instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int a2dp_ctrl_receive(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, void* buffer, int length)
{
int ret = recv(common->ctrl_fd, buffer, length, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (ret < 0)
{
ERROR("ack failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EINTR)
{
/* retry again */
ret = recv(common->ctrl_fd, buffer, length, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (ret < 0)
{
ERROR("ack failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
}
else
{
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_, log2width_,
log2height_, x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,587
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void color_apply_icc_profile(opj_image_t *image)
{
cmsHPROFILE in_prof, out_prof;
cmsHTRANSFORM transform;
cmsColorSpaceSignature in_space, out_space;
cmsUInt32Number intent, in_type, out_type;
int *r, *g, *b;
size_t nr_samples, i, max, max_w, max_h;
int prec, ok = 0;
OPJ_COLOR_SPACE new_space;
in_prof = cmsOpenProfileFromMem(image->icc_profile_buf, image->icc_profile_len);
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
FILE *icm = fopen("debug.icm", "wb");
fwrite(image->icc_profile_buf, 1, image->icc_profile_len, icm);
fclose(icm);
#endif
if (in_prof == NULL) {
return;
}
in_space = cmsGetPCS(in_prof);
out_space = cmsGetColorSpace(in_prof);
intent = cmsGetHeaderRenderingIntent(in_prof);
max_w = image->comps[0].w;
max_h = image->comps[0].h;
prec = (int)image->comps[0].prec;
if (out_space == cmsSigRgbData) { /* enumCS 16 */
unsigned int i, nr_comp = image->numcomps;
if (nr_comp > 4) {
nr_comp = 4;
}
for (i = 1; i < nr_comp; ++i) { /* AFL test */
if (image->comps[0].dx != image->comps[i].dx) {
break;
}
if (image->comps[0].dy != image->comps[i].dy) {
break;
}
if (image->comps[0].prec != image->comps[i].prec) {
break;
}
if (image->comps[0].sgnd != image->comps[i].sgnd) {
break;
}
}
if (i != nr_comp) {
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
if (prec <= 8) {
in_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
} else {
in_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
}
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
} else if (out_space == cmsSigGrayData) { /* enumCS 17 */
in_type = TYPE_GRAY_8;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
} else if (out_space == cmsSigYCbCrData) { /* enumCS 18 */
in_type = TYPE_YCbCr_16;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
} else {
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: color_apply_icc_profile\n\tICC Profile has unknown "
"output colorspace(%#x)(%c%c%c%c)\n\tICC Profile ignored.\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, out_space,
(out_space >> 24) & 0xff, (out_space >> 16) & 0xff,
(out_space >> 8) & 0xff, out_space & 0xff);
#endif
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
if (out_prof == NULL) {
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr,
"%s:%d:color_apply_icc_profile\n\tchannels(%d) prec(%d) w(%d) h(%d)"
"\n\tprofile: in(%p) out(%p)\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, image->numcomps, prec,
max_w, max_h, (void*)in_prof, (void*)out_prof);
fprintf(stderr, "\trender_intent (%u)\n\t"
"color_space: in(%#x)(%c%c%c%c) out:(%#x)(%c%c%c%c)\n\t"
" type: in(%u) out:(%u)\n",
intent,
in_space,
(in_space >> 24) & 0xff, (in_space >> 16) & 0xff,
(in_space >> 8) & 0xff, in_space & 0xff,
out_space,
(out_space >> 24) & 0xff, (out_space >> 16) & 0xff,
(out_space >> 8) & 0xff, out_space & 0xff,
in_type, out_type
);
#else
(void)prec;
(void)in_space;
#endif /* DEBUG_PROFILE */
transform = cmsCreateTransform(in_prof, in_type, out_prof, out_type, intent, 0);
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS2
/* Possible for: LCMS_VERSION >= 2000 :*/
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
if (transform == NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d:color_apply_icc_profile\n\tcmsCreateTransform failed. "
"ICC Profile ignored.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
#endif
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS1
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
return;
}
if (image->numcomps > 2) { /* RGB, RGBA */
if (prec <= 8) {
unsigned char *inbuf, *outbuf, *in, *out;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3U * sizeof(unsigned char));
in = inbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL) {
goto fails0;
}
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned char) * r++;
*in++ = (unsigned char) * g++;
*in++ = (unsigned char) * b++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
ok = 1;
fails0:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
} else { /* prec > 8 */
unsigned short *inbuf, *outbuf, *in, *out;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3U * sizeof(unsigned short));
in = inbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL) {
goto fails1;
}
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U ; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned short) * r++;
*in++ = (unsigned short) * g++;
*in++ = (unsigned short) * b++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
ok = 1;
fails1:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
}
} else { /* image->numcomps <= 2 : GRAY, GRAYA */
if (prec <= 8) {
unsigned char *in, *inbuf, *out, *outbuf;
opj_image_comp_t *new_comps;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3 * sizeof(unsigned char));
in = inbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned char*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
g = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
b = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) {
goto fails2;
}
new_comps = (opj_image_comp_t*)realloc(image->comps,
(image->numcomps + 2) * sizeof(opj_image_comp_t));
if (new_comps == NULL) {
goto fails2;
}
image->comps = new_comps;
if (image->numcomps == 2) {
image->comps[3] = image->comps[1];
}
image->comps[1] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[2] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[1].data = g;
image->comps[2].data = b;
image->numcomps += 2;
r = image->comps[0].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned char) * r++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
r = g = b = NULL;
ok = 1;
fails2:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
opj_image_data_free(g);
opj_image_data_free(b);
} else { /* prec > 8 */
unsigned short *in, *inbuf, *out, *outbuf;
opj_image_comp_t *new_comps;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3U * sizeof(unsigned short));
in = inbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned short*)opj_image_data_alloc(nr_samples);
g = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
b = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc((size_t)max * sizeof(int));
if (inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) {
goto fails3;
}
new_comps = (opj_image_comp_t*)realloc(image->comps,
(image->numcomps + 2) * sizeof(opj_image_comp_t));
if (new_comps == NULL) {
goto fails3;
}
image->comps = new_comps;
if (image->numcomps == 2) {
image->comps[3] = image->comps[1];
}
image->comps[1] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[2] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[1].data = g;
image->comps[2].data = b;
image->numcomps += 2;
r = image->comps[0].data;
for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
*in++ = (unsigned short) * r++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
*r++ = (int) * out++;
*g++ = (int) * out++;
*b++ = (int) * out++;
}
r = g = b = NULL;
ok = 1;
fails3:
opj_image_data_free(inbuf);
opj_image_data_free(outbuf);
opj_image_data_free(g);
opj_image_data_free(b);
}
}/* if(image->numcomps > 2) */
cmsDeleteTransform(transform);
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS1
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
if (ok) {
image->color_space = new_space;
}
}/* color_apply_icc_profile() */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: OpenJPEG before 2.3.1 has a heap buffer overflow in color_apply_icc_profile in bin/common/color.c.
Commit Message: color_apply_icc_profile: avoid potential heap buffer overflow
Derived from a patch by Thuan Pham
|
Medium
| 169,760
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_rec_arrays (MyObject *obj, GPtrArray *in, GPtrArray **ret, GError **error)
{
char **strs;
GArray *ints;
guint v_UINT;
if (in->len != 2)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid array len");
return FALSE;
}
strs = g_ptr_array_index (in, 0);
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "foo"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "bar"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 1");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (*strs)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string array len in pos 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs = g_ptr_array_index (in, 1);
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "baz"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "whee"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 1");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "moo"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 2");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (*strs)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string array len in pos 1");
return FALSE;
}
*ret = g_ptr_array_new ();
ints = g_array_new (TRUE, TRUE, sizeof (guint));
v_UINT = 10;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
v_UINT = 42;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
v_UINT = 27;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
g_ptr_array_add (*ret, ints);
ints = g_array_new (TRUE, TRUE, sizeof (guint));
v_UINT = 30;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
g_ptr_array_add (*ret, ints);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void mp_encode_lua_table_as_array(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM < 502
size_t len = lua_objlen(L,-1), j;
#else
size_t len = lua_rawlen(L,-1), j;
#endif
mp_encode_array(L,buf,len);
for (j = 1; j <= len; j++) {
lua_pushnumber(L,j);
lua_gettable(L,-2);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,level+1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
|
Low
| 169,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::DetachFromFrame() {
DCHECK(frame_);
fetcher_->StopFetching();
if (frame_ && !SentDidFinishLoad())
LoadFailed(ResourceError::CancelledError(Url()));
fetcher_->ClearContext();
if (!frame_)
return;
application_cache_host_->DetachFromDocumentLoader();
application_cache_host_.Clear();
service_worker_network_provider_ = nullptr;
WeakIdentifierMap<DocumentLoader>::NotifyObjectDestroyed(this);
ClearResource();
frame_ = nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The update_dimensions function in libavcodec/vp8.c in FFmpeg through 2.8.1, as used in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 and other products, relies on a coefficient-partition count during multi-threaded operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (race condition and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted WebM file.
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
|
Medium
| 171,851
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void IOThread::RegisterPrefs(PrefRegistrySimple* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthSchemes,
"basic,digest,ntlm,negotiate,"
"spdyproxy");
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kDisableAuthNegotiateCnameLookup, false);
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableAuthNegotiatePort, false);
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthServerWhitelist, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthNegotiateDelegateWhitelist,
std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kGSSAPILibraryName, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthOrigin, std::string());
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableReferrers, true);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, 0);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, 0);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpOriginalContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpReceivedContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kDailyHttpContentLengthLastUpdateDate, 0L);
#endif
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kBuiltInDnsClientEnabled, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetFileSystem",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetFileSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int send_reply(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct page *page,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec,
int byte_count,
u32 inv_rkey)
{
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
struct ib_send_wr send_wr;
u32 xdr_off;
int sge_no;
int sge_bytes;
int page_no;
int pages;
int ret = -EIO;
/* Prepare the context */
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(rdma);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->pages[0] = page;
ctxt->count = 1;
/* Prepare the SGE for the RPCRDMA Header */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = rdma->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length =
svc_rdma_xdr_get_reply_hdr_len((__be32 *)rdma_resp);
ctxt->sge[0].addr =
ib_dma_map_page(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, page, 0,
ctxt->sge[0].length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr))
goto err;
svc_rdma_count_mappings(rdma, ctxt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
/* Map the payload indicated by 'byte_count' */
xdr_off = 0;
for (sge_no = 1; byte_count && sge_no < vec->count; sge_no++) {
sge_bytes = min_t(size_t, vec->sge[sge_no].iov_len, byte_count);
byte_count -= sge_bytes;
ctxt->sge[sge_no].addr =
dma_map_xdr(rdma, &rqstp->rq_res, xdr_off,
sge_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
xdr_off += sge_bytes;
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(rdma->sc_cm_id->device,
ctxt->sge[sge_no].addr))
goto err;
svc_rdma_count_mappings(rdma, ctxt);
ctxt->sge[sge_no].lkey = rdma->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[sge_no].length = sge_bytes;
}
if (byte_count != 0) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Could not map %d bytes\n", byte_count);
goto err;
}
/* Save all respages in the ctxt and remove them from the
* respages array. They are our pages until the I/O
* completes.
*/
pages = rqstp->rq_next_page - rqstp->rq_respages;
for (page_no = 0; page_no < pages; page_no++) {
ctxt->pages[page_no+1] = rqstp->rq_respages[page_no];
ctxt->count++;
rqstp->rq_respages[page_no] = NULL;
}
rqstp->rq_next_page = rqstp->rq_respages + 1;
if (sge_no > rdma->sc_max_sge) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Too many sges (%d)\n", sge_no);
goto err;
}
memset(&send_wr, 0, sizeof send_wr);
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
send_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
send_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
send_wr.num_sge = sge_no;
if (inv_rkey) {
send_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV;
send_wr.ex.invalidate_rkey = inv_rkey;
} else
send_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
send_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
ret = svc_rdma_send(rdma, &send_wr);
if (ret)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,611
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
VideoFrame::Columns(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().width()),
VideoFrame::Rows(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().height()));
}
return dst_frame;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An insufficient watchdog timer in navigation in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <hiroh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
|
Medium
| 172,397
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingDidCommit(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT) {
can_lock_compositor_ = YES;
for (ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
it != resize_locks_.end(); ++it)
if ((*it)->GrabDeferredLock())
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
}
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(compositor);
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
(void) ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
value);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->matte=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->storage_class=
(viff_info.number_data_bands < 3 ? PseudoClass : DirectClass);
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
else
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(max_packets,
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)));
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].red);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(q);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].green);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].blue);
}
SetPixelOpacity(q,image->matte != MagickFalse ? QuantumRange-
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a crafted VIFF file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/99
|
Medium
| 168,801
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: __imlib_Ellipse_DrawToData(int xc, int yc, int a, int b, DATA32 color,
DATA32 * dst, int dstw, int clx, int cly, int clw,
int clh, ImlibOp op, char dst_alpha, char blend)
{
ImlibPointDrawFunction pfunc;
int xx, yy, x, y, prev_x, prev_y, ty, by, lx, rx;
DATA32 a2, b2, *tp, *bp;
DATA64 dx, dy;
if (A_VAL(&color) == 0xff)
blend = 0;
pfunc = __imlib_GetPointDrawFunction(op, dst_alpha, blend);
if (!pfunc)
return;
xc -= clx;
yc -= cly;
dst += (dstw * cly) + clx;
a2 = a * a;
b2 = b * b;
yy = b << 16;
prev_y = b;
dx = a2 * b;
dy = 0;
ty = yc - b - 1;
by = yc + b;
lx = xc - 1;
rx = xc;
tp = dst + (dstw * ty) + lx;
bp = dst + (dstw * by) + lx;
while (dy < dx)
{
int len;
y = yy >> 16;
y += ((yy - (y << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_y != y)
{
prev_y = y;
dx -= a2;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dy += b2;
yy -= ((dy << 16) / dx);
lx--;
if ((lx < 0) && (rx > clw))
return;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
xx = yy;
prev_x = xx >> 16;
dx = dy;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
while (ty < yc)
{
int len;
x = xx >> 16;
x += ((xx - (x << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_x != x)
{
prev_x = x;
dy += b2;
lx--;
rx++;
tp--;
bp--;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dx -= a2;
xx += ((dx << 16) / dy);
ty++;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) by drawing a 2x1 ellipse.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,344
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mpls_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const u_char *p;
uint32_t label_entry;
uint16_t label_stack_depth = 0;
enum mpls_packet_type pt = PT_UNKNOWN;
p = bp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "MPLS"));
do {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, sizeof(label_entry));
if (length < sizeof(label_entry)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|MPLS], length %u", length));
return;
}
label_entry = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s(label %u",
(label_stack_depth && ndo->ndo_vflag) ? "\n\t" : " ",
MPLS_LABEL(label_entry)));
label_stack_depth++;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag &&
MPLS_LABEL(label_entry) < sizeof(mpls_labelname) / sizeof(mpls_labelname[0]))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", mpls_labelname[MPLS_LABEL(label_entry)]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", exp %u", MPLS_EXP(label_entry)));
if (MPLS_STACK(label_entry))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u)", MPLS_TTL(label_entry)));
p += sizeof(label_entry);
length -= sizeof(label_entry);
} while (!MPLS_STACK(label_entry));
/*
* Try to figure out the packet type.
*/
switch (MPLS_LABEL(label_entry)) {
case 0: /* IPv4 explicit NULL label */
case 3: /* IPv4 implicit NULL label */
pt = PT_IPV4;
break;
case 2: /* IPv6 explicit NULL label */
pt = PT_IPV6;
break;
default:
/*
* Generally there's no indication of protocol in MPLS label
* encoding.
*
* However, draft-hsmit-isis-aal5mux-00.txt describes a
* technique for encapsulating IS-IS and IP traffic on the
* same ATM virtual circuit; you look at the first payload
* byte to determine the network layer protocol, based on
* the fact that
*
* 1) the first byte of an IP header is 0x45-0x4f
* for IPv4 and 0x60-0x6f for IPv6;
*
* 2) the first byte of an OSI CLNP packet is 0x81,
* the first byte of an OSI ES-IS packet is 0x82,
* and the first byte of an OSI IS-IS packet is
* 0x83;
*
* so the network layer protocol can be inferred from the
* first byte of the packet, if the protocol is one of the
* ones listed above.
*
* Cisco sends control-plane traffic MPLS-encapsulated in
* this fashion.
*/
ND_TCHECK(*p);
if (length < 1) {
/* nothing to print */
return;
}
switch(*p) {
case 0x45:
case 0x46:
case 0x47:
case 0x48:
case 0x49:
case 0x4a:
case 0x4b:
case 0x4c:
case 0x4d:
case 0x4e:
case 0x4f:
pt = PT_IPV4;
break;
case 0x60:
case 0x61:
case 0x62:
case 0x63:
case 0x64:
case 0x65:
case 0x66:
case 0x67:
case 0x68:
case 0x69:
case 0x6a:
case 0x6b:
case 0x6c:
case 0x6d:
case 0x6e:
case 0x6f:
pt = PT_IPV6;
break;
case 0x81:
case 0x82:
case 0x83:
pt = PT_OSI;
break;
default:
/* ok bail out - we did not figure out what it is*/
break;
}
}
/*
* Print the payload.
*/
if (pt == PT_UNKNOWN) {
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, length);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_vflag ? "\n\t" : " "));
switch (pt) {
case PT_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PT_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PT_OSI:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, length);
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|MPLS]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,954
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Browser::FindInPage(bool find_next, bool forward_direction) {
ShowFindBar();
if (find_next) {
string16 find_text;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
find_text = GetFindPboardText();
#endif
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->
GetFindManager()->StartFinding(find_text,
forward_direction,
false); // Not case sensitive.
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8AudioContext::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.AudioContext.Contructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("AudioContext constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
Frame* frame = V8Proxy::retrieveFrameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "AudioContext constructor associated frame is unavailable", args.GetIsolate());
Document* document = frame->document();
if (!document)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "AudioContext constructor associated document is unavailable", args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<AudioContext> audioContext;
if (!args.Length()) {
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
audioContext = AudioContext::create(document, ec);
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
if (!audioContext.get())
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::SyntaxError, "audio resources unavailable for AudioContext construction", args.GetIsolate());
} else {
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
bool ok = false;
int32_t numberOfChannels = toInt32(args[0], ok);
if (!ok || numberOfChannels <= 0 || numberOfChannels > 10)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::SyntaxError, "Invalid number of channels", args.GetIsolate());
int32_t numberOfFrames = toInt32(args[1], ok);
if (!ok || numberOfFrames <= 0)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::SyntaxError, "Invalid number of frames", args.GetIsolate());
float sampleRate = toFloat(args[2]);
if (sampleRate <= 0)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::SyntaxError, "Invalid sample rate", args.GetIsolate());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
audioContext = AudioContext::createOfflineContext(document, numberOfChannels, numberOfFrames, sampleRate, ec);
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
}
if (!audioContext.get())
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::SyntaxError, "Error creating AudioContext", args.GetIsolate());
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(args.Holder(), &info, audioContext.get());
audioContext->ref();
return args.Holder();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,111
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SVGImage::setContainerSize(const IntSize& size)
{
if (!m_page || !usesContainerSize())
return;
LocalFrame* frame = m_page->mainFrame();
SVGSVGElement* rootElement = toSVGDocument(frame->document())->rootElement();
if (!rootElement)
return;
RenderSVGRoot* renderer = toRenderSVGRoot(rootElement->renderer());
if (!renderer)
return;
FrameView* view = frameView();
view->resize(this->containerSize());
renderer->setContainerSize(size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVGImage::setContainerSize function in core/svg/graphics/SVGImage.cpp in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the resizing of a view.
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Record(
GraphicsContext& context,
const DisplayItemClient& client,
DisplayItem::Type type,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset_node) {
PaintController& paint_controller = context.GetPaintController();
DCHECK_NE(paint_controller.CurrentPaintChunkProperties().Transform(),
scroll_offset_node.get());
if (paint_controller.DisplayItemConstructionIsDisabled())
return;
paint_controller.CreateAndAppend<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, type, std::move(scroll_offset_node));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,841
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dophn_exec(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int sh_num)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
const char *linking_style = "statically";
const char *interp = "";
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
char ibuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
size_t offset, align, len;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
bufsize = 0;
align = 4;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_DYNAMIC:
linking_style = "dynamically";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
if (sh_num) /* Did this through section headers */
continue;
if (((align = xph_align) & 0x80000000UL) != 0 ||
align < 4) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", invalid note alignment 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)align) == -1)
return -1;
align = 4;
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case PT_INTERP:
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz
: sizeof(nbuf);
bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset);
if (bufsize == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Maybe warn here? */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_INTERP:
if (bufsize && nbuf[0]) {
nbuf[bufsize - 1] = '\0';
interp = (const char *)nbuf;
} else
interp = "*empty*";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset,
(size_t)bufsize, clazz, swap, align,
flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s linked", linking_style)
== -1)
return -1;
if (interp[0])
if (file_printf(ms, ", interpreter %s",
file_printable(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), interp)) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov
|
Low
| 166,768
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int ip_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int maxfraglen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP fragmentation offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* specify the length of each IP datagram fragment */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.12, when UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) is enabled, does not properly initialize certain data structures, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call and sends both short and long packets, related to the ip_ufo_append_data function in net/ipv4/ip_output.c and the ip6_ufo_append_data function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c.
Commit Message: ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadCLIPBOARDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
{
HBITMAP
bitmapH;
HPALETTE
hPal;
OpenClipboard(NULL);
bitmapH=(HBITMAP) GetClipboardData(CF_BITMAP);
hPal=(HPALETTE) GetClipboardData(CF_PALETTE);
CloseClipboard();
if ( bitmapH == NULL )
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NoBitmapOnClipboard");
{
BITMAPINFO
DIBinfo;
BITMAP
bitmap;
HBITMAP
hBitmap,
hOldBitmap;
HDC
hDC,
hMemDC;
RGBQUAD
*pBits,
*ppBits;
/* create an offscreen DC for the source */
hMemDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hMemDC,bitmapH);
GetObject(bitmapH,sizeof(BITMAP),(LPSTR) &bitmap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
image->rows=bitmap.bmHeight;
image->columns=bitmap.bmWidth;
}
/*
Initialize the bitmap header info.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&DIBinfo,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) image->columns;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) image->rows;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biBitCount=32;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
hDC=GetDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
hBitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&DIBinfo,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &ppBits,
NULL,0);
ReleaseDC(NULL,hDC);
if (hBitmap == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
/* create an offscreen DC */
hDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
{
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
}
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hDC,hBitmap);
if (hOldBitmap == 0)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
if (hPal != NULL)
{
/* Kenichi Masuko says this needed */
SelectPalette(hDC, hPal, FALSE);
RealizePalette(hDC);
}
/* bitblt from the memory to the DIB-based one */
BitBlt(hDC,0,0,(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,hMemDC,0,0,SRCCOPY);
/* finally copy the pixels! */
pBits=ppBits;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
pBits++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,552
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void sem_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
{
ipc_lock_by_ptr(&sma->sem_perm);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
ipc_unlock(&(sma)->sem_perm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,978
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UserSelectionScreen::FillUserMojoStruct(
const user_manager::User* user,
bool is_owner,
bool is_signin_to_add,
proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType auth_type,
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales,
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfo* user_info) {
user_info->basic_user_info = ash::mojom::UserInfo::New();
user_info->basic_user_info->type = user->GetType();
user_info->basic_user_info->account_id = user->GetAccountId();
user_info->basic_user_info->display_name =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(user->GetDisplayName());
user_info->basic_user_info->display_email = user->display_email();
user_info->basic_user_info->avatar = BuildMojoUserAvatarForUser(user);
user_info->auth_type = auth_type;
user_info->is_signed_in = user->is_logged_in();
user_info->is_device_owner = is_owner;
user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(user);
user_info->allow_fingerprint_unlock = AllowFingerprintForUser(user);
if (!is_signin_to_add) {
user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed = true;
} else {
GetMultiProfilePolicy(user, &user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed,
&user_info->multiprofile_policy);
}
if (user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT) {
user_info->public_account_info = ash::mojom::PublicAccountInfo::New();
std::string domain;
if (GetEnterpriseDomain(&domain))
user_info->public_account_info->enterprise_domain = domain;
std::string selected_locale;
bool has_multiple_locales;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> available_locales =
GetPublicSessionLocales(public_session_recommended_locales,
&selected_locale, &has_multiple_locales);
DCHECK(available_locales);
user_info->public_account_info->available_locales =
lock_screen_utils::FromListValueToLocaleItem(
std::move(available_locales));
user_info->public_account_info->default_locale = selected_locale;
user_info->public_account_info->show_advanced_view = has_multiple_locales;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
Low
| 172,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_revision(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
unsigned char buffer[3];
int ret;
/* Get a couple of the ATMega Firmware values */
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_ID, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
buffer, 3, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
atusb->fw_ver_maj = buffer[0];
atusb->fw_ver_min = buffer[1];
atusb->fw_hw_type = buffer[2];
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware: major: %u, minor: %u, hardware type: %u\n",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min, atusb->fw_hw_type);
}
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 2) {
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware version (%u.%u) predates our first public release.",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min);
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Please update to version 0.2 or newer");
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
Low
| 168,391
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _gd2GetHeader (gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy,
int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy,
t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading gd2 header info\n"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC (in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
};
id[i] = ch;
};
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Got file code: %s\n", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp (id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Not a valid gd2 file\n"));
goto fail1;
};
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord (vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Version: %d\n", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad version: %d\n", *vers));
goto fail1;
};
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord (sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get x-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord (sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get y-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG (printf ("Image is %dx%d\n", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord (cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("ChunkSize: %d\n", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad chunk size: %d\n", *cs));
goto fail1;
};
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord (fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Format: %d\n", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad data format: %d\n", *fmt));
goto fail1;
};
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord (ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks Wide\n", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord (ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks vertically\n", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed (*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading %d chunk index entries\n", nc));
if (overflow2(sizeof(t_chunk_info), nc)) {
goto fail1;
}
sidx = sizeof (t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc (sidx, 1);
if (cidx == NULL) {
goto fail1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0)
goto fail2;
};
*chunkIdx = cidx;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("gd2 header complete\n"));
return 1;
fail2:
gdFree(cidx);
fail1:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in gd_io.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving the number of horizontal and vertical chunks in an image.
Commit Message: Fix #354: Signed Integer Overflow gd_io.c
GD2 stores the number of horizontal and vertical chunks as words (i.e. 2
byte unsigned). These values are multiplied and assigned to an int when
reading the image, what can cause integer overflows. We have to avoid
that, and also make sure that either chunk count is actually greater
than zero. If illegal chunk counts are detected, we bail out from
reading the image.
|
Medium
| 168,509
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Cancel() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Cancel";
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
pairing_delegate_->DismissDisplayOrConfirm();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,218
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, event) >= 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The validate_event function in arch/arm/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10.8 on the ARM platform allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by adding a hardware event to an event group led by a software event.
Commit Message: ARM: 7809/1: perf: fix event validation for software group leaders
It is possible to construct an event group with a software event as a
group leader and then subsequently add a hardware event to the group.
This results in the event group being validated by adding all members
of the group to a fake PMU and attempting to allocate each event on
their respective PMU.
Unfortunately, for software events wthout a corresponding arm_pmu, this
results in a kernel crash attempting to dereference the ->get_event_idx
function pointer.
This patch fixes the problem by checking explicitly for software events
and ignoring those in event validation (since they can always be
scheduled). We will probably want to revisit this for 3.12, since the
validation checks don't appear to work correctly when dealing with
multiple hardware PMUs anyway.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 166,009
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
{
ssize_t err;
int32_t fid;
uint64_t off;
uint32_t count;
int32_t len = 0;
int32_t total = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
QEMUIOVector qiov_full;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dqd", &fid, &off, &count);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return;
}
offset += err;
v9fs_init_qiov_from_pdu(&qiov_full, pdu, offset, count, true);
trace_v9fs_write(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, off, count, qiov_full.niov);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
if (fidp->fs.fd == -1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
/*
* setxattr operation
*/
err = v9fs_xattr_write(s, pdu, fidp, off, count,
qiov_full.iov, qiov_full.niov);
goto out;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
qemu_iovec_init(&qiov, qiov_full.niov);
do {
qemu_iovec_reset(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&qiov, &qiov_full, total, qiov_full.size - total);
if (0) {
print_sg(qiov.iov, qiov.niov);
}
/* Loop in case of EINTR */
do {
len = v9fs_co_pwritev(pdu, fidp, qiov.iov, qiov.niov, off);
if (len >= 0) {
off += len;
total += len;
}
} while (len == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
if (len < 0) {
/* IO error return the error */
err = len;
goto out_qiov;
}
} while (total < count && len > 0);
offset = 7;
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);
out_qiov:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the v9fs_write function in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging failure to free an IO vector.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,906
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
* troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
* the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
* modify both bitspersample and sampleformat in the directory to
* indicate 8-bit linear. This way, the decode "just works" even for
* readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
* the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
*/
td->td_bitspersample = 8;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, related to *READ of size 512* and libtiff/tif_unix.c:340:2.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
|
Medium
| 168,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline struct futex_hash_bucket *queue_lock(struct futex_q *q)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
get_futex_key_refs(&q->key);
hb = hash_futex(&q->key);
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
return hb;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The futex_wait function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly maintain a certain reference count during requeue operations, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that triggers a zero count.
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
Medium
| 166,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadCUTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image,*palette;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
MagickBooleanType status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t EncodedByte;
unsigned char RunCount,RunValue,RunCountMasked;
CUTHeader Header;
CUTPalHeader PalHeader;
ssize_t depth;
ssize_t i,j;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff=NULL,*ptrB;
PixelPacket *q;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read CUT image.
*/
palette=NULL;
clone_info=NULL;
Header.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.Width==0 || Header.Height==0 || Header.Reserved!=0)
CUT_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*---This code checks first line of image---*/
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
ldblk=0;
while((int) RunCountMasked!=0) /*end of line?*/
{
i=1;
if((int) RunCount<0x80) i=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
offset=SeekBlob(image,TellBlob(image)+i,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data*/
EncodedByte-=i+1;
ldblk+=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: unexpected eof in line*/
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
if(EncodedByte!=1) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: size incorrect*/
i=0; /*guess a number of bit planes*/
if(ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=8;
if(2*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=4;
if(8*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=1;
if(i==0) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: incorrect bit planes*/
depth=i;
image->columns=Header.Width;
image->rows=Header.Height;
image->depth=8;
image->colors=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(1UL*i)+1);
if (image_info->ping) goto Finish;
/* ----- Do something with palette ----- */
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL) goto NoPalette;
i=(ssize_t) strlen(clone_info->filename);
j=i;
while(--i>0)
{
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='.')
{
break;
}
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='/' || clone_info->filename[i]=='\\' ||
clone_info->filename[i]==':' )
{
i=j;
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".PAL",(size_t)
(MaxTextExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".pal",(size_t)
(MaxTextExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info->filename[i]='\0';
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
}
}
if( (palette=AcquireImage(clone_info))==NULL ) goto NoPalette;
status=OpenBlob(clone_info,palette,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ErasePalette:
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
palette=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
if(palette!=NULL)
{
(void) ReadBlob(palette,2,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.FileId);
if(strncmp(PalHeader.FileId,"AH",2) != 0) goto ErasePalette;
PalHeader.Version=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.Size=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.FileType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.SubType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.BoardID=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.GraphicsMode=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxRed=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxGreen=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxBlue=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
(void) ReadBlob(palette,20,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.PaletteId);
if(PalHeader.MaxIndex<1) goto ErasePalette;
image->colors=PalHeader.MaxIndex+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse) goto NoMemory;
if(PalHeader.MaxRed==0) PalHeader.MaxRed=(unsigned int) QuantumRange; /*avoid division by 0*/
if(PalHeader.MaxGreen==0) PalHeader.MaxGreen=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
if(PalHeader.MaxBlue==0) PalHeader.MaxBlue=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
for(i=0;i<=(int) PalHeader.MaxIndex;i++)
{ /*this may be wrong- I don't know why is palette such strange*/
j=(ssize_t) TellBlob(palette);
if((j % 512)>512-6)
{
j=((j / 512)+1)*512;
offset=SeekBlob(palette,j,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxRed)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
image->colormap[i].red*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxRed>>1))/
PalHeader.MaxRed);
}
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxGreen)
{
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum
(((double) image->colormap[i].green*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxGreen>>1))/PalHeader.MaxGreen);
}
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxBlue)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum
(((double)image->colormap[i].blue*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxBlue>>1))/PalHeader.MaxBlue);
}
}
}
NoPalette:
if(palette==NULL)
{
image->colors=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
}
/* ----- Load RLE compressed raster ----- */
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk,
sizeof(*BImgBuff)); /*Ldblk was set in the check phase*/
if(BImgBuff==NULL) goto NoMemory;
offset=SeekBlob(image,6 /*sizeof(Header)*/,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (i=0; i < (int) Header.Height; i++)
{
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
ptrB=BImgBuff;
j=ldblk;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
while ((int) RunCountMasked != 0)
{
if((ssize_t) RunCountMasked>j)
{ /*Wrong Data*/
RunCountMasked=(unsigned char) j;
if(j==0)
{
break;
}
}
if((int) RunCount>0x80)
{
RunValue=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(ptrB,(int) RunValue,(size_t) RunCountMasked);
}
else {
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) RunCountMasked,ptrB);
}
ptrB+=(int) RunCountMasked;
j-=(int) RunCountMasked;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto Finish; /* wrong data: unexpected eof in line */
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
InsertRow(depth,BImgBuff,i,image);
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
/*detect monochrome image*/
if(palette==NULL)
{ /*attempt to detect binary (black&white) images*/
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if(GetCutColors(image)==2)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
register Quantum
sample;
sample=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
if(image->colormap[i].red!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].green!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].blue!=sample) goto Finish;
}
image->colormap[1].red=image->colormap[1].green=
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->rows; i++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,exception);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t)image->columns; j++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(q) == ScaleCharToQuantum(1))
{
SetPixelRed(q,QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,QuantumRange);
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) goto Finish;
}
}
}
}
Finish:
if (BImgBuff != NULL)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
struct efi_info *ei = ¶ms->efi_info;
if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
return 0;
/*
* If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI
* and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass
* acpi_rsdp=<addr> on kernel command line to make second kernel boot
* without efi.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
ei->efi_memdesc_version = current_ei->efi_memdesc_version;
ei->efi_memdesc_size = efi_get_runtime_map_desc_size();
setup_efi_info_memmap(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset,
efi_map_sz);
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(params, params_load_addr,
efi_setup_data_offset);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The Linux kernel, as used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, kernel-rt, and Enterprise MRG 2 and when booted with UEFI Secure Boot enabled, allows local users to bypass intended securelevel/secureboot restrictions by leveraging improper handling of secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Commit Message: kexec/uefi: copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag
in original kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const
{
return m_pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,291
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct _mdi *_WM_ParseNewXmi(uint8_t *xmi_data, uint32_t xmi_size) {
struct _mdi *xmi_mdi = NULL;
uint32_t xmi_tmpdata = 0;
uint8_t xmi_formcnt = 0;
uint32_t xmi_catlen = 0;
uint32_t xmi_subformlen = 0;
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t j = 0;
uint32_t xmi_evntlen = 0;
uint32_t xmi_divisions = 60;
uint32_t xmi_tempo = 500000;
uint32_t xmi_sample_count = 0;
float xmi_sample_count_f = 0.0;
float xmi_sample_remainder = 0.0;
float xmi_samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
uint8_t xmi_ch = 0;
uint8_t xmi_note = 0;
uint32_t *xmi_notelen = NULL;
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
uint32_t xmi_delta = 0;
uint32_t xmi_lowestdelta = 0;
uint32_t xmi_evnt_cnt = 0;
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"FORM",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_tmpdata = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 4;
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"XDIRINFO",8)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 8;
xmi_size -= 8;
/*
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x02 at this point are unknown
so skip over them
*/
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_formcnt = *xmi_data++;
if (xmi_formcnt == 0) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_size--;
/*
at this stage unsure if remaining data in
this section means anything
*/
xmi_tmpdata -= 13;
xmi_data += xmi_tmpdata;
xmi_size -= xmi_tmpdata;
/* FIXME: Check: may not even need to process CAT information */
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"CAT ",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_catlen = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_catlen |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_catlen |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_catlen |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 4;
UNUSED(xmi_catlen);
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"XMID",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(xmi_mdi, xmi_divisions);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(xmi_mdi, xmi_tempo);
xmi_samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(xmi_divisions, xmi_tempo);
xmi_notelen = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * 16 * 128);
memset(xmi_notelen, 0, (sizeof(uint32_t) * 16 * 128));
for (i = 0; i < xmi_formcnt; i++) {
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"FORM",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_subformlen = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_subformlen |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_subformlen |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_subformlen |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 4;
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"XMID",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_subformlen -= 4;
do {
if (!memcmp(xmi_data,"TIMB",4)) {
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_tmpdata = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_data += xmi_tmpdata;
xmi_size -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
xmi_subformlen -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
} else if (!memcmp(xmi_data,"RBRN",4)) {
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_tmpdata = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_data += xmi_tmpdata;
xmi_size -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
xmi_subformlen -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
} else if (!memcmp(xmi_data,"EVNT",4)) {
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_evnt_cnt++;
xmi_evntlen = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_evntlen |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_evntlen |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_evntlen |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 8;
xmi_subformlen -= 8;
do {
if (*xmi_data < 0x80) {
xmi_delta = 0;
if (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
while (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
xmi_delta = (xmi_delta << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
}
}
xmi_delta = (xmi_delta << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
do {
if ((xmi_lowestdelta != 0) && (xmi_lowestdelta <= xmi_delta)) {
xmi_tmpdata = xmi_lowestdelta;
} else {
xmi_tmpdata = xmi_delta;
}
xmi_sample_count_f= (((float) xmi_tmpdata * xmi_samples_per_delta_f) + xmi_sample_remainder);
xmi_sample_count = (uint32_t) xmi_sample_count_f;
xmi_sample_remainder = xmi_sample_count_f - (float) xmi_sample_count;
xmi_mdi->events[xmi_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += xmi_sample_count;
xmi_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += xmi_sample_count;
xmi_lowestdelta = 0;
for (j = 0; j < (16*128); j++) {
if (xmi_notelen[j] == 0) continue;
xmi_notelen[j] -= xmi_tmpdata;
if (xmi_notelen[j] == 0) {
xmi_ch = j / 128;
xmi_note = j - (xmi_ch * 128);
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(xmi_mdi, xmi_ch, xmi_note, 0);
} else {
if ((xmi_lowestdelta == 0) || (xmi_lowestdelta > xmi_notelen[j])) {
xmi_lowestdelta = xmi_notelen[j];
}
}
}
xmi_delta -= xmi_tmpdata;
} while (xmi_delta);
} else {
if ((xmi_data[0] == 0xff) && (xmi_data[1] == 0x51) && (xmi_data[2] == 0x03)) {
setup_ret = 6;
goto _XMI_Next_Event;
}
if ((setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(xmi_mdi,xmi_data,0)) == 0) {
goto _xmi_end;
}
if ((*xmi_data & 0xf0) == 0x90) {
xmi_ch = *xmi_data & 0x0f;
xmi_note = xmi_data[1];
xmi_data += setup_ret;
xmi_size -= setup_ret;
xmi_evntlen -= setup_ret;
xmi_subformlen -= setup_ret;
xmi_tmpdata = 0;
if (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
while (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
xmi_tmpdata = (xmi_tmpdata << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
}
}
xmi_tmpdata = (xmi_tmpdata << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
xmi_notelen[128 * xmi_ch + xmi_note] = xmi_tmpdata;
if ((xmi_tmpdata > 0) && ((xmi_lowestdelta == 0) || (xmi_tmpdata < xmi_lowestdelta))) {
xmi_lowestdelta = xmi_tmpdata;
}
} else {
_XMI_Next_Event:
xmi_data += setup_ret;
xmi_size -= setup_ret;
xmi_evntlen -= setup_ret;
xmi_subformlen -= setup_ret;
}
}
} while (xmi_evntlen);
} else {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
} while (xmi_subformlen);
}
if ((xmi_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
xmi_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
xmi_mdi->current_event = &xmi_mdi->events[0];
xmi_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
xmi_mdi->note = NULL;
/* More than 1 event form in XMI means treat as type 2 */
if (xmi_evnt_cnt > 1) {
xmi_mdi->is_type2 = 1;
}
_WM_ResetToStart(xmi_mdi);
_xmi_end:
if (xmi_notelen != NULL) free(xmi_notelen);
if (xmi_mdi->reverb) return (xmi_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(xmi_mdi);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
|
Medium
| 168,006
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: double AudioTrack::GetSamplingRate() const
{
return m_rate;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CheckThread() {
if (detach_thread_at_next_check_) {
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
detach_thread_at_next_check_ = false;
}
CHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,590
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCookies()
{
m_client->clearBrowserCookies();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly load Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,349
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned long get_seg_limit(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
{
struct desc_struct *desc;
unsigned long limit;
short sel;
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, seg_reg_idx);
if (sel < 0)
return 0;
if (user_64bit_mode(regs) || v8086_mode(regs))
return -1L;
if (!sel)
return 0;
desc = get_desc(sel);
if (!desc)
return 0;
/*
* If the granularity bit is set, the limit is given in multiples
* of 4096. This also means that the 12 least significant bits are
* not tested when checking the segment limits. In practice,
* this means that the segment ends in (limit << 12) + 0xfff.
*/
limit = get_desc_limit(desc);
if (desc->g)
limit = (limit << 12) + 0xfff;
return limit;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.9, there is a use-after-free for access to an LDT entry because of a race condition between modify_ldt() and a #BR exception for an MPX bounds violation.
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void perf_swevent_overflow(struct perf_event *event, u64 overflow,
int nmi, struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int throttle = 0;
data->period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!overflow)
overflow = perf_swevent_set_period(event);
if (hwc->interrupts == MAX_INTERRUPTS)
return;
for (; overflow; overflow--) {
if (__perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, throttle,
data, regs)) {
/*
* We inhibit the overflow from happening when
* hwc->interrupts == MAX_INTERRUPTS.
*/
break;
}
throttle = 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void on_page_prepare(GtkNotebook *assistant, GtkWidget *page, gpointer user_data)
{
/* This suppresses [Last] button: assistant thinks that
* we never have this page ready unless we are on it
* -> therefore there is at least one non-ready page
* -> therefore it won't show [Last]
*/
/* If processing is finished and if it was terminated because of an error
* the event progress page is selected. So, it does not make sense to show
* the next step button and we MUST NOT clear warnings.
*/
if (!is_processing_finished())
{
/* some pages hide it, so restore it to it's default */
show_next_step_button();
clear_warnings();
}
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_detail);
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_onfail);
if (!g_expert_mode)
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_repeat);
/* Save text fields if changed */
/* Must be called before any GUI operation because the following two
* functions causes recreating of the text items tabs, thus all updates to
* these tabs will be lost */
save_items_from_notepad();
save_text_from_text_view(g_tv_comment, FILENAME_COMMENT);
if (pages[PAGENO_SUMMARY].page_widget == page)
{
if (!g_expert_mode)
{
/* Skip intro screen */
int n = select_next_page_no(pages[PAGENO_SUMMARY].page_no, NULL);
log_info("switching to page_no:%d", n);
gtk_notebook_set_current_page(assistant, n);
return;
}
}
if (pages[PAGENO_EDIT_ELEMENTS].page_widget == page)
{
if (highlight_forbidden())
{
add_sensitive_data_warning();
show_warnings();
gtk_expander_set_expanded(g_exp_search, TRUE);
}
else
gtk_toggle_button_set_active(GTK_TOGGLE_BUTTON(g_rb_custom_search), TRUE);
show_warnings();
}
if (pages[PAGENO_REVIEW_DATA].page_widget == page)
{
update_ls_details_checkboxes(g_event_selected);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, gtk_toggle_button_get_active(g_tb_approve_bt));
}
if (pages[PAGENO_EDIT_COMMENT].page_widget == page)
{
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_detail);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, false);
on_comment_changed(gtk_text_view_get_buffer(g_tv_comment), NULL);
}
if (pages[PAGENO_EVENT_PROGRESS].page_widget == page)
{
log_info("g_event_selected:'%s'", g_event_selected);
if (g_event_selected
&& g_event_selected[0]
) {
clear_warnings();
start_event_run(g_event_selected);
}
}
if(pages[PAGENO_EVENT_SELECTOR].page_widget == page)
{
if (!g_expert_mode && !g_auto_event_list)
hide_next_step_button();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: libreport 2.0.7 before 2.6.3 only saves changes to the first file when editing a crash report, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors related to the (1) backtrace, (2) cmdline, (3) environ, (4) open_fds, (5) maps, (6) smaps, (7) hostname, (8) remote, (9) ks.cfg, or (10) anaconda-tb file attachment included in a Red Hat Bugzilla bug report.
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void fslib_copy_libs(const char *full_path) {
assert(full_path);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" fslib_copy_libs %s\n", full_path);
if (access(full_path, R_OK)) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf("cannot find %s for private-lib, skipping...\n", full_path);
return;
}
unlink(RUN_LIB_FILE); // in case is there
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_LIB_FILE, 0644);
if (chown(RUN_LIB_FILE, getuid(), getgid()))
errExit("chown");
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" running fldd %s\n", full_path);
sbox_run(SBOX_USER | SBOX_SECCOMP | SBOX_CAPS_NONE, 3, PATH_FLDD, full_path, RUN_LIB_FILE);
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_LIB_FILE, "r");
if (!fp)
errExit("fopen");
char buf[MAXBUF];
while (fgets(buf, MAXBUF, fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
fslib_duplicate(buf);
}
fclose(fp);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: In Firejail before 0.9.60, seccomp filters are writable inside the jail, leading to a lack of intended seccomp restrictions for a process that is joined to the jail after a filter has been modified by an attacker.
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
|
Low
| 169,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> strictFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.strictFunction");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(float, a, static_cast<float>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)->NumberValue()));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, b, V8int::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8int::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
RefPtr<bool> result = imp->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ripng_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, unsigned int length)
{
register const struct rip6 *rp = (const struct rip6 *)dat;
register const struct netinfo6 *ni;
register u_int amt;
register u_int i;
int j;
int trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend < dat)
return;
amt = ndo->ndo_snapend - dat;
i = min(length, amt);
if (i < (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6)))
return;
i -= (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6));
switch (rp->rip6_cmd) {
case RIP6_REQUEST:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j == 1
&& rp->rip6_nets->rip6_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY6
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&rp->rip6_nets->rip6_dest)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req dump"));
break;
}
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, 0);
}
break;
case RIP6_RESPONSE:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, ni->rip6_metric);
}
if (trunc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ripng]"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-%d ?? %u", rp->rip6_cmd, length));
break;
}
if (rp->rip6_vers != RIP6_VERSION)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [vers %d]", rp->rip6_vers));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The RIPng parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ripng.c:ripng_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12992/RIPng: Clean up bounds checking.
Do bounds checking as we access items.
Scan the list of netinfo6 entries based on the supplied packet length,
without taking the captured length into account; let the aforementioned
bounds checking handle that.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,922
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: poppler_page_prepare_output_dev (PopplerPage *page,
double scale,
int rotation,
gboolean transparent,
OutputDevData *output_dev_data)
{
CairoOutputDev *output_dev;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double width, height;
int cairo_width, cairo_height, cairo_rowstride, rotate;
unsigned char *cairo_data;
rotate = rotation + page->page->getRotate ();
if (rotate == 90 || rotate == 270) {
height = page->page->getCropWidth ();
width = page->page->getCropHeight ();
} else {
width = page->page->getCropWidth ();
height = page->page->getCropHeight ();
}
cairo_width = (int) ceil(width * scale);
cairo_height = (int) ceil(height * scale);
output_dev = page->document->output_dev;
cairo_rowstride = cairo_width * 4;
cairo_data = (guchar *) gmalloc (cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
if (transparent)
memset (cairo_data, 0x00, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
else
memset (cairo_data, 0xff, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
surface = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(cairo_data,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
cairo_width, cairo_height,
cairo_rowstride);
output_dev_data->cairo_data = cairo_data;
output_dev_data->surface = surface;
output_dev_data->cairo = cairo_create (surface);
output_dev->setCairo (output_dev_data->cairo);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,617
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
image = 0;
info = 0;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
goto error;
JAS_DBGLOG(1, (
"BMP header: magic 0x%x; siz %d; res1 %d; res2 %d; off %d\n",
hdr.magic, hdr.siz, hdr.reserved1, hdr.reserved2, hdr.off
));
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
}
JAS_DBGLOG(1,
("BMP information: len %ld; width %ld; height %ld; numplanes %d; "
"depth %d; enctype %ld; siz %ld; hres %ld; vres %ld; numcolors %ld; "
"mincolors %ld\n", JAS_CAST(long, info->len),
JAS_CAST(long, info->width), JAS_CAST(long, info->height),
JAS_CAST(long, info->numplanes), JAS_CAST(long, info->depth),
JAS_CAST(long, info->enctype), JAS_CAST(long, info->siz),
JAS_CAST(long, info->hres), JAS_CAST(long, info->vres),
JAS_CAST(long, info->numcolors), JAS_CAST(long, info->mincolors)));
if (info->width < 0 || info->height < 0 || info->numplanes < 0 ||
info->depth < 0 || info->siz < 0 || info->hres < 0 || info->vres < 0) {
jas_eprintf("corrupt bit stream\n");
goto error;
}
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
goto error;
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
error:
if (info) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
}
if (image) {
jas_image_destroy(image);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,713
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void gdImageLine (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int dx, dy, incr1, incr2, d, x, y, xend, yend, xdirflag, ydirflag;
int wid;
int w, wstart;
int thick = im->thick;
if (color == gdAntiAliased) {
/*
gdAntiAliased passed as color: use the much faster, much cheaper
and equally attractive gdImageAALine implementation. That
clips too, so don't clip twice.
*/
gdImageAALine(im, x1, y1, x2, y2, im->AA_color);
return;
}
/* 2.0.10: Nick Atty: clip to edges of drawing rectangle, return if no points need to be drawn */
if (!clip_1d(&x1,&y1,&x2,&y2,gdImageSX(im)) || !clip_1d(&y1,&x1,&y2,&x2,gdImageSY(im))) {
return;
}
dx = abs (x2 - x1);
dy = abs (y2 - y1);
if (dx == 0) {
gdImageVLine(im, x1, y1, y2, color);
return;
} else if (dy == 0) {
gdImageHLine(im, y1, x1, x2, color);
return;
}
if (dy <= dx) {
/* More-or-less horizontal. use wid for vertical stroke */
/* Doug Claar: watch out for NaN in atan2 (2.0.5) */
if ((dx == 0) && (dy == 0)) {
wid = 1;
} else {
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double ac = cos (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (ac != 0) {
wid = thick / ac;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
if (wid == 0) {
wid = 1;
}
}
d = 2 * dy - dx;
incr1 = 2 * dy;
incr2 = 2 * (dy - dx);
if (x1 > x2) {
x = x2;
y = y2;
ydirflag = (-1);
xend = x1;
} else {
x = x1;
y = y1;
ydirflag = 1;
xend = x2;
}
/* Set up line thickness */
wstart = y - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, w, color);
}
if (((y2 - y1) * ydirflag) > 0) {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y++;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = y - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, w, color);
}
}
} else {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y--;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = y - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, w, color);
}
}
}
} else {
/* More-or-less vertical. use wid for horizontal stroke */
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double as = sin (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (as != 0) {
wid = thick / as;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
if (wid == 0) {
wid = 1;
}
d = 2 * dx - dy;
incr1 = 2 * dx;
incr2 = 2 * (dx - dy);
if (y1 > y2) {
y = y2;
x = x2;
yend = y1;
xdirflag = (-1);
} else {
y = y1;
x = x1;
yend = y2;
xdirflag = 1;
}
/* Set up line thickness */
wstart = x - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, w, y, color);
}
if (((x2 - x1) * xdirflag) > 0) {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x++;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = x - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, w, y, color);
}
}
} else {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x--;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = x - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, w, y, color);
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
|
Medium
| 167,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rpl_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct icmp6_hdr *hdr,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
int secured = hdr->icmp6_code & 0x80;
int basecode= hdr->icmp6_code & 0x7f;
if(secured) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (SEC) [worktodo]"));
/* XXX
* the next header pointer needs to move forward to
* skip the secure part.
*/
return;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (CLR)"));
}
switch(basecode) {
case ND_RPL_DAG_IS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DODAG Information Solicitation"));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag) {
}
break;
case ND_RPL_DAG_IO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DODAG Information Object"));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag) {
rpl_dio_print(ndo, bp, length);
}
break;
case ND_RPL_DAO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Destination Advertisement Object"));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag) {
rpl_dao_print(ndo, bp, length);
}
break;
case ND_RPL_DAO_ACK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Destination Advertisement Object Ack"));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag) {
rpl_daoack_print(ndo, bp, length);
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RPL message, unknown code %u",hdr->icmp6_code));
break;
}
return;
#if 0
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|truncated]"));
return;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
|
Low
| 169,832
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: av_cold void ff_mpv_idct_init(MpegEncContext *s)
{
ff_idctdsp_init(&s->idsp, s->avctx);
/* load & permutate scantables
* note: only wmv uses different ones
*/
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
}
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libavcodec in FFmpeg 4.0 may trigger a NULL pointer dereference if the studio profile is incorrectly detected while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service, related to idctdsp.c and mpegvideo.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,190
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
return internalSetBitrateParams(
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)params);
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEntropyMode = 0;
if (OMX_TRUE == avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC)
mEntropyMode = 1;
if ((avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) &&
avcType->nPFrames) {
mBframes = avcType->nBFrames / avcType->nPFrames;
}
mIInterval = avcType->nPFrames + avcType->nBFrames;
if (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLoopFilterDisable == avcType->eLoopFilterMode)
mDisableDeblkLevel = 4;
if (avcType->nRefFrames != 1
|| avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE
|| avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0
|| avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE
|| avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int iov_fault_in_pages_write(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
{
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
while (len > 0) {
unsigned long this_len;
this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (fault_in_pages_writeable(iov->iov_base, this_len))
break;
len -= this_len;
iov++;
}
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The (1) pipe_read and (2) pipe_write implementations in fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16 do not properly consider the side effects of failed __copy_to_user_inatomic and __copy_from_user_inatomic calls, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application, aka an *I/O vector array overrun.*
Commit Message: switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 169,927
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static double digitize(double value, int depth, int do_round)
{
/* 'value' is in the range 0 to 1, the result is the same value rounded to a
* multiple of the digitization factor - 8 or 16 bits depending on both the
* sample depth and the 'assume' setting. Digitization is normally by
* rounding and 'do_round' should be 1, if it is 0 the digitized value will
* be truncated.
*/
PNG_CONST unsigned int digitization_factor = (1U << depth) -1;
/* Limiting the range is done as a convenience to the caller - it's easier to
* do it once here than every time at the call site.
*/
if (value <= 0)
value = 0;
else if (value >= 1)
value = 1;
value *= digitization_factor;
if (do_round) value += .5;
return floor(value)/digitization_factor;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Isolated Sites feature in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not properly enforce the use of separate processes, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,436
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FramebufferInfoTest()
: manager_(1, 1),
feature_info_(new FeatureInfo()),
renderbuffer_manager_(NULL, kMaxRenderbufferSize, kMaxSamples,
kDepth24Supported) {
texture_manager_.reset(new TextureManager(NULL,
feature_info_.get(),
kMaxTextureSize,
kMaxCubemapSize,
kUseDefaultTextures));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not ensure that clear calls interact properly with the state of a draw buffer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via a crafted CANVAS element, related to gpu/command_buffer/service/framebuffer_manager.cc and gpu/command_buffer/service/gles2_cmd_decoder.cc.
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void *atomic_thread_inc_dec(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
usleep(1);
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
usleep(1);
atomic_dec_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebMediaPlayerMS::DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,620
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
inet->nodefrag = 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
inet->inet_id = 0;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = sk->sk_prot->backlog_rcv;
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_all = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically
* shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
/* Add to protocol hash chains. */
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err)
sk_common_release(sk);
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The networking implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3, as used in Android and other products, does not validate protocol identifiers for certain protocol families, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL function pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging CLONE_NEWUSER support to execute a crafted SOCK_RAW application.
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInsideManhattanSquare(const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - first_touch_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - first_touch_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance < kMaximumTouchMoveInPixelsForClick;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly handle Tibetan text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,044
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
const KURL& fileSystemURL,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
fileSystem()->resolveURL(fileSystemURL, callbacks->release());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,431
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static const char *parse_array( cJSON *item, const char *value )
{
cJSON *child;
if ( *value != '[' ) {
/* Not an array! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
item->type = cJSON_Array;
value = skip( value + 1 );
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* empty array. */
if ( ! ( item->child = child = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
while ( *value == ',' ) {
cJSON *new_item;
if ( ! ( new_item = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next = new_item;
new_item->prev = child;
child = new_item;
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value+1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
}
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* end of array */
/* Malformed. */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,301
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::handleTextNode()
{
m_lastTextNode = m_node;
int startOffset;
int offsetInNode;
RenderText* renderer = handleFirstLetter(startOffset, offsetInNode);
if (!renderer)
return true;
String text = renderer->text();
if (!renderer->firstTextBox() && text.length() > 0)
return true;
m_positionEndOffset = m_offset;
m_offset = startOffset + offsetInNode;
m_positionNode = m_node;
m_positionStartOffset = m_offset;
ASSERT(0 <= m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(1 <= m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(m_positionStartOffset <= m_positionEndOffset);
m_textLength = m_positionEndOffset - m_positionStartOffset;
m_textCharacters = text.characters() + (m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode);
ASSERT(m_textCharacters >= text.characters());
ASSERT(m_textCharacters + m_textLength <= text.characters() + static_cast<int>(text.length()));
m_lastCharacter = text[m_positionEndOffset - 1];
return !m_shouldHandleFirstLetter;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors related to the handling of text.
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int WriteRiffHeader (FILE *outfile, WavpackContext *wpc, int64_t total_samples, int qmode)
{
int do_rf64 = 0, write_junk = 1;
ChunkHeader ds64hdr, datahdr, fmthdr;
RiffChunkHeader riffhdr;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
JunkChunk junkchunk;
WaveHeader wavhdr;
uint32_t bcount;
int64_t total_data_bytes, total_riff_bytes;
int num_channels = WavpackGetNumChannels (wpc);
int32_t channel_mask = WavpackGetChannelMask (wpc);
int32_t sample_rate = WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc);
int bytes_per_sample = WavpackGetBytesPerSample (wpc);
int bits_per_sample = WavpackGetBitsPerSample (wpc);
int format = WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) ? 3 : 1;
int wavhdrsize = 16;
if (format == 3 && WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) != 127) {
error_line ("can't create valid RIFF wav header for non-normalized floating data!");
return FALSE;
}
if (total_samples == -1)
total_samples = 0x7ffff000 / (bytes_per_sample * num_channels);
total_data_bytes = total_samples * bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
if (total_data_bytes > 0xff000000) {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so rf64", total_data_bytes);
write_junk = 0;
do_rf64 = 1;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so riff", total_data_bytes);
CLEAR (wavhdr);
wavhdr.FormatTag = format;
wavhdr.NumChannels = num_channels;
wavhdr.SampleRate = sample_rate;
wavhdr.BytesPerSecond = sample_rate * num_channels * bytes_per_sample;
wavhdr.BlockAlign = bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
if (num_channels > 2 || channel_mask != 0x5 - num_channels) {
wavhdrsize = sizeof (wavhdr);
wavhdr.cbSize = 22;
wavhdr.ValidBitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
wavhdr.SubFormat = format;
wavhdr.ChannelMask = channel_mask;
wavhdr.FormatTag = 0xfffe;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bytes_per_sample * 8;
wavhdr.GUID [4] = 0x10;
wavhdr.GUID [6] = 0x80;
wavhdr.GUID [9] = 0xaa;
wavhdr.GUID [11] = 0x38;
wavhdr.GUID [12] = 0x9b;
wavhdr.GUID [13] = 0x71;
}
strncpy (riffhdr.ckID, do_rf64 ? "RF64" : "RIFF", sizeof (riffhdr.ckID));
strncpy (riffhdr.formType, "WAVE", sizeof (riffhdr.formType));
total_riff_bytes = sizeof (riffhdr) + wavhdrsize + sizeof (datahdr) + ((total_data_bytes + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
if (do_rf64) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (ds64hdr) + sizeof (ds64_chunk);
if (write_junk) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (junkchunk);
strncpy (fmthdr.ckID, "fmt ", sizeof (fmthdr.ckID));
strncpy (datahdr.ckID, "data", sizeof (datahdr.ckID));
fmthdr.ckSize = wavhdrsize;
if (write_junk) {
CLEAR (junkchunk);
strncpy (junkchunk.ckID, "junk", sizeof (junkchunk.ckID));
junkchunk.ckSize = sizeof (junkchunk) - 8;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&junkchunk, ChunkHeaderFormat);
}
if (do_rf64) {
strncpy (ds64hdr.ckID, "ds64", sizeof (ds64hdr.ckID));
ds64hdr.ckSize = sizeof (ds64_chunk);
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
ds64_chunk.riffSize64 = total_riff_bytes;
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 = total_data_bytes;
ds64_chunk.sampleCount64 = total_samples;
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64hdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
}
else {
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_riff_bytes;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_data_bytes;
}
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&riffhdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&fmthdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&wavhdr, WaveHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&datahdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &riffhdr, sizeof (riffhdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (riffhdr) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64hdr, sizeof (ds64hdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64hdr))) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (ds64_chunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64_chunk))) ||
(write_junk && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &junkchunk, sizeof (junkchunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (junkchunk))) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &fmthdr, sizeof (fmthdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (fmthdr) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &wavhdr, wavhdrsize, &bcount) || bcount != wavhdrsize ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &datahdr, sizeof (datahdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (datahdr)) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A stack-based buffer over-read in the ParseRiffHeaderConfig function of cli/riff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service attack or possibly have unspecified other impact via a maliciously crafted RF64 file.
Commit Message: issue #27, do not overwrite stack on corrupt RF64 file
|
Medium
| 169,335
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read_line(zval * this_ptr, spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
while (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY) && ret == SUCCESS && spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(intern TSRMLS_CC)) {
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,078
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int read_part_of_packet(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t *pts,
int *len, int *strid, int read_packet) {
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
PVAContext *pvactx = s->priv_data;
int syncword, streamid, reserved, flags, length, pts_flag;
int64_t pva_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE, startpos;
int ret;
recover:
startpos = avio_tell(pb);
syncword = avio_rb16(pb);
streamid = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* counter not used */
reserved = avio_r8(pb);
flags = avio_r8(pb);
length = avio_rb16(pb);
pts_flag = flags & 0x10;
if (syncword != PVA_MAGIC) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid syncword\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid != PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && streamid != PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid streamid\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (reserved != 0x55) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected reserved byte to be 0x55\n");
}
if (length > PVA_MAX_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid payload length %u\n", length);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid == PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && pts_flag) {
pva_pts = avio_rb32(pb);
length -= 4;
} else if (streamid == PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
/* PVA Audio Packets either start with a signaled PES packet or
* are a continuation of the previous PES packet. New PES packets
* always start at the beginning of a PVA Packet, never somewhere in
* the middle. */
if (!pvactx->continue_pes) {
int pes_signal, pes_header_data_length, pes_packet_length,
pes_flags;
unsigned char pes_header_data[256];
pes_signal = avio_rb24(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
pes_packet_length = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_flags = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_header_data_length = avio_r8(pb);
if (pes_signal != 1 || pes_header_data_length == 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected non empty signaled PES packet, "
"trying to recover\n");
avio_skip(pb, length - 9);
if (!read_packet)
return AVERROR(EIO);
goto recover;
}
ret = avio_read(pb, pes_header_data, pes_header_data_length);
if (ret != pes_header_data_length)
return ret < 0 ? ret : AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
length -= 9 + pes_header_data_length;
pes_packet_length -= 3 + pes_header_data_length;
pvactx->continue_pes = pes_packet_length;
if (pes_flags & 0x80 && (pes_header_data[0] & 0xf0) == 0x20) {
if (pes_header_data_length < 5) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "header too short\n");
avio_skip(pb, length);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
pva_pts = ff_parse_pes_pts(pes_header_data);
}
}
pvactx->continue_pes -= length;
if (pvactx->continue_pes < 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "audio data corruption\n");
pvactx->continue_pes = 0;
}
}
if (pva_pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[streamid-1], startpos, pva_pts, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
*pts = pva_pts;
*len = length;
*strid = streamid;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: FFmpeg before commit 9807d3976be0e92e4ece3b4b1701be894cd7c2e1 contains a CWE-835: Infinite loop vulnerability in pva format demuxer that can result in a Vulnerability that allows attackers to consume excessive amount of resources like CPU and RAM. This attack appear to be exploitable via specially crafted PVA file has to be provided as input. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 9807d3976be0e92e4ece3b4b1701be894cd7c2e1 and later.
Commit Message: avformat/pva: Check for EOF before retrying in read_part_of_packet()
Fixes: Infinite loop
Fixes: pva-4b1835dbc2027bf3c567005dcc78e85199240d06
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sgi_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec *cur_setting)
{
if (timr->it.mmtimer.clock == TIMER_OFF) {
cur_setting->it_interval.tv_nsec = 0;
cur_setting->it_interval.tv_sec = 0;
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 0;
cur_setting->it_value.tv_sec =0;
return;
}
ns_to_timespec(cur_setting->it_interval, timr->it.mmtimer.incr * sgi_clock_period);
ns_to_timespec(cur_setting->it_value, (timr->it.mmtimer.expires - rtc_time())* sgi_clock_period);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FileTransfer::DoUpload(filesize_t *total_bytes, ReliSock *s)
{
int rc;
MyString fullname;
filesize_t bytes;
bool is_the_executable;
bool upload_success = false;
bool do_download_ack = false;
bool do_upload_ack = false;
bool try_again = false;
int hold_code = 0;
int hold_subcode = 0;
MyString error_desc;
bool I_go_ahead_always = false;
bool peer_goes_ahead_always = false;
DCTransferQueue xfer_queue(m_xfer_queue_contact_info);
CondorError errstack;
bool first_failed_file_transfer_happened = false;
bool first_failed_upload_success = false;
bool first_failed_try_again = false;
int first_failed_hold_code = 0;
int first_failed_hold_subcode = 0;
MyString first_failed_error_desc;
int first_failed_line_number;
*total_bytes = 0;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"entering FileTransfer::DoUpload\n");
priv_state saved_priv = PRIV_UNKNOWN;
if( want_priv_change ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
s->encode();
if( !s->code(m_final_transfer_flag) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
bool socket_default_crypto = s->get_encryption();
if( want_priv_change && saved_priv == PRIV_UNKNOWN ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
FileTransferList filelist;
ExpandFileTransferList( FilesToSend, filelist );
FileTransferList::iterator filelist_it;
for( filelist_it = filelist.begin();
filelist_it != filelist.end();
filelist_it++ )
{
char const *filename = filelist_it->srcName();
char const *dest_dir = filelist_it->destDir();
if( dest_dir && *dest_dir ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: sending file %s to %s%c\n",filename,dest_dir,DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
else {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: sending file %s\n",filename);
}
bool is_url;
is_url = false;
if( param_boolean("ENABLE_URL_TRANSFERS", true) && IsUrl(filename) ) {
is_url = true;
fullname = filename;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: sending %s as URL.\n", filename);
} else if( filename[0] != '/' && filename[0] != '\\' && filename[1] != ':' ){
fullname.sprintf("%s%c%s",Iwd,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,filename);
} else {
fullname = filename;
}
#ifdef WIN32
if( !is_url && perm_obj && !is_the_executable &&
(perm_obj->read_access(fullname.Value()) != 1) ) {
upload_success = false;
error_desc.sprintf("error reading from %s: permission denied",fullname.Value());
do_upload_ack = true; // tell receiver that we failed
do_download_ack = true;
try_again = false; // put job on hold
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_UploadFileError;
hold_subcode = EPERM;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,
error_desc.Value(),__LINE__);
}
#endif
if (is_the_executable) {} // Done to get rid of the compiler set-but-not-used warnings.
int file_command = 1;
int file_subcommand = 0;
if ( DontEncryptFiles->file_contains_withwildcard(filename) ) {
file_command = 3;
}
if ( EncryptFiles->file_contains_withwildcard(filename) ) {
file_command = 2;
}
if ( X509UserProxy && file_strcmp( filename, X509UserProxy ) == 0 &&
DelegateX509Credentials ) {
file_command = 4;
}
if ( is_url ) {
file_command = 5;
}
if ( m_final_transfer_flag && OutputDestination ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: Using command 999:7 for OutputDestionation: %s\n",
OutputDestination);
file_command = 999;
file_subcommand = 7;
}
bool fail_because_mkdir_not_supported = false;
bool fail_because_symlink_not_supported = false;
if( filelist_it->is_directory ) {
if( filelist_it->is_symlink ) {
fail_because_symlink_not_supported = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: attempting to transfer symlink %s which points to a directory. This is not supported.\n",filename);
}
else if( PeerUnderstandsMkdir ) {
file_command = 6;
}
else {
fail_because_mkdir_not_supported = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: attempting to transfer directory %s, but the version of Condor we are talking to is too old to support that!\n",
filename);
}
}
dprintf ( D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: outgoing file_command is %i for %s\n",
file_command, filename );
if( !s->snd_int(file_command,FALSE) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if (file_command == 2) {
s->set_crypto_mode(true);
} else if (file_command == 3) {
s->set_crypto_mode(false);
}
else {
s->set_crypto_mode(socket_default_crypto);
}
MyString dest_filename;
if ( ExecFile && !simple_init && (file_strcmp(ExecFile,filename)==0 )) {
is_the_executable = true;
dest_filename = CONDOR_EXEC;
} else {
is_the_executable = false;
if( dest_dir && *dest_dir ) {
dest_filename.sprintf("%s%c",dest_dir,DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
dest_filename.sprintf_cat( condor_basename(filename) );
}
if( !s->put(dest_filename.Value()) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( PeerDoesGoAhead ) {
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: failed on eom before GoAhead; exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !peer_goes_ahead_always ) {
if( !ReceiveTransferGoAhead(s,fullname.Value(),false,peer_goes_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
if( !I_go_ahead_always ) {
if( !ObtainAndSendTransferGoAhead(xfer_queue,false,s,fullname.Value(),I_go_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
s->encode();
}
if ( file_command == 999) {
ClassAd file_info;
file_info.Assign("ProtocolVersion", 1);
file_info.Assign("Command", file_command);
file_info.Assign("SubCommand", file_subcommand);
if(file_subcommand == 7) {
MyString source_filename;
source_filename = Iwd;
source_filename += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
source_filename += filename;
MyString URL;
URL = OutputDestination;
URL += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
URL += filename;
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: calling IFTP(fn,U): fn\"%s\", U\"%s\"\n", source_filename.Value(), URL.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "LocalProxyName: %s\n", LocalProxyName.Value());
rc = InvokeFileTransferPlugin(errstack, source_filename.Value(), URL.Value(), LocalProxyName.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: IFTP(fn,U): fn\"%s\", U\"%s\" returns %i\n", source_filename.Value(), URL.Value(), rc);
file_info.Assign("Filename", source_filename);
file_info.Assign("OutputDestination", URL);
file_info.Assign("Result", rc);
if (rc) {
file_info.Assign("ErrorString", errstack.getFullText());
}
if(!file_info.put(*s)) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
MyString junkbuf;
file_info.sPrint(junkbuf);
bytes = junkbuf.Length();
} else {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "DoUpload: invalid subcommand %i, skipping %s.",
file_subcommand, filename);
bytes = 0;
rc = 0;
}
} else if ( file_command == 4 ) {
if ( (PeerDoesGoAhead || s->end_of_message()) ) {
time_t expiration_time = GetDesiredDelegatedJobCredentialExpiration(&jobAd);
rc = s->put_x509_delegation( &bytes, fullname.Value(), expiration_time, NULL );
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG,
"DoUpload: put_x509_delegation() returned %d\n",
rc );
} else {
rc = -1;
}
} else if (file_command == 5) {
if(!s->code(fullname)) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: failed to send fullname: %s\n", fullname.Value());
rc = -1;
} else {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: sent fullname and NO eom: %s\n", fullname.Value());
rc = 0;
}
bytes = fullname.Length();
} else if( file_command == 6 ) { // mkdir
bytes = sizeof( filelist_it->file_mode );
if( !s->put( filelist_it->file_mode ) ) {
rc = -1;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: failed to send mkdir mode\n");
}
else {
rc = 0;
}
} else if( fail_because_mkdir_not_supported || fail_because_symlink_not_supported ) {
if( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->put_file_with_permissions( &bytes, NULL_FILE );
}
else {
rc = s->put_file( &bytes, NULL_FILE );
}
if( rc == 0 ) {
rc = PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED;
errno = EISDIR;
}
} else if ( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->put_file_with_permissions( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
} else {
rc = s->put_file( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
}
if( rc < 0 ) {
int the_error = errno;
upload_success = false;
error_desc.sprintf("error sending %s",fullname.Value());
if((rc == PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED) || (rc == PUT_FILE_PLUGIN_FAILED)) {
if (rc == PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED) {
error_desc.replaceString("sending","reading from");
error_desc.sprintf_cat(": (errno %d) %s",the_error,strerror(the_error));
if( fail_because_mkdir_not_supported ) {
error_desc.sprintf_cat("; Remote condor version is too old to transfer directories.");
}
if( fail_because_symlink_not_supported ) {
error_desc.sprintf_cat("; Transfer of symlinks to directories is not supported.");
}
} else {
error_desc.sprintf_cat(": %s", errstack.getFullText());
}
try_again = false; // put job on hold
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_UploadFileError;
hold_subcode = the_error;
if (first_failed_file_transfer_happened == false) {
first_failed_file_transfer_happened = true;
first_failed_upload_success = false;
first_failed_try_again = false;
first_failed_hold_code = hold_code;
first_failed_hold_subcode = the_error;
first_failed_error_desc = error_desc;
first_failed_line_number = __LINE__;
}
}
else {
do_download_ack = true;
do_upload_ack = false;
try_again = true;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,
socket_default_crypto,upload_success,
do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,
error_desc.Value(),__LINE__);
}
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
*total_bytes += bytes;
if( dest_filename.FindChar(DIR_DELIM_CHAR) < 0 &&
dest_filename != condor_basename(JobStdoutFile.Value()) &&
dest_filename != condor_basename(JobStderrFile.Value()) )
{
Info.addSpooledFile( dest_filename.Value() );
}
}
do_download_ack = true;
do_upload_ack = true;
if (first_failed_file_transfer_happened == true) {
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
first_failed_upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
first_failed_try_again,first_failed_hold_code,
first_failed_hold_subcode,first_failed_error_desc.Value(),
first_failed_line_number);
}
upload_success = true;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,NULL,__LINE__);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,386
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionTtsController::ExtensionTtsController()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(method_factory_(this)),
current_utterance_(NULL),
platform_impl_(NULL) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int touch(const char *path) {
return touch_file(path, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: A flaw in systemd v228 in /src/basic/fs-util.c caused world writable suid files to be created when using the systemd timers features, allowing local attackers to escalate their privileges to root. This is fixed in v229.
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
|
Low
| 170,104
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long ec_device_ioctl_xcmd(struct cros_ec_dev *ec, void __user *arg)
{
long ret;
struct cros_ec_command u_cmd;
struct cros_ec_command *s_cmd;
if (copy_from_user(&u_cmd, arg, sizeof(u_cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((u_cmd.outsize > EC_MAX_MSG_BYTES) ||
(u_cmd.insize > EC_MAX_MSG_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
s_cmd = kmalloc(sizeof(*s_cmd) + max(u_cmd.outsize, u_cmd.insize),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s_cmd)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(s_cmd, arg, sizeof(*s_cmd) + u_cmd.outsize)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto exit;
}
s_cmd->command += ec->cmd_offset;
ret = cros_ec_cmd_xfer(ec->ec_dev, s_cmd);
/* Only copy data to userland if data was received. */
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
if (copy_to_user(arg, s_cmd, sizeof(*s_cmd) + u_cmd.insize))
ret = -EFAULT;
exit:
kfree(s_cmd);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ec_device_ioctl_xcmd function in drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) by changing a certain size value, aka a *double fetch* vulnerability.
Commit Message: platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
|
Medium
| 167,017
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void bt_tags_for_each(struct blk_mq_tags *tags,
struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt, unsigned int off,
busy_tag_iter_fn *fn, void *data, bool reserved)
{
struct request *rq;
int bit, i;
if (!tags->rqs)
return;
for (i = 0; i < bt->map_nr; i++) {
struct blk_align_bitmap *bm = &bt->map[i];
for (bit = find_first_bit(&bm->word, bm->depth);
bit < bm->depth;
bit = find_next_bit(&bm->word, bm->depth, bit + 1)) {
rq = blk_mq_tag_to_rq(tags, off + bit);
fn(rq, data, reserved);
}
off += (1 << bt->bits_per_word);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In blk_mq_tag_to_rq in blk-mq.c in the upstream kernel, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition when a request has been previously freed by blk_mq_complete_request. This could lead to local escalation of privilege. Product: Android. Versions: Android kernel. Android ID: A-63083046.
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
|
Medium
| 169,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int phar_build(zend_object_iterator *iter, void *puser TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **value;
zend_uchar key_type;
zend_bool close_fp = 1;
ulong int_key;
struct _phar_t *p_obj = (struct _phar_t*) puser;
uint str_key_len, base_len = p_obj->l, fname_len;
phar_entry_data *data;
php_stream *fp;
size_t contents_len;
char *fname, *error = NULL, *base = p_obj->b, *opened, *save = NULL, *temp = NULL;
phar_zstr key;
char *str_key;
zend_class_entry *ce = p_obj->c;
phar_archive_object *phar_obj = p_obj->p;
char *str = "[stream]";
iter->funcs->get_current_data(iter, &value TSRMLS_CC);
if (EG(exception)) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (!value) {
/* failure in get_current_data */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned no value", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(value)) {
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
case IS_UNICODE:
zval_unicode_to_string(*(value) TSRMLS_CC);
/* break intentionally omitted */
#endif
case IS_STRING:
break;
case IS_RESOURCE:
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(fp, value);
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid stream handle", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (iter->funcs->get_current_key) {
key_type = iter->funcs->get_current_key(iter, &key, &str_key_len, &int_key TSRMLS_CC);
if (EG(exception)) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type == HASH_KEY_IS_LONG) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type > 9) { /* IS_UNICODE == 10 */
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 60000
/* this can never happen, but fixes a compile warning */
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%s", key);
#else
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%v", key);
ezfree(key);
#endif
} else {
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
}
save = str_key;
if (str_key[str_key_len - 1] == '\0') {
str_key_len--;
}
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
close_fp = 0;
opened = (char *) estrndup(str, sizeof("[stream]") - 1);
goto after_open_fp;
case IS_OBJECT:
if (instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_PP(value), spl_ce_SplFileInfo TSRMLS_CC)) {
char *test = NULL;
zval dummy;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(*value TSRMLS_CC);
if (!base_len) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returns an SplFileInfo object, so base directory must be specified", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
switch (intern->type) {
case SPL_FS_DIR:
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
test = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC).s;
#elif PHP_VERSION_ID >= 50300
test = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
#else
test = intern->path;
#endif
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "%s%c%s", test, DEFAULT_SLASH, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
php_stat(fname, fname_len, FS_IS_DIR, &dummy TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_BVAL(dummy)) {
/* ignore directories */
efree(fname);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
test = expand_filepath(fname, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
efree(fname);
if (test) {
fname = test;
fname_len = strlen(fname);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not resolve file path");
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
save = fname;
goto phar_spl_fileinfo;
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
if (intern->file_name_type == IS_UNICODE) {
zval zv;
INIT_ZVAL(zv);
Z_UNIVAL(zv) = intern->file_name;
Z_UNILEN(zv) = intern->file_name_len;
Z_TYPE(zv) = IS_UNICODE;
zval_copy_ctor(&zv);
zval_unicode_to_string(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
fname = expand_filepath(Z_STRVAL(zv), NULL TSRMLS_CC);
ezfree(Z_UNIVAL(zv));
} else {
fname = expand_filepath(intern->file_name.s, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
#else
fname = expand_filepath(intern->file_name, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
#endif
if (!fname) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not resolve file path");
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
fname_len = strlen(fname);
save = fname;
goto phar_spl_fileinfo;
}
}
/* fall-through */
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid value (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
fname = Z_STRVAL_PP(value);
fname_len = Z_STRLEN_PP(value);
phar_spl_fileinfo:
if (base_len) {
temp = expand_filepath(base, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (!temp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not resolve file path");
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
base = temp;
base_len = strlen(base);
if (strstr(fname, base)) {
str_key_len = fname_len - base_len;
if (str_key_len <= 0) {
if (save) {
efree(save);
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
str_key = fname + base_len;
if (*str_key == '/' || *str_key == '\\') {
str_key++;
str_key_len--;
}
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a path \"%s\" that is not in the base directory \"%s\"", ce->name, fname, base);
if (save) {
efree(save);
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
} else {
if (iter->funcs->get_current_key) {
key_type = iter->funcs->get_current_key(iter, &key, &str_key_len, &int_key TSRMLS_CC);
if (EG(exception)) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type == HASH_KEY_IS_LONG) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type > 9) { /* IS_UNICODE == 10 */
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 60000
/* this can never happen, but fixes a compile warning */
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%s", key);
#else
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%v", key);
ezfree(key);
#endif
} else {
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
}
save = str_key;
if (str_key[str_key_len - 1] == '\0') str_key_len--;
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fname, NULL, CHECKUID_ALLOW_ONLY_FILE))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a path \"%s\" that safe mode prevents opening", ce->name, fname);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
#endif
if (php_check_open_basedir(fname TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a path \"%s\" that open_basedir prevents opening", ce->name, fname);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
/* try to open source file, then create internal phar file and copy contents */
fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(fname, "rb", STREAM_MUST_SEEK|0, &opened);
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a file that could not be opened \"%s\"", ce->name, fname);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
after_open_fp:
if (str_key_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(str_key, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* silently skip any files that would be added to the magic .phar directory */
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
if (opened) {
efree(opened);
}
if (close_fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
if (!(data = phar_get_or_create_entry_data(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname_len, str_key, str_key_len, "w+b", 0, &error, 1 TSRMLS_CC))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Entry %s cannot be created: %s", str_key, error);
efree(error);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (opened) {
efree(opened);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
if (close_fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
} else {
if (error) {
efree(error);
}
/* convert to PHAR_UFP */
if (data->internal_file->fp_type == PHAR_MOD) {
php_stream_close(data->internal_file->fp);
}
data->internal_file->fp = NULL;
data->internal_file->fp_type = PHAR_UFP;
data->internal_file->offset_abs = data->internal_file->offset = php_stream_tell(p_obj->fp);
data->fp = NULL;
phar_stream_copy_to_stream(fp, p_obj->fp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, &contents_len);
data->internal_file->uncompressed_filesize = data->internal_file->compressed_filesize =
php_stream_tell(p_obj->fp) - data->internal_file->offset;
}
if (close_fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
add_assoc_string(p_obj->ret, str_key, opened, 0);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
data->internal_file->compressed_filesize = data->internal_file->uncompressed_filesize = contents_len;
phar_entry_delref(data TSRMLS_CC);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,297
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void nfs4_close_sync(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, mode, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer underflow in the MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted MPEG-4 data, aka internal bug 23034759. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2015-3824.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
|
Low
| 173,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_ref_list(codec_t *ps_codec, pps_t *ps_pps, sps_t *ps_sps, slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr)
{
WORD32 i;
WORD32 st_rps_idx;
WORD32 num_neg_pics, num_pos_pics;
WORD8 *pi1_used;
WORD16 *pi2_delta_poc;
UWORD32 u4_max_poc_lsb;
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
UWORD32 r_idx;
dpb_mgr_t *ps_dpb_mgr = (dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr;
buf_mgr_t *ps_mv_buf_mgr = (buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr;
WORD32 ai4_poc_st_curr_before[MAX_DPB_SIZE], ai4_poc_st_foll[MAX_DPB_SIZE], ai4_poc_st_curr_after[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
WORD32 ai4_poc_lt_curr[MAX_DPB_SIZE], ai4_poc_lt_foll[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
UWORD32 u4_num_st_curr_before, u4_num_st_foll, u4_num_st_curr_after, u4_num_lt_curr, u4_num_lt_foll;
UWORD32 u4_num_total_curr;
WORD8 ai1_curr_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[MAX_DPB_SIZE], ai1_foll_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
pic_buf_t *as_ref_pic_lt_curr[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
pic_buf_t *as_ref_pic_lt_foll[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
pic_buf_t *as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
pic_buf_t *as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
pic_buf_t *as_ref_pic_st_foll[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
pic_buf_t *as_ref_pic_list_temp0[MAX_DPB_SIZE], *as_ref_pic_list_temp1[MAX_DPB_SIZE];
UWORD32 u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list0, u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list1;
WORD32 i4_pic_order_cnt_val;
WORD32 i4_poc_lt;
UNUSED(as_ref_pic_lt_foll);
UNUSED(as_ref_pic_st_foll);
UNUSED(ps_pps);
RETURN_IF_NAL_INFO;
u4_max_poc_lsb = (1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
i4_pic_order_cnt_val = ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
if(1 == ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag)
{
st_rps_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx;
num_neg_pics = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].i1_num_neg_pics;
num_pos_pics = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].i1_num_pos_pics;
pi1_used = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].ai1_used;
pi2_delta_poc = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].ai2_delta_poc;
}
else
{
st_rps_idx = ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets;
num_neg_pics = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.i1_num_neg_pics;
num_pos_pics = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.i1_num_pos_pics;
pi1_used = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.ai1_used;
pi2_delta_poc = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.ai2_delta_poc;
}
u4_num_st_curr_before = 0;
u4_num_st_foll = 0;
for(i = 0; i < num_neg_pics; i++)
{
if(pi1_used[i])
{
ai4_poc_st_curr_before[u4_num_st_curr_before] = i4_pic_order_cnt_val + pi2_delta_poc[i];
u4_num_st_curr_before++;
}
else
{
ai4_poc_st_foll[u4_num_st_foll] = i4_pic_order_cnt_val + pi2_delta_poc[i];
u4_num_st_foll++;
}
}
u4_num_st_curr_after = 0;
for(i = num_neg_pics; i < num_neg_pics + num_pos_pics; i++)
{
if(pi1_used[i])
{
ai4_poc_st_curr_after[u4_num_st_curr_after] = i4_pic_order_cnt_val + pi2_delta_poc[i];
u4_num_st_curr_after++;
}
else
{
ai4_poc_st_foll[u4_num_st_foll] = i4_pic_order_cnt_val + pi2_delta_poc[i];
u4_num_st_foll++;
}
}
u4_num_lt_curr = 0;
u4_num_lt_foll = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps + ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics; i++)
{
i4_poc_lt = ps_slice_hdr->ai4_poc_lsb_lt[i];
if(ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
i4_poc_lt += i4_pic_order_cnt_val - ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] * u4_max_poc_lsb - ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
}
if(ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i])
{
ai4_poc_lt_curr[u4_num_lt_curr] = i4_poc_lt;
ai1_curr_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[u4_num_lt_curr] = ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i];
u4_num_lt_curr++;
}
else
{
ai4_poc_lt_foll[u4_num_lt_foll] = i4_poc_lt;
ai1_foll_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[u4_num_lt_foll] = ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i];
u4_num_lt_foll++;
}
}
u4_num_total_curr = u4_num_lt_curr + u4_num_st_curr_after + u4_num_st_curr_before;
/* Bit stream conformance tests */
/*
for(i = 0; i < u4_num_lt_curr; i++)
{
int j;
if(ai1_curr_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_before; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_st_curr_before[j] != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_after; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_st_curr_after[j] != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_foll; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_st_foll[j] != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_lt_curr; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_lt_curr[j] != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]) || (j == i));
}
}
else
{
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_before; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_st_curr_before[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_after; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_st_curr_after[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_foll; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_st_foll[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_lt_curr; j++)
{
ASSERT(((ai4_poc_lt_curr[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]) || (j == i));
}
}
}
for(i = 0; i < u4_num_lt_foll; i++)
{
int j;
if(ai1_foll_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_before; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_st_curr_before[j] != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_after; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_st_curr_after[j] != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_foll; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_st_foll[j] != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_lt_curr; j++)
{
ASSERT(ai4_poc_lt_curr[j] != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_lt_foll; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_lt_foll[j] != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]) || (j == i));
}
}
else
{
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_before; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_st_curr_before[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_curr_after; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_st_curr_after[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_st_foll; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_st_foll[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_lt_curr; j++)
{
ASSERT((ai4_poc_lt_curr[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
}
for(j = 0; j < u4_num_lt_foll; j++)
{
ASSERT(((ai4_poc_lt_foll[j] & (u4_max_poc_lsb - 1)) != ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]) || (j == i));
}
}
}
*/
/* Reference Pic sets creation */
/* Set all the DPB buffers to UNUSED_FOR_REF */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DPB_BUFS; i++)
{
if(ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf)
ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = UNUSED_FOR_REF;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < (WORD32)u4_num_lt_curr; i++)
{
if(0 == ai1_curr_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc_lsb(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = LONG_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
else
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = LONG_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < (WORD32)u4_num_lt_foll; i++)
{
if(0 == ai1_foll_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc_lsb(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = LONG_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_lt_foll[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
else
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_lt_foll[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = LONG_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_lt_foll[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_curr_before; i++)
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_curr_before[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = SHORT_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
for(i = 0; i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_curr_after; i++)
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_curr_after[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = SHORT_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
for(i = 0; i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_foll; i++)
{
ps_pic_buf = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_foll[i]);
if(NULL != ps_pic_buf)
ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref = SHORT_TERM_REF;
as_ref_pic_st_foll[i] = ps_pic_buf;
}
u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list0 = (WORD32)u4_num_total_curr > ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active ? (WORD32)u4_num_total_curr : ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active;
r_idx = 0;
if((PSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type) ||
(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type))
{
while(r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list0)
{
for(i = 0; (i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_curr_before) && (r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list0); r_idx++, i++)
{
if(NULL == as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i])
{
as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i] = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_curr_before[i]);
}
as_ref_pic_list_temp0[r_idx] = as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i];
}
for(i = 0; (i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_curr_after) && (r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list0); r_idx++, i++)
{
if(NULL == as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i])
{
as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i] = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_curr_after[i]);
}
as_ref_pic_list_temp0[r_idx] = as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i];
}
for(i = 0; (i < (WORD32)u4_num_lt_curr) && (r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list0); r_idx++, i++)
{
if(NULL == as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i])
{
as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i] = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
as_ref_pic_list_temp0[r_idx] = as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i];
}
}
for(r_idx = 0; (WORD32)r_idx < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active; r_idx++)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_ref_pic_list_modification_flag_l0 ? (void *)as_ref_pic_list_temp0[ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_list_entry_l0[r_idx]] : (void *)as_ref_pic_list_temp0[r_idx];
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf;
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
return IHEVCD_REF_PIC_NOT_FOUND;
ps_mv_buf = ihevcd_mv_mgr_get_poc(ps_mv_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc);
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = ps_mv_buf;
}
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type == BSLICE)
{
u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list1 = (WORD32)u4_num_total_curr > ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active ? (WORD32)u4_num_total_curr : ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active;
r_idx = 0;
while(r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list1)
{
for(i = 0; (i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_curr_after) && (r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list1); r_idx++, i++)
{
if(NULL == as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i])
{
as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i] = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_curr_after[i]);
}
as_ref_pic_list_temp1[r_idx] = as_ref_pic_st_curr_after[i];
}
for(i = 0; (i < (WORD32)u4_num_st_curr_before) && (r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list1); r_idx++, i++)
{
if(NULL == as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i])
{
as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i] = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_st_curr_before[i]);
}
as_ref_pic_list_temp1[r_idx] = as_ref_pic_st_curr_before[i];
}
for(i = 0; (i < (WORD32)u4_num_lt_curr) && (r_idx < u4_num_rps_curr_temp_list1); r_idx++, i++)
{
if(NULL == as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i])
{
as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i] = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ai4_poc_lt_curr[i]);
}
as_ref_pic_list_temp1[r_idx] = as_ref_pic_lt_curr[i];
}
}
for(r_idx = 0; (WORD32)r_idx < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active; r_idx++)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_ref_pic_list_modification_flag_l1 ? (void *)as_ref_pic_list_temp1[ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_list_entry_l1[r_idx]] : (void *)as_ref_pic_list_temp1[r_idx];
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf;
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
return IHEVCD_REF_PIC_NOT_FOUND;
ps_mv_buf = ihevcd_mv_mgr_get_poc(ps_mv_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc);
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = ps_mv_buf;
}
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_REF_LIST_POCS(i4_pic_order_cnt_val, ps_slice_hdr, ps_dpb_mgr, u4_num_st_curr_before, u4_num_st_curr_after, u4_num_st_foll, u4_num_lt_curr, u4_num_lt_foll, ai4_poc_st_curr_before, ai4_poc_st_curr_after, ai4_poc_st_foll, ai4_poc_lt_curr, ai4_poc_lt_foll);
/* Buffers that are still marked as UNUSED_FOR_REF are released from dpb (internally dpb calls release from pic buf manager)*/
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DPB_BUFS; i++)
{
if((ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf) && (UNUSED_FOR_REF == ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf->u1_used_as_ref))
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf = ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Long term index is set to MAX_DPB_BUFS to ensure it is not added as LT */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_del_ref(ps_dpb_mgr, (buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc);
/* Find buffer id of the MV bank corresponding to the buffer being freed (Buffer with POC of u4_abs_poc) */
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)ps_codec->ps_mv_buf;
for(i = 0; i < BUF_MGR_MAX_CNT; i++)
{
if(ps_mv_buf && ps_mv_buf->i4_abs_poc == ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc)
{
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, i, BUF_MGR_REF);
break;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
}
}
return IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34819017.
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
|
Medium
| 173,998
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ImportCbYCrYQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 10:
{
Quantum
cbcr[4];
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x+=2)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
cbcr[i]=(Quantum) (quantum);
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[1],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[3],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The generic decoder in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
|
Medium
| 168,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate::OpenTab() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Type confusion in libGLESv2 in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android possibly allowed a remote attacker to bypass buffer validation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <nyquist@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <sebsg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <jeffreycohen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <mdjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <tgupta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
|
Medium
| 172,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct thread_struct *thread = &(current->thread);
/*
* Store in the virtual DR6 register the fact that the breakpoint
* was hit so the thread's debugger will see it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < HBP_NUM; i++) {
if (thread->ptrace_bps[i] == bp)
break;
}
thread->debugreg6 |= (DR_TRAP0 << i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,824
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* receiving_widget) {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return receiving_widget;
if (receiving_widget != GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return receiving_widget;
WebContentsImpl* focused_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
FrameTreeNode* focused_frame = nullptr;
if (focused_contents->browser_plugin_guest_ &&
!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_contents)) {
focused_frame = frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
} else {
focused_frame = GetFocusedWebContents()->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
}
if (!focused_frame)
return receiving_widget;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = focused_frame->current_frame_host()->GetView();
if (!view)
return nullptr;
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int http_receive_data(HTTPContext *c)
{
HTTPContext *c1;
int len, loop_run = 0;
while (c->chunked_encoding && !c->chunk_size &&
c->buffer_end > c->buffer_ptr) {
/* read chunk header, if present */
len = recv(c->fd, c->buffer_ptr, 1, 0);
if (len < 0) {
if (ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EAGAIN) &&
ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EINTR))
/* error : close connection */
goto fail;
return 0;
} else if (len == 0) {
/* end of connection : close it */
goto fail;
} else if (c->buffer_ptr - c->buffer >= 2 &&
!memcmp(c->buffer_ptr - 1, "\r\n", 2)) {
c->chunk_size = strtol(c->buffer, 0, 16);
if (c->chunk_size == 0) // end of stream
goto fail;
c->buffer_ptr = c->buffer;
break;
} else if (++loop_run > 10)
/* no chunk header, abort */
goto fail;
else
c->buffer_ptr++;
}
if (c->buffer_end > c->buffer_ptr) {
len = recv(c->fd, c->buffer_ptr,
FFMIN(c->chunk_size, c->buffer_end - c->buffer_ptr), 0);
if (len < 0) {
if (ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EAGAIN) &&
ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EINTR))
/* error : close connection */
goto fail;
} else if (len == 0)
/* end of connection : close it */
goto fail;
else {
c->chunk_size -= len;
c->buffer_ptr += len;
c->data_count += len;
update_datarate(&c->datarate, c->data_count);
}
}
if (c->buffer_ptr - c->buffer >= 2 && c->data_count > FFM_PACKET_SIZE) {
if (c->buffer[0] != 'f' ||
c->buffer[1] != 'm') {
http_log("Feed stream has become desynchronized -- disconnecting\n");
goto fail;
}
}
if (c->buffer_ptr >= c->buffer_end) {
FFServerStream *feed = c->stream;
/* a packet has been received : write it in the store, except
* if header */
if (c->data_count > FFM_PACKET_SIZE) {
/* XXX: use llseek or url_seek
* XXX: Should probably fail? */
if (lseek(c->feed_fd, feed->feed_write_index, SEEK_SET) == -1)
http_log("Seek to %"PRId64" failed\n", feed->feed_write_index);
if (write(c->feed_fd, c->buffer, FFM_PACKET_SIZE) < 0) {
http_log("Error writing to feed file: %s\n", strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
feed->feed_write_index += FFM_PACKET_SIZE;
/* update file size */
if (feed->feed_write_index > c->stream->feed_size)
feed->feed_size = feed->feed_write_index;
/* handle wrap around if max file size reached */
if (c->stream->feed_max_size &&
feed->feed_write_index >= c->stream->feed_max_size)
feed->feed_write_index = FFM_PACKET_SIZE;
/* write index */
if (ffm_write_write_index(c->feed_fd, feed->feed_write_index) < 0) {
http_log("Error writing index to feed file: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
/* wake up any waiting connections */
for(c1 = first_http_ctx; c1; c1 = c1->next) {
if (c1->state == HTTPSTATE_WAIT_FEED &&
c1->stream->feed == c->stream->feed)
c1->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA;
}
} else {
/* We have a header in our hands that contains useful data */
AVFormatContext *s = avformat_alloc_context();
AVIOContext *pb;
AVInputFormat *fmt_in;
int i;
if (!s)
goto fail;
/* use feed output format name to find corresponding input format */
fmt_in = av_find_input_format(feed->fmt->name);
if (!fmt_in)
goto fail;
pb = avio_alloc_context(c->buffer, c->buffer_end - c->buffer,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!pb)
goto fail;
pb->seekable = 0;
s->pb = pb;
if (avformat_open_input(&s, c->stream->feed_filename, fmt_in, NULL) < 0) {
av_freep(&pb);
goto fail;
}
/* Now we have the actual streams */
if (s->nb_streams != feed->nb_streams) {
avformat_close_input(&s);
av_freep(&pb);
http_log("Feed '%s' stream number does not match registered feed\n",
c->stream->feed_filename);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
LayeredAVStream *fst = feed->streams[i];
AVStream *st = s->streams[i];
avcodec_parameters_to_context(fst->codec, st->codecpar);
avcodec_parameters_from_context(fst->codecpar, fst->codec);
}
avformat_close_input(&s);
av_freep(&pb);
}
c->buffer_ptr = c->buffer;
}
return 0;
fail:
c->stream->feed_opened = 0;
close(c->feed_fd);
/* wake up any waiting connections to stop waiting for feed */
for(c1 = first_http_ctx; c1; c1 = c1->next) {
if (c1->state == HTTPSTATE_WAIT_FEED &&
c1->stream->feed == c->stream->feed)
c1->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA_TRAILER;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in ffserver.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging failure to check chunk size.
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Low
| 168,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(
const KURL& current_src) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
return Context()->GetSecurityOrigin() &&
Context()->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanRequest(current_src);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
Medium
| 173,148
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Block::Parse(const Cluster* pCluster)
{
if (pCluster == NULL)
return -1;
if (pCluster->m_pSegment == NULL)
return -1;
assert(m_start >= 0);
assert(m_size >= 0);
assert(m_track <= 0);
assert(m_frames == NULL);
assert(m_frame_count <= 0);
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long len;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pCluster->m_pSegment->m_pReader;
m_track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (m_track <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume track number
if ((stop - pos) < 2)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long status;
long long value;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, 2, value);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (value < SHRT_MIN)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (value > SHRT_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_timecode = static_cast<short>(value);
pos += 2;
if ((stop - pos) <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &m_flags);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
++pos; //consume flags byte
if (lacing == 0) //no lacing
{
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_frame_count = 1;
m_frames = new Frame[m_frame_count];
Frame& f = m_frames[0];
f.pos = pos;
const long long frame_size = stop - pos;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
f.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
return 0; //success
}
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char biased_count;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &biased_count);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
++pos; //consume frame count
assert(pos <= stop);
m_frame_count = int(biased_count) + 1;
m_frames = new Frame[m_frame_count];
assert(m_frames);
if (lacing == 1) //Xiph
{
Frame* pf = m_frames;
Frame* const pf_end = pf + m_frame_count;
long size = 0;
int frame_count = m_frame_count;
while (frame_count > 1)
{
long frame_size = 0;
for (;;)
{
unsigned char val;
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &val);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
++pos; //consume xiph size byte
frame_size += val;
if (val < 255)
break;
}
Frame& f = *pf++;
assert(pf < pf_end);
f.pos = 0; //patch later
f.len = frame_size;
size += frame_size; //contribution of this frame
--frame_count;
}
assert(pf < pf_end);
assert(pos <= stop);
{
Frame& f = *pf++;
if (pf != pf_end)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
f.pos = 0; //patch later
const long long total_size = stop - pos;
if (total_size < size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long frame_size = total_size - size;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
f.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
}
pf = m_frames;
while (pf != pf_end)
{
Frame& f = *pf++;
assert((pos + f.len) <= stop);
f.pos = pos;
pos += f.len;
}
assert(pos == stop);
}
else if (lacing == 2) //fixed-size lacing
{
const long long total_size = stop - pos;
if ((total_size % m_frame_count) != 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long frame_size = total_size / m_frame_count;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
Frame* pf = m_frames;
Frame* const pf_end = pf + m_frame_count;
while (pf != pf_end)
{
assert((pos + frame_size) <= stop);
Frame& f = *pf++;
f.pos = pos;
f.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
pos += frame_size;
}
assert(pos == stop);
}
else
{
assert(lacing == 3); //EBML lacing
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long size = 0;
int frame_count = m_frame_count;
long long frame_size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (frame_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume length of size of first frame
if ((pos + frame_size) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
Frame* pf = m_frames;
Frame* const pf_end = pf + m_frame_count;
{
Frame& curr = *pf;
curr.pos = 0; //patch later
curr.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
size += curr.len; //contribution of this frame
}
--frame_count;
while (frame_count > 1)
{
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(pf < pf_end);
const Frame& prev = *pf++;
assert(prev.len == frame_size);
if (prev.len != frame_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(pf < pf_end);
Frame& curr = *pf;
curr.pos = 0; //patch later
const long long delta_size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (delta_size_ < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume length of (delta) size
assert(pos <= stop);
const int exp = 7*len - 1;
const long long bias = (1LL << exp) - 1LL;
const long long delta_size = delta_size_ - bias;
frame_size += delta_size;
if (frame_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
curr.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
size += curr.len; //contribution of this frame
--frame_count;
}
{
assert(pos <= stop);
assert(pf < pf_end);
const Frame& prev = *pf++;
assert(prev.len == frame_size);
if (prev.len != frame_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(pf < pf_end);
Frame& curr = *pf++;
assert(pf == pf_end);
curr.pos = 0; //patch later
const long long total_size = stop - pos;
if (total_size < size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
frame_size = total_size - size;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
curr.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
}
pf = m_frames;
while (pf != pf_end)
{
Frame& f = *pf++;
assert((pos + f.len) <= stop);
f.pos = pos;
pos += f.len;
}
assert(pos == stop);
}
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
struct fscrypt_context *ctx, u8 *raw_key,
const char *prefix)
{
char *description;
struct key *keyring_key;
struct fscrypt_key *master_key;
const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
int res;
description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
ctx->master_key_descriptor);
if (!description)
return -ENOMEM;
keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL);
kfree(description);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_key))
return PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
"%s: key type must be logon\n", __func__);
res = -ENOKEY;
goto out;
}
down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
res = -EINVAL;
up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
goto out;
}
master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
BUILD_BUG_ON(FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
if (master_key->size != FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
"%s: key size incorrect: %d\n",
__func__, master_key->size);
res = -ENOKEY;
up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
goto out;
}
res = derive_key_aes(ctx->nonce, master_key->raw, raw_key);
up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
if (res)
goto out;
crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
return 0;
out:
key_put(keyring_key);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
|
Low
| 168,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ParseWave64HeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;
Wave64ChunkHeader chunk_header;
Wave64FileHeader filehdr;
WaveHeader WaveHeader;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&filehdr, fourcc, 4);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &filehdr) + 4, sizeof (Wave64FileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (Wave64FileHeader) - 4 || memcmp (filehdr.ckID, riff_guid, sizeof (riff_guid)) ||
memcmp (filehdr.formType, wave_guid, sizeof (wave_guid))) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .W64 file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &filehdr, sizeof (filehdr))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&filehdr, Wave64ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
filehdr.ckSize && filehdr.ckSize + 1 && filehdr.ckSize != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .W64 file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &chunk_header, sizeof (Wave64ChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (Wave64ChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .W64 file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &chunk_header, sizeof (Wave64ChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&chunk_header, Wave64ChunkHeaderFormat);
chunk_header.ckSize -= sizeof (chunk_header);
if (!memcmp (chunk_header.ckID, fmt_guid, sizeof (fmt_guid))) {
int supported = TRUE, format;
chunk_header.ckSize = (chunk_header.ckSize + 7) & ~7L;
if (chunk_header.ckSize < 16 || chunk_header.ckSize > sizeof (WaveHeader) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &WaveHeader, (uint32_t) chunk_header.ckSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != chunk_header.ckSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .W64 file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &WaveHeader, (uint32_t) chunk_header.ckSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&WaveHeader, WaveHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode) {
error_line ("format tag size = %d", chunk_header.ckSize);
error_line ("FormatTag = %x, NumChannels = %d, BitsPerSample = %d",
WaveHeader.FormatTag, WaveHeader.NumChannels, WaveHeader.BitsPerSample);
error_line ("BlockAlign = %d, SampleRate = %d, BytesPerSecond = %d",
WaveHeader.BlockAlign, WaveHeader.SampleRate, WaveHeader.BytesPerSecond);
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 16)
error_line ("cbSize = %d, ValidBitsPerSample = %d", WaveHeader.cbSize,
WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample);
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 20)
error_line ("ChannelMask = %x, SubFormat = %d",
WaveHeader.ChannelMask, WaveHeader.SubFormat);
}
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 16 && WaveHeader.cbSize == 2)
config->qmode |= QMODE_ADOBE_MODE;
format = (WaveHeader.FormatTag == 0xfffe && chunk_header.ckSize == 40) ?
WaveHeader.SubFormat : WaveHeader.FormatTag;
config->bits_per_sample = (chunk_header.ckSize == 40 && WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample) ?
WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample : WaveHeader.BitsPerSample;
if (format != 1 && format != 3)
supported = FALSE;
if (format == 3 && config->bits_per_sample != 32)
supported = FALSE;
if (!WaveHeader.NumChannels || WaveHeader.NumChannels > 256 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels < (config->bits_per_sample + 7) / 8 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels > 4 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign % WaveHeader.NumChannels)
supported = FALSE;
if (config->bits_per_sample < 1 || config->bits_per_sample > 32)
supported = FALSE;
if (!supported) {
error_line ("%s is an unsupported .W64 format!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (chunk_header.ckSize < 40) {
if (!config->channel_mask && !(config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED)) {
if (WaveHeader.NumChannels <= 2)
config->channel_mask = 0x5 - WaveHeader.NumChannels;
else if (WaveHeader.NumChannels <= 18)
config->channel_mask = (1 << WaveHeader.NumChannels) - 1;
else
config->channel_mask = 0x3ffff;
}
}
else if (WaveHeader.ChannelMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this W64 file already has channel order information!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (WaveHeader.ChannelMask)
config->channel_mask = WaveHeader.ChannelMask;
if (format == 3)
config->float_norm_exp = 127;
else if ((config->qmode & QMODE_ADOBE_MODE) &&
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels == 4) {
if (WaveHeader.BitsPerSample == 24)
config->float_norm_exp = 127 + 23;
else if (WaveHeader.BitsPerSample == 32)
config->float_norm_exp = 127 + 15;
}
if (debug_logging_mode) {
if (config->float_norm_exp == 127)
error_line ("data format: normalized 32-bit floating point");
else
error_line ("data format: %d-bit integers stored in %d byte(s)",
config->bits_per_sample, WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels);
}
}
else if (!memcmp (chunk_header.ckID, data_guid, sizeof (data_guid))) { // on the data chunk, get size and exit loop
if (!WaveHeader.NumChannels) { // make sure we saw "fmt" chunk
error_line ("%s is not a valid .W64 file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) || chunk_header.ckSize <= 0) {
config->qmode |= QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH;
if (infilesize && DoGetFilePosition (infile) != -1)
total_samples = (infilesize - DoGetFilePosition (infile)) / WaveHeader.BlockAlign;
else
total_samples = -1;
}
else {
if (infilesize && infilesize - chunk_header.ckSize > 16777216) {
error_line ("this .W64 file has over 16 MB of extra RIFF data, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = chunk_header.ckSize / WaveHeader.BlockAlign;
if (!total_samples) {
error_line ("this .W64 file has no audio samples, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (total_samples > MAX_WAVPACK_SAMPLES) {
error_line ("%s has too many samples for WavPack!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
config->bytes_per_sample = WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels;
config->num_channels = WaveHeader.NumChannels;
config->sample_rate = WaveHeader.SampleRate;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (chunk_header.ckSize + 7) & ~7L;
char *buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
chunk_header.ckID [0], chunk_header.ckID [1], chunk_header.ckID [2],
chunk_header.ckID [3], chunk_header.ckSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in WavPack 5.1.0 and earlier for W64 input. Out-of-bounds writes can occur because ParseWave64HeaderConfig in wave64.c does not validate the sizes of unknown chunks before attempting memory allocation, related to a lack of integer-overflow protection within a bytes_to_copy calculation and subsequent malloc call, leading to insufficient memory allocation.
Commit Message: issue #33, sanitize size of unknown chunks before malloc()
|
Medium
| 169,251
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (params.url.GetOrigin() != options_page_.GetOrigin()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.75 incorrectly relies on GetOrigin method calls for origin comparisons, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and obtain sensitive information via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
|
Medium
| 172,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
struct iovec *l2_hdr, *l3_hdr;
size_t bytes_read;
size_t full_ip6hdr_len;
uint16_t l3_proto;
assert(pkt);
l2_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG];
l3_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG];
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, 0, l2_hdr->iov_base,
ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN);
if (bytes_read < ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l2_hdr->iov_len = eth_get_l2_hdr_length(l2_hdr->iov_base);
}
l3_proto = eth_get_l3_proto(l2_hdr->iov_base, l2_hdr->iov_len);
l3_hdr->iov_len = IP_HDR_GET_LEN(l3_hdr->iov_base);
pkt->l4proto = ((struct ip_header *) l3_hdr->iov_base)->ip_p;
/* copy optional IPv4 header data */
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags,
l2_hdr->iov_len + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_base + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header));
if (bytes_read < l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
break;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
if (!eth_parse_ipv6_hdr(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
&pkt->l4proto, &full_ip6hdr_len)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(full_ip6hdr_len);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, full_ip6hdr_len);
if (bytes_read < full_ip6hdr_len) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l3_hdr->iov_len = full_ip6hdr_len;
}
break;
default:
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
break;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) built with a VMWARE VMXNET3 paravirtual NIC emulator support is vulnerable to crash issue. It occurs when a guest sends a Layer-2 packet smaller than 22 bytes. A privileged (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) guest user could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process instance resulting in DoS.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,277
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ReturnFrameBuffer(vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
ExternalFrameBuffer *const ext_fb =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBuffer*>(fb->priv);
EXPECT_TRUE(ext_fb != NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(1, ext_fb->in_use);
ext_fb->in_use = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
*minor_status = 0;
if (*context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
} else {
assert(iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_CONTEXT);
major_status = krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
}
return major_status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted IAKERB packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(const PrintSettings& settings,
PrintMsg_Print_Params* params) {
params->page_size = settings.page_setup_device_units().physical_size();
params->content_size.SetSize(
settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().width(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().height());
params->printable_area.SetRect(
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().x(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().y(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().width(),
settings.page_setup_device_units().printable_area().height());
params->margin_top = settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().y();
params->margin_left = settings.page_setup_device_units().content_area().x();
params->dpi = settings.dpi();
params->scale_factor = settings.scale_factor();
params->rasterize_pdf = settings.rasterize_pdf();
params->document_cookie = 0;
params->selection_only = settings.selection_only();
params->supports_alpha_blend = settings.supports_alpha_blend();
params->should_print_backgrounds = settings.should_print_backgrounds();
params->display_header_footer = settings.display_header_footer();
params->title = settings.title();
params->url = settings.url();
params->printed_doc_type = SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
Low
| 171,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
for (std::vector< base::Callback<void(ui::Compositor*)> >::const_iterator
it = on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.begin();
it != on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.end(); ++it) {
it->Run(compositor);
}
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::AddExtraInitParams(
views::Widget::InitParams* params) {
params->opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params->shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android incorrectly allowed reentrance of FrameView::updateLifecyclePhasesInternal(), which allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
Medium
| 172,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool isUserInteractionEventForSlider(Event* event, LayoutObject* layoutObject) {
if (isUserInteractionEvent(event))
return true;
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject));
if (!slider.isNull() && !slider.inDragMode())
return false;
const AtomicString& type = event->type();
return type == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
type == EventTypeNames::mouseout || type == EventTypeNames::mousemove;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly handle certain out-of-memory conditions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document that triggers a large memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
|
Medium
| 171,900
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int DefragMfIpv4Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Expected IP length is 20 + 8 + 8 = 36 as only 2 of the
* fragments should be in the re-assembled packet. */
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != 36) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dhcpv4_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint8_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
tlv = cp + i;
type = (uint8_t)tlv[0];
optlen = (uint8_t)tlv[1];
value = tlv + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh4opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 2 ));
switch (type) {
case DH4OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH4OPT_NTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen < 4 || optlen % 4 != 0) {
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH4OPT_DOMAIN_SEARCH: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 2 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The HNCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-hncp.c:dhcpv4_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13044/HNCP: add DHCPv4-Data bounds checks
dhcpv4_print() in print-hncp.c had the same bug as dhcpv6_print(), apply
a fix along the same lines.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,831
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: QuotaTask::QuotaTask(QuotaTaskObserver* observer)
: observer_(observer),
original_task_runner_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to application exit.
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
VLOGF(2) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
CARD32 *p;
int i;
xEvent eventT;
xEvent *eventP;
EventSwapPtr proc;
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
swapl(&stuff->destination);
swaps(&stuff->count);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
bytes_to_int32(stuff->num_events * sizeof(xEvent)))
return BadLength;
eventP = (xEvent *) &stuff[1];
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_events; i++, eventP++) {
proc = EventSwapVector[eventP->u.u.type & 0177];
if (proc == NotImplemented) /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
return BadValue;
(*proc) (eventP, &eventT);
*eventP = eventT;
}
p = (CARD32 *) (((xEvent *) &stuff[1]) + stuff->num_events);
SwapLongs(p, stuff->count);
return (ProcXSendExtensionEvent(client));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-665
Summary: Uninitialized data in endianness conversion in the XEvent handling of the X.Org X Server before 2017-06-19 allowed authenticated malicious users to access potentially privileged data from the X server.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: vbf_stp_error(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
ssize_t l, ll, o;
double now;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct vsb *synth_body;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
AN(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_BUSY);
assert(bo->director_state == DIR_S_NULL);
wrk->stats->fetch_failed++;
now = W_TIM_real(wrk);
VSLb_ts_busyobj(bo, "Error", now);
if (bo->fetch_objcore->stobj->stevedore != NULL)
ObjFreeObj(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
HTTP_Setup(bo->beresp, bo->ws, bo->vsl, SLT_BerespMethod);
http_PutResponse(bo->beresp, "HTTP/1.1", 503, "Backend fetch failed");
http_TimeHeader(bo->beresp, "Date: ", now);
http_SetHeader(bo->beresp, "Server: Varnish");
bo->fetch_objcore->t_origin = now;
if (!VTAILQ_EMPTY(&bo->fetch_objcore->objhead->waitinglist)) {
/*
* If there is a waitinglist, it means that there is no
* grace-able object, so cache the error return for a
* short time, so the waiting list can drain, rather than
* each objcore on the waiting list sequentially attempt
* to fetch from the backend.
*/
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 1;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 5;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 5;
} else {
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 0;
}
synth_body = VSB_new_auto();
AN(synth_body);
VCL_backend_error_method(bo->vcl, wrk, NULL, bo, synth_body);
AZ(VSB_finish(synth_body));
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_ABANDON || wrk->handling == VCL_RET_FAIL) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_RETRY) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
if (bo->retries++ < cache_param->max_retries)
return (F_STP_RETRY);
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_VCL_Error, "Too many retries, failing");
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
bo->vfc->bo = bo;
bo->vfc->wrk = bo->wrk;
bo->vfc->oc = bo->fetch_objcore;
bo->vfc->http = bo->beresp;
bo->vfc->esi_req = bo->bereq;
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
ll = VSB_len(synth_body);
o = 0;
while (ll > 0) {
l = ll;
if (VFP_GetStorage(bo->vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK)
break;
memcpy(ptr, VSB_data(synth_body) + o, l);
VFP_Extend(bo->vfc, l);
ll -= l;
o += l;
}
AZ(ObjSetU64(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OA_LEN, o));
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_FINISHED);
return (F_STP_DONE);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: vbf_stp_error in bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c in Varnish HTTP Cache 4.1.x before 4.1.9 and 5.x before 5.2.1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory because a VFP_GetStorage buffer is larger than intended in certain circumstances involving -sfile Stevedore transient objects.
Commit Message: Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile
The file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when
requesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code
to copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun
the buffer.
Patch by @shamger
Fixes: #2429
|
Low
| 168,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleForPainting()
{
RefPtr<FrameView> protector(this);
updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive();
if (RenderView* view = renderView()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "UpdateLayerTree", "frame", m_frame.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::willUpdateLayerTree(m_frame.get());
view->compositor()->updateIfNeededRecursive();
if (view->compositor()->inCompositingMode() && m_frame->isLocalRoot())
m_frame->page()->scrollingCoordinator()->updateAfterCompositingChangeIfNeeded();
updateCompositedSelectionBoundsIfNeeded();
InspectorInstrumentation::didUpdateLayerTree(m_frame.get());
invalidateTreeIfNeededRecursive();
}
scrollContentsIfNeededRecursive();
ASSERT(lifecycle().state() == DocumentLifecycle::PaintInvalidationClean);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers a widget-position update that improperly interacts with the render tree, related to the FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleForPainting function in core/frame/FrameView.cpp and the RenderLayerScrollableArea::setScrollOffset function in core/rendering/RenderLayerScrollableArea.cpp.
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawElements(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawElements& c) {
if (!bound_element_array_buffer_ ||
bound_element_array_buffer_->IsDeleted()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glDrawElements: No element array buffer bound");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLenum mode = c.mode;
GLsizei count = c.count;
GLenum type = c.type;
int32 offset = c.index_offset;
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawElements: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (offset < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawElements: offset < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawElements: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->index_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawElements: type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawElements")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed;
if (!bound_element_array_buffer_->GetMaxValueForRange(
offset, count, type, &max_vertex_accessed)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glDrawElements: range out of bounds for buffer");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
const GLvoid* indices = reinterpret_cast<const GLvoid*>(offset);
glDrawElements(mode, count, type, indices);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawElements.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,331
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.