instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> flipSkImageVertically(SkImage* input,
AlphaDisposition alphaOp) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
size_t height = static_cast<size_t>(input->height());
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::MakeN32(input->width(), input->height(),
(alphaOp == PremultiplyAlpha)
? kPremul_SkAlphaType
: kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
size_t imageRowBytes = width * info.bytesPerPixel();
RefPtr<Uint8Array> imagePixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!imagePixels)
return nullptr;
for (size_t i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
size_t topFirstElement = i * imageRowBytes;
size_t topLastElement = (i + 1) * imageRowBytes;
size_t bottomFirstElement = (height - 1 - i) * imageRowBytes;
std::swap_ranges(imagePixels->data() + topFirstElement,
imagePixels->data() + topLastElement,
imagePixels->data() + bottomFirstElement);
}
return newSkImageFromRaster(info, std::move(imagePixels), imageRowBytes);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: datum_to_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
JsonTypeCategory tcategory, Oid outfuncoid,
bool key_scalar)
{
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
Assert(!(key_scalar && is_null));
if (key_scalar &&
(tcategory == JSONTYPE_ARRAY ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_JSON ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_CAST))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("key value must be scalar, not array, composite, or json")));
switch (tcategory)
{
case JSONTYPE_ARRAY:
array_to_json_internal(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE:
composite_to_json(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_BOOL:
outputstr = DatumGetBool(val) ? "true" : "false";
if (key_scalar)
escape_json(result, outputstr);
else
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_NUMERIC:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
/*
* Don't call escape_json for a non-key if it's a valid JSON
* number.
*/
if (!key_scalar && IsValidJsonNumber(outputstr, strlen(outputstr)))
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
else
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_DATE:
{
DateADT date;
struct pg_tm tm;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
date = DatumGetDateADT(val);
if (DATE_NOT_FINITE(date))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else
{
j2date(date + POSTGRES_EPOCH_JDATE,
&(tm.tm_year), &(tm.tm_mon), &(tm.tm_mday));
EncodeDateOnly(&tm, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMP:
{
Timestamp timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
fsec_t fsec;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, NULL, &tm, &fsec, NULL, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, false, 0, NULL, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMPTZ:
{
TimestampTz timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
int tz;
fsec_t fsec;
const char *tzn = NULL;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, &tz, &tm, &fsec, &tzn, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, true, tz, tzn, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_JSON:
/* JSON and JSONB output will already be escaped */
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_CAST:
/* outfuncoid refers to a cast function, not an output function */
jsontext = DatumGetTextP(OidFunctionCall1(outfuncoid, val));
outputstr = text_to_cstring(jsontext);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
pfree(jsontext);
break;
default:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in json parsing in PostgreSQL before 9.3.x before 9.3.10 and 9.4.x before 9.4.5 allow attackers to cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors, which are not properly handled in (1) json or (2) jsonb values.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,678
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (arg_zsh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.zshrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.zshrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname) == 0) {
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
}
else { //
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
fclose(fp);
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
}
free(fname);
}
else if (arg_csh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.cshrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.cshrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname) == 0) {
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
}
else { //
/* coverity[toctou] */
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
fclose(fp);
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.bashrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.bashrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname) == 0) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
}
free(fname);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix
|
Low
| 170,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SessionService::CreateTabsAndWindows(
const std::vector<SessionCommand*>& data,
std::map<int, SessionTab*>* tabs,
std::map<int, SessionWindow*>* windows) {
for (std::vector<SessionCommand*>::const_iterator i = data.begin();
i != data.end(); ++i) {
const SessionCommand::id_type kCommandSetWindowBounds2 = 10;
const SessionCommand* command = *i;
switch (command->id()) {
case kCommandSetTabWindow: {
SessionID::id_type payload[2];
if (!command->GetPayload(payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetTab(payload[1], tabs)->window_id.set_id(payload[0]);
break;
}
case kCommandSetWindowBounds2: {
WindowBoundsPayload2 payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetWindow(payload.window_id, windows)->bounds.SetRect(payload.x,
payload.y,
payload.w,
payload.h);
GetWindow(payload.window_id, windows)->show_state =
payload.is_maximized ?
ui::SHOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED : ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL;
break;
}
case kCommandSetWindowBounds3: {
WindowBoundsPayload3 payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetWindow(payload.window_id, windows)->bounds.SetRect(payload.x,
payload.y,
payload.w,
payload.h);
ui::WindowShowState show_state = ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL;
if (payload.show_state > ui::SHOW_STATE_DEFAULT &&
payload.show_state < ui::SHOW_STATE_END &&
payload.show_state != ui::SHOW_STATE_INACTIVE) {
show_state = static_cast<ui::WindowShowState>(payload.show_state);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
GetWindow(payload.window_id, windows)->show_state = show_state;
break;
}
case kCommandSetTabIndexInWindow: {
TabIndexInWindowPayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetTab(payload.id, tabs)->tab_visual_index = payload.index;
break;
}
case kCommandTabClosed:
case kCommandWindowClosed: {
ClosedPayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
if (command->id() == kCommandTabClosed) {
delete GetTab(payload.id, tabs);
tabs->erase(payload.id);
} else {
delete GetWindow(payload.id, windows);
windows->erase(payload.id);
}
break;
}
case kCommandTabNavigationPathPrunedFromBack: {
TabNavigationPathPrunedFromBackPayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
SessionTab* tab = GetTab(payload.id, tabs);
tab->navigations.erase(
FindClosestNavigationWithIndex(&(tab->navigations), payload.index),
tab->navigations.end());
break;
}
case kCommandTabNavigationPathPrunedFromFront: {
TabNavigationPathPrunedFromFrontPayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)) ||
payload.index <= 0) {
return true;
}
SessionTab* tab = GetTab(payload.id, tabs);
tab->current_navigation_index =
std::max(-1, tab->current_navigation_index - payload.index);
for (std::vector<TabNavigation>::iterator i = tab->navigations.begin();
i != tab->navigations.end();) {
i->set_index(i->index() - payload.index);
if (i->index() < 0)
i = tab->navigations.erase(i);
else
++i;
}
break;
}
case kCommandUpdateTabNavigation: {
TabNavigation navigation;
SessionID::id_type tab_id;
if (!RestoreUpdateTabNavigationCommand(*command, &navigation, &tab_id))
return true;
SessionTab* tab = GetTab(tab_id, tabs);
std::vector<TabNavigation>::iterator i =
FindClosestNavigationWithIndex(&(tab->navigations),
navigation.index());
if (i != tab->navigations.end() && i->index() == navigation.index())
*i = navigation;
else
tab->navigations.insert(i, navigation);
break;
}
case kCommandSetSelectedNavigationIndex: {
SelectedNavigationIndexPayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetTab(payload.id, tabs)->current_navigation_index = payload.index;
break;
}
case kCommandSetSelectedTabInIndex: {
SelectedTabInIndexPayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetWindow(payload.id, windows)->selected_tab_index = payload.index;
break;
}
case kCommandSetWindowType: {
WindowTypePayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetWindow(payload.id, windows)->is_constrained = false;
GetWindow(payload.id, windows)->type =
BrowserTypeForWindowType(
static_cast<WindowType>(payload.index));
break;
}
case kCommandSetPinnedState: {
PinnedStatePayload payload;
if (!command->GetPayload(&payload, sizeof(payload)))
return true;
GetTab(payload.tab_id, tabs)->pinned = payload.pinned_state;
break;
}
case kCommandSetExtensionAppID: {
SessionID::id_type tab_id;
std::string extension_app_id;
if (!RestoreSetTabExtensionAppIDCommand(
*command, &tab_id, &extension_app_id)) {
return true;
}
GetTab(tab_id, tabs)->extension_app_id.swap(extension_app_id);
break;
}
default:
return true;
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging an out-of-bounds write error in the implementation of sampled functions.
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType EqualizeImage(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define EqualizeImageTag "Equalize/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
double
black[CompositePixelChannel+1],
*equalize_map,
*histogram,
*map,
white[CompositePixelChannel+1];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize histogram arrays.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
if (AccelerateEqualizeImage(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
#endif
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
equalize_map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,
GetPixelChannels(image)*sizeof(*equalize_map));
histogram=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*map));
if ((equalize_map == (double *) NULL) || (histogram == (double *) NULL) ||
(map == (double *) NULL))
{
if (map != (double *) NULL)
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (histogram != (double *) NULL)
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
if (equalize_map != (double *) NULL)
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
/*
Form histogram.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(histogram,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
intensity=p[i];
if ((image->channel_mask & SyncChannels) != 0)
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(image,p);
histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*ScaleQuantumToMap(intensity)+i]++;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
/*
Integrate the histogram to get the equalization map.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
register ssize_t
j;
intensity=0.0;
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
{
intensity+=histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i];
map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=intensity;
}
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(equalize_map,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*equalize_map));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(black,0,sizeof(*black));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(white,0,sizeof(*white));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
black[i]=map[i];
white[i]=map[GetPixelChannels(image)*MaxMap+i];
if (black[i] != white[i])
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=(double)
ScaleMapToQuantum((double) ((MaxMap*(map[
GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]-black[i]))/(white[i]-black[i])));
}
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
j;
/*
Equalize colormap.
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->colors; j++)
{
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,RedPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].red=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].red))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
GreenPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].green=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].green))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,BluePixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].blue=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].blue))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
AlphaPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].alpha=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].alpha))+
channel];
}
}
}
/*
Equalize image.
*/
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if (((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0) || (black[j] == white[j]))
continue;
q[j]=ClampToQuantum(equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(q[j])+j]);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_EqualizeImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,EqualizeImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Buffer overflow in MagickCore/enhance.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-7 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to pixel cache morphology.
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
|
Low
| 166,996
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindEntriesForUrl(
const GURL& url, std::vector<EntryRecord>* records) {
DCHECK(records && records->empty());
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT cache_id, url, flags, response_id, response_size FROM Entries"
" WHERE url = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindString(0, url.spec());
while (statement.Step()) {
records->push_back(EntryRecord());
ReadEntryRecord(statement, &records->back());
DCHECK(records->back().url == url);
}
return statement.Succeeded();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,976
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteImageChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const MagickBooleanType separate,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
channels,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
/*
Write uncompressed pixels as separate planes.
*/
channels=1;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2*channels*
next_image->columns,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GrayQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GrayQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,IndexQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
IndexQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,RedQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GreenQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlueQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlackQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
RedQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,1,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GreenQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,2,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlueQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,3,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlackQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,4,6);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,5,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
}
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadPSDChannelPixels function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Fixed overflow.
|
Medium
| 170,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
|
Medium
| 173,766
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection(ExecState* exec)
{
JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor* jsConstructor = static_cast<JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor*>(exec->callee());
ScriptExecutionContext* context = jsConstructor->scriptExecutionContext();
if (!context)
return throwVMError(exec, createReferenceError(exec, "DeprecatedPeerConnection constructor associated document is unavailable"));
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
String serverConfiguration = ustringToString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
RefPtr<SignalingCallback> signalingCallback = createFunctionOnlyCallback<JSSignalingCallback>(exec, static_cast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(exec->lexicalGlobalObject()), exec->argument(1));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
RefPtr<DeprecatedPeerConnection> peerConnection = DeprecatedPeerConnection::create(context, serverConfiguration, signalingCallback.release());
return JSValue::encode(CREATE_DOM_WRAPPER(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), DeprecatedPeerConnection, peerConnection.get()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,559
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int lookup1_values(int entries, int dim)
{
int r = (int) floor(exp((float) log((float) entries) / dim));
if ((int) floor(pow((float) r+1, dim)) <= entries) // (int) cast for MinGW warning;
++r; // floor() to avoid _ftol() when non-CRT
assert(pow((float) r+1, dim) > entries);
assert((int) floor(pow((float) r, dim)) <= entries); // (int),floor() as above
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
|
Medium
| 169,616
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static zend_object_value php_snmp_object_new(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_object_value retval;
php_snmp_object *intern;
/* Allocate memory for it */
intern = emalloc(sizeof(php_snmp_object));
memset(&intern->zo, 0, sizeof(php_snmp_object));
zend_object_std_init(&intern->zo, class_type TSRMLS_CC);
object_properties_init(&intern->zo, class_type);
retval.handle = zend_objects_store_put(intern, (zend_objects_store_dtor_t)zend_objects_destroy_object, (zend_objects_free_object_storage_t) php_snmp_object_free_storage, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
retval.handlers = (zend_object_handlers *) &php_snmp_object_handlers;
return retval;
}
/* {{{ php_snmp_error
*
* Record last SNMP-related error in object
*
*/
static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref TSRMLS_DC, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type TSRMLS_CC, "%s", snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args TSRMLS_CC);
va_end(args);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_getvalue
*
* SNMP value to zval converter
*
*/
static void php_snmp_getvalue(struct variable_list *vars, zval *snmpval TSRMLS_DC, int valueretrieval)
{
zval *val;
char sbuf[512];
char *buf = &(sbuf[0]);
char *dbuf = (char *)NULL;
int buflen = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
int val_len = vars->val_len;
/* use emalloc() for large values, use static array otherwize */
/* There is no way to know the size of buffer snprint_value() needs in order to print a value there.
* So we are forced to probe it
*/
while ((valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) == 0) {
*buf = '\0';
if (snprint_value(buf, buflen, vars->name, vars->name_length, vars) == -1) {
if (val_len > 512*1024) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "snprint_value() asks for a buffer more than 512k, Net-SNMP bug?");
break;
}
/* buffer is not long enough to hold full output, double it */
val_len *= 2;
} else {
break;
}
if (buf == dbuf) {
dbuf = (char *)erealloc(dbuf, val_len + 1);
} else {
dbuf = (char *)emalloc(val_len + 1);
}
if (!dbuf) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed: %s, fallback to static buffer", strerror(errno));
buf = &(sbuf[0]);
buflen = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
break;
}
buf = dbuf;
buflen = val_len;
}
if((valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) && val_len > buflen){
if ((dbuf = (char *)emalloc(val_len + 1))) {
buf = dbuf;
buflen = val_len;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed: %s, fallback to static buffer", strerror(errno));
}
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
if (valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) {
*buf = 0;
switch (vars->type) {
case ASN_BIT_STR: /* 0x03, asn1.h */
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, (char *)vars->val.bitstring, vars->val_len, 1);
break;
case ASN_OCTET_STR: /* 0x04, asn1.h */
case ASN_OPAQUE: /* 0x44, snmp_impl.h */
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, (char *)vars->val.string, vars->val_len, 1);
break;
case ASN_NULL: /* 0x05, asn1.h */
ZVAL_NULL(val);
break;
case ASN_OBJECT_ID: /* 0x06, asn1.h */
snprint_objid(buf, buflen, vars->val.objid, vars->val_len / sizeof(oid));
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_IPADDRESS: /* 0x40, snmp_impl.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
(vars->val.string)[0], (vars->val.string)[1],
(vars->val.string)[2], (vars->val.string)[3]);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_COUNTER: /* 0x41, snmp_impl.h */
case ASN_GAUGE: /* 0x42, snmp_impl.h */
/* ASN_UNSIGNED is the same as ASN_GAUGE */
case ASN_TIMETICKS: /* 0x43, snmp_impl.h */
case ASN_UINTEGER: /* 0x47, snmp_impl.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%lu", *vars->val.integer);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_INTEGER: /* 0x02, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%ld", *vars->val.integer);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
#if defined(NETSNMP_WITH_OPAQUE_SPECIAL_TYPES) || defined(OPAQUE_SPECIAL_TYPES)
case ASN_OPAQUE_FLOAT: /* 0x78, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%f", *vars->val.floatVal);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_DOUBLE: /* 0x79, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%Lf", *vars->val.doubleVal);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_I64: /* 0x80, asn1.h */
printI64(buf, vars->val.counter64);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_U64: /* 0x81, asn1.h */
#endif
case ASN_COUNTER64: /* 0x46, snmp_impl.h */
printU64(buf, vars->val.counter64);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
default:
ZVAL_STRING(val, "Unknown value type", 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown value type: %u", vars->type);
break;
}
} else /* use Net-SNMP value translation */ {
/* we have desired string in buffer, just use it */
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
}
if (valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_OBJECT) {
object_init(snmpval);
add_property_long(snmpval, "type", vars->type);
add_property_zval(snmpval, "value", val);
} else {
*snmpval = *val;
zval_copy_ctor(snmpval);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&val);
if(dbuf){ /* malloc was used to store value */
efree(dbuf);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_internal
*
* SNMP object fetcher/setter for all SNMP versions
*
*/
static void php_snmp_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int st,
struct snmp_session *session,
struct objid_query *objid_query)
{
struct snmp_session *ss;
struct snmp_pdu *pdu=NULL, *response;
struct variable_list *vars;
oid root[MAX_NAME_LEN];
size_t rootlen = 0;
int status, count, found;
char buf[2048];
char buf2[2048];
int keepwalking=1;
char *err;
zval *snmpval = NULL;
int snmp_errno;
/* we start with retval=FALSE. If any actual data is acquired, retval will be set to appropriate type */
RETVAL_FALSE;
/* reset errno and errstr */
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR, "");
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) { /* remember root OID */
memmove((char *)root, (char *)(objid_query->vars[0].name), (objid_query->vars[0].name_length) * sizeof(oid));
rootlen = objid_query->vars[0].name_length;
objid_query->offset = objid_query->count;
}
if ((ss = snmp_open(session)) == NULL) {
snmp_error(session, NULL, NULL, &err);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not open snmp connection: %s", err);
free(err);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
if ((st & SNMP_CMD_SET) && objid_query->count > objid_query->step) {
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_MULTIPLE_SET_QUERIES, "Can not fit all OIDs for SET query into one packet, using multiple queries");
}
while (keepwalking) {
keepwalking = 0;
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (session->version == SNMP_VERSION_1) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT);
} else {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETBULK);
pdu->non_repeaters = objid_query->non_repeaters;
pdu->max_repetitions = objid_query->max_repetitions;
}
snmp_add_null_var(pdu, objid_query->vars[0].name, objid_query->vars[0].name_length);
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_GET) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GET);
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT);
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
pdu = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_SET);
} else {
snmp_close(ss);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "Unknown SNMP command (internals)");
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
for (count = 0; objid_query->offset < objid_query->count && count < objid_query->step; objid_query->offset++, count++){
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if ((snmp_errno = snmp_add_var(pdu, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].type, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].value))) {
snprint_objid(buf, sizeof(buf), objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Could not add variable: OID='%s' type='%c' value='%s': %s", buf, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].type, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].value, snmp_api_errstring(snmp_errno));
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
} else {
snmp_add_null_var(pdu, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length);
}
}
if(pdu->variables == NULL){
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
}
retry:
status = snmp_synch_response(ss, pdu, &response);
if (status == STAT_SUCCESS) {
if (response->errstat == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (objid_query->offset < objid_query->count) { /* we have unprocessed OIDs */
keepwalking = 1;
continue;
}
snmp_free_pdu(response);
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_TRUE;
return;
}
for (vars = response->variables; vars; vars = vars->next_variable) {
/* do not output errors as values */
if ( vars->type == SNMP_ENDOFMIBVIEW ||
vars->type == SNMP_NOSUCHOBJECT ||
vars->type == SNMP_NOSUCHINSTANCE ) {
if ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) && Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_ARRAY) {
break;
}
snprint_objid(buf, sizeof(buf), vars->name, vars->name_length);
snprint_value(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length, vars);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_ERROR_IN_REPLY, "Error in packet at '%s': %s", buf, buf2);
continue;
}
if ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) &&
(vars->name_length < rootlen || memcmp(root, vars->name, rootlen * sizeof(oid)))) { /* not part of this subtree */
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_ARRAY) { /* some records are fetched already, shut down further lookup */
keepwalking = 0;
} else {
/* first fetched OID is out of subtree, fallback to GET query */
st |= SNMP_CMD_GET;
st ^= SNMP_CMD_WALK;
objid_query->offset = 0;
keepwalking = 1;
}
break;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(snmpval);
php_snmp_getvalue(vars, snmpval TSRMLS_CC, objid_query->valueretrieval);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_BOOL) {
array_init(return_value);
}
if (st & SNMP_NUMERIC_KEYS) {
add_next_index_zval(return_value, snmpval);
} else if (st & SNMP_ORIGINAL_NAMES_AS_KEYS && st & SNMP_CMD_GET) {
found = 0;
for (count = 0; count < objid_query->count; count++) {
if (objid_query->vars[count].name_length == vars->name_length && snmp_oid_compare(objid_query->vars[count].name, objid_query->vars[count].name_length, vars->name, vars->name_length) == 0) {
found = 1;
objid_query->vars[count].name_length = 0; /* mark this name as used */
break;
}
}
if (found) {
add_assoc_zval(return_value, objid_query->vars[count].oid, snmpval);
} else {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not find original OID name for '%s'", buf2);
}
} else if (st & SNMP_USE_SUFFIX_AS_KEYS && st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
if (rootlen <= vars->name_length && snmp_oid_compare(root, rootlen, vars->name, rootlen) == 0) {
buf2[0] = '\0';
count = rootlen;
while(count < vars->name_length){
sprintf(buf, "%lu.", vars->name[count]);
strcat(buf2, buf);
count++;
}
buf2[strlen(buf2) - 1] = '\0'; /* remove trailing '.' */
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, buf2, snmpval);
} else {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, buf2, snmpval);
}
} else {
*return_value = *snmpval;
zval_copy_ctor(return_value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&snmpval);
break;
}
/* OID increase check */
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (objid_query->oid_increasing_check == TRUE && snmp_oid_compare(objid_query->vars[0].name, objid_query->vars[0].name_length, vars->name, vars->name_length) >= 0) {
snprint_objid(buf2, sizeof(buf2), vars->name, vars->name_length);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_NOT_INCREASING, "Error: OID not increasing: %s", buf2);
keepwalking = 0;
} else {
memmove((char *)(objid_query->vars[0].name), (char *)vars->name, vars->name_length * sizeof(oid));
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = vars->name_length;
keepwalking = 1;
}
}
}
if (objid_query->offset < objid_query->count) { /* we have unprocessed OIDs */
keepwalking = 1;
}
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK && response->errstat == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG && objid_query->max_repetitions > 1) { /* Answer will not fit into single packet */
objid_query->max_repetitions /= 2;
snmp_free_pdu(response);
keepwalking = 1;
continue;
}
if (!(st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) || response->errstat != SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME || Z_TYPE_P(return_value) == IS_BOOL) {
for ( count=1, vars = response->variables;
vars && count != response->errindex;
vars = vars->next_variable, count++);
if (st & (SNMP_CMD_GET | SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT) && response->errstat == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG && objid_query->step > 1) { /* Answer will not fit into single packet */
objid_query->offset = ((objid_query->offset > objid_query->step) ? (objid_query->offset - objid_query->step) : 0 );
objid_query->step /= 2;
snmp_free_pdu(response);
keepwalking = 1;
continue;
}
if (vars) {
snprint_objid(buf, sizeof(buf), vars->name, vars->name_length);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_ERROR_IN_REPLY, "Error in packet at '%s': %s", buf, snmp_errstring(response->errstat));
} else {
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_ERROR_IN_REPLY, "Error in packet at %u object_id: %s", response->errindex, snmp_errstring(response->errstat));
}
if (st & (SNMP_CMD_GET | SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT)) { /* cut out bogus OID and retry */
if ((pdu = snmp_fix_pdu(response, ((st & SNMP_CMD_GET) ? SNMP_MSG_GET : SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT) )) != NULL) {
snmp_free_pdu(response);
goto retry;
}
}
snmp_free_pdu(response);
snmp_close(ss);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
}
} else if (status == STAT_TIMEOUT) {
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_TIMEOUT, "No response from %s", session->peername);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
}
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
} else { /* status == STAT_ERROR */
snmp_error(ss, NULL, NULL, &err);
php_snmp_error(getThis(), NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_GENERIC, "Fatal error: %s", err);
free(err);
if (objid_query->array_output) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
}
snmp_close(ss);
RETVAL_FALSE;
return;
}
if (response) {
snmp_free_pdu(response);
}
} /* keepwalking */
snmp_close(ss);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_parse_oid
*
* OID parser (and type, value for SNMP_SET command)
*/
static int php_snmp_parse_oid(zval *object, int st, struct objid_query *objid_query, zval **oid, zval **type, zval **value TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *pptr;
HashPosition pos_oid, pos_type, pos_value;
zval **tmp_oid, **tmp_type, **tmp_value;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) != IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_ISREF_PP(oid)) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(oid);
}
convert_to_string_ex(oid);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), &pos_oid);
}
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) != IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_ISREF_PP(type)) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(type);
}
convert_to_string_ex(type);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(type), &pos_type);
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) != IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_ISREF_PP(value)) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(value);
}
convert_to_string_ex(value);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(value), &pos_value);
}
}
objid_query->count = 0;
objid_query->array_output = ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) ? TRUE : FALSE);
if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) == IS_STRING) {
objid_query->vars = (snmpobjarg *)emalloc(sizeof(snmpobjarg));
if (objid_query->vars == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while parsing oid: %s", strerror(errno));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].oid = Z_STRVAL_PP(oid);
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_STRING && Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(type) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Bogus type '%s', should be single char, got %u", Z_STRVAL_PP(type), Z_STRLEN_PP(type));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
pptr = Z_STRVAL_PP(type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_PP(value);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Single objid and multiple type or values are not supported");
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
objid_query->count++;
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) == IS_ARRAY) { /* we got objid array */
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Got empty OID array");
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars = (snmpobjarg *)emalloc(sizeof(snmpobjarg) * zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid)));
if (objid_query->vars == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while parsing oid array: %s", strerror(errno));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->array_output = ( (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) ? FALSE : TRUE );
for ( zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), &pos_oid);
zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), (void **) &tmp_oid, &pos_oid) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), &pos_oid) ) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_oid);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].oid = Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid);
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_STRING) {
pptr = Z_STRVAL_PP(type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(type), (void **) &tmp_type, &pos_type)) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_type);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp_type) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s': bogus type '%s', should be single char, got %u", Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid), Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_type), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp_type));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
pptr = Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(type), &pos_type);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s': no type set", Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_STRING) {
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_PP(value);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(value), (void **) &tmp_value, &pos_value)) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_value);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_value);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(value), &pos_value);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s': no value set", Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
objid_query->count++;
}
}
/* now parse all OIDs */
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (objid_query->count > 1) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Multi OID walks are not supported!");
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = MAX_NAME_LEN;
if (strlen(objid_query->vars[0].oid)) { /* on a walk, an empty string means top of tree - no error */
if (!snmp_parse_oid(objid_query->vars[0].oid, objid_query->vars[0].name, &(objid_query->vars[0].name_length))) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Invalid object identifier: %s", objid_query->vars[0].oid);
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
} else {
memmove((char *)objid_query->vars[0].name, (char *)objid_mib, sizeof(objid_mib));
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = sizeof(objid_mib) / sizeof(oid);
}
} else {
for (objid_query->offset = 0; objid_query->offset < objid_query->count; objid_query->offset++) {
objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length = MAX_OID_LEN;
if (!snmp_parse_oid(objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].oid, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, &(objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length))) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Invalid object identifier: %s", objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].oid);
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
objid_query->offset = 0;
objid_query->step = objid_query->count;
return (objid_query->count > 0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ netsnmp_session_init
allocates memory for session and session->peername, caller should free it manually using netsnmp_session_free() and efree()
*/
static int netsnmp_session_init(php_snmp_session **session_p, int version, char *hostname, char *community, int timeout, int retries TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_snmp_session *session;
char *pptr, *host_ptr;
int force_ipv6 = FALSE;
int n;
struct sockaddr **psal;
struct sockaddr **res;
*session_p = (php_snmp_session *)emalloc(sizeof(php_snmp_session));
session = *session_p;
if (session == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed allocating session");
return (-1);
}
memset(session, 0, sizeof(php_snmp_session));
snmp_sess_init(session);
session->version = version;
session->remote_port = SNMP_PORT;
session->peername = emalloc(MAX_NAME_LEN);
if (session->peername == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while copying hostname");
return (-1);
}
/* we copy original hostname for further processing */
strlcpy(session->peername, hostname, MAX_NAME_LEN);
host_ptr = session->peername;
/* Reading the hostname and its optional non-default port number */
if (*host_ptr == '[') { /* IPv6 address */
force_ipv6 = TRUE;
host_ptr++;
if ((pptr = strchr(host_ptr, ']'))) {
if (pptr[1] == ':') {
session->remote_port = atoi(pptr + 2);
}
*pptr = '\0';
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "malformed IPv6 address, closing square bracket missing");
return (-1);
}
} else { /* IPv4 address */
if ((pptr = strchr(host_ptr, ':'))) {
session->remote_port = atoi(pptr + 1);
*pptr = '\0';
}
}
/* since Net-SNMP library requires 'udp6:' prefix for all IPv6 addresses (in FQDN form too) we need to
perform possible name resolution before running any SNMP queries */
if ((n = php_network_getaddresses(host_ptr, SOCK_DGRAM, &psal, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) == 0) { /* some resolver error */
/* warnings sent, bailing out */
return (-1);
}
/* we have everything we need in psal, flush peername and fill it properly */
*(session->peername) = '\0';
res = psal;
while (n-- > 0) {
pptr = session->peername;
#if HAVE_GETADDRINFO && HAVE_IPV6 && HAVE_INET_NTOP
if (force_ipv6 && (*res)->sa_family != AF_INET6) {
res++;
continue;
}
if ((*res)->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
strcpy(session->peername, "udp6:[");
pptr = session->peername + strlen(session->peername);
inet_ntop((*res)->sa_family, &(((struct sockaddr_in6*)(*res))->sin6_addr), pptr, MAX_NAME_LEN);
strcat(pptr, "]");
} else if ((*res)->sa_family == AF_INET) {
inet_ntop((*res)->sa_family, &(((struct sockaddr_in*)(*res))->sin_addr), pptr, MAX_NAME_LEN);
} else {
res++;
continue;
}
#else
if ((*res)->sa_family != AF_INET) {
res++;
continue;
}
strcat(pptr, inet_ntoa(((struct sockaddr_in*)(*res))->sin_addr));
#endif
break;
}
if (strlen(session->peername) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown failure while resolving '%s'", hostname);
return (-1);
}
/* XXX FIXME
There should be check for non-empty session->peername!
*/
/* put back non-standard SNMP port */
if (session->remote_port != SNMP_PORT) {
pptr = session->peername + strlen(session->peername);
sprintf(pptr, ":%d", session->remote_port);
}
php_network_freeaddresses(psal);
if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) {
/* Setting the security name. */
session->securityName = estrdup(community);
session->securityNameLen = strlen(session->securityName);
} else {
session->authenticator = NULL;
session->community = (u_char *)estrdup(community);
session->community_len = strlen(community);
}
session->retries = retries;
session->timeout = timeout;
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ int netsnmp_session_set_sec_level(struct snmp_session *s, char *level)
Set the security level in the snmpv3 session */
static int netsnmp_session_set_sec_level(struct snmp_session *s, char *level)
{
if (!strcasecmp(level, "noAuthNoPriv") || !strcasecmp(level, "nanp")) {
s->securityLevel = SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_NOAUTH;
} else if (!strcasecmp(level, "authNoPriv") || !strcasecmp(level, "anp")) {
s->securityLevel = SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHNOPRIV;
} else if (!strcasecmp(level, "authPriv") || !strcasecmp(level, "ap")) {
s->securityLevel = SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHPRIV;
} else {
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ int netsnmp_session_set_auth_protocol(struct snmp_session *s, char *prot)
Set the authentication protocol in the snmpv3 session */
static int netsnmp_session_set_auth_protocol(struct snmp_session *s, char *prot TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!strcasecmp(prot, "MD5")) {
s->securityAuthProto = usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol;
s->securityAuthProtoLen = USM_AUTH_PROTO_MD5_LEN;
} else if (!strcasecmp(prot, "SHA")) {
s->securityAuthProto = usmHMACSHA1AuthProtocol;
s->securityAuthProtoLen = USM_AUTH_PROTO_SHA_LEN;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown authentication protocol '%s'", prot);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ int netsnmp_session_set_sec_protocol(struct snmp_session *s, char *prot)
Set the security protocol in the snmpv3 session */
static int netsnmp_session_set_sec_protocol(struct snmp_session *s, char *prot TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!strcasecmp(prot, "DES")) {
s->securityPrivProto = usmDESPrivProtocol;
s->securityPrivProtoLen = USM_PRIV_PROTO_DES_LEN;
#ifdef HAVE_AES
} else if (!strcasecmp(prot, "AES128") || !strcasecmp(prot, "AES")) {
s->securityPrivProto = usmAESPrivProtocol;
s->securityPrivProtoLen = USM_PRIV_PROTO_AES_LEN;
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown security protocol '%s'", prot);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ int netsnmp_session_gen_auth_key(struct snmp_session *s, char *pass)
Make key from pass phrase in the snmpv3 session */
static int netsnmp_session_gen_auth_key(struct snmp_session *s, char *pass TSRMLS_DC)
{
int snmp_errno;
s->securityAuthKeyLen = USM_AUTH_KU_LEN;
if ((snmp_errno = generate_Ku(s->securityAuthProto, s->securityAuthProtoLen,
(u_char *) pass, strlen(pass),
s->securityAuthKey, &(s->securityAuthKeyLen)))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error generating a key for authentication pass phrase '%s': %s", pass, snmp_api_errstring(snmp_errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ int netsnmp_session_gen_sec_key(struct snmp_session *s, u_char *pass)
Make key from pass phrase in the snmpv3 session */
static int netsnmp_session_gen_sec_key(struct snmp_session *s, char *pass TSRMLS_DC)
{
int snmp_errno;
s->securityPrivKeyLen = USM_PRIV_KU_LEN;
if ((snmp_errno = generate_Ku(s->securityAuthProto, s->securityAuthProtoLen,
(u_char *)pass, strlen(pass),
s->securityPrivKey, &(s->securityPrivKeyLen)))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error generating a key for privacy pass phrase '%s': %s", pass, snmp_api_errstring(snmp_errno));
return (-2);
}
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ in netsnmp_session_set_contextEngineID(struct snmp_session *s, u_char * contextEngineID)
Set context Engine Id in the snmpv3 session */
static int netsnmp_session_set_contextEngineID(struct snmp_session *s, char * contextEngineID TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t ebuf_len = 32, eout_len = 0;
u_char *ebuf = (u_char *) emalloc(ebuf_len);
if (ebuf == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "malloc failure setting contextEngineID");
return (-1);
}
if (!snmp_hex_to_binary(&ebuf, &ebuf_len, &eout_len, 1, contextEngineID)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Bad engine ID value '%s'", contextEngineID);
efree(ebuf);
return (-1);
}
if (s->contextEngineID) {
efree(s->contextEngineID);
}
s->contextEngineID = ebuf;
s->contextEngineIDLen = eout_len;
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_set_security(struct snmp_session *session, char *sec_level, char *auth_protocol, char *auth_passphrase, char *priv_protocol, char *priv_passphrase, char *contextName, char *contextEngineID)
Set all snmpv3-related security options */
static int netsnmp_session_set_security(struct snmp_session *session, char *sec_level, char *auth_protocol, char *auth_passphrase, char *priv_protocol, char *priv_passphrase, char *contextName, char *contextEngineID TSRMLS_DC)
{
/* Setting the security level. */
if (netsnmp_session_set_sec_level(session, sec_level)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid security level '%s'", sec_level);
return (-1);
}
if (session->securityLevel == SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHNOPRIV || session->securityLevel == SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHPRIV) {
/* Setting the authentication protocol. */
if (netsnmp_session_set_auth_protocol(session, auth_protocol TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
return (-1);
}
/* Setting the authentication passphrase. */
if (netsnmp_session_gen_auth_key(session, auth_passphrase TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
return (-1);
}
if (session->securityLevel == SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHPRIV) {
/* Setting the security protocol. */
if (netsnmp_session_set_sec_protocol(session, priv_protocol TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
return (-1);
}
/* Setting the security protocol passphrase. */
if (netsnmp_session_gen_sec_key(session, priv_passphrase TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
return (-1);
}
}
}
/* Setting contextName if specified */
if (contextName) {
session->contextName = contextName;
session->contextNameLen = strlen(contextName);
}
/* Setting contextEngineIS if specified */
if (contextEngineID && strlen(contextEngineID) && netsnmp_session_set_contextEngineID(session, contextEngineID TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp
*
* Generic SNMP handler for all versions.
* This function makes use of the internal SNMP object fetcher.
* Used both in old (non-OO) and OO API
*
*/
static void php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int st, int version)
{
zval **oid, **value, **type;
char *a1, *a2, *a3, *a4, *a5, *a6, *a7;
int a1_len, a2_len, a3_len, a4_len, a5_len, a6_len, a7_len;
zend_bool use_orignames = 0, suffix_keys = 0;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
struct objid_query objid_query;
php_snmp_session *session;
int session_less_mode = (getThis() == NULL);
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
php_snmp_object glob_snmp_object;
objid_query.max_repetitions = -1;
objid_query.non_repeaters = 0;
objid_query.valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
objid_query.oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
if (session_less_mode) {
if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "sssssssZZZ|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &a3, &a3_len,
&a4, &a4_len, &a5, &a5_len, &a6, &a6_len, &a7, &a7_len, &oid, &type, &value, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
/* SNMP_CMD_GET
* SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT
* SNMP_CMD_WALK
*/
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "sssssssZ|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &a3, &a3_len,
&a4, &a4_len, &a5, &a5_len, &a6, &a6_len, &a7, &a7_len, &oid, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "ssZZZ|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &oid, &type, &value, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
/* SNMP_CMD_GET
* SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT
* SNMP_CMD_WALK
*/
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "ssZ|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &oid, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "ZZZ", &oid, &type, &value) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "Z|bll", &oid, &suffix_keys, &(objid_query.max_repetitions), &(objid_query.non_repeaters)) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (suffix_keys) {
st |= SNMP_USE_SUFFIX_AS_KEYS;
}
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_GET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "Z|b", &oid, &use_orignames) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (use_orignames) {
st |= SNMP_ORIGINAL_NAMES_AS_KEYS;
}
} else {
/* SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT
*/
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "Z", &oid) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (!php_snmp_parse_oid(getThis(), st, &objid_query, oid, type, value TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (session_less_mode) {
if (netsnmp_session_init(&session, version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(objid_query.vars);
netsnmp_session_free(&session);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && netsnmp_session_set_security(session, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(objid_query.vars);
netsnmp_session_free(&session);
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
zval *object = getThis();
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
session = snmp_object->session;
if (!session) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid or uninitialized SNMP object");
efree(objid_query.vars);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (snmp_object->max_oids > 0) {
objid_query.step = snmp_object->max_oids;
if (objid_query.max_repetitions < 0) { /* unspecified in function call, use session-wise */
objid_query.max_repetitions = snmp_object->max_oids;
}
}
objid_query.oid_increasing_check = snmp_object->oid_increasing_check;
objid_query.valueretrieval = snmp_object->valueretrieval;
glob_snmp_object.enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, snmp_object->enum_print);
glob_snmp_object.quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT, snmp_object->quick_print);
glob_snmp_object.oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, snmp_object->oid_output_format);
}
if (objid_query.max_repetitions < 0) {
objid_query.max_repetitions = 20; /* provide correct default value */
}
php_snmp_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, st, session, &objid_query);
efree(objid_query.vars);
if (session_less_mode) {
netsnmp_session_free(&session);
} else {
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, glob_snmp_object.enum_print);
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT, glob_snmp_object.quick_print);
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, glob_snmp_object.oid_output_format);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmpget(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmpget)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GET, SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmpgetnext(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmpgetnext)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT, SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmpwalk(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Return all objects under the specified object id */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmpwalk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, (SNMP_CMD_WALK | SNMP_NUMERIC_KEYS), SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmprealwalk(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Return all objects including their respective object id withing the specified one */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmprealwalk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_WALK, SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmpset(string host, string community, mixed object_id, mixed type, mixed value [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Set the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmpset)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp_get_quick_print(void)
Return the current status of quick_print */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_get_quick_print)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp_set_quick_print(int quick_print)
Return all objects including their respective object id withing the specified one */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_quick_print)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT, (int)a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp_set_enum_print(int enum_print)
Return all values that are enums with their enum value instead of the raw integer */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_enum_print)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, (int) a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp_set_oid_output_format(int oid_format)
Set the OID output format. */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_oid_output_format)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch((int) a1) {
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_SUFFIX:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_MODULE:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_FULL:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NUMERIC:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_UCD:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NONE:
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP output print format '%d'", (int) a1);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp2_get(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_get)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GET, SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp2_getnext(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_getnext)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT, SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp2_walk(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Return all objects under the specified object id */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, (SNMP_CMD_WALK | SNMP_NUMERIC_KEYS), SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp2_real_walk(string host, string community, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Return all objects including their respective object id withing the specified one */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_real_walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_WALK, SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp2_set(string host, string community, mixed object_id, mixed type, mixed value [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Set the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_set)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp3_get(string host, string sec_name, string sec_level, string auth_protocol, string auth_passphrase, string priv_protocol, string priv_passphrase, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp3_get)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GET, SNMP_VERSION_3);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp3_getnext(string host, string sec_name, string sec_level, string auth_protocol, string auth_passphrase, string priv_protocol, string priv_passphrase, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp3_getnext)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT, SNMP_VERSION_3);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp3_walk(string host, string sec_name, string sec_level, string auth_protocol, string auth_passphrase, string priv_protocol, string priv_passphrase, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp3_walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, (SNMP_CMD_WALK | SNMP_NUMERIC_KEYS), SNMP_VERSION_3);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed snmp3_real_walk(string host, string sec_name, string sec_level, string auth_protocol, string auth_passphrase, string priv_protocol, string priv_passphrase, mixed object_id [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp3_real_walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_WALK, SNMP_VERSION_3);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp3_set(string host, string sec_name, string sec_level, string auth_protocol, string auth_passphrase, string priv_protocol, string priv_passphrase, mixed object_id, mixed type, mixed value [, int timeout [, int retries]])
Fetch the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp3_set)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, SNMP_VERSION_3);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp_set_valueretrieval(int method)
Specify the method how the SNMP values will be returned */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_valueretrieval)
{
long method;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &method) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method >= 0 && method <= (SNMP_VALUE_LIBRARY|SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN|SNMP_VALUE_OBJECT)) {
SNMP_G(valueretrieval) = method;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP value retrieval method '%ld'", method);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int snmp_get_valueretrieval()
Return the method how the SNMP values will be returned */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_get_valueretrieval)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(SNMP_G(valueretrieval));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool snmp_read_mib(string filename)
Reads and parses a MIB file into the active MIB tree. */
PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_read_mib)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &filename, &filename_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!read_mib(filename)) {
char *error = strerror(errno);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading MIB file '%s': %s", filename, error);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto SNMP SNMP::__construct(int version, string hostname, string community|securityName [, long timeout [, long retries]])
Creates a new SNMP session to specified host. */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
int a1_len, a2_len;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_error_handling error_handling;
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, NULL, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch(version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SNMP::close()
Close SNMP session */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, close)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SNMP::get(mixed object_id [, bool preserve_keys])
Fetch a SNMP object returning scalar for single OID and array of oid->value pairs for multi OID request */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, get)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GET, (-1));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SNMP::getnext(mixed object_id)
Fetch a SNMP object returning scalar for single OID and array of oid->value pairs for multi OID request */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, getnext)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT, (-1));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SNMP::walk(mixed object_id [, bool $suffix_as_key = FALSE [, int $max_repetitions [, int $non_repeaters]])
Return all objects including their respective object id withing the specified one as array of oid->value pairs */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_WALK, (-1));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SNMP::set(mixed object_id, mixed type, mixed value)
Set the value of a SNMP object */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, set)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, (-1));
}
/* {{{ proto bool SNMP::setSecurity(string sec_level, [ string auth_protocol, string auth_passphrase [, string priv_protocol, string priv_passphrase [, string contextName [, string contextEngineID]]]])
Set SNMPv3 security-related session parameters */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, setSecurity)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1 = "", *a2 = "", *a3 = "", *a4 = "", *a5 = "", *a6 = "", *a7 = "";
int a1_len = 0, a2_len = 0, a3_len = 0, a4_len = 0, a5_len = 0, a6_len = 0, a7_len = 0;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "s|ssssss", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &a3, &a3_len,
&a4, &a4_len, &a5, &a5_len, &a6, &a6_len, &a7, &a7_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (netsnmp_session_set_security(snmp_object->session, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7 TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto long SNMP::getErrno()
Get last error code number */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, getErrno)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
RETVAL_LONG(snmp_object->snmp_errno);
return;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto long SNMP::getError()
Get last error message */
PHP_METHOD(snmp, getError)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
RETVAL_STRING(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 1);
return;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ */
void php_snmp_add_property(HashTable *h, const char *name, size_t name_length, php_snmp_read_t read_func, php_snmp_write_t write_func TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_snmp_prop_handler p;
p.name = (char*) name;
p.name_length = name_length;
p.read_func = (read_func) ? read_func : NULL;
p.write_func = (write_func) ? write_func : NULL;
zend_hash_add(h, (char *)name, name_length + 1, &p, sizeof(php_snmp_prop_handler), NULL);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_read_property(zval *object, zval *member, int type[, const zend_literal *key])
Generic object property reader */
zval *php_snmp_read_property(zval *object, zval *member, int type, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval tmp_member;
zval *retval;
php_snmp_object *obj;
php_snmp_prop_handler *hnd;
int ret;
ret = FAILURE;
obj = (php_snmp_object *)zend_objects_get_address(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
tmp_member = *member;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
}
ret = zend_hash_find(&php_snmp_properties, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member)+1, (void **) &hnd);
if (ret == SUCCESS && hnd->read_func) {
ret = hnd->read_func(obj, &retval TSRMLS_CC);
if (ret == SUCCESS) {
/* ensure we're creating a temporary variable */
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(retval, 0);
} else {
retval = EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
} else {
zend_object_handlers * std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
retval = std_hnd->read_property(object, member, type, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
return(retval);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_write_property(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value[, const zend_literal *key])
Generic object property writer */
void php_snmp_write_property(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval tmp_member;
php_snmp_object *obj;
php_snmp_prop_handler *hnd;
int ret;
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
tmp_member = *member;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
}
ret = FAILURE;
obj = (php_snmp_object *)zend_objects_get_address(object TSRMLS_CC);
ret = zend_hash_find(&php_snmp_properties, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member) + 1, (void **) &hnd);
if (ret == SUCCESS && hnd->write_func) {
hnd->write_func(obj, value TSRMLS_CC);
if (! PZVAL_IS_REF(value) && Z_REFCOUNT_P(value) == 0) {
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&value);
}
} else {
zend_object_handlers * std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
std_hnd->write_property(object, member, value, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_has_property(zval *object, zval *member, int has_set_exists[, const zend_literal *key])
Generic object property checker */
static int php_snmp_has_property(zval *object, zval *member, int has_set_exists, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_snmp_prop_handler *hnd;
int ret = 0;
if (zend_hash_find(&php_snmp_properties, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member) + 1, (void **)&hnd) == SUCCESS) {
switch (has_set_exists) {
case 2:
ret = 1;
break;
case 0: {
zval *value = php_snmp_read_property(object, member, BP_VAR_IS, key TSRMLS_CC);
if (value != EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr)) {
ret = Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_NULL? 1:0;
/* refcount is 0 */
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&value);
}
break;
}
default: {
zval *value = php_snmp_read_property(object, member, BP_VAR_IS, key TSRMLS_CC);
if (value != EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr)) {
convert_to_boolean(value);
ret = Z_BVAL_P(value)? 1:0;
/* refcount is 0 */
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&value);
}
break;
}
}
} else {
zend_object_handlers * std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
ret = std_hnd->has_property(object, member, has_set_exists, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_snmp_get_properties(zval *object)
Returns all object properties. Injects SNMP properties into object on first call */
static HashTable *php_snmp_get_properties(zval *object TSRMLS_DC)
ulong num_key;
obj = (php_snmp_object *)zend_objects_get_address(object TSRMLS_CC);
props = zend_std_get_properties(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&php_snmp_properties, &pos);
while (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&php_snmp_properties, (void**)&hnd, &pos) == SUCCESS) {
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(&php_snmp_properties, &key, &key_len, &num_key, 0, &pos);
if (!hnd->read_func || hnd->read_func(obj, &val TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
val = EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
Z_ADDREF_P(val);
}
zend_hash_update(props, key, key_len, (void *)&val, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&php_snmp_properties, &pos);
}
return obj->zo.properties;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ */
static int php_snmp_read_info(php_snmp_object *snmp_object, zval **retval TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *val;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(*retval);
array_init(*retval);
if (snmp_object->session == NULL) {
return SUCCESS;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, snmp_object->session->peername, strlen(snmp_object->session->peername), 1);
add_assoc_zval(*retval, "hostname", val);
if (snmp_object->session == NULL) {
return SUCCESS;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, snmp_object->session->peername, strlen(snmp_object->session->peername), 1);
add_assoc_zval(*retval, "hostname", val);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
ZVAL_LONG(val, snmp_object->session->remote_port);
add_assoc_zval(*retval, "port", val);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
ZVAL_LONG(val, snmp_object->session->timeout);
add_assoc_zval(*retval, "timeout", val);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
ZVAL_LONG(val, snmp_object->session->retries);
add_assoc_zval(*retval, "retries", val);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
ZVAL_NULL(*retval);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,978
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size,
unsigned mac_size)
{
unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
const char has_explicit_iv =
s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
mac_size +
(has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
* time. */
if (overhead > rec->length)
return 0;
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
padding_length--;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c in the AES-NI functionality in the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via crafted CBC data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgent(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Agent registered, now pairing";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
Pair(object_path_,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback, error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPairError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NavigateOnUIThread(
const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
|
Medium
| 173,024
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct *t, int force_default)
{
int i;
struct k_sigaction *ka = &t->sighand->action[0];
for (i = _NSIG ; i != 0 ; i--) {
if (force_default || ka->sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN)
ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
ka->sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigemptyset(&ka->sa.sa_mask);
ka++;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The flush_signal_handlers function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 preserves the value of the sa_restorer field across an exec operation, which makes it easier for local users to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application containing a sigaction system call.
Commit Message: signal: always clear sa_restorer on execve
When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is
not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to
children. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by
examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction().
Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only
matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed
until the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer,
this is where it should be fixed.
Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written
since this would be the only use. Instead, we use
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places.
Example of the leak before applying this patch:
$ cat /proc/$$/maps
...
7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
$ ./leak
...
7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
...
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: size_t jsvGetString(const JsVar *v, char *str, size_t len) {
assert(len>0);
const char *s = jsvGetConstString(v);
if (s) {
/* don't use strncpy here because we don't
* want to pad the entire buffer with zeros */
len--;
int l = 0;
while (*s && l<len) {
str[l] = s[l];
l++;
}
str[l] = 0;
return l;
} else if (jsvIsInt(v)) {
itostr(v->varData.integer, str, 10);
return strlen(str);
} else if (jsvIsFloat(v)) {
ftoa_bounded(v->varData.floating, str, len);
return strlen(str);
} else if (jsvHasCharacterData(v)) {
assert(!jsvIsStringExt(v));
size_t l = len;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNewConst(&it, v, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
if (l--<=1) {
*str = 0;
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
return len;
}
*(str++) = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
*str = 0;
return len-l;
} else {
JsVar *stringVar = jsvAsString((JsVar*)v, false); // we know we're casting to non-const here
if (stringVar) {
size_t l = jsvGetString(stringVar, str, len); // call again - but this time with converted var
jsvUnLock(stringVar);
return l;
} else {
str[0] = 0;
jsExceptionHere(JSET_INTERNALERROR, "Variable type cannot be converted to string");
return 0;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via a Buffer Overflow during syntax parsing because a check for '0' is made for the wrong array element in jsvar.c.
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
|
Medium
| 169,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers(Platform::TouchPoint& point)
{
m_lastScreenPoint = point.m_screenPos;
m_lastFatFingersResult.reset(); // Theoretically this shouldn't be required. Keep it just in case states get mangled.
IntPoint contentPos(m_webPage->mapFromViewportToContents(point.m_pos));
m_webPage->postponeDocumentStyleRecalc();
m_lastFatFingersResult = FatFingers(m_webPage, contentPos, FatFingers::ClickableElement).findBestPoint();
m_webPage->resumeDocumentStyleRecalc();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,769
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void snd_pcm_period_elapsed(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
unsigned long flags;
if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream))
return;
runtime = substream->runtime;
snd_pcm_stream_lock_irqsave(substream, flags);
if (!snd_pcm_running(substream) ||
snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0(substream, 1) < 0)
goto _end;
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_TIMER
if (substream->timer_running)
snd_timer_interrupt(substream->timer, 1);
#endif
_end:
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irqrestore(substream, flags);
kill_fasync(&runtime->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the snd_pcm_period_elapsed function in sound/core/pcm_lib.c in the ALSA subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START command.
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 166,845
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_divpow2(jas_matrix_t *matrix, int n)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
int rowstep;
jas_seqent_t *data;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
*data = (*data >= 0) ? ((*data) >> n) :
(-((-(*data)) >> n));
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
* the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
* so that AppArmor can null terminate them
*/
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
args[size] = '\0';
}
/* task can only write its own attributes */
if (current != task)
return -EACCES;
args = value;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
return -EINVAL;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
return -EINVAL;
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else
goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
else
goto fail;
} else
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
fail:
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
aad.info = name;
aad.error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
return -EINVAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The apparmor_setprocattr function in security/apparmor/lsm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6.5 does not validate the buffer size, which allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an AppArmor setprocattr hook.
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 167,016
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tower_probe (struct usb_interface *interface, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct device *idev = &interface->dev;
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
struct lego_usb_tower *dev = NULL;
struct usb_host_interface *iface_desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor* endpoint;
struct tower_get_version_reply get_version_reply;
int i;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
int result;
/* allocate memory for our device state and initialize it */
dev = kmalloc (sizeof(struct lego_usb_tower), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
goto exit;
mutex_init(&dev->lock);
dev->udev = udev;
dev->open_count = 0;
dev->read_buffer = NULL;
dev->read_buffer_length = 0;
dev->read_packet_length = 0;
spin_lock_init (&dev->read_buffer_lock);
dev->packet_timeout_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(packet_timeout);
dev->read_last_arrival = jiffies;
init_waitqueue_head (&dev->read_wait);
init_waitqueue_head (&dev->write_wait);
dev->interrupt_in_buffer = NULL;
dev->interrupt_in_endpoint = NULL;
dev->interrupt_in_urb = NULL;
dev->interrupt_in_running = 0;
dev->interrupt_in_done = 0;
dev->interrupt_out_buffer = NULL;
dev->interrupt_out_endpoint = NULL;
dev->interrupt_out_urb = NULL;
dev->interrupt_out_busy = 0;
iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
/* set up the endpoint information */
for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(endpoint)) {
if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(endpoint))
dev->interrupt_in_endpoint = endpoint;
else
dev->interrupt_out_endpoint = endpoint;
}
}
if(dev->interrupt_in_endpoint == NULL) {
dev_err(idev, "interrupt in endpoint not found\n");
goto error;
}
if (dev->interrupt_out_endpoint == NULL) {
dev_err(idev, "interrupt out endpoint not found\n");
goto error;
}
dev->read_buffer = kmalloc (read_buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->read_buffer)
goto error;
dev->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc (usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->interrupt_in_endpoint), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->interrupt_in_buffer)
goto error;
dev->interrupt_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->interrupt_in_urb)
goto error;
dev->interrupt_out_buffer = kmalloc (write_buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->interrupt_out_buffer)
goto error;
dev->interrupt_out_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->interrupt_out_urb)
goto error;
dev->interrupt_in_interval = interrupt_in_interval ? interrupt_in_interval : dev->interrupt_in_endpoint->bInterval;
dev->interrupt_out_interval = interrupt_out_interval ? interrupt_out_interval : dev->interrupt_out_endpoint->bInterval;
/* we can register the device now, as it is ready */
usb_set_intfdata (interface, dev);
retval = usb_register_dev (interface, &tower_class);
if (retval) {
/* something prevented us from registering this driver */
dev_err(idev, "Not able to get a minor for this device.\n");
usb_set_intfdata (interface, NULL);
goto error;
}
dev->minor = interface->minor;
/* let the user know what node this device is now attached to */
dev_info(&interface->dev, "LEGO USB Tower #%d now attached to major "
"%d minor %d\n", (dev->minor - LEGO_USB_TOWER_MINOR_BASE),
USB_MAJOR, dev->minor);
/* get the firmware version and log it */
result = usb_control_msg (udev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0),
LEGO_USB_TOWER_REQUEST_GET_VERSION,
USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_DEVICE,
0,
0,
&get_version_reply,
sizeof(get_version_reply),
1000);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(idev, "LEGO USB Tower get version control request failed\n");
retval = result;
goto error;
}
dev_info(&interface->dev, "LEGO USB Tower firmware version is %d.%d "
"build %d\n", get_version_reply.major,
get_version_reply.minor,
le16_to_cpu(get_version_reply.build_no));
exit:
return retval;
error:
tower_delete(dev);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The tower_probe function in drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.1 allows local users (who are physically proximate for inserting a crafted USB device) to gain privileges by leveraging a write-what-where condition that occurs after a race condition and a NULL pointer dereference.
Commit Message: usb: misc: legousbtower: Fix NULL pointer deference
This patch fixes a NULL pointer dereference caused by a race codition in
the probe function of the legousbtower driver. It re-structures the
probe function to only register the interface after successfully reading
the board's firmware ID.
The probe function does not deregister the usb interface after an error
receiving the devices firmware ID. The device file registered
(/dev/usb/legousbtower%d) may be read/written globally before the probe
function returns. When tower_delete is called in the probe function
(after an r/w has been initiated), core dev structures are deleted while
the file operation functions are still running. If the 0 address is
mappable on the machine, this vulnerability can be used to create a
Local Priviege Escalation exploit via a write-what-where condition by
remapping dev->interrupt_out_buffer in tower_write. A forged USB device
and local program execution would be required for LPE. The USB device
would have to delay the control message in tower_probe and accept
the control urb in tower_open whilst guest code initiated a write to the
device file as tower_delete is called from the error in tower_probe.
This bug has existed since 2003. Patch tested by emulated device.
Reported-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Tested-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 167,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: shared_memory_handle(const gfx::GpuMemoryBufferHandle& handle) {
if (handle.type != gfx::SHARED_MEMORY_BUFFER &&
handle.type != gfx::DXGI_SHARED_HANDLE &&
handle.type != gfx::ANDROID_HARDWARE_BUFFER)
return mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle();
return mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle.handle, handle.handle.GetSize(),
false);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sdb_set_internal function in sdb.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file because of missing input validation in r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in libr/bin/dwarf.c.
Commit Message: Fix #10465 - Avoid string on low addresses (workaround) for corrupted dwarf
|
Medium
| 169,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OneClickSigninSyncStarter::OneClickSigninSyncStarter(
Profile* profile,
Browser* browser,
const std::string& session_index,
const std::string& email,
const std::string& password,
StartSyncMode start_mode,
bool force_same_tab_navigation,
ConfirmationRequired confirmation_required)
: start_mode_(start_mode),
force_same_tab_navigation_(force_same_tab_navigation),
confirmation_required_(confirmation_required),
weak_pointer_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
BrowserList::AddObserver(this);
Initialize(profile, browser);
SigninManager* manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
SigninManager::OAuthTokenFetchedCallback callback;
callback = base::Bind(&OneClickSigninSyncStarter::ConfirmSignin,
weak_pointer_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
manager->StartSignInWithCredentials(session_index, email, password, callback);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly determine the circumstances in which a renderer process can be considered a trusted process for sign-in and subsequent sync operations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct phishing attacks via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,245
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void read_conf(FILE *conffile)
{
char *buffer, *line, *val;
buffer = loadfile(conffile);
for (line = strtok(buffer, "\r\n"); line; line = strtok(NULL, "\r\n")) {
if (!strncmp(line, "export ", 7))
continue;
val = strchr(line, '=');
if (!val) {
printf("invalid configuration line\n");
break;
}
*val++ = '\0';
if (!strcmp(line, "JSON_INDENT"))
conf.indent = atoi(val);
if (!strcmp(line, "JSON_COMPACT"))
conf.compact = atoi(val);
if (!strcmp(line, "JSON_ENSURE_ASCII"))
conf.ensure_ascii = atoi(val);
if (!strcmp(line, "JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER"))
conf.preserve_order = atoi(val);
if (!strcmp(line, "JSON_SORT_KEYS"))
conf.sort_keys = atoi(val);
if (!strcmp(line, "STRIP"))
conf.strip = atoi(val);
}
free(buffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
Low
| 166,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: getword(f, word, newlinep, filename)
FILE *f;
char *word;
int *newlinep;
char *filename;
{
int c, len, escape;
int quoted, comment;
int value, digit, got, n;
#define isoctal(c) ((c) >= '0' && (c) < '8')
*newlinep = 0;
len = 0;
escape = 0;
comment = 0;
quoted = 0;
/*
* First skip white-space and comments.
*/
for (;;) {
c = getc(f);
if (c == EOF)
break;
/*
* A newline means the end of a comment; backslash-newline
* is ignored. Note that we cannot have escape && comment.
*/
if (c == '\n') {
if (!escape) {
*newlinep = 1;
comment = 0;
} else
escape = 0;
continue;
}
/*
* Ignore characters other than newline in a comment.
*/
if (comment)
continue;
/*
* If this character is escaped, we have a word start.
*/
if (escape)
break;
/*
* If this is the escape character, look at the next character.
*/
if (c == '\\') {
escape = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* If this is the start of a comment, ignore the rest of the line.
*/
if (c == '#') {
comment = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* A non-whitespace character is the start of a word.
*/
if (!isspace(c))
break;
}
/*
* Process characters until the end of the word.
*/
while (c != EOF) {
if (escape) {
/*
* This character is escaped: backslash-newline is ignored,
* various other characters indicate particular values
* as for C backslash-escapes.
*/
escape = 0;
if (c == '\n') {
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
got = 0;
switch (c) {
case 'a':
value = '\a';
break;
case 'b':
value = '\b';
break;
case 'f':
value = '\f';
break;
case 'n':
value = '\n';
break;
case 'r':
value = '\r';
break;
case 's':
value = ' ';
break;
case 't':
value = '\t';
break;
default:
if (isoctal(c)) {
/*
* \ddd octal sequence
*/
value = 0;
for (n = 0; n < 3 && isoctal(c); ++n) {
value = (value << 3) + (c & 07);
c = getc(f);
}
got = 1;
break;
}
if (c == 'x') {
/*
* \x<hex_string> sequence
*/
value = 0;
c = getc(f);
for (n = 0; n < 2 && isxdigit(c); ++n) {
digit = toupper(c) - '0';
if (digit > 10)
digit += '0' + 10 - 'A';
value = (value << 4) + digit;
c = getc (f);
}
got = 1;
break;
}
/*
* Otherwise the character stands for itself.
*/
value = c;
break;
}
/*
* Store the resulting character for the escape sequence.
*/
if (len < MAXWORDLEN-1)
word[len] = value;
++len;
if (!got)
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
/*
* Backslash starts a new escape sequence.
*/
if (c == '\\') {
escape = 1;
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
/*
* Not escaped: check for the start or end of a quoted
* section and see if we've reached the end of the word.
*/
if (quoted) {
if (c == quoted) {
quoted = 0;
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
} else if (c == '"' || c == '\'') {
quoted = c;
c = getc(f);
continue;
} else if (isspace(c) || c == '#') {
ungetc (c, f);
break;
}
/*
* An ordinary character: store it in the word and get another.
*/
if (len < MAXWORDLEN-1)
word[len] = c;
++len;
c = getc(f);
}
/*
* End of the word: check for errors.
*/
if (c == EOF) {
if (ferror(f)) {
if (errno == 0)
errno = EIO;
option_error("Error reading %s: %m", filename);
die(1);
}
/*
* If len is zero, then we didn't find a word before the
* end of the file.
*/
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (quoted)
option_error("warning: quoted word runs to end of file (%.20s...)",
filename, word);
}
/*
* Warn if the word was too long, and append a terminating null.
*/
if (len >= MAXWORDLEN) {
option_error("warning: word in file %s too long (%.20s...)",
filename, word);
len = MAXWORDLEN - 1;
}
word[len] = 0;
return 1;
#undef isoctal
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in the getword function in options.c in pppd in Paul's PPP Package (ppp) before 2.4.7 allows attackers to *access privileged options* via a long word in an options file, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow that *[corrupts] security-relevant variables.*
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
|
Low
| 166,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
d* (tod(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert4();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,586
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void lxc_execute_bind_init(struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
int ret;
char path[PATH_MAX], destpath[PATH_MAX], *p;
/* If init exists in the container, don't bind mount a static one */
p = choose_init(conf->rootfs.mount);
if (p) {
free(p);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, SBINDIR "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long searching for lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(path)) {
INFO("%s does not exist on host", path);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(destpath, PATH_MAX, "%s%s", conf->rootfs.mount, "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long for container's lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(destpath)) {
FILE * pathfile = fopen(destpath, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create mount target '%s'", destpath);
return;
}
fclose(pathfile);
}
ret = mount(path, destpath, "none", MS_BIND, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
SYSERROR("Failed to bind lxc.init.static into container");
INFO("lxc.init.static bound into container at %s", path);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,712
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ASessionDescription::getFormatType(
size_t index, unsigned long *PT,
AString *desc, AString *params) const {
AString format;
getFormat(index, &format);
const char *lastSpacePos = strrchr(format.c_str(), ' ');
CHECK(lastSpacePos != NULL);
char *end;
unsigned long x = strtoul(lastSpacePos + 1, &end, 10);
CHECK_GT(end, lastSpacePos + 1);
CHECK_EQ(*end, '\0');
*PT = x;
char key[20];
sprintf(key, "a=rtpmap:%lu", x);
CHECK(findAttribute(index, key, desc));
sprintf(key, "a=fmtp:%lu", x);
if (!findAttribute(index, key, params)) {
params->clear();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in rtsp/ASessionDescription.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25747670.
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
|
Medium
| 173,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void pin_remove(struct fs_pin *pin)
{
spin_lock(&pin_lock);
hlist_del(&pin->m_list);
hlist_del(&pin->s_list);
spin_unlock(&pin_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&pin->wait.lock);
pin->done = 1;
wake_up_locked(&pin->wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&pin->wait.lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The fs_pin implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.0.5 does not ensure the internal consistency of a certain list data structure, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging user-namespace root access for an MNT_DETACH umount2 system call, related to fs/fs_pin.c and include/linux/fs_pin.h.
Commit Message: fs_pin: Allow for the possibility that m_list or s_list go unused.
This is needed to support lazily umounting locked mounts. Because the
entire unmounted subtree needs to stay together until there are no
users with references to any part of the subtree.
To support this guarantee that the fs_pin m_list and s_list nodes
are initialized by initializing them in init_fs_pin allowing
for the possibility that pin_insert_group does not touch them.
Further use hlist_del_init in pin_remove so that there is
a hlist_unhashed test before the list we attempt to update
the previous list item.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Low
| 167,562
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void tv_details_row_activated(
GtkTreeView *tree_view,
GtkTreePath *tree_path_UNUSED,
GtkTreeViewColumn *column,
gpointer user_data)
{
gchar *item_name;
struct problem_item *item = get_current_problem_item_or_NULL(tree_view, &item_name);
if (!item || !(item->flags & CD_FLAG_TXT))
goto ret;
if (!strchr(item->content, '\n')) /* one line? */
goto ret; /* yes */
gint exitcode;
gchar *arg[3];
arg[0] = (char *) "xdg-open";
arg[1] = concat_path_file(g_dump_dir_name, item_name);
arg[2] = NULL;
const gboolean spawn_ret = g_spawn_sync(NULL, arg, NULL,
G_SPAWN_SEARCH_PATH | G_SPAWN_STDOUT_TO_DEV_NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &exitcode, NULL);
if (spawn_ret == FALSE || exitcode != EXIT_SUCCESS)
{
GtkWidget *dialog = gtk_dialog_new_with_buttons(_("View/edit a text file"),
GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant),
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL | GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
NULL, NULL);
GtkWidget *vbox = gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
GtkWidget *scrolled = gtk_scrolled_window_new(NULL, NULL);
GtkWidget *textview = gtk_text_view_new();
gtk_dialog_add_button(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), _("_Save"), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
gtk_dialog_add_button(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), _("_Cancel"), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(vbox), scrolled, TRUE, TRUE, 0);
gtk_widget_set_size_request(scrolled, 640, 480);
gtk_widget_show(scrolled);
#if ((GTK_MAJOR_VERSION == 3 && GTK_MINOR_VERSION < 7) || (GTK_MAJOR_VERSION == 3 && GTK_MINOR_VERSION == 7 && GTK_MICRO_VERSION < 8))
/* http://developer.gnome.org/gtk3/unstable/GtkScrolledWindow.html#gtk-scrolled-window-add-with-viewport */
/* gtk_scrolled_window_add_with_viewport has been deprecated since version 3.8 and should not be used in newly-written code. */
gtk_scrolled_window_add_with_viewport(GTK_SCROLLED_WINDOW(scrolled), textview);
#else
/* gtk_container_add() will now automatically add a GtkViewport if the child doesn't implement GtkScrollable. */
gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(scrolled), textview);
#endif
gtk_widget_show(textview);
load_text_to_text_view(GTK_TEXT_VIEW(textview), item_name);
if (gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)) == GTK_RESPONSE_OK)
save_text_from_text_view(GTK_TEXT_VIEW(textview), item_name);
gtk_widget_destroy(textview);
gtk_widget_destroy(scrolled);
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
}
free(arg[1]);
ret:
g_free(item_name);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: libreport 2.0.7 before 2.6.3 only saves changes to the first file when editing a crash report, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors related to the (1) backtrace, (2) cmdline, (3) environ, (4) open_fds, (5) maps, (6) smaps, (7) hostname, (8) remote, (9) ks.cfg, or (10) anaconda-tb file attachment included in a Red Hat Bugzilla bug report.
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
ASSERT(context);
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(context->isDocument());
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystemInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,424
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct ias_attrib *attrib;
int name_len;
int attr_len;
char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
__u8 *fp;
int n;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(skb != NULL, return;);
fp = skb->data;
n = 1;
name_len = fp[n++];
memcpy(name, fp+n, name_len); n+=name_len;
name[name_len] = '\0';
attr_len = fp[n++];
memcpy(attr, fp+n, attr_len); n+=attr_len;
attr[attr_len] = '\0';
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: Looking up %s: %s\n", name, attr);
obj = irias_find_object(name);
if (obj == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Object %s not found\n", name);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, 0x1235, IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: found %s, id=%d\n", obj->name, obj->id);
attrib = irias_find_attrib(obj, attr);
if (attrib == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Attribute %s not found\n", attr);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id,
IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
/* We have a match; send the value. */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id, IAS_SUCCESS,
attrib->value);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication function in net/irda/iriap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging connectivity to an IrDA infrared network and sending a large integer value for a (1) name length or (2) attribute length.
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_mv_buf_mgr_add_bufs(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 max_dpb_size;
WORD32 mv_bank_size_allocated;
WORD32 pic_mv_bank_size;
sps_t *ps_sps;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Initialize MV Bank buffer manager */
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
/* Compute the number of MV Bank buffers needed */
max_dpb_size = ps_sps->ai1_sps_max_dec_pic_buffering[ps_sps->i1_sps_max_sub_layers - 1];
/* Allocate one extra MV Bank to handle current frame
* In case of asynchronous parsing and processing, number of buffers should increase here
* based on when parsing and processing threads are synchronized
*/
max_dpb_size++;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_codec->pv_mv_bank_buf_base;
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
ps_codec->ps_mv_buf = ps_mv_buf;
mv_bank_size_allocated = ps_codec->i4_total_mv_bank_size - max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
/* Compute MV bank size per picture */
pic_mv_bank_size = ihevcd_get_pic_mv_bank_size(ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples));
for(i = 0; i < max_dpb_size; i++)
{
WORD32 buf_ret;
WORD32 num_pu;
WORD32 num_ctb;
WORD32 pic_size;
pic_size = ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples);
num_pu = pic_size / (MIN_PU_SIZE * MIN_PU_SIZE);
num_ctb = pic_size / (MIN_CTB_SIZE * MIN_CTB_SIZE);
mv_bank_size_allocated -= pic_mv_bank_size;
if(mv_bank_size_allocated < 0)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
return IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
}
ps_mv_buf->pu4_pic_pu_idx = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (num_ctb + 1) * sizeof(WORD32);
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_pu_map = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu;
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_slice_map = (UWORD16 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += ALIGN4(num_ctb * sizeof(UWORD16));
ps_mv_buf->ps_pic_pu = (pu_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu * sizeof(pu_t);
buf_ret = ihevc_buf_mgr_add((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, ps_mv_buf, i);
if(0 != buf_ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
return IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34819017.
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
|
Medium
| 173,999
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(BImgBuff,i,image,bpp);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);;
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned bs = crypto_ablkcipher_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(
&ctx->req));
struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned long iovlen;
struct iovec *iov;
int err = -EAGAIN;
int used;
long copied = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
iovlen--, iov++) {
unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
while (seglen) {
sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
sg = sgl->sg;
while (!sg->length)
sg++;
used = ctx->used;
if (!used) {
err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
used = min_t(unsigned long, used, seglen);
used = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl, from, used, 1);
err = used;
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
if (ctx->more || used < ctx->used)
used -= used % bs;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!used)
goto free;
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, sg,
ctx->rsgl.sg, used,
ctx->iv);
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(
ctx->enc ?
crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(&ctx->req) :
crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(&ctx->req),
&ctx->completion);
free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl);
if (err)
goto unlock;
copied += used;
from += used;
seglen -= used;
skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used);
}
}
err = 0;
unlock:
skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,485
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iovec *from,
int offset, size_t count)
{
int len = iov_length(from, count) - offset;
int copy = skb_headlen(skb);
int size, offset1 = 0;
int i = 0;
/* Skip over from offset */
while (count && (offset >= from->iov_len)) {
offset -= from->iov_len;
++from;
--count;
}
/* copy up to skb headlen */
while (count && (copy > 0)) {
size = min_t(unsigned int, copy, from->iov_len - offset);
if (copy_from_user(skb->data + offset1, from->iov_base + offset,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy > size) {
++from;
--count;
offset = 0;
} else
offset += size;
copy -= size;
offset1 += size;
}
if (len == offset1)
return 0;
while (count--) {
struct page *page[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
int num_pages;
unsigned long base;
unsigned long truesize;
len = from->iov_len - offset;
if (!len) {
offset = 0;
++from;
continue;
}
base = (unsigned long)from->iov_base + offset;
size = ((base & ~PAGE_MASK) + len + ~PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
num_pages = get_user_pages_fast(base, size, 0, &page[i]);
if ((num_pages != size) ||
(num_pages > MAX_SKB_FRAGS - skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)) {
for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++)
put_page(page[i]);
return -EFAULT;
}
truesize = size * PAGE_SIZE;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->len += len;
skb->truesize += truesize;
atomic_add(truesize, &skb->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
while (len) {
int off = base & ~PAGE_MASK;
int size = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page[i], off, size);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
/* increase sk_wmem_alloc */
base += size;
len -= size;
i++;
}
offset = 0;
++from;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the macvtap device driver in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5, when running in certain configurations, allows privileged KVM guest users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a long descriptor with a long vector length.
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LogErrorEventDescription(Display* dpy,
const XErrorEvent& error_event) {
char error_str[256];
char request_str[256];
XGetErrorText(dpy, error_event.error_code, error_str, sizeof(error_str));
strncpy(request_str, "Unknown", sizeof(request_str));
if (error_event.request_code < 128) {
std::string num = base::UintToString(error_event.request_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", num.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
} else {
int num_ext;
char** ext_list = XListExtensions(dpy, &num_ext);
for (int i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
int ext_code, first_event, first_error;
XQueryExtension(dpy, ext_list[i], &ext_code, &first_event, &first_error);
if (error_event.request_code == ext_code) {
std::string msg = StringPrintf(
"%s.%d", ext_list[i], error_event.minor_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", msg.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
break;
}
}
XFreeExtensionList(ext_list);
}
LOG(ERROR)
<< "X Error detected: "
<< "serial " << error_event.serial << ", "
<< "error_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.error_code)
<< " (" << error_str << "), "
<< "request_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.request_code) << ", "
<< "minor_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.minor_code)
<< " (" << request_str << ")";
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 on Linux uses weak permissions for shared memory segments, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx,
void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
PicContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame *frame = data;
uint32_t *palette;
int bits_per_plane, bpp, etype, esize, npal, pos_after_pal;
int i, x, y, plane, tmp, ret, val;
bytestream2_init(&s->g, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 11)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bytestream2_get_le16u(&s->g) != 0x1234)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->width = bytestream2_get_le16u(&s->g);
s->height = bytestream2_get_le16u(&s->g);
bytestream2_skip(&s->g, 4);
tmp = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
bits_per_plane = tmp & 0xF;
s->nb_planes = (tmp >> 4) + 1;
bpp = bits_per_plane * s->nb_planes;
if (bits_per_plane > 8 || bpp < 1 || bpp > 32) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Unsupported bit depth");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (bytestream2_peek_byte(&s->g) == 0xFF || bpp == 1 || bpp == 4 || bpp == 8) {
bytestream2_skip(&s->g, 2);
etype = bytestream2_get_le16(&s->g);
esize = bytestream2_get_le16(&s->g);
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < esize)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else {
etype = -1;
esize = 0;
}
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
if (av_image_check_size(s->width, s->height, 0, avctx) < 0)
return -1;
if (s->width != avctx->width && s->height != avctx->height) {
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, s->width, s->height);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, frame, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
memset(frame->data[0], 0, s->height * frame->linesize[0]);
frame->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
frame->palette_has_changed = 1;
pos_after_pal = bytestream2_tell(&s->g) + esize;
palette = (uint32_t*)frame->data[1];
if (etype == 1 && esize > 1 && bytestream2_peek_byte(&s->g) < 6) {
int idx = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
npal = 4;
for (i = 0; i < npal; i++)
palette[i] = ff_cga_palette[ cga_mode45_index[idx][i] ];
} else if (etype == 2) {
npal = FFMIN(esize, 16);
for (i = 0; i < npal; i++) {
int pal_idx = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
palette[i] = ff_cga_palette[FFMIN(pal_idx, 15)];
}
} else if (etype == 3) {
npal = FFMIN(esize, 16);
for (i = 0; i < npal; i++) {
int pal_idx = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
palette[i] = ff_ega_palette[FFMIN(pal_idx, 63)];
}
} else if (etype == 4 || etype == 5) {
npal = FFMIN(esize / 3, 256);
for (i = 0; i < npal; i++) {
palette[i] = bytestream2_get_be24(&s->g) << 2;
palette[i] |= 0xFFU << 24 | palette[i] >> 6 & 0x30303;
}
} else {
if (bpp == 1) {
npal = 2;
palette[0] = 0xFF000000;
palette[1] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
} else if (bpp == 2) {
npal = 4;
for (i = 0; i < npal; i++)
palette[i] = ff_cga_palette[ cga_mode45_index[0][i] ];
} else {
npal = 16;
memcpy(palette, ff_cga_palette, npal * 4);
}
}
memset(palette + npal, 0, AVPALETTE_SIZE - npal * 4);
bytestream2_seek(&s->g, pos_after_pal, SEEK_SET);
val = 0;
y = s->height - 1;
if (bytestream2_get_le16(&s->g)) {
x = 0;
plane = 0;
while (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) >= 6) {
int stop_size, marker, t1, t2;
t1 = bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g);
t2 = bytestream2_get_le16(&s->g);
stop_size = t1 - FFMIN(t1, t2);
bytestream2_skip(&s->g, 2);
marker = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
while (plane < s->nb_planes &&
bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) > stop_size) {
int run = 1;
val = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
if (val == marker) {
run = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
if (run == 0)
run = bytestream2_get_le16(&s->g);
val = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
}
if (!bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g))
break;
if (bits_per_plane == 8) {
picmemset_8bpp(s, frame, val, run, &x, &y);
if (y < 0)
goto finish;
} else {
picmemset(s, frame, val, run, &x, &y, &plane, bits_per_plane);
}
}
}
if (x < avctx->width) {
int run = (y + 1) * avctx->width - x;
if (bits_per_plane == 8)
picmemset_8bpp(s, frame, val, run, &x, &y);
else
picmemset(s, frame, val, run / (8 / bits_per_plane), &x, &y, &plane, bits_per_plane);
}
} else {
while (y >= 0 && bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) > 0) {
memcpy(frame->data[0] + y * frame->linesize[0], s->g.buffer, FFMIN(avctx->width, bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g)));
bytestream2_skip(&s->g, avctx->width);
y--;
}
}
finish:
*got_frame = 1;
return avpkt->size;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FFmpeg before 2017-02-07 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the decode_frame function in libavcodec/pictordec.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/pictordec: Fix logic error
Fixes: 559/clusterfuzz-testcase-6424225917173760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Low
| 168,249
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void mntput_no_expire(struct mount *mnt)
{
rcu_read_lock();
mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
if (likely(mnt->mnt_ns)) { /* shouldn't be the last one */
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
lock_mount_hash();
if (mnt_get_count(mnt)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
unlock_mount_hash();
return;
}
if (unlikely(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
unlock_mount_hash();
return;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_DOOMED;
rcu_read_unlock();
list_del(&mnt->mnt_instance);
unlock_mount_hash();
if (likely(!(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL))) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
if (likely(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
init_task_work(&mnt->mnt_rcu, __cleanup_mnt);
if (!task_work_add(task, &mnt->mnt_rcu, true))
return;
}
if (llist_add(&mnt->mnt_llist, &delayed_mntput_list))
schedule_delayed_work(&delayed_mntput_work, 1);
return;
}
cleanup_mnt(mnt);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 processes MNT_DETACH umount2 system calls without verifying that the MNT_LOCKED flag is unset, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and navigate to filesystem locations beneath a mount by calling umount2 within a user namespace.
Commit Message: mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Low
| 167,589
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EAS_RESULT DLSParser (EAS_HW_DATA_HANDLE hwInstData, EAS_FILE_HANDLE fileHandle, EAS_I32 offset, EAS_DLSLIB_HANDLE *ppDLS)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA dls;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 pos;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 size;
EAS_I32 instSize;
EAS_I32 rgnPoolSize;
EAS_I32 artPoolSize;
EAS_I32 waveLenSize;
EAS_I32 endDLS;
EAS_I32 wvplPos;
EAS_I32 wvplSize;
EAS_I32 linsPos;
EAS_I32 linsSize;
EAS_I32 ptblPos;
EAS_I32 ptblSize;
void *p;
/* zero counts and pointers */
EAS_HWMemSet(&dls, 0, sizeof(dls));
/* save file handle and hwInstData to save copying pointers around */
dls.hwInstData = hwInstData;
dls.fileHandle = fileHandle;
/* NULL return value in case of error */
*ppDLS = NULL;
/* seek to start of DLS and read in RIFF tag and set processor endian flag */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(dls.hwInstData, dls.fileHandle, offset)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWReadFile(dls.hwInstData, dls.fileHandle, &temp, sizeof(temp), &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* check for processor endian-ness */
dls.bigEndian = (temp == CHUNK_RIFF);
/* first chunk should be DLS */
pos = offset;
if ((result = NextChunk(&dls, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (temp != CHUNK_DLS)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Expected DLS chunk, got %08lx\n", temp); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* no instrument or wavepool chunks */
linsSize = wvplSize = ptblSize = linsPos = wvplPos = ptblPos = 0;
/* scan the chunks in the DLS list */
endDLS = offset + size;
pos = offset + 12;
while (pos < endDLS)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the next chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(&dls, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_CDL:
if ((result = Parse_cdl(&dls, size, &temp)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (!temp)
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
break;
case CHUNK_LINS:
linsPos = chunkPos + 12;
linsSize = size - 4;
break;
case CHUNK_WVPL:
wvplPos = chunkPos + 12;
wvplSize = size - 4;
break;
case CHUNK_PTBL:
ptblPos = chunkPos + 8;
ptblSize = size - 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* must have a lins chunk */
if (linsSize == 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No lins chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a wvpl chunk */
if (wvplSize == 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No wvpl chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a ptbl chunk */
if ((ptblSize == 0) || (ptblSize > DLS_MAX_WAVE_COUNT * sizeof(POOLCUE) + sizeof(POOLTABLE)))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No ptbl chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* pre-parse the wave pool chunk */
if ((result = Parse_ptbl(&dls, ptblPos, wvplPos, wvplSize)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* limit check */
if ((dls.waveCount == 0) || (dls.waveCount > DLS_MAX_WAVE_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #waves [%u]\n", dls.waveCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* allocate memory for wsmp data */
dls.wsmpData = EAS_HWMalloc(dls.hwInstData, (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_WSMP_DATA) * dls.waveCount));
if (dls.wsmpData == NULL)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "EAS_HWMalloc for wsmp data failed\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
EAS_HWMemSet(dls.wsmpData, 0, (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_WSMP_DATA) * dls.waveCount));
/* pre-parse the lins chunk */
result = Parse_lins(&dls, linsPos, linsSize);
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
{
/* limit check */
if ((dls.regionCount == 0) || (dls.regionCount > DLS_MAX_REGION_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #regions [%u]\n", dls.regionCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* limit check */
if ((dls.artCount == 0) || (dls.artCount > DLS_MAX_ART_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #articulations [%u]\n", dls.regionCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* limit check */
if ((dls.instCount == 0) || (dls.instCount > DLS_MAX_INST_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #instruments [%u]\n", dls.instCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* Allocate memory for the converted DLS data */
/* calculate size of instrument data */
instSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_PROGRAM) * dls.instCount);
/* calculate size of region pool */
rgnPoolSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_DLS_REGION) * dls.regionCount);
/* calculate size of articulation pool, add one for default articulation */
dls.artCount++;
artPoolSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_DLS_ARTICULATION) * dls.artCount);
/* calculate size of wave length and offset arrays */
waveLenSize = (EAS_I32) (dls.waveCount * sizeof(EAS_U32));
/* calculate final memory size */
size = (EAS_I32) sizeof(S_EAS) + instSize + rgnPoolSize + artPoolSize + (2 * waveLenSize) + (EAS_I32) dls.wavePoolSize;
if (size <= 0) {
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* allocate the main EAS chunk */
dls.pDLS = EAS_HWMalloc(dls.hwInstData, size);
if (dls.pDLS == NULL)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "EAS_HWMalloc failed for DLS memory allocation size %ld\n", size); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
EAS_HWMemSet(dls.pDLS, 0, size);
dls.pDLS->refCount = 1;
p = PtrOfs(dls.pDLS, sizeof(S_EAS));
/* setup pointer to programs */
dls.pDLS->numDLSPrograms = (EAS_U16) dls.instCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSPrograms = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, instSize);
/* setup pointer to regions */
dls.pDLS->pDLSRegions = p;
dls.pDLS->numDLSRegions = (EAS_U16) dls.regionCount;
p = PtrOfs(p, rgnPoolSize);
/* setup pointer to articulations */
dls.pDLS->numDLSArticulations = (EAS_U16) dls.artCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSArticulations = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, artPoolSize);
/* setup pointer to wave length table */
dls.pDLS->numDLSSamples = (EAS_U16) dls.waveCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSSampleLen = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, waveLenSize);
/* setup pointer to wave offsets table */
dls.pDLS->pDLSSampleOffsets = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, waveLenSize);
/* setup pointer to wave pool */
dls.pDLS->pDLSSamples = p;
/* clear filter flag */
dls.filterUsed = EAS_FALSE;
/* parse the wave pool and load samples */
result = Parse_ptbl(&dls, ptblPos, wvplPos, wvplSize);
}
/* create the default articulation */
Convert_art(&dls, &defaultArt, 0);
dls.artCount = 1;
/* parse the lins chunk and load instruments */
dls.regionCount = dls.instCount = 0;
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
result = Parse_lins(&dls, linsPos, linsSize);
/* clean up any temporary objects that were allocated */
if (dls.wsmpData)
EAS_HWFree(dls.hwInstData, dls.wsmpData);
/* if successful, return a pointer to the EAS collection */
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
{
*ppDLS = dls.pDLS;
#ifdef _DEBUG_DLS
DumpDLS(dls.pDLS);
#endif
}
/* something went wrong, deallocate the EAS collection */
else
DLSCleanup(dls.hwInstData, dls.pDLS);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_mdls.c in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference, and device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29770686.
Commit Message: Fix NULL pointer dereference
Bug: 29770686
Bug: 23304983
Change-Id: I1648aab90bc281702a00744bf884ae8bb8009412
|
Medium
| 173,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void vlan_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_802_1Q_VLAN;
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
dev->tx_queue_len = 0;
dev->netdev_ops = &vlan_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
dev->ethtool_ops = &vlan_ethtool_ops;
memset(dev->broadcast, 0, ETH_ALEN);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckIfSuggestedPathExists(
int32 download_id,
const FilePath& unverified_path,
bool should_prompt,
bool is_forced_path,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const FilePath& default_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
FilePath target_path(unverified_path);
file_util::CreateDirectory(default_path);
FilePath dir = target_path.DirName();
FilePath filename = target_path.BaseName();
if (!file_util::PathIsWritable(dir)) {
VLOG(1) << "Unable to write to directory \"" << dir.value() << "\"";
should_prompt = true;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DOCUMENTS, &dir);
target_path = dir.Append(filename);
}
bool should_uniquify =
(!is_forced_path &&
(danger_type == content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS ||
should_prompt));
bool should_overwrite =
(should_uniquify || is_forced_path);
bool should_create_marker = (should_uniquify && !should_prompt);
if (should_uniquify) {
int uniquifier =
download_util::GetUniquePathNumberWithCrDownload(target_path);
if (uniquifier > 0) {
target_path = target_path.InsertBeforeExtensionASCII(
StringPrintf(" (%d)", uniquifier));
} else if (uniquifier == -1) {
VLOG(1) << "Unable to find a unique path for suggested path \""
<< target_path.value() << "\"";
should_prompt = true;
}
}
if (should_create_marker)
file_util::WriteFile(download_util::GetCrDownloadPath(target_path), "", 0);
DownloadItem::TargetDisposition disposition;
if (should_prompt)
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT;
else if (should_overwrite)
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE;
else
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathExistenceAvailable,
this, download_id, target_path, disposition, danger_type));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,874
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DECLAREreadFunc(readContigTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth && colb < imagew; col += tw) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
uint32 oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, width,
oskew + iskew, oskew );
} else
cpStripToTile(bufp + colb,
tilebuf, nrow, tilew,
iskew, 0);
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in tools/tiffcp.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610
|
Medium
| 168,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_do_open_reclaim(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
int delegation_type = 0;
int status;
opendata = nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(ctx, state);
if (IS_ERR(opendata))
return PTR_ERR(opendata);
opendata->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS;
opendata->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(state->inode)->delegation);
if (delegation != NULL && test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags) != 0)
delegation_type = delegation->type;
rcu_read_unlock();
opendata->o_arg.u.delegation_type = delegation_type;
status = nfs4_open_recover(opendata, state);
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,685
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_matching_model_microcode(int cpu, unsigned long start,
void *data, size_t size,
struct mc_saved_data *mc_saved_data,
unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd,
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
{
u8 *ucode_ptr = data;
unsigned int leftover = size;
enum ucode_state state = UCODE_OK;
unsigned int mc_size;
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header;
struct microcode_intel *mc_saved_tmp[MAX_UCODE_COUNT];
unsigned int mc_saved_count = mc_saved_data->mc_saved_count;
int i;
while (leftover) {
mc_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)ucode_ptr;
mc_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
if (!mc_size || mc_size > leftover ||
microcode_sanity_check(ucode_ptr, 0) < 0)
break;
leftover -= mc_size;
/*
* Since APs with same family and model as the BSP may boot in
* the platform, we need to find and save microcode patches
* with the same family and model as the BSP.
*/
if (matching_model_microcode(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig) !=
UCODE_OK) {
ucode_ptr += mc_size;
continue;
}
_save_mc(mc_saved_tmp, ucode_ptr, &mc_saved_count);
ucode_ptr += mc_size;
}
if (leftover) {
state = UCODE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (mc_saved_count == 0) {
state = UCODE_NFOUND;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < mc_saved_count; i++)
mc_saved_in_initrd[i] = (unsigned long)mc_saved_tmp[i] - start;
mc_saved_data->mc_saved_count = mc_saved_count;
out:
return state;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the get_matching_model_microcode function in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel_early.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0 allows context-dependent attackers to gain privileges by constructing a crafted microcode header and leveraging root privileges for write access to the initrd.
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
Medium
| 166,679
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CreatePrintSettingsDictionary(DictionaryValue* dict) {
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, false);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, printing::GRAY);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, true);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, printing::SIMPLEX);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, 1);
dict->SetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, "dummy");
dict->SetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, "0xb33fbeef");
dict->SetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, 12345);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, true);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType, printing::DEFAULT_MARGINS);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingPreviewModifiable, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,858
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar_archive_data *phar, char *filename, int filename_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *s;
while ((s = zend_memrchr(filename, '/', filename_len))) {
filename_len = s - filename;
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_add_empty_element(&phar->virtual_dirs, filename, filename_len)) {
break;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the phar_parse_zipfile function in ext/phar/zip.c in PHP before 5.5.30 and 5.6.x before 5.6.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized pointer dereference and application crash) by including the / filename in a .zip PHAR archive.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,572
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::DidChangeState(
content::PresentationConnectionState state) {
if (state == content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CONNECTED) {
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Connected);
} else if (state == content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED) {
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Closed);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 40.0.2214.111 on Windows, OS X, and Linux and before 40.0.2214.109 on Android allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
|
Low
| 172,044
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI int php_var_unserialize(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER)
{
const unsigned char *cursor, *limit, *marker, *start;
zval **rval_ref;
limit = max;
cursor = *p;
if (YYCURSOR >= YYLIMIT) {
return 0;
}
if (var_hash && cursor[0] != 'R') {
var_push(var_hash, rval);
}
start = cursor;
#line 496 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
{
YYCTYPE yych;
static const unsigned char yybm[] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128,
128, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
};
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 7) YYFILL(7);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
switch (yych) {
case 'C':
case 'O': goto yy13;
case 'N': goto yy5;
case 'R': goto yy2;
case 'S': goto yy10;
case 'a': goto yy11;
case 'b': goto yy6;
case 'd': goto yy8;
case 'i': goto yy7;
case 'o': goto yy12;
case 'r': goto yy4;
case 's': goto yy9;
case '}': goto yy14;
default: goto yy16;
}
yy2:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy95;
yy3:
#line 861 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{ return 0; }
#line 558 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy4:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy89;
goto yy3;
yy5:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == ';') goto yy87;
goto yy3;
yy6:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy83;
goto yy3;
yy7:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy77;
goto yy3;
yy8:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy53;
goto yy3;
yy9:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy46;
goto yy3;
yy10:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy39;
goto yy3;
yy11:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy32;
goto yy3;
yy12:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy25;
goto yy3;
yy13:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy17;
goto yy3;
yy14:
++YYCURSOR;
#line 855 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
/* this is the case where we have less data than planned */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Unexpected end of serialized data");
return 0; /* not sure if it should be 0 or 1 here? */
}
#line 607 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy16:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy3;
yy17:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy20;
}
if (yych == '+') goto yy19;
yy18:
YYCURSOR = YYMARKER;
goto yy3;
yy19:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy20;
}
goto yy18;
yy20:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy20;
}
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 708 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
size_t len, len2, len3, maxlen;
long elements;
char *class_name;
zend_class_entry *ce;
zend_class_entry **pce;
int incomplete_class = 0;
int custom_object = 0;
zval *user_func;
zval *retval_ptr;
zval **args[1];
zval *arg_func_name;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
if (*start == 'C') {
custom_object = 1;
}
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
len2 = len = parse_uiv(start + 2);
maxlen = max - YYCURSOR;
if (maxlen < len || len == 0) {
*p = start + 2;
return 0;
}
class_name = (char*)YYCURSOR;
YYCURSOR += len;
if (*(YYCURSOR) != '"') {
*p = YYCURSOR;
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR+1) != ':') {
*p = YYCURSOR+1;
return 0;
}
len3 = strspn(class_name, "0123456789_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\177\200\201\202\203\204\205\206\207\210\211\212\213\214\215\216\217\220\221\222\223\224\225\226\227\230\231\232\233\234\235\236\237\240\241\242\243\244\245\246\247\250\251\252\253\254\255\256\257\260\261\262\263\264\265\266\267\270\271\272\273\274\275\276\277\300\301\302\303\304\305\306\307\310\311\312\313\314\315\316\317\320\321\322\323\324\325\326\327\330\331\332\333\334\335\336\337\340\341\342\343\344\345\346\347\350\351\352\353\354\355\356\357\360\361\362\363\364\365\366\367\370\371\372\373\374\375\376\377\\");
if (len3 != len)
{
*p = YYCURSOR + len3 - len;
return 0;
}
class_name = estrndup(class_name, len);
do {
/* Try to find class directly */
BG(serialize_lock)++;
if (zend_lookup_class(class_name, len2, &pce TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (EG(exception)) {
efree(class_name);
return 0;
}
ce = *pce;
break;
}
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (EG(exception)) {
efree(class_name);
return 0;
}
/* Check for unserialize callback */
if ((PG(unserialize_callback_func) == NULL) || (PG(unserialize_callback_func)[0] == '\0')) {
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
break;
}
/* Call unserialize callback */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(user_func);
ZVAL_STRING(user_func, PG(unserialize_callback_func), 1);
args[0] = &arg_func_name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg_func_name);
ZVAL_STRING(arg_func_name, class_name, 1);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), NULL, user_func, &retval_ptr, 1, args, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (EG(exception)) {
efree(class_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg_func_name);
return 0;
}
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "defined (%s) but not found", user_func->value.str.val);
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg_func_name);
break;
}
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
efree(class_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg_func_name);
return 0;
}
/* The callback function may have defined the class */
if (zend_lookup_class(class_name, len2, &pce TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
ce = *pce;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Function %s() hasn't defined the class it was called for", user_func->value.str.val);
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg_func_name);
break;
} while (1);
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (custom_object) {
int ret;
ret = object_custom(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, ce);
if (ret && incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(*rval, class_name, len2);
}
efree(class_name);
return ret;
}
elements = object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, ce);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(*rval, class_name, len2);
}
efree(class_name);
return object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, elements);
}
#line 785 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy25:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy26;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy27;
goto yy18;
}
yy26:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy27:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy27;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 699 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
if (!var_hash) return 0;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
return object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU,
object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, ZEND_STANDARD_CLASS_DEF_PTR));
}
#line 819 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy32:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '+') goto yy33;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy34;
goto yy18;
yy33:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy34:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy34;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '{') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 678 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
long elements = parse_iv(start + 2);
/* use iv() not uiv() in order to check data range */
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
if (elements < 0) {
return 0;
}
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
array_init_size(*rval, elements);
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_ARRVAL_PP(rval), elements, 0)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
#line 861 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy39:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '+') goto yy40;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy41;
goto yy18;
yy40:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy41:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy41;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 643 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
size_t len, maxlen;
char *str;
len = parse_uiv(start + 2);
maxlen = max - YYCURSOR;
if (maxlen < len) {
*p = start + 2;
return 0;
}
if ((str = unserialize_str(&YYCURSOR, &len, maxlen)) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR) != '"') {
efree(str);
*p = YYCURSOR;
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR + 1) != ';') {
efree(str);
*p = YYCURSOR + 1;
return 0;
}
YYCURSOR += 2;
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*rval, str, len, 0);
return 1;
}
#line 917 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy46:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '+') goto yy47;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy48;
goto yy18;
yy47:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy48:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy48;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 610 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
size_t len, maxlen;
char *str;
len = parse_uiv(start + 2);
maxlen = max - YYCURSOR;
if (maxlen < len) {
*p = start + 2;
return 0;
}
str = (char*)YYCURSOR;
YYCURSOR += len;
if (*(YYCURSOR) != '"') {
*p = YYCURSOR;
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR + 1) != ';') {
*p = YYCURSOR + 1;
return 0;
}
YYCURSOR += 2;
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*rval, str, len, 1);
return 1;
}
#line 971 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy53:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych == '+') goto yy57;
goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy55;
if (yych <= '.') goto yy60;
goto yy18;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'I') {
if (yych <= '9') goto yy58;
if (yych <= 'H') goto yy18;
goto yy56;
} else {
if (yych != 'N') goto yy18;
}
}
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'A') goto yy76;
goto yy18;
yy55:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych == '.') goto yy60;
goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '9') goto yy58;
if (yych != 'I') goto yy18;
}
yy56:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'N') goto yy72;
goto yy18;
yy57:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '.') goto yy60;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy58:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 4) YYFILL(4);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ':') {
if (yych <= '.') {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy18;
goto yy70;
} else {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy58;
goto yy18;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'E') {
if (yych <= ';') goto yy63;
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy18;
goto yy65;
} else {
if (yych == 'e') goto yy65;
goto yy18;
}
}
yy60:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy61:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 4) YYFILL(4);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ';') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy61;
if (yych <= ':') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= 'E') {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy18;
goto yy65;
} else {
if (yych == 'e') goto yy65;
goto yy18;
}
}
yy63:
++YYCURSOR;
#line 600 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
#if SIZEOF_LONG == 4
use_double:
#endif
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*rval, zend_strtod((const char *)start + 2, NULL));
return 1;
}
#line 1069 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy65:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy66;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy18;
}
yy66:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych == '+') goto yy69;
goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy69;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
}
yy67:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
if (yych == ';') goto yy63;
goto yy18;
yy69:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy18;
yy70:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 4) YYFILL(4);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ';') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy70;
if (yych <= ':') goto yy18;
goto yy63;
} else {
if (yych <= 'E') {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy18;
goto yy65;
} else {
if (yych == 'e') goto yy65;
goto yy18;
}
}
yy72:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'F') goto yy18;
yy73:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 585 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
if (!strncmp(start + 2, "NAN", 3)) {
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*rval, php_get_nan());
} else if (!strncmp(start + 2, "INF", 3)) {
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*rval, php_get_inf());
} else if (!strncmp(start + 2, "-INF", 4)) {
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*rval, -php_get_inf());
}
return 1;
}
#line 1143 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy76:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'N') goto yy73;
goto yy18;
yy77:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy78;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy79;
goto yy18;
}
yy78:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy79:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy79;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 558 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
#if SIZEOF_LONG == 4
int digits = YYCURSOR - start - 3;
if (start[2] == '-' || start[2] == '+') {
digits--;
}
/* Use double for large long values that were serialized on a 64-bit system */
if (digits >= MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1) {
if (digits == MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1) {
int cmp = strncmp(YYCURSOR - MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG, long_min_digits, MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1);
if (!(cmp < 0 || (cmp == 0 && start[2] == '-'))) {
goto use_double;
}
} else {
goto use_double;
}
}
#endif
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
ZVAL_LONG(*rval, parse_iv(start + 2));
return 1;
}
#line 1197 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy83:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 551 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
ZVAL_BOOL(*rval, parse_iv(start + 2));
return 1;
}
#line 1212 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy87:
++YYCURSOR;
#line 544 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
*p = YYCURSOR;
INIT_PZVAL(*rval);
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 1;
}
#line 1222 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy89:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy90;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy91;
goto yy18;
}
yy90:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy91:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy91;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 521 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
long id;
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
id = parse_iv(start + 2) - 1;
if (id == -1 || var_access(var_hash, id, &rval_ref) != SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
if (*rval == *rval_ref) return 0;
if (*rval != NULL) {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, rval);
}
*rval = *rval_ref;
Z_ADDREF_PP(rval);
Z_UNSET_ISREF_PP(rval);
return 1;
}
#line 1268 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy95:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy96;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy97;
goto yy18;
}
yy96:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy97:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy97;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 500 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
long id;
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
id = parse_iv(start + 2) - 1;
if (id == -1 || var_access(var_hash, id, &rval_ref) != SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
if (*rval != NULL) {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, rval);
}
*rval = *rval_ref;
Z_ADDREF_PP(rval);
Z_SET_ISREF_PP(rval);
return 1;
}
#line 1312 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
}
#line 863 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The object_common1 function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.c in PHP before 5.6.30, 7.0.x before 7.0.15, and 7.1.x before 7.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read and application crash) via crafted serialized data that is mishandled in a finish_nested_data call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73825 - Heap out of bounds read on unserialize in finish_nested_data()
|
Low
| 168,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
|
Medium
| 172,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: midi_synth_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
int offs, int count, int pmgr_flag)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
struct sysex_info sysex;
int i;
unsigned long left, src_offs, eox_seen = 0;
int first_byte = 1;
int hdr_size = (unsigned long) &sysex.data[0] - (unsigned long) &sysex;
leave_sysex(dev);
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0xf0))
return 0;
if (format != SYSEX_PATCH)
{
/* printk("MIDI Error: Invalid patch format (key) 0x%x\n", format);*/
return -EINVAL;
}
if (count < hdr_size)
{
/* printk("MIDI Error: Patch header too short\n");*/
return -EINVAL;
}
count -= hdr_size;
/*
* Copy the header from user space but ignore the first bytes which have
* been transferred already.
*/
if(copy_from_user(&((char *) &sysex)[offs], &(addr)[offs], hdr_size - offs))
return -EFAULT;
if (count < sysex.len)
{
/* printk(KERN_WARNING "MIDI Warning: Sysex record too short (%d<%d)\n", count, (int) sysex.len);*/
sysex.len = count;
}
left = sysex.len;
src_offs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < left && !signal_pending(current); i++)
{
unsigned char data;
if (get_user(data,
(unsigned char __user *)(addr + hdr_size + i)))
return -EFAULT;
eox_seen = (i > 0 && data & 0x80); /* End of sysex */
if (eox_seen && data != 0xf7)
data = 0xf7;
if (i == 0)
{
if (data != 0xf0)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "midi_synth: Sysex start missing\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
while (!midi_devs[orig_dev]->outputc(orig_dev, (unsigned char) (data & 0xff)) &&
!signal_pending(current))
schedule();
if (!first_byte && data & 0x80)
return 0;
first_byte = 0;
}
if (!eox_seen)
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0xf7);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer underflow in the Open Sound System (OSS) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on unspecified non-x86 platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging write access to /dev/sequencer.
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
High
| 165,892
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __ref online_pages(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
unsigned long onlined_pages = 0;
struct zone *zone;
int need_zonelists_rebuild = 0;
int nid;
int ret;
struct memory_notify arg;
lock_memory_hotplug();
arg.start_pfn = pfn;
arg.nr_pages = nr_pages;
arg.status_change_nid = -1;
nid = page_to_nid(pfn_to_page(pfn));
if (node_present_pages(nid) == 0)
arg.status_change_nid = nid;
ret = memory_notify(MEM_GOING_ONLINE, &arg);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret) {
memory_notify(MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE, &arg);
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
/*
* This doesn't need a lock to do pfn_to_page().
* The section can't be removed here because of the
* memory_block->state_mutex.
*/
zone = page_zone(pfn_to_page(pfn));
/*
* If this zone is not populated, then it is not in zonelist.
* This means the page allocator ignores this zone.
* So, zonelist must be updated after online.
*/
mutex_lock(&zonelists_mutex);
if (!populated_zone(zone))
need_zonelists_rebuild = 1;
ret = walk_system_ram_range(pfn, nr_pages, &onlined_pages,
online_pages_range);
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&zonelists_mutex);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "online_pages [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] failed\n",
(unsigned long long) pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
(((unsigned long long) pfn + nr_pages)
<< PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
memory_notify(MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE, &arg);
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
zone->present_pages += onlined_pages;
zone->zone_pgdat->node_present_pages += onlined_pages;
if (need_zonelists_rebuild)
build_all_zonelists(NULL, zone);
else
zone_pcp_update(zone);
mutex_unlock(&zonelists_mutex);
init_per_zone_wmark_min();
if (onlined_pages) {
kswapd_run(zone_to_nid(zone));
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY);
}
vm_total_pages = nr_free_pagecache_pages();
writeback_set_ratelimit();
if (onlined_pages)
memory_notify(MEM_ONLINE, &arg);
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The online_pages function in mm/memory_hotplug.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact in opportunistic circumstances by using memory that was hot-added by an administrator.
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,529
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HistoryModelWorker::DoWorkAndWaitUntilDone(Callback0::Type* work) {
WaitableEvent done(false, false);
scoped_refptr<WorkerTask> task(new WorkerTask(work, &done));
history_service_->ScheduleDBTask(task.get(), this);
done.Wait();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG use elements.
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,613
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13046/BGP: fix an existing bounds check for PMSI Tunnel
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,829
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __svc_rdma_free(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma =
container_of(work, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_work);
struct svc_xprt *xprt = &rdma->sc_xprt;
dprintk("svcrdma: %s(%p)\n", __func__, rdma);
if (rdma->sc_qp && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_qp))
ib_drain_qp(rdma->sc_qp);
/* We should only be called from kref_put */
if (kref_read(&xprt->xpt_ref) != 0)
pr_err("svcrdma: sc_xprt still in use? (%d)\n",
kref_read(&xprt->xpt_ref));
/*
* Destroy queued, but not processed read completions. Note
* that this cleanup has to be done before destroying the
* cm_id because the device ptr is needed to unmap the dma in
* svc_rdma_put_context.
*/
while (!list_empty(&rdma->sc_read_complete_q)) {
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
ctxt = list_first_entry(&rdma->sc_read_complete_q,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt, list);
list_del(&ctxt->list);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
/* Destroy queued, but not processed recv completions */
while (!list_empty(&rdma->sc_rq_dto_q)) {
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
ctxt = list_first_entry(&rdma->sc_rq_dto_q,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt, list);
list_del(&ctxt->list);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
/* Warn if we leaked a resource or under-referenced */
if (rdma->sc_ctxt_used != 0)
pr_err("svcrdma: ctxt still in use? (%d)\n",
rdma->sc_ctxt_used);
/* Final put of backchannel client transport */
if (xprt->xpt_bc_xprt) {
xprt_put(xprt->xpt_bc_xprt);
xprt->xpt_bc_xprt = NULL;
}
rdma_dealloc_frmr_q(rdma);
svc_rdma_destroy_ctxts(rdma);
svc_rdma_destroy_maps(rdma);
/* Destroy the QP if present (not a listener) */
if (rdma->sc_qp && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_qp))
ib_destroy_qp(rdma->sc_qp);
if (rdma->sc_sq_cq && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_sq_cq))
ib_free_cq(rdma->sc_sq_cq);
if (rdma->sc_rq_cq && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_rq_cq))
ib_free_cq(rdma->sc_rq_cq);
if (rdma->sc_pd && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_pd))
ib_dealloc_pd(rdma->sc_pd);
/* Destroy the CM ID */
rdma_destroy_id(rdma->sc_cm_id);
kfree(rdma);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tt_sbit_decoder_init( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
TT_Face face,
FT_ULong strike_index,
TT_SBit_MetricsRec* metrics )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Stream stream = face->root.stream;
FT_ULong ebdt_size;
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CBDT, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_EBDT, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_bdat, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
decoder->face = face;
decoder->stream = stream;
decoder->bitmap = &face->root.glyph->bitmap;
decoder->metrics = metrics;
decoder->metrics_loaded = 0;
decoder->bitmap_allocated = 0;
decoder->ebdt_start = FT_STREAM_POS();
decoder->ebdt_size = ebdt_size;
decoder->eblc_base = face->sbit_table;
decoder->eblc_limit = face->sbit_table + face->sbit_table_size;
/* now find the strike corresponding to the index */
{
FT_Byte* p;
if ( 8 + 48 * strike_index + 3 * 4 + 34 + 1 > face->sbit_table_size )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
p = decoder->eblc_base + 8 + 48 * strike_index;
decoder->strike_index_array = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 4;
decoder->strike_index_count = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 34;
decoder->bit_depth = *p;
if ( decoder->strike_index_array > face->sbit_table_size ||
decoder->strike_index_array + 8 * decoder->strike_index_count >
face->sbit_table_size )
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The tt_sbit_decoder_init function in sfnt/ttsbit.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 proceeds with a count-to-size association without restricting the count value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted embedded bitmap.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,846
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int nfsd_mountpoint(struct dentry *dentry, struct svc_export *exp)
{
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
return 1;
if (nfsd4_is_junction(dentry))
return 1;
if (!(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT))
return 0;
return d_inode(dentry) != NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Chapters::Atom::ExpandDisplaysArray()
{
if (m_displays_size > m_displays_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_displays_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_displays_size;
Display* const displays = new (std::nothrow) Display[size];
if (displays == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_displays_count; ++idx)
{
m_displays[idx].ShallowCopy(displays[idx]);
}
delete[] m_displays;
m_displays = displays;
m_displays_size = size;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
if (!ci ||
(ci->ci_keyring_key &&
(ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))))
return fscrypt_get_crypt_info(inode);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
|
Low
| 168,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
{
if (keyring->description)
seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
else
seq_puts(m, ": empty");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,702
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture,
Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec());
GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string);
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id);
Profile* profile = nullptr;
if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing.
profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
BlockState block_state =
GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile);
if (block_state == BLOCK) {
if (delegate)
delegate->BlockRequest();
return;
}
g_accept_requests = false;
shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind(
&OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, url, render_process_host_id,
render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN, page_transition,
has_user_gesture, delegate);
CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate)
->StartCheckIsDefault();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient data validation in External Protocol Handler in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary programs on user machine via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
|
Medium
| 172,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int result;
int error = FALSE;
int display_license = FALSE;
int display_help = FALSE;
int c = 0;
struct tm *tm, tm_s;
time_t now;
char datestring[256];
nagios_macros *mac;
const char *worker_socket = NULL;
int i;
#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
struct sigaction sig_action;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_H
int option_index = 0;
static struct option long_options[] = {
{"help", no_argument, 0, 'h'},
{"version", no_argument, 0, 'V'},
{"license", no_argument, 0, 'V'},
{"verify-config", no_argument, 0, 'v'},
{"daemon", no_argument, 0, 'd'},
{"test-scheduling", no_argument, 0, 's'},
{"precache-objects", no_argument, 0, 'p'},
{"use-precached-objects", no_argument, 0, 'u'},
{"enable-timing-point", no_argument, 0, 'T'},
{"worker", required_argument, 0, 'W'},
{0, 0, 0, 0}
};
#define getopt(argc, argv, o) getopt_long(argc, argv, o, long_options, &option_index)
#endif
memset(&loadctl, 0, sizeof(loadctl));
mac = get_global_macros();
/* make sure we have the correct number of command line arguments */
if(argc < 2)
error = TRUE;
/* get all command line arguments */
while(1) {
c = getopt(argc, argv, "+hVvdspuxTW");
if(c == -1 || c == EOF)
break;
switch(c) {
case '?': /* usage */
case 'h':
display_help = TRUE;
break;
case 'V': /* version */
display_license = TRUE;
break;
case 'v': /* verify */
verify_config++;
break;
case 's': /* scheduling check */
test_scheduling = TRUE;
break;
case 'd': /* daemon mode */
daemon_mode = TRUE;
break;
case 'p': /* precache object config */
precache_objects = TRUE;
break;
case 'u': /* use precached object config */
use_precached_objects = TRUE;
break;
case 'T':
enable_timing_point = TRUE;
break;
case 'W':
worker_socket = optarg;
break;
case 'x':
printf("Warning: -x is deprecated and will be removed\n");
break;
default:
break;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_MEMORY
mtrace();
#endif
/* if we're a worker we can skip everything below */
if(worker_socket) {
exit(nagios_core_worker(worker_socket));
}
/* Initialize configuration variables */
init_main_cfg_vars(1);
init_shared_cfg_vars(1);
if(daemon_mode == FALSE) {
printf("\nNagios Core %s\n", PROGRAM_VERSION);
printf("Copyright (c) 2009-present Nagios Core Development Team and Community Contributors\n");
printf("Copyright (c) 1999-2009 Ethan Galstad\n");
printf("Last Modified: %s\n", PROGRAM_MODIFICATION_DATE);
printf("License: GPL\n\n");
printf("Website: https://www.nagios.org\n");
}
/* just display the license */
if(display_license == TRUE) {
printf("This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n");
printf("it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as\n");
printf("published by the Free Software Foundation.\n\n");
printf("This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n");
printf("but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n");
printf("MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the\n");
printf("GNU General Public License for more details.\n\n");
printf("You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License\n");
printf("along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software\n");
printf("Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.\n\n");
exit(OK);
}
/* make sure we got the main config file on the command line... */
if(optind >= argc)
error = TRUE;
/* if there are no command line options (or if we encountered an error), print usage */
if(error == TRUE || display_help == TRUE) {
printf("Usage: %s [options] <main_config_file>\n", argv[0]);
printf("\n");
printf("Options:\n");
printf("\n");
printf(" -v, --verify-config Verify all configuration data (-v -v for more info)\n");
printf(" -s, --test-scheduling Shows projected/recommended check scheduling and other\n");
printf(" diagnostic info based on the current configuration files.\n");
printf(" -T, --enable-timing-point Enable timed commentary on initialization\n");
printf(" -x, --dont-verify-paths Deprecated (Don't check for circular object paths)\n");
printf(" -p, --precache-objects Precache object configuration\n");
printf(" -u, --use-precached-objects Use precached object config file\n");
printf(" -d, --daemon Starts Nagios in daemon mode, instead of as a foreground process\n");
printf(" -W, --worker /path/to/socket Act as a worker for an already running daemon\n");
printf("\n");
printf("Visit the Nagios website at https://www.nagios.org/ for bug fixes, new\n");
printf("releases, online documentation, FAQs, information on subscribing to\n");
printf("the mailing lists, and commercial support options for Nagios.\n");
printf("\n");
exit(ERROR);
}
/*
* config file is last argument specified.
* Make sure it uses an absolute path
*/
config_file = nspath_absolute(argv[optind], NULL);
if(config_file == NULL) {
printf("Error allocating memory.\n");
exit(ERROR);
}
config_file_dir = nspath_absolute_dirname(config_file, NULL);
/*
* Set the signal handler for the SIGXFSZ signal here because
* we may encounter this signal before the other signal handlers
* are set.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
sig_action.sa_sigaction = NULL;
sig_action.sa_handler = handle_sigxfsz;
sigfillset(&sig_action.sa_mask);
sig_action.sa_flags = SA_NODEFER|SA_RESTART;
sigaction(SIGXFSZ, &sig_action, NULL);
#else
signal(SIGXFSZ, handle_sigxfsz);
#endif
/*
* let's go to town. We'll be noisy if we're verifying config
* or running scheduling tests.
*/
if(verify_config || test_scheduling || precache_objects) {
reset_variables();
/*
* if we don't beef up our resource limits as much as
* we can, it's quite possible we'll run headlong into
* EAGAIN due to too many processes when we try to
* drop privileges later.
*/
set_loadctl_defaults();
if(verify_config)
printf("Reading configuration data...\n");
/* read our config file */
result = read_main_config_file(config_file);
if(result != OK) {
printf(" Error processing main config file!\n\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(verify_config)
printf(" Read main config file okay...\n");
/* drop privileges */
if((result = drop_privileges(nagios_user, nagios_group)) == ERROR) {
printf(" Failed to drop privileges. Aborting.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* this must come after dropping privileges, so we make
* sure to test access permissions as the right user.
*/
if (!verify_config && test_configured_paths() == ERROR) {
printf(" One or more path problems detected. Aborting.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* read object config files */
result = read_all_object_data(config_file);
if(result != OK) {
printf(" Error processing object config files!\n\n");
/* if the config filename looks fishy, warn the user */
if(!strstr(config_file, "nagios.cfg")) {
printf("\n***> The name of the main configuration file looks suspicious...\n");
printf("\n");
printf(" Make sure you are specifying the name of the MAIN configuration file on\n");
printf(" the command line and not the name of another configuration file. The\n");
printf(" main configuration file is typically '%s'\n", DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILE);
}
printf("\n***> One or more problems was encountered while processing the config files...\n");
printf("\n");
printf(" Check your configuration file(s) to ensure that they contain valid\n");
printf(" directives and data definitions. If you are upgrading from a previous\n");
printf(" version of Nagios, you should be aware that some variables/definitions\n");
printf(" may have been removed or modified in this version. Make sure to read\n");
printf(" the HTML documentation regarding the config files, as well as the\n");
printf(" 'Whats New' section to find out what has changed.\n\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(verify_config) {
printf(" Read object config files okay...\n\n");
printf("Running pre-flight check on configuration data...\n\n");
}
/* run the pre-flight check to make sure things look okay... */
result = pre_flight_check();
if(result != OK) {
printf("\n***> One or more problems was encountered while running the pre-flight check...\n");
printf("\n");
printf(" Check your configuration file(s) to ensure that they contain valid\n");
printf(" directives and data definitions. If you are upgrading from a previous\n");
printf(" version of Nagios, you should be aware that some variables/definitions\n");
printf(" may have been removed or modified in this version. Make sure to read\n");
printf(" the HTML documentation regarding the config files, as well as the\n");
printf(" 'Whats New' section to find out what has changed.\n\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(verify_config) {
printf("\nThings look okay - No serious problems were detected during the pre-flight check\n");
}
/* scheduling tests need a bit more than config verifications */
if(test_scheduling == TRUE) {
/* we'll need the event queue here so we can time insertions */
init_event_queue();
timing_point("Done initializing event queue\n");
/* read initial service and host state information */
initialize_retention_data(config_file);
read_initial_state_information();
timing_point("Retention data and initial state parsed\n");
/* initialize the event timing loop */
init_timing_loop();
timing_point("Timing loop initialized\n");
/* display scheduling information */
display_scheduling_info();
}
if(precache_objects) {
result = fcache_objects(object_precache_file);
timing_point("Done precaching objects\n");
if(result == OK) {
printf("Object precache file created:\n%s\n", object_precache_file);
}
else {
printf("Failed to precache objects to '%s': %s\n", object_precache_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
/* clean up after ourselves */
cleanup();
/* exit */
timing_point("Exiting\n");
/* make valgrind shut up about still reachable memory */
neb_free_module_list();
free(config_file_dir);
free(config_file);
exit(result);
}
/* else start to monitor things... */
else {
/*
* if we're called with a relative path we must make
* it absolute so we can launch our workers.
* If not, we needn't bother, as we're using execvp()
*/
if (strchr(argv[0], '/'))
nagios_binary_path = nspath_absolute(argv[0], NULL);
else
nagios_binary_path = strdup(argv[0]);
if (!nagios_binary_path) {
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Error: Unable to allocate memory for nagios_binary_path\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!(nagios_iobs = iobroker_create())) {
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Error: Failed to create IO broker set: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* keep monitoring things until we get a shutdown command */
do {
/* reset internal book-keeping (in case we're restarting) */
wproc_num_workers_spawned = wproc_num_workers_online = 0;
caught_signal = sigshutdown = FALSE;
sig_id = 0;
/* reset program variables */
reset_variables();
timing_point("Variables reset\n");
/* get PID */
nagios_pid = (int)getpid();
/* read in the configuration files (main and resource config files) */
result = read_main_config_file(config_file);
if (result != OK) {
logit(NSLOG_CONFIG_ERROR, TRUE, "Error: Failed to process config file '%s'. Aborting\n", config_file);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
timing_point("Main config file read\n");
/* NOTE 11/06/07 EG moved to after we read config files, as user may have overridden timezone offset */
/* get program (re)start time and save as macro */
program_start = time(NULL);
my_free(mac->x[MACRO_PROCESSSTARTTIME]);
asprintf(&mac->x[MACRO_PROCESSSTARTTIME], "%llu", (unsigned long long)program_start);
/* drop privileges */
if(drop_privileges(nagios_user, nagios_group) == ERROR) {
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO | NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR | NSLOG_CONFIG_ERROR, TRUE, "Failed to drop privileges. Aborting.");
cleanup();
exit(ERROR);
}
if (test_path_access(nagios_binary_path, X_OK)) {
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Error: failed to access() %s: %s\n", nagios_binary_path, strerror(errno));
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Error: Spawning workers will be impossible. Aborting.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (test_configured_paths() == ERROR) {
/* error has already been logged */
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* enter daemon mode (unless we're restarting...) */
if(daemon_mode == TRUE && sigrestart == FALSE) {
result = daemon_init();
/* we had an error daemonizing, so bail... */
if(result == ERROR) {
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO | NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Bailing out due to failure to daemonize. (PID=%d)", (int)getpid());
cleanup();
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* get new PID */
nagios_pid = (int)getpid();
}
/* this must be logged after we read config data, as user may have changed location of main log file */
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO, TRUE, "Nagios %s starting... (PID=%d)\n", PROGRAM_VERSION, (int)getpid());
/* log the local time - may be different than clock time due to timezone offset */
now = time(NULL);
tm = localtime_r(&now, &tm_s);
strftime(datestring, sizeof(datestring), "%a %b %d %H:%M:%S %Z %Y", tm);
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO, TRUE, "Local time is %s", datestring);
/* write log version/info */
write_log_file_info(NULL);
/* open debug log now that we're the right user */
open_debug_log();
#ifdef USE_EVENT_BROKER
/* initialize modules */
neb_init_modules();
neb_init_callback_list();
#endif
timing_point("NEB module API initialized\n");
/* handle signals (interrupts) before we do any socket I/O */
setup_sighandler();
/*
* Initialize query handler and event subscription service.
* This must be done before modules are initialized, so
* the modules can use our in-core stuff properly
*/
if (qh_init(qh_socket_path ? qh_socket_path : DEFAULT_QUERY_SOCKET) != OK) {
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Error: Failed to initialize query handler. Aborting\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
timing_point("Query handler initialized\n");
nerd_init();
timing_point("NERD initialized\n");
/* initialize check workers */
if(init_workers(num_check_workers) < 0) {
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "Failed to spawn workers. Aborting\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
timing_point("%u workers spawned\n", wproc_num_workers_spawned);
i = 0;
while (i < 50 && wproc_num_workers_online < wproc_num_workers_spawned) {
iobroker_poll(nagios_iobs, 50);
i++;
}
timing_point("%u workers connected\n", wproc_num_workers_online);
/* now that workers have arrived we can set the defaults */
set_loadctl_defaults();
#ifdef USE_EVENT_BROKER
/* load modules */
if (neb_load_all_modules() != OK) {
logit(NSLOG_CONFIG_ERROR, ERROR, "Error: Module loading failed. Aborting.\n");
/* if we're dumping core, we must remove all dl-files */
if (daemon_dumps_core)
neb_unload_all_modules(NEBMODULE_FORCE_UNLOAD, NEBMODULE_NEB_SHUTDOWN);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
timing_point("Modules loaded\n");
/* send program data to broker */
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_PRELAUNCH, NEBFLAG_NONE, NEBATTR_NONE, NULL);
timing_point("First callback made\n");
#endif
/* read in all object config data */
if(result == OK)
result = read_all_object_data(config_file);
/* there was a problem reading the config files */
if(result != OK)
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO | NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR | NSLOG_CONFIG_ERROR, TRUE, "Bailing out due to one or more errors encountered in the configuration files. Run Nagios from the command line with the -v option to verify your config before restarting. (PID=%d)", (int)getpid());
else {
/* run the pre-flight check to make sure everything looks okay*/
if((result = pre_flight_check()) != OK)
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO | NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR | NSLOG_VERIFICATION_ERROR, TRUE, "Bailing out due to errors encountered while running the pre-flight check. Run Nagios from the command line with the -v option to verify your config before restarting. (PID=%d)\n", (int)getpid());
}
/* an error occurred that prevented us from (re)starting */
if(result != OK) {
/* if we were restarting, we need to cleanup from the previous run */
if(sigrestart == TRUE) {
/* clean up the status data */
cleanup_status_data(TRUE);
}
#ifdef USE_EVENT_BROKER
/* send program data to broker */
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_SHUTDOWN, NEBFLAG_PROCESS_INITIATED, NEBATTR_SHUTDOWN_ABNORMAL, NULL);
#endif
cleanup();
exit(ERROR);
}
timing_point("Object configuration parsed and understood\n");
/* write the objects.cache file */
fcache_objects(object_cache_file);
timing_point("Objects cached\n");
init_event_queue();
timing_point("Event queue initialized\n");
#ifdef USE_EVENT_BROKER
/* send program data to broker */
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_START, NEBFLAG_NONE, NEBATTR_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* initialize status data unless we're starting */
if(sigrestart == FALSE) {
initialize_status_data(config_file);
timing_point("Status data initialized\n");
}
/* initialize scheduled downtime data */
initialize_downtime_data();
timing_point("Downtime data initialized\n");
/* read initial service and host state information */
initialize_retention_data(config_file);
timing_point("Retention data initialized\n");
read_initial_state_information();
timing_point("Initial state information read\n");
/* initialize comment data */
initialize_comment_data();
timing_point("Comment data initialized\n");
/* initialize performance data */
initialize_performance_data(config_file);
timing_point("Performance data initialized\n");
/* initialize the event timing loop */
init_timing_loop();
timing_point("Event timing loop initialized\n");
/* initialize check statistics */
init_check_stats();
timing_point("check stats initialized\n");
/* check for updates */
check_for_nagios_updates(FALSE, TRUE);
timing_point("Update check concluded\n");
/* update all status data (with retained information) */
update_all_status_data();
timing_point("Status data updated\n");
/* log initial host and service state */
log_host_states(INITIAL_STATES, NULL);
log_service_states(INITIAL_STATES, NULL);
timing_point("Initial states logged\n");
/* reset the restart flag */
sigrestart = FALSE;
/* fire up command file worker */
launch_command_file_worker();
timing_point("Command file worker launched\n");
#ifdef USE_EVENT_BROKER
/* send program data to broker */
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_EVENTLOOPSTART, NEBFLAG_NONE, NEBATTR_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* get event start time and save as macro */
event_start = time(NULL);
my_free(mac->x[MACRO_EVENTSTARTTIME]);
asprintf(&mac->x[MACRO_EVENTSTARTTIME], "%llu", (unsigned long long)event_start);
timing_point("Entering event execution loop\n");
/***** start monitoring all services *****/
/* (doesn't return until a restart or shutdown signal is encountered) */
event_execution_loop();
/*
* immediately deinitialize the query handler so it
* can remove modules that have stashed data with it
*/
qh_deinit(qh_socket_path ? qh_socket_path : DEFAULT_QUERY_SOCKET);
/* 03/01/2007 EG Moved from sighandler() to prevent FUTEX locking problems under NPTL */
/* 03/21/2007 EG SIGSEGV signals are still logged in sighandler() so we don't loose them */
/* did we catch a signal? */
if(caught_signal == TRUE) {
if(sig_id == SIGHUP)
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO, TRUE, "Caught SIGHUP, restarting...\n");
}
#ifdef USE_EVENT_BROKER
/* send program data to broker */
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_EVENTLOOPEND, NEBFLAG_NONE, NEBATTR_NONE, NULL);
if(sigshutdown == TRUE)
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_SHUTDOWN, NEBFLAG_USER_INITIATED, NEBATTR_SHUTDOWN_NORMAL, NULL);
else if(sigrestart == TRUE)
broker_program_state(NEBTYPE_PROCESS_RESTART, NEBFLAG_USER_INITIATED, NEBATTR_RESTART_NORMAL, NULL);
#endif
/* save service and host state information */
save_state_information(FALSE);
cleanup_retention_data();
/* clean up performance data */
cleanup_performance_data();
/* clean up the scheduled downtime data */
cleanup_downtime_data();
/* clean up the status data unless we're restarting */
if(sigrestart == FALSE) {
cleanup_status_data(TRUE);
}
free_worker_memory(WPROC_FORCE);
/* shutdown stuff... */
if(sigshutdown == TRUE) {
iobroker_destroy(nagios_iobs, IOBROKER_CLOSE_SOCKETS);
nagios_iobs = NULL;
/* log a shutdown message */
logit(NSLOG_PROCESS_INFO, TRUE, "Successfully shutdown... (PID=%d)\n", (int)getpid());
}
/* clean up after ourselves */
cleanup();
/* close debug log */
close_debug_log();
}
while(sigrestart == TRUE && sigshutdown == FALSE);
if(daemon_mode == TRUE)
unlink(lock_file);
/* free misc memory */
my_free(lock_file);
my_free(config_file);
my_free(config_file_dir);
my_free(nagios_binary_path);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-665
Summary: Nagios Core before 4.3.3 creates a nagios.lock PID file after dropping privileges to a non-root account, which might allow local users to kill arbitrary processes by leveraging access to this non-root account for nagios.lock modification before a root script executes a *kill `cat /pathname/nagios.lock`* command.
Commit Message: halfway revert hack/configure changes - switch order of daemon_init/drop_privileges
|
Medium
| 167,966
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::SupportsSwapBuffersWithBounds() {
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
Medium
| 172,112
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayersInternal(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobSignedLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobSignedLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.width,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double) ((MagickOffsetType)
length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile",image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile",image->filename);
}
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) || (layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info,exception);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In coders/psd.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSDLayersInternal() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large *length* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over *length* would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
|
Medium
| 170,017
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SessionStartupPref StartupBrowserCreator::GetSessionStartupPref(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile);
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
SessionStartupPref pref = SessionStartupPref::GetStartupPref(prefs);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
const bool is_first_run =
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsCurrentUserNew();
const bool did_restart = false;
StartupBrowserCreator::WasRestarted();
#else
const bool is_first_run = first_run::IsChromeFirstRun();
const bool did_restart = StartupBrowserCreator::WasRestarted();
#endif
if (is_first_run && SessionStartupPref::TypeIsDefault(prefs))
pref.type = SessionStartupPref::DEFAULT;
if ((command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kRestoreLastSession) || did_restart) &&
!profile->IsNewProfile()) {
pref.type = SessionStartupPref::LAST;
}
if (!profile->IsGuestSession()) {
ProfileAttributesEntry* entry = nullptr;
bool has_entry =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()
->GetProfileAttributesStorage()
.GetProfileAttributesWithPath(profile->GetPath(), &entry);
if (has_entry && entry->IsSigninRequired())
pref.type = SessionStartupPref::LAST;
}
if (pref.type == SessionStartupPref::LAST &&
IncognitoModePrefs::ShouldLaunchIncognito(command_line, prefs)) {
pref.type = SessionStartupPref::DEFAULT;
}
return pref;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Incorrect MIME type of XSS-Protection reports in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 58.0.3029.83 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to circumvent Cross-Origin Resource Sharing checks via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
|
Medium
| 172,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int av_reallocp_array(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void **ptrptr = ptr;
*ptrptr = av_realloc_f(*ptrptr, nmemb, size);
if (!*ptrptr && !(nmemb && size))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The av_reallocp_array function in libavutil/mem.c in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has an unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a *wrong return code* and a resultant NULL pointer dereference.
Commit Message: avutil/mem: Fix flipped condition
Fixes return code and later null pointer dereference
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Low
| 165,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void rng_egd_request_entropy(RngBackend *b, size_t size,
EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
void *opaque)
{
RngEgd *s = RNG_EGD(b);
RngRequest *req;
req = g_malloc(sizeof(*req));
req->offset = 0;
req->size = size;
req->receive_entropy = receive_entropy;
req->opaque = opaque;
req->data = g_malloc(req->size);
while (size > 0) {
uint8_t header[2];
req = g_malloc(sizeof(*req));
req->offset = 0;
req->size = size;
req->receive_entropy = receive_entropy;
req->opaque = opaque;
req->data = g_malloc(req->size);
size -= len;
}
s->parent.requests = g_slist_append(s->parent.requests, req);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: QEMU, when built with the Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) back-end support, allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (process crash) via an entropy request, which triggers arbitrary stack based allocation and memory corruption.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,180
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: print_pixel(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_const_bytep row,
png_uint_32 x)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int bit_depth = png_get_bit_depth(png_ptr, info_ptr);
switch (png_get_color_type(png_ptr, info_ptr))
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
printf("GRAY %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1));
return;
/* The palette case is slightly more difficult - the palette and, if
* present, the tRNS ('transparency', though the values are really
* opacity) data must be read to give the full picture:
*/
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int index = component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1);
png_colorp palette = NULL;
int num_palette = 0;
if ((png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &palette, &num_palette) &
PNG_INFO_PLTE) && num_palette > 0 && palette != NULL)
{
png_bytep trans_alpha = NULL;
int num_trans = 0;
if ((png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &trans_alpha, &num_trans,
NULL) & PNG_INFO_tRNS) && num_trans > 0 &&
trans_alpha != NULL)
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue,
index < num_trans ? trans_alpha[index] : 255);
else /* no transparency */
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue);
}
else
printf("INDEXED %u = invalid index\n", index);
}
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
printf("RGB %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 3));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
printf("GRAY+ALPHA %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 2),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 2));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
printf("RGBA %u %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 3, bit_depth, 4));
return;
default:
png_error(png_ptr, "pngpixel: invalid color type");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,566
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void r_bin_dwarf_dump_debug_info(FILE *f, const RBinDwarfDebugInfo *inf) {
size_t i, j, k;
RBinDwarfDIE *dies;
RBinDwarfAttrValue *values;
if (!inf || !f) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < inf->length; i++) {
fprintf (f, " Compilation Unit @ offset 0x%"PFMT64x":\n", inf->comp_units [i].offset);
fprintf (f, " Length: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.length);
fprintf (f, " Version: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.version);
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Offset: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.abbrev_offset);
fprintf (f, " Pointer Size: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.pointer_size);
dies = inf->comp_units[i].dies;
for (j = 0; j < inf->comp_units[i].length; j++) {
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Number: %"PFMT64u" ", dies[j].abbrev_code);
if (dies[j].tag && dies[j].tag <= DW_TAG_volatile_type &&
dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]) {
fprintf (f, "(%s)\n", dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]);
} else {
fprintf (f, "(Unknown abbrev tag)\n");
}
if (!dies[j].abbrev_code) {
continue;
}
values = dies[j].attr_values;
for (k = 0; k < dies[j].length; k++) {
if (!values[k].name)
continue;
if (values[k].name < DW_AT_vtable_elem_location &&
dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]) {
fprintf (f, " %-18s : ", dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]);
} else {
fprintf (f, " TODO\t");
}
r_bin_dwarf_dump_attr_value (&values[k], f);
fprintf (f, "\n");
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 2.0.1, libr/bin/dwarf.c allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file, related to r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in dwarf.c and sdb_set_internal in shlr/sdb/src/sdb.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
|
Medium
| 167,668
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<AudioParameters>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
AudioParameters* r) {
int format, channel_layout, sample_rate, bits_per_sample,
frames_per_buffer, channels;
if (!m->ReadInt(iter, &format) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &channel_layout) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &sample_rate) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &bits_per_sample) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &frames_per_buffer) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &channels))
return false;
r->Reset(static_cast<AudioParameters::Format>(format),
static_cast<ChannelLayout>(channel_layout),
sample_rate, bits_per_sample, frames_per_buffer);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the audio IPC layer in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,526
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hstore_from_record(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
HeapTupleHeader rec;
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
Oid tupType;
int32 tupTypmod;
TupleDesc tupdesc;
HeapTupleData tuple;
RecordIOData *my_extra;
int ncolumns;
int i,
j;
Datum *values;
bool *nulls;
if (PG_ARGISNULL(0))
{
Oid argtype = get_fn_expr_argtype(fcinfo->flinfo, 0);
/*
* have no tuple to look at, so the only source of type info is the
* argtype. The lookup_rowtype_tupdesc call below will error out if we
* don't have a known composite type oid here.
*/
tupType = argtype;
tupTypmod = -1;
rec = NULL;
}
else
{
rec = PG_GETARG_HEAPTUPLEHEADER(0);
/* Extract type info from the tuple itself */
tupType = HeapTupleHeaderGetTypeId(rec);
tupTypmod = HeapTupleHeaderGetTypMod(rec);
}
tupdesc = lookup_rowtype_tupdesc(tupType, tupTypmod);
ncolumns = tupdesc->natts;
/*
* We arrange to look up the needed I/O info just once per series of
* calls, assuming the record type doesn't change underneath us.
*/
my_extra = (RecordIOData *) fcinfo->flinfo->fn_extra;
if (my_extra == NULL ||
my_extra->ncolumns != ncolumns)
{
fcinfo->flinfo->fn_extra =
MemoryContextAlloc(fcinfo->flinfo->fn_mcxt,
sizeof(RecordIOData) - sizeof(ColumnIOData)
+ ncolumns * sizeof(ColumnIOData));
my_extra = (RecordIOData *) fcinfo->flinfo->fn_extra;
my_extra->record_type = InvalidOid;
my_extra->record_typmod = 0;
}
if (my_extra->record_type != tupType ||
my_extra->record_typmod != tupTypmod)
{
MemSet(my_extra, 0,
sizeof(RecordIOData) - sizeof(ColumnIOData)
+ ncolumns * sizeof(ColumnIOData));
my_extra->record_type = tupType;
my_extra->record_typmod = tupTypmod;
my_extra->ncolumns = ncolumns;
}
pairs = palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(Pairs));
if (rec)
{
/* Build a temporary HeapTuple control structure */
tuple.t_len = HeapTupleHeaderGetDatumLength(rec);
ItemPointerSetInvalid(&(tuple.t_self));
tuple.t_tableOid = InvalidOid;
tuple.t_data = rec;
values = (Datum *) palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(Datum));
nulls = (bool *) palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(bool));
/* Break down the tuple into fields */
heap_deform_tuple(&tuple, tupdesc, values, nulls);
}
else
{
values = NULL;
nulls = NULL;
}
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ncolumns; ++i)
{
ColumnIOData *column_info = &my_extra->columns[i];
Oid column_type = tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypid;
char *value;
/* Ignore dropped columns in datatype */
if (tupdesc->attrs[i]->attisdropped)
continue;
pairs[j].key = NameStr(tupdesc->attrs[i]->attname);
pairs[j].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(strlen(NameStr(tupdesc->attrs[i]->attname)));
if (!nulls || nulls[i])
{
pairs[j].val = NULL;
pairs[j].vallen = 4;
pairs[j].isnull = true;
pairs[j].needfree = false;
++j;
continue;
}
/*
* Convert the column value to text
*/
if (column_info->column_type != column_type)
{
bool typIsVarlena;
getTypeOutputInfo(column_type,
&column_info->typiofunc,
&typIsVarlena);
fmgr_info_cxt(column_info->typiofunc, &column_info->proc,
fcinfo->flinfo->fn_mcxt);
column_info->column_type = column_type;
}
value = OutputFunctionCall(&column_info->proc, values[i]);
pairs[j].val = value;
pairs[j].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(strlen(value));
pairs[j].isnull = false;
pairs[j].needfree = false;
++j;
}
ncolumns = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, j, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, ncolumns, buflen);
ReleaseTupleDesc(tupdesc);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftMP3::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0 && inHeader->nFilledLen) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
mConfig->pInputBuffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
mConfig->pInputBuffer = NULL;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = 0;
}
mConfig->inputBufferMaxLength = 0;
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = 0;
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
mConfig->pOutputBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer);
ERROR_CODE decoderErr;
if ((decoderErr = pvmp3_framedecoder(mConfig, mDecoderBuf))
!= NO_DECODING_ERROR) {
ALOGV("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
if (decoderErr != NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR
&& decoderErr != SIDE_INFO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (mConfig->outputFrameSize == 0) {
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
}
if (decoderErr == NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR && mSawInputEos) {
if (!mIsFirst) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
memset(outHeader->pBuffer, 0, outHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
} else {
ALOGV_IF(mIsFirst, "insufficient data for first frame, sending silence");
memset(outHeader->pBuffer,
0,
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader) {
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
}
} else if (mConfig->samplingRate != mSamplingRate
|| mConfig->num_channels != mNumChannels) {
mSamplingRate = mConfig->samplingRate;
mNumChannels = mConfig->num_channels;
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mIsFirst) {
mIsFirst = false;
outHeader->nOffset =
kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFilledLen =
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t) - outHeader->nOffset;
} else if (!mSignalledOutputEos) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs + (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mSamplingRate;
if (inHeader) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength);
inHeader->nOffset += mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
mNumFramesOutput += mConfig->outputFrameSize / mNumChannels;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mp3dec/SoftMP3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate the relationship between allocated memory and the frame size, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27793371.
Commit Message: Check mp3 output buffer size
Bug: 27793371
Change-Id: I0fe40a4cfd0a5b488f93d3f3ba6f9495235926ac
|
Medium
| 173,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, addEmptyDir)
{
char *dirname;
size_t dirname_len;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &dirname, &dirname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (dirname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(dirname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot create a directory in magic \".phar\" directory");
return;
}
phar_mkdir(&phar_obj->archive, dirname, dirname_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
{
int i;
uint32_t txr_len_log2, rxr_len_log2;
uint32_t req_ring_size, cmp_ring_size;
m->rs_pa = ri->ringsStatePPN << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((ri->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)
|| (ri->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)) {
return -1;
}
req_ring_size = ri->reqRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
cmp_ring_size = ri->cmpRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
txr_len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(req_ring_size - 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access or infinite loop, and QEMU process crash) via a crafted page count for descriptor rings.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 mishandles the SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS feature, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from the kernel's internal socket data structures or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted system calls, related to net/core/skbuff.c and net/socket.c.
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 170,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: native_handle_t* native_handle_create(int numFds, int numInts)
{
native_handle_t* h = malloc(
sizeof(native_handle_t) + sizeof(int)*(numFds+numInts));
if (h) {
h->version = sizeof(native_handle_t);
h->numFds = numFds;
h->numInts = numInts;
}
return h;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the native_handle_create function in libcutils/native_handle.c in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M allows attackers to obtain a different application's privileges or cause a denial of service (Binder heap memory corruption) via a crafted application, aka internal bug 19334482.
Commit Message: Prevent integer overflow when allocating native_handle_t
User specified values of numInts and numFds can overflow
and cause malloc to allocate less than we expect, causing
heap corruption in subsequent operations on the allocation.
Bug: 19334482
Change-Id: I43c75f536ea4c08f14ca12ca6288660fd2d1ec55
|
Medium
| 174,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
DOMStringList* arrayArg(toDOMStringList(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,606
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPasskey(uint32 passkey) {
if (!agent_.get() || passkey_callback_.is_null())
return;
passkey_callback_.Run(SUCCESS, passkey);
passkey_callback_.Reset();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getShaderParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLShader::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
WebGLShader* shader = V8WebGLShader::HasInstance(args[0]) ? V8WebGLShader::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0])) : 0;
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[1]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getShaderParameter(shader, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,126
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_wave (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, EAS_U16 waveIndex)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 size;
EAS_I32 endChunk;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 wsmpPos = 0;
EAS_I32 fmtPos = 0;
EAS_I32 dataPos = 0;
EAS_I32 dataSize = 0;
S_WSMP_DATA *p;
void *pSample;
S_WSMP_DATA wsmp;
/* seek to start of chunk */
chunkPos = pos + 12;
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get the chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* make sure it is a wave chunk */
if (temp != CHUNK_WAVE)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Offset in ptbl does not point to wave chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* read to end of chunk */
pos = chunkPos;
endChunk = pos + size;
while (pos < endChunk)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_WSMP:
wsmpPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_FMT:
fmtPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_DATA:
dataPos = chunkPos + 8;
dataSize = size;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (dataSize > MAX_DLS_WAVE_SIZE)
{
return EAS_ERROR_SOUND_LIBRARY;
}
/* for first pass, use temporary variable */
if (pDLSData->pDLS == NULL)
p = &wsmp;
else
p = &pDLSData->wsmpData[waveIndex];
/* set the defaults */
p->fineTune = 0;
p->unityNote = 60;
p->gain = 0;
p->loopStart = 0;
p->loopLength = 0;
/* must have a fmt chunk */
if (!fmtPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS wave chunk has no fmt chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a data chunk */
if (!dataPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS wave chunk has no data chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* parse the wsmp chunk */
if (wsmpPos)
{
if ((result = Parse_wsmp(pDLSData, wsmpPos, p)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
/* parse the fmt chunk */
if ((result = Parse_fmt(pDLSData, fmtPos, p)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* calculate the size of the wavetable needed. We need only half
* the memory for 16-bit samples when in 8-bit mode, and we need
* double the memory for 8-bit samples in 16-bit mode. For
* unlooped samples, we may use ADPCM. If so, we need only 1/4
* the memory.
*
* We also need to add one for looped samples to allow for
* the first sample to be copied to the end of the loop.
*/
/* use ADPCM encode for unlooped 16-bit samples if ADPCM is enabled */
/*lint -e{506} -e{774} groundwork for future version to support 8 & 16 bit */
if (bitDepth == 8)
{
if (p->bitsPerSample == 8)
size = dataSize;
else
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
size = dataSize >> 1;
if (p->loopLength)
size++;
}
else
{
if (p->bitsPerSample == 16)
size = dataSize;
else
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
size = dataSize << 1;
if (p->loopLength)
size += 2;
}
/* for first pass, add size to wave pool size and return */
if (pDLSData->pDLS == NULL)
{
pDLSData->wavePoolSize += (EAS_U32) size;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
/* allocate memory and read in the sample data */
pSample = pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSamples + pDLSData->wavePoolOffset;
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleOffsets[waveIndex] = pDLSData->wavePoolOffset;
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleLen[waveIndex] = (EAS_U32) size;
pDLSData->wavePoolOffset += (EAS_U32) size;
if (pDLSData->wavePoolOffset > pDLSData->wavePoolSize)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Wave pool exceeded allocation\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_SOUND_LIBRARY;
}
if ((result = Parse_data(pDLSData, dataPos, dataSize, p, pSample)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Parse_wave function in arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_mdls.c in the Sonivox DLS-to-EAS converter in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not reject a negative value for a certain size field, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer overflow) via crafted XMF data, aka internal bug 21132860.
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
|
Low
| 173,356
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::ContinueInterceptedRequest(
const std::string& interception_id,
Maybe<std::string> error_reason,
Maybe<std::string> base64_raw_response,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> method,
Maybe<std::string> post_data,
Maybe<protocol::Network::Headers> headers,
Maybe<protocol::Network::AuthChallengeResponse> auth_challenge_response,
std::unique_ptr<ContinueInterceptedRequestCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(
process_->GetBrowserContext());
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
base::Optional<std::string> raw_response;
if (base64_raw_response.isJust()) {
std::string decoded;
if (!base::Base64Decode(base64_raw_response.fromJust(), &decoded)) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid rawResponse."));
return;
}
raw_response = decoded;
}
base::Optional<net::Error> error;
bool mark_as_canceled = false;
if (error_reason.isJust()) {
bool ok;
error = NetErrorFromString(error_reason.fromJust(), &ok);
if (!ok) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid errorReason."));
return;
}
mark_as_canceled = true;
}
interceptor->ContinueInterceptedRequest(
interception_id,
std::make_unique<DevToolsURLRequestInterceptor::Modifications>(
std::move(error), std::move(raw_response), std::move(url),
std::move(method), std::move(post_data), std::move(headers),
std::move(auth_challenge_response), mark_as_canceled),
std::move(callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,754
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ff_h263_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
MpegEncContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int ret;
int slice_ret = 0;
AVFrame *pict = data;
/* no supplementary picture */
if (buf_size == 0) {
/* special case for last picture */
if (s->low_delay == 0 && s->next_picture_ptr) {
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(pict, s->next_picture_ptr->f)) < 0)
return ret;
s->next_picture_ptr = NULL;
*got_frame = 1;
}
return 0;
}
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_TRUNCATED) {
int next;
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
next = ff_mpeg4_find_frame_end(&s->parse_context, buf, buf_size);
} else if (CONFIG_H263_DECODER && s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263) {
next = ff_h263_find_frame_end(&s->parse_context, buf, buf_size);
} else if (CONFIG_H263P_DECODER && s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263P) {
next = ff_h263_find_frame_end(&s->parse_context, buf, buf_size);
} else {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"this codec does not support truncated bitstreams\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
if (ff_combine_frame(&s->parse_context, next, (const uint8_t **)&buf,
&buf_size) < 0)
return buf_size;
}
retry:
if (s->divx_packed && s->bitstream_buffer_size) {
int i;
for(i=0; i < buf_size-3; i++) {
if (buf[i]==0 && buf[i+1]==0 && buf[i+2]==1) {
if (buf[i+3]==0xB0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding excessive bitstream in packed xvid\n");
s->bitstream_buffer_size = 0;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (s->bitstream_buffer_size && (s->divx_packed || buf_size <= MAX_NVOP_SIZE)) // divx 5.01+/xvid frame reorder
ret = init_get_bits8(&s->gb, s->bitstream_buffer,
s->bitstream_buffer_size);
else
ret = init_get_bits8(&s->gb, buf, buf_size);
s->bitstream_buffer_size = 0;
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!s->context_initialized)
ff_mpv_idct_init(s);
/* let's go :-) */
if (CONFIG_WMV2_DECODER && s->msmpeg4_version == 5) {
ret = ff_wmv2_decode_picture_header(s);
} else if (CONFIG_MSMPEG4_DECODER && s->msmpeg4_version) {
ret = ff_msmpeg4_decode_picture_header(s);
} else if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
if (s->avctx->extradata_size && s->picture_number == 0) {
GetBitContext gb;
if (init_get_bits8(&gb, s->avctx->extradata, s->avctx->extradata_size) >= 0 )
ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(avctx->priv_data, &gb);
}
ret = ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(avctx->priv_data, &s->gb);
} else if (CONFIG_H263I_DECODER && s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263I) {
ret = ff_intel_h263_decode_picture_header(s);
} else if (CONFIG_FLV_DECODER && s->h263_flv) {
ret = ff_flv_decode_picture_header(s);
} else {
ret = ff_h263_decode_picture_header(s);
}
if (ret < 0 || ret == FRAME_SKIPPED) {
if ( s->width != avctx->coded_width
|| s->height != avctx->coded_height) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Reverting picture dimensions change due to header decoding failure\n");
s->width = avctx->coded_width;
s->height= avctx->coded_height;
}
}
if (ret == FRAME_SKIPPED)
return get_consumed_bytes(s, buf_size);
/* skip if the header was thrashed */
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "header damaged\n");
return ret;
}
if (!s->context_initialized) {
avctx->pix_fmt = h263_get_format(avctx);
if ((ret = ff_mpv_common_init(s)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!s->current_picture_ptr || s->current_picture_ptr->f->data[0]) {
int i = ff_find_unused_picture(s->avctx, s->picture, 0);
if (i < 0)
return i;
s->current_picture_ptr = &s->picture[i];
}
avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
if (ff_mpeg4_workaround_bugs(avctx) == 1)
goto retry;
if (s->studio_profile != (s->idsp.idct == NULL))
ff_mpv_idct_init(s);
}
/* After H.263 & MPEG-4 header decode we have the height, width,
* and other parameters. So then we could init the picture.
* FIXME: By the way H.263 decoder is evolving it should have
* an H263EncContext */
if (s->width != avctx->coded_width ||
s->height != avctx->coded_height ||
s->context_reinit) {
/* H.263 could change picture size any time */
s->context_reinit = 0;
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, s->width, s->height);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ff_set_sar(avctx, avctx->sample_aspect_ratio);
if ((ret = ff_mpv_common_frame_size_change(s)))
return ret;
if (avctx->pix_fmt != h263_get_format(avctx)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format change not supported\n");
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_NONE;
return AVERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
}
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263 ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263P ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263I)
s->gob_index = H263_GOB_HEIGHT(s->height);
s->current_picture.f->pict_type = s->pict_type;
s->current_picture.f->key_frame = s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
/* skip B-frames if we don't have reference frames */
if (!s->last_picture_ptr &&
(s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B || s->droppable))
return get_consumed_bytes(s, buf_size);
if ((avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_NONREF &&
s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) ||
(avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_NONKEY &&
s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) ||
avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_ALL)
return get_consumed_bytes(s, buf_size);
if (s->next_p_frame_damaged) {
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B)
return get_consumed_bytes(s, buf_size);
else
s->next_p_frame_damaged = 0;
}
if ((!s->no_rounding) || s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) {
s->me.qpel_put = s->qdsp.put_qpel_pixels_tab;
s->me.qpel_avg = s->qdsp.avg_qpel_pixels_tab;
} else {
s->me.qpel_put = s->qdsp.put_no_rnd_qpel_pixels_tab;
s->me.qpel_avg = s->qdsp.avg_qpel_pixels_tab;
}
if ((ret = ff_mpv_frame_start(s, avctx)) < 0)
return ret;
if (!s->divx_packed)
ff_thread_finish_setup(avctx);
if (avctx->hwaccel) {
ret = avctx->hwaccel->start_frame(avctx, s->gb.buffer,
s->gb.buffer_end - s->gb.buffer);
if (ret < 0 )
return ret;
}
ff_mpeg_er_frame_start(s);
/* the second part of the wmv2 header contains the MB skip bits which
* are stored in current_picture->mb_type which is not available before
* ff_mpv_frame_start() */
if (CONFIG_WMV2_DECODER && s->msmpeg4_version == 5) {
ret = ff_wmv2_decode_secondary_picture_header(s);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 1)
goto frame_end;
}
/* decode each macroblock */
s->mb_x = 0;
s->mb_y = 0;
slice_ret = decode_slice(s);
while (s->mb_y < s->mb_height) {
if (s->msmpeg4_version) {
if (s->slice_height == 0 || s->mb_x != 0 || slice_ret < 0 ||
(s->mb_y % s->slice_height) != 0 || get_bits_left(&s->gb) < 0)
break;
} else {
int prev_x = s->mb_x, prev_y = s->mb_y;
if (ff_h263_resync(s) < 0)
break;
if (prev_y * s->mb_width + prev_x < s->mb_y * s->mb_width + s->mb_x)
s->er.error_occurred = 1;
}
if (s->msmpeg4_version < 4 && s->h263_pred)
ff_mpeg4_clean_buffers(s);
if (decode_slice(s) < 0)
slice_ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->msmpeg4_version && s->msmpeg4_version < 4 &&
s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I)
if (!CONFIG_MSMPEG4_DECODER ||
ff_msmpeg4_decode_ext_header(s, buf_size) < 0)
s->er.error_status_table[s->mb_num - 1] = ER_MB_ERROR;
av_assert1(s->bitstream_buffer_size == 0);
frame_end:
ff_er_frame_end(&s->er);
if (avctx->hwaccel) {
ret = avctx->hwaccel->end_frame(avctx);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
ff_mpv_frame_end(s);
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4)
ff_mpeg4_frame_end(avctx, buf, buf_size);
if (!s->divx_packed && avctx->hwaccel)
ff_thread_finish_setup(avctx);
av_assert1(s->current_picture.f->pict_type == s->current_picture_ptr->f->pict_type);
av_assert1(s->current_picture.f->pict_type == s->pict_type);
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B || s->low_delay) {
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(pict, s->current_picture_ptr->f)) < 0)
return ret;
ff_print_debug_info(s, s->current_picture_ptr, pict);
ff_mpv_export_qp_table(s, pict, s->current_picture_ptr, FF_QSCALE_TYPE_MPEG1);
} else if (s->last_picture_ptr) {
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(pict, s->last_picture_ptr->f)) < 0)
return ret;
ff_print_debug_info(s, s->last_picture_ptr, pict);
ff_mpv_export_qp_table(s, pict, s->last_picture_ptr, FF_QSCALE_TYPE_MPEG1);
}
if (s->last_picture_ptr || s->low_delay) {
if ( pict->format == AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P
&& (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("GEOV") || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("GEOX"))) {
int x, y, p;
av_frame_make_writable(pict);
for (p=0; p<3; p++) {
int w = AV_CEIL_RSHIFT(pict-> width, !!p);
int h = AV_CEIL_RSHIFT(pict->height, !!p);
int linesize = pict->linesize[p];
for (y=0; y<(h>>1); y++)
for (x=0; x<w; x++)
FFSWAP(int,
pict->data[p][x + y*linesize],
pict->data[p][x + (h-1-y)*linesize]);
}
}
*got_frame = 1;
}
if (slice_ret < 0 && (avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE))
return slice_ret;
else
return get_consumed_bytes(s, buf_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In libavcodec in FFmpeg 4.0.1, improper maintenance of the consistency between the context profile field and studio_profile in libavcodec may trigger an assertion failure while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service, related to error_resilience.c, h263dec.c, and mpeg4videodec.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_video_set_spu_palette(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct compat_video_spu_palette __user *up)
{
struct video_spu_palette __user *up_native;
compat_uptr_t palp;
int length, err;
err = get_user(palp, &up->palette);
err |= get_user(length, &up->length);
up_native = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct video_spu_palette));
err = put_user(compat_ptr(palp), &up_native->palette);
err |= put_user(length, &up_native->length);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
err = sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) up_native);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The do_video_set_spu_palette function in fs/compat_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6.5 on unspecified architectures lacks a certain error check, which might allow local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE ioctl call on a /dev/dvb device.
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,102
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGL2RenderingContextBase::isTransformFeedback(
WebGLTransformFeedback* feedback) {
if (isContextLost() || !feedback)
return 0;
if (!feedback->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTransformFeedback(feedback->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
Medium
| 173,126
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void libxsmm_sparse_csr_reader( libxsmm_generated_code* io_generated_code,
const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSR_INPUT );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_row_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csr_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSR_READ_LEN );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC data-structure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_row_count) + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_row_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csr_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_ALLOC_DATA );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_row_count) + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i <= *o_row_count; ++l_i )
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSR_READ_DESC );
fclose( l_csr_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row = 0, l_column = 0;
double l_value = 0;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_row_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csr_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSR_READ_ELEMS );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_row_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSR_LEN );
return;
}
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: There is a heap-based buffer-overflow at generator_spgemm_csc_reader.c (function libxsmm_sparse_csc_reader) in LIBXSMM 1.10, a different vulnerability than CVE-2018-20541 (which is in a different part of the source code and is seen at a different address).
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
|
Medium
| 168,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,al,ok;
unsigned int j;
long n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
-1,
20000, /* ?? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
{
if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
else /* already sent a cookie */
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
p+=2;
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
{
/* actually a client application bug */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
{
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
s->hit=0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length=j;
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
}
p+=j;
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
if (c == NULL)
{
/* unknown cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
#if 0
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
* client authentication.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (*(p++) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
j= *(p++);
if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (j == 0)
comp=NULL;
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
}
else
comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
{
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (p != (d+n))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ssl_set_client_disabled function in t1_lib.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1i allows remote SSL servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and client application crash) via a ServerHello message that includes an SRP ciphersuite without the required negotiation of that ciphersuite with the client.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,022
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerDestroyed() {
DCHECK_NE(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_TERMINATED;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetCrashed();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(nullptr, nullptr);
worker_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* SegmentInfo::GetTitleAsUTF8() const
{
return m_pTitleAsUTF8;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,369
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GfxIndexedColorSpace::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
Guchar *line;
int i, j, n;
n = base->getNComps();
line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * n);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
line[i * n + j] = lookup[in[i] * n + j];
base->getRGBLine(line, out, length);
gfree (line);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_eh_defer_cmd(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha;
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
if (!dev_is_sata(dev)) {
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
return;
}
/* report the timeout to libata */
sas_end_task(cmd, task);
list_move_tail(&cmd->eh_entry, &ha->eh_ata_q);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16 allows local users to cause a denial of service (ata qc leak) by triggering certain failure conditions. NOTE: a third party disputes the relevance of this report because the failure can only occur for physically proximate attackers who unplug SAS Host Bus Adapter cables.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,260
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int simulate_rdhwr(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int opcode)
{
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(current);
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == SPEC3 && (opcode & FUNC) == RDHWR) {
int rd = (opcode & RD) >> 11;
int rt = (opcode & RT) >> 16;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
switch (rd) {
case 0: /* CPU number */
regs->regs[rt] = smp_processor_id();
return 0;
case 1: /* SYNCI length */
regs->regs[rt] = min(current_cpu_data.dcache.linesz,
current_cpu_data.icache.linesz);
return 0;
case 2: /* Read count register */
regs->regs[rt] = read_c0_count();
return 0;
case 3: /* Count register resolution */
switch (current_cpu_data.cputype) {
case CPU_20KC:
case CPU_25KF:
regs->regs[rt] = 1;
break;
default:
regs->regs[rt] = 2;
}
return 0;
case 29:
regs->regs[rt] = ti->tp_value;
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
}
/* Not ours. */
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,782
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool BitReaderCore::ReadBitsInternal(int num_bits, uint64_t* out) {
DCHECK_GE(num_bits, 0);
if (num_bits == 0) {
*out = 0;
return true;
}
if (num_bits > nbits_ && !Refill(num_bits)) {
nbits_ = 0;
reg_ = 0;
return false;
}
bits_read_ += num_bits;
if (num_bits == kRegWidthInBits) {
*out = reg_;
reg_ = 0;
nbits_ = 0;
return true;
}
*out = reg_ >> (kRegWidthInBits - num_bits);
reg_ <<= num_bits;
nbits_ -= num_bits;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Uninitialized data in media in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
|
Medium
| 173,017
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_open_uri)
{
char *valid_file = NULL;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *source;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
int source_len;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
ze_xmlwriter_object *ze_obj = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
xmlOutputBufferPtr out_buffer;
void *ioctx;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
if (this) {
/* We do not use XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT, xmlwriter init function here */
ze_obj = (ze_xmlwriter_object*) zend_object_store_get_object(this TSRMLS_CC);
}
#endif
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string as source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
valid_file = _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to resolve file path");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* TODO: Fix either the PHP stream or libxml APIs: it can then detect when a given
path is valid and not report out of memory error. Once it is done, remove the
directory check in _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path */
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
ioctx = php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(valid_file TSRMLS_CC);
if (ioctx == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out_buffer = xmlOutputBufferCreateIO(php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_write,
php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_close, ioctx, NULL);
if (out_buffer == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create output buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ptr = xmlNewTextWriter(out_buffer);
#else
ptr = xmlNewTextWriterFilename(valid_file, 0);
#endif
if (!ptr) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern = emalloc(sizeof(xmlwriter_object));
intern->ptr = ptr;
intern->output = NULL;
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
intern->uri_output = out_buffer;
#else
if (this) {
if (ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr) {
xmlwriter_free_resource_ptr(ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr = intern;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else
#endif
{
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value,intern,le_xmlwriter);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ping()
{
CCMainThread::postTask(createMainThreadTask(this, &PingPongTestUsingTasks::pong));
hit = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,298
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asmlinkage void kernel_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir = decode_direction(insn);
int size = decode_access_size(insn);
if(!ok_for_kernel(insn) || dir == both) {
printk("Unsupported unaligned load/store trap for kernel at <%08lx>.\n",
regs->pc);
unaligned_panic("Wheee. Kernel does fpu/atomic unaligned load/store.");
} else {
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
int err;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch (dir) {
case load:
err = do_int_load(fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f),
regs),
size, (unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn));
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs);
break;
default:
panic("Impossible kernel unaligned trap.");
/* Not reached... */
}
if (err)
kernel_mna_trap_fault(regs, insn);
else
advance(regs);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,805
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestBasics() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::QuitMessageLoopTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
ASSERT_TRUE(message_loop_);
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, result);
PASS();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
|
Medium
| 172,126
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int clie_5_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port;
unsigned int pipe;
int j;
/* TH55 registers 2 ports.
Communication in from the UX50/TH55 uses bulk_in_endpointAddress
from port 0. Communication out to the UX50/TH55 uses
bulk_out_endpointAddress from port 1
Lets do a quick and dirty mapping
*/
/* some sanity check */
if (serial->num_ports < 2)
return -1;
/* port 0 now uses the modified endpoint Address */
port = serial->port[0];
port->bulk_out_endpointAddress =
serial->port[1]->bulk_out_endpointAddress;
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(serial->dev, port->bulk_out_endpointAddress);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(port->write_urbs); ++j)
port->write_urbs[j]->pipe = pipe;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The clie_5_attach function in drivers/usb/serial/visor.c in the Linux kernel through 4.4.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inserting a USB device that lacks a bulk-out endpoint.
Commit Message: USB: serial: visor: fix crash on detecting device without write_urbs
The visor driver crashes in clie_5_attach() when a specially crafted USB
device without bulk-out endpoint is detected. This fix adds a check that
the device has proper configuration expected by the driver.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Fixes: cfb8da8f69b8 ("USB: visor: fix initialisation of UX50/TH55 devices")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 167,557
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static jlong Region_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject clazz, jobject parcel)
{
if (parcel == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
SkRegion* region = new SkRegion;
size_t size = p->readInt32();
region->readFromMemory(p->readInplace(size), size);
return reinterpret_cast<jlong>(region);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Region_createFromParcel function in core/jni/android/graphics/Region.cpp in Region in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M does not check the return values of certain read operations, which allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via an application that sends a crafted message to a service, aka internal bug 21585255.
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
|
Medium
| 173,341
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GetStartupData(HANDLE pipe, STARTUP_DATA *sud)
{
size_t size, len;
BOOL ret = FALSE;
WCHAR *data = NULL;
DWORD bytes, read;
bytes = PeekNamedPipeAsync(pipe, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("PeekNamedPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"PeekNamedPipeAsync");
goto out;
}
size = bytes / sizeof(*data);
if (size == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malformed startup data: 1 byte received"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
data = malloc(bytes);
if (data == NULL)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malloc failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"malloc");
goto out;
}
read = ReadPipeAsync(pipe, data, bytes, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes != read)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ReadPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"ReadPipeAsync");
goto out;
}
if (data[size - 1] != 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data is not NULL terminated"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->directory = data;
len = wcslen(sud->directory) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at working directory"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->options = sud->directory + len;
len = wcslen(sud->options) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at command line options"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->std_input = sud->options + len;
data = NULL; /* don't free data */
ret = TRUE;
out:
free(data);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: openvpnserv.exe (aka the interactive service helper) in OpenVPN 2.4.x before 2.4.6 allows a local attacker to cause a double-free of memory by sending a malformed request to the interactive service. This could cause a denial-of-service through memory corruption or possibly have unspecified other impact including privilege escalation.
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
|
Low
| 169,267
|
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