instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX];
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
unsigned uninitialized_var(in), log;
struct vhost_log *vq_log;
struct msghdr msg = {
.msg_name = NULL,
.msg_namelen = 0,
.msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */
.msg_controllen = 0,
.msg_iov = vq->iov,
.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
};
struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf hdr = {
.hdr.flags = 0,
.hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
};
size_t total_len = 0;
int err, mergeable;
s16 headcount;
size_t vhost_hlen, sock_hlen;
size_t vhost_len, sock_len;
struct socket *sock;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
sock = vq->private_data;
if (!sock)
goto out;
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
vhost_hlen = nvq->vhost_hlen;
sock_hlen = nvq->sock_hlen;
vq_log = unlikely(vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) ?
vq->log : NULL;
mergeable = vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF);
while ((sock_len = peek_head_len(sock->sk))) {
sock_len += sock_hlen;
vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen;
headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads, vhost_len,
&in, vq_log, &log,
likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1);
/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
if (unlikely(headcount < 0))
break;
/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
if (!headcount) {
if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
/* They have slipped one in as we were
* doing that: check again. */
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
continue;
}
/* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us
* they refilled. */
break;
}
/* We don't need to be notified again. */
if (unlikely((vhost_hlen)))
/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, vhost_hlen, in);
else
/* Copy the header for use in VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF:
* needed because recvmsg can modify msg_iov. */
copy_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, sock_hlen, in);
msg.msg_iovlen = in;
err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
sock_len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
/* Userspace might have consumed the packet meanwhile:
* it's not supposed to do this usually, but might be hard
* to prevent. Discard data we got (if any) and keep going. */
if (unlikely(err != sock_len)) {
pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: "
" len %d, expected %zd\n", err, sock_len);
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
continue;
}
if (unlikely(vhost_hlen) &&
memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&hdr, 0,
vhost_hlen)) {
vq_err(vq, "Unable to write vnet_hdr at addr %p\n",
vq->iov->iov_base);
break;
}
/* TODO: Should check and handle checksum. */
if (likely(mergeable) &&
memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&headcount,
offsetof(typeof(hdr), num_buffers),
sizeof hdr.num_buffers)) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed num_buffers write");
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
break;
}
vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads,
headcount);
if (unlikely(vq_log))
vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len);
total_len += vhost_len;
if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
break;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: drivers/vhost/net.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.10, when mergeable buffers are disabled, does not properly validate packet lengths, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and host OS crash) or possibly gain privileges on the host OS via crafted packets, related to the handle_rx and get_rx_bufs functions.
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 166,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"п > n; ћ > h; ґ > r; ғ > f; ҫ > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x; [ҽҿ] > e;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; ԍ > g; ട > s"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Map U+0454 (є) to 'e' (small E)
Bug: 803571
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I8cc473d0e74208076a2aa17c1869d14bbfaa20ed
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/882006
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531739}
|
Medium
| 172,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int bmdma_prepare_buf(IDEDMA *dma, int is_write)
{
BMDMAState *bm = DO_UPCAST(BMDMAState, dma, dma);
IDEState *s = bmdma_active_if(bm);
uint32_t size;
} prd;
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) BMDMA and (2) AHCI HBA interfaces in the IDE functionality in QEMU 1.0 through 2.1.3 have multiple interpretations of a function's return value, which allows guest OS users to cause a host OS denial of service (memory consumption or infinite loop, and system crash) via a PRDT with zero complete sectors, related to the bmdma_prepare_buf and ahci_dma_prepare_buf functions.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Platform::IntPoint InRegionScrollableArea::calculateMinimumScrollPosition(const Platform::IntSize& viewportSize, float overscrollLimitFactor) const
{
ASSERT(!allowsOverscroll());
return Platform::IntPoint(-(viewportSize.width() * overscrollLimitFactor),
-(viewportSize.height() * overscrollLimitFactor));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly perform text iteration, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Remove minimum and maximum scroll position as they are no
longer required due to changes in ScrollViewBase.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87298
Patch by Genevieve Mak <gmak@rim.com> on 2012-05-23
Reviewed by Antonio Gomes.
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InRegionScrollableArea::InRegionScrollableArea):
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.h:
(InRegionScrollableArea):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118233 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SiteInstanceImpl::ShouldLockToOrigin(BrowserContext* browser_context,
GURL site_url) {
if (RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process())
return false;
if (!DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(browser_context, site_url))
return false;
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kGuestScheme))
return false;
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme))
return false;
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldLockToOrigin(browser_context,
site_url)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: objects.cc in Google V8 before 5.0.71.32, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, does not properly restrict lazy deoptimization, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
|
Medium
| 173,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int can_open_cached(struct nfs4_state *state, int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (mode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|O_EXCL)) {
case FMODE_READ:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0;
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags) != 0;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,686
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool ShouldAutofocus(const HTMLFormControlElement* element) {
if (!element->isConnected())
return false;
if (!element->IsAutofocusable())
return false;
Document& doc = element->GetDocument();
if (doc.IsSandboxed(WebSandboxFlags::kAutomaticFeatures)) {
doc.AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kSecurity,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kError,
"Blocked autofocusing on a form control because the form's frame is "
"sandboxed and the 'allow-scripts' permission is not set."));
return false;
}
if (!doc.IsInMainFrame() &&
!doc.TopFrameOrigin()->CanAccess(doc.GetSecurityOrigin())) {
doc.AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kSecurity,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kError,
"Blocked autofocusing on a form control in a cross-origin subframe."));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: Type confusion in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially maliciously modify objects via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
|
Medium
| 172,349
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ip4_datagram_release_cb(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
if (! __sk_dst_get(sk) || __sk_dst_check(sk, 0))
return;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk, daddr,
inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_dport,
inet->inet_sport, sk->sk_protocol,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!IS_ERR(rt))
__sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the ip4_datagram_release_cb function in net/ipv4/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging incorrect expectations about locking during multithreaded access to internal data structures for IPv4 UDP sockets.
Commit Message: ipv4: fix a race in ip4_datagram_release_cb()
Alexey gave a AddressSanitizer[1] report that finally gave a good hint
at where was the origin of various problems already reported by Dormando
in the past [2]
Problem comes from the fact that UDP can have a lockless TX path, and
concurrent threads can manipulate sk_dst_cache, while another thread,
is holding socket lock and calls __sk_dst_set() in
ip4_datagram_release_cb() (this was added in linux-3.8)
It seems that all we need to do is to use sk_dst_check() and
sk_dst_set() so that all the writers hold same spinlock
(sk->sk_dst_lock) to prevent corruptions.
TCP stack do not need this protection, as all sk_dst_cache writers hold
the socket lock.
[1]
https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ipv4_dst_check
Read of size 2 by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff817daa3a>] ipv4_dst_check+0x1a/0x90 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1116
[<ffffffff8175b789>] __sk_dst_check+0x89/0xe0 ./net/core/sock.c:531
[<ffffffff81830a36>] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x46/0x390 ??:0
[<ffffffff8175eaea>] release_sock+0x17a/0x230 ./net/core/sock.c:2413
[<ffffffff81830882>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x462/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Freed by thread T15455:
[<ffffffff8178d9b8>] dst_destroy+0xa8/0x160 ./net/core/dst.c:251
[<ffffffff8178de25>] dst_release+0x45/0x80 ./net/core/dst.c:280
[<ffffffff818304c1>] ip4_datagram_connect+0xa1/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Allocated by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff8178d291>] dst_alloc+0x81/0x2b0 ./net/core/dst.c:171
[<ffffffff817db3b7>] rt_dst_alloc+0x47/0x50 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1406
[< inlined >] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70
__mkroute_output ./net/ipv4/route.c:1939
[<ffffffff817dde08>] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2161
[<ffffffff817deb34>] ip_route_output_flow+0x14/0x30 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2249
[<ffffffff81830737>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x317/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
[2]
<4>[196727.311203] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
<4>[196727.311224] Modules linked in: xt_TEE xt_dscp xt_DSCP macvlan bridge coretemp crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel gpio_ich microcode ipmi_watchdog ipmi_devintf sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm tpm_bios ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler isci igb libsas i2c_algo_bit ixgbe ptp pps_core mdio
<4>[196727.311333] CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 3.10.26 #1
<4>[196727.311344] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+/X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+, BIOS 3.0 07/05/2013
<4>[196727.311364] task: ffff885e6f069700 ti: ffff885e6f072000 task.ti: ffff885e6f072000
<4>[196727.311377] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f8c7f>] [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.311399] RSP: 0018:ffff885effd23a70 EFLAGS: 00010282
<4>[196727.311409] RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8854c398ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000040
<4>[196727.311423] RDX: dead000000100100 RSI: dead000000100100 RDI: dead000000200200
<4>[196727.311437] RBP: ffff885effd23a80 R08: ffffffff815fd9e0 R09: ffff885d5a590800
<4>[196727.311451] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311464] R13: ffffffff81c8c280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880e85ee16ce
<4>[196727.311510] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885effd20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311554] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[196727.311581] CR2: 00007a46751eb000 CR3: 0000005e65688000 CR4: 00000000000407e0
<4>[196727.311625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311669] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
<4>[196727.311713] Stack:
<4>[196727.311733] ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff885effd23ab0 ffffffff815b7f42
<4>[196727.311784] ffff88be6595bc00 ffff8854c398ecc0 0000000000000000 ffff8854c398ecc0
<4>[196727.311834] ffff885effd23ad0 ffffffff815b86c6 ffff885d5a590800 ffff8816827821c0
<4>[196727.311885] Call Trace:
<4>[196727.311907] <IRQ>
<4>[196727.311912] [<ffffffff815b7f42>] dst_destroy+0x32/0xe0
<4>[196727.311959] [<ffffffff815b86c6>] dst_release+0x56/0x80
<4>[196727.311986] [<ffffffff81620bd5>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a5/0x4a0
<4>[196727.312013] [<ffffffff81622b5a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x7da/0x820
<4>[196727.312041] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312070] [<ffffffff815de02d>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x7d/0x150
<4>[196727.312097] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312125] [<ffffffff815fda92>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb2/0x230
<4>[196727.312154] [<ffffffff815fdd9a>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90
<4>[196727.312183] [<ffffffff815fd799>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x360
<4>[196727.312212] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312242] [<ffffffffa0339680>] ? macvlan_broadcast+0x160/0x160 [macvlan]
<4>[196727.312275] [<ffffffff815b0c62>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x512/0x640
<4>[196727.312308] [<ffffffff811427fb>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13b/0x150
<4>[196727.312338] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312368] [<ffffffff815b0fa1>] netif_receive_skb+0x31/0xa0
<4>[196727.312397] [<ffffffff815b1ae8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x140
<4>[196727.312433] [<ffffffffa00274f1>] ixgbe_poll+0x551/0x11f0 [ixgbe]
<4>[196727.312463] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ? ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312491] [<ffffffff815b1691>] net_rx_action+0x111/0x210
<4>[196727.312521] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312552] [<ffffffff810519d0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x270
<4>[196727.312583] [<ffffffff816cef3c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
<4>[196727.312613] [<ffffffff81004205>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90
<4>[196727.312640] [<ffffffff81051c85>] irq_exit+0x55/0x60
<4>[196727.312668] [<ffffffff816cf5c3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0
<4>[196727.312696] [<ffffffff816c5aaa>] common_interrupt+0x6a/0x6a
<4>[196727.312722] <EOI>
<1>[196727.313071] RIP [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.313100] RSP <ffff885effd23a70>
<4>[196727.313377] ---[ end trace 64b3f14fae0f2e29 ]---
<0>[196727.380908] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Reported-by: Alexey Preobrazhensky <preobr@google.com>
Reported-by: dormando <dormando@rydia.ne>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 8141ed9fcedb2 ("ipv4: Add a socket release callback for datagram sockets")
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,897
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(intArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** The kex_input_kexinit function in kex.c in OpenSSH 6.x and 7.x through 7.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate KEXINIT requests. NOTE: a third party reports that *OpenSSH upstream does not consider this as a security issue.*
Commit Message: upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
|
Low
| 166,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: normalize_color_encoding(color_encoding *encoding)
{
PNG_CONST double whiteY = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y +
encoding->blue.Y;
if (whiteY != 1)
{
encoding->red.X /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->green.X /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.X /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Z /= whiteY;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int walk_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
int err = 0;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
again:
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
if (walk->pte_hole)
err = walk->pte_hole(addr, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
continue;
}
/*
* This implies that each ->pmd_entry() handler
* needs to know about pmd_trans_huge() pmds
*/
if (walk->pmd_entry)
err = walk->pmd_entry(pmd, addr, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
/*
* Check this here so we only break down trans_huge
* pages when we _need_ to
*/
if (!walk->pte_entry)
continue;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
goto again;
err = walk_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
}
s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
}
# endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (data == limit)
goto ri_check;
if (data > (limit - 2))
goto err;
n2s(data, len);
if (data + len != limit)
goto err;
while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > (limit))
goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
# endif
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned char *sdata;
int servname_type;
int dsize;
if (size < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
sdata = data;
while (dsize > 3) {
servname_type = *(sdata++);
n2s(sdata, len);
dsize -= 3;
if (len > dsize)
goto err;
if (s->servername_done == 0)
switch (servname_type) {
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
goto err;
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
(char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
dsize -= len;
}
if (dsize != 0)
goto err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
goto err;
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
goto err;
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
goto err;
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
ecpointformatlist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
goto err;
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
ellipticcurvelist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
ellipticcurvelist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
}
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
else
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
int dsize;
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
goto err;
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
goto err;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
if (size < 5)
goto err;
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
size--;
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *sdata;
int dsize;
/* Read in responder_id_list */
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
while (dsize > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
if (dsize < 4)
goto err;
n2s(data, idsize);
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
size -= 2 + idsize;
if (dsize < 0)
goto err;
sdata = data;
data += idsize;
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
if (!id)
goto err;
if (data != sdata) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
goto err;
}
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (size < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size)
goto err;
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0) {
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
goto err;
}
}
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
*/
else
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
return 0;
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
}
# endif
data += size;
}
/* Spurious data on the end */
if (data != limit)
goto err;
*p = data;
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
int hexdump = FALSE;
int subobj_type, subobj_len;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_len = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
if (subobj_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
break;
}
if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
break;
}
if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
break;
}
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
return (hexdump);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The LMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-lmp.c:lmp_print_data_link_subobjs().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14464/LMP: Add a missing bounds check
In lmp_print_data_link_subobjs().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 169,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: horAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
assert((cc%(2*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] + (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,882
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int32_t PepperFlashRendererHost::OnNavigate(
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext* host_context,
const ppapi::URLRequestInfoData& data,
const std::string& target,
bool from_user_action) {
content::PepperPluginInstance* plugin_instance =
host_->GetPluginInstance(pp_instance());
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher* host_dispatcher =
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(pp_instance());
host_dispatcher->set_allow_plugin_reentrancy();
base::WeakPtr<PepperFlashRendererHost> weak_ptr = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
navigate_replies_.push_back(host_context->MakeReplyMessageContext());
plugin_instance->Navigate(data, target.c_str(), from_user_action);
if (weak_ptr.get()) {
SendReply(navigate_replies_.back(), IPC::Message());
navigate_replies_.pop_back();
}
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVGImage::setContainerSize function in core/svg/graphics/SVGImage.cpp in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the resizing of a view.
Commit Message: PPB_Flash.Navigate(): Disallow certain HTTP request headers.
With this CL, PPB_Flash.Navigate() fails the operation with
PP_ERROR_NOACCESS if the request headers contain non-simple headers.
BUG=332023
TEST=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/136393004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249114 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,709
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewDataSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
if (!EndsWith(path, "/print.pdf", true)) {
ChromeWebUIDataSource::StartDataRequest(path, is_incognito, request_id);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data;
std::vector<std::string> url_substr;
base::SplitString(path, '/', &url_substr);
int page_index = 0;
if (url_substr.size() == 3 && base::StringToInt(url_substr[1], &page_index)) {
PrintPreviewDataService::GetInstance()->GetDataEntry(
url_substr[0], page_index, &data);
}
if (data.get()) {
SendResponse(request_id, data);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> empty_bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes);
SendResponse(request_id, empty_bytes);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,827
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ScriptPromise Bluetooth::requestDevice(ScriptState* script_state,
const RequestDeviceOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
ExecutionContext* context = ExecutionContext::From(script_state);
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && \
!defined(OS_WIN)
context->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kInfo,
"Web Bluetooth is experimental on this platform. See "
"https://github.com/WebBluetoothCG/web-bluetooth/blob/gh-pages/"
"implementation-status.md"));
#endif
CHECK(context->IsSecureContext());
auto& doc = *To<Document>(context);
auto* frame = doc.GetFrame();
if (!frame) {
return ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state, V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(), "Document not active"));
}
if (!LocalFrame::HasTransientUserActivation(frame)) {
return ScriptPromise::RejectWithDOMException(
script_state,
MakeGarbageCollected<DOMException>(
DOMExceptionCode::kSecurityError,
"Must be handling a user gesture to show a permission request."));
}
if (!service_) {
frame->GetInterfaceProvider().GetInterface(mojo::MakeRequest(
&service_, context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kMiscPlatformAPI)));
}
auto device_options = mojom::blink::WebBluetoothRequestDeviceOptions::New();
ConvertRequestDeviceOptions(options, device_options, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return ScriptPromise();
Platform::Current()->RecordRapporURL("Bluetooth.APIUsage.Origin", doc.Url());
auto* resolver = MakeGarbageCollected<ScriptPromiseResolver>(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
service_->RequestDevice(
std::move(device_options),
WTF::Bind(&Bluetooth::RequestDeviceCallback, WrapPersistent(this),
WrapPersistent(resolver)));
return promise;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in filter processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
Medium
| 172,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 mobility parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mobility.c:mobility_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13009/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it:
Add a comment giving the RFC for IPv6 mobility headers.
Clean up some bounds checks to make it clearer what they're checking, by
matching the subsequent EXTRACT_ calls or memcpy.
For the binding update, if none of the flag bits are set, don't check
the individual flag bits.
|
Low
| 167,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
unsigned char *orig = buf;
unsigned char *ret = buf;
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return orig;
ret+=2;
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
unsigned long size_str;
long lenmax;
/* check for enough space.
4 for the servername type and entension length
2 for servernamelist length
1 for the hostname type
2 for hostname length
+ hostname length
*/
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
|| (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
return NULL;
/* extension type and length */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
s2n(size_str+5,ret);
/* length of servername list */
s2n(size_str+3,ret);
/* hostname type, length and hostname */
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
s2n(size_str,ret);
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
ret+=size_str;
}
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate)
{
int el;
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
{ /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
/* check for enough space.
4 for the srp type type and entension length
1 for the srp user identity
+ srp user identity length
*/
if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
/* fill in the extension */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
s2n(login_len+1,ret);
(*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
ret+=login_len;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
* elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
* http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
* resolves this to two bytes.
*/
s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
{
int ticklen;
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
{
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return NULL;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
}
else
ticklen = 0;
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
goto skip_ext;
/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
* rest for ticket
*/
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
s2n(ticklen,ret);
if (ticklen)
{
memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
ret += ticklen;
}
}
skip_ext:
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
return NULL;
if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
s2n(col + 2, ret);
s2n(col, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
ret += col;
}
#endif
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
int i;
long extlen, idlen, itmp;
OCSP_RESPID *id;
idlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
{
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
if (itmp <= 0)
return NULL;
idlen += itmp + 2;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
{
extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
if (extlen < 0)
return NULL;
}
else
extlen = 0;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
return NULL;
s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
s2n(idlen, ret);
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
{
/* save position of id len */
unsigned char *q = ret;
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
/* skip over id len */
ret += 2;
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
/* write id len */
s2n(itmp, q);
}
s2n(extlen, ret);
if (extlen > 0)
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension */
if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
{
/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
* support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
{
int el;
ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#endif
/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
*
* NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
* extensions it MUST always appear last.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
{
int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
* includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
* the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
*/
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
hlen -= 5;
if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
{
hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
if (hlen >= 4)
hlen -= 4;
else
hlen = 0;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
s2n(hlen, ret);
memset(ret, 0, hlen);
ret += hlen;
}
}
if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
return orig;
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Memory leak in d1_srtp.c in the DTLS SRTP extension in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1j allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted handshake message.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
OM_uint32 req_output_size,
OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
req_output_size,
max_input_size);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void fib_del_ifaddr(struct in_ifaddr *ifa, struct in_ifaddr *iprim)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = ifa->ifa_dev;
struct net_device *dev = in_dev->dev;
struct in_ifaddr *ifa1;
struct in_ifaddr *prim = ifa, *prim1 = NULL;
__be32 brd = ifa->ifa_address | ~ifa->ifa_mask;
__be32 any = ifa->ifa_address & ifa->ifa_mask;
#define LOCAL_OK 1
#define BRD_OK 2
#define BRD0_OK 4
#define BRD1_OK 8
unsigned int ok = 0;
int subnet = 0; /* Primary network */
int gone = 1; /* Address is missing */
int same_prefsrc = 0; /* Another primary with same IP */
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) {
prim = inet_ifa_byprefix(in_dev, any, ifa->ifa_mask);
if (!prim) {
pr_warn("%s: bug: prim == NULL\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (iprim && iprim != prim) {
pr_warn("%s: bug: iprim != prim\n", __func__);
return;
}
} else if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(any) &&
(any != ifa->ifa_local || ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 32)) {
if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE,
dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK ? RTN_LOCAL : RTN_UNICAST,
any, ifa->ifa_prefixlen, prim);
subnet = 1;
}
/* Deletion is more complicated than add.
* We should take care of not to delete too much :-)
*
* Scan address list to be sure that addresses are really gone.
*/
for (ifa1 = in_dev->ifa_list; ifa1; ifa1 = ifa1->ifa_next) {
if (ifa1 == ifa) {
/* promotion, keep the IP */
gone = 0;
continue;
}
/* Ignore IFAs from our subnet */
if (iprim && ifa1->ifa_mask == iprim->ifa_mask &&
inet_ifa_match(ifa1->ifa_address, iprim))
continue;
/* Ignore ifa1 if it uses different primary IP (prefsrc) */
if (ifa1->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) {
/* Another address from our subnet? */
if (ifa1->ifa_mask == prim->ifa_mask &&
inet_ifa_match(ifa1->ifa_address, prim))
prim1 = prim;
else {
/* We reached the secondaries, so
* same_prefsrc should be determined.
*/
if (!same_prefsrc)
continue;
/* Search new prim1 if ifa1 is not
* using the current prim1
*/
if (!prim1 ||
ifa1->ifa_mask != prim1->ifa_mask ||
!inet_ifa_match(ifa1->ifa_address, prim1))
prim1 = inet_ifa_byprefix(in_dev,
ifa1->ifa_address,
ifa1->ifa_mask);
if (!prim1)
continue;
if (prim1->ifa_local != prim->ifa_local)
continue;
}
} else {
if (prim->ifa_local != ifa1->ifa_local)
continue;
prim1 = ifa1;
if (prim != prim1)
same_prefsrc = 1;
}
if (ifa->ifa_local == ifa1->ifa_local)
ok |= LOCAL_OK;
if (ifa->ifa_broadcast == ifa1->ifa_broadcast)
ok |= BRD_OK;
if (brd == ifa1->ifa_broadcast)
ok |= BRD1_OK;
if (any == ifa1->ifa_broadcast)
ok |= BRD0_OK;
/* primary has network specific broadcasts */
if (prim1 == ifa1 && ifa1->ifa_prefixlen < 31) {
__be32 brd1 = ifa1->ifa_address | ~ifa1->ifa_mask;
__be32 any1 = ifa1->ifa_address & ifa1->ifa_mask;
if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(any1)) {
if (ifa->ifa_broadcast == brd1 ||
ifa->ifa_broadcast == any1)
ok |= BRD_OK;
if (brd == brd1 || brd == any1)
ok |= BRD1_OK;
if (any == brd1 || any == any1)
ok |= BRD0_OK;
}
}
}
if (!(ok & BRD_OK))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, ifa->ifa_broadcast, 32, prim);
if (subnet && ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 31) {
if (!(ok & BRD1_OK))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, brd, 32, prim);
if (!(ok & BRD0_OK))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, any, 32, prim);
}
if (!(ok & LOCAL_OK)) {
unsigned int addr_type;
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_LOCAL, ifa->ifa_local, 32, prim);
/* Check, that this local address finally disappeared. */
addr_type = inet_addr_type_dev_table(dev_net(dev), dev,
ifa->ifa_local);
if (gone && addr_type != RTN_LOCAL) {
/* And the last, but not the least thing.
* We must flush stray FIB entries.
*
* First of all, we scan fib_info list searching
* for stray nexthop entries, then ignite fib_flush.
*/
if (fib_sync_down_addr(dev_net(dev), ifa->ifa_local))
fib_flush(dev_net(dev));
}
}
#undef LOCAL_OK
#undef BRD_OK
#undef BRD0_OK
#undef BRD1_OK
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5.2 mishandles destruction of device objects, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS networking outage) by arranging for a large number of IP addresses.
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
|
Low
| 167,355
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void webkit_web_view_update_settings(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
WebKitWebSettings* webSettings = priv->webSettings.get();
Settings* settings = core(webView)->settings();
gchar* defaultEncoding, *cursiveFontFamily, *defaultFontFamily, *fantasyFontFamily, *monospaceFontFamily, *sansSerifFontFamily, *serifFontFamily, *userStylesheetUri, *defaultSpellCheckingLanguages;
gboolean autoLoadImages, autoShrinkImages, printBackgrounds,
enableScripts, enablePlugins, enableDeveloperExtras, resizableTextAreas,
enablePrivateBrowsing, enableCaretBrowsing, enableHTML5Database, enableHTML5LocalStorage,
enableXSSAuditor, enableSpatialNavigation, enableFrameFlattening, javascriptCanOpenWindows,
javaScriptCanAccessClipboard, enableOfflineWebAppCache,
enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI, enableFileAccessFromFileURI,
enableDOMPaste, tabKeyCyclesThroughElements, enableWebGL,
enableSiteSpecificQuirks, usePageCache, enableJavaApplet,
enableHyperlinkAuditing, enableFullscreen, enableDNSPrefetching;
WebKitEditingBehavior editingBehavior;
g_object_get(webSettings,
"default-encoding", &defaultEncoding,
"cursive-font-family", &cursiveFontFamily,
"default-font-family", &defaultFontFamily,
"fantasy-font-family", &fantasyFontFamily,
"monospace-font-family", &monospaceFontFamily,
"sans-serif-font-family", &sansSerifFontFamily,
"serif-font-family", &serifFontFamily,
"auto-load-images", &autoLoadImages,
"auto-shrink-images", &autoShrinkImages,
"print-backgrounds", &printBackgrounds,
"enable-scripts", &enableScripts,
"enable-plugins", &enablePlugins,
"resizable-text-areas", &resizableTextAreas,
"user-stylesheet-uri", &userStylesheetUri,
"enable-developer-extras", &enableDeveloperExtras,
"enable-private-browsing", &enablePrivateBrowsing,
"enable-caret-browsing", &enableCaretBrowsing,
"enable-html5-database", &enableHTML5Database,
"enable-html5-local-storage", &enableHTML5LocalStorage,
"enable-xss-auditor", &enableXSSAuditor,
"enable-spatial-navigation", &enableSpatialNavigation,
"enable-frame-flattening", &enableFrameFlattening,
"javascript-can-open-windows-automatically", &javascriptCanOpenWindows,
"javascript-can-access-clipboard", &javaScriptCanAccessClipboard,
"enable-offline-web-application-cache", &enableOfflineWebAppCache,
"editing-behavior", &editingBehavior,
"enable-universal-access-from-file-uris", &enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI,
"enable-file-access-from-file-uris", &enableFileAccessFromFileURI,
"enable-dom-paste", &enableDOMPaste,
"tab-key-cycles-through-elements", &tabKeyCyclesThroughElements,
"enable-site-specific-quirks", &enableSiteSpecificQuirks,
"enable-page-cache", &usePageCache,
"enable-java-applet", &enableJavaApplet,
"enable-hyperlink-auditing", &enableHyperlinkAuditing,
"spell-checking-languages", &defaultSpellCheckingLanguages,
"enable-fullscreen", &enableFullscreen,
"enable-dns-prefetching", &enableDNSPrefetching,
"enable-webgl", &enableWebGL,
NULL);
settings->setDefaultTextEncodingName(defaultEncoding);
settings->setCursiveFontFamily(cursiveFontFamily);
settings->setStandardFontFamily(defaultFontFamily);
settings->setFantasyFontFamily(fantasyFontFamily);
settings->setFixedFontFamily(monospaceFontFamily);
settings->setSansSerifFontFamily(sansSerifFontFamily);
settings->setSerifFontFamily(serifFontFamily);
settings->setLoadsImagesAutomatically(autoLoadImages);
settings->setShrinksStandaloneImagesToFit(autoShrinkImages);
settings->setShouldPrintBackgrounds(printBackgrounds);
settings->setJavaScriptEnabled(enableScripts);
settings->setPluginsEnabled(enablePlugins);
settings->setTextAreasAreResizable(resizableTextAreas);
settings->setUserStyleSheetLocation(KURL(KURL(), userStylesheetUri));
settings->setDeveloperExtrasEnabled(enableDeveloperExtras);
settings->setPrivateBrowsingEnabled(enablePrivateBrowsing);
settings->setCaretBrowsingEnabled(enableCaretBrowsing);
#if ENABLE(DATABASE)
AbstractDatabase::setIsAvailable(enableHTML5Database);
#endif
settings->setLocalStorageEnabled(enableHTML5LocalStorage);
settings->setXSSAuditorEnabled(enableXSSAuditor);
settings->setSpatialNavigationEnabled(enableSpatialNavigation);
settings->setFrameFlatteningEnabled(enableFrameFlattening);
settings->setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(javascriptCanOpenWindows);
settings->setJavaScriptCanAccessClipboard(javaScriptCanAccessClipboard);
settings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(enableOfflineWebAppCache);
settings->setEditingBehaviorType(static_cast<WebCore::EditingBehaviorType>(editingBehavior));
settings->setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI);
settings->setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(enableFileAccessFromFileURI);
settings->setDOMPasteAllowed(enableDOMPaste);
settings->setNeedsSiteSpecificQuirks(enableSiteSpecificQuirks);
settings->setUsesPageCache(usePageCache);
settings->setJavaEnabled(enableJavaApplet);
settings->setHyperlinkAuditingEnabled(enableHyperlinkAuditing);
settings->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(enableDNSPrefetching);
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
settings->setFullScreenEnabled(enableFullscreen);
#endif
#if ENABLE(SPELLCHECK)
WebKit::EditorClient* client = static_cast<WebKit::EditorClient*>(core(webView)->editorClient());
static_cast<WebKit::TextCheckerClientEnchant*>(client->textChecker())->updateSpellCheckingLanguage(defaultSpellCheckingLanguages);
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEBGL)
settings->setWebGLEnabled(enableWebGL);
#endif
Page* page = core(webView);
if (page)
page->setTabKeyCyclesThroughElements(tabKeyCyclesThroughElements);
g_free(defaultEncoding);
g_free(cursiveFontFamily);
g_free(defaultFontFamily);
g_free(fantasyFontFamily);
g_free(monospaceFontFamily);
g_free(sansSerifFontFamily);
g_free(serifFontFamily);
g_free(userStylesheetUri);
webkit_web_view_screen_changed(GTK_WIDGET(webView), NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to HTML range handling.
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,450
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_image_t *jas_image_create0()
{
jas_image_t *image;
if (!(image = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_image_t)))) {
return 0;
}
image->tlx_ = 0;
image->tly_ = 0;
image->brx_ = 0;
image->bry_ = 0;
image->clrspc_ = JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN;
image->numcmpts_ = 0;
image->maxcmpts_ = 0;
image->cmpts_ = 0;
image->inmem_ = true;
//// image->inmem_ = true;
image->cmprof_ = 0;
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,695
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const wchar_t* GetIntegrityLevelString(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) {
switch (integrity_level) {
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_SYSTEM:
return L"S-1-16-16384";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_HIGH:
return L"S-1-16-12288";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM:
return L"S-1-16-8192";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-6144";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-4096";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_BELOW_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-2048";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST:
return NULL;
}
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::allocate_input_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes)
{
(void)hComp, (void)port;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned i = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("allocate_input_buffer()::");
if (bytes != m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Buffer size mismatch error: bytes[%u] != nBufferSize[%u]",
(unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s: size = %u, actual cnt %u", __FUNCTION__,
(unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
m_inp_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*) \
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_inp_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Successfully allocated m_inp_mem_ptr = %p", m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_pInput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_inp_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (i < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_inp_mem_ptr + i);
(*bufferHdr)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*bufferHdr)->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
(*bufferHdr)->nInputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_IN;
(*bufferHdr)->pInputPortPrivate = (OMX_PTR)&m_pInput_pmem[i];
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
m_pInput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pInput_pmem[i].fd,0);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap FAILED= %d", errno);
close(m_pInput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = malloc(sizeof(OMX_U32) + sizeof(native_handle_t*));
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = sizeof(OMX_U32) + sizeof(native_handle_t*);
}
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Virtual address in allocate buffer is %p", m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer);
BITMASK_SET(&m_inp_bm_count,i);
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat && (dev_use_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_IN,i) != true)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf FAILED for i/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All i/p buffers are allocated, invalid allocate buf call"
"for index [%d]", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The secure-session feature in the mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles heap pointers, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28920116.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
|
Medium
| 173,501
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Sp_match(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int len;
const char *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!(re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)) {
js_RegExp_prototype_exec(J, re, text);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
a = text;
e = text + strlen(text);
while (a <= e) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break;
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
js_pushlstring(J, b, c - b);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
a = c;
if (c - b == 0)
++a;
}
if (len == 0) {
js_pop(J, 1);
js_pushnull(J);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex MuJS 1.0.5. It has unlimited recursion because the match function in regexp.c lacks a depth check.
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
|
Low
| 169,698
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void usage(char *progname) {
printf("Usage:\n");
printf("%s <input_yuv> <width>x<height> <target_width>x<target_height> ",
progname);
printf("<output_yuv> [<frames>]\n");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,480
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dpcm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf_end = buf + buf_size;
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int out = 0, ret;
int predictor[2];
int ch = 0;
int stereo = s->channels - 1;
int16_t *output_samples;
/* calculate output size */
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
out = buf_size - 2 * s->channels;
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3)
out = buf_size * 2;
else
out = buf_size;
break;
}
if (out <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* get output buffer */
s->frame.nb_samples = out / s->channels;
if ((ret = avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "get_buffer() failed\n");
return ret;
}
output_samples = (int16_t *)s->frame.data[0];
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
buf += 6;
if (stereo) {
predictor[1] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
predictor[0] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
} else {
predictor[0] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
}
/* decode the samples */
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += s->roq_square_array[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
buf += 6; /* skip over the stream mask and stream length */
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
}
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += interplay_delta_table[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
{
int shift[2] = { 4, 4 };
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++)
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
int16_t diff = (n & 0xFC) << 8;
if ((n & 0x03) == 3)
shift[ch]++;
else
shift[ch] -= (2 * (n & 3));
/* saturate the shifter to a lower limit of 0 */
if (shift[ch] < 0)
shift[ch] = 0;
diff >>= shift[ch];
predictor[ch] += diff;
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
}
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3) {
uint8_t *output_samples_u8 = s->frame.data[0];
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
s->sample[0] += s->sol_table[n >> 4];
s->sample[0] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[0]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[0];
s->sample[stereo] += s->sol_table[n & 0x0F];
s->sample[stereo] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[stereo]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[stereo];
}
} else {
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
if (n & 0x80) s->sample[ch] -= sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
else s->sample[ch] += sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
s->sample[ch] = av_clip_int16(s->sample[ch]);
*output_samples++ = s->sample[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
}
break;
}
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
*(AVFrame *)data = s->frame;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dpcm_decode_frame function in dpcm.c in libavcodec in FFmpeg before 0.10 and in Libav 0.5.x before 0.5.9, 0.6.x before 0.6.6, 0.7.x before 0.7.6, and 0.8.x before 0.8.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted stereo stream in a media file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,241
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CanOnlyDiscardOnceTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kExternal);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kProactive);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ExpectCanDiscardTrue(background_lifecycle_unit, DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#else
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
Medium
| 172,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *cur;
int ret;
struct uffdio_range uffdio_unregister;
unsigned long new_flags;
bool found;
unsigned long start, end, vma_end;
const void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_unregister, buf, sizeof(uffdio_unregister)))
goto out;
ret = validate_range(mm, uffdio_unregister.start,
uffdio_unregister.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
start = uffdio_unregister.start;
end = start + uffdio_unregister.len;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto out;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, start, &prev);
if (!vma)
goto out_unlock;
/* check that there's at least one vma in the range */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_start >= end)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If the first vma contains huge pages, make sure start address
* is aligned to huge page size.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(vma);
if (start & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Search for not compatible vmas.
*/
found = false;
ret = -EINVAL;
for (cur = vma; cur && cur->vm_start < end; cur = cur->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
/*
* Check not compatible vmas, not strictly required
* here as not compatible vmas cannot have an
* userfaultfd_ctx registered on them, but this
* provides for more strict behavior to notice
* unregistration errors.
*/
if (!vma_can_userfault(cur))
goto out_unlock;
found = true;
}
BUG_ON(!found);
if (vma->vm_start < start)
prev = vma;
ret = 0;
do {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma));
/*
* Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this
* userfaultfd and with the right tracking mode too.
*/
if (!vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx)
goto skip;
WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE));
if (vma->vm_start > start)
start = vma->vm_start;
vma_end = min(end, vma->vm_end);
if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) {
/*
* Wake any concurrent pending userfault while
* we unregister, so they will not hang
* permanently and it avoids userland to call
* UFFDIO_WAKE explicitly.
*/
struct userfaultfd_wake_range range;
range.start = start;
range.len = vma_end - start;
wake_userfault(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx, &range);
}
new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP);
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (prev) {
vma = prev;
goto next;
}
if (vma->vm_start < start) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (ret)
break;
}
if (vma->vm_end > end) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (ret)
break;
}
next:
/*
* In the vma_merge() successful mprotect-like case 8:
* the next vma was merged into the current one and
* the current one has not been updated yet.
*/
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX;
skip:
prev = vma;
start = vma->vm_end;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,689
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fwnet_incoming_packet(struct fwnet_device *dev, __be32 *buf, int len,
int source_node_id, int generation,
bool is_broadcast)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *net = dev->netdev;
struct rfc2734_header hdr;
unsigned lf;
unsigned long flags;
struct fwnet_peer *peer;
struct fwnet_partial_datagram *pd;
int fg_off;
int dg_size;
u16 datagram_label;
int retval;
u16 ether_type;
hdr.w0 = be32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
lf = fwnet_get_hdr_lf(&hdr);
if (lf == RFC2374_HDR_UNFRAG) {
/*
* An unfragmented datagram has been received by the ieee1394
* bus. Build an skbuff around it so we can pass it to the
* high level network layer.
*/
ether_type = fwnet_get_hdr_ether_type(&hdr);
buf++;
len -= RFC2374_UNFRAG_HDR_SIZE;
skb = dev_alloc_skb(len + LL_RESERVED_SPACE(net));
if (unlikely(!skb)) {
net->stats.rx_dropped++;
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_reserve(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(net));
memcpy(skb_put(skb, len), buf, len);
return fwnet_finish_incoming_packet(net, skb, source_node_id,
is_broadcast, ether_type);
}
/* A datagram fragment has been received, now the fun begins. */
hdr.w1 = ntohl(buf[1]);
buf += 2;
len -= RFC2374_FRAG_HDR_SIZE;
if (lf == RFC2374_HDR_FIRSTFRAG) {
ether_type = fwnet_get_hdr_ether_type(&hdr);
fg_off = 0;
} else {
ether_type = 0;
fg_off = fwnet_get_hdr_fg_off(&hdr);
}
datagram_label = fwnet_get_hdr_dgl(&hdr);
dg_size = fwnet_get_hdr_dg_size(&hdr); /* ??? + 1 */
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
peer = fwnet_peer_find_by_node_id(dev, source_node_id, generation);
if (!peer) {
retval = -ENOENT;
goto fail;
}
pd = fwnet_pd_find(peer, datagram_label);
if (pd == NULL) {
while (peer->pdg_size >= FWNET_MAX_FRAGMENTS) {
/* remove the oldest */
fwnet_pd_delete(list_first_entry(&peer->pd_list,
struct fwnet_partial_datagram, pd_link));
peer->pdg_size--;
}
pd = fwnet_pd_new(net, peer, datagram_label,
dg_size, buf, fg_off, len);
if (pd == NULL) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
peer->pdg_size++;
} else {
if (fwnet_frag_overlap(pd, fg_off, len) ||
pd->datagram_size != dg_size) {
/*
* Differing datagram sizes or overlapping fragments,
* discard old datagram and start a new one.
*/
fwnet_pd_delete(pd);
pd = fwnet_pd_new(net, peer, datagram_label,
dg_size, buf, fg_off, len);
if (pd == NULL) {
peer->pdg_size--;
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
} else {
if (!fwnet_pd_update(peer, pd, buf, fg_off, len)) {
/*
* Couldn't save off fragment anyway
* so might as well obliterate the
* datagram now.
*/
fwnet_pd_delete(pd);
peer->pdg_size--;
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
}
} /* new datagram or add to existing one */
if (lf == RFC2374_HDR_FIRSTFRAG)
pd->ether_type = ether_type;
if (fwnet_pd_is_complete(pd)) {
ether_type = pd->ether_type;
peer->pdg_size--;
skb = skb_get(pd->skb);
fwnet_pd_delete(pd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return fwnet_finish_incoming_packet(net, skb, source_node_id,
false, ether_type);
}
/*
* Datagram is not complete, we're done for the
* moment.
*/
retval = 0;
fail:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/firewire/net.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.7, in certain unusual hardware configurations, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted fragmented packets.
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
|
High
| 166,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct svc_rdma_req_map *svc_rdma_get_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map = NULL;
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
if (list_empty(&xprt->sc_maps))
goto out_empty;
map = list_first_entry(&xprt->sc_maps,
struct svc_rdma_req_map, free);
list_del_init(&map->free);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
out:
map->count = 0;
return map;
out_empty:
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
/* Pre-allocation amount was incorrect */
map = alloc_req_map(GFP_NOIO);
if (map)
goto out;
WARN_ONCE(1, "svcrdma: empty request map list?\n");
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,181
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ospf6_decode_v3(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct ospf6hdr *op,
register const u_char *dataend)
{
register const rtrid_t *ap;
register const struct lsr6 *lsrp;
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp;
register const struct lsa6 *lsap;
register int i;
switch (op->ospf6_type) {
case OSPF_TYPE_HELLO: {
register const struct hello6 *hellop = (const struct hello6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tOptions [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_options))));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_deadint);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hello Timer %us, Dead Timer %us, Interface-ID %s, Priority %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&hellop->hello_helloint),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&hellop->hello_deadint),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_ifid),
hellop->hello_priority));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_dr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_dr) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Designated Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_dr)));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_bdr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_bdr) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Backup Designated Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_bdr)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor List:"));
ap = hellop->hello_neighbor;
while ((const u_char *)ap < dataend) {
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ap)));
++ap;
}
}
break; /* HELLO */
}
case OSPF_TYPE_DD: {
register const struct dd6 *ddp = (const struct dd6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_options);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tOptions [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ddp->db_options))));
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", DD Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_dd_flag_values,"none",ddp->db_flags)));
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MTU %u, DD-Sequence 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ddp->db_mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ddp->db_seq)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
/* Print all the LS adv's */
lshp = ddp->db_lshdr;
while ((const u_char *)lshp < dataend) {
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, lshp++, dataend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
}
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_REQ:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
lsrp = (const struct lsr6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
while ((const u_char *)lsrp < dataend) {
ND_TCHECK(*lsrp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lsrp->ls_router)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsrp->ls_type),
&lsrp->ls_stateid);
++lsrp;
}
}
break;
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_UPDATE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
register const struct lsu6 *lsup = (const struct lsu6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK(lsup->lsu_count);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsup->lsu_count);
lsap = lsup->lsu_lsa;
while ((const u_char *)lsap < dataend && i--) {
if (ospf6_print_lsa(ndo, lsap, dataend))
goto trunc;
lsap = (const struct lsa6 *)((const u_char *)lsap +
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->ls_hdr.ls_length));
}
}
break;
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_ACK:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
lshp = (const struct lsa6_hdr *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
while ((const u_char *)lshp < dataend) {
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, lshp++, dataend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The OSPFv3 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ospf6.c:ospf6_decode_v3().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13036/OSPFv3: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,847
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::localDescription()
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return 0;
return m_webHandler->localDescription();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Block::Frame& Block::GetFrame(int idx) const
{
assert(idx >= 0);
assert(idx < m_frame_count);
const Frame& f = m_frames[idx];
assert(f.pos > 0);
assert(f.len > 0);
return f;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long AudioTrack::Parse(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) //Sample Rate
{
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x1F) //Channel Count
{
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x2264) //Bit Depth
{
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
AudioTrack* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status)
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,407
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetFirstTime() const
{
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetFirst(pEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
cache_filename[MagickPathExtent],
id[MagickPathExtent],
keyword[MagickPathExtent],
*options;
const unsigned char
*p;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
LinkedListInfo
*profiles;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
length;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
signature;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MagickPathExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
*id='\0';
(void) ResetMagickMemory(keyword,0,sizeof(keyword));
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Decode image header; header terminates one character beyond a ':'.
*/
profiles=(LinkedListInfo *) NULL;
length=MagickPathExtent;
options=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
signature=GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL);
image->depth=8;
image->compression=NoCompression;
while ((isgraph(c) != MagickFalse) && (c != (int) ':'))
{
register char
*p;
if (c == (int) '{')
{
char
*comment;
/*
Read comment-- any text between { }.
*/
length=MagickPathExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '\\')
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '}'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Get the keyword.
*/
length=MagickPathExtent;
p=keyword;
do
{
if (c == (int) '=')
break;
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (c != EOF);
*p='\0';
p=options;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '=')
{
/*
Get the keyword value.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while ((c != (int) '}') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-options+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
options=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(options,length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*options));
if (options == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=options+strlen(options);
}
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '\\')
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '}')
{
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (*options != '{')
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
break;
}
if (options == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
*p='\0';
if (*options == '{')
(void) CopyMagickString(options,options+1,strlen(options));
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'a':
case 'A':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"alpha-trait") == 0)
{
ssize_t
alpha_trait;
alpha_trait=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelTraitOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (alpha_trait < 0)
break;
image->alpha_trait=(PixelTrait) alpha_trait;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(options,AllCompliance,
&image->background_color,exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"border-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(options,AllCompliance,
&image->border_color,exception);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"class") == 0)
{
ssize_t
storage_class;
storage_class=ParseCommandOption(MagickClassOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (storage_class < 0)
break;
image->storage_class=(ClassType) storage_class;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
image->colors=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (colorspace < 0)
break;
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) colorspace;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compression") == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (compression < 0)
break;
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"columns") == 0)
{
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"delay") == 0)
{
image->delay=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dispose") == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (dispose < 0)
break;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endian") == 0)
{
ssize_t
endian;
endian=ParseCommandOption(MagickEndianOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (endian < 0)
break;
image->endian=(EndianType) endian;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"error") == 0)
{
image->error.mean_error_per_pixel=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(id,options,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"iterations") == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick-signature") == 0)
{
signature=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mattecolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(options,AllCompliance,
&image->matte_color,exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maximum-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_maximum_error=StringToDouble(
options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mean-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_mean_error=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"montage") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image->montage,options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'n':
case 'N':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"number-channels") == 0)
{
image->number_channels=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"number-meta-channels") == 0)
{
image->number_meta_channels=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"orientation") == 0)
{
ssize_t
orientation;
orientation=ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (orientation < 0)
break;
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"page") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pixel-intensity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (intensity < 0)
break;
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
break;
}
if ((LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile:",8) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile-",8) == 0))
{
if (profiles == (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
profiles=NewLinkedList(0);
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList(profiles,
AcquireString(keyword+8));
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,(size_t)
StringToLong(options));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProfile(image,keyword+8,profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image->quality=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rendering-intent") == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
break;
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"resolution") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rows") == 0)
{
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scene") == 0)
{
image->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"ticks-per-second") == 0)
{
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) StringToLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile-offset") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"type") == 0)
{
ssize_t
type;
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickTypeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (type < 0)
break;
image->type=(ImageType) type;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'u':
case 'U':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"units") == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (units < 0)
break;
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
case 'w':
case 'W':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white-point") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=
image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options,exception);
break;
}
}
}
else
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
options=DestroyString(options);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if ((LocaleCompare(id,"MagickCache") != 0) ||
(image->storage_class == UndefinedClass) ||
(image->compression == UndefinedCompression) || (image->columns == 0) ||
(image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (signature != GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"IncompatibleAPI");
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p;
/*
Image directory.
*/
length=MagickPathExtent;
image->directory=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
p=image->directory;
do
{
*p='\0';
if ((strlen(image->directory)+MagickPathExtent) >= length)
{
/*
Allocate more memory for the image directory.
*/
length<<=1;
image->directory=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(image->directory,
length+MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*image->directory));
if (image->directory == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=image->directory+strlen(image->directory);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
*p++=(char) c;
} while (c != (int) '\0');
}
if (profiles != (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
register unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read image profiles.
*/
ResetLinkedListIterator(profiles);
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
count=ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),p);
}
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
}
profiles=DestroyLinkedList(profiles,RelinquishMagickMemory);
}
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Create image colormap.
*/
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors+1,
sizeof(*image->colormap));
if (image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->colors != 0)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read image colormap from file.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (3UL*depth/8UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
packet_size*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
{
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=colormap;
switch (depth)
{
default:
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageDepthNotSupported");
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((AcquireMagickResource(WidthResource,image->columns) == MagickFalse) ||
(AcquireMagickResource(HeightResource,image->rows) == MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
/*
Attach persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=PersistPixelCache(image,cache_filename,MagickTrue,&offset,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"UnableToPersistPixelCache");
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
do
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while ((isgraph(c) == MagickFalse) && (c != EOF));
if (c != EOF)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (c != EOF);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.0.5-7 Q16, an assertion failure was found in the function SetPixelChannelAttributes, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Added check for incorrect number of meta channels report in #492.
|
Medium
| 168,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int get_next_char(
enum entity_charset charset,
const unsigned char *str,
size_t str_len,
size_t *cursor,
int *status)
{
size_t pos = *cursor;
unsigned int this_char = 0;
*status = SUCCESS;
assert(pos <= str_len);
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 1))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
switch (charset) {
case cs_utf_8:
{
/* We'll follow strategy 2. from section 3.6.1 of UTR #36:
* "In a reported illegal byte sequence, do not include any
* non-initial byte that encodes a valid character or is a leading
* byte for a valid sequence." */
unsigned char c;
c = str[pos];
if (c < 0x80) {
this_char = c;
pos++;
} else if (c < 0xc2) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else if (c < 0xe0) {
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
if (!utf8_trail(str[pos + 1])) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, utf8_lead(str[pos + 1]) ? 1 : 2);
}
this_char = ((c & 0x1f) << 6) | (str[pos + 1] & 0x3f);
if (this_char < 0x80) { /* non-shortest form */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c < 0xf0) {
size_t avail = str_len - pos;
if (avail < 3 ||
!utf8_trail(str[pos + 1]) || !utf8_trail(str[pos + 2])) {
if (avail < 2 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 1]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
else if (avail < 3 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 2]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
else
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
}
this_char = ((c & 0x0f) << 12) | ((str[pos + 1] & 0x3f) << 6) | (str[pos + 2] & 0x3f);
if (this_char < 0x800) { /* non-shortest form */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
} else if (this_char >= 0xd800 && this_char <= 0xdfff) { /* surrogate */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
}
pos += 3;
} else if (c < 0xf5) {
size_t avail = str_len - pos;
if (avail < 4 ||
!utf8_trail(str[pos + 1]) || !utf8_trail(str[pos + 2]) ||
!utf8_trail(str[pos + 3])) {
if (avail < 2 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 1]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
else if (avail < 3 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 2]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
else if (avail < 4 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 3]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
else
MB_FAILURE(pos, 4);
}
this_char = ((c & 0x07) << 18) | ((str[pos + 1] & 0x3f) << 12) | ((str[pos + 2] & 0x3f) << 6) | (str[pos + 3] & 0x3f);
if (this_char < 0x10000 || this_char > 0x10FFFF) { /* non-shortest form or outside range */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 4);
}
pos += 4;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
case cs_big5:
/* reference http://demo.icu-project.org/icu-bin/convexp?conv=big5 */
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0x81 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if ((next >= 0x40 && next <= 0x7E) ||
(next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xFE)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
pos += 2;
} else {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
}
}
break;
case cs_big5hkscs:
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0x81 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if ((next >= 0x40 && next <= 0x7E) ||
(next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xFE)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else if (next != 0x80 && next != 0xFF) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
}
}
break;
case cs_gb2312: /* EUC-CN */
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0xA1 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (gb2312_trail(next)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else if (gb2312_lead(next)) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (gb2312_lead(c)) {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
case cs_sjis:
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if ((c >= 0x81 && c <= 0x9F) || (c >= 0xE0 && c <= 0xFC)) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (sjis_trail(next)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else if (sjis_lead(next)) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c < 0x80 || (c >= 0xA1 && c <= 0xDF)) {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
case cs_eucjp:
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0xA1 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xFE) {
/* this a jis kanji char */
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, (next != 0xA0 && next != 0xFF) ? 1 : 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c == 0x8E) {
unsigned next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xDF) {
/* JIS X 0201 kana */
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, (next != 0xA0 && next != 0xFF) ? 1 : 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c == 0x8F) {
size_t avail = str_len - pos;
if (avail < 3 || !(str[pos + 1] >= 0xA1 && str[pos + 1] <= 0xFE) ||
!(str[pos + 2] >= 0xA1 && str[pos + 2] <= 0xFE)) {
if (avail < 2 || (str[pos + 1] != 0xA0 && str[pos + 1] != 0xFF))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
else if (avail < 3 || (str[pos + 2] != 0xA0 && str[pos + 2] != 0xFF))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
else
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
} else {
/* JIS X 0212 hojo-kanji */
this_char = (c << 16) | (str[pos + 1] << 8) | str[pos + 2];
}
pos += 3;
} else if (c != 0xA0 && c != 0xFF) {
/* character encoded in 1 code unit */
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
default:
/* single-byte charsets */
this_char = str[pos++];
break;
}
*cursor = pos;
return this_char;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,172
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[] ) {
int i, fails_count=0;
CU_pSuite cryptoUtilsTestSuite, parserTestSuite;
CU_pSuite *suites[] = {
&cryptoUtilsTestSuite,
&parserTestSuite,
NULL
};
if (argc>1) {
if (argv[1][0] == '-') {
if (strcmp(argv[1], "-verbose") == 0) {
verbose = 1;
} else {
printf ("Usage:\n %s [-verbose] to enable extensive logging\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
} else {
printf ("Usage:\n %s [-verbose] to enable extensive logging\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXML2
xmlInitParser();
#endif
/* initialize the CUnit test registry */
if (CUE_SUCCESS != CU_initialize_registry()) {
return CU_get_error();
}
/* Add the cryptoUtils suite to the registry */
cryptoUtilsTestSuite = CU_add_suite("Bzrtp Crypto Utils", NULL, NULL);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "zrtpKDF", test_zrtpKDF);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "CRC32", test_CRC32);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "algo agreement", test_algoAgreement);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "context algo setter and getter", test_algoSetterGetter);
CU_add_test(cryptoUtilsTestSuite, "adding mandatory crypto algorithms if needed", test_addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded);
/* Add the parser suite to the registry */
parserTestSuite = CU_add_suite("Bzrtp ZRTP Packet Parser", NULL, NULL);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse", test_parser);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "Parse Exchange", test_parserComplete);
CU_add_test(parserTestSuite, "State machine", test_stateMachine);
/* Run all suites */
for(i=0; suites[i]; i++){
CU_basic_run_suite(*suites[i]);
fails_count += CU_get_number_of_tests_failed();
}
/* cleanup the CUnit registry */
CU_cleanup_registry();
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXML2
/* cleanup libxml2 */
xmlCleanupParser();
#endif
return (fails_count == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The Bzrtp library (aka libbzrtp) 1.0.x before 1.0.4 allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct spoofing attacks by leveraging a missing HVI check on DHPart2 packet reception.
Commit Message: Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception
|
Low
| 168,830
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: horDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint32 *wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/4;
assert((cc%(4*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] -= wp[0]; wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: uint32_t *GetPayload(size_t handle, uint32_t *lastpayload, uint32_t index)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return NULL;
uint32_t *MP4buffer = NULL;
if (index < mp4->indexcount && mp4->mediafp)
{
MP4buffer = (uint32_t *)realloc((void *)lastpayload, mp4->metasizes[index]);
if (MP4buffer)
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, mp4->metaoffsets[index], SEEK_SET);
fread(MP4buffer, 1, mp4->metasizes[index], mp4->mediafp);
return MP4buffer;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
|
Medium
| 169,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Segment::DoLoadCluster(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
if (m_pos < 0)
return DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(pos, len);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long cluster_off = -1; //offset relative to start of segment
long long cluster_size = -1; //size of cluster payload
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
return 1; //no more clusters
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; //no more clusters
pos = m_pos;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
if (size == 0) //weird
{
m_pos = pos;
continue;
}
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
#if 0 //we must handle this to support live webm
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: allow this
#endif
if ((segment_stop >= 0) &&
(size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop))
{
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
#if 0 //commented-out, to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
if (m_pCues == NULL)
{
const long long element_size = (pos - idpos) + size;
m_pCues = new Cues(this,
pos,
size,
idpos,
element_size);
assert(m_pCues); //TODO
}
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
cluster_off = idpos - m_start; //relative pos
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(cluster_off >= 0); //have cluster
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, cluster_off, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) //error, or underflow
{
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
const long idx = m_clusterCount;
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
{
if (status == 0) //no entries found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (cluster_size >= 0)
pos += cluster_size;
else
{
const long long element_size = pCluster->GetElementSize();
if (element_size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this case
pos = pCluster->m_element_start + element_size;
}
pCluster->m_index = idx; //move from preloaded to loaded
++m_clusterCount;
--m_clusterPreloadCount;
m_pos = pos; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0; //success
}
}
if (status == 0) //no entries found
{
if (cluster_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this
pos += cluster_size;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
m_pos = total;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
m_pos = segment_stop;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
m_pos = pos;
return 2; //try again
}
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this,
idx,
cluster_off);
assert(pCluster);
AppendCluster(pCluster);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
if (cluster_size >= 0)
{
pos += cluster_size;
m_pos = pos;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0;
}
m_pUnknownSize = pCluster;
m_pos = -pos;
return 0; //partial success, since we have a new cluster
//// status == 0 means "no block entries found"
//// pos designates start of payload
//// m_pos has NOT been adjusted yet (in case we need to come back here)
#if 0
if (cluster_size < 0) //unknown size
{
const long long payload_pos = pos; //absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; //no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0);
pos = payload_pos; //reset and re-parse original cluster
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //subtle
}
m_pos = pos + cluster_size; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; //try to find another cluster
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CreateFileHelper(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
: m_result(result)
, m_name(name)
, m_url(url)
, m_type(type)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FeatureInfo::EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear() {
if (!oes_texture_half_float_linear_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear");
feature_flags_.enable_texture_half_float_linear = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RGBA_F16);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Type confusion in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 58.0.3029.83 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
|
Medium
| 172,387
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Verify_StoreExistingGroupExistingCache(base::Time expected_update_time) {
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
EXPECT_EQ(cache_.get(), group_->newest_complete_cache());
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord cache_record;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindCache(1, &cache_record));
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.group_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(cache_record.online_wildcard);
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_update_time == cache_record.update_time);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, cache_record.cache_size);
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord> entry_records;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindEntriesForCache(1, &entry_records));
EXPECT_EQ(2U, entry_records.size());
if (entry_records[0].url == kDefaultEntryUrl)
entry_records.erase(entry_records.begin());
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl, entry_records[0].url);
EXPECT_EQ(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, entry_records[0].flags);
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].response_id);
EXPECT_EQ(100, entry_records[0].response_size);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
EXPECT_EQ(1, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->notify_storage_modified_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(kOrigin, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_origin_);
EXPECT_EQ(100, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_delta_);
TestFinished();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,994
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void mp_decode_to_lua_array(lua_State *L, mp_cur *c, size_t len) {
assert(len <= UINT_MAX);
int index = 1;
lua_newtable(L);
while(len--) {
lua_pushnumber(L,index++);
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,c);
if (c->err) return;
lua_settable(L,-3);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
|
Low
| 169,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
PNG_CONST int error_action = 1; /* no error, no defines in png.h */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_rgb_to_gray(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set, data.green_to_set);
# else
png_set_rgb_to_gray_fixed(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set,
data.green_to_set);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_cHRM_SUPPORTED
if (that->pm->current_encoding != 0)
{
/* We have an encoding so a cHRM chunk may have been set; if so then
* check that the libpng APIs give the correct (X,Y,Z) values within
* some margin of error for the round trip through the chromaticity
* form.
*/
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ
# define API_form "FP"
# define API_type double
# define API_cvt(x) (x)
# else
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ_fixed
# define API_form "fixed"
# define API_type png_fixed_point
# define API_cvt(x) ((double)(x)/PNG_FP_1)
# endif
API_type rX, gX, bX;
API_type rY, gY, bY;
API_type rZ, gZ, bZ;
if ((API_function(pp, pi, &rX, &rY, &rZ, &gX, &gY, &gZ, &bX, &bY, &bZ)
& PNG_INFO_cHRM) != 0)
{
double maxe;
PNG_CONST char *el;
color_encoding e, o;
/* Expect libpng to return a normalized result, but the original
* color space encoding may not be normalized.
*/
modifier_current_encoding(that->pm, &o);
normalize_color_encoding(&o);
/* Sanity check the pngvalid code - the coefficients should match
* the normalized Y values of the encoding unless they were
* overridden.
*/
if (data.red_to_set == -1 && data.green_to_set == -1 &&
(fabs(o.red.Y - data.red_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.green.Y - data.green_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.blue.Y - data.blue_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON))
png_error(pp, "internal pngvalid cHRM coefficient error");
/* Generate a colour space encoding. */
e.gamma = o.gamma; /* not used */
e.red.X = API_cvt(rX);
e.red.Y = API_cvt(rY);
e.red.Z = API_cvt(rZ);
e.green.X = API_cvt(gX);
e.green.Y = API_cvt(gY);
e.green.Z = API_cvt(gZ);
e.blue.X = API_cvt(bX);
e.blue.Y = API_cvt(bY);
e.blue.Z = API_cvt(bZ);
/* This should match the original one from the png_modifier, within
* the range permitted by the libpng fixed point representation.
*/
maxe = 0;
el = "-"; /* Set to element name with error */
# define CHECK(col,x)\
{\
double err = fabs(o.col.x - e.col.x);\
if (err > maxe)\
{\
maxe = err;\
el = #col "(" #x ")";\
}\
}
CHECK(red,X)
CHECK(red,Y)
CHECK(red,Z)
CHECK(green,X)
CHECK(green,Y)
CHECK(green,Z)
CHECK(blue,X)
CHECK(blue,Y)
CHECK(blue,Z)
/* Here in both fixed and floating cases to check the values read
* from the cHRm chunk. PNG uses fixed point in the cHRM chunk, so
* we can't expect better than +/-.5E-5 on the result, allow 1E-5.
*/
if (maxe >= 1E-5)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[256];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, API_form);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " cHRM ");
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, el);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " error: ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, maxe, 7);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " ");
/* Print the color space without the gamma value: */
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &o, 0);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " -> ");
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &e, 0);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* READ_cHRM */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unset_and_free_gvalue (gpointer val)
{
g_value_unset (val);
g_free (val);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,127
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BrowserContextImpl::~BrowserContextImpl() {
CHECK(!otr_context_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,417
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate) {
static const int kDefaultBufferSize = kSamplesPerSecond / 10;
static const int kDefaultFramesRequested = 5 * kSamplesPerSecond;
TestPlaybackRate(playback_rate, kDefaultBufferSize,
kDefaultFramesRequested);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MediaControlsProgressView::OnMousePressed(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
gfx::Point location_in_bar(event.location());
ConvertPointToTarget(this, this->progress_bar_, &location_in_bar);
if (!event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() ||
!progress_bar_->GetLocalBounds().Contains(location_in_bar)) {
return false;
}
HandleSeeking(location_in_bar);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 172,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline realpath_cache_bucket* realpath_cache_find(const char *path, int path_len, time_t t TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
unsigned long key = realpath_cache_key(path, path_len TSRMLS_CC);
#else
unsigned long key = realpath_cache_key(path, path_len);
#endif
unsigned long n = key % (sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)) / sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)[0]));
realpath_cache_bucket **bucket = &CWDG(realpath_cache)[n];
while (*bucket != NULL) {
if (CWDG(realpath_cache_ttl) && (*bucket)->expires < t) {
realpath_cache_bucket *r = *bucket;
*bucket = (*bucket)->next;
/* if the pointers match then only subtract the length of the path */
if(r->path == r->realpath) {
CWDG(realpath_cache_size) -= sizeof(realpath_cache_bucket) + r->path_len + 1;
} else {
CWDG(realpath_cache_size) -= sizeof(realpath_cache_bucket) + r->path_len + 1 + r->realpath_len + 1;
}
free(r);
} else if (key == (*bucket)->key && path_len == (*bucket)->path_len &&
memcmp(path, (*bucket)->path, path_len) == 0) {
return *bucket;
} else {
bucket = &(*bucket)->next;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the virtual_file_ex function in TSRM/tsrm_virtual_cwd.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted extract operation on a ZIP archive.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,983
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(const KURL& url, PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData)
{
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(url, blobData);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, blobData));
callOnMainThread(®isterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
status_t err = NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
void *params = NULL;
size_t pageSize = 0;
size_t allocSize = 0;
if (code != SET_INTERNAL_OPTION && size < 8) {
ALOGE("b/27207275 (%zu)", size);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27207275");
} else {
err = NO_MEMORY;
pageSize = (size_t) sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
if (size > SIZE_MAX - (pageSize * 2)) {
ALOGE("requested param size too big");
} else {
allocSize = (size + pageSize * 2) & ~(pageSize - 1);
params = mmap(NULL, allocSize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1 /* fd */, 0 /* offset */);
}
if (params != MAP_FAILED) {
err = data.read(params, size);
if (err != OK) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26914474");
} else {
err = NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
OMX_U32 declaredSize = *(OMX_U32*)params;
if (code != SET_INTERNAL_OPTION && declaredSize > size) {
ALOGE("b/27207275 (%u/%zu)", declaredSize, size);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27207275");
} else {
mprotect((char*)params + allocSize - pageSize, pageSize, PROT_NONE);
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
}
}
} else {
ALOGE("couldn't map: %s", strerror(errno));
}
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
if (params) {
munmap(params, allocSize);
}
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index, &bufferProducer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_PERSISTENT_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer;
status_t err = createPersistentInputSurface(
&bufferProducer, &bufferConsumer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferConsumer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer =
interface_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer>(data.readStrongBinder());
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = setInputSurface(node, port_index, bufferConsumer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length, flags, timestamp, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
|
Medium
| 173,798
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pdf_read_new_xref_section(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, fz_stream *stm, int64_t i0, int i1, int w0, int w1, int w2)
{
pdf_xref_entry *table;
pdf_xref_entry *table;
int i, n;
if (i0 < 0 || i1 < 0 || i0 > INT_MAX - i1)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "negative xref stream entry index");
table = pdf_xref_find_subsection(ctx, doc, i0, i1);
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry = &table[i-i0];
int a = 0;
int64_t b = 0;
int c = 0;
if (fz_is_eof(ctx, stm))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "truncated xref stream");
for (n = 0; n < w0; n++)
a = (a << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w1; n++)
b = (b << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w2; n++)
c = (c << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (!entry->type)
{
int t = w0 ? a : 1;
entry->type = t == 0 ? 'f' : t == 1 ? 'n' : t == 2 ? 'o' : 0;
entry->ofs = w1 ? b : 0;
entry->gen = w2 ? c : 0;
entry->num = i;
}
}
doc->has_xref_streams = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the ensure_solid_xref function in pdf/pdf-xref.c in Artifex MuPDF 1.12.0 allows a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, because xref subsection object numbers are unrestricted.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,390
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int qeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata)
{
struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob;
struct qeth_ipa_cmd *cmd;
struct qeth_snmp_ureq *ureq;
int req_len;
struct qeth_arp_query_info qinfo = {0, };
int rc = 0;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "snmpcmd");
if (card->info.guestlan)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((!qeth_adp_supported(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL)) &&
(!card->options.layer2)) {
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* skip 4 bytes (data_len struct member) to get req_len */
if (copy_from_user(&req_len, udata + sizeof(int), sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
ureq = memdup_user(udata, req_len + sizeof(struct qeth_snmp_ureq_hdr));
if (IS_ERR(ureq)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "snmpnome");
return PTR_ERR(ureq);
}
qinfo.udata_len = ureq->hdr.data_len;
qinfo.udata = kzalloc(qinfo.udata_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!qinfo.udata) {
kfree(ureq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
qinfo.udata_offset = sizeof(struct qeth_snmp_ureq_hdr);
iob = qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL,
QETH_SNMP_SETADP_CMDLENGTH + req_len);
cmd = (struct qeth_ipa_cmd *)(iob->data+IPA_PDU_HEADER_SIZE);
memcpy(&cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp, &ureq->cmd, req_len);
rc = qeth_send_ipa_snmp_cmd(card, iob, QETH_SETADP_BASE_LEN + req_len,
qeth_snmp_command_cb, (void *)&qinfo);
if (rc)
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "SNMP command failed on %s: (0x%x)\n",
QETH_CARD_IFNAME(card), rc);
else {
if (copy_to_user(udata, qinfo.udata, qinfo.udata_len))
rc = -EFAULT;
}
kfree(ureq);
kfree(qinfo.udata);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the qeth_snmp_command function in drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via an SNMP ioctl call with a length value that is incompatible with the command-buffer size.
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,940
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_png(struct control *control)
/* Read a PNG, return 0 on success else an error (status) code; a bit mask as
* defined for file::status_code as above.
*/
{
png_structp png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
volatile png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
volatile int rc;
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, control,
error_handler, warning_handler);
if (png_ptr == NULL)
{
/* This is not really expected. */
log_error(&control->file, LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE, "OOM allocating png_struct");
control->file.status_code |= INTERNAL_ERROR;
return LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE;
}
rc = setjmp(control->file.jmpbuf);
if (rc == 0)
{
png_set_read_fn(png_ptr, control, read_callback);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " INFO\n");
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
row = png_voidcast(png_byte*, malloc(rowbytes));
display = png_voidcast(png_byte*, malloc(rowbytes));
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " END\n");
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mg_context *ctx;
base::AtExitManager exit;
base::WaitableEvent shutdown_event(false, false);
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
#endif
srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
chrome::RegisterPathProvider();
TestTimeouts::Initialize();
InitChromeDriverLogging(*cmd_line);
std::string port = "9515";
std::string root;
std::string url_base;
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("port"))
port = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("port");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("root"))
root = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("root");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("url-base"))
url_base = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("url-base");
webdriver::SessionManager* manager = webdriver::SessionManager::GetInstance();
manager->set_port(port);
manager->set_url_base(url_base);
ctx = mg_start();
if (!SetMongooseOptions(ctx, port, root)) {
mg_stop(ctx);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return WSAEADDRINUSE;
#else
return EADDRINUSE;
#endif
}
webdriver::Dispatcher dispatcher(ctx, url_base);
webdriver::InitCallbacks(ctx, &dispatcher, &shutdown_event, root.empty());
std::cout << "Started ChromeDriver" << std::endl
<< "port=" << port << std::endl;
if (root.length()) {
VLOG(1) << "Serving files from the current working directory";
}
shutdown_event.Wait();
mg_stop(ctx);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual bool Speak(
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& language,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
error_ = kNotSupportedError;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information via vectors involving the q variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
Low
| 169,955
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::Clear() {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
delete it->frame_producer;
}
queue_[i].clear();
}
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/spdy/spdy_write_queue.cc in the SPDY implementation in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.153 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging incorrect queue maintenance.
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UserSelectionScreen::FillMultiProfileUserPrefs(
user_manager::User* user,
base::DictionaryValue* user_dict,
bool is_signin_to_add) {
if (!is_signin_to_add) {
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyMultiProfilesAllowed, true);
return;
}
bool is_user_allowed;
ash::mojom::MultiProfileUserBehavior policy;
GetMultiProfilePolicy(user, &is_user_allowed, &policy);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyMultiProfilesAllowed, is_user_allowed);
user_dict->SetInteger(kKeyMultiProfilesPolicy, static_cast<int>(policy));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
Low
| 172,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Browser::AddNewContents(WebContents* source,
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
if (source && PopupBlockerTabHelper::ConsiderForPopupBlocking(disposition))
PopupTracker::CreateForWebContents(new_contents.get(), source);
chrome::AddWebContents(this, source, std::move(new_contents), disposition,
initial_rect);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A missing check for popup window handling in Fullscreen in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
Medium
| 173,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<HttpResponse> HandleFileRequest(
const base::FilePath& server_root,
const HttpRequest& request) {
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
GURL request_url = request.GetURL();
std::string relative_path(request_url.path());
std::string post_prefix("/post/");
if (base::StartsWith(relative_path, post_prefix,
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
if (request.method != METHOD_POST)
return nullptr;
relative_path = relative_path.substr(post_prefix.size() - 1);
}
RequestQuery query = ParseQuery(request_url);
std::unique_ptr<BasicHttpResponse> failed_response(new BasicHttpResponse);
failed_response->set_code(HTTP_NOT_FOUND);
if (query.find("expected_body") != query.end()) {
if (request.content.find(query["expected_body"].front()) ==
std::string::npos) {
return std::move(failed_response);
}
}
if (query.find("expected_headers") != query.end()) {
for (const auto& header : query["expected_headers"]) {
if (header.find(":") == std::string::npos)
return std::move(failed_response);
std::string key = header.substr(0, header.find(":"));
std::string value = header.substr(header.find(":") + 1);
if (request.headers.find(key) == request.headers.end() ||
request.headers.at(key) != value) {
return std::move(failed_response);
}
}
}
DCHECK(base::StartsWith(relative_path, "/", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE));
std::string request_path = relative_path.substr(1);
base::FilePath file_path(server_root.AppendASCII(request_path));
std::string file_contents;
if (!base::ReadFileToString(file_path, &file_contents)) {
file_path = file_path.AppendASCII("index.html");
if (!base::ReadFileToString(file_path, &file_contents))
return nullptr;
}
if (request.method == METHOD_HEAD)
file_contents = "";
if (query.find("replace_text") != query.end()) {
for (const auto& replacement : query["replace_text"]) {
if (replacement.find(":") == std::string::npos)
return std::move(failed_response);
std::string find;
std::string with;
base::Base64Decode(replacement.substr(0, replacement.find(":")), &find);
base::Base64Decode(replacement.substr(replacement.find(":") + 1), &with);
base::ReplaceSubstringsAfterOffset(&file_contents, 0, find, with);
}
}
base::FilePath::StringPieceType mock_headers_extension;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::string16 temp = base::ASCIIToUTF16(kMockHttpHeadersExtension);
mock_headers_extension = temp;
#else
mock_headers_extension = kMockHttpHeadersExtension;
#endif
base::FilePath headers_path(file_path.AddExtension(mock_headers_extension));
if (base::PathExists(headers_path)) {
std::string headers_contents;
if (!base::ReadFileToString(headers_path, &headers_contents))
return nullptr;
return std::make_unique<RawHttpResponse>(headers_contents, file_contents);
}
std::unique_ptr<BasicHttpResponse> http_response(new BasicHttpResponse);
http_response->set_code(HTTP_OK);
if (request.headers.find("Range") != request.headers.end()) {
std::vector<HttpByteRange> ranges;
if (HttpUtil::ParseRangeHeader(request.headers.at("Range"), &ranges) &&
ranges.size() == 1) {
ranges[0].ComputeBounds(file_contents.size());
size_t start = ranges[0].first_byte_position();
size_t end = ranges[0].last_byte_position();
http_response->set_code(HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT);
http_response->AddCustomHeader(
"Content-Range",
base::StringPrintf("bytes %" PRIuS "-%" PRIuS "/%" PRIuS, start, end,
file_contents.size()));
file_contents = file_contents.substr(start, end - start + 1);
}
}
http_response->set_content_type(GetContentType(file_path));
http_response->AddCustomHeader("Accept-Ranges", "bytes");
http_response->AddCustomHeader("ETag", "'" + file_path.MaybeAsASCII() + "'");
http_response->set_content(file_contents);
return std::move(http_response);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
|
Low
| 172,585
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
const Extension* extension = GetExtension(render_view_host);
if (!extension)
return;
content::RenderProcessHost* process = render_view_host->GetProcess();
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP ||
(type == Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP &&
extension->location() == Manifest::COMPONENT)) {
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
process->GetID(), content::kChromeUIScheme);
}
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP) {
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = ExtensionPrefs::Get(browser_context_);
if (prefs->AllowFileAccess(extension->id())) {
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
process->GetID(), url::kFileScheme);
}
}
render_view_host->Send(new ExtensionMsg_ActivateExtension(extension->id()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly restrict use of chrome: URLs, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended scheme restrictions via a crafted PDF document, as demonstrated by a document with a link to a chrome://settings URL.
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
|
Medium
| 171,776
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaymentRequest::UpdateWith(mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details) {
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (details->shipping_address_errors &&
!PaymentsValidators::IsValidAddressErrorsFormat(
details->shipping_address_errors, &error)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Missing total";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_->UpdateWith(std::move(details));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
|
Medium
| 173,088
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
TabContents* contents) {
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,510
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent(const Platform::TouchPoint& point, unsigned modifiers)
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return;
if (d->m_fullScreenPluginView.get())
return;
d->m_lastUserEventTimestamp = currentTime();
Platform::TouchPoint tPoint = point;
tPoint.m_pos = d->mapFromTransformed(tPoint.m_pos);
d->m_touchEventHandler->handleTouchPoint(tPoint, modifiers);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,767
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: set_modifier_for_read(png_modifier *pm, png_infopp ppi, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Do this first so that the modifier fields are cleared even if an error
* happens allocating the png_struct. No allocation is done here so no
* cleanup is required.
*/
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->bit_depth = 0;
pm->colour_type = 255;
pm->pending_len = 0;
pm->pending_chunk = 0;
pm->flush = 0;
pm->buffer_count = 0;
pm->buffer_position = 0;
return set_store_for_read(&pm->this, ppi, id, name);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,694
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
LoginLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->login_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void encode_share_access(struct xdr_stream *xdr, int open_flags)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(8);
switch (open_flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE)) {
case FMODE_READ:
WRITE32(NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
WRITE32(NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
WRITE32(NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_BOTH);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
WRITE32(0); /* for linux, share_deny = 0 always */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,715
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
const NavigationRequest& request) {
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
bool no_renderer_swap_allowed = false;
bool was_server_redirect = request.navigation_handle() &&
request.navigation_handle()->WasServerRedirect();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool can_renderer_initiate_transfer =
(request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
true /* in_main_frame */)) ||
(render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive() &&
IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(request.common_params().url) &&
IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
request.common_params().url));
no_renderer_swap_allowed |=
request.from_begin_navigation() && !can_renderer_initiate_transfer;
} else {
no_renderer_swap_allowed |= !CanSubframeSwapProcess(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), was_server_redirect);
}
if (no_renderer_swap_allowed)
return scoped_refptr<SiteInstance>(current_site_instance);
SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance =
speculative_render_frame_host_
? speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()
: nullptr;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> dest_site_instance = GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), candidate_site_instance,
request.common_params().transition,
request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED,
request.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE, request.is_view_source(),
was_server_redirect);
return dest_site_instance;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in site isolation in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
|
Medium
| 173,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void JNI_WebApkUpdateManager_StoreWebApkUpdateRequestToFile(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_update_request_path,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_start_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_scope,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_short_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_primary_icon_url,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_primary_icon_bitmap,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_badge_icon_url,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_badge_icon_bitmap,
const JavaParamRef<jobjectArray>& java_icon_urls,
const JavaParamRef<jobjectArray>& java_icon_hashes,
jint java_display_mode,
jint java_orientation,
jlong java_theme_color,
jlong java_background_color,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_web_manifest_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_webapk_package,
jint java_webapk_version,
jboolean java_is_manifest_stale,
jint java_update_reason,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string update_request_path =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_update_request_path);
ShortcutInfo info(GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_start_url)));
info.scope = GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_scope));
info.name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, java_name);
info.short_name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, java_short_name);
info.user_title = info.short_name;
info.display = static_cast<blink::WebDisplayMode>(java_display_mode);
info.orientation =
static_cast<blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType>(java_orientation);
info.theme_color = (int64_t)java_theme_color;
info.background_color = (int64_t)java_background_color;
info.best_primary_icon_url =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_primary_icon_url));
info.best_badge_icon_url =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_badge_icon_url));
info.manifest_url = GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_web_manifest_url));
base::android::AppendJavaStringArrayToStringVector(env, java_icon_urls,
&info.icon_urls);
std::vector<std::string> icon_hashes;
base::android::AppendJavaStringArrayToStringVector(env, java_icon_hashes,
&icon_hashes);
std::map<std::string, std::string> icon_url_to_murmur2_hash;
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.icon_urls.size(); ++i)
icon_url_to_murmur2_hash[info.icon_urls[i]] = icon_hashes[i];
gfx::JavaBitmap java_primary_icon_bitmap_lock(java_primary_icon_bitmap);
SkBitmap primary_icon =
gfx::CreateSkBitmapFromJavaBitmap(java_primary_icon_bitmap_lock);
primary_icon.setImmutable();
SkBitmap badge_icon;
if (!java_badge_icon_bitmap.is_null()) {
gfx::JavaBitmap java_badge_icon_bitmap_lock(java_badge_icon_bitmap);
gfx::CreateSkBitmapFromJavaBitmap(java_badge_icon_bitmap_lock);
badge_icon.setImmutable();
}
std::string webapk_package;
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_webapk_package, &webapk_package);
WebApkUpdateReason update_reason =
static_cast<WebApkUpdateReason>(java_update_reason);
WebApkInstaller::StoreUpdateRequestToFile(
base::FilePath(update_request_path), info, primary_icon, badge_icon,
webapk_package, std::to_string(java_webapk_version),
icon_url_to_murmur2_hash, java_is_manifest_stale, update_reason,
base::BindOnce(&base::android::RunBooleanCallbackAndroid,
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject>(java_callback)));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The download implementation in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux does not properly restrict saving a file:// URL that is referenced by an http:// URL, which makes it easier for user-assisted remote attackers to discover NetNTLM hashes and conduct SMB relay attacks via a crafted web page that is accessed with the *Save page as* menu choice.
Commit Message: [Android WebAPK] Send share target information in WebAPK updates
This CL plumbs through share target information for WebAPK updates.
Chromium detects Web Manifest updates (including Web Manifest share
target updates) and requests an update.
Currently, depending on whether the Web Manifest is for an intranet
site, the updated WebAPK would either:
- no longer be able handle share intents (even if the Web Manifest
share target information was not deleted)
- be created with the same share intent handlers as the current WebAPK
(regardless of whether the Web Manifest share target information has
changed).
This CL plumbs through the share target information from
WebApkUpdateDataFetcher#onDataAvailable() to
WebApkUpdateManager::StoreWebApkUpdateRequestToFile()
BUG=912945
Change-Id: Ie416570533abc848eeb23de8c197b44f2a1fd028
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369709
Commit-Queue: Peter Kotwicz <pkotwicz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616429}
|
High
| 172,073
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
libettercap_init();
ef_globals_alloc();
select_text_interface();
libettercap_ui_init();
/* etterfilter copyright */
fprintf(stdout, "\n" EC_COLOR_BOLD "%s %s" EC_COLOR_END " copyright %s %s\n\n",
PROGRAM, EC_VERSION, EC_COPYRIGHT, EC_AUTHORS);
/* initialize the line number */
EF_GBL->lineno = 1;
/* getopt related parsing... */
parse_options(argc, argv);
/* set the input for source file */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file) {
yyin = fopen(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file, "r");
if (yyin == NULL)
FATAL_ERROR("Input file not found !");
} else {
FATAL_ERROR("No source file.");
}
/* no buffering */
setbuf(yyin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* load the tables in etterfilter.tbl */
load_tables();
/* load the constants in etterfilter.cnt */
load_constants();
/* print the message */
fprintf(stdout, "\n Parsing source file \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file);
fflush(stdout);
ef_debug(1, "\n");
/* begin the parsing */
if (yyparse() == 0)
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
else
fprintf(stdout, "\n\nThe script contains errors...\n\n");
/* write to file */
if (write_output() != E_SUCCESS)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s)", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
ef_globals_free();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The compile_tree function in ef_compiler.c in the Etterfilter utility in Ettercap 0.8.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted filter.
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
|
Medium
| 168,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
btif_config_remove_unpaired(config);
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows local users to gain privileges by establishing a pairing that remains present during a session of the primary user, aka internal bug 27410683.
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
|
Medium
| 173,553
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XSLStyleSheet::XSLStyleSheet(Node* parentNode, const String& originalURL, const KURL& finalURL, bool embedded)
: m_ownerNode(parentNode)
, m_originalURL(originalURL)
, m_finalURL(finalURL)
, m_isDisabled(false)
, m_embedded(embedded)
, m_processed(true) // The root sheet starts off processed.
, m_stylesheetDoc(0)
, m_stylesheetDocTaken(false)
, m_parentStyleSheet(0)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the XSLStyleSheet::compileStyleSheet function in core/xml/XSLStyleSheetLibxslt.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of post-failure recompilation in unspecified libxslt versions.
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
R=inferno@chromium.org,abarth@chromium.org,pdr@chromium.org
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,184
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: HeadlessWebContentsImpl::HeadlessWebContentsImpl(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
HeadlessBrowserContextImpl* browser_context)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
web_contents_delegate_(new HeadlessWebContentsImpl::Delegate(this)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
agent_host_(content::DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(web_contents)),
inject_mojo_services_into_isolated_world_(false),
browser_context_(browser_context),
render_process_host_(web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING) && !defined(CHROME_MULTIPLE_DLL_CHILD)
HeadlessPrintManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
//// TODO(weili): Add support for printing OOPIFs.
#endif
web_contents->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->accept_languages =
browser_context->options()->accept_language();
web_contents_->SetDelegate(web_contents_delegate_.get());
render_process_host_->AddObserver(this);
agent_host_->AddObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
Low
| 171,896
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ax25_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the
* queue for us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (!ax25_sk(sk)->pidincl)
skb_pull(skb, 1); /* Remove PID */
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (msg->msg_namelen != 0) {
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
ax25_digi digi;
ax25_address src;
const unsigned char *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
ax25_addr_parse(mac + 1, skb->data - mac - 1, &src, NULL,
&digi, NULL, NULL);
sax->sax25_family = AF_AX25;
/* We set this correctly, even though we may not let the
application know the digi calls further down (because it
did NOT ask to know them). This could get political... **/
sax->sax25_ndigis = digi.ndigi;
sax->sax25_call = src;
if (sax->sax25_ndigis != 0) {
int ct;
struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *fsa = (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *)sax;
for (ct = 0; ct < digi.ndigi; ct++)
fsa->fsa_digipeater[ct] = digi.calls[ct];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
err = copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The ax25_recvmsg function in net/ax25/af_ax25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,044
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidFocus() {
WebFrame* main_frame = webview() ? webview()->MainFrame() : nullptr;
bool is_processing_user_gesture =
WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(
main_frame && main_frame->IsWebLocalFrame()
? main_frame->ToWebLocalFrame()
: nullptr);
if (is_processing_user_gesture &&
!RenderThreadImpl::current()->layout_test_mode()) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_Focus(GetRoutingID()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
???
| 172,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
break;
case MSR_EFER:
return set_efer(vcpu, data);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
data &= ~(u64)0x8; /* ignore TLB cache disable */
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented HWCR wrmsr: 0x%llx\n",
data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented MMIO_CONF_BASE wrmsr: "
"0x%llx\n", data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
if (!data) {
/* We support the non-activated case already */
break;
} else if (data & ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF)) {
/* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific,
thus reserved and should throw a #GP */
return 1;
}
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
__func__, data);
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return set_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, data);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
if (guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(vcpu)) {
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
u64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset(vcpu, adj, true);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data);
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: {
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.time = data;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
if (!(data & 1))
break;
/* ...but clean it before doing the actual write */
vcpu->arch.time_offset = data & ~(PAGE_MASK | 1);
/* Check that the address is 32-byte aligned. */
if (vcpu->arch.time_offset &
(sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info) - 1))
break;
vcpu->arch.time_page =
gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, data >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(vcpu->arch.time_page))
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
break;
}
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
if (unlikely(!sched_info_on()))
return 1;
if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK)
return 1;
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
data & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
break;
vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
preempt_disable();
accumulate_steal_time(vcpu);
preempt_enable();
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
if (kvm_lapic_enable_pv_eoi(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, data);
/* Performance counters are not protected by a CPUID bit,
* so we should check all of them in the generic path for the sake of
* cross vendor migration.
* Writing a zero into the event select MSRs disables them,
* which we perfectly emulate ;-). Any other value should be at least
* reported, some guests depend on them.
*/
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
if (data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
/* at least RHEL 4 unconditionally writes to the perfctr registers,
* so we ignore writes to make it happy.
*/
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR2:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
pr = true;
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (pr || data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "disabled perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR.
* Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors,
* all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from
* AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the
* affected processor models on the command line, hence
* the need to ignore the workaround.
*/
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = set_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, data);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return set_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr
* counterpart for further detail.
*/
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data;
break;
default:
if (msr && (msr == vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr))
return xen_hvm_config(vcpu, data);
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that triggers use of a guest physical address (GPA) in (1) movable or (2) removable memory during an MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME kvm_set_msr_common operation.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void set_fat(DOS_FS * fs, uint32_t cluster, int32_t new)
{
unsigned char *data = NULL;
int size;
loff_t offs;
if (new == -1)
new = FAT_EOF(fs);
else if ((long)new == -2)
new = FAT_BAD(fs);
switch (fs->fat_bits) {
case 12:
data = fs->fat + cluster * 3 / 2;
offs = fs->fat_start + cluster * 3 / 2;
if (cluster & 1) {
FAT_ENTRY prevEntry;
get_fat(&prevEntry, fs->fat, cluster - 1, fs);
data[0] = ((new & 0xf) << 4) | (prevEntry.value >> 8);
data[1] = new >> 4;
} else {
FAT_ENTRY subseqEntry;
if (cluster != fs->clusters - 1)
get_fat(&subseqEntry, fs->fat, cluster + 1, fs);
else
subseqEntry.value = 0;
data[0] = new & 0xff;
data[1] = (new >> 8) | ((0xff & subseqEntry.value) << 4);
}
size = 2;
break;
case 16:
data = fs->fat + cluster * 2;
offs = fs->fat_start + cluster * 2;
*(unsigned short *)data = htole16(new);
size = 2;
break;
case 32:
{
FAT_ENTRY curEntry;
get_fat(&curEntry, fs->fat, cluster, fs);
data = fs->fat + cluster * 4;
offs = fs->fat_start + cluster * 4;
/* According to M$, the high 4 bits of a FAT32 entry are reserved and
* are not part of the cluster number. So we never touch them. */
*(uint32_t *)data = htole32((new & 0xfffffff) |
(curEntry.reserved << 28));
size = 4;
}
break;
default:
die("Bad FAT entry size: %d bits.", fs->fat_bits);
}
fs_write(offs, size, data);
if (fs->nfats > 1) {
fs_write(offs + fs->fat_size, size, data);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The set_fat function in fat.c in dosfstools before 4.0 might allow attackers to corrupt a FAT12 filesystem or cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and crash) by writing an odd number of clusters to the third to last entry on a FAT12 filesystem, which triggers an *off-by-two error.*
Commit Message: set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12
In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three
bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it
must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing
beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is
not the last one.
Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to
fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters
not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test
triggered two clusters early.
If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an
odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted.
This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the
corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later.
Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
|
Low
| 167,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)
{
assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->_eip + rel);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 169,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause a KDC assertion failure by sending invalid S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy requests.
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int bin_symbols(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, ut64 at, const char *name, bool exponly, const char *args) {
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (r->bin);
RList *entries = r_bin_get_entries (r->bin);
RBinSymbol *symbol;
RBinAddr *entry;
RListIter *iter;
bool firstexp = true;
bool printHere = false;
int i = 0, lastfs = 's';
bool bin_demangle = r_config_get_i (r->config, "bin.demangle");
if (!info) {
return 0;
}
if (args && *args == '.') {
printHere = true;
}
bool is_arm = info && info->arch && !strncmp (info->arch, "arm", 3);
const char *lang = bin_demangle ? r_config_get (r->config, "bin.lang") : NULL;
RList *symbols = r_bin_get_symbols (r->bin);
r_spaces_push (&r->anal->meta_spaces, "bin");
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, R_FLAGS_FS_SYMBOLS);
} else if (!at && exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs exports\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Exports]\n");
}
} else if (!at && !exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Symbols]\n");
}
}
if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("Num Paddr Vaddr Bind Type Size Name\n");
}
size_t count = 0;
r_list_foreach (symbols, iter, symbol) {
if (!symbol->name) {
continue;
}
char *r_symbol_name = r_str_escape_utf8 (symbol->name, false, true);
ut64 addr = compute_addr (r->bin, symbol->paddr, symbol->vaddr, va);
int len = symbol->size ? symbol->size : 32;
SymName sn = {0};
if (exponly && !isAnExport (symbol)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (name && strcmp (r_symbol_name, name)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (at && (!symbol->size || !is_in_range (at, addr, symbol->size))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if ((printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, symbol->paddr, len))
&& (printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, addr, len))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
count ++;
snInit (r, &sn, symbol, lang);
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && (is_section_symbol (symbol) || is_file_symbol (symbol))) {
/*
* Skip section symbols because they will have their own flag.
* Skip also file symbols because not useful for now.
*/
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_special_symbol (r, symbol, va);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_symbol (r, symbol, info, va);
}
select_flag_space (r, symbol);
/* If that's a Classed symbol (method or so) */
if (sn.classname) {
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_get (r->flags, sn.methflag);
if (r->bin->prefix) {
char *prname = r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, sn.methflag);
r_name_filter (sn.methflag, -1);
free (sn.methflag);
sn.methflag = prname;
}
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, sn.methname);
if ((fi->offset - r->flags->base) == addr) {
r_flag_unset (r->flags, fi);
}
} else {
fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, sn.methflag, addr, symbol->size);
char *comment = fi->comment ? strdup (fi->comment) : NULL;
if (comment) {
r_flag_item_set_comment (fi, comment);
R_FREE (comment);
}
}
} else {
const char *n = sn.demname ? sn.demname : sn.name;
const char *fn = sn.demflag ? sn.demflag : sn.nameflag;
char *fnp = (r->bin->prefix) ?
r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, fn):
strdup (fn);
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, fnp, addr, symbol->size);
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, n);
fi->demangled = (bool)(size_t)sn.demname;
} else {
if (fn) {
eprintf ("[Warning] Can't find flag (%s)\n", fn);
}
}
free (fnp);
}
if (sn.demname) {
r_meta_add (r->anal, R_META_TYPE_COMMENT,
addr, symbol->size, sn.demname);
}
r_flag_space_pop (r->flags);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
char *str = r_str_escape_utf8_for_json (r_symbol_name, -1);
r_cons_printf ("%s{\"name\":\"%s\","
"\"demname\":\"%s\","
"\"flagname\":\"%s\","
"\"ordinal\":%d,"
"\"bind\":\"%s\","
"\"size\":%d,"
"\"type\":\"%s\","
"\"vaddr\":%"PFMT64d","
"\"paddr\":%"PFMT64d"}",
((exponly && firstexp) || printHere) ? "" : (iter->p ? "," : ""),
str,
sn.demname? sn.demname: "",
sn.nameflag,
symbol->ordinal,
symbol->bind,
(int)symbol->size,
symbol->type,
(ut64)addr, (ut64)symbol->paddr);
free (str);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" %d %s\n",
addr, (int)symbol->size, name);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLEST (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("%s\n", name);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
/* Skip special symbols because we do not flag them and
* they shouldn't be printed in the rad format either */
if (is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
goto next;
}
RBinFile *binfile;
RBinPlugin *plugin;
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
if (!name) {
goto next;
}
if (!strncmp (name, "imp.", 4)) {
if (lastfs != 'i') {
r_cons_printf ("fs imports\n");
}
lastfs = 'i';
} else {
if (lastfs != 's') {
const char *fs = exponly? "exports": "symbols";
r_cons_printf ("fs %s\n", fs);
}
lastfs = 's';
}
if (r->bin->prefix || *name) { // we don't want unnamed symbol flags
char *flagname = construct_symbol_flagname ("sym", name, MAXFLAG_LEN_DEFAULT);
if (!flagname) {
goto next;
}
r_cons_printf ("\"f %s%s%s %u 0x%08" PFMT64x "\"\n",
r->bin->prefix ? r->bin->prefix : "", r->bin->prefix ? "." : "",
flagname, symbol->size, addr);
free (flagname);
}
binfile = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
plugin = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (binfile);
if (plugin && plugin->name) {
if (r_str_startswith (plugin->name, "pe")) {
char *module = strdup (r_symbol_name);
char *p = strstr (module, ".dll_");
if (p && strstr (module, "imp.")) {
char *symname = __filterShell (p + 5);
char *m = __filterShell (module);
*p = 0;
if (r->bin->prefix) {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s.%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, r->bin->prefix, symname);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, symname);
}
free (symname);
free (m);
}
free (module);
}
}
} else {
const char *bind = symbol->bind? symbol->bind: "NONE";
const char *type = symbol->type? symbol->type: "NONE";
const char *name = r_str_get (sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name);
r_cons_printf ("%03u", symbol->ordinal);
if (symbol->paddr == UT64_MAX) {
r_cons_printf (" ----------");
} else {
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x, symbol->paddr);
}
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x" %6s %6s %4d%s%s\n",
addr, bind, type, symbol->size, *name? " ": "", name);
}
next:
snFini (&sn);
i++;
free (r_symbol_name);
if (exponly && firstexp) {
firstexp = false;
}
if (printHere) {
break;
}
}
if (count == 0 && IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{}");
}
if (is_arm) {
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, entry) {
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
handle_arm_entry (r, entry, info, va);
}
}
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("]");
}
r_spaces_pop (&r->anal->meta_spaces);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: In radare2 before 3.9.0, a command injection vulnerability exists in bin_symbols() in libr/core/cbin.c. By using a crafted executable file, it's possible to execute arbitrary shell commands with the permissions of the victim. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient fix for CVE-2019-14745 and improper handling of symbol names embedded in executables.
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
|
Medium
| 170,186
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void avcodec_align_dimensions2(AVCodecContext *s, int *width, int *height,
int linesize_align[AV_NUM_DATA_POINTERS])
{
int i;
int w_align = 1;
int h_align = 1;
AVPixFmtDescriptor const *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(s->pix_fmt);
if (desc) {
w_align = 1 << desc->log2_chroma_w;
h_align = 1 << desc->log2_chroma_h;
}
switch (s->pix_fmt) {
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUYV422:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YVYU422:
case AV_PIX_FMT_UYVY422:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP16BE:
w_align = 16; //FIXME assume 16 pixel per macroblock
h_align = 16 * 2; // interlaced needs 2 macroblocks height
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ411P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_UYYVYY411:
w_align = 32;
h_align = 16 * 2;
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_SVQ1) {
w_align = 64;
h_align = 64;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_RGB555:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RPZA) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8:
case AV_PIX_FMT_BGR8:
case AV_PIX_FMT_RGB8:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_SMC ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_CINEPAK) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_JV) {
w_align = 8;
h_align = 8;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24:
if ((s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MSZH) ||
(s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ZLIB)) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_CINEPAK) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_IFF_ILBM) {
w_align = FFMAX(w_align, 8);
}
*width = FFALIGN(*width, w_align);
*height = FFALIGN(*height, h_align);
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || s->lowres) {
*height += 2;
*width = FFMAX(*width, 32);
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
linesize_align[i] = STRIDE_ALIGN;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FFmpeg before 2017-01-24 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the ipvideo_decode_block_opcode_0xA function in libavcodec/interplayvideo.c and the avcodec_align_dimensions2 function in libavcodec/utils.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Low
| 168,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AutomationInternalCustomBindings::AutomationInternalCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
is_active_profile_(true),
tree_change_observer_overall_filter_(
api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_NOTREECHANGES) {
#define ROUTE_FUNCTION(FN) \
RouteFunction(#FN, \
base::Bind(&AutomationInternalCustomBindings::FN, \
base::Unretained(this)))
ROUTE_FUNCTION(IsInteractPermitted);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(GetSchemaAdditions);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(GetRoutingID);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(StartCachingAccessibilityTrees);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(DestroyAccessibilityTree);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(AddTreeChangeObserver);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(RemoveTreeChangeObserver);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(GetChildIDAtIndex);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(GetFocus);
ROUTE_FUNCTION(GetState);
#undef ROUTE_FUNCTION
RouteTreeIDFunction(
"GetRootID", [](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Integer::New(isolate, cache->tree.root()->id()));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction(
"GetDocURL", [](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, cache->tree.data().url.c_str()));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction(
"GetDocTitle", [](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, cache->tree.data().title.c_str()));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction(
"GetDocLoaded", [](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result, TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Boolean::New(isolate, cache->tree.data().loaded));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction("GetDocLoadingProgress",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result, TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Number::New(
isolate, cache->tree.data().loading_progress));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction("GetAnchorObjectID",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result, TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Number::New(
isolate, cache->tree.data().sel_anchor_object_id));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction("GetAnchorOffset", [](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Number::New(isolate, cache->tree.data().sel_anchor_offset));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction("GetFocusObjectID",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result, TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Number::New(
isolate, cache->tree.data().sel_focus_object_id));
});
RouteTreeIDFunction("GetFocusOffset", [](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache) {
result.Set(v8::Number::New(isolate, cache->tree.data().sel_focus_offset));
});
RouteNodeIDFunction(
"GetParentID", [](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node) {
if (node->parent())
result.Set(v8::Integer::New(isolate, node->parent()->id()));
});
RouteNodeIDFunction("GetChildCount", [](v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node) {
result.Set(v8::Integer::New(isolate, node->child_count()));
});
RouteNodeIDFunction(
"GetIndexInParent",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node) {
result.Set(v8::Integer::New(isolate, node->index_in_parent()));
});
RouteNodeIDFunction(
"GetRole", [](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node) {
std::string role_name = ui::ToString(node->data().role);
result.Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, role_name.c_str()));
});
RouteNodeIDFunction(
"GetLocation", [](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node) {
gfx::Rect location = ComputeGlobalNodeBounds(cache, node);
location.Offset(cache->location_offset);
result.Set(RectToV8Object(isolate, location));
});
RouteNodeIDPlusRangeFunction(
"GetBoundsForRange",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node, int start, int end) {
gfx::Rect location = ComputeGlobalNodeBounds(cache, node);
location.Offset(cache->location_offset);
if (node->data().role == ui::AX_ROLE_INLINE_TEXT_BOX) {
std::string name = node->data().GetStringAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_NAME);
std::vector<int> character_offsets =
node->data().GetIntListAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_CHARACTER_OFFSETS);
int len =
static_cast<int>(std::min(name.size(), character_offsets.size()));
if (start >= 0 && start <= end && end <= len) {
int start_offset = start > 0 ? character_offsets[start - 1] : 0;
int end_offset = end > 0 ? character_offsets[end - 1] : 0;
switch (node->data().GetIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_TEXT_DIRECTION)) {
case ui::AX_TEXT_DIRECTION_LTR:
default:
location.set_x(location.x() + start_offset);
location.set_width(end_offset - start_offset);
break;
case ui::AX_TEXT_DIRECTION_RTL:
location.set_x(location.x() + location.width() - end_offset);
location.set_width(end_offset - start_offset);
break;
case ui::AX_TEXT_DIRECTION_TTB:
location.set_y(location.y() + start_offset);
location.set_height(end_offset - start_offset);
break;
case ui::AX_TEXT_DIRECTION_BTT:
location.set_y(location.y() + location.height() - end_offset);
location.set_height(end_offset - start_offset);
break;
}
}
}
result.Set(RectToV8Object(isolate, location));
});
RouteNodeIDPlusAttributeFunction(
"GetStringAttribute",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
ui::AXNode* node, const std::string& attribute_name) {
ui::AXStringAttribute attribute =
ui::ParseAXStringAttribute(attribute_name);
std::string attr_value;
if (!node->data().GetStringAttribute(attribute, &attr_value))
return;
result.Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, attr_value.c_str()));
});
RouteNodeIDPlusAttributeFunction(
"GetBoolAttribute",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
ui::AXNode* node, const std::string& attribute_name) {
ui::AXBoolAttribute attribute =
ui::ParseAXBoolAttribute(attribute_name);
bool attr_value;
if (!node->data().GetBoolAttribute(attribute, &attr_value))
return;
result.Set(v8::Boolean::New(isolate, attr_value));
});
RouteNodeIDPlusAttributeFunction(
"GetIntAttribute",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
ui::AXNode* node, const std::string& attribute_name) {
ui::AXIntAttribute attribute = ui::ParseAXIntAttribute(attribute_name);
int attr_value;
if (!node->data().GetIntAttribute(attribute, &attr_value))
return;
result.Set(v8::Integer::New(isolate, attr_value));
});
RouteNodeIDPlusAttributeFunction(
"GetFloatAttribute",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
ui::AXNode* node, const std::string& attribute_name) {
ui::AXFloatAttribute attribute =
ui::ParseAXFloatAttribute(attribute_name);
float attr_value;
if (!node->data().GetFloatAttribute(attribute, &attr_value))
return;
result.Set(v8::Number::New(isolate, attr_value));
});
RouteNodeIDPlusAttributeFunction(
"GetIntListAttribute",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
ui::AXNode* node, const std::string& attribute_name) {
ui::AXIntListAttribute attribute =
ui::ParseAXIntListAttribute(attribute_name);
if (!node->data().HasIntListAttribute(attribute))
return;
const std::vector<int32_t>& attr_value =
node->data().GetIntListAttribute(attribute);
v8::Local<v8::Array> array_result(
v8::Array::New(isolate, attr_value.size()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < attr_value.size(); ++i)
array_result->Set(static_cast<uint32_t>(i),
v8::Integer::New(isolate, attr_value[i]));
result.Set(array_result);
});
RouteNodeIDPlusAttributeFunction(
"GetHtmlAttribute",
[](v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> result,
ui::AXNode* node, const std::string& attribute_name) {
std::string attr_value;
if (!node->data().GetHtmlAttribute(attribute_name.c_str(), &attr_value))
return;
result.Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, attr_value.c_str()));
});
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,269
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLLinkElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode& insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
LogAddElementIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("link", relAttr, hrefAttr);
if (!insertion_point.isConnected())
return kInsertionDone;
DCHECK(isConnected());
if (!ShouldLoadLink() && IsInShadowTree()) {
String message = "HTML element <link> is ignored in shadow tree.";
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel, message));
return kInsertionDone;
}
GetDocument().GetStyleEngine().AddStyleSheetCandidateNode(*this);
Process();
if (link_)
link_->OwnerInserted();
return kInsertionDone;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect handling of stylesheets leading to a use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
|
Medium
| 172,586
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->process_keyring)
return -EEXIST;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
new->process_keyring = keyring;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.10.13 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a series of KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
{
struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl;
int i;
if (!fpl)
return NULL;
new_fpl = kmemdup(fpl, offsetof(struct scm_fp_list, fp[fpl->count]),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (new_fpl) {
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
}
return new_fpl;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging incorrect tracking of descriptor ownership and sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-4312.
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void mincore_pmd_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
unsigned char *vec)
{
unsigned long next;
pmd_t *pmd;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (mincore_huge_pmd(vma, pmd, addr, next, vec)) {
vec += (next - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
continue;
}
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
mincore_unmapped_range(vma, addr, next, vec);
else
mincore_pte_range(vma, pmd, addr, next, vec);
vec += (next - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,635
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nsc_decode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
BYTE shift = context->ColorLossLevel - 1; /* colorloss recovery + YCoCg shift */
BYTE* bmpdata = context->BitmapData;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
const BYTE* yplane;
const BYTE* coplane;
const BYTE* cgplane;
const BYTE* aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width; /* A */
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Co, supersampled */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Cg, supersampled */
}
else
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * context->width; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * context->width; /* Co */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * context->width; /* Cg */
}
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
INT16 y_val = (INT16) * yplane;
INT16 co_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*coplane << shift);
INT16 cg_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*cgplane << shift);
INT16 r_val = y_val + co_val - cg_val;
INT16 g_val = y_val + cg_val;
INT16 b_val = y_val - co_val - cg_val;
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(b_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(g_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(r_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = *aplane;
yplane++;
coplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
cgplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
aplane++;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t *len,
struct iovec **iovec,
bool compat)
{
ssize_t ret;
*nr_segs = *len;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct compat_iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
else
#endif
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* len now reflect bytes instead of segs */
*len = ret;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in the aio_setup_single_vector function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel 4.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large AIO iovec. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of a CVE-2012-6701 regression.
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 170,003
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()
|| defParams->nSize
!= sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
const PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.itemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
memcpy(defParams, &port->mDef, sizeof(port->mDef));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,222
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if ((id == 0x000003ed) && (PSDQuantum(count) < (ssize_t) (length-12)))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
|
Medium
| 168,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: header_put_byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 1)
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} /* header_put_byte */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,053
|
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