instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXLayoutObject::isSelected() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getNode())
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaSelected = getAttribute(aria_selectedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSelected, "true"))
return true;
AXObject* focusedObject = axObjectCache().focusedObject();
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole && focusedObject &&
focusedObject->activeDescendant() == this) {
return true;
}
if (isTabItem() && isTabItemSelected())
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftAVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize decoder");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL) {
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
if (!(inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
continue;
}
mReceivedEOS = true;
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
} else if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx);
DUMP_TO_FILE(mInFile, s_dec_ip.pv_stream_buffer, s_dec_ip.u4_num_Bytes);
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool unsupportedResolution =
(IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
/* Check for unsupported dimensions */
if (unsupportedResolution) {
ALOGE("Unsupported resolution : %dx%d", mWidth, mHeight);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
bool allocationFailed = (IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
if (allocationFailed) {
ALOGE("Allocation failure in decoder");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
PRINT_TIME("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
|
Medium
| 174,179
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
{
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
struct bpf_verifer_log *log;
int ret = -EINVAL;
/* no program is valid */
if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
* allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
*/
env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
log = &env->log;
env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
(*prog)->len);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->insn_aux_data)
goto err_free_env;
env->prog = *prog;
env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
/* user requested verbose verifier output
* and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
*/
log->level = attr->log_level;
log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
log->len_total = attr->log_size;
ret = -EINVAL;
/* log attributes have to be sane */
if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
!log->level || !log->ubuf)
goto err_unlock;
}
env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
env->strict_alignment = true;
if (env->prog->aux->offload) {
ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env);
if (ret)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
GFP_USER);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->explored_states)
goto skip_full_check;
ret = check_cfg(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ret = do_check(env);
if (env->cur_state) {
free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
env->cur_state = NULL;
}
skip_full_check:
while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL));
free_states(env);
if (ret == 0)
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
ret = -ENOSPC;
if (log->level && !log->ubuf) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_release_maps;
}
if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_release_maps;
}
memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
* bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
*/
convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
}
err_release_maps:
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
* them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
*/
release_maps(env);
*prog = env->prog;
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
kfree(env);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 ignores unreachable code, even though it would still be processed by JIT compilers. This behavior, also considered an improper branch-pruning logic issue, could possibly be used by local users for denial of service.
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTasksFinished() {
if (!should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_)
return;
CheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,260
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_do_nothing (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InputMethodStatusConnection()
: current_input_method_changed_(NULL),
register_ime_properties_(NULL),
update_ime_property_(NULL),
connection_change_handler_(NULL),
language_library_(NULL),
ibus_(NULL),
ibus_config_(NULL) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,540
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* Track::GetCodecId() const
{
return m_info.codecId;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,293
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
if (data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str) != data_store_map_.end())
return data_store_map_[preview_ui_addr_str]->GetAvailableDraftPageCount();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::computeAccessibilityIsIgnored(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
ASSERT(m_initialized);
#endif
if (isDescendantOfLeafNode()) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXAncestorIsLeafNode, leafNodeAncestor()));
return true;
}
AXObject* controlObject = correspondingControlForLabelElement();
if (controlObject && controlObject->isCheckboxOrRadio() &&
controlObject->nameFromLabelElement()) {
if (ignoredReasons) {
HTMLLabelElement* label = labelElementContainer();
if (label && label != getNode()) {
AXObject* labelAXObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(label);
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXLabelContainer, labelAXObject));
}
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXLabelFor, controlObject));
}
return true;
}
Element* element = getNode()->isElementNode() ? toElement(getNode())
: getNode()->parentElement();
if (!getLayoutObject() && (!element || !element->isInCanvasSubtree()) &&
!equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false")) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered));
return true;
}
if (m_role == UnknownRole) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXUninteresting));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,911
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int udhcpc_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
uint8_t *message;
const char *str_V, *str_h, *str_F, *str_r;
IF_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING(const char *str_a = "2000";)
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(char *str_P;)
void *clientid_mac_ptr;
llist_t *list_O = NULL;
llist_t *list_x = NULL;
int tryagain_timeout = 20;
int discover_timeout = 3;
int discover_retries = 3;
uint32_t server_addr = server_addr; /* for compiler */
uint32_t requested_ip = 0;
uint32_t xid = xid; /* for compiler */
int packet_num;
int timeout; /* must be signed */
unsigned already_waited_sec;
unsigned opt;
IF_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING(unsigned arpping_ms;)
int retval;
setup_common_bufsiz();
/* Default options */
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(SERVER_PORT = 67;)
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(CLIENT_PORT = 68;)
client_config.interface = "eth0";
client_config.script = CONFIG_UDHCPC_DEFAULT_SCRIPT;
str_V = "udhcp "BB_VER;
/* Parse command line */
opt = getopt32long(argv, "^"
/* O,x: list; -T,-t,-A take numeric param */
"CV:H:h:F:i:np:qRr:s:T:+t:+SA:+O:*ox:*fB"
USE_FOR_MMU("b")
IF_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING("a::")
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT("P:")
"v"
"\0" IF_UDHCP_VERBOSE("vv") /* -v is a counter */
, udhcpc_longopts
, &str_V, &str_h, &str_h, &str_F
, &client_config.interface, &client_config.pidfile /* i,p */
, &str_r /* r */
, &client_config.script /* s */
, &discover_timeout, &discover_retries, &tryagain_timeout /* T,t,A */
, &list_O
, &list_x
IF_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING(, &str_a)
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(, &str_P)
IF_UDHCP_VERBOSE(, &dhcp_verbose)
);
if (opt & (OPT_h|OPT_H)) {
bb_error_msg("option -h NAME is deprecated, use -x hostname:NAME");
client_config.hostname = alloc_dhcp_option(DHCP_HOST_NAME, str_h, 0);
}
if (opt & OPT_F) {
/* FQDN option format: [0x51][len][flags][0][0]<fqdn> */
client_config.fqdn = alloc_dhcp_option(DHCP_FQDN, str_F, 3);
/* Flag bits: 0000NEOS
* S: 1 = Client requests server to update A RR in DNS as well as PTR
* O: 1 = Server indicates to client that DNS has been updated regardless
* E: 1 = Name is in DNS format, i.e. <4>host<6>domain<3>com<0>,
* not "host.domain.com". Format 0 is obsolete.
* N: 1 = Client requests server to not update DNS (S must be 0 then)
* Two [0] bytes which follow are deprecated and must be 0.
*/
client_config.fqdn[OPT_DATA + 0] = 0x1;
/*client_config.fqdn[OPT_DATA + 1] = 0; - xzalloc did it */
/*client_config.fqdn[OPT_DATA + 2] = 0; */
}
if (opt & OPT_r)
requested_ip = inet_addr(str_r);
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT
if (opt & OPT_P) {
CLIENT_PORT = xatou16(str_P);
SERVER_PORT = CLIENT_PORT - 1;
}
#endif
IF_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING(arpping_ms = xatou(str_a);)
while (list_O) {
char *optstr = llist_pop(&list_O);
unsigned n = bb_strtou(optstr, NULL, 0);
if (errno || n > 254) {
n = udhcp_option_idx(optstr, dhcp_option_strings);
n = dhcp_optflags[n].code;
}
client_config.opt_mask[n >> 3] |= 1 << (n & 7);
}
if (!(opt & OPT_o)) {
unsigned i, n;
for (i = 0; (n = dhcp_optflags[i].code) != 0; i++) {
if (dhcp_optflags[i].flags & OPTION_REQ) {
client_config.opt_mask[n >> 3] |= 1 << (n & 7);
}
}
}
while (list_x) {
char *optstr = xstrdup(llist_pop(&list_x));
udhcp_str2optset(optstr, &client_config.options,
dhcp_optflags, dhcp_option_strings,
/*dhcpv6:*/ 0
);
free(optstr);
}
if (udhcp_read_interface(client_config.interface,
&client_config.ifindex,
NULL,
client_config.client_mac)
) {
return 1;
}
clientid_mac_ptr = NULL;
if (!(opt & OPT_C) && !udhcp_find_option(client_config.options, DHCP_CLIENT_ID)) {
/* not suppressed and not set, set the default client ID */
client_config.clientid = alloc_dhcp_option(DHCP_CLIENT_ID, "", 7);
client_config.clientid[OPT_DATA] = 1; /* type: ethernet */
clientid_mac_ptr = client_config.clientid + OPT_DATA+1;
memcpy(clientid_mac_ptr, client_config.client_mac, 6);
}
if (str_V[0] != '\0') {
client_config.vendorclass = alloc_dhcp_option(DHCP_VENDOR, str_V, 0);
}
#if !BB_MMU
/* on NOMMU reexec (i.e., background) early */
if (!(opt & OPT_f)) {
bb_daemonize_or_rexec(0 /* flags */, argv);
logmode = LOGMODE_NONE;
}
#endif
if (opt & OPT_S) {
openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
logmode |= LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
}
/* Make sure fd 0,1,2 are open */
bb_sanitize_stdio();
/* Create pidfile */
write_pidfile(client_config.pidfile);
/* Goes to stdout (unless NOMMU) and possibly syslog */
bb_error_msg("started, v"BB_VER);
/* Set up the signal pipe */
udhcp_sp_setup();
/* We want random_xid to be random... */
srand(monotonic_us());
state = INIT_SELECTING;
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "deconfig");
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_RAW);
packet_num = 0;
timeout = 0;
already_waited_sec = 0;
/* Main event loop. select() waits on signal pipe and possibly
* on sockfd.
* "continue" statements in code below jump to the top of the loop.
*/
for (;;) {
int tv;
struct pollfd pfds[2];
struct dhcp_packet packet;
/* silence "uninitialized!" warning */
unsigned timestamp_before_wait = timestamp_before_wait;
/* Was opening raw or udp socket here
* if (listen_mode != LISTEN_NONE && sockfd < 0),
* but on fast network renew responses return faster
* than we open sockets. Thus this code is moved
* to change_listen_mode(). Thus we open listen socket
* BEFORE we send renew request (see "case BOUND:"). */
udhcp_sp_fd_set(pfds, sockfd);
tv = timeout - already_waited_sec;
retval = 0;
/* If we already timed out, fall through with retval = 0, else... */
if (tv > 0) {
log1("waiting %u seconds", tv);
timestamp_before_wait = (unsigned)monotonic_sec();
retval = poll(pfds, 2, tv < INT_MAX/1000 ? tv * 1000 : INT_MAX);
if (retval < 0) {
/* EINTR? A signal was caught, don't panic */
if (errno == EINTR) {
already_waited_sec += (unsigned)monotonic_sec() - timestamp_before_wait;
continue;
}
/* Else: an error occurred, panic! */
bb_perror_msg_and_die("poll");
}
}
/* If timeout dropped to zero, time to become active:
* resend discover/renew/whatever
*/
if (retval == 0) {
/* When running on a bridge, the ifindex may have changed
* (e.g. if member interfaces were added/removed
* or if the status of the bridge changed).
* Refresh ifindex and client_mac:
*/
if (udhcp_read_interface(client_config.interface,
&client_config.ifindex,
NULL,
client_config.client_mac)
) {
goto ret0; /* iface is gone? */
}
if (clientid_mac_ptr)
memcpy(clientid_mac_ptr, client_config.client_mac, 6);
/* We will restart the wait in any case */
already_waited_sec = 0;
switch (state) {
case INIT_SELECTING:
if (!discover_retries || packet_num < discover_retries) {
if (packet_num == 0)
xid = random_xid();
/* broadcast */
send_discover(xid, requested_ip);
timeout = discover_timeout;
packet_num++;
continue;
}
leasefail:
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "leasefail");
#if BB_MMU /* -b is not supported on NOMMU */
if (opt & OPT_b) { /* background if no lease */
bb_error_msg("no lease, forking to background");
client_background();
/* do not background again! */
opt = ((opt & ~OPT_b) | OPT_f);
} else
#endif
if (opt & OPT_n) { /* abort if no lease */
bb_error_msg("no lease, failing");
retval = 1;
goto ret;
}
/* wait before trying again */
timeout = tryagain_timeout;
packet_num = 0;
continue;
case REQUESTING:
if (packet_num < 3) {
/* send broadcast select packet */
send_select(xid, server_addr, requested_ip);
timeout = discover_timeout;
packet_num++;
continue;
}
/* Timed out, go back to init state.
* "discover...select...discover..." loops
* were seen in the wild. Treat them similarly
* to "no response to discover" case */
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_RAW);
state = INIT_SELECTING;
goto leasefail;
case BOUND:
/* 1/2 lease passed, enter renewing state */
state = RENEWING;
client_config.first_secs = 0; /* make secs field count from 0 */
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_KERNEL);
log1("entering renew state");
/* fall right through */
case RENEW_REQUESTED: /* manual (SIGUSR1) renew */
case_RENEW_REQUESTED:
case RENEWING:
if (timeout >= 60) {
/* send an unicast renew request */
/* Sometimes observed to fail (EADDRNOTAVAIL) to bind
* a new UDP socket for sending inside send_renew.
* I hazard to guess existing listening socket
* is somehow conflicting with it, but why is it
* not deterministic then?! Strange.
* Anyway, it does recover by eventually failing through
* into INIT_SELECTING state.
*/
if (send_renew(xid, server_addr, requested_ip) >= 0) {
timeout >>= 1;
continue;
}
/* else: error sending.
* example: ENETUNREACH seen with server
* which gave us bogus server ID 1.1.1.1
* which wasn't reachable (and probably did not exist).
*/
}
/* Timed out or error, enter rebinding state */
log1("entering rebinding state");
state = REBINDING;
/* fall right through */
case REBINDING:
/* Switch to bcast receive */
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_RAW);
/* Lease is *really* about to run out,
* try to find DHCP server using broadcast */
if (timeout > 0) {
/* send a broadcast renew request */
send_renew(xid, 0 /*INADDR_ANY*/, requested_ip);
timeout >>= 1;
continue;
}
/* Timed out, enter init state */
bb_error_msg("lease lost, entering init state");
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "deconfig");
state = INIT_SELECTING;
client_config.first_secs = 0; /* make secs field count from 0 */
/*timeout = 0; - already is */
packet_num = 0;
continue;
/* case RELEASED: */
}
/* yah, I know, *you* say it would never happen */
timeout = INT_MAX;
continue; /* back to main loop */
} /* if poll timed out */
/* poll() didn't timeout, something happened */
/* Is it a signal? */
switch (udhcp_sp_read()) {
case SIGUSR1:
client_config.first_secs = 0; /* make secs field count from 0 */
already_waited_sec = 0;
perform_renew();
if (state == RENEW_REQUESTED) {
/* We might be either on the same network
* (in which case renew might work),
* or we might be on a completely different one
* (in which case renew won't ever succeed).
* For the second case, must make sure timeout
* is not too big, or else we can send
* futile renew requests for hours.
*/
if (timeout > 60)
timeout = 60;
goto case_RENEW_REQUESTED;
}
/* Start things over */
packet_num = 0;
/* Kill any timeouts, user wants this to hurry along */
timeout = 0;
continue;
case SIGUSR2:
perform_release(server_addr, requested_ip);
timeout = INT_MAX;
continue;
case SIGTERM:
bb_error_msg("received %s", "SIGTERM");
goto ret0;
}
/* Is it a packet? */
if (!pfds[1].revents)
continue; /* no */
{
int len;
/* A packet is ready, read it */
if (listen_mode == LISTEN_KERNEL)
len = udhcp_recv_kernel_packet(&packet, sockfd);
else
len = udhcp_recv_raw_packet(&packet, sockfd);
if (len == -1) {
/* Error is severe, reopen socket */
bb_error_msg("read error: "STRERROR_FMT", reopening socket" STRERROR_ERRNO);
sleep(discover_timeout); /* 3 seconds by default */
change_listen_mode(listen_mode); /* just close and reopen */
}
/* If this packet will turn out to be unrelated/bogus,
* we will go back and wait for next one.
* Be sure timeout is properly decreased. */
already_waited_sec += (unsigned)monotonic_sec() - timestamp_before_wait;
if (len < 0)
continue;
}
if (packet.xid != xid) {
log1("xid %x (our is %x), ignoring packet",
(unsigned)packet.xid, (unsigned)xid);
continue;
}
/* Ignore packets that aren't for us */
if (packet.hlen != 6
|| memcmp(packet.chaddr, client_config.client_mac, 6) != 0
) {
log1("chaddr does not match, ignoring packet"); // log2?
continue;
}
message = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
if (message == NULL) {
bb_error_msg("no message type option, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
switch (state) {
case INIT_SELECTING:
/* Must be a DHCPOFFER */
if (*message == DHCPOFFER) {
uint8_t *temp;
/* What exactly is server's IP? There are several values.
* Example DHCP offer captured with tchdump:
*
* 10.34.25.254:67 > 10.34.25.202:68 // IP header's src
* BOOTP fields:
* Your-IP 10.34.25.202
* Server-IP 10.34.32.125 // "next server" IP
* Gateway-IP 10.34.25.254 // relay's address (if DHCP relays are in use)
* DHCP options:
* DHCP-Message Option 53, length 1: Offer
* Server-ID Option 54, length 4: 10.34.255.7 // "server ID"
* Default-Gateway Option 3, length 4: 10.34.25.254 // router
*
* We think that real server IP (one to use in renew/release)
* is one in Server-ID option. But I am not 100% sure.
* IP header's src and Gateway-IP (same in this example)
* might work too.
* "Next server" and router are definitely wrong ones to use, though...
*/
/* We used to ignore pcakets without DHCP_SERVER_ID.
* I've got user reports from people who run "address-less" servers.
* They either supply DHCP_SERVER_ID of 0.0.0.0 or don't supply it at all.
* They say ISC DHCP client supports this case.
*/
server_addr = 0;
temp = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
if (!temp) {
bb_error_msg("no server ID, using 0.0.0.0");
} else {
/* it IS unaligned sometimes, don't "optimize" */
move_from_unaligned32(server_addr, temp);
}
/*xid = packet.xid; - already is */
requested_ip = packet.yiaddr;
/* enter requesting state */
state = REQUESTING;
timeout = 0;
packet_num = 0;
already_waited_sec = 0;
}
continue;
case REQUESTING:
case RENEWING:
case RENEW_REQUESTED:
case REBINDING:
if (*message == DHCPACK) {
unsigned start;
uint32_t lease_seconds;
struct in_addr temp_addr;
uint8_t *temp;
temp = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
if (!temp) {
bb_error_msg("no lease time with ACK, using 1 hour lease");
lease_seconds = 60 * 60;
} else {
/* it IS unaligned sometimes, don't "optimize" */
move_from_unaligned32(lease_seconds, temp);
lease_seconds = ntohl(lease_seconds);
/* paranoia: must not be too small and not prone to overflows */
/* timeout > 60 - ensures at least one unicast renew attempt */
if (lease_seconds < 2 * 61)
lease_seconds = 2 * 61;
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING
if (opt & OPT_a) {
/* RFC 2131 3.1 paragraph 5:
* "The client receives the DHCPACK message with configuration
* parameters. The client SHOULD perform a final check on the
* parameters (e.g., ARP for allocated network address), and notes
* the duration of the lease specified in the DHCPACK message. At this
* point, the client is configured. If the client detects that the
* address is already in use (e.g., through the use of ARP),
* the client MUST send a DHCPDECLINE message to the server and restarts
* the configuration process..." */
if (!arpping(packet.yiaddr,
NULL,
(uint32_t) 0,
client_config.client_mac,
client_config.interface,
arpping_ms)
) {
bb_error_msg("offered address is in use "
"(got ARP reply), declining");
send_decline(/*xid,*/ server_addr, packet.yiaddr);
if (state != REQUESTING)
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "deconfig");
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_RAW);
state = INIT_SELECTING;
client_config.first_secs = 0; /* make secs field count from 0 */
requested_ip = 0;
timeout = tryagain_timeout;
packet_num = 0;
already_waited_sec = 0;
continue; /* back to main loop */
}
}
#endif
/* enter bound state */
temp_addr.s_addr = packet.yiaddr;
bb_error_msg("lease of %s obtained, lease time %u",
inet_ntoa(temp_addr), (unsigned)lease_seconds);
requested_ip = packet.yiaddr;
start = monotonic_sec();
udhcp_run_script(&packet, state == REQUESTING ? "bound" : "renew");
already_waited_sec = (unsigned)monotonic_sec() - start;
timeout = lease_seconds / 2;
if ((unsigned)timeout < already_waited_sec) {
/* Something went wrong. Back to discover state */
timeout = already_waited_sec = 0;
}
state = BOUND;
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_NONE);
if (opt & OPT_q) { /* quit after lease */
goto ret0;
}
/* future renew failures should not exit (JM) */
opt &= ~OPT_n;
#if BB_MMU /* NOMMU case backgrounded earlier */
if (!(opt & OPT_f)) {
client_background();
/* do not background again! */
opt = ((opt & ~OPT_b) | OPT_f);
}
#endif
/* make future renew packets use different xid */
/* xid = random_xid(); ...but why bother? */
continue; /* back to main loop */
}
if (*message == DHCPNAK) {
/* If network has more than one DHCP server,
* "wrong" server can reply first, with a NAK.
* Do not interpret it as a NAK from "our" server.
*/
if (server_addr != 0) {
uint32_t svid;
uint8_t *temp;
temp = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
if (!temp) {
non_matching_svid:
log1("received DHCP NAK with wrong"
" server ID, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
move_from_unaligned32(svid, temp);
if (svid != server_addr)
goto non_matching_svid;
}
/* return to init state */
bb_error_msg("received %s", "DHCP NAK");
udhcp_run_script(&packet, "nak");
if (state != REQUESTING)
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "deconfig");
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_RAW);
sleep(3); /* avoid excessive network traffic */
state = INIT_SELECTING;
client_config.first_secs = 0; /* make secs field count from 0 */
requested_ip = 0;
timeout = 0;
packet_num = 0;
already_waited_sec = 0;
}
continue;
/* case BOUND: - ignore all packets */
/* case RELEASED: - ignore all packets */
}
/* back to main loop */
} /* for (;;) - main loop ends */
ret0:
if (opt & OPT_R) /* release on quit */
perform_release(server_addr, requested_ip);
retval = 0;
ret:
/*if (client_config.pidfile) - remove_pidfile has its own check */
remove_pidfile(client_config.pidfile);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in BusyBox before 1.30.0. An out of bounds read in udhcp components (consumed by the DHCP server, client, and relay) allows a remote attacker to leak sensitive information from the stack by sending a crafted DHCP message. This is related to verification in udhcp_get_option() in networking/udhcp/common.c that 4-byte options are indeed 4 bytes.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,224
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
int i;
SRP_user_pwd *user;
unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
return user;
}
if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
(vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
return NULL;
if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N)))
goto err;
N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g)))
goto err;
g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
defgNid = "*";
} else {
SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
if (gN == NULL)
goto err;
N_bn = gN->N;
g_bn = gN->g;
defgNid = gN->id;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the SRP_VBASE_get_by_user implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by providing an invalid username in a connection attempt, related to apps/s_server.c and crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::SecureProxyCheck(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
secure_proxy_checker_->CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(fetcher_callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
Medium
| 172,418
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext4_xattr_block_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int error;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ea_idebug(inode, "buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
buffer, (long)buffer_size);
error = 0;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %llu",
(unsigned long long)EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
if (ext4_xattr_check_block(inode, bh)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_cache_insert(ext4_mb_cache, bh);
error = ext4_xattr_list_entries(dentry, BFIRST(bh), buffer, buffer_size);
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,989
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContextState::RestoreTextureUnitBindings(
GLuint unit, const ContextState* prev_state) const {
DCHECK_LT(unit, texture_units.size());
const TextureUnit& texture_unit = texture_units[unit];
GLuint service_id_2d = Get2dServiceId(texture_unit);
GLuint service_id_cube = GetCubeServiceId(texture_unit);
GLuint service_id_oes = GetOesServiceId(texture_unit);
GLuint service_id_arb = GetArbServiceId(texture_unit);
bool bind_texture_2d = true;
bool bind_texture_cube = true;
bool bind_texture_oes =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_egl_image_external ||
feature_info_->feature_flags().nv_egl_stream_consumer_external;
bool bind_texture_arb = feature_info_->feature_flags().arb_texture_rectangle;
if (prev_state) {
const TextureUnit& prev_unit = prev_state->texture_units[unit];
bind_texture_2d = service_id_2d != Get2dServiceId(prev_unit);
bind_texture_cube = service_id_cube != GetCubeServiceId(prev_unit);
bind_texture_oes =
bind_texture_oes && service_id_oes != GetOesServiceId(prev_unit);
bind_texture_arb =
bind_texture_arb && service_id_arb != GetArbServiceId(prev_unit);
}
if (!bind_texture_2d && !bind_texture_cube
&& !bind_texture_oes && !bind_texture_arb) {
return;
}
api()->glActiveTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE0 + unit);
if (bind_texture_2d) {
api()->glBindTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, service_id_2d);
}
if (bind_texture_cube) {
api()->glBindTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP, service_id_cube);
}
if (bind_texture_oes) {
api()->glBindTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES, service_id_oes);
}
if (bind_texture_arb) {
api()->glBindTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB, service_id_arb);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Inappropriate sharing of TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data between tabs in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
|
Medium
| 172,911
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
{
int ret;
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
s->d1->listen = 1;
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The dtls1_listen function in d1_lib.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not properly isolate the state information of independent data streams, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via crafted DTLS traffic, as demonstrated by DTLS 1.0 traffic to a DTLS 1.2 server.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,821
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
free = i;
continue;
}
if (table->refs[i] &&
(vlan == (MLX4_VLAN_MASK &
be32_to_cpu(table->entries[i])))) {
/* Vlan already registered, increase refernce count */
*index = i;
++table->refs[i];
goto out;
}
}
if (table->total == table->max) {
/* No free vlan entries */
err = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
/* Register new MAC */
table->refs[free] = 1;
table->entries[free] = cpu_to_be32(vlan | MLX4_VLAN_VALID);
err = mlx4_set_port_vlan_table(dev, port, table->entries);
if (unlikely(err)) {
mlx4_warn(dev, "Failed adding vlan: %u\n", vlan);
table->refs[free] = 0;
table->entries[free] = 0;
goto out;
}
*index = free;
++table->total;
out:
mutex_unlock(&table->mutex);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 2.6.37, an out of bounds array access happened in drivers/net/mlx4/port.c. When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access.
Commit Message: mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,872
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DownloadUrlParameters::DownloadUrlParameters(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_host_routing_id,
int render_frame_host_routing_id,
const net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag& traffic_annotation)
: content_initiated_(false),
use_if_range_(true),
method_("GET"),
post_id_(-1),
prefer_cache_(false),
referrer_policy_(
net::URLRequest::
CLEAR_REFERRER_ON_TRANSITION_FROM_SECURE_TO_INSECURE),
render_process_host_id_(render_process_host_id),
render_view_host_routing_id_(render_view_host_routing_id),
render_frame_host_routing_id_(render_frame_host_routing_id),
url_(url),
do_not_prompt_for_login_(false),
follow_cross_origin_redirects_(true),
fetch_error_body_(false),
transient_(false),
traffic_annotation_(traffic_annotation),
download_source_(DownloadSource::UNKNOWN) {}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
|
Medium
| 173,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void server_real_connect(SERVER_REC *server, IPADDR *ip,
const char *unix_socket)
{
GIOChannel *handle;
IPADDR *own_ip = NULL;
const char *errmsg;
char *errmsg2;
char ipaddr[MAX_IP_LEN];
int port;
g_return_if_fail(ip != NULL || unix_socket != NULL);
signal_emit("server connecting", 2, server, ip);
if (server->connrec->no_connect)
return;
if (ip != NULL) {
own_ip = ip == NULL ? NULL :
(IPADDR_IS_V6(ip) ? server->connrec->own_ip6 :
server->connrec->own_ip4);
port = server->connrec->proxy != NULL ?
server->connrec->proxy_port : server->connrec->port;
handle = server->connrec->use_ssl ?
net_connect_ip_ssl(ip, port, own_ip, server->connrec->ssl_cert, server->connrec->ssl_pkey,
server->connrec->ssl_cafile, server->connrec->ssl_capath, server->connrec->ssl_verify) :
net_connect_ip(ip, port, own_ip);
} else {
handle = net_connect_unix(unix_socket);
}
if (handle == NULL) {
/* failed */
errmsg = g_strerror(errno);
errmsg2 = NULL;
if (errno == EADDRNOTAVAIL) {
if (own_ip != NULL) {
/* show the IP which is causing the error */
net_ip2host(own_ip, ipaddr);
errmsg2 = g_strconcat(errmsg, ": ", ipaddr, NULL);
}
server->no_reconnect = TRUE;
}
if (server->connrec->use_ssl && errno == ENOSYS)
server->no_reconnect = TRUE;
server->connection_lost = TRUE;
server_connect_failed(server, errmsg2 ? errmsg2 : errmsg);
g_free(errmsg2);
} else {
server->handle = net_sendbuffer_create(handle, 0);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
if (server->connrec->use_ssl)
server_connect_callback_init_ssl(server, handle);
else
#endif
server->connect_tag =
g_input_add(handle, G_INPUT_WRITE | G_INPUT_READ,
(GInputFunction)
server_connect_callback_init,
server);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Irssi before 0.8.15, when SSL is used, does not verify that the server hostname matches a domain name in the subject's Common Name (CN) field or a Subject Alternative Name field of the X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof IRC servers via an arbitrary certificate.
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
|
Medium
| 165,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CompileFromResponseCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
ExceptionState exception_state(args.GetIsolate(),
ExceptionState::kExecutionContext,
"WebAssembly", "compile");
ExceptionToRejectPromiseScope reject_promise_scope(args, exception_state);
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(args);
if (!ExecutionContext::From(script_state)) {
V8SetReturnValue(args, ScriptPromise().V8Value());
return;
}
if (args.Length() < 1 || !args[0]->IsObject() ||
!V8Response::hasInstance(args[0], args.GetIsolate())) {
V8SetReturnValue(
args,
ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state, V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"An argument must be provided, which must be a"
"Response or Promise<Response> object"))
.V8Value());
return;
}
Response* response = V8Response::ToImpl(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0]));
if (response->MimeType() != "application/wasm") {
V8SetReturnValue(
args,
ScriptPromise::Reject(
script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Incorrect response MIME type. Expected 'application/wasm'."))
.V8Value());
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> promise;
if (response->IsBodyLocked() || response->bodyUsed()) {
promise = ScriptPromise::Reject(script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Cannot compile WebAssembly.Module "
"from an already read Response"))
.V8Value();
} else {
if (response->BodyBuffer()) {
FetchDataLoaderAsWasmModule* loader =
new FetchDataLoaderAsWasmModule(script_state);
promise = loader->GetPromise();
response->BodyBuffer()->StartLoading(loader, new WasmDataLoaderClient());
} else {
promise = ScriptPromise::Reject(script_state,
V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(
script_state->GetIsolate(),
"Response object has a null body."))
.V8Value();
}
}
V8SetReturnValue(args, promise);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in V8 WebAssembly JS bindings in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.108 allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [wasm] Use correct bindings APIs
Use ScriptState::ForCurrentRealm in static methods, instead of
ForRelevantRealm().
Bug: chromium:788453
Change-Id: I63bd25e3f5a4e8d7cbaff945da8df0d71aa65527
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/795096
Commit-Queue: Mircea Trofin <mtrofin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#520174}
|
Medium
| 172,938
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void common_hrtimer_rearm(struct k_itimer *timr)
{
struct hrtimer *timer = &timr->it.real.timer;
if (!timr->it_interval)
return;
timr->it_overrun += (unsigned int) hrtimer_forward(timer,
timer->base->get_time(),
timr->it_interval);
hrtimer_restart(timer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An Integer Overflow in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the POSIX timer code is caused by the way the overrun accounting works. Depending on interval and expiry time values, the overrun can be larger than INT_MAX, but the accounting is int based. This basically makes the accounting values, which are visible to user space via timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun, random. For example, a local user can cause a denial of service (signed integer overflow) via crafted mmap, futex, timer_create, and timer_settime system calls.
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
|
Low
| 169,179
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool NaClProcessHost::ReplyToRenderer(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> handles_for_renderer;
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_renderer.size(); i++) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HANDLE handle_in_renderer;
if (!DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(
internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i]),
chrome_render_message_filter_->peer_handle(),
&handle_in_renderer,
0, // Unused given DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS.
FALSE,
DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "DuplicateHandle() failed";
return false;
}
handles_for_renderer.push_back(
reinterpret_cast<nacl::FileDescriptor>(handle_in_renderer));
#else
nacl::FileDescriptor imc_handle;
imc_handle.fd = internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i];
imc_handle.auto_close = true;
handles_for_renderer.push_back(imc_handle);
#endif
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (RunningOnWOW64()) {
if (!content::BrokerAddTargetPeer(process_->GetData().handle)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add NaCl process PID";
return false;
}
}
#endif
ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl::WriteReplyParams(
reply_msg_, handles_for_renderer, channel_handle);
chrome_render_message_filter_->Send(reply_msg_);
chrome_render_message_filter_ = NULL;
reply_msg_ = NULL;
internal_->sockets_for_renderer.clear();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,727
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{
PCNetState *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int is_padr = 0, is_bcast = 0, is_ladr = 0;
uint8_t buf1[60];
int remaining;
int crc_err = 0;
int size = size_;
if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size ||
(CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) {
return -1;
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size);
#endif
/* if too small buffer, then expand it */
if (size < MIN_BUF_SIZE) {
memcpy(buf1, buf, size);
memset(buf1 + size, 0, MIN_BUF_SIZE - size);
buf = buf1;
size = MIN_BUF_SIZE;
}
if (CSR_PROM(s)
|| (is_padr=padr_match(s, buf, size))
|| (is_bcast=padr_bcast(s, buf, size))
|| (is_ladr=ladr_match(s, buf, size))) {
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
if (!(CSR_CRST(s) & 0x8000) && s->rdra) {
struct pcnet_RMD rmd;
int rcvrc = CSR_RCVRC(s)-1,i;
hwaddr nrda;
for (i = CSR_RCVRL(s)-1; i > 0; i--, rcvrc--) {
if (rcvrc <= 1)
rcvrc = CSR_RCVRL(s);
nrda = s->rdra +
(CSR_RCVRL(s) - rcvrc) *
(BCR_SWSTYLE(s) ? 16 : 8 );
RMDLOAD(&rmd, nrda);
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
printf("pcnet - scan buffer: RCVRC=%d PREV_RCVRC=%d\n",
rcvrc, CSR_RCVRC(s));
#endif
CSR_RCVRC(s) = rcvrc;
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
break;
}
}
}
if (!(CSR_CRST(s) & 0x8000)) {
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
printf("pcnet - no buffer: RCVRC=%d\n", CSR_RCVRC(s));
#endif
s->csr[0] |= 0x1000; /* Set MISS flag */
CSR_MISSC(s)++;
} else {
uint8_t *src = s->buffer;
hwaddr crda = CSR_CRDA(s);
struct pcnet_RMD rmd;
int pktcount = 0;
if (!s->looptest) {
memcpy(src, buf, size);
/* no need to compute the CRC */
src[size] = 0;
uint32_t fcs = ~0;
uint8_t *p = src;
while (p != &src[size])
CRC(fcs, *p++);
*(uint32_t *)p = htonl(fcs);
size += 4;
} else {
uint32_t fcs = ~0;
uint8_t *p = src;
while (p != &src[size])
CRC(fcs, *p++);
crc_err = (*(uint32_t *)p != htonl(fcs));
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_MATCH
PRINT_PKTHDR(buf);
#endif
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
/*if (!CSR_LAPPEN(s))*/
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, STP, 1);
#define PCNET_RECV_STORE() do { \
int count = MIN(4096 - GET_FIELD(rmd.buf_length, RMDL, BCNT),remaining); \
hwaddr rbadr = PHYSADDR(s, rmd.rbadr); \
s->phys_mem_write(s->dma_opaque, rbadr, src, count, CSR_BSWP(s)); \
src += count; remaining -= count; \
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, OWN, 0); \
RMDSTORE(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda)); \
pktcount++; \
} while (0)
remaining = size;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
if ((remaining > 0) && CSR_NRDA(s)) {
hwaddr nrda = CSR_NRDA(s);
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,nrda));
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
crda = nrda;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
if ((remaining > 0) && (nrda=CSR_NNRD(s))) {
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,nrda));
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
crda = nrda;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
}
}
}
}
#undef PCNET_RECV_STORE
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
if (remaining == 0) {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.msg_length, RMDM, MCNT, size);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ENP, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, PAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_padr);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, LFAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_ladr);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, BAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_bcast);
if (crc_err) {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, CRC, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ERR, 1);
}
} else {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, OFLO, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, BUFF, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ERR, 1);
}
RMDSTORE(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
s->csr[0] |= 0x0400;
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
printf("RCVRC=%d CRDA=0x%08x BLKS=%d\n",
CSR_RCVRC(s), PHYSADDR(s,CSR_CRDA(s)), pktcount);
#endif
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
while (pktcount--) {
if (CSR_RCVRC(s) <= 1)
CSR_RCVRC(s) = CSR_RCVRL(s);
else
CSR_RCVRC(s)--;
}
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
}
}
pcnet_poll(s);
pcnet_update_irq(s);
return size_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the pcnet_receive function in hw/net/pcnet.c in QEMU, when a guest NIC has a larger MTU, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) or execute arbitrary code via a large packet.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,286
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void patch_instruction(VAPICROMState *s, X86CPU *cpu, target_ulong ip)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
VAPICHandlers *handlers;
uint8_t opcode[2];
uint32_t imm32;
target_ulong current_pc = 0;
target_ulong current_cs_base = 0;
uint32_t current_flags = 0;
if (smp_cpus == 1) {
handlers = &s->rom_state.up;
} else {
handlers = &s->rom_state.mp;
}
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(env, ¤t_pc, ¤t_cs_base,
¤t_flags);
}
pause_all_vcpus();
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0);
switch (opcode[0]) {
case 0x89: /* mov r32 to r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50 + modrm_reg(opcode[1])); /* push reg */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0x8b: /* mov r/m32 to r32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x90);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr[modrm_reg(opcode[1])]);
break;
case 0xa1: /* mov abs to eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->get_tpr[0]);
break;
case 0xa3: /* mov eax to abs */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->set_tpr_eax);
break;
case 0xc7: /* mov imm32, r/m32 (c7/0) */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x68); /* push imm32 */
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 6, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 0);
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 1, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 1);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 5, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0xff: /* push r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50); /* push eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr_stack);
break;
default:
abort();
}
resume_all_vcpus();
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
tb_gen_code(cs, current_pc, current_cs_base, current_flags, 1);
cpu_resume_from_signal(cs, NULL);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The patch_instruction function in hw/i386/kvmvapic.c in QEMU does not initialize the imm32 variable, which allows local guest OS administrators to obtain sensitive information from host stack memory by accessing the Task Priority Register (TPR).
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,076
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType(ContentSettingsType type,
PermissionType* out) {
if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION) {
*out = PermissionType::GEOLOCATION;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS) {
*out = PermissionType::NOTIFICATIONS;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PUSH_MESSAGING) {
*out = PermissionType::PUSH_MESSAGING;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX) {
*out = PermissionType::MIDI_SYSEX;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_DURABLE_STORAGE) {
*out = PermissionType::DURABLE_STORAGE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA) {
*out = PermissionType::VIDEO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC) {
*out = PermissionType::AUDIO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC) {
*out = PermissionType::BACKGROUND_SYNC;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS) {
*out = PermissionType::FLASH;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER) {
*out = PermissionType::PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER;
#endif
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in core/html/HTMLInputElement.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger extraneous change events, as demonstrated by events for invalid input or input to read-only fields, related to the initializeTypeInParsing and updateType functions.
Commit Message: PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType needs to handle MIDI
After the recent PermissionManager's change, it calls
GetPermissionType even for CONTENT_SETTING_TYPE_MIDI.
BUG=697771
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454231}
|
Low
| 172,033
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions, std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
URLPattern origin(Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The extension functionality in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not verify that use of the permissions API is consistent with file permissions, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %lu, expected %zu", (unsigned long)outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in codecs/mp3dec/SoftMP3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29422022.
Commit Message: Fix build
Change-Id: I48ba34b3df9c9a896d4b18c3f48e41744b7dab54
|
Medium
| 174,156
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn **replay_esn,
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn **preplay_esn,
struct nlattr *rta)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *p, *pp, *up;
if (!rta)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rta);
p = kmemdup(up, xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
pp = kmemdup(up, xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pp) {
kfree(p);
return -ENOMEM;
}
*replay_esn = p;
*preplay_esn = pp;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not verify that the actual Netlink message length is consistent with a certain header field, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a (1) new or (2) updated state.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:
1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
code later on.
2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (<http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/>). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.
To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.
To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@revosec.ch>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ShellMainDelegate::ShellMainDelegate() {
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ContainerNode::parserRemoveChild function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75, mishandles widget updates, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
|
Medium
| 172,121
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext2_xattr_header *header)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
again:
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_first(ext2_xattr_cache, inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
if (IS_ERR(ce)) {
if (PTR_ERR(ce) == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
break;
}
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_cache_find",
"inode %ld: block %ld read error",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else {
lock_buffer(bh);
if (le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount) >
EXT2_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %ld refcount %d>%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT2_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (!ext2_xattr_cmp(header, HDR(bh))) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
return bh;
}
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_next(ce, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, hash);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,977
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: StorageHandler::GetCacheStorageObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!cache_storage_observer_) {
cache_storage_observer_ = std::make_unique<CacheStorageObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<CacheStorageContextImpl*>(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetCacheStorageContext()));
}
return cache_storage_observer_.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,771
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XIQueryDevice(Display *dpy, int deviceid, int *ndevices_return)
{
XIDeviceInfo *info = NULL;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReply reply;
char *ptr;
int i;
char *buf;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_2_0, extinfo) == -1)
goto error_unlocked;
GetReq(XIQueryDevice, req);
req->reqType = extinfo->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_XIQueryDevice;
req->deviceid = deviceid;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
*ndevices_return = reply.num_devices;
info = Xmalloc((reply.num_devices + 1) * sizeof(XIDeviceInfo));
if (!info)
goto error;
buf = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
_XRead(dpy, buf, reply.length * 4);
ptr = buf;
/* info is a null-terminated array */
info[reply.num_devices].name = NULL;
nclasses = wire->num_classes;
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
XIDeviceInfo *lib = &info[i];
xXIDeviceInfo *wire = (xXIDeviceInfo*)ptr;
lib->deviceid = wire->deviceid;
lib->use = wire->use;
lib->attachment = wire->attachment;
Xfree(buf);
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
strncpy(lib->name, ptr, wire->name_len);
ptr += ((wire->name_len + 3)/4) * 4;
sz = size_classes((xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, nclasses);
lib->classes = Xmalloc(sz);
ptr += copy_classes(lib, (xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, &nclasses);
/* We skip over unused classes */
lib->num_classes = nclasses;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: X.org libXi before 1.7.7 allows remote X servers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors involving length fields.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickBooleanType SyncExifProfile(Image *image,StringInfo *profile)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
} DirectoryInfo;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries;
ssize_t
id,
level,
offset;
static int
format_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
/*
Set EXIF resolution tag.
*/
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
if ((id != 0x4949) && (id != 0x4D4D))
{
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
}
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadProfileShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
return(MagickFalse);
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
do
{
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=ReadProfileShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
int
components;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_bytes;
ssize_t
format,
tag_value;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+2+(12*entry));
if (q > (exif+length-12))
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
tag_value=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q);
format=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q+2);
if ((format-1) >= EXIF_NUM_FORMATS)
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+4);
if (components < 0)
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
number_bytes=(size_t) components*format_bytes[format];
if ((ssize_t) number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+8);
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
if (~length < number_bytes)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
switch (tag_value)
{
case 0x011a:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.x+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x011b:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.y+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x0112:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) image->orientation,p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) image->orientation,
p);
break;
}
case 0x0128:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET))
{
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/profile.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3-2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280
|
Medium
| 168,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static x86newTokenType getToken(const char *str, size_t *begin, size_t *end) {
while (begin && isspace ((ut8)str[*begin])) {
++(*begin);
}
if (!str[*begin]) { // null byte
*end = *begin;
return TT_EOF;
} else if (isalpha ((ut8)str[*begin])) { // word token
*end = *begin;
while (end && isalnum ((ut8)str[*end])) {
++(*end);
}
return TT_WORD;
} else if (isdigit ((ut8)str[*begin])) { // number token
*end = *begin;
while (end && isalnum ((ut8)str[*end])) { // accept alphanumeric characters, because hex.
++(*end);
}
return TT_NUMBER;
} else { // special character: [, ], +, *, ...
*end = *begin + 1;
return TT_SPECIAL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: getToken in libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c in radare2 before 3.1.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer over-read) via crafted x86 assembly data, as demonstrated by rasm2.
Commit Message: Fix #12239 - crash in the x86.nz assembler ##asm (#12252)
|
Medium
| 168,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: on_handler_appeared(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
const gchar *name_owner,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
info->connection = connection;
tcmur_register_handler(handler);
dbus_export_handler(handler, G_CALLBACK(on_dbus_check_config));
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
info->register_invocation = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: tcmu-runner version 1.0.5 to 1.2.0 is vulnerable to a dbus triggered NULL pointer dereference in the tcmu-runner daemon's on_unregister_handler() function resulting in denial of service
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
|
Low
| 167,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long address;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int fault;
int write = error_code & PF_WRITE;
unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE |
(write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/* Get the faulting address: */
address = read_cr2();
/*
* Detect and handle instructions that would cause a page fault for
* both a tracked kernel page and a userspace page.
*/
if (kmemcheck_active(regs))
kmemcheck_hide(regs);
prefetchw(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(kmmio_fault(regs, address)))
return;
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*
* This verifies that the fault happens in kernel space
* (error_code & 4) == 0, and that the fault was not a
* protection error (error_code & 9) == 0.
*/
if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) {
if (!(error_code & (PF_RSVD | PF_USER | PF_PROT))) {
if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0)
return;
if (kmemcheck_fault(regs, address, error_code))
return;
}
/* Can handle a stale RO->RW TLB: */
if (spurious_fault(error_code, address))
return;
/* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return;
/*
* Don't take the mm semaphore here. If we fixup a prefetch
* fault we could otherwise deadlock:
*/
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */
if (unlikely(notify_page_fault(regs)))
return;
/*
* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved and the
* vmalloc fault has been handled.
*
* User-mode registers count as a user access even for any
* potential system fault or CPU buglet:
*/
if (user_mode_vm(regs)) {
local_irq_enable();
error_code |= PF_USER;
} else {
if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
local_irq_enable();
}
if (unlikely(error_code & PF_RSVD))
pgtable_bad(regs, error_code, address);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/*
* If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running
* in an atomic region then we must not take the fault:
*/
if (unlikely(in_atomic() || !mm)) {
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/*
* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
* addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in
* the kernel and should generate an OOPS. Unfortunately, in the
* case of an erroneous fault occurring in a code path which already
* holds mmap_sem we will deadlock attempting to validate the fault
* against the address space. Luckily the kernel only validly
* references user space from well defined areas of code, which are
* listed in the exceptions table.
*
* As the vast majority of faults will be valid we will only perform
* the source reference check when there is a possibility of a
* deadlock. Attempt to lock the address space, if we cannot we then
* validate the source. If this is invalid we can skip the address
* space check, thus avoiding the deadlock:
*/
if (unlikely(!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
if ((error_code & PF_USER) == 0 &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) {
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
/*
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
* which case we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
* down_read():
*/
might_sleep();
}
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (unlikely(!vma)) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
if (likely(vma->vm_start <= address))
goto good_area;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
if (error_code & PF_USER) {
/*
* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
* The large cushion allows instructions like enter
* and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes
* 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.)
*/
if (unlikely(address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
}
if (unlikely(expand_stack(vma, address))) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
if (unlikely(access_error(error_code, vma))) {
bad_area_access_error(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault:
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY|VM_FAULT_ERROR))) {
if (mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, fault))
return;
}
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
check_v8086_mode(regs, address, tsk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,825
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Encoder::EncodeFrameInternal(const VideoSource &video,
const unsigned long frame_flags) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
const vpx_image_t *img = video.img();
if (!encoder_.priv) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
cfg_.g_timebase = video.timebase();
cfg_.rc_twopass_stats_in = stats_->buf();
res = vpx_codec_enc_init(&encoder_, CodecInterface(), &cfg_,
init_flags_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
if (cfg_.g_w != img->d_w || cfg_.g_h != img->d_h) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(&encoder_, &cfg_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_,
video.img(), video.pts(), video.duration(),
frame_flags, deadline_));
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadFITSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct _FITSInfo
{
MagickBooleanType
extend,
simple;
int
bits_per_pixel,
columns,
rows,
number_axes,
number_planes;
double
min_data,
max_data,
zero,
scale;
EndianType
endian;
} FITSInfo;
char
*comment,
keyword[9],
property[MaxTextExtent],
value[73];
double
pixel,
scale;
FITSInfo
fits_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
scene,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&fits_info,0,sizeof(fits_info));
fits_info.extend=MagickFalse;
fits_info.simple=MagickFalse;
fits_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
fits_info.columns=1;
fits_info.rows=1;
fits_info.rows=1;
fits_info.number_planes=1;
fits_info.min_data=0.0;
fits_info.max_data=0.0;
fits_info.zero=0.0;
fits_info.scale=1.0;
fits_info.endian=MSBEndian;
/*
Decode image header.
*/
for (comment=(char *) NULL; EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse; )
{
for ( ; EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse; )
{
register char
*p;
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) keyword);
if (count != 8)
break;
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) keyword[i])) != 0)
break;
keyword[i]=tolower((int) ((unsigned char) keyword[i]));
}
keyword[i]='\0';
count=ReadBlob(image,72,(unsigned char *) value);
value[72]='\0';
if (count != 72)
break;
p=value;
if (*p == '=')
{
p+=2;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
p++;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"end") == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"extend") == 0)
fits_info.extend=(*p == 'T') || (*p == 't') ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"simple") == 0)
fits_info.simple=(*p == 'T') || (*p == 't') ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bitpix") == 0)
fits_info.bits_per_pixel=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis") == 0)
fits_info.number_axes=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis1") == 0)
fits_info.columns=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis2") == 0)
fits_info.rows=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis3") == 0)
fits_info.number_planes=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"datamax") == 0)
fits_info.max_data=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"datamin") == 0)
fits_info.min_data=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bzero") == 0)
fits_info.zero=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bscale") == 0)
fits_info.scale=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"comment") == 0)
{
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
comment=ConstantString(p);
else
(void) ConcatenateString(&comment,p);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"xendian") == 0)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(p,"big",3) == 0)
fits_info.endian=MSBEndian;
else
fits_info.endian=LSBEndian;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MaxTextExtent,"fits:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,property,p);
}
c=0;
while (((TellBlob(image) % FITSBlocksize) != 0) && (c != EOF))
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (fits_info.extend == MagickFalse)
break;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) fits_info.columns*fits_info.rows;
if ((fits_info.simple != MagickFalse) && (fits_info.number_axes >= 1) &&
(fits_info.number_axes <= 4) && (number_pixels != 0))
break;
}
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if (comment != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) fits_info.columns*fits_info.rows;
if ((fits_info.simple == MagickFalse) || (fits_info.number_axes < 1) ||
(fits_info.number_axes > 4) || (number_pixels == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) fits_info.number_planes; scene++)
{
image->columns=(size_t) fits_info.columns;
image->rows=(size_t) fits_info.rows;
image->depth=(size_t) (fits_info.bits_per_pixel < 0 ? -1 : 1)*
fits_info.bits_per_pixel;
image->endian=fits_info.endian;
image->scene=(size_t) scene;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if ((fits_info.min_data == 0.0) && (fits_info.max_data == 0.0))
{
if (fits_info.zero == 0.0)
(void) GetFITSPixelExtrema(image,fits_info.bits_per_pixel,
&fits_info.min_data,&fits_info.max_data);
else
fits_info.max_data=GetFITSPixelRange((size_t)
fits_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
else
fits_info.max_data=GetFITSPixelRange((size_t) fits_info.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Convert FITS pixels to pixel packets.
*/
scale=QuantumRange/(fits_info.max_data-fits_info.min_data);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=GetFITSPixel(image,fits_info.bits_per_pixel);
if ((image->depth == 16) || (image->depth == 32) ||
(image->depth == 64))
SetFITSUnsignedPixels(1,image->depth,image->endian,(unsigned char *)
&pixel);
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum(scale*(fits_info.scale*(pixel-
fits_info.min_data)+fits_info.zero)));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelRed(q));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelRed(q));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (fits_info.number_planes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,565
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::GetResponseBodyForInterception(
const String& interception_id,
std::unique_ptr<GetResponseBodyForInterceptionCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(
process_->GetBrowserContext());
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
interceptor->GetResponseBody(interception_id, std::move(callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pch_write_line (lin line, FILE *file)
{
bool after_newline = p_line[line][p_len[line] - 1] == '\n';
if (! fwrite (p_line[line], sizeof (*p_line[line]), p_len[line], file))
write_fatal ();
return after_newline;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in GNU patch before 2.7.6. Out-of-bounds access within pch_write_line() in pch.c can possibly lead to DoS via a crafted input file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool TestDataReductionProxyConfig::ShouldAddDefaultProxyBypassRules() const {
return add_default_proxy_bypass_rules_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Lack of special casing of localhost in WPAD files in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to proxy resources on localhost via a crafted WPAD file.
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
|
Medium
| 172,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
if (
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
# endif
0) {
if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
}
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
ret = s->hit;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
ret = (int)(s->s3->flags);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
(EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
(512 / 8))))
ret = 1;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
{
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (ret);
}
if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return (ret);
}
if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
ret = 1;
}
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (ret);
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
{
DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
if (dh == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (ret);
}
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
DH_free(dh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
ret = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The DH_check_pub_key function in crypto/dh/dh_check.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2f does not ensure that prime numbers are appropriate for Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, which makes it easier for remote attackers to discover a private DH exponent by making multiple handshakes with a peer that chose an inappropriate number, as demonstrated by a number in an X9.42 file.
Commit Message:
|
High
| 165,255
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string MediaStreamManager::MakeMediaAccessRequest(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
const StreamControls& controls,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
MediaAccessRequestCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = new DeviceRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
false /* user gesture */, MEDIA_DEVICE_ACCESS, controls,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{std::string() /* salt */,
std::string() /* group_id_salt */,
security_origin});
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->media_access_request_cb = std::move(callback);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
return label;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,104
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(ui::Compositor*) {
if (current_surface_ || !host_->is_hidden())
return;
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_ = false;
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,385
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FocusIn(const char* input_context_path) {
if (!input_context_path) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NULL context passed";
} else {
DLOG(INFO) << "FocusIn: " << input_context_path;
}
input_context_path_ = Or(input_context_path, "");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: The snd_compress_check_input function in sound/core/compress_offload.c in the ALSA subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.17 does not properly check for an integer overflow, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (insufficient memory allocation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,574
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationHandleImpl> navigation_handle) {
FrameTree* frame_tree = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree();
bool oopifs_possible = SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible();
bool is_navigation_within_page = controller_->IsURLInPageNavigation(
params.url, params.origin, params.was_within_same_document,
render_frame_host);
if (is_navigation_within_page &&
render_frame_host !=
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()
->render_manager()
->current_frame_host()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(render_frame_host->GetProcess(),
bad_message::NI_IN_PAGE_NAVIGATION);
is_navigation_within_page = false;
}
if (ui::PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition)) {
if (delegate_) {
if (delegate_->CanOverscrollContent()) {
if (!params.was_within_same_document)
controller_->TakeScreenshot();
}
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePreCommit(is_navigation_within_page);
}
if (!oopifs_possible)
frame_tree->root()->render_manager()->DidNavigateFrame(
render_frame_host, params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser);
}
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetCurrentOrigin(
params.origin, params.has_potentially_trustworthy_unique_origin);
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetInsecureRequestPolicy(
params.insecure_request_policy);
if (!is_navigation_within_page) {
render_frame_host->ResetContentSecurityPolicies();
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->ResetCspHeaders();
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->ResetFeaturePolicyHeader();
}
if (oopifs_possible) {
FrameTreeNode* frame = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node();
frame->render_manager()->DidNavigateFrame(
render_frame_host, params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser);
}
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
if (!site_instance->HasSite() && ShouldAssignSiteForURL(params.url) &&
!params.url_is_unreachable) {
site_instance->SetSite(params.url);
}
if (ui::PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition) && delegate_)
delegate_->SetMainFrameMimeType(params.contents_mime_type);
int old_entry_count = controller_->GetEntryCount();
LoadCommittedDetails details;
bool did_navigate = controller_->RendererDidNavigate(
render_frame_host, params, &details, is_navigation_within_page,
navigation_handle.get());
if (old_entry_count != controller_->GetEntryCount() ||
details.previous_entry_index !=
controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex()) {
frame_tree->root()->render_manager()->SendPageMessage(
new PageMsg_SetHistoryOffsetAndLength(
MSG_ROUTING_NONE, controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex(),
controller_->GetEntryCount()),
site_instance);
}
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetCurrentURL(params.url);
render_frame_host->SetLastCommittedOrigin(params.origin);
if (!params.url_is_unreachable)
render_frame_host->set_last_successful_url(params.url);
if (did_navigate && !is_navigation_within_page)
render_frame_host->ResetFeaturePolicy();
if (details.type != NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE && delegate_) {
DCHECK_EQ(!render_frame_host->GetParent(),
did_navigate ? details.is_main_frame : false);
navigation_handle->DidCommitNavigation(params, did_navigate,
details.did_replace_entry,
details.previous_url, details.type,
render_frame_host);
navigation_handle.reset();
}
if (!did_navigate)
return; // No navigation happened.
RecordNavigationMetrics(details, params, site_instance);
if (delegate_) {
if (details.is_main_frame) {
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePostCommit(render_frame_host,
details, params);
}
delegate_->DidNavigateAnyFramePostCommit(
render_frame_host, details, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that a PDF document's modal dialog is closed upon navigation to an interstitial page, which allows remote attackers to spoof URLs via a crafted document, as demonstrated by the alert_dialog.pdf document.
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
Medium
| 171,963
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libyara/re.c in the regex component in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yr_re_exec function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
|
Low
| 168,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copyStereo16(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i];
*dst++ = src[1][i];
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
Medium
| 174,021
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int override_release(char __user *release, int len)
{
int ret = 0;
char buf[65];
if (current->personality & UNAME26) {
char *rest = UTS_RELEASE;
int ndots = 0;
unsigned v;
while (*rest) {
if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3)
break;
if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.')
break;
rest++;
}
v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 40;
snprintf(buf, len, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest);
ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, len);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-16
Summary: The override_release function in kernel/sys.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a uname system call in conjunction with a UNAME26 personality.
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,647
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-31091777.
Commit Message: SampleIterator: clear members on seekTo error
Bug: 31091777
Change-Id: Iddf99d0011961d0fd3d755e57db4365b6a6a1193
(cherry picked from commit 03237ce0f9584c98ccda76c2474a4ae84c763f5b)
|
Medium
| 173,378
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bgp_capabilities_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, int caps_len)
{
int cap_type, cap_len, tcap_len, cap_offset;
int i = 0;
while (i < caps_len) {
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i], BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE);
cap_type=opt[i];
cap_len=opt[i+1];
tcap_len=cap_len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_capcode_values, "Unknown",
cap_type),
cap_type,
cap_len));
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i+2], cap_len);
switch (cap_type) {
case BGP_CAPCODE_MP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown",
opt[i+5]),
opt[i+5]));
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tRestart Flags: [%s], Restart Time %us",
((opt[i+2])&0x80) ? "R" : "none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)&0xfff));
tcap_len-=2;
cap_offset=4;
while(tcap_len>=4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t AFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Forwarding state preserved: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",
opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
((opt[i+cap_offset+3])&0x80) ? "yes" : "no" ));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR:
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR_CISCO:
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_AS_NEW:
/*
* Extract the 4 byte AS number encoded.
*/
if (cap_len == 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t 4 Byte AS %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(opt + i + 2))));
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_ADD_PATH:
cap_offset=2;
if (tcap_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (bogus)")); /* length */
break;
}
while (tcap_len > 0) {
if (tcap_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t(invalid)"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Send/Receive: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
tok2str(bgp_add_path_recvsend,"Bogus (0x%02x)",opt[i+cap_offset+3])
));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tno decoder for Capability %u",
cap_type));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && cap_len > 0) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
}
i += BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE + cap_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|BGP]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:bgp_capabilities_print() (BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART).
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14881/BGP: Fix BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART.
Add a bounds check and a comment to bgp_capabilities_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 169,833
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssl_do_connect (server * serv)
{
char buf[128];
g_sess = serv->server_session;
if (SSL_connect (serv->ssl) <= 0)
{
char err_buf[128];
int err;
g_sess = NULL;
if ((err = ERR_get_error ()) > 0)
{
ERR_error_string (err, err_buf);
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "(%d) %s", err, err_buf);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_CONNFAIL, serv->server_session, buf, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0);
if (ERR_GET_REASON (err) == SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)
PrintText (serv->server_session, _("Are you sure this is a SSL capable server and port?\n"));
server_cleanup (serv);
if (prefs.hex_net_auto_reconnectonfail)
auto_reconnect (serv, FALSE, -1);
return (0); /* remove it (0) */
}
}
g_sess = NULL;
if (SSL_is_init_finished (serv->ssl))
{
struct cert_info cert_info;
struct chiper_info *chiper_info;
int verify_error;
int i;
if (!_SSL_get_cert_info (&cert_info, serv->ssl))
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "* Certification info:");
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " Subject:");
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
for (i = 0; cert_info.subject_word[i]; i++)
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " %s", cert_info.subject_word[i]);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
}
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " Issuer:");
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
for (i = 0; cert_info.issuer_word[i]; i++)
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " %s", cert_info.issuer_word[i]);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
}
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " Public key algorithm: %s (%d bits)",
cert_info.algorithm, cert_info.algorithm_bits);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
/*if (cert_info.rsa_tmp_bits)
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
" Public key algorithm uses ephemeral key with %d bits",
cert_info.rsa_tmp_bits);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
}*/
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " Sign algorithm %s",
cert_info.sign_algorithm/*, cert_info.sign_algorithm_bits*/);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " Valid since %s to %s",
cert_info.notbefore, cert_info.notafter);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
} else
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " * No Certificate");
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
}
chiper_info = _SSL_get_cipher_info (serv->ssl); /* static buffer */
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "* Cipher info:");
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL,
0);
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), " Version: %s, cipher %s (%u bits)",
chiper_info->version, chiper_info->chiper,
chiper_info->chiper_bits);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL,
0);
verify_error = SSL_get_verify_result (serv->ssl);
switch (verify_error)
{
case X509_V_OK:
/* snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "* Verify OK (?)"); */
/* EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); */
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
if (serv->accept_invalid_cert)
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "* Verify E: %s.? (%d) -- Ignored",
X509_verify_cert_error_string (verify_error),
verify_error);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_SSLMESSAGE, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
break;
}
default:
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%s.? (%d)",
X509_verify_cert_error_string (verify_error),
verify_error);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_CONNFAIL, serv->server_session, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
server_cleanup (serv);
return (0);
}
server_stopconnecting (serv);
/* activate gtk poll */
server_connected (serv);
return (0); /* remove it (0) */
} else
{
if (serv->ssl->session && serv->ssl->session->time + SSLTMOUT < time (NULL))
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "SSL handshake timed out");
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_CONNFAIL, serv->server_session, buf, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0);
server_cleanup (serv); /* ->connecting = FALSE */
if (prefs.hex_net_auto_reconnectonfail)
auto_reconnect (serv, FALSE, -1);
return (0); /* remove it (0) */
}
return (1); /* call it more (1) */
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The ssl_do_connect function in common/server.c in HexChat before 2.10.2, XChat, and XChat-GNOME does not verify that the server hostname matches a domain name in the X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via an arbitrary valid certificate.
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
Medium
| 167,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int proxy_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_login", sizeof("_proxy_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_password", sizeof("_proxy_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
smart_str_appendl(soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: PHP before 5.6.7 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via an unexpected data type, related to "type confusion" issues in (1) ext/soap/php_encoding.c, (2) ext/soap/php_http.c, and (3) ext/soap/soap.c, a different issue than CVE-2015-4600.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,306
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderBase::CreateSensor(
mojom::SensorType type,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!CreateSharedBufferIfNeeded()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping = MapSharedBufferForType(type);
if (!mapping) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
auto it = requests_map_.find(type);
if (it != requests_map_.end()) {
it->second.push_back(callback);
} else { // This is the first CreateSensor call.
requests_map_[type] = CallbackQueue({callback});
CreateSensorInternal(
type, std::move(mapping),
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorProviderBase::NotifySensorCreated,
base::Unretained(this), type));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,838
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int nfs4_do_close(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, int wait)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kmalloc(sizeof(*calldata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.open_flags = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
calldata->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg,
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res,
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void prefetch_table(const void *tab, size_t len)
{
const volatile byte *vtab = tab;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8 * 32)
{
(void)vtab[i + 0 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 1 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 2 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 3 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 4 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 5 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 6 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 7 * 32];
}
(void)vtab[len - 1];
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
|
Medium
| 169,651
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ieee80211_if_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &ieee80211_dataif_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,739
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::ProcessQueries(bool did_finish) {
while (!pending_queries_.empty()) {
const PendingQuery& query = pending_queries_.front();
GLuint result_available = GL_FALSE;
GLuint64 result = 0;
switch (query.target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
DCHECK(query.commands_completed_fence != nullptr);
result_available =
did_finish || query.commands_completed_fence->HasCompleted();
result = result_available;
break;
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = GL_TRUE;
break;
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = (base::TimeTicks::Now() - base::TimeTicks()).InMilliseconds();
break;
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = GL_TRUE;
for (const PendingReadPixels& pending_read_pixels :
pending_read_pixels_) {
if (pending_read_pixels.waiting_async_pack_queries.count(
query.service_id) > 0) {
DCHECK(!did_finish);
result_available = GL_FALSE;
result = GL_FALSE;
break;
}
}
break;
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
DCHECK(query.buffer_shadow_update_fence);
if (did_finish || query.buffer_shadow_update_fence->HasCompleted()) {
ReadBackBuffersIntoShadowCopies(query.buffer_shadow_updates);
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = 0;
}
break;
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
FlushErrors();
result = PopError();
break;
default:
DCHECK(!IsEmulatedQueryTarget(query.target));
if (did_finish) {
result_available = GL_TRUE;
} else {
api()->glGetQueryObjectuivFn(
query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT_AVAILABLE, &result_available);
}
if (result_available == GL_TRUE) {
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_disjoint_timer_query) {
api()->glGetQueryObjectui64vFn(query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT,
&result);
} else {
GLuint temp_result = 0;
api()->glGetQueryObjectuivFn(query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT,
&temp_result);
result = temp_result;
}
}
break;
}
if (!result_available) {
break;
}
query.sync->result = result;
base::subtle::Release_Store(&query.sync->process_count, query.submit_count);
pending_queries_.pop_front();
}
DCHECK(!did_finish || pending_queries_.empty());
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
Medium
| 172,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
format,
magick[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
Quantum
index;
QuantumAny
pixel;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
extent,
imageListLength,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
QuantumAny
max_value;
/*
Write PNM file header.
*/
packet_size=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image_info->magick,MagickPathExtent);
max_value=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
switch (magick[1])
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
format='7';
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
format='F';
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
format='f';
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
format='6';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='3';
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"P%c\n",format);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Write comments to file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p);
if ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r'))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (format != '7')
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
char
type[MagickPathExtent];
/*
PAM header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"WIDTH %.20g\nHEIGHT %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_type=GetQuantumType(image,exception);
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
packet_size=4;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"CMYK",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
packet_size=1;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"GRAYSCALE",MagickPathExtent);
if (IdentifyImageMonochrome(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"BLACKANDWHITE",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
packet_size=3;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"RGB",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
packet_size++;
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"_ALPHA",MagickPathExtent);
}
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"DEPTH %.20g\nMAXVAL %.20g\n",(double) packet_size,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"TUPLTYPE %s\nENDHDR\n",type);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
/*
Convert runextent encoded to PNM raster pixels.
*/
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0) ?
'0' : '1');
*q++=' ';
if ((q-pixels+1) >= (ssize_t) sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '2':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToChar(index));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(index));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(index));
extent=(size_t) count;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '3':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
extent=(size_t) count;
if ((q-pixels+extent+2) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
image->depth=1;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '5':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,GrayQuantum);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 8)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),
max_value);
}
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,
p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),
max_value);
}
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p)),
max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
}
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '6':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PAM.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,
p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,image->endian == LSBEndian ? "-1.0\n" :
"1.0\n");
image->depth=32;
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of a misplaced assignment.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1614
|
Medium
| 169,598
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pdf_load_xobject(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *dict)
{
pdf_xobject *form;
if ((form = pdf_find_item(ctx, pdf_drop_xobject_imp, dict)) != NULL)
return form;
form->iteration = 0;
/* Store item immediately, to avoid possible recursion if objects refer back to this one */
pdf_store_item(ctx, dict, form, pdf_xobject_size(form));
form->obj = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, dict);
return form;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple reachable assertions in the PDF parser allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (assert crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void hostap_setup_dev(struct net_device *dev, local_info_t *local,
int type)
{
struct hostap_interface *iface;
iface = netdev_priv(dev);
ether_setup(dev);
/* kernel callbacks */
if (iface) {
/* Currently, we point to the proper spy_data only on
* the main_dev. This could be fixed. Jean II */
iface->wireless_data.spy_data = &iface->spy_data;
dev->wireless_data = &iface->wireless_data;
}
dev->wireless_handlers = &hostap_iw_handler_def;
dev->watchdog_timeo = TX_TIMEOUT;
switch(type) {
case HOSTAP_INTERFACE_AP:
dev->tx_queue_len = 0; /* use main radio device queue */
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_mgmt_netdev_ops;
dev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211;
dev->header_ops = &hostap_80211_ops;
break;
case HOSTAP_INTERFACE_MASTER:
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_master_ops;
break;
default:
dev->tx_queue_len = 0; /* use main radio device queue */
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_netdev_ops;
}
dev->mtu = local->mtu;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &prism2_ethtool_ops);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,734
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void WriteProfile(j_compress_ptr jpeg_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
MagickBooleanType
iptc;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length,
tag_length;
StringInfo
*custom_profile;
/*
Save image profile as a APP marker.
*/
iptc=MagickFalse;
custom_profile=AcquireStringInfo(65535L);
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (const char *) NULL; )
{
register unsigned char
*p;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(custom_profile);
if (LocaleCompare(name,"EXIF") == 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i+=65533L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(profile)-i,65533L);
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,XML_MARKER,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+i,
(unsigned int) length);
}
if (LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0)
{
register unsigned char
*p;
tag_length=strlen(ICC_PROFILE);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(custom_profile);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(p,ICC_PROFILE,tag_length);
p[tag_length]='\0';
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i+=65519L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(profile)-i,65519L);
p[12]=(unsigned char) ((i/65519L)+1);
p[13]=(unsigned char) (GetStringInfoLength(profile)/65519L+1);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(p+tag_length+3,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+i,
length);
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,ICC_MARKER,GetStringInfoDatum(
custom_profile),(unsigned int) (length+tag_length+3));
}
}
if (((LocaleCompare(name,"IPTC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"8BIM") == 0)) && (iptc == MagickFalse))
{
size_t
roundup;
iptc=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i+=65500L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(profile)-i,65500L);
roundup=(size_t) (length & 0x01);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) GetStringInfoDatum(profile),"8BIM",4) == 0)
{
(void) memcpy(p,"Photoshop 3.0 ",14);
tag_length=14;
}
else
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(p,"Photoshop 3.0 8BIM\04\04\0\0\0\0",24);
tag_length=26;
p[24]=(unsigned char) (length >> 8);
p[25]=(unsigned char) (length & 0xff);
}
p[13]=0x00;
(void) memcpy(p+tag_length,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+i,length);
if (roundup != 0)
p[length+tag_length]='\0';
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,IPTC_MARKER,GetStringInfoDatum(
custom_profile),(unsigned int) (length+tag_length+roundup));
}
}
if (LocaleCompare(name,"XMP") == 0)
{
StringInfo
*xmp_profile;
/*
Add namespace to XMP profile.
*/
xmp_profile=StringToStringInfo("http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ ");
if (xmp_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
ConcatenateStringInfo(xmp_profile,profile);
GetStringInfoDatum(xmp_profile)[28]='\0';
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(xmp_profile); i+=65533L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(xmp_profile)-i,65533L);
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,XML_MARKER,
GetStringInfoDatum(xmp_profile)+i,(unsigned int) length);
}
xmp_profile=DestroyStringInfo(xmp_profile);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"%s profile: %.20g bytes",name,(double) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
custom_profile=DestroyStringInfo(custom_profile);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the WriteProfile function in coders/jpeg.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Changed the JPEG writer to raise a warning when the exif profile exceeds 65533 bytes and truncate it.
|
Medium
| 168,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,inl;
int mdnid, pknid;
if (!pkey)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
return -1;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (mdnid == NID_undef)
{
if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a,
signature, pkey);
/* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we
* exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying
* verification routine handles all verification.
*/
if (ret != 2)
goto err;
ret = -1;
}
else
{
const EVP_MD *type;
type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (!ret)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = -1;
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data,
(size_t)signature->length) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k does not enforce certain constraints on certificate data, which allows remote attackers to defeat a fingerprint-based certificate-blacklist protection mechanism by including crafted data within a certificate's unsigned portion, related to crypto/asn1/a_verify.c, crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c, crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c, and crypto/x509/x_all.c.
Commit Message: use correct function name
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 166,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin() {
if (MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) {
return false;
}
if (!MediaElement()->HasSingleSecurityOrigin()) {
return true;
}
return Context()->WouldTaintOrigin(MediaElement()->currentSrc());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,634
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void sctp_generate_heartbeat_event(unsigned long data)
{
int error = 0;
struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *) data;
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
bh_lock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(asoc->base.sk)) {
pr_debug("%s: sock is busy\n", __func__);
/* Try again later. */
if (!mod_timer(&transport->hb_timer, jiffies + (HZ/20)))
sctp_transport_hold(transport);
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Is this structure just waiting around for us to actually
* get destroyed?
*/
if (transport->dead)
goto out_unlock;
error = sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_TIMEOUT,
SCTP_ST_TIMEOUT(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_HEARTBEAT),
asoc->state, asoc->ep, asoc,
transport, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error)
asoc->base.sk->sk_err = -error;
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_transport_put(transport);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 does not properly manage the relationship between a lock and a socket, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted sctp_accept call.
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static char *rfc2047_decode_word(const char *s, size_t len, enum ContentEncoding enc)
{
const char *it = s;
const char *end = s + len;
if (enc == ENCQUOTEDPRINTABLE)
{
struct Buffer buf = { 0 };
for (; it < end; ++it)
{
if (*it == '_')
{
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, ' ');
}
else if ((*it == '=') && (!(it[1] & ~127) && hexval(it[1]) != -1) &&
(!(it[2] & ~127) && hexval(it[2]) != -1))
{
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, (hexval(it[1]) << 4) | hexval(it[2]));
it += 2;
}
else
{
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, *it);
}
}
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, '\0');
return buf.data;
}
else if (enc == ENCBASE64)
{
char *out = mutt_mem_malloc(3 * len / 4 + 1);
int dlen = mutt_b64_decode(out, it);
if (dlen == -1)
{
FREE(&out);
return NULL;
}
out[dlen] = '\0';
return out;
}
assert(0); /* The enc parameter has an invalid value */
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They have a buffer overflow via base64 data.
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
|
Low
| 169,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int getSingletonPos(const char* str)
{
int result =-1;
int i=0;
int len = 0;
if( str && ((len=strlen(str))>0) ){
for( i=0; i<len ; i++){
if( isIDSeparator(*(str+i)) ){
if( i==1){
/* string is of the form x-avy or a-prv1 */
result =0;
break;
} else {
/* delimiter found; check for singleton */
if( isIDSeparator(*(str+i+2)) ){
/* a singleton; so send the position of separator before singleton */
result = i+1;
break;
}
}
}
}/* end of for */
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,202
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PlatformSensorProviderBase::CreateSharedBufferIfNeeded() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (shared_buffer_handle_.is_valid())
return true;
shared_buffer_handle_ =
mojo::SharedBufferHandle::Create(kSharedBufferSizeInBytes);
return shared_buffer_handle_.is_valid();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTimecode() const
{
return m_stop_timecode;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,358
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask(int32_t unused) {
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
} else {
PP_NOTREACHED();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
|
Medium
| 172,124
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init xfrm6_tunnel_init(void)
{
int rv;
rv = xfrm_register_type(&xfrm6_tunnel_type, AF_INET6);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
rv = xfrm6_tunnel_register(&xfrm6_tunnel_handler, AF_INET6);
if (rv < 0)
goto unreg;
rv = xfrm6_tunnel_register(&xfrm46_tunnel_handler, AF_INET);
if (rv < 0)
goto dereg6;
rv = xfrm6_tunnel_spi_init();
if (rv < 0)
goto dereg46;
rv = register_pernet_subsys(&xfrm6_tunnel_net_ops);
if (rv < 0)
goto deregspi;
return 0;
deregspi:
xfrm6_tunnel_spi_fini();
dereg46:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm46_tunnel_handler, AF_INET);
dereg6:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm6_tunnel_handler, AF_INET6);
unreg:
xfrm_unregister_type(&xfrm6_tunnel_type, AF_INET6);
err:
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int php_session_destroy(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
int retval = SUCCESS;
if (PS(session_status) != php_session_active) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to destroy uninitialized session");
return FAILURE;
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (PS(mod)->s_destroy(&PS(mod_data), PS(id) TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
retval = FAILURE;
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Session object destruction failed");
}
php_rinit_session_globals(TSRMLS_C);
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI void php_add_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **sym_track = NULL;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen + 1, (void *) &sym_track);
} else {
return;
}
if (sym_track == NULL) {
zval *empty_var;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(empty_var);
ZEND_SET_SYMBOL_WITH_LENGTH(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen+1, empty_var, 1, 0);
}
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI void php_set_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval *state_val, php_unserialize_data_t *var_hash TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_set_hash_symbol(state_val, name, namelen, PZVAL_IS_REF(state_val), 1, Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)));
}
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI int php_get_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval ***state_var TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = FAILURE;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
ret = zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen + 1, (void **) state_var);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_session_track_init(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
zval *session_vars = NULL;
/* Unconditionally destroy existing array -- possible dirty data */
zend_delete_global_variable("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION")-1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(session_vars);
array_init(session_vars);
PS(http_session_vars) = session_vars;
ZEND_SET_GLOBAL_VAR_WITH_LENGTH("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION"), PS(http_session_vars), 2, 1);
}
/* }}} */
static char *php_session_encode(int *newlen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *ret = NULL;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown session.serialize_handler. Failed to encode session object");
ret = NULL;
} else if (PS(serializer)->encode(&ret, newlen TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
ret = NULL;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot encode non-existent session");
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_session_decode(const char *val, int vallen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown session.serialize_handler. Failed to decode session object");
return;
}
if (PS(serializer)->decode(val, vallen TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
php_session_destroy(TSRMLS_C);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to decode session object. Session has been destroyed");
}
}
/* }}} */
/*
* Note that we cannot use the BASE64 alphabet here, because
* it contains "/" and "+": both are unacceptable for simple inclusion
* into URLs.
*/
static char hexconvtab[] = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ,-";
enum {
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Session fixation vulnerability in the Sessions subsystem in PHP before 5.5.2 allows remote attackers to hijack web sessions by specifying a session ID.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,873
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::DidPassCORSAccessCheck() const {
if (data_source_)
return data_source_->DidPassCORSAccessCheck();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const BlockEntry* Cluster::GetEntry(const Track* pTrack,
long long time_ns) const {
assert(pTrack);
if (m_pSegment == NULL) // this is the special EOS cluster
return pTrack->GetEOS();
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if ((m_entries == NULL) || (m_entries_count <= 0))
return NULL; //return EOS here?
const BlockEntry* pResult = pTrack->GetEOS();
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
assert(i);
BlockEntry** const j = i + m_entries_count;
while (i != j)
{
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != pTrack->GetNumber())
continue;
if (pTrack->VetEntry(pEntry))
{
if (time_ns < 0) //just want first candidate block
return pEntry;
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
break;
pResult = pEntry;
}
else if (time_ns >= 0)
{
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
break;
}
}
return pResult;
#else
const BlockEntry* pResult = pTrack->GetEOS();
long index = 0;
for (;;) {
if (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
assert(status >= 0);
if (status > 0) // completely parsed, and no more entries
return pResult;
if (status < 0) // should never happen
return 0;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != pTrack->GetNumber()) {
++index;
continue;
}
if (pTrack->VetEntry(pEntry)) {
if (time_ns < 0) // just want first candidate block
return pEntry;
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
return pResult;
pResult = pEntry; // have a candidate
} else if (time_ns >= 0) {
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
return pResult;
}
++index;
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,816
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
|
Low
| 174,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::makeBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
return (OMX::buffer_id)bufferHeader;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer function in omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20634516.
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
|
Medium
| 173,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SchedulerObject::_continue(std::string key, std::string &/*reason*/, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Remove: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
scheduler.enqueueActOnJobMyself(id,JA_CONTINUE_JOBS,true);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,831
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(const sp<IStreamSource> &source)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource");
status_t err = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(source))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libmedia in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 has certain incorrect declarations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28166152.
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
|
Low
| 173,539
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void timer_config_save(UNUSED_ATTR void *data) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
static const size_t CACHE_MAX = 256;
const char *keys[CACHE_MAX];
size_t num_keys = 0;
size_t total_candidates = 0;
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
for (const config_section_node_t *snode = config_section_begin(config); snode != config_section_end(config); snode = config_section_next(snode)) {
const char *section = config_section_name(snode);
if (!string_is_bdaddr(section))
continue;
if (config_has_key(config, section, "LinkKey") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_PENC") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_PID") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_PCSRK") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_LENC") ||
config_has_key(config, section, "LE_KEY_LCSRK"))
continue;
if (num_keys < CACHE_MAX)
keys[num_keys++] = section;
++total_candidates;
}
if (total_candidates > CACHE_MAX * 2)
while (num_keys > 0)
config_remove_section(config, keys[--num_keys]);
config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: btif_config.c in Bluetooth in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and persistent daemon crash) by triggering a large number of configuration entries, and consequently exceeding the maximum size of a configuration file, aka internal bug 26071376.
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
|
Low
| 173,931
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsAnimatorProgressed(views::BoundsAnimator* animator) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Chapters::ParseEdition(
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandEditionsArray())
return -1;
Edition& e = m_editions[m_editions_count++];
e.Init();
return e.Parse(m_pSegment->m_pReader, pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* pluginView, const Platform::TouchPoint& point)
{
NPEvent npEvent;
NPMouseEvent mouse;
switch (point.m_state) {
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
mouse.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_DOWN;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
mouse.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
mouse.type = MOUSE_MOTION;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary:
return true;
}
mouse.x = point.m_screenPos.x();
mouse.y = point.m_screenPos.y();
mouse.button = mouse.type != MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
mouse.flags = 0;
npEvent.type = NP_MouseEvent;
npEvent.data = &mouse;
pluginView->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,765
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_device(dev_t *pdev, struct archive *a, char *val)
{
#define MAX_PACK_ARGS 3
unsigned long numbers[MAX_PACK_ARGS];
char *p, *dev;
int argc;
pack_t *pack;
dev_t result;
const char *error = NULL;
memset(pdev, 0, sizeof(*pdev));
if ((dev = strchr(val, ',')) != NULL) {
/*
* Device's major/minor are given in a specified format.
* Decode and pack it accordingly.
*/
*dev++ = '\0';
if ((pack = pack_find(val)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown format `%s'", val);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
argc = 0;
while ((p = la_strsep(&dev, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*p == '\0') {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Missing number");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
numbers[argc++] = (unsigned long)mtree_atol(&p);
if (argc > MAX_PACK_ARGS) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Too many arguments");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
}
if (argc < 2) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Not enough arguments");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
result = (*pack)(argc, numbers, &error);
if (error != NULL) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"%s", error);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
} else {
/* file system raw value. */
result = (dev_t)mtree_atol(&val);
}
*pdev = result;
return ARCHIVE_OK;
#undef MAX_PACK_ARGS
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the parse_device function in archive_read_support_format_mtree.c in libarchive before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted mtree file.
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
|
Medium
| 167,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_lookup)
{
char* fallback_loc = NULL;
int fallback_loc_len = 0;
const char* loc_range = NULL;
int loc_range_len = 0;
zval* arr = NULL;
HashTable* hash_arr = NULL;
zend_bool boolCanonical = 0;
char* result =NULL;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "as|bs", &arr, &loc_range, &loc_range_len,
&boolCanonical, &fallback_loc, &fallback_loc_len) == FAILURE) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_lookup: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_range_len == 0) {
loc_range = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
hash_arr = HASH_OF(arr);
if( !hash_arr || zend_hash_num_elements( hash_arr ) == 0 ) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
result = lookup_loc_range(loc_range, hash_arr, boolCanonical TSRMLS_CC);
if(result == NULL || result[0] == '\0') {
if( fallback_loc ) {
result = estrndup(fallback_loc, fallback_loc_len);
} else {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(result, strlen(result), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rdpsnd_process_training(STREAM in)
{
uint16 tick;
uint16 packsize;
STREAM out;
in_uint16_le(in, tick);
in_uint16_le(in, packsize);
logger(Sound, Debug, "rdpsnd_process_training(), tick=0x%04x", (unsigned) tick);
out = rdpsnd_init_packet(SNDC_TRAINING, 4);
out_uint16_le(out, tick);
out_uint16_le(out, packsize);
s_mark_end(out);
rdpsnd_send(out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
Low
| 169,806
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WandPrivate MagickBooleanType CLIListOperatorImages(MagickCLI *cli_wand,
const char *option,const char *arg1n,const char *arg2n)
{
const char /* percent escaped versions of the args */
*arg1,
*arg2;
Image
*new_images;
MagickStatusType
status;
ssize_t
parse;
#define _image_info (cli_wand->wand.image_info)
#define _images (cli_wand->wand.images)
#define _exception (cli_wand->wand.exception)
#define _draw_info (cli_wand->draw_info)
#define _quantize_info (cli_wand->quantize_info)
#define _process_flags (cli_wand->process_flags)
#define _option_type ((CommandOptionFlags) cli_wand->command->flags)
#define IfNormalOp (*option=='-')
#define IfPlusOp (*option!='-')
#define IsNormalOp IfNormalOp ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse
assert(cli_wand != (MagickCLI *) NULL);
assert(cli_wand->signature == MagickWandSignature);
assert(cli_wand->wand.signature == MagickWandSignature);
assert(_images != (Image *) NULL); /* _images must be present */
if (cli_wand->wand.debug != MagickFalse)
(void) CLILogEvent(cli_wand,CommandEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"- List Operator: %s \"%s\" \"%s\"", option,
arg1n == (const char *) NULL ? "null" : arg1n,
arg2n == (const char *) NULL ? "null" : arg2n);
arg1 = arg1n;
arg2 = arg2n;
/* Interpret Percent Escapes in Arguments - using first image */
if ( (((_process_flags & ProcessInterpretProperities) != 0 )
|| ((_option_type & AlwaysInterpretArgsFlag) != 0)
) && ((_option_type & NeverInterpretArgsFlag) == 0) ) {
/* Interpret Percent escapes in argument 1 */
if (arg1n != (char *) NULL) {
arg1=InterpretImageProperties(_image_info,_images,arg1n,_exception);
if (arg1 == (char *) NULL) {
CLIWandException(OptionWarning,"InterpretPropertyFailure",option);
arg1=arg1n; /* use the given argument as is */
}
}
if (arg2n != (char *) NULL) {
arg2=InterpretImageProperties(_image_info,_images,arg2n,_exception);
if (arg2 == (char *) NULL) {
CLIWandException(OptionWarning,"InterpretPropertyFailure",option);
arg2=arg2n; /* use the given argument as is */
}
}
}
#undef _process_flags
#undef _option_type
status=MagickTrue;
new_images=NewImageList();
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=AppendImages(_images,IsNormalOp,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
CLIWandWarnReplaced("-evaluate-sequence Mean");
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-evaluate-sequence","Mean",
NULL);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=ChannelFxImage(_images,arg1,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image;
/* FUTURE - make this a compose option, and thus can be used
with layers compose or even compose last image over all other
_images.
*/
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
clut_image=RemoveLastImageFromList(&_images);
/* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) ClutImage(new_images,clut_image,new_images->interpolate,
_exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=CoalesceImages(_images,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=(ssize_t) _images->colorspace;
if (_images->number_channels < GetImageListLength(_images))
parse=sRGBColorspace;
if ( IfPlusOp )
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if (parse < 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedColorspace",option,
arg1);
new_images=CombineImages(_images,(ColorspaceType) parse,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
/* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
break;
}
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(_image_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
new_images=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,&distortion,
_exception);
(void) distortion;
reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if (parse < 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedEvaluateOperator",
option,arg1);
new_images=ComplexImages(_images,(ComplexOperator) parse,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE - this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,_exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,_exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity, &geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,clip_to_self,
geometry.x,geometry.y,_exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,_exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,_exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,_exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,_exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,_exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,OverCompositeOp,
clip_to_self,0,0,_exception);
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
if (IsGeometry(arg2) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(_images,arg2,&geometry,_exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=_images;
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,arg1,&geometry,_exception);
(void) CopyImagePixels(_images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
_exception);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
CLIWandWarnReplaced("-layer CompareAny");
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-layer","CompareAny",NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (IfNormalOp)
DeleteImages(&_images,arg1,_exception);
else
DeleteImages(&_images,"-1",_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
if (IfNormalOp)
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,
arg1);
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(arg1);
p=strchr(arg1,',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
new_images=DuplicateImages(_images,number_duplicates,"-1",
_exception);
else
new_images=DuplicateImages(_images,number_duplicates,p,
_exception);
}
else
new_images=DuplicateImages(_images,1,"-1",_exception);
AppendImageToList(&_images, new_images);
new_images=(Image *) NULL;
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if (parse < 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedEvaluateOperator",
option,arg1);
new_images=EvaluateImages(_images,(MagickEvaluateOperator) parse,
_exception);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=ForwardFourierTransformImage(_images,IsNormalOp,
_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
/* REDIRECTED to use -layers flatten instead */
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-layers",option+1,NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=FxImage(_images,arg1,_exception);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE - make this a compose option (and thus layers compose )
or perhaps compose last image over all other _images.
*/
Image
*hald_image;
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
hald_image=RemoveLastImageFromList(&_images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) HaldClutImage(new_images,hald_image,_exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
/* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
new_images=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,phase_image,
IsNormalOp,_exception);
magnitude_image=DestroyImage(magnitude_image);
phase_image=DestroyImage(phase_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*insert_image,
*index_image;
ssize_t
index;
if (IfNormalOp && (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse))
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
index=0;
insert_image=RemoveLastImageFromList(&_images);
if (IfNormalOp)
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(arg1);
index_image=insert_image;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(&_images,insert_image);
else if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(_images))
AppendImageToList(&_images,insert_image);
else
{
index_image=GetImageFromList(_images,index-1);
if (index_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
insert_image=DestroyImage(insert_image);
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"NoSuchImage",option,arg1);
}
InsertImageInList(&index_image,insert_image);
}
_images=GetFirstImageInList(index_image);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if ( parse < 0 )
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedLayerMethod",
option,arg1);
switch ((LayerMethod) parse)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
new_images=CoalesceImages(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
new_images=CompareImagesLayers(_images,(LayerMethod) parse,
_exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
new_images=MergeImageLayers(_images,(LayerMethod) parse,
_exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
new_images=DisposeImages(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
new_images=OptimizeImageLayers(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
new_images=OptimizePlusImageLayers(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(&_images,_exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(&_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{ /* General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer. */
new_images=CoalesceImages(_images,_exception);
if (new_images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
_images=DestroyImageList(_images);
_images=OptimizeImageLayers(new_images,_exception);
if (_images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
OptimizeImageTransparency(_images,_exception);
(void) RemapImages(_quantize_info,_images,(Image *) NULL,
_exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose");
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* Default to Over */
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image. */
source=_images;
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{ /* Separate the two lists, junk the null: image. */
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(_exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
break;
}
/* Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas. */
SetGeometry(_images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(_images->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry(_images->page.width != 0 ?
_images->page.width : _images->columns,
_images->page.height != 0 ? _images->page.height :
_images->rows,_images->gravity,&geometry);
/* Compose the two image sequences together */
CompositeLayers(_images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
_exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
CLIWandWarnReplaced("+remap");
(void) RemapImages(_quantize_info,_images,(Image *) NULL,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("metric",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageOption(_image_info,option+1,arg1);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
morph_image=MorphImages(_images,StringToUnsignedLong(arg1),
_exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
_images=DestroyImageList(_images);
_images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
/* REDIRECTED to use -layers mosaic instead */
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-layers",option+1,NULL);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
double
*args;
ssize_t
count;
/* convert argument string into an array of doubles */
args = StringToArrayOfDoubles(arg1,&count,_exception);
if (args == (double *) NULL )
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidNumberList",option,arg1);
new_images=PolynomialImage(_images,(size_t) (count >> 1),args,
_exception);
args=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(args);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE: better parsing using ScriptToken() from string ??? */
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
arguments=StringToArgv(arg1,&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL)
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*arguments;
int
next,
status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg1".
*/
assert(arg1 != (const char *) NULL);
length=strlen(arg1);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
arguments=arg1;
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=",
"\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (status == 0)
{
const char
*argv;
argv=(&(arguments[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&_images,1,&argv,
_exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&_images,
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,_exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("remap",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) RemapImages(_quantize_info,_images,(Image *) NULL,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(&_images);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE: this option needs more work to make better */
ssize_t
offset;
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(arg1);
new_images=SmushImages(_images,IsNormalOp,offset,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("subimage",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*base_image,
*compare_image;
const char
*value;
MetricType
metric;
double
similarity;
RectangleInfo
offset;
base_image=GetImageFromList(_images,0);
compare_image=GetImageFromList(_images,1);
/* Comparision Metric */
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"metric");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
new_images=SimilarityImage(base_image,compare_image,metric,0.0,
&offset,&similarity,_exception);
if (new_images != (Image *) NULL)
{
char
result[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,"%lf",
similarity);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:similarity",result,
_exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,"%+ld",(long)
offset.x);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:x",result,
_exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,"%+ld",(long)
offset.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:y",result,
_exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,
"%lux%lu%+ld%+ld",(unsigned long) offset.width,(unsigned long)
offset.height,(long) offset.x,(long) offset.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:offset",result,
_exception);
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*swap;
ssize_t
index,
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (IfNormalOp) {
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(arg1,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & RhoValue) == 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(_images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(_images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL)) {
if (IfNormalOp)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidImageIndex",option,arg1)
else
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"TwoOrMoreImagesRequired",option);
}
if (p == q)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidImageIndex",option,arg1);
swap=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,_exception);
if (swap == (Image *) NULL)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
option,GetExceptionMessage(errno));
ReplaceImageInList(&p,CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,_exception));
ReplaceImageInList(&q,swap);
_images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
default:
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
/* clean up percent escape interpreted strings */
if (arg1 != arg1n )
arg1=DestroyString((char *)arg1);
if (arg2 != arg2n )
arg2=DestroyString((char *)arg2);
/* if new image list generated, replace existing image list */
if (new_images == (Image *) NULL)
return(status == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
_images=DestroyImageList(_images);
_images=GetFirstImageInList(new_images);
return(status == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
#undef _image_info
#undef _images
#undef _exception
#undef _draw_info
#undef _quantize_info
#undef IfNormalOp
#undef IfPlusOp
#undef IsNormalOp
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of a wand/mogrify.c error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
|
Medium
| 170,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int simulate_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int opcode)
{
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == SPEC0 && (opcode & FUNC) == SYNC) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
return 0;
}
return -1; /* Must be something else ... */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: explicit SyncInternal(const std::string& name)
: name_(name),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients_(false),
registrar_(NULL),
change_delegate_(NULL),
initialized_(false),
testing_mode_(NON_TEST),
observing_ip_address_changes_(false),
traffic_recorder_(kMaxMessagesToRecord, kMaxMessageSizeToRecord),
encryptor_(NULL),
unrecoverable_error_handler_(NULL),
report_unrecoverable_error_function_(NULL),
created_on_loop_(MessageLoop::current()),
nigori_overwrite_count_(0) {
for (int i = syncable::FIRST_REAL_MODEL_TYPE;
i < syncable::MODEL_TYPE_COUNT; ++i) {
notification_info_map_.insert(
std::make_pair(syncable::ModelTypeFromInt(i), NotificationInfo()));
}
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNotificationState",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNotificationState);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNotificationInfo",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNotificationInfo);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getRootNodeDetails",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetRootNodeDetails);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNodeSummariesById",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNodeSummariesById);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNodeDetailsById",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNodeDetailsById);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getAllNodes",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetAllNodes);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getChildNodeIds",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetChildNodeIds);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getClientServerTraffic",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetClientServerTraffic);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,797
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Browser_Window *window_create(const char *url)
{
Browser_Window *app_data = malloc(sizeof(Browser_Window));
if (!app_data) {
info("ERROR: could not create browser window.\n");
return NULL;
}
/* Create window */
app_data->window = elm_win_add(NULL, "minibrowser-window", ELM_WIN_BASIC);
elm_win_title_set(app_data->window, APP_NAME);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->window, "delete,request", on_window_deletion, &app_data);
/* Create window background */
Evas_Object *bg = elm_bg_add(app_data->window);
elm_bg_color_set(bg, 193, 192, 191);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(bg, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
elm_win_resize_object_add(app_data->window, bg);
evas_object_show(bg);
/* Create vertical layout */
Evas_Object *vertical_layout = elm_box_add(app_data->window);
elm_box_padding_set(vertical_layout, 0, 2);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(vertical_layout, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
elm_win_resize_object_add(app_data->window, vertical_layout);
evas_object_show(vertical_layout);
/* Create horizontal layout for top bar */
Evas_Object *horizontal_layout = elm_box_add(app_data->window);
elm_box_horizontal_set(horizontal_layout, EINA_TRUE);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(horizontal_layout, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND, 0.0);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(horizontal_layout, EVAS_HINT_FILL, 0.0);
elm_box_pack_end(vertical_layout, horizontal_layout);
evas_object_show(horizontal_layout);
/* Create Back button */
app_data->back_button = create_toolbar_button(app_data->window, "arrow_left");
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->back_button, "clicked", on_back_button_clicked, app_data);
elm_object_disabled_set(app_data->back_button, EINA_TRUE);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(app_data->back_button, 0.0, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(app_data->back_button, 0.0, 0.5);
elm_box_pack_end(horizontal_layout, app_data->back_button);
evas_object_show(app_data->back_button);
/* Create Forward button */
app_data->forward_button = create_toolbar_button(app_data->window, "arrow_right");
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->forward_button, "clicked", on_forward_button_clicked, app_data);
elm_object_disabled_set(app_data->forward_button, EINA_TRUE);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(app_data->forward_button, 0.0, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(app_data->forward_button, 0.0, 0.5);
elm_box_pack_end(horizontal_layout, app_data->forward_button);
evas_object_show(app_data->forward_button);
/* Create URL bar */
app_data->url_bar = elm_entry_add(app_data->window);
elm_entry_scrollable_set(app_data->url_bar, EINA_TRUE);
elm_entry_scrollbar_policy_set(app_data->url_bar, ELM_SCROLLER_POLICY_OFF, ELM_SCROLLER_POLICY_OFF);
elm_entry_single_line_set(app_data->url_bar, EINA_TRUE);
elm_entry_cnp_mode_set(app_data->url_bar, ELM_CNP_MODE_PLAINTEXT);
elm_entry_text_style_user_push(app_data->url_bar, "DEFAULT='font_size=18'");
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->url_bar, "activated", on_url_bar_activated, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->url_bar, "clicked", on_url_bar_clicked, app_data);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(app_data->url_bar, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(app_data->url_bar, EVAS_HINT_FILL, EVAS_HINT_FILL);
elm_box_pack_end(horizontal_layout, app_data->url_bar);
evas_object_show(app_data->url_bar);
/* Create Refresh button */
Evas_Object *refresh_button = create_toolbar_button(app_data->window, "refresh");
evas_object_smart_callback_add(refresh_button, "clicked", on_refresh_button_clicked, app_data);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(refresh_button, 0.0, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(refresh_button, 1.0, 0.5);
elm_box_pack_end(horizontal_layout, refresh_button);
evas_object_show(refresh_button);
/* Create Home button */
Evas_Object *home_button = create_toolbar_button(app_data->window, "home");
evas_object_smart_callback_add(home_button, "clicked", on_home_button_clicked, app_data);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(home_button, 0.0, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(home_button, 1.0, 0.5);
elm_box_pack_end(horizontal_layout, home_button);
evas_object_show(home_button);
/* Create webview */
Ewk_View_Smart_Class *ewkViewClass = miniBrowserViewSmartClass();
ewkViewClass->run_javascript_alert = on_javascript_alert;
ewkViewClass->run_javascript_confirm = on_javascript_confirm;
ewkViewClass->run_javascript_prompt = on_javascript_prompt;
Evas *evas = evas_object_evas_get(app_data->window);
Evas_Smart *smart = evas_smart_class_new(&ewkViewClass->sc);
app_data->webview = ewk_view_smart_add(evas, smart, ewk_context_default_get());
ewk_view_theme_set(app_data->webview, THEME_DIR "/default.edj");
Ewk_Settings *settings = ewk_view_settings_get(app_data->webview);
ewk_settings_file_access_from_file_urls_allowed_set(settings, EINA_TRUE);
ewk_settings_frame_flattening_enabled_set(settings, frame_flattening_enabled);
ewk_settings_developer_extras_enabled_set(settings, EINA_TRUE);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "authentication,request", on_authentication_request, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "close,window", on_close_window, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "create,window", on_new_window, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "download,failed", on_download_failed, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "download,finished", on_download_finished, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "download,request", on_download_request, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "file,chooser,request", on_file_chooser_request, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "icon,changed", on_view_icon_changed, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "load,error", on_error, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "load,progress", on_progress, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "title,changed", on_title_changed, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "url,changed", on_url_changed, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "back,forward,list,changed", on_back_forward_list_changed, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "tooltip,text,set", on_tooltip_text_set, app_data);
evas_object_smart_callback_add(app_data->webview, "tooltip,text,unset", on_tooltip_text_unset, app_data);
evas_object_event_callback_add(app_data->webview, EVAS_CALLBACK_KEY_DOWN, on_key_down, app_data);
evas_object_event_callback_add(app_data->webview, EVAS_CALLBACK_MOUSE_DOWN, on_mouse_down, app_data);
evas_object_size_hint_weight_set(app_data->webview, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND, EVAS_HINT_EXPAND);
evas_object_size_hint_align_set(app_data->webview, EVAS_HINT_FILL, EVAS_HINT_FILL);
elm_box_pack_end(vertical_layout, app_data->webview);
evas_object_show(app_data->webview);
if (url)
ewk_view_url_set(app_data->webview, url);
evas_object_resize(app_data->window, DEFAULT_WIDTH, DEFAULT_HEIGHT);
evas_object_show(app_data->window);
view_focus_set(app_data, EINA_TRUE);
return app_data;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.57 does not properly handle JavaScript code, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect object access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,910
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int userfaultfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
/* len == 0 means wake all */
struct userfaultfd_wake_range range = { .len = 0, };
unsigned long new_flags;
WRITE_ONCE(ctx->released, true);
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto wakeup;
/*
* Flush page faults out of all CPUs. NOTE: all page faults
* must be retried without returning VM_FAULT_SIGBUS if
* userfaultfd_ctx_get() succeeds but vma->vma_userfault_ctx
* changes while handle_userfault released the mmap_sem. So
* it's critical that released is set to true (above), before
* taking the mmap_sem for writing.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
prev = NULL;
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx) {
prev = vma;
continue;
}
new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP);
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
new_flags, vma->anon_vma,
vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (prev)
vma = prev;
else
prev = vma;
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX;
}
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
wakeup:
/*
* After no new page faults can wait on this fault_*wqh, flush
* the last page faults that may have been already waiting on
* the fault_*wqh.
*/
spin_lock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
__wake_up_locked_key(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh, TASK_NORMAL, &range);
__wake_up(&ctx->fault_wqh, TASK_NORMAL, 1, &range);
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
/* Flush pending events that may still wait on event_wqh */
wake_up_all(&ctx->event_wqh);
wake_up_poll(&ctx->fd_wqh, EPOLLHUP);
userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,688
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteSIXELImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
opacity,
y;
sixel_output_t
*output;
unsigned char
sixel_palette[256 * 3],
*sixel_pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
exception=(&image->exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
opacity=(-1);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
{
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
}
else
{
MagickRealType
alpha,
beta;
/*
Identify transparent colormap index.
*/
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteBilevelMatteType);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
{
if (opacity < 0)
{
opacity=i;
continue;
}
alpha=(MagickRealType) image->colormap[i].opacity;
beta=(MagickRealType) image->colormap[opacity].opacity;
if (alpha > beta)
opacity=i;
}
if (opacity == -1)
{
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteBilevelMatteType);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
{
if (opacity < 0)
{
opacity=i;
continue;
}
alpha=(MagickRealType) image->colormap[i].opacity;
beta=(MagickRealType) image->colormap[opacity].opacity;
if (alpha > beta)
opacity=i;
}
}
if (opacity >= 0)
{
image->colormap[opacity].red=image->transparent_color.red;
image->colormap[opacity].green=image->transparent_color.green;
image->colormap[opacity].blue=image->transparent_color.blue;
}
}
/*
SIXEL header.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
sixel_palette[i * 3 + 0] = ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
sixel_palette[i * 3 + 1] = ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
sixel_palette[i * 3 + 2] = ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
/*
Define SIXEL pixels.
*/
output = sixel_output_create(image);
sixel_pixels =(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns * image->rows,1);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
(void) GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
sixel_pixels[y * image->columns + x] = (unsigned char) ((ssize_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes + x));
}
status = sixel_encode_impl(sixel_pixels, image->columns, image->rows,
sixel_palette, image->colors, -1,
output);
sixel_pixels =(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sixel_pixels);
output = (sixel_output_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(output);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the WriteGROUP4Image function in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
|
Medium
| 168,634
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ocfs2_dio_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc;
struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc *desc = NULL;
struct ocfs2_dio_write_ctxt *dwc = NULL;
struct buffer_head *di_bh = NULL;
u64 p_blkno;
loff_t pos = iblock << inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
unsigned len, total_len = bh_result->b_size;
int ret = 0, first_get_block = 0;
len = osb->s_clustersize - (pos & (osb->s_clustersize - 1));
len = min(total_len, len);
mlog(0, "get block of %lu at %llu:%u req %u\n",
inode->i_ino, pos, len, total_len);
/*
* Because we need to change file size in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), or
* we may need to add it to orphan dir. So can not fall to fast path
* while file size will be changed.
*/
if (pos + total_len <= i_size_read(inode)) {
down_read(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
/* This is the fast path for re-write. */
ret = ocfs2_get_block(inode, iblock, bh_result, create);
up_read(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (buffer_mapped(bh_result) &&
!buffer_new(bh_result) &&
ret == 0)
goto out;
/* Clear state set by ocfs2_get_block. */
bh_result->b_state = 0;
}
dwc = ocfs2_dio_alloc_write_ctx(bh_result, &first_get_block);
if (unlikely(dwc == NULL)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
if (ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(inode->i_sb, pos + total_len) >
ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(inode->i_sb, i_size_read(inode)) &&
!dwc->dw_orphaned) {
/*
* when we are going to alloc extents beyond file size, add the
* inode to orphan dir, so we can recall those spaces when
* system crashed during write.
*/
ret = ocfs2_add_inode_to_orphan(osb, inode);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
dwc->dw_orphaned = 1;
}
ret = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, &di_bh, 1);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (first_get_block) {
if (ocfs2_sparse_alloc(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb)))
ret = ocfs2_zero_tail(inode, di_bh, pos);
else
ret = ocfs2_expand_nonsparse_inode(inode, di_bh, pos,
total_len, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto unlock;
}
}
ret = ocfs2_write_begin_nolock(inode->i_mapping, pos, len,
OCFS2_WRITE_DIRECT, NULL,
(void **)&wc, di_bh, NULL);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto unlock;
}
desc = &wc->w_desc[0];
p_blkno = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(inode->i_sb, desc->c_phys);
BUG_ON(p_blkno == 0);
p_blkno += iblock & (u64)(ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(inode->i_sb, 1) - 1);
map_bh(bh_result, inode->i_sb, p_blkno);
bh_result->b_size = len;
if (desc->c_needs_zero)
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/* May sleep in end_io. It should not happen in a irq context. So defer
* it to dio work queue. */
set_buffer_defer_completion(bh_result);
if (!list_empty(&wc->w_unwritten_list)) {
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent *ue = NULL;
ue = list_first_entry(&wc->w_unwritten_list,
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent,
ue_node);
BUG_ON(ue->ue_cpos != desc->c_cpos);
/* The physical address may be 0, fill it. */
ue->ue_phys = desc->c_phys;
list_splice_tail_init(&wc->w_unwritten_list, &dwc->dw_zero_list);
dwc->dw_zero_count++;
}
ret = ocfs2_write_end_nolock(inode->i_mapping, pos, len, len, wc);
BUG_ON(ret != len);
ret = 0;
unlock:
up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1);
brelse(di_bh);
out:
if (ret < 0)
ret = -EIO;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.15, fs/ocfs2/aops.c omits use of a semaphore and consequently has a race condition for access to the extent tree during read operations in DIRECT mode, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG) by modifying a certain e_cpos field.
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CallCompositorWithSuccess(mojom::PdfCompositorPtr ptr) {
auto handle = CreateMSKPInSharedMemory();
ASSERT_TRUE(handle.IsValid());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle buffer_handle =
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, handle.GetSize(), true);
ASSERT_TRUE(buffer_handle->is_valid());
EXPECT_CALL(*this, CallbackOnSuccess(testing::_)).Times(1);
ptr->CompositePdf(std::move(buffer_handle),
base::BindOnce(&PdfCompositorServiceTest::OnCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
run_loop_->Run();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,856
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void a2dp_open_ctrl_path(struct a2dp_stream_common *common)
{
int i;
/* retry logic to catch any timing variations on control channel */
for (i = 0; i < CTRL_CHAN_RETRY_COUNT; i++)
{
/* connect control channel if not already connected */
if ((common->ctrl_fd = skt_connect(A2DP_CTRL_PATH, common->buffer_sz)) > 0)
{
/* success, now check if stack is ready */
if (check_a2dp_ready(common) == 0)
break;
ERROR("error : a2dp not ready, wait 250 ms and retry");
usleep(250000);
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
}
/* ctrl channel not ready, wait a bit */
usleep(250000);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,424
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
{
int scriptId = function->ScriptId();
if (scriptId == v8::UnboundScript::kNoScriptId)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
int lineNumber = function->GetScriptLineNumber();
int columnNumber = function->GetScriptColumnNumber();
if (lineNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound || columnNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> location = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "scriptId"), toV8String(m_isolate, String16::fromInteger(scriptId))).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "lineNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, lineNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "columnNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, columnNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, location, V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
|
Medium
| 172,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: keepalived_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
bool report_stopped = true;
struct utsname uname_buf;
char *end;
/* Ensure time_now is set. We then don't have to check anywhere
* else if it is set. */
set_time_now();
/* Save command line options in case need to log them later */
save_cmd_line_options(argc, argv);
/* Init debugging level */
debug = 0;
/* We are the parent process */
#ifndef _DEBUG_
prog_type = PROG_TYPE_PARENT;
#endif
/* Initialise daemon_mode */
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
__set_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
__set_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
__set_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
#endif
/* Open log with default settings so we can log initially */
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, LOG_PID, log_facility);
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
mem_log_init(PACKAGE_NAME, "Parent process");
#endif
/* Some functionality depends on kernel version, so get the version here */
if (uname(&uname_buf))
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to get uname() information - error %d", errno);
else {
os_major = (unsigned)strtoul(uname_buf.release, &end, 10);
if (*end != '.')
os_major = 0;
else {
os_minor = (unsigned)strtoul(end + 1, &end, 10);
if (*end != '.')
os_major = 0;
else {
if (!isdigit(end[1]))
os_major = 0;
else
os_release = (unsigned)strtoul(end + 1, &end, 10);
}
}
if (!os_major)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse kernel version %s", uname_buf.release);
/* config_id defaults to hostname */
if (!config_id) {
end = strchrnul(uname_buf.nodename, '.');
config_id = MALLOC((size_t)(end - uname_buf.nodename) + 1);
strncpy(config_id, uname_buf.nodename, (size_t)(end - uname_buf.nodename));
config_id[end - uname_buf.nodename] = '\0';
}
}
/*
* Parse command line and set debug level.
* bits 0..7 reserved by main.c
*/
if (parse_cmdline(argc, argv)) {
closelog();
if (!__test_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug))
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, LOG_PID | ((__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) ? LOG_CONS : 0) , log_facility);
}
if (__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug))
enable_console_log();
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Starting %s, git commit %s", version_string, GIT_COMMIT);
#else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Starting %s", version_string);
#endif
/* Handle any core file requirements */
core_dump_init();
if (os_major) {
if (KERNEL_VERSION(os_major, os_minor, os_release) < LINUX_VERSION_CODE) {
/* keepalived was build for a later kernel version */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "WARNING - keepalived was build for newer Linux %d.%d.%d, running on %s %s %s",
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff,
uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version);
} else {
/* keepalived was build for a later kernel version */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Running on %s %s %s (built for Linux %d.%d.%d)",
uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff);
}
}
#ifndef _DEBUG_
log_command_line(0);
#endif
/* Check we can read the configuration file(s).
NOTE: the working directory will be / if we
forked, but will be the current working directory
when keepalived was run if we haven't forked.
This means that if any config file names are not
absolute file names, the behaviour will be different
depending on whether we forked or not. */
if (!check_conf_file(conf_file)) {
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug))
config_test_exit();
goto end;
}
global_data = alloc_global_data();
read_config_file();
init_global_data(global_data, NULL);
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (override_namespace) {
if (global_data->network_namespace) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Overriding config net_namespace '%s' with command line namespace '%s'", global_data->network_namespace, override_namespace);
FREE(global_data->network_namespace);
}
global_data->network_namespace = override_namespace;
override_namespace = NULL;
}
#endif
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug) &&
(global_data->instance_name
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
|| global_data->network_namespace
#endif
)) {
if ((syslog_ident = make_syslog_ident(PACKAGE_NAME))) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Changing syslog ident to %s", syslog_ident);
closelog();
openlog(syslog_ident, LOG_PID | ((__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) ? LOG_CONS : 0), log_facility);
}
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to change syslog ident");
use_pid_dir = true;
open_log_file(log_file_name,
NULL,
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
global_data->network_namespace,
#else
NULL,
#endif
global_data->instance_name);
}
/* Initialise pointer to child finding function */
set_child_finder_name(find_keepalived_child_name);
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
if (use_pid_dir) {
/* Create the directory for pid files */
create_pid_dir();
}
}
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (global_data->network_namespace) {
if (global_data->network_namespace && !set_namespaces(global_data->network_namespace)) {
log_message(LOG_ERR, "Unable to set network namespace %s - exiting", global_data->network_namespace);
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
if (global_data->instance_name) {
if (!main_pidfile && (main_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_main_pidfile = true;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile && (checkers_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_checkers_pidfile = true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile && (vrrp_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_vrrp_pidfile = true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile && (bfd_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_bfd_pidfile = true;
#endif
}
if (use_pid_dir) {
if (!main_pidfile)
main_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile)
checkers_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile)
vrrp_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile)
bfd_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR BFD_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
}
else
{
if (!main_pidfile)
main_pidfile = PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile)
checkers_pidfile = PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile)
vrrp_pidfile = PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile)
bfd_pidfile = PID_DIR BFD_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
}
/* Check if keepalived is already running */
if (keepalived_running(daemon_mode)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "daemon is already running");
report_stopped = false;
goto end;
}
}
/* daemonize process */
if (!__test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug) &&
xdaemon(false, false, true) > 0) {
closelog();
FREE_PTR(config_id);
FREE_PTR(orig_core_dump_pattern);
close_std_fd();
exit(0);
}
/* Set file creation mask */
umask(0);
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
enable_mem_log_termination();
#endif
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
validate_config();
config_test_exit();
}
/* write the father's pidfile */
if (!pidfile_write(main_pidfile, getpid()))
goto end;
/* Create the master thread */
master = thread_make_master();
/* Signal handling initialization */
signal_init();
/* Init daemon */
if (!start_keepalived())
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Warning - keepalived has no configuration to run");
initialise_debug_options();
#ifdef THREAD_DUMP
register_parent_thread_addresses();
#endif
/* Launch the scheduling I/O multiplexer */
launch_thread_scheduler(master);
/* Finish daemon process */
stop_keepalived();
#ifdef THREAD_DUMP
deregister_thread_addresses();
#endif
/*
* Reached when terminate signal catched.
* finally return from system
*/
end:
if (report_stopped) {
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Stopped %s, git commit %s", version_string, GIT_COMMIT);
#else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Stopped %s", version_string);
#endif
}
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (global_data && global_data->network_namespace)
clear_namespaces();
#endif
if (use_pid_dir)
remove_pid_dir();
/* Restore original core_pattern if necessary */
if (orig_core_dump_pattern)
update_core_dump_pattern(orig_core_dump_pattern);
free_parent_mallocs_startup(false);
free_parent_mallocs_exit();
free_global_data(global_data);
closelog();
#ifndef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
FREE_PTR(syslog_ident);
#else
if (syslog_ident)
free(syslog_ident);
#endif
close_std_fd();
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 used mode 0666 when creating new temporary files upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats, potentially leaking sensitive information.
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Low
| 168,982
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int board_early_init_r(void)
{
int ret = 0;
/* Flush d-cache and invalidate i-cache of any FLASH data */
flush_dcache();
invalidate_icache();
set_liodns();
setup_qbman_portals();
ret = trigger_fpga_config();
if (ret)
printf("error triggering PCIe FPGA config\n");
/* enable the Unit LED (red) & Boot LED (on) */
qrio_set_leds();
/* enable Application Buffer */
qrio_enable_app_buffer();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
Medium
| 169,628
|
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