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Sel Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("not a sel file", procName, NULL);
if (version != SEL_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("invalid sel version", procName, NULL);
if (fgets(linebuf, L_BUF_SIZE, fp) == NULL)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("error reading into linebuf", procName, NULL);
selname = stringNew(linebuf);
sscanf(linebuf, " ------ %s ------", selname);
if (fscanf(fp, " sy = %d, sx = %d, cy = %d, cx = %d\n",
&sy, &sx, &cy, &cx) != 4) {
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("dimensions not read", procName, NULL);
}
if ((sel = selCreate(sy, sx, selname)) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel not made", procName, NULL);
}
selSetOrigin(sel, cy, cx);
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++) {
ignore = fscanf(fp, " ");
for (j = 0; j < sx; j++)
ignore = fscanf(fp, "%1d", &sel->data[i][j]);
ignore = fscanf(fp, "\n");
}
ignore = fscanf(fp, "\n");
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return sel;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
|
Low
| 169,329
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void pdo_stmt_init(TSRMLS_D)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "PDOStatement", pdo_dbstmt_functions);
pdo_dbstmt_ce = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
pdo_dbstmt_ce->get_iterator = pdo_stmt_iter_get;
pdo_dbstmt_ce->create_object = pdo_dbstmt_new;
zend_class_implements(pdo_dbstmt_ce TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_traversable);
zend_declare_property_null(pdo_dbstmt_ce, "queryString", sizeof("queryString")-1, ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
memcpy(&pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers, &std_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.write_property = dbstmt_prop_write;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.unset_property = dbstmt_prop_delete;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.get_method = dbstmt_method_get;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.compare_objects = dbstmt_compare;
pdo_dbstmt_object_handlers.clone_obj = dbstmt_clone_obj;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "PDORow", pdo_row_functions);
pdo_row_ce = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
pdo_row_ce->ce_flags |= ZEND_ACC_FINAL_CLASS; /* when removing this a lot of handlers need to be redone */
pdo_row_ce->create_object = pdo_row_new;
pdo_row_ce->serialize = pdo_row_serialize;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.28 and 7.x before 7.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via crafted serialized data in a wddxPacket XML document, as demonstrated by a PDORow string.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
|
Low
| 168,668
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePDBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*comment;
int
bits;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PDBImage
pdb_image;
PDBInfo
pdb_info;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
literal,
packets,
packet_size,
repeat;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*runlength,
*scanline;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image -> colors <= 2 ) ||
(GetImageType(image,&image->exception ) == BilevelType)) {
bits_per_pixel=1;
} else if (image->colors <= 4) {
bits_per_pixel=2;
} else if (image->colors <= 8) {
bits_per_pixel=3;
} else {
bits_per_pixel=4;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pdb_info,0,sizeof(pdb_info));
(void) CopyMagickString(pdb_info.name,image_info->filename,
sizeof(pdb_info.name));
pdb_info.attributes=0;
pdb_info.version=0;
pdb_info.create_time=time(NULL);
pdb_info.modify_time=pdb_info.create_time;
pdb_info.archive_time=0;
pdb_info.modify_number=0;
pdb_info.application_info=0;
pdb_info.sort_info=0;
(void) CopyMagickMemory(pdb_info.type,"vIMG",4);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(pdb_info.id,"View",4);
pdb_info.seed=0;
pdb_info.next_record=0;
comment=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
pdb_info.number_records=(comment == (const char *) NULL ? 1 : 2);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_info.name),(unsigned char *) pdb_info.name);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.attributes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.create_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.modify_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.archive_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.modify_number);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.application_info);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.sort_info);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.type);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.id);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.seed);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.next_record);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.number_records);
(void) CopyMagickString(pdb_image.name,pdb_info.name,sizeof(pdb_image.name));
pdb_image.version=1; /* RLE Compressed */
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0xff; break; /* monochrome */
case 2: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0x00; break; /* 2 bit gray */
default: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0x02; /* 4 bit gray */
}
pdb_image.reserved_1=0;
pdb_image.note=0;
pdb_image.x_last=0;
pdb_image.y_last=0;
pdb_image.reserved_2=0;
pdb_image.x_anchor=(unsigned short) 0xffff;
pdb_image.y_anchor=(unsigned short) 0xffff;
pdb_image.width=(short) image->columns;
if (image->columns % 16)
pdb_image.width=(short) (16*(image->columns/16+1));
pdb_image.height=(short) image->rows;
packets=((bits_per_pixel*image->columns+7)/8);
runlength=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(9UL*packets,
image->rows*sizeof(*runlength));
if (runlength == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(512,sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 2: 1);
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Convert to GRAY raster scanline.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bits=8/(int) bits_per_pixel-1; /* start at most significant bits */
literal=0;
repeat=0;
q=runlength;
buffer[0]=0x00;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,scanline,&image->exception);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pdb_image.width; x++)
{
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
buffer[literal+repeat]|=(0xff-scanline[x*packet_size]) >>
(8-bits_per_pixel) << bits*bits_per_pixel;
bits--;
if (bits < 0)
{
if (((literal+repeat) > 0) &&
(buffer[literal+repeat] == buffer[literal+repeat-1]))
{
if (repeat == 0)
{
literal--;
repeat++;
}
repeat++;
if (0x7f < repeat)
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
literal=0;
repeat=0;
}
}
else
{
if (repeat >= 2)
literal+=repeat;
else
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
buffer[0]=buffer[literal+repeat];
literal=0;
}
literal++;
repeat=0;
if (0x7f < literal)
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,(literal < 0x80 ? literal : 0x80),0);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(buffer,buffer+literal+repeat,0x80);
literal-=0x80;
}
}
bits=8/(int) bits_per_pixel-1;
buffer[literal+repeat]=0x00;
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
/*
Write the Image record header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (TellBlob(image)+8*
pdb_info.number_records));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x40);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x6f);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x80);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
/*
Write the comment record header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (TellBlob(image)+8+58+q-
runlength));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x40);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x6f);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x80);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,1);
}
/*
Write the Image data.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_image.name),(unsigned char *)
pdb_image.name);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) pdb_image.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pdb_image.type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.reserved_1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.note);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.x_last);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.y_last);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.reserved_2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,pdb_image.x_anchor);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,pdb_image.y_anchor);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.width);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.height);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-runlength),runlength);
runlength=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,comment);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the WriteGROUP4Image function in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
|
Medium
| 168,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::~ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
(*GetProcessIdToFilterMap())[render_process_id_] = nullptr;
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, BrowserThread::UI,
base::BindOnce(RemoveProcessIdFromGlobalMap, render_process_id_));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int vmxnet3_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
if (s->msix_used) {
if (!vmxnet3_use_msix_vectors(s, VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS)) {
VMW_WRPRN("Failed to re-use MSI-X vectors");
msix_uninit(d, &s->msix_bar, &s->msix_bar);
s->msix_used = false;
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: hw/net/vmxnet3.c in QEMU 2.0.0-rc0, 1.7.1, and earlier allows local guest users to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors related to (1) RX or (2) TX queue numbers or (3) interrupt indices. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,354
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GraphicsContext3D::getImageData(Image* image,
GC3Denum format,
GC3Denum type,
bool premultiplyAlpha,
bool ignoreGammaAndColorProfile,
Vector<uint8_t>& outputVector)
{
if (!image)
return false;
CGImageRef cgImage;
RetainPtr<CGImageRef> decodedImage;
bool hasAlpha = image->isBitmapImage() ? static_cast<BitmapImage*>(image)->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0) : true;
if ((ignoreGammaAndColorProfile || (hasAlpha && !premultiplyAlpha)) && image->data()) {
ImageSource decoder(ImageSource::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
ignoreGammaAndColorProfile ? ImageSource::GammaAndColorProfileIgnored : ImageSource::GammaAndColorProfileApplied);
decoder.setData(image->data(), true);
if (!decoder.frameCount())
return false;
decodedImage.adoptCF(decoder.createFrameAtIndex(0));
cgImage = decodedImage.get();
} else
cgImage = image->nativeImageForCurrentFrame();
if (!cgImage)
return false;
size_t width = CGImageGetWidth(cgImage);
size_t height = CGImageGetHeight(cgImage);
if (!width || !height)
return false;
CGColorSpaceRef colorSpace = CGImageGetColorSpace(cgImage);
CGColorSpaceModel model = CGColorSpaceGetModel(colorSpace);
if (model == kCGColorSpaceModelIndexed) {
RetainPtr<CGContextRef> bitmapContext;
bitmapContext.adoptCF(CGBitmapContextCreate(0, width, height, 8, width * 4,
deviceRGBColorSpaceRef(),
kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedFirst | kCGBitmapByteOrder32Host));
if (!bitmapContext)
return false;
CGContextSetBlendMode(bitmapContext.get(), kCGBlendModeCopy);
CGContextSetInterpolationQuality(bitmapContext.get(), kCGInterpolationNone);
CGContextDrawImage(bitmapContext.get(), CGRectMake(0, 0, width, height), cgImage);
decodedImage.adoptCF(CGBitmapContextCreateImage(bitmapContext.get()));
cgImage = decodedImage.get();
}
size_t bitsPerComponent = CGImageGetBitsPerComponent(cgImage);
size_t bitsPerPixel = CGImageGetBitsPerPixel(cgImage);
if (bitsPerComponent != 8 && bitsPerComponent != 16)
return false;
if (bitsPerPixel % bitsPerComponent)
return false;
size_t componentsPerPixel = bitsPerPixel / bitsPerComponent;
CGBitmapInfo bitInfo = CGImageGetBitmapInfo(cgImage);
bool bigEndianSource = false;
if (bitsPerComponent == 16) {
switch (bitInfo & kCGBitmapByteOrderMask) {
case kCGBitmapByteOrder16Big:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrder16Little:
bigEndianSource = false;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrderDefault:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
default:
return false;
}
} else {
switch (bitInfo & kCGBitmapByteOrderMask) {
case kCGBitmapByteOrder32Big:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrder32Little:
bigEndianSource = false;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrderDefault:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
default:
return false;
}
}
AlphaOp neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoNothing;
AlphaFormat alphaFormat = AlphaFormatNone;
switch (CGImageGetAlphaInfo(cgImage)) {
case kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedFirst:
if (!premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoUnmultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatFirst;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaFirst:
if (premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoPremultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatFirst;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaNoneSkipFirst:
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatFirst;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedLast:
if (!premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoUnmultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatLast;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaLast:
if (premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoPremultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatLast;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaNoneSkipLast:
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatLast;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaNone:
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatNone;
break;
default:
return false;
}
SourceDataFormat srcDataFormat = getSourceDataFormat(componentsPerPixel, alphaFormat, bitsPerComponent == 16, bigEndianSource);
if (srcDataFormat == SourceFormatNumFormats)
return false;
RetainPtr<CFDataRef> pixelData;
pixelData.adoptCF(CGDataProviderCopyData(CGImageGetDataProvider(cgImage)));
if (!pixelData)
return false;
const UInt8* rgba = CFDataGetBytePtr(pixelData.get());
unsigned int packedSize;
if (computeImageSizeInBytes(format, type, width, height, 1, &packedSize, 0) != GraphicsContext3D::NO_ERROR)
return false;
outputVector.resize(packedSize);
unsigned int srcUnpackAlignment = 0;
size_t bytesPerRow = CGImageGetBytesPerRow(cgImage);
unsigned int padding = bytesPerRow - bitsPerPixel / 8 * width;
if (padding) {
srcUnpackAlignment = padding + 1;
while (bytesPerRow % srcUnpackAlignment)
++srcUnpackAlignment;
}
bool rt = packPixels(rgba, srcDataFormat, width, height, srcUnpackAlignment,
format, type, neededAlphaOp, outputVector.data());
return rt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to SVG painting.
Commit Message: Set the access qualifier of two methods to query frame specific info of BitmapImage to protected.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90505
Patch by Huang Dongsung <luxtella@company100.net> on 2012-08-12
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Following 4 methods are protected.
size_t frameCount();
NativeImagePtr frameAtIndex(size_t);
bool frameIsCompleteAtIndex(size_t);
float frameDurationAtIndex(size_t);
So, 2 methds also should be protected because the frame info is only specific of
BitmapImage.
bool frameHasAlphaAtIndex(size_t);
ImageOrientation frameOrientationAtIndex(size_t);
On the other hand, this patch amended GraphicsContext3DCG.
- static_cast<BitmapImage*>(image)->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0)
+ image->currentFrameHasAlpha()
This patch does not affect PNG, JPEG, BMP, and WEBP because those images
have only 0 indexed frame.
Thus, GIF, and ICO are affected. However, an above query to get Alpha
is for the image that is created by image->nativeImageForCurrentFrame(), so it
is proper to use image->currentFrameHasAlpha() instead of
image->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0).
No new tests, because it is hard to test. We need an animated GIF that
one frame has alpha and another frame does not have alpha. However, I
cannot find the animated GIF file that suffices the requirement.
* platform/graphics/BitmapImage.h:
(BitmapImage):
* platform/graphics/cg/GraphicsContext3DCG.cpp:
(WebCore::GraphicsContext3D::getImageData):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125374 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UpdateProperty(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < prop_list.size(); ++i) {
FindAndUpdateProperty(prop_list[i], ¤t_ime_properties_);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,509
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _zip_cdir_new(int nentry, struct zip_error *error)
{
struct zip_cdir *cd;
if ((cd=(struct zip_cdir *)malloc(sizeof(*cd))) == NULL) {
_zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd->entry=(struct zip_dirent *)malloc(sizeof(*(cd->entry))*nentry))
== NULL) {
_zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
free(cd);
return NULL;
}
/* entries must be initialized by caller */
cd->nentry = nentry;
cd->size = cd->offset = 0;
cd->comment = NULL;
cd->comment_len = 0;
return cd;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the _zip_cdir_new function in zip_dirent.c in libzip 0.11.2 and earlier, as used in the ZIP extension in PHP before 5.4.39, 5.5.x before 5.5.23, and 5.6.x before 5.6.7 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a ZIP archive that contains many entries, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,752
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PropertyTreeManager::SetupRootTransformNode() {
cc::TransformTree& transform_tree = property_trees_.transform_tree;
transform_tree.clear();
property_trees_.element_id_to_transform_node_index.clear();
cc::TransformNode& transform_node = *transform_tree.Node(
transform_tree.Insert(cc::TransformNode(), kRealRootNodeId));
DCHECK_EQ(transform_node.id, kSecondaryRootNodeId);
transform_node.source_node_id = transform_node.parent_id;
float device_scale_factor =
root_layer_->layer_tree_host()->device_scale_factor();
gfx::Transform to_screen;
to_screen.Scale(device_scale_factor, device_scale_factor);
transform_tree.SetToScreen(kRealRootNodeId, to_screen);
gfx::Transform from_screen;
bool invertible = to_screen.GetInverse(&from_screen);
DCHECK(invertible);
transform_tree.SetFromScreen(kRealRootNodeId, from_screen);
transform_tree.set_needs_update(true);
transform_node_map_.Set(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
transform_node.id);
root_layer_->SetTransformTreeIndex(transform_node.id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,831
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError(
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to unregister agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,231
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *newext, int at)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *fidx;
int i = at, k, m, a;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, oldblock;
__le32 border;
ext4_fsblk_t *ablocks = NULL; /* array of allocated blocks */
int err = 0;
/* make decision: where to split? */
/* FIXME: now decision is simplest: at current extent */
/* if current leaf will be split, then we should use
* border from split point */
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT!");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (path[depth].p_ext != EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
border = path[depth].p_ext[1].ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be split."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
} else {
border = newext->ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be added."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
}
/*
* If error occurs, then we break processing
* and mark filesystem read-only. index won't
* be inserted and tree will be in consistent
* state. Next mount will repair buffers too.
*/
/*
* Get array to track all allocated blocks.
* We need this to handle errors and free blocks
* upon them.
*/
ablocks = kcalloc(depth, sizeof(ext4_fsblk_t), GFP_NOFS);
if (!ablocks)
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate all needed blocks */
ext_debug("allocate %d blocks for indexes/leaf\n", depth - at);
for (a = 0; a < depth - at; a++) {
newblock = ext4_ext_new_meta_block(handle, inode, path,
newext, &err, flags);
if (newblock == 0)
goto cleanup;
ablocks[a] = newblock;
}
/* initialize new leaf */
newblock = ablocks[--a];
if (unlikely(newblock == 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "newblock == 0!");
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = 0;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_depth = 0;
/* move remainder of path[depth] to the new leaf */
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries !=
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "eh_entries %d != eh_max %d!",
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries,
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* start copy from next extent */
m = EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr) - path[depth].p_ext++;
ext4_ext_show_move(inode, path, newblock, depth);
if (m) {
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh);
memmove(ex, path[depth].p_ext, sizeof(struct ext4_extent) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old leaf */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
/* create intermediate indexes */
k = depth - at - 1;
if (unlikely(k < 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "k %d < 0!", k);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (k)
ext_debug("create %d intermediate indices\n", k);
/* insert new index into current index block */
/* current depth stored in i var */
i = depth - 1;
while (k--) {
oldblock = newblock;
newblock = ablocks[--a];
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
neh->eh_depth = cpu_to_le16(depth - i);
fidx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh);
fidx->ei_block = border;
ext4_idx_store_pblock(fidx, oldblock);
ext_debug("int.index at %d (block %llu): %u -> %llu\n",
i, newblock, le32_to_cpu(border), oldblock);
/* move remainder of path[i] to the new index block */
if (unlikely(EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) !=
EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"EXT_MAX_INDEX != EXT_LAST_INDEX ee_block %d!",
le32_to_cpu(path[i].p_ext->ee_block));
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* start copy indexes */
m = EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) - path[i].p_idx++;
ext_debug("cur 0x%p, last 0x%p\n", path[i].p_idx,
EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
ext4_ext_show_move(inode, path, newblock, i);
if (m) {
memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old index */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[i].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
i--;
}
/* insert new index */
err = ext4_ext_insert_index(handle, inode, path + at,
le32_to_cpu(border), newblock);
cleanup:
if (bh) {
if (buffer_locked(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
if (err) {
/* free all allocated blocks in error case */
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if (!ablocks[i])
continue;
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, ablocks[i], 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA);
}
}
kfree(ablocks);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel through 5.1.2 does not zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block, which might allow local users to obtain sensitive information by reading uninitialized data in the filesystem.
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
Low
| 169,678
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr;
/*
* Disable the breakpoint request here since ptrace has defined a
* one-shot behaviour for breakpoint exceptions in PPC64.
* The SIGTRAP signal is generated automatically for us in do_dabr().
* We don't have to do anything about that here
*/
attr = bp->attr;
attr.disabled = true;
modify_user_hw_breakpoint(bp, &attr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,792
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DateTimeChooserImpl::writeDocument(SharedBuffer* data)
{
String stepString = String::number(m_parameters.step);
String stepBaseString = String::number(m_parameters.stepBase, 11, WTF::TruncateTrailingZeros);
IntRect anchorRectInScreen = m_chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(m_parameters.anchorRectInRootView);
String todayLabelString;
String otherDateLabelString;
if (m_parameters.type == InputTypeNames::month) {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::ThisMonthButtonLabel);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherMonthLabel);
} else if (m_parameters.type == InputTypeNames::week) {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::ThisWeekButtonLabel);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherWeekLabel);
} else {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::CalendarToday);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherDateLabel);
}
addString("<!DOCTYPE html><head><meta charset='UTF-8'><style>\n", data);
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerCommon.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerButton.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("suggestionPicker.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("calendarPicker.css"));
addString("</style></head><body><div id=main>Loading...</div><script>\n"
"window.dialogArguments = {\n", data);
addProperty("anchorRectInScreen", anchorRectInScreen, data);
addProperty("min", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.minimum, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("max", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.maximum, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("step", stepString, data);
addProperty("stepBase", stepBaseString, data);
addProperty("required", m_parameters.required, data);
addProperty("currentValue", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.doubleValue, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("locale", m_parameters.locale.string(), data);
addProperty("todayLabel", todayLabelString, data);
addProperty("clearLabel", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::CalendarClear), data);
addProperty("weekLabel", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::WeekNumberLabel), data);
addProperty("weekStartDay", m_locale->firstDayOfWeek(), data);
addProperty("shortMonthLabels", m_locale->shortMonthLabels(), data);
addProperty("dayLabels", m_locale->weekDayShortLabels(), data);
addProperty("isLocaleRTL", m_locale->isRTL(), data);
addProperty("isRTL", m_parameters.isAnchorElementRTL, data);
addProperty("mode", m_parameters.type.string(), data);
if (m_parameters.suggestions.size()) {
Vector<String> suggestionValues;
Vector<String> localizedSuggestionValues;
Vector<String> suggestionLabels;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_parameters.suggestions.size(); i++) {
suggestionValues.append(valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.suggestions[i].value, m_parameters.type));
localizedSuggestionValues.append(m_parameters.suggestions[i].localizedValue);
suggestionLabels.append(m_parameters.suggestions[i].label);
}
addProperty("suggestionValues", suggestionValues, data);
addProperty("localizedSuggestionValues", localizedSuggestionValues, data);
addProperty("suggestionLabels", suggestionLabels, data);
addProperty("inputWidth", static_cast<unsigned>(m_parameters.anchorRectInRootView.width()), data);
addProperty("showOtherDateEntry", RenderTheme::theme().supportsCalendarPicker(m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("otherDateLabel", otherDateLabelString, data);
addProperty("suggestionHighlightColor", RenderTheme::theme().activeListBoxSelectionBackgroundColor().serialized(), data);
addProperty("suggestionHighlightTextColor", RenderTheme::theme().activeListBoxSelectionForegroundColor().serialized(), data);
}
addString("}\n", data);
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerCommon.js"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("suggestionPicker.js"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("calendarPicker.js"));
addString("</script></body>\n", data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: The FilePath::ReferencesParent function in files/file_path.cc in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57 on Windows does not properly handle pathname components composed entirely of . (dot) and whitespace characters, which allows remote attackers to conduct directory traversal attacks via a crafted directory name.
Commit Message: AX: Calendar Picker: Add AX labels to MonthPopupButton and CalendarNavigationButtons.
This CL adds no new tests. Will add tests after a Chromium change for
string resource.
BUG=123896
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/552163002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@181617 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CameraSource::dataCallbackTimestamp(int64_t timestampUs,
int32_t msgType __unused, const sp<IMemory> &data) {
ALOGV("dataCallbackTimestamp: timestamp %lld us", (long long)timestampUs);
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (!mStarted || (mNumFramesReceived == 0 && timestampUs < mStartTimeUs)) {
ALOGV("Drop frame at %lld/%lld us", (long long)timestampUs, (long long)mStartTimeUs);
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (skipCurrentFrame(timestampUs)) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (mNumFramesReceived > 0) {
if (timestampUs <= mLastFrameTimestampUs) {
ALOGW("Dropping frame with backward timestamp %lld (last %lld)",
(long long)timestampUs, (long long)mLastFrameTimestampUs);
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
if (timestampUs - mLastFrameTimestampUs > mGlitchDurationThresholdUs) {
++mNumGlitches;
}
}
mLastFrameTimestampUs = timestampUs;
if (mNumFramesReceived == 0) {
mFirstFrameTimeUs = timestampUs;
if (mStartTimeUs > 0) {
if (timestampUs < mStartTimeUs) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame(data);
return;
}
mStartTimeUs = timestampUs - mStartTimeUs;
}
}
++mNumFramesReceived;
CHECK(data != NULL && data->size() > 0);
mFramesReceived.push_back(data);
int64_t timeUs = mStartTimeUs + (timestampUs - mFirstFrameTimeUs);
mFrameTimes.push_back(timeUs);
ALOGV("initial delay: %" PRId64 ", current time stamp: %" PRId64,
mStartTimeUs, timeUs);
mFrameAvailableCondition.signal();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The camera APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allow attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and obtain sensitive information about ANW buffer addresses via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28466701.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
Medium
| 173,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebRunnerMainDelegate::CreateContentBrowserClient() {
DCHECK(!browser_client_);
browser_client_ = std::make_unique<WebRunnerContentBrowserClient>(
std::move(context_channel_));
return browser_client_.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,159
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(index=0x%x)", index);
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioFlac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *flacParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *)params;
flacParams->nCompressionLevel = mCompressionLevel;
flacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
flacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Track::GetContentEncodingByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count =
content_encoding_entries_end_ - content_encoding_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return content_encoding_entries_[idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* Chapters::Atom::GetStringUID() const
{
return m_string_uid;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void readpng2_end_callback(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr;
/* retrieve the pointer to our special-purpose struct */
mainprog_ptr = png_get_progressive_ptr(png_ptr);
/* let the main program know that it should flush any buffered image
* data to the display now and set a "done" flag or whatever, but note
* that it SHOULD NOT DESTROY THE PNG STRUCTS YET--in other words, do
* NOT call readpng2_cleanup() either here or in the finish_display()
* routine; wait until control returns to the main program via
* readpng2_decode_data() */
(*mainprog_ptr->mainprog_finish_display)();
/* all done */
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_attr_node_addname(xfs_da_args_t *args)
{
xfs_da_state_t *state;
xfs_da_state_blk_t *blk;
xfs_inode_t *dp;
xfs_mount_t *mp;
int committed, retval, error;
trace_xfs_attr_node_addname(args);
/*
* Fill in bucket of arguments/results/context to carry around.
*/
dp = args->dp;
mp = dp->i_mount;
restart:
state = xfs_da_state_alloc();
state->args = args;
state->mp = mp;
state->blocksize = state->mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
state->node_ents = state->mp->m_attr_node_ents;
/*
* Search to see if name already exists, and get back a pointer
* to where it should go.
*/
error = xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(state, &retval);
if (error)
goto out;
blk = &state->path.blk[ state->path.active-1 ];
ASSERT(blk->magic == XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC);
if ((args->flags & ATTR_REPLACE) && (retval == ENOATTR)) {
goto out;
} else if (retval == EEXIST) {
if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
goto out;
trace_xfs_attr_node_replace(args);
args->op_flags |= XFS_DA_OP_RENAME; /* atomic rename op */
args->blkno2 = args->blkno; /* set 2nd entry info*/
args->index2 = args->index;
args->rmtblkno2 = args->rmtblkno;
args->rmtblkcnt2 = args->rmtblkcnt;
args->rmtblkno = 0;
args->rmtblkcnt = 0;
}
retval = xfs_attr3_leaf_add(blk->bp, state->args);
if (retval == ENOSPC) {
if (state->path.active == 1) {
/*
* Its really a single leaf node, but it had
* out-of-line values so it looked like it *might*
* have been a b-tree.
*/
xfs_da_state_free(state);
state = NULL;
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_to_node(args);
if (!error) {
error = xfs_bmap_finish(&args->trans,
args->flist,
&committed);
}
if (error) {
ASSERT(committed);
args->trans = NULL;
xfs_bmap_cancel(args->flist);
goto out;
}
/*
* bmap_finish() may have committed the last trans
* and started a new one. We need the inode to be
* in all transactions.
*/
if (committed)
xfs_trans_ijoin(args->trans, dp, 0);
/*
* Commit the node conversion and start the next
* trans in the chain.
*/
error = xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, dp);
if (error)
goto out;
goto restart;
}
/*
* Split as many Btree elements as required.
* This code tracks the new and old attr's location
* in the index/blkno/rmtblkno/rmtblkcnt fields and
* in the index2/blkno2/rmtblkno2/rmtblkcnt2 fields.
*/
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
error = xfs_da3_split(state);
if (!error) {
error = xfs_bmap_finish(&args->trans, args->flist,
&committed);
}
if (error) {
ASSERT(committed);
args->trans = NULL;
xfs_bmap_cancel(args->flist);
goto out;
}
/*
* bmap_finish() may have committed the last trans and started
* a new one. We need the inode to be in all transactions.
*/
if (committed)
xfs_trans_ijoin(args->trans, dp, 0);
} else {
/*
* Addition succeeded, update Btree hashvals.
*/
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(state, &state->path);
}
/*
* Kill the state structure, we're done with it and need to
* allow the buffers to come back later.
*/
xfs_da_state_free(state);
state = NULL;
/*
* Commit the leaf addition or btree split and start the next
* trans in the chain.
*/
error = xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, dp);
if (error)
goto out;
/*
* If there was an out-of-line value, allocate the blocks we
* identified for its storage and copy the value. This is done
* after we create the attribute so that we don't overflow the
* maximum size of a transaction and/or hit a deadlock.
*/
if (args->rmtblkno > 0) {
error = xfs_attr_rmtval_set(args);
if (error)
return(error);
}
/*
* If this is an atomic rename operation, we must "flip" the
* incomplete flags on the "new" and "old" attribute/value pairs
* so that one disappears and one appears atomically. Then we
* must remove the "old" attribute/value pair.
*/
if (args->op_flags & XFS_DA_OP_RENAME) {
/*
* In a separate transaction, set the incomplete flag on the
* "old" attr and clear the incomplete flag on the "new" attr.
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_flipflags(args);
if (error)
goto out;
/*
* Dismantle the "old" attribute/value pair by removing
* a "remote" value (if it exists).
*/
args->index = args->index2;
args->blkno = args->blkno2;
args->rmtblkno = args->rmtblkno2;
args->rmtblkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt2;
if (args->rmtblkno) {
error = xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(args);
if (error)
return(error);
}
/*
* Re-find the "old" attribute entry after any split ops.
* The INCOMPLETE flag means that we will find the "old"
* attr, not the "new" one.
*/
args->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
state = xfs_da_state_alloc();
state->args = args;
state->mp = mp;
state->blocksize = state->mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
state->node_ents = state->mp->m_attr_node_ents;
state->inleaf = 0;
error = xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(state, &retval);
if (error)
goto out;
/*
* Remove the name and update the hashvals in the tree.
*/
blk = &state->path.blk[ state->path.active-1 ];
ASSERT(blk->magic == XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_remove(blk->bp, args);
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(state, &state->path);
/*
* Check to see if the tree needs to be collapsed.
*/
if (retval && (state->path.active > 1)) {
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
error = xfs_da3_join(state);
if (!error) {
error = xfs_bmap_finish(&args->trans,
args->flist,
&committed);
}
if (error) {
ASSERT(committed);
args->trans = NULL;
xfs_bmap_cancel(args->flist);
goto out;
}
/*
* bmap_finish() may have committed the last trans
* and started a new one. We need the inode to be
* in all transactions.
*/
if (committed)
xfs_trans_ijoin(args->trans, dp, 0);
}
/*
* Commit and start the next trans in the chain.
*/
error = xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, dp);
if (error)
goto out;
} else if (args->rmtblkno > 0) {
/*
* Added a "remote" value, just clear the incomplete flag.
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_clearflag(args);
if (error)
goto out;
}
retval = error = 0;
out:
if (state)
xfs_da_state_free(state);
if (error)
return(error);
return(retval);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
|
Low
| 166,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void comps_objmrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
COMPS_ObjListIt *it2;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair->added = 0;
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key =
malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key+strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +
1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first != NULL) {
for (it2 = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first;
it2 != NULL; it2 = it2->next) {
comps_objmrtree_set(rt1, pair->key, it2->comps_obj);
}
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
/* current node hasn't data */
} else {
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free flaw has been discovered in libcomps before version 0.1.10 in the way ObjMRTrees are merged. An attacker, who is able to make an application read a crafted comps XML file, may be able to crash the application or execute malicious code.
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
|
Medium
| 169,751
|
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