instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod1Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod1");
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, strArg, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->overloadedMethod(objArg, strArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CreateOAuth2ServiceDelegate(
signin::AccountConsistencyMethod account_consistency) {
oauth2_service_delegate_.reset(new MutableProfileOAuth2TokenServiceDelegate(
client_.get(), &signin_error_controller_, &account_tracker_service_,
token_web_data_, account_consistency, revoke_all_tokens_on_load_,
true /* can_revoke_credantials */));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
oauth2_service_delegate_->AddObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
Medium
| 172,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) via crafted MPEG-4 covr atoms with a size equal to SIZE_MAX, aka internal bug 20923261.
Commit Message: Prevent integer overflow when processing covr MPEG4 atoms
If the 'chunk_data_size' value is SIZE_MAX, an integer overflow will occur
and cause an undersized buffer to be allocated. The following processing
then overfills the resulting memory and creates a potentially exploitable
condition. Ensure that integer overflow does not occur.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: I75cce323aec04a612e5a230ecd7c2077ce06035f
|
Low
| 173,366
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::OnFocus() {
display_blurred_ = false;
ConnectVSyncProvider();
navigator_vr_->EnqueueVREvent(VRDisplayEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::vrdisplayfocus, true, false, this, ""));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
|
Low
| 171,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetDocumentEntry(const FilePath& cache_file_path,
const GetFileFromCacheParams& params,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
scoped_ptr<GDataEntry> fresh_entry;
if (error == GDATA_FILE_OK) {
scoped_ptr<DocumentEntry> doc_entry(DocumentEntry::ExtractAndParse(*data));
if (doc_entry.get()) {
fresh_entry.reset(
GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(NULL, doc_entry.get(),
directory_service_.get()));
}
if (!fresh_entry.get() || !fresh_entry->AsGDataFile()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Got invalid entry from server for " << params.resource_id;
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
}
}
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!params.get_file_callback.is_null()) {
params.get_file_callback.Run(error,
cache_file_path,
params.mime_type,
REGULAR_FILE);
}
return;
}
GURL content_url = fresh_entry->content_url();
int64 file_size = fresh_entry->file_info().size;
DCHECK_EQ(params.resource_id, fresh_entry->resource_id());
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> fresh_entry_as_file(
fresh_entry.release()->AsGDataFile());
directory_service_->RefreshFile(fresh_entry_as_file.Pass());
bool* has_enough_space = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::FreeDiskSpaceIfNeededFor,
base::Unretained(cache_),
file_size,
has_enough_space),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::StartDownloadFileIfEnoughSpace,
ui_weak_ptr_,
params,
content_url,
cache_file_path,
base::Owned(has_enough_space)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ip_options_get_finish(struct net *net, struct ip_options **optp,
struct ip_options *opt, int optlen)
{
while (optlen & 3)
opt->__data[optlen++] = IPOPT_END;
opt->optlen = optlen;
if (optlen && ip_options_compile(net, opt, NULL)) {
kfree(opt);
return -EINVAL;
}
kfree(*optp);
*optp = opt;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,560
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isRenderbuffer(
WebGLRenderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
if (!renderbuffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!renderbuffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (renderbuffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
Medium
| 173,131
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
bool should_reuse_default_view,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument())
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (!should_reuse_default_view)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
bool user_gesture_bit_set = frame_->HasReceivedUserGesture() ||
frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation();
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithFrame(frame_)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (user_gesture_bit_set) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
ShouldPersistUserGestureValue(previous_security_origin,
document->GetSecurityOrigin()));
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearDocumentHasReceivedUserGesture();
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
frame_->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().InstallSupplements(*frame_);
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation();
writer_ =
DocumentWriter::Create(document, parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
document->SetFeaturePolicy(
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::FeaturePolicyExperimentalFeaturesEnabled()
? response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy)
: g_empty_string);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 61.0.3163.81 for Android, failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to javascript scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
Medium
| 172,303
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunTestsInFile(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& pdf_filename) {
extensions::ResultCatcher catcher;
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/pdf/" + pdf_filename));
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadPdf(url));
content::WebContents* contents =
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
content::BrowserPluginGuestManager* guest_manager =
contents->GetBrowserContext()->GetGuestManager();
content::WebContents* guest_contents =
guest_manager->GetFullPageGuest(contents);
ASSERT_TRUE(guest_contents);
base::FilePath test_data_dir;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, &test_data_dir);
test_data_dir = test_data_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("pdf"));
base::FilePath test_util_path = test_data_dir.AppendASCII("test_util.js");
std::string test_util_js;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(test_util_path, &test_util_js));
base::FilePath test_file_path = test_data_dir.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string test_js;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(test_file_path, &test_js));
test_util_js.append(test_js);
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(guest_contents, test_util_js));
if (!catcher.GetNextResult())
FAIL() << catcher.message();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly restrict use of chrome: URLs, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended scheme restrictions via a crafted PDF document, as demonstrated by a document with a link to a chrome://settings URL.
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
|
Medium
| 171,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSwapOut(const ViewMsg_SwapOut_Params& params) {
OnStop();
if (!is_swapped_out_) {
SyncNavigationState();
webview()->dispatchUnloadEvent();
SetSwappedOut(true);
WebURLRequest request(GURL("about:swappedout"));
webview()->mainFrame()->loadRequest(request);
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK(routing_id_, params));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,031
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MultibufferDataSource::DidPassCORSAccessCheck() const {
if (url_data()->cors_mode() == UrlData::CORS_UNSPECIFIED)
return false;
if (init_cb_)
return false;
if (failed_)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: icmp6_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, int resid)
{
const struct nd_opt_hdr *op;
const struct nd_opt_prefix_info *opp;
const struct nd_opt_mtu *opm;
const struct nd_opt_rdnss *oprd;
const struct nd_opt_dnssl *opds;
const struct nd_opt_advinterval *opa;
const struct nd_opt_homeagent_info *oph;
const struct nd_opt_route_info *opri;
const u_char *cp, *ep, *domp;
struct in6_addr in6;
const struct in6_addr *in6p;
size_t l;
u_int i;
#define ECHECK(var) if ((const u_char *)&(var) > ep - sizeof(var)) return
cp = bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
while (cp < ep) {
op = (const struct nd_opt_hdr *)cp;
ECHECK(op->nd_opt_len);
if (resid <= 0)
return;
if (op->nd_opt_len == 0)
goto trunc;
if (cp + (op->nd_opt_len << 3) > ep)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t %s option (%u), length %u (%u): ",
tok2str(icmp6_opt_values, "unknown", op->nd_opt_type),
op->nd_opt_type,
op->nd_opt_len << 3,
op->nd_opt_len));
switch (op->nd_opt_type) {
case ND_OPT_SOURCE_LINKADDR:
l = (op->nd_opt_len << 3) - 2;
print_lladdr(ndo, cp + 2, l);
break;
case ND_OPT_TARGET_LINKADDR:
l = (op->nd_opt_len << 3) - 2;
print_lladdr(ndo, cp + 2, l);
break;
case ND_OPT_PREFIX_INFORMATION:
opp = (const struct nd_opt_prefix_info *)op;
ND_TCHECK(opp->nd_opt_pi_prefix);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s/%u%s, Flags [%s], valid time %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &opp->nd_opt_pi_prefix),
opp->nd_opt_pi_prefix_len,
(op->nd_opt_len != 4) ? "badlen" : "",
bittok2str(icmp6_opt_pi_flag_values, "none", opp->nd_opt_pi_flags_reserved),
get_lifetime(EXTRACT_32BITS(&opp->nd_opt_pi_valid_time))));
ND_PRINT((ndo,", pref. time %s", get_lifetime(EXTRACT_32BITS(&opp->nd_opt_pi_preferred_time))));
break;
case ND_OPT_REDIRECTED_HEADER:
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t ",op->nd_opt_len<<3);
/* xxx */
break;
case ND_OPT_MTU:
opm = (const struct nd_opt_mtu *)op;
ND_TCHECK(opm->nd_opt_mtu_mtu);
ND_PRINT((ndo," %u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&opm->nd_opt_mtu_mtu),
(op->nd_opt_len != 1) ? "bad option length" : "" ));
break;
case ND_OPT_RDNSS:
oprd = (const struct nd_opt_rdnss *)op;
l = (op->nd_opt_len - 1) / 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo," lifetime %us,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&oprd->nd_opt_rdnss_lifetime)));
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(oprd->nd_opt_rdnss_addr[i]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," addr: %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oprd->nd_opt_rdnss_addr[i])));
}
break;
case ND_OPT_DNSSL:
opds = (const struct nd_opt_dnssl *)op;
ND_PRINT((ndo," lifetime %us, domain(s):",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&opds->nd_opt_dnssl_lifetime)));
domp = cp + 8; /* domain names, variable-sized, RFC1035-encoded */
while (domp < cp + (op->nd_opt_len << 3) && *domp != '\0')
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((domp = ns_nprint (ndo, domp, bp)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
break;
case ND_OPT_ADVINTERVAL:
opa = (const struct nd_opt_advinterval *)op;
ND_TCHECK(opa->nd_opt_adv_interval);
ND_PRINT((ndo," %ums", EXTRACT_32BITS(&opa->nd_opt_adv_interval)));
break;
case ND_OPT_HOMEAGENT_INFO:
oph = (const struct nd_opt_homeagent_info *)op;
ND_TCHECK(oph->nd_opt_hai_lifetime);
ND_PRINT((ndo," preference %u, lifetime %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&oph->nd_opt_hai_preference),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&oph->nd_opt_hai_lifetime)));
break;
case ND_OPT_ROUTE_INFO:
opri = (const struct nd_opt_route_info *)op;
ND_TCHECK(opri->nd_opt_rti_lifetime);
memset(&in6, 0, sizeof(in6));
in6p = (const struct in6_addr *)(opri + 1);
switch (op->nd_opt_len) {
case 1:
break;
case 2:
ND_TCHECK2(*in6p, 8);
memcpy(&in6, opri + 1, 8);
break;
case 3:
ND_TCHECK(*in6p);
memcpy(&in6, opri + 1, sizeof(in6));
break;
default:
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s/%u", ip6addr_string(ndo, &in6),
opri->nd_opt_rti_prefixlen));
ND_PRINT((ndo,", pref=%s", get_rtpref(opri->nd_opt_rti_flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo,", lifetime=%s",
get_lifetime(EXTRACT_32BITS(&opri->nd_opt_rti_lifetime))));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo,cp+2,"\n\t ", (op->nd_opt_len << 3) - 2); /* skip option header */
return;
}
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additional hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, cp+2,"\n\t ", (op->nd_opt_len << 3) - 2); /* skip option header */
cp += op->nd_opt_len << 3;
resid -= op->nd_opt_len << 3;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[ndp opt]"));
return;
#undef ECHECK
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
|
Low
| 169,823
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c in ServiceManager in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 does not properly restrict service registration, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29431260.
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Restore basic uid check
Prevent apps from registering services without relying on selinux checks.
Bug: 29431260
Change-Id: I38c6e8bc7f7cba1cbd3568e8fed1ae7ac2054a9b
(cherry picked from commit 2b74d2c1d2a2c1bb6e9c420f7e9b339ba2a95179)
|
Medium
| 174,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-120
Summary: There is heap-based buffer overflow in kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
|
Low
| 169,575
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize, clustersize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files, has_bigalloc;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err = 0;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_sb = sb;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
strreplace(sb->s_id, '/', '!');
/* -EINVAL is default */
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Warn if metadata_csum and gdt_csum are both set. */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb) &&
ext4_has_feature_gdt_csum(sb))
ext4_warning(sb, "metadata_csum and uninit_bg are "
"redundant flags; please run fsck.");
/* Check for a known checksum algorithm */
if (!ext4_verify_csum_type(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"unknown checksum algorithm.");
silent = 1;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Load the checksum driver */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb)) {
sbi->s_chksum_driver = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32c", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot load crc32c driver.");
ret = PTR_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
sbi->s_chksum_driver = NULL;
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/* Check superblock checksum */
if (!ext4_superblock_csum_verify(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"invalid superblock checksum. Run e2fsck?");
silent = 1;
ret = -EFSBADCRC;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Precompute checksum seed for all metadata */
if (ext4_has_feature_csum_seed(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = le32_to_cpu(es->s_checksum_seed);
else if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = ext4_chksum(sbi, ~0, es->s_uuid,
sizeof(es->s_uuid));
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS)
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
/* don't forget to enable journal_csum when metadata_csum is enabled. */
if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
/* block_validity enabled by default; disable with noblock_validity */
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid));
sbi->s_resgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid));
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) && !IS_EXT2_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
/*
* set default s_li_wait_mult for lazyinit, for the case there is
* no mount option specified.
*/
sbi->s_li_wait_mult = EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT;
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt = sbi->s_mount_opt;
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, 0))
goto failed_mount;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting "
"with data=journal disables delayed "
"allocation and O_DIRECT support!\n");
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_DELALLOC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and delalloc");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dioread_nolock");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DAX)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
} else {
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_CGROUPWB;
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(ext4_has_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_ro_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_incompat_features(sb)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
if (es->s_creator_os == cpu_to_le32(EXT4_OS_HURD)) {
set_opt2(sb, HURD_COMPAT);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"The Hurd can't support 64-bit file systems");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT2_SB(sb)) {
if (ext2_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext2 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext2 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT3_SB(sb)) {
if (ext3_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext3 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext3 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_DAX) {
if (blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: unsupported blocksize for dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (!sb->s_bdev->bd_disk->fops->direct_access) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: device does not support dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb) && es->s_encryption_level) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported encryption level %d",
es->s_encryption_level);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
if (ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb)) {
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
}
}
/* Handle clustersize */
clustersize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size);
has_bigalloc = ext4_has_feature_bigalloc(sb);
if (has_bigalloc) {
if (clustersize < blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"cluster size (%d) smaller than "
"block size (%d)", clustersize, blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_cluster_bits = le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
sbi->s_clusters_per_group =
le32_to_cpu(es->s_clusters_per_group);
if (sbi->s_clusters_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#clusters per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group !=
(sbi->s_clusters_per_group * (clustersize / blocksize))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "blocks per group (%lu) and "
"clusters per group (%lu) inconsistent",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group,
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else {
if (clustersize != blocksize) {
ext4_warning(sb, "fragment/cluster size (%d) != "
"block size (%d)", clustersize,
blocksize);
clustersize = blocksize;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_clusters_per_group = sbi->s_blocks_per_group;
sbi->s_cluster_bits = 0;
}
sbi->s_cluster_ratio = clustersize / blocksize;
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/* Do we have standard group size of clustersize * 8 blocks ? */
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group == clustersize << 3)
set_opt2(sb, STD_GROUP_SIZE);
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data "
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = ext4_kvmalloc(db_count *
sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount;
}
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
setup_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, print_daily_error_info,
(unsigned long) sb);
/* Register extent status tree shrinker */
if (ext4_es_register_shrinker(sbi))
goto failed_mount3;
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb = 32;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb))
sb->s_qcop = &dquot_quotactl_sysfile_ops;
else
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->s_quota_types = QTYPE_MASK_USR | QTYPE_MASK_GRP | QTYPE_MASK_PRJ;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb));
if (ext4_has_feature_mmp(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
if (ext4_multi_mount_protect(sb, le64_to_cpu(es->s_mmp_block)))
goto failed_mount3a;
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && ext4_has_feature_journal(sb)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3a;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
/* Nojournal mode, all journal mount options are illegal */
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"commit=%lu, fs mounted w/o journal",
sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ);
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (EXT4_MOUNT_DATA_FLAGS &
(sbi->s_mount_opt ^ sbi->s_def_mount_opt)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"data=, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
clear_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (!set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set journal checksum "
"feature set");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
sbi->s_journal->j_commit_callback = ext4_journal_commit_callback;
no_journal:
if (ext4_mballoc_ready) {
sbi->s_mb_cache = ext4_xattr_create_cache(sb->s_id);
if (!sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to create an mb_cache");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
}
if ((DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) || ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) &&
(blocksize != PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported blocksize for fs encryption");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) {
ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
}
/*
* Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the
* superblock if present.
*/
if (es->s_overhead_clusters)
sbi->s_overhead = le32_to_cpu(es->s_overhead_clusters);
else {
err = ext4_calculate_overhead(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-rsv-conversion", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create workqueue\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
iput(root);
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
ext4_set_resv_clusters(sb);
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4a;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount5;
}
block = ext4_count_free_clusters(sb);
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, block));
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, block,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err) {
unsigned long freei = ext4_count_free_inodes(sb);
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(freei);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, freei,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, 0,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount6;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount6;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount6;
err = ext4_register_sysfs(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount7;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Enable quota usage during mount. */
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
err = ext4_enable_quotas(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount8;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_QUOTA */
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD)) {
struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"mounting with \"discard\" option, but "
"the device does not support discard");
}
if (___ratelimit(&ext4_mount_msg_ratelimit, "EXT4-fs mount"))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
/* Enable message ratelimiting. Default is 10 messages per 5 secs. */
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_err_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_warning_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_msg_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
failed_mount8:
ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb);
#endif
failed_mount7:
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
failed_mount6:
ext4_mb_release(sb);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups)
kvfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter);
failed_mount5:
ext4_ext_release(sb);
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
failed_mount4a:
dput(sb->s_root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
failed_mount4:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq)
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3a:
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(sbi);
failed_mount3:
del_timer_sync(&sbi->s_err_report);
if (sbi->s_mmp_tsk)
kthread_stop(sbi->s_mmp_tsk);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kvfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return err ? err : ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const {
const Cluster* pCluster = m_pSegment->GetFirst();
for (int i = 0;;) {
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) { //all clusters have been loaded
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pBlockEntry == 0) { // empty cluster
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
continue;
}
for (;;) {
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: s_aes_process(stream_state * ss, stream_cursor_read * pr,
stream_cursor_write * pw, bool last)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
const unsigned char *limit;
const long in_size = pr->limit - pr->ptr;
const long out_size = pw->limit - pw->ptr;
unsigned char temp[16];
int status = 0;
/* figure out if we're going to run out of space */
if (in_size > out_size) {
limit = pr->ptr + out_size;
status = 1; /* need more output space */
} else {
limit = pr->limit;
status = last ? EOFC : 0; /* need more input */
}
/* set up state and context */
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
/* allocate the aes context. this is a public struct but it
contains internal pointers, so we need to store it separately
in immovable memory like any opaque structure. */
state->ctx = (aes_context *)gs_alloc_bytes_immovable(state->memory,
sizeof(aes_context), "aes context structure");
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "could not allocate aes context");
return ERRC;
}
if (state->keylength < 1 || state->keylength > SAES_MAX_KEYLENGTH) {
gs_throw1(gs_error_rangecheck, "invalid aes key length (%d bytes)",
state->keylength);
}
aes_setkey_dec(state->ctx, state->key, state->keylength * 8);
}
if (!state->initialized) {
/* read the initialization vector from the first 16 bytes */
if (in_size < 16) return 0; /* get more data */
memcpy(state->iv, pr->ptr + 1, 16);
state->initialized = 1;
pr->ptr += 16;
}
/* decrypt available blocks */
while (pr->ptr + 16 <= limit) {
aes_crypt_cbc(state->ctx, AES_DECRYPT, 16, state->iv,
pr->ptr + 1, temp);
pr->ptr += 16;
if (last && pr->ptr == pr->limit) {
/* we're on the last block; unpad if necessary */
int pad;
if (state->use_padding) {
/* we are using RFC 1423-style padding, so the last byte of the
plaintext gives the number of bytes to discard */
pad = temp[15];
if (pad < 1 || pad > 16) {
/* Bug 692343 - don't error here, just warn. Take padding to be
* zero. This may give us a stream that's too long - preferable
* to the alternatives. */
gs_warn1("invalid aes padding byte (0x%02x)",
(unsigned char)pad);
pad = 0;
}
} else {
/* not using padding */
pad = 0;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16 - pad);
pw->ptr += 16 - pad;
return EOFC;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16);
pw->ptr += 16;
}
/* if we got to the end of the file without triggering the padding
check, the input must not have been a multiple of 16 bytes long.
complain. */
if (status == EOFC) {
gs_throw(gs_error_rangecheck, "aes stream isn't a multiple of 16 bytes");
return 0;
}
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript 9.23 before 2018-08-24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript could use uninitialized memory access in the aesdecode operator to crash the interpreter or potentially execute code.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,703
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jpc_tsfb_synthesize(jpc_tsfb_t *tsfb, jas_seq2d_t *a)
{
return (tsfb->numlvls > 0) ? jpc_tsfb_synthesize2(tsfb,
jas_seq2d_getref(a, jas_seq2d_xstart(a), jas_seq2d_ystart(a)),
jas_seq2d_xstart(a), jas_seq2d_ystart(a), jas_seq2d_width(a),
jas_seq2d_height(a), jas_seq2d_rowstep(a), tsfb->numlvls - 1) : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jpc_tsfb_synthesize function in jpc_tsfb.c in JasPer before 1.900.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via vectors involving an empty sequence.
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
|
Low
| 168,478
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DetachInterstitialPage() {
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
bool interstitial_pausing_throbber =
ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage())
GetRenderManager()->remove_interstitial_page();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidDetachInterstitialPage();
if (interstitial_pausing_throbber && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_sps(dec_struct_t *ps_dec, dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD8 i;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = NULL;
UWORD8 u1_profile_idc, u1_level_idc, u1_seq_parameter_set_id;
UWORD16 i2_max_frm_num;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD8 u1_frm, uc_constraint_set0_flag, uc_constraint_set1_flag;
WORD32 i4_cropped_ht, i4_cropped_wd;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 pic_height_in_map_units_minus1 = 0;
UWORD32 u2_pic_wd = 0;
UWORD32 u2_pic_ht = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_wd_y = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_ht_y = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_wd_uv = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_ht_uv = 0;
UWORD32 u2_crop_offset_y = 0;
UWORD32 u2_crop_offset_uv = 0;
WORD32 ret;
UWORD32 u4_num_reorder_frames;
/* High profile related syntax element */
WORD32 i4_i;
/* G050 */
UWORD8 u1_frame_cropping_flag, u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst,
u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst,
u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst,
u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst;
/* G050 */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode seq_parameter_set_id and profile and level values */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
SWITCHONTRACE;
u1_profile_idc = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: profile_idc",u1_profile_idc);
/* G050 */
uc_constraint_set0_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
uc_constraint_set1_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
/*****************************************************/
/* Read 5 bits for uc_constraint_set3_flag (1 bit) */
/* and reserved_zero_4bits (4 bits) - Sushant */
/*****************************************************/
ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 5);
/* G050 */
/* Check whether particular profile is suported or not */
/* Check whether particular profile is suported or not */
if((u1_profile_idc != MAIN_PROFILE_IDC) &&
(u1_profile_idc != BASE_PROFILE_IDC) &&
(u1_profile_idc != HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
)
{
/* Apart from Baseline, main and high profile,
* only extended profile is supported provided
* uc_constraint_set0_flag or uc_constraint_set1_flag are set to 1
*/
if((u1_profile_idc != EXTENDED_PROFILE_IDC) ||
((uc_constraint_set1_flag != 1) && (uc_constraint_set0_flag != 1)))
{
return (ERROR_FEATURE_UNAVAIL);
}
}
u1_level_idc = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: u4_level_idc",u1_level_idc);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_SEQ_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
u1_seq_parameter_set_id = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: seq_parameter_set_id",
u1_seq_parameter_set_id);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Find an seq param entry in seqparam array of decStruct */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_seq = ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps;
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1)
{
*ps_seq = *ps_dec->ps_cur_sps;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_profile_idc != u1_profile_idc))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_level_idc != u1_level_idc))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
ps_seq->u1_profile_idc = u1_profile_idc;
ps_seq->u1_level_idc = u1_level_idc;
ps_seq->u1_seq_parameter_set_id = u1_seq_parameter_set_id;
/*******************************************************************/
/* Initializations for high profile - Sushant */
/*******************************************************************/
ps_seq->i4_chroma_format_idc = 1;
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_luma_minus8 = 0;
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_chroma_minus8 = 0;
ps_seq->i4_qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag = 0;
ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag = 0;
if(u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
/* reading chroma_format_idc */
ps_seq->i4_chroma_format_idc = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/* Monochrome is not supported */
if(ps_seq->i4_chroma_format_idc != 1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading bit_depth_luma_minus8 */
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_luma_minus8 = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_luma_minus8 != 0)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading bit_depth_chroma_minus8 */
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_chroma_minus8 = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_chroma_minus8 != 0)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag */
ps_seq->i4_qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag =
(WORD32)ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(ps_seq->i4_qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag != 0)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag */
ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag =
(WORD32)ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
{
for(i4_i = 0; i4_i < 8; i4_i++)
{
ps_seq->u1_seq_scaling_list_present_flag[i4_i] =
ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
/* initialize u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i] to zero */
/* before calling scaling list */
ps_seq->u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i] = 0;
if(ps_seq->u1_seq_scaling_list_present_flag[i4_i])
{
if(i4_i < 6)
{
ih264d_scaling_list(
ps_seq->i2_scalinglist4x4[i4_i],
16,
&ps_seq->u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i],
ps_bitstrm);
}
else
{
ih264d_scaling_list(
ps_seq->i2_scalinglist8x8[i4_i - 6],
64,
&ps_seq->u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i],
ps_bitstrm);
}
}
}
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode MaxFrameNum */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_temp = 4 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_BITS_IN_FRAME_NUM)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: log2_max_frame_num_minus4",
(ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num - 4));
i2_max_frm_num = (1 << (ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num));
ps_seq->u2_u4_max_pic_num_minus1 = i2_max_frm_num - 1;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode picture order count and related values */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_PIC_ORDER_CNT_TYPE)
{
return ERROR_INV_POC_TYPE_T;
}
ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: pic_order_cnt_type",ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type);
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
u4_temp = 4 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_BITS_IN_POC_LSB)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus = u4_temp;
ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb = (1 << u4_temp);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4",(u4_temp - 4));
}
else if(ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1)
{
ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag",
ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag);
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_non_ref_pic = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: offset_for_non_ref_pic",
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_non_ref_pic);
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_top_to_bottom_field = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: offset_for_top_to_bottom_field",
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_top_to_bottom_field);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 255)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle",
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle);
for(i = 0; i < ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)
{
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_ref_frame[i] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: offset_for_ref_frame",
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_ref_frame[i]);
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((u4_temp > H264_MAX_REF_PICS))
{
return ERROR_NUM_REF;
}
/* Compare with older num_ref_frames is header is already once */
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames != u4_temp))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: num_ref_frames",ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames);
ps_seq->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag",
ps_seq->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode FrameWidth and FrameHeight and related values */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = 1
+ ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: pic_width_in_mbs_minus1",
ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1);
u2_pic_wd = (ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs << 4);
pic_height_in_map_units_minus1 = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs = 1 + pic_height_in_map_units_minus1;
u2_pic_ht = (ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs << 4);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Get the value of MaxMbAddress and Number of bits needed for it */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr = (ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs
* ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_seq->u2_total_num_of_mbs = ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
ps_seq->u1_level_idc = ih264d_correct_level_idc(
u1_level_idc, ps_seq->u2_total_num_of_mbs);
u1_frm = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag != u1_frm))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag = u1_frm;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_mbs_only_flag", u1_frm);
if(!u1_frm)
{
u2_pic_ht <<= 1;
ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: mb_adaptive_frame_field_flag",
ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag);
}
else
ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag = 0;
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: direct_8x8_inference_flag",
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag);
/* G050 */
u1_frame_cropping_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_flag",u1_frame_cropping_flag);
if(u1_frame_cropping_flag)
{
u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_left_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst);
u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_right_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst);
u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_top_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst);
u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_bottom_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst);
}
/* G050 */
ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: vui_parameters_present_flag",
ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag);
u2_frm_wd_y = u2_pic_wd + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1);
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width > u2_frm_wd_y)
u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width;
}
u2_frm_ht_y = u2_pic_ht + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_Y_V << 2);
u2_frm_wd_uv = u2_pic_wd + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2);
u2_frm_wd_uv = MAX(u2_frm_wd_uv, u2_frm_wd_y);
u2_frm_ht_uv = (u2_pic_ht >> 1) + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_UV_V << 2);
u2_frm_ht_uv = MAX(u2_frm_ht_uv, (u2_frm_ht_y >> 1));
/* Calculate display picture width, height and start u4_ofst from YUV420 */
/* pictute buffers as per cropping information parsed above */
{
UWORD16 u2_rgt_ofst = 0;
UWORD16 u2_lft_ofst = 0;
UWORD16 u2_top_ofst = 0;
UWORD16 u2_btm_ofst = 0;
UWORD8 u1_frm_mbs_flag;
UWORD8 u1_vert_mult_factor;
if(u1_frame_cropping_flag)
{
/* Calculate right and left u4_ofst for cropped picture */
u2_rgt_ofst = u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst << 1;
u2_lft_ofst = u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst << 1;
/* Know frame MBs only u4_flag */
u1_frm_mbs_flag = (1 == ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag);
/* Simplify the vertical u4_ofst calculation from field/frame */
u1_vert_mult_factor = (2 - u1_frm_mbs_flag);
/* Calculate bottom and top u4_ofst for cropped picture */
u2_btm_ofst = (u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst
<< u1_vert_mult_factor);
u2_top_ofst = (u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst
<< u1_vert_mult_factor);
}
/* Calculate u4_ofst from start of YUV 420 picture buffer to start of*/
/* cropped picture buffer */
u2_crop_offset_y = (u2_frm_wd_y * u2_top_ofst) + (u2_lft_ofst);
u2_crop_offset_uv = (u2_frm_wd_uv * (u2_top_ofst >> 1))
+ (u2_lft_ofst >> 1) * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
/* Calculate the display picture width and height based on crop */
/* information */
i4_cropped_ht = u2_pic_ht - (u2_btm_ofst + u2_top_ofst);
i4_cropped_wd = u2_pic_wd - (u2_rgt_ofst + u2_lft_ofst);
if((i4_cropped_ht < MB_SIZE) || (i4_cropped_wd < MB_SIZE))
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_dec->u2_pic_wd != u2_pic_wd))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_dec->u2_pic_ht != u2_pic_ht))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
/* Check for unsupported resolutions */
if((u2_pic_wd > H264_MAX_FRAME_WIDTH) || (u2_pic_ht > H264_MAX_FRAME_HEIGHT)
|| (u2_pic_wd < H264_MIN_FRAME_WIDTH) || (u2_pic_ht < H264_MIN_FRAME_HEIGHT)
|| (u2_pic_wd * (UWORD32)u2_pic_ht > H264_MAX_FRAME_SIZE))
{
return IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* If MBAff is enabled, decoder support is limited to streams with
* width less than half of H264_MAX_FRAME_WIDTH.
* In case of MBAff decoder processes two rows at a time
*/
if((u2_pic_wd << ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag) > H264_MAX_FRAME_WIDTH)
{
return IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
}
/* Backup u4_num_reorder_frames if header is already decoded */
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) &&
(1 == ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag) &&
(1 == ps_seq->s_vui.u1_bitstream_restriction_flag))
{
u4_num_reorder_frames = ps_seq->s_vui.u4_num_reorder_frames;
}
else
{
u4_num_reorder_frames = -1;
}
if(1 == ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag)
{
ret = ih264d_parse_vui_parametres(&ps_seq->s_vui, ps_bitstrm);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
/* Compare older u4_num_reorder_frames with the new one if header is already decoded */
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) &&
(-1 != (WORD32)u4_num_reorder_frames) &&
(1 == ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag) &&
(1 == ps_seq->s_vui.u1_bitstream_restriction_flag) &&
(ps_seq->s_vui.u4_num_reorder_frames != u4_num_reorder_frames))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
/* In case bitstream read has exceeded the filled size, then
return an error */
if (ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst > ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All initializations to ps_dec are beyond this point */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_disp_height = i4_cropped_ht;
ps_dec->u2_disp_width = i4_cropped_wd;
ps_dec->u2_pic_wd = u2_pic_wd;
ps_dec->u2_pic_ht = u2_pic_ht;
/* Determining the Width and Height of Frame from that of Picture */
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y = u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_y = u2_frm_ht_y;
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv = u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_uv = u2_frm_ht_uv;
ps_dec->s_pad_mgr.u1_pad_len_y_v = (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_Y_V << (1 - u1_frm));
ps_dec->s_pad_mgr.u1_pad_len_cr_v = (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_UV_V << (1 - u1_frm));
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y = u2_crop_offset_y;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv = u2_crop_offset_uv;
ps_seq->u1_is_valid = TRUE;
ps_dec->ps_sps[u1_seq_parameter_set_id] = *ps_seq;
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps = &ps_dec->ps_sps[u1_seq_parameter_set_id];
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libavc). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-64380237.
Commit Message: Decoder: Detect change of mbaff flag in SPS
Change in Mbaff flag needs re-initialization of NMB group
and other variables in decoder context.
Bug: 64380237
Test: ran poc on ASAN before/after
Change-Id: I0fc65e4dfc3cc2c15528ec52da1782ecec61feab
(cherry picked from commit d524ba03101c0c662c9d365d7357536b42a0265e)
|
Low
| 174,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetTime() const
{
const long long tc = GetTimeCode();
if (tc < 0)
return tc;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = m_pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long t = m_timecode * scale;
return t;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void readpng2_warning_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg)
{
fprintf(stderr, "readpng2 libpng warning: %s\n", msg);
fflush(stderr);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,571
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunNestedLoopTask(int* counter) {
RunLoop nested_run_loop;
ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, BindOnce(&QuitWhenIdleTask, Unretained(&nested_run_loop),
Unretained(counter)));
ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, BindOnce(&ShouldNotRunTask), TimeDelta::FromDays(1));
std::unique_ptr<MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower> allower;
if (MessageLoop::current()) {
allower = base::MakeUnique<MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower>(
MessageLoop::current());
}
nested_run_loop.Run();
++(*counter);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
Low
| 171,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::Process(size_t number_of_frames) {
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_lock_);
if (try_locker.Locked()) {
if (!MediaElement() || !source_sample_rate_) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
if (source_number_of_channels_ != output_bus->NumberOfChannels()) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
AudioSourceProvider& provider = MediaElement()->GetAudioSourceProvider();
if (multi_channel_resampler_.get()) {
DCHECK_NE(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
multi_channel_resampler_->Process(&provider, output_bus,
number_of_frames);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
provider.ProvideInput(output_bus, number_of_frames);
}
if (!PassesCORSAccessCheck()) {
if (maybe_print_cors_message_) {
maybe_print_cors_message_ = false;
PostCrossThreadTask(
*task_runner_, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PrintCORSMessage,
WrapRefCounted(this), current_src_string_));
}
output_bus->Zero();
}
} else {
output_bus->Zero();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
Medium
| 173,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Huff_offsetTransmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout);
*offset = bloc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ioquake3 before 2017-08-02 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
|
Low
| 167,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_t *p;
struct ikev1_pl_t t;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
switch (proto) {
case 1:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ikev1_p_map);
map = oakley_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
break;
case 2:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ah_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
case 3:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, esp_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
case 4:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t.t_id, ipcomp_p_map);
map = ipsec_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(ipsec_t_map)/sizeof(ipsec_t_map[0]);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%d id=%s ", t.t_no, idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%d id=%d ", t.t_no, t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2,
map, nmap);
} else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2);
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void _isdn_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
isdn_net_local *lp = netdev_priv(dev);
ether_setup(dev);
/* Setup the generic properties */
dev->flags = IFF_NOARP|IFF_POINTOPOINT;
dev->header_ops = NULL;
dev->netdev_ops = &isdn_netdev_ops;
/* for clients with MPPP maybe higher values better */
dev->tx_queue_len = 30;
lp->p_encap = ISDN_NET_ENCAP_RAWIP;
lp->magic = ISDN_NET_MAGIC;
lp->last = lp;
lp->next = lp;
lp->isdn_device = -1;
lp->isdn_channel = -1;
lp->pre_device = -1;
lp->pre_channel = -1;
lp->exclusive = -1;
lp->ppp_slot = -1;
lp->pppbind = -1;
skb_queue_head_init(&lp->super_tx_queue);
lp->l2_proto = ISDN_PROTO_L2_X75I;
lp->l3_proto = ISDN_PROTO_L3_TRANS;
lp->triggercps = 6000;
lp->slavedelay = 10 * HZ;
lp->hupflags = ISDN_INHUP; /* Do hangup even on incoming calls */
lp->onhtime = 10; /* Default hangup-time for saving costs */
lp->dialmax = 1;
/* Hangup before Callback, manual dial */
lp->flags = ISDN_NET_CBHUP | ISDN_NET_DM_MANUAL;
lp->cbdelay = 25; /* Wait 5 secs before Callback */
lp->dialtimeout = -1; /* Infinite Dial-Timeout */
lp->dialwait = 5 * HZ; /* Wait 5 sec. after failed dial */
lp->dialstarted = 0; /* Jiffies of last dial-start */
lp->dialwait_timer = 0; /* Jiffies of earliest next dial-start */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AwMainDelegate::BasicStartupComplete(int* exit_code) {
content::SetContentClient(&content_client_);
content::RegisterMediaUrlInterceptor(new AwMediaUrlInterceptor());
BrowserViewRenderer::CalculateTileMemoryPolicy();
ui::GestureConfiguration::GetInstance()
->set_fling_touchscreen_tap_suppression_enabled(false);
base::CommandLine* cl = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cl->AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableBeginFrameScheduling);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableOverscrollEdgeEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePullToRefreshEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedTextureMailboxes);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableScreenOrientationLock);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableAggressiveDOMStorageFlushing);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI);
if (cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType).empty()) {
#ifdef __LP64__
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_64.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_64.bin";
#else
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_32.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_32.bin";
#endif // __LP64__
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8NativesDataDescriptor, kNativesFileName));
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8SnapshotDataDescriptor, kSnapshotFileName));
}
if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kWebViewSanboxedRenderer)) {
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU);
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererProcessLimit, "1");
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
|
Low
| 171,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 data, tpr;
int max_irr, max_isr;
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
void *vapic;
apic_sync_pv_eoi_to_guest(vcpu, apic);
if (!test_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
return;
tpr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI) & 0xff;
max_irr = apic_find_highest_irr(apic);
if (max_irr < 0)
max_irr = 0;
max_isr = apic_find_highest_isr(apic);
if (max_isr < 0)
max_isr = 0;
data = (tpr & 0xff) | ((max_isr & 0xf0) << 8) | (max_irr << 24);
vapic = kmap_atomic(vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_page);
*(u32 *)(vapic + offset_in_page(vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr)) = data;
kunmap_atomic(vapic);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
High
| 165,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebContents* DevToolsWindow::OpenURLFromTab(
WebContents* source,
const content::OpenURLParams& params) {
DCHECK(source == main_web_contents_);
if (!params.url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme)) {
WebContents* inspected_web_contents = GetInspectedWebContents();
return inspected_web_contents ?
inspected_web_contents->OpenURL(params) : NULL;
}
bindings_->Reload();
return main_web_contents_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-668
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Devtools remote debugging in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to obtain access to remote debugging functionality via a crafted HTML page, aka a Referer leak.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
|
Medium
| 172,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void vnc_dpy_update(DisplayState *ds, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int i;
VncDisplay *vd = ds->opaque;
struct VncSurface *s = &vd->guest;
h += y;
two 16-pixel blocks but we only mark the first as dirty
*/
w += (x % 16);
x -= (x % 16);
w += (x % 16);
x -= (x % 16);
x = MIN(x, s->ds->width);
y = MIN(y, s->ds->height);
w = MIN(x + w, s->ds->width) - x;
h = MIN(h, s->ds->height);
for (; y < h; y++)
for (i = 0; i < w; i += 16)
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
int32_t encoding)
{
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
}
void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len)
{
if ((buffer->capacity - buffer->offset) < len) {
buffer->capacity += (len + 1024);
buffer->buffer = g_realloc(buffer->buffer, buffer->capacity);
if (buffer->buffer == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "vnc: out of memory\n");
exit(1);
}
}
}
int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->offset == 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->buffer + buffer->offset;
}
void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer)
{
buffer->offset = 0;
}
void buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
{
g_free(buffer->buffer);
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->capacity = 0;
buffer->buffer = NULL;
}
void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len)
{
memcpy(buffer->buffer + buffer->offset, data, len);
buffer->offset += len;
}
static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs)
{
DisplayState *ds = vs->ds;
if (vs->csock == -1 || !vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE)) {
return;
}
if (vs->client_width == ds_get_width(ds) &&
vs->client_height == ds_get_height(ds)) {
return;
}
vs->client_width = ds_get_width(ds);
vs->client_height = ds_get_height(ds);
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->client_width, vs->client_height,
VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
static void vnc_abort_display_jobs(VncDisplay *vd)
{
VncState *vs;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = true;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = false;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,470
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> TestSynchronousCompositor::DemandDrawHw(
gfx::Size surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
return hardware_frame_.Pass();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
Low
| 171,620
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SMB2_sess_establish_session(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (ses->server->sign && ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey) {
rc = ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses);
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI,
"SMB3 session key generation failed\n");
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
goto keygen_exit;
}
}
if (!ses->server->session_estab) {
ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2;
ses->server->session_estab = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2/3 session established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
keygen_exit:
if (!ses->server->sign) {
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
|
Medium
| 169,361
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void diff_bytes_c(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src1, const uint8_t *src2, int w){
long i;
#if !HAVE_FAST_UNALIGNED
if((long)src2 & (sizeof(long)-1)){
for(i=0; i+7<w; i+=8){
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
dst[i+1] = src1[i+1]-src2[i+1];
dst[i+2] = src1[i+2]-src2[i+2];
dst[i+3] = src1[i+3]-src2[i+3];
dst[i+4] = src1[i+4]-src2[i+4];
dst[i+5] = src1[i+5]-src2[i+5];
dst[i+6] = src1[i+6]-src2[i+6];
dst[i+7] = src1[i+7]-src2[i+7];
}
}else
#endif
for(i=0; i<=w-sizeof(long); i+=sizeof(long)){
long a = *(long*)(src1+i);
long b = *(long*)(src2+i);
*(long*)(dst+i) = ((a|pb_80) - (b&pb_7f)) ^ ((a^b^pb_80)&pb_80);
}
for(; i<w; i++)
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer signedness errors in libavcodec/dsputil.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data.
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,930
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
{
int is_export, i, n, keya, ek;
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *md;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) {
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 10 - s->init_num);
if (i < (10 - s->init_num))
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
s->init_num = 10;
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
if (cp == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return (-1);
}
s->session->cipher = cp;
p += 3;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.clear = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.enc = i;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
s->session->key_arg_length = i;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
keya = s->session->key_arg_length;
len =
10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc +
(unsigned long)keya;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 10;
memcpy(s->session->key_arg, &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear + s->s2->tmp.enc]),
(unsigned int)keya);
if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
return (-1);
}
i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &md, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
return (0);
} else
ek = 5;
/* bad decrypt */
# if 1
/*
* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
* secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
*/
if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
|| (is_export && ((i != ek)
|| (s->s2->tmp.clear +
(unsigned int)i != (unsigned int)
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) {
ERR_clear_error();
if (is_export)
i = ek;
else
i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, i) <= 0)
return 0;
}
# else
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
int z;
/*
* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet type the first
* time round.
*/
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A) {
s->first_packet = 1;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
}
# endif
if (is_export)
i += s->s2->tmp.clear;
if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i < s->version)
s->version = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
(i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
len =
9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-HELLO */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 9;
/*
* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session structure
* if it is cached
*/
/* session-id */
if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) &&
(s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
} else {
if (s->cert == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
}
}
if (!s->hit) {
cs = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
&s->session->ciphers);
if (cs == NULL)
goto mem_err;
cl = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
prio = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
if (prio == NULL)
goto mem_err;
allow = cs;
} else {
prio = cs;
allow = cl;
}
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
z--;
}
}
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = prio;
}
/*
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
* client sent the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
* if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
*/
}
p += s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
/* done cipher selection */
/* session id extracted already */
p += s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
/* challenge */
if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->s2->challenge, p, (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
return (1);
mem_err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The SSLv2 implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (s2_lib.c assertion failure and daemon exit) via a crafted CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,802
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
return em_pop(ctxt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 169,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* Track::GetLanguage() const
{
return m_info.language;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rdpdr_process(STREAM s)
{
uint32 handle;
uint16 vmin;
uint16 component;
uint16 pakid;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "rdpdr_process()");
/* hexdump(s->p, s->end - s->p); */
in_uint16(s, component);
in_uint16(s, pakid);
if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_CORE)
{
switch (pakid)
{
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_IOREQUEST:
rdpdr_process_irp(s);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE:
/* DR_CORE_SERVER_ANNOUNCE_REQ */
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip versionMajor */
in_uint16_le(s, vmin); /* VersionMinor */
in_uint32_le(s, g_client_id); /* ClientID */
/* The RDP client is responsibility to provide a random client id
if server version is < 12 */
if (vmin < 0x000c)
g_client_id = 0x815ed39d; /* IP address (use 127.0.0.1) 0x815ed39d */
g_epoch++;
#if WITH_SCARD
/*
* We need to release all SCARD contexts to end all
* current transactions and pending calls
*/
scard_release_all_contexts();
/*
* According to [MS-RDPEFS] 3.2.5.1.2:
*
* If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets,
* it is a signal that the server has reconnected to a new session
* and the whole sequence has been reset. The client MUST treat
* this packet as the beginning of a new sequence.
* The client MUST also cancel all outstanding requests and release
* previous references to all devices.
*
* If any problem arises in the future, please, pay attention to the
* "If this packet appears after a sequence of other packets" part
*
*/
#endif
rdpdr_send_client_announce_reply();
rdpdr_send_client_name_request();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_CLIENTID_CONFIRM:
rdpdr_send_client_device_list_announce();
break;
case PAKID_CORE_DEVICE_REPLY:
in_uint32(s, handle);
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), server connected to resource %d", handle);
break;
case PAKID_CORE_SERVER_CAPABILITY:
rdpdr_send_client_capability_response();
break;
default:
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"rdpdr_process(), pakid 0x%x of component 0x%x", pakid,
component);
break;
}
}
else if (component == RDPDR_CTYP_PRN)
{
if (pakid == PAKID_PRN_CACHE_DATA)
printercache_process(s);
}
else
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdpdr_process(), unhandled component 0x%x", component);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
Low
| 169,805
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int efx_register_netdev(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
struct net_device *net_dev = efx->net_dev;
struct efx_channel *channel;
int rc;
net_dev->watchdog_timeo = 5 * HZ;
net_dev->irq = efx->pci_dev->irq;
net_dev->netdev_ops = &efx_netdev_ops;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(net_dev, &efx_ethtool_ops);
/* Clear MAC statistics */
efx->mac_op->update_stats(efx);
memset(&efx->mac_stats, 0, sizeof(efx->mac_stats));
rtnl_lock();
rc = dev_alloc_name(net_dev, net_dev->name);
if (rc < 0)
goto fail_locked;
efx_update_name(efx);
rc = register_netdevice(net_dev);
if (rc)
goto fail_locked;
efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx) {
struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;
efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue(tx_queue, channel)
efx_init_tx_queue_core_txq(tx_queue);
}
/* Always start with carrier off; PHY events will detect the link */
netif_carrier_off(efx->net_dev);
rtnl_unlock();
rc = device_create_file(&efx->pci_dev->dev, &dev_attr_phy_type);
if (rc) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"failed to init net dev attributes\n");
goto fail_registered;
}
return 0;
fail_locked:
rtnl_unlock();
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "could not register net dev\n");
return rc;
fail_registered:
unregister_netdev(net_dev);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The sfc (aka Solarflare Solarstorm) driver in the Linux kernel before 3.2.30 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (DMA descriptor consumption and network-controller outage) via crafted TCP packets that trigger a small MSS value.
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
Low
| 165,585
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
#define USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1 1
const struct ikev1_pl_id *p;
struct ikev1_pl_id id;
static const char *idtypestr[] = {
"IPv4", "IPv4net", "IPv6", "IPv6net",
};
static const char *ipsecidtypestr[] = {
NULL, "IPv4", "FQDN", "user FQDN", "IPv4net", "IPv6",
"IPv6net", "IPv4range", "IPv6range", "ASN1 DN", "ASN1 GN",
"keyid",
};
int len;
const u_char *data;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_ID)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
if (sizeof(*p) < item_len) {
data = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
len = item_len - sizeof(*p);
} else {
data = NULL;
len = 0;
}
#if 0 /*debug*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," [phase=%d doi=%d proto=%d]", phase, doi, proto));
#endif
switch (phase) {
#ifndef USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1
case 1:
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo," idtype=%s", STR_OR_ID(id.d.id_type, idtypestr)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi_data=%u",
(uint32_t)(ntohl(id.d.doi_data) & 0xffffff)));
break;
#ifdef USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1
case 1:
#endif
case 2:
{
const struct ipsecdoi_id *doi_p;
struct ipsecdoi_id doi_id;
const char *p_name;
doi_p = (const struct ipsecdoi_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*doi_p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&doi_id, ext, sizeof(doi_id));
ND_PRINT((ndo," idtype=%s", STR_OR_ID(doi_id.type, ipsecidtypestr)));
/* A protocol ID of 0 DOES NOT mean IPPROTO_IP! */
if (!ndo->ndo_nflag && doi_id.proto_id && (p_name = netdb_protoname(doi_id.proto_id)) != NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo," protoid=%s", p_name));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," protoid=%u", doi_id.proto_id));
ND_PRINT((ndo," port=%d", ntohs(doi_id.port)));
if (!len)
break;
if (data == NULL)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*data, len);
switch (doi_id.type) {
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
if (len < 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 4]", len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s", len, ipaddr_string(ndo, data)));
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_FQDN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_USER_FQDN:
{
int i;
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d ", len));
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
safeputchar(ndo, data[i]);
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
{
const u_char *mask;
if (len < 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 8]", len));
else {
mask = data + sizeof(struct in_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s/%u.%u.%u.%u", len,
ipaddr_string(ndo, data),
mask[0], mask[1], mask[2], mask[3]));
}
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
if (len < 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 16]", len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s", len, ip6addr_string(ndo, data)));
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
{
const u_char *mask;
if (len < 20)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 20]", len));
else {
mask = (const u_char *)(data + sizeof(struct in6_addr));
/*XXX*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s/0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", len,
ip6addr_string(ndo, data),
mask[0], mask[1], mask[2], mask[3],
mask[4], mask[5], mask[6], mask[7],
mask[8], mask[9], mask[10], mask[11],
mask[12], mask[13], mask[14], mask[15]));
}
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
if (len < 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 8]", len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s-%s", len,
ipaddr_string(ndo, data),
ipaddr_string(ndo, data + sizeof(struct in_addr))));
}
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
if (len < 32)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 32]", len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s-%s", len,
ip6addr_string(ndo, data),
ip6addr_string(ndo, data + sizeof(struct in6_addr))));
}
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_KEY_ID:
break;
}
break;
}
}
if (data && len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", len));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)data, len))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_ID)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv1 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c:ikev1_id_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13689/IKEv1: Fix addr+subnet length check.
An IPv6 address plus subnet mask is 32 bytes, not 20 bytes.
16 bytes of IPv6 address, 16 bytes of subnet mask.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rds_cmsg_atomic(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
struct cmsghdr *cmsg)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
struct rds_atomic_args *args;
int ret = 0;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct rds_atomic_args))
|| rm->atomic.op_active)
return -EINVAL;
args = CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
/* Nonmasked & masked cmsg ops converted to masked hw ops */
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case RDS_CMSG_ATOMIC_FADD:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_FADD;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.add = args->fadd.add;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.nocarry_mask = 0;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_MASKED_ATOMIC_FADD:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_FADD;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.add = args->m_fadd.add;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.nocarry_mask = args->m_fadd.nocarry_mask;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_ATOMIC_CSWP:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_CSWP;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare = args->cswp.compare;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap = args->cswp.swap;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare_mask = ~0;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap_mask = ~0;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_MASKED_ATOMIC_CSWP:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_CSWP;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare = args->m_cswp.compare;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap = args->m_cswp.swap;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare_mask = args->m_cswp.compare_mask;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap_mask = args->m_cswp.swap_mask;
break;
default:
BUG(); /* should never happen */
}
rm->atomic.op_notify = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_NOTIFY_ME);
rm->atomic.op_silent = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_SILENT);
rm->atomic.op_active = 1;
rm->atomic.op_recverr = rs->rs_recverr;
rm->atomic.op_sg = rds_message_alloc_sgs(rm, 1);
if (!rm->atomic.op_sg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
/* verify 8 byte-aligned */
if (args->local_addr & 0x7) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
ret = rds_pin_pages(args->local_addr, 1, &page, 1);
if (ret != 1)
goto err;
ret = 0;
sg_set_page(rm->atomic.op_sg, page, 8, offset_in_page(args->local_addr));
if (rm->atomic.op_notify || rm->atomic.op_recverr) {
/* We allocate an uninitialized notifier here, because
* we don't want to do that in the completion handler. We
* would have to use GFP_ATOMIC there, and don't want to deal
* with failed allocations.
*/
rm->atomic.op_notifier = kmalloc(sizeof(*rm->atomic.op_notifier), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rm->atomic.op_notifier) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
rm->atomic.op_notifier->n_user_token = args->user_token;
rm->atomic.op_notifier->n_status = RDS_RDMA_SUCCESS;
}
rm->atomic.op_rkey = rds_rdma_cookie_key(args->cookie);
rm->atomic.op_remote_addr = args->remote_addr + rds_rdma_cookie_offset(args->cookie);
return ret;
err:
if (page)
put_page(page);
kfree(rm->atomic.op_notifier);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In the Linux kernel through 4.14.13, the rds_cmsg_atomic function in net/rds/rdma.c mishandles cases where page pinning fails or an invalid address is supplied, leading to an rds_atomic_free_op NULL pointer dereference.
Commit Message: RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op
set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails
or the user supplied address is invalid,
this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op()
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SplashPath *Splash::makeDashedPath(SplashPath *path) {
SplashPath *dPath;
SplashCoord lineDashTotal;
SplashCoord lineDashStartPhase, lineDashDist, segLen;
SplashCoord x0, y0, x1, y1, xa, ya;
GBool lineDashStartOn, lineDashOn, newPath;
int lineDashStartIdx, lineDashIdx;
int i, j, k;
lineDashTotal = 0;
for (i = 0; i < state->lineDashLength; ++i) {
lineDashTotal += state->lineDash[i];
}
if (lineDashTotal == 0) {
return new SplashPath();
}
lineDashStartPhase = state->lineDashPhase;
i = splashFloor(lineDashStartPhase / lineDashTotal);
lineDashStartPhase -= (SplashCoord)i * lineDashTotal;
lineDashStartOn = gTrue;
lineDashStartIdx = 0;
if (lineDashStartPhase > 0) {
while (lineDashStartPhase >= state->lineDash[lineDashStartIdx]) {
lineDashStartOn = !lineDashStartOn;
lineDashStartPhase -= state->lineDash[lineDashStartIdx];
++lineDashStartIdx;
}
}
dPath = new SplashPath();
while (i < path->length) {
for (j = i;
j < path->length - 1 && !(path->flags[j] & splashPathLast);
++j) ;
lineDashOn = lineDashStartOn;
lineDashIdx = lineDashStartIdx;
lineDashDist = state->lineDash[lineDashIdx] - lineDashStartPhase;
newPath = gTrue;
for (k = i; k < j; ++k) {
x0 = path->pts[k].x;
y0 = path->pts[k].y;
x1 = path->pts[k+1].x;
y1 = path->pts[k+1].y;
segLen = splashDist(x0, y0, x1, y1);
while (segLen > 0) {
if (lineDashDist >= segLen) {
if (lineDashOn) {
if (newPath) {
dPath->moveTo(x0, y0);
newPath = gFalse;
}
dPath->lineTo(x1, y1);
}
lineDashDist -= segLen;
segLen = 0;
} else {
xa = x0 + (lineDashDist / segLen) * (x1 - x0);
ya = y0 + (lineDashDist / segLen) * (y1 - y0);
if (lineDashOn) {
if (newPath) {
dPath->moveTo(x0, y0);
newPath = gFalse;
}
dPath->lineTo(xa, ya);
}
x0 = xa;
y0 = ya;
segLen -= lineDashDist;
lineDashDist = 0;
}
if (lineDashDist <= 0) {
lineDashOn = !lineDashOn;
if (++lineDashIdx == state->lineDashLength) {
lineDashIdx = 0;
}
lineDashDist = state->lineDash[lineDashIdx];
newPath = gTrue;
}
}
}
i = j + 1;
}
if (dPath->length == 0) {
GBool allSame = gTrue;
for (int i = 0; allSame && i < path->length - 1; ++i) {
allSame = path->pts[i].x == path->pts[i + 1].x && path->pts[i].y == path->pts[i + 1].y;
}
if (allSame) {
x0 = path->pts[0].x;
y0 = path->pts[0].y;
dPath->moveTo(x0, y0);
dPath->lineTo(x0, y0);
}
}
return dPath;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: poppler before 0.22.1 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors that trigger an "invalid memory access" in (1) splash/Splash.cc, (2) poppler/Function.cc, and (3) poppler/Stream.cc.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,734
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BitSet(byte,bit) (((byte) & (bit)) == (bit))
#define LSBFirstOrder(x,y) (((y) << 8) | (x))
Image
*image,
*meta_image;
int
number_extensionss=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
RectangleInfo
page;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
delay,
dispose,
duration,
global_colors,
image_count,
iterations,
one;
ssize_t
count,
opacity;
unsigned char
background,
c,
flag,
*global_colormap,
buffer[257];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a GIF file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,6,buffer);
if ((count != 6) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF87",5) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF89",5) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
page.width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
c=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved */
one=1;
global_colors=one << (((size_t) flag & 0x07)+1);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
MagickMax(global_colors,256),3UL*sizeof(*global_colormap));
if (global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) != 0)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*global_colors),global_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*global_colors))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
delay=0;
dispose=0;
duration=0;
iterations=1;
opacity=(-1);
image_count=0;
meta_image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); /* metadata container */
for ( ; ; )
{
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
break;
if (c == (unsigned char) ';')
break; /* terminator */
if (c == (unsigned char) '!')
{
/*
GIF Extension block.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToReadExtensionBlock");
}
switch (c)
{
case 0xf9:
{
/*
Read graphics control extension.
*/
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ;
dispose=(size_t) (buffer[0] >> 2);
delay=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]);
if ((ssize_t) (buffer[0] & 0x01) == 0x01)
opacity=(ssize_t) buffer[3];
break;
}
case 0xfe:
{
char
*comments;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment extension.
*/
comments=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (length=0; ; length+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer);
if (count == 0)
break;
buffer[count]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateString(&comments,(const char *) buffer);
}
(void) SetImageProperty(meta_image,"comment",comments,exception);
comments=DestroyString(comments);
break;
}
case 0xff:
{
MagickBooleanType
loop;
/*
Read Netscape Loop extension.
*/
loop=MagickFalse;
if (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0)
loop=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"NETSCAPE2.0",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (loop != MagickFalse)
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0)
iterations=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]);
break;
}
else
{
char
name[MagickPathExtent];
int
block_length,
info_length,
reserved_length;
MagickBooleanType
i8bim,
icc,
iptc,
magick;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*info;
/*
Store GIF application extension as a generic profile.
*/
icc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ICCRGBG1012",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
magick=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ImageMagick",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i8bim=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGK8BIM0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
iptc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGKIPTC0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_extensionss++;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading GIF application extension");
info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(255UL,
sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
reserved_length=255;
for (info_length=0; ; )
{
block_length=(int) ReadBlobBlock(image,&info[info_length]);
if (block_length == 0)
break;
info_length+=block_length;
if (info_length > (reserved_length-255))
{
reserved_length+=4096;
info=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(info,(size_t)
reserved_length,sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,(size_t) info_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (i8bim != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"8bim",sizeof(name));
else if (icc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"icc",sizeof(name));
else if (iptc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"iptc",sizeof(name));
else if (magick != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"magick",sizeof(name));
meta_image->gamma=StringToDouble((char *) info+6,
(char **) NULL);
}
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,sizeof(name),"gif:%.11s",
buffer);
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
if (magick == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageProfile(meta_image,name,profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" profile name=%s",name);
}
break;
}
default:
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ;
break;
}
}
}
if (c != (unsigned char) ',')
continue;
if (image_count != 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image_count++;
/*
Read image attributes.
*/
meta_image->scene=image->scene;
(void) CloneImageProperties(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProperties(meta_image);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProfiles(meta_image);
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->compression=LZWCompression;
page.x=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.y=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->depth=8;
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->interlace=BitSet((int) flag,0x40) != 0 ? GIFInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->colors=BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0 ? global_colors : one <<
((size_t) (flag & 0x07)+1);
if (opacity >= (ssize_t) image->colors)
opacity=(-1);
image->page.width=page.width;
image->page.height=page.height;
image->page.y=page.y;
image->page.x=page.x;
image->delay=delay;
image->ticks_per_second=100;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
image->iterations=iterations;
image->alpha_trait=opacity >= 0 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
delay=0;
dispose=0;
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
}
/*
Inititialize colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0)
{
/*
Use global colormap.
*/
p=global_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
{
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha;
image->transparent_color=image->colormap[opacity];
}
}
image->background_color=image->colormap[MagickMin((ssize_t) background,
(ssize_t) image->colors-1)];
}
else
{
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read local colormap.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,3*
sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(3*image->colors)*sizeof(*colormap),colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
if (image->gamma == 1.0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (IsPixelInfoGray(image->colormap+i) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,i == (ssize_t) image->colors ?
GRAYColorspace : RGBColorspace,exception);
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Decode image.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
status=PingGIFImage(image,exception);
else
status=DecodeImage(image,opacity,exception);
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
duration+=image->delay*image->iterations;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
opacity=(-1);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) image->scene-
1,image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->duration=duration;
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ReadGIFImage in coders/gif.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 and GraphicsMagick 1.3.26 leaves the palette uninitialized when processing a GIF file that has neither a global nor local palette. If the affected product is used as a library loaded into a process that operates on interesting data, this data sometimes can be leaked via the uninitialized palette.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
|
Medium
| 167,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void uipc_read_task(void *arg)
{
int ch_id;
int result;
UNUSED(arg);
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long)"uipc-main", 0, 0, 0);
raise_priority_a2dp(TASK_UIPC_READ);
while (uipc_main.running)
{
uipc_main.read_set = uipc_main.active_set;
result = select(uipc_main.max_fd+1, &uipc_main.read_set, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (result == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("select timeout");
continue;
}
else if (result < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("select failed %s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
UIPC_LOCK();
/* clear any wakeup interrupt */
uipc_check_interrupt_locked();
/* check pending task events */
uipc_check_task_flags_locked();
/* make sure we service audio channel first */
uipc_check_fd_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO);
/* check for other connections */
for (ch_id = 0; ch_id < UIPC_CH_NUM; ch_id++)
{
if (ch_id != UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO)
uipc_check_fd_locked(ch_id);
}
UIPC_UNLOCK();
}
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC READ THREAD EXITING");
uipc_main_cleanup();
uipc_main.tid = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC READ THREAD DONE");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,498
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: swabHorAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
horAcc16(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,888
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool FidoCableHandshakeHandler::ValidateAuthenticatorHandshakeMessage(
base::span<const uint8_t> response) {
crypto::HMAC hmac(crypto::HMAC::SHA256);
if (!hmac.Init(handshake_key_))
return false;
if (response.size() != kCableAuthenticatorHandshakeMessageSize) {
return false;
}
const auto authenticator_hello = response.first(
kCableAuthenticatorHandshakeMessageSize - kCableHandshakeMacMessageSize);
if (!hmac.VerifyTruncated(
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(authenticator_hello),
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(
response.subspan(authenticator_hello.size())))) {
return false;
}
const auto authenticator_hello_cbor =
cbor::CBORReader::Read(authenticator_hello);
if (!authenticator_hello_cbor || !authenticator_hello_cbor->is_map() ||
authenticator_hello_cbor->GetMap().size() != 2) {
return false;
}
const auto authenticator_hello_msg =
authenticator_hello_cbor->GetMap().find(cbor::CBORValue(0));
if (authenticator_hello_msg == authenticator_hello_cbor->GetMap().end() ||
!authenticator_hello_msg->second.is_string() ||
authenticator_hello_msg->second.GetString() !=
kCableAuthenticatorHelloMessage) {
return false;
}
const auto authenticator_random_nonce =
authenticator_hello_cbor->GetMap().find(cbor::CBORValue(1));
if (authenticator_random_nonce == authenticator_hello_cbor->GetMap().end() ||
!authenticator_random_nonce->second.is_bytestring() ||
authenticator_random_nonce->second.GetBytestring().size() != 16) {
return false;
}
cable_device_->SetEncryptionData(
GetEncryptionKeyAfterSuccessfulHandshake(
authenticator_random_nonce->second.GetBytestring()),
nonce_);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102 on Android mishandles / (slash) and (backslash) characters, which allows attackers to conduct directory traversal attacks via a file: URL, related to net/base/escape.cc and net/base/filename_util.cc.
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
|
Medium
| 172,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
Node *fmt;
struct file * interp_file = NULL;
char iname[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE];
const char *iname_addr = iname;
int retval;
int fd_binary = -1;
retval = -ENOEXEC;
if (!enabled)
goto _ret;
/* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */
read_lock(&entries_lock);
fmt = check_file(bprm);
if (fmt)
strlcpy(iname, fmt->interpreter, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
read_unlock(&entries_lock);
if (!fmt)
goto _ret;
if (!(fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0)) {
retval = remove_arg_zero(bprm);
if (retval)
goto _ret;
}
if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY) {
/* if the binary should be opened on behalf of the
* interpreter than keep it open and assign descriptor
* to it */
fd_binary = get_unused_fd();
if (fd_binary < 0) {
retval = fd_binary;
goto _ret;
}
fd_install(fd_binary, bprm->file);
/* if the binary is not readable than enforce mm->dumpable=0
regardless of the interpreter's permissions */
would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
/* mark the bprm that fd should be passed to interp */
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD;
bprm->interp_data = fd_binary;
} else {
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
}
/* make argv[1] be the path to the binary */
retval = copy_strings_kernel (1, &bprm->interp, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto _error;
bprm->argc++;
/* add the interp as argv[0] */
retval = copy_strings_kernel (1, &iname_addr, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto _error;
bprm->argc ++;
bprm->interp = iname; /* for binfmt_script */
interp_file = open_exec (iname);
retval = PTR_ERR (interp_file);
if (IS_ERR (interp_file))
goto _error;
bprm->file = interp_file;
if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) {
/*
* No need to call prepare_binprm(), it's already been
* done. bprm->buf is stale, update from interp_file.
*/
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
retval = kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
} else
retval = prepare_binprm (bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto _error;
retval = search_binary_handler(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto _error;
_ret:
return retval;
_error:
if (fd_binary > 0)
sys_close(fd_binary);
bprm->interp_flags = 0;
bprm->interp_data = 0;
goto _ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The load_script function in fs/binfmt_script.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.2 does not properly handle recursion, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,197
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int snd_hrtimer_start(struct snd_timer *t)
{
struct snd_hrtimer *stime = t->private_data;
atomic_set(&stime->running, 0);
hrtimer_cancel(&stime->hrt);
hrtimer_start(&stime->hrt, ns_to_ktime(t->sticks * resolution),
HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
atomic_set(&stime->running, 1);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/hrtimer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 does not prevent recursive callback access, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fx_command(effect_handle_t self,
uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
struct effect_s *effect = (struct effect_s *)self;
if (effect == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
switch (cmdCode) {
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG: {
if (pCmdData == NULL||
cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t)||
pReplyData == NULL||
*replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG invalid args");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = session_set_config(effect->session, (effect_config_t *)pCmdData);
if (*(int *)pReplyData != 0)
break;
if (effect->state != EFFECT_STATE_ACTIVE)
*(int *)pReplyData = effect_set_state(effect, EFFECT_STATE_CONFIG);
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG invalid args");
return -EINVAL;
}
session_get_config(effect->session, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize < (int)sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize < (int)sizeof(effect_param_t)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM invalid args");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize);
p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
p->status = -ENOSYS;
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL||
cmdSize < (int)sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM invalid args");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM invalid param format");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = -ENOSYS;
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE invalid args");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = effect_set_state(effect, EFFECT_STATE_ACTIVE);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE invalid args");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = effect_set_state(effect, EFFECT_STATE_CONFIG);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_INPUT_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGV("fx_command() %s invalid args",
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE" :
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_INPUT_DEVICE ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_INPUT_DEVICE" :
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME" :
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE" :
"");
return -EINVAL;
}
ALOGV("fx_command() %s value %08x",
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE" :
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_INPUT_DEVICE ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_INPUT_DEVICE" :
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME" :
cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE ? "EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE":
"",
*(int *)pCmdData);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that provides an AudioEffect reply, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 28173666.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix AudioEffect reply overflow
Bug: 28173666
Change-Id: I055af37a721b20c5da0f1ec4b02f630dcd5aee02
|
Low
| 173,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void handle_data_packet(struct mt_connection *curconn, struct mt_mactelnet_hdr *pkthdr, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
struct mt_packet pdata;
unsigned char *data = pkthdr->data;
unsigned int act_size = 0;
int got_user_packet = 0;
int got_pass_packet = 0;
int got_width_packet = 0;
int got_height_packet = 0;
int success;
/* Parse first control packet */
success = parse_control_packet(data, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_BEGINAUTH) {
int plen,i;
if (!curconn->have_pass_salt) {
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
curconn->pass_salt[i] = rand() % 256;
}
curconn->have_pass_salt = 1;
memset(curconn->trypassword, 0, sizeof(curconn->trypassword));
}
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_DATA, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&pdata, MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT, (curconn->pass_salt), 16);
curconn->outcounter += plen;
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
/* Don't change the username after the state is active */
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME && curconn->state != STATE_ACTIVE) {
memcpy(curconn->username, cpkt.data, act_size = (cpkt.length > MT_MNDP_MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1 ? MT_MNDP_MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1 : cpkt.length));
curconn->username[act_size] = 0;
got_user_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH && cpkt.length >= 2) {
unsigned short width;
memcpy(&width, cpkt.data, 2);
curconn->terminal_width = le16toh(width);
got_width_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT && cpkt.length >= 2) {
unsigned short height;
memcpy(&height, cpkt.data, 2);
curconn->terminal_height = le16toh(height);
got_height_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE) {
memcpy(curconn->terminal_type, cpkt.data, act_size = (cpkt.length > 30 - 1 ? 30 - 1 : cpkt.length));
curconn->terminal_type[act_size] = 0;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD) {
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(curconn->trypassword, 17);
#endif
memcpy(curconn->trypassword, cpkt.data, 17);
got_pass_packet = 1;
} else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
/* relay data from client to shell */
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE && curconn->ptsfd != -1) {
write(curconn->ptsfd, cpkt.data, cpkt.length);
}
} else {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("(%d) Unhandeled control packet type: %d"), curconn->seskey, cpkt.cptype);
}
/* Parse next control packet */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
if (got_user_packet && got_pass_packet) {
user_login(curconn, pkthdr);
}
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE && (got_width_packet || got_height_packet)) {
set_terminal_size(curconn->ptsfd, curconn->terminal_width, curconn->terminal_height);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the handle_packet function in mactelnet.c in the client in MAC-Telnet 0.4.3 and earlier allows remote TELNET servers to execute arbitrary code via a long string in an MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT control packet.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
|
Low
| 166,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,inl;
int mdnid, pknid;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
{
if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a,
signature, pkey);
/* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we
* exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying
* verification routine handles all verification.
*/
if (ret != 2)
goto err;
ret = -1;
}
else
{
const EVP_MD *type;
type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data,
(size_t)signature->length) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8y, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0k, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d does not properly perform signature verification for OCSP responses, which allows remote OCSP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an invalid key.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,791
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
{
int i, j, val, n, r;
unsigned char bitlengths[MAX_SYMBOLS], zerocount, ppmd_flags;
unsigned int maxorder;
struct huffman_code precode;
struct rar *rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
struct rar_br *br = &(rar->br);
free_codes(a);
/* Skip to the next byte */
rar_br_consume_unalined_bits(br);
/* PPMd block flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if ((rar->is_ppmd_block = rar_br_bits(br, 1)) != 0)
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7))
goto truncated_data;
ppmd_flags = rar_br_bits(br, 7);
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
/* Memory is allocated in MB */
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->dictionary_size = (rar_br_bits(br, 8) + 1) << 20;
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
if (ppmd_flags & 0x40)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->ppmd_escape = rar->ppmd7_context.InitEsc = rar_br_bits(br, 8);
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
else
rar->ppmd_escape = 2;
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
maxorder = (ppmd_flags & 0x1F) + 1;
if(maxorder > 16)
maxorder = 16 + (maxorder - 16) * 3;
if (maxorder == 1)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make sure ppmd7_contest is freed before Ppmd7_Construct
* because reading a broken file cause this abnormal sequence. */
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context);
rar->bytein.a = a;
rar->bytein.Read = &ppmd_read;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_CreateVTable(&rar->range_dec);
rar->range_dec.Stream = &rar->bytein;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Construct(&rar->ppmd7_context);
if (rar->dictionary_size == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid zero dictionary size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Alloc(&rar->ppmd7_context,
rar->dictionary_size))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Init(&rar->ppmd7_context, maxorder);
rar->ppmd_valid = 1;
}
else
{
if (!rar->ppmd_valid) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid PPMd sequence");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
}
else
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
/* Keep existing table flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if (!rar_br_bits(br, 1))
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
memset(&bitlengths, 0, sizeof(bitlengths));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SYMBOLS;)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
bitlengths[i++] = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (bitlengths[i-1] == 0xF)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
zerocount = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (zerocount)
{
i--;
for (j = 0; j < zerocount + 2 && i < MAX_SYMBOLS; j++)
bitlengths[i++] = 0;
}
}
}
memset(&precode, 0, sizeof(precode));
r = create_code(a, &precode, bitlengths, MAX_SYMBOLS, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (r);
}
for (i = 0; i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE;)
{
if ((val = read_next_symbol(a, &precode)) < 0) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (val < 16)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = (rar->lengthtable[i] + val) & 0xF;
i++;
}
else if (val < 18)
{
if (i == 0)
{
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Internal error extracting RAR file.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if(val == 16) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for (j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = rar->lengthtable[i-1];
i++;
}
}
else
{
if(val == 18) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for(j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
rar->lengthtable[i++] = 0;
}
}
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
r = create_code(a, &rar->maincode, &rar->lengthtable[0], MAINCODE_SIZE,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->offsetcode, &rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE],
OFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE],
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lengthcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE +
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE], LENGTHCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
if (!rar->dictionary_size || !rar->lzss.window)
{
/* Seems as though dictionary sizes are not used. Even so, minimize
* memory usage as much as possible.
*/
void *new_window;
unsigned int new_size;
if (rar->unp_size >= DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE)
new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
else
new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
if (new_window == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for uncompressed data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->lzss.window = (unsigned char *)new_window;
rar->dictionary_size = new_size;
memset(rar->lzss.window, 0, rar->dictionary_size);
rar->lzss.mask = rar->dictionary_size - 1;
}
rar->start_new_table = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
truncated_data:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
rar->valid = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: libarchive version commit 416694915449219d505531b1096384f3237dd6cc onwards (release v3.1.0 onwards) contains a CWE-415: Double Free vulnerability in RAR decoder - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c, parse_codes(), realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size) with new_size = 0 that can result in Crash/DoS. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted RAR archive.
Commit Message: Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym.
|
Medium
| 168,932
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FileReaderLoader::~FileReaderLoader()
{
terminate();
if (!m_urlForReading.isEmpty())
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_urlForReading);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,693
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct salsa20_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 64);
salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv);
if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes))
{
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes);
return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
while (walk.nbytes >= 64) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - (walk.nbytes % 64));
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, walk.nbytes % 64);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Salsa20 encryption algorithm in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not correctly handle zero-length inputs, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based skcipher interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) to cause a denial of service (uninitialized-memory free and kernel crash) or have unspecified other impact by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that use the blkcipher_walk API. Both the generic implementation (crypto/salsa20_generic.c) and x86 implementation (arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c) of Salsa20 were vulnerable.
Commit Message: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.
The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.
The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.
Reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int algfd, reqfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "salsa20",
};
char key[16] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
}
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 167,651
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
register Quantum *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image2 = (Image *) NULL;
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
clone_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
if (ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image == NULL)
{
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
{
MATLAB_KO:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
if (filepos != (unsigned int) filepos)
break;
if(SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET) != filepos) break;
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
if((MagickSizeType) (MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize+filepos) > GetBlobSize(image))
goto MATLAB_KO;
filepos += (MagickOffsetType) MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = decompress_block(image,&MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if (MATLAB_HDR.DataType != miMATRIX)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (image2 != image)
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
#endif
continue; /* skip another objects. */
}
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
(void) ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(z!=3)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,
"MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,
"MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (AcquireMagickResource(ListLengthResource,Frames) == MagickFalse)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ListLengthExceedsLimit");
}
break;
default:
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
{
if ((image2 != (Image*) NULL) && (image2 != image))
{
CloseBlob(image2);
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
}
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (((size_t) size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
/* data size */
if (ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size) != 4)
goto MATLAB_KO;
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
}
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
image->colors = GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
if((unsigned int)ldblk*MATLAB_HDR.SizeY > MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) memset(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2,image_info->endian,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY,
CellType,ldblk,BImgBuff,&quantum_info->minimum,
&quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(image,q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
if (i != (long) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY)
goto END_OF_READING;
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
InsertComplexDoubleRow(image, (double *)BImgBuff, i, MinVal, MaxVal,
exception);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
InsertComplexFloatRow(image,(float *)BImgBuff,i,MinVal,MaxVal,
exception);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
DestroyBlob(rotated_image);
rotated_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
if(!EOFBlob(image) && TellBlob(image)<filepos)
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if ((image2!=NULL) && (image2!=image)) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
END_OF_READING:
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
if (tmp == image2)
image2=(Image *) NULL;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader")
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: coders/mat.c in ImageMagick 7.0.8-43 Q16 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by crafting a Matlab image file that is mishandled in ReadImage in MagickCore/constitute.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1554
|
Medium
| 169,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::free_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nPortIndex;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In for encoder free_buffer");
if (m_state == OMX_StateIdle &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" free buffer while Component in Loading pending");
} else if ((m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == PORT_INDEX_IN)||
(m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == PORT_INDEX_OUT)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Buffer while port %u disabled", (unsigned int)port);
} else if (m_state == OMX_StateExecuting || m_state == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid state to free buffer,ports need to be disabled");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
return eRet;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid state to free buffer,port lost Buffers");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
if (port == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
nPortIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on i/p port - Port idx %u, actual cnt %u",
nPortIndex, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (nPortIndex < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_inp_bm_count,nPortIndex);
free_input_buffer (buffer);
m_sInPortDef.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
/*Free the Buffer Header*/
if (release_input_done()
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
&& !meta_mode_enable
#endif
) {
input_use_buffer = false;
if (m_inp_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_inp_mem_ptr");
free (m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
if (m_pInput_pmem) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pInput_pmem");
free(m_pInput_pmem);
m_pInput_pmem = NULL;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (m_pInput_ion) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pInput_ion");
free(m_pInput_ion);
m_pInput_ion = NULL;
}
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_buffer ,Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
PORT_INDEX_IN,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else if (port == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
nPortIndex = buffer - (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*)m_out_mem_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on o/p port - Port idx %u, actual cnt %u",
nPortIndex, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (nPortIndex < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_out_bm_count,nPortIndex);
m_sOutPortDef.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
free_output_buffer (buffer);
if (release_output_done()) {
output_use_buffer = false;
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_out_mem_ptr");
free (m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
if (m_pOutput_pmem) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pOutput_pmem");
free(m_pOutput_pmem);
m_pOutput_pmem = NULL;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (m_pOutput_ion) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pOutput_ion");
free(m_pOutput_ion);
m_pOutput_ion = NULL;
}
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_buffer , Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_output_done() ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer : If any Disable event pending,post it");
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
PORT_INDEX_OUT,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else {
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if ((eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
if (release_done()) {
if (dev_stop() != 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_stop() FAILED");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateLoaded,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("in free buffer, release not done, need to free more buffers input %" PRIx64" output %" PRIx64,
m_out_bm_count, m_inp_bm_count);
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27662502.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
|
Medium
| 173,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, __construct)
{
#if !HAVE_SPL
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_ce_exception, 0, "Cannot instantiate Phar object without SPL extension");
#else
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *save_fname;
size_t fname_len, alias_len = 0;
int arch_len, entry_len, is_data;
zend_long flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS|SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS;
zend_long format = 0;
phar_archive_object *phar_obj;
phar_archive_data *phar_data;
zval *zobj = getThis(), arg1, arg2;
phar_obj = (phar_archive_object*)((char*)Z_OBJ_P(zobj) - Z_OBJ_P(zobj)->handlers->offset);
is_data = instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(zobj), phar_ce_data);
if (is_data) {
if (zend_parse_parameters_throw(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|ls!l", &fname, &fname_len, &flags, &alias, &alias_len, &format) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters_throw(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|ls!", &fname, &fname_len, &flags, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (phar_obj->archive) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot call constructor twice");
return;
}
save_fname = fname;
if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, (int)fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, !is_data, 2)) {
/* use arch (the basename for the archive) for fname instead of fname */
/* this allows support for RecursiveDirectoryIterator of subdirectories */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(arch, arch_len);
#endif
fname = arch;
fname_len = arch_len;
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
} else {
arch = estrndup(fname, fname_len);
arch_len = fname_len;
fname = arch;
phar_unixify_path_separators(arch, arch_len);
#endif
}
if (phar_open_or_create_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, is_data, REPORT_ERRORS, &phar_data, &error) == FAILURE) {
if (fname == arch && fname != save_fname) {
efree(arch);
fname = save_fname;
}
if (entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"%s", error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Phar creation or opening failed");
}
return;
}
if (is_data && phar_data->is_tar && phar_data->is_brandnew && format == PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP) {
phar_data->is_zip = 1;
phar_data->is_tar = 0;
}
if (fname == arch) {
efree(arch);
fname = save_fname;
}
if ((is_data && !phar_data->is_data) || (!is_data && phar_data->is_data)) {
if (is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"PharData class can only be used for non-executable tar and zip archives");
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Phar class can only be used for executable tar and zip archives");
}
efree(entry);
return;
}
is_data = phar_data->is_data;
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
++(phar_data->refcount);
}
phar_obj->archive = phar_data;
phar_obj->spl.oth_handler = &phar_spl_foreign_handler;
if (entry) {
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "phar://%s%s", phar_data->fname, entry);
efree(entry);
} else {
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "phar://%s", phar_data->fname);
}
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, fname, fname_len);
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, flags);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(zobj, Z_OBJCE_P(zobj),
&spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1, &arg2);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
phar_obj->archive->is_data = is_data;
} else if (!EG(exception)) {
/* register this guy so we can modify if necessary */
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&PHAR_G(phar_persist_map), (const char *) phar_obj->archive, sizeof(phar_obj->archive), phar_obj);
}
phar_obj->spl.info_class = phar_ce_entry;
efree(fname);
#endif /* HAVE_SPL */
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegateImpl::DoCreateShortcutsFlow(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
DCHECK(CanDoCreateShortcutsFlow());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
DCHECK(service);
const extensions::Extension* extension = service->GetInstalledExtension(
extension_id);
DCHECK(extension);
gfx::NativeWindow parent_window = GetAppListWindow();
if (!parent_window)
return;
OnShowChildDialog();
chrome::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(
parent_window, profile, extension,
base::Bind(&AppListControllerDelegateImpl::OnCloseCreateShortcutsPrompt,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
|
Low
| 171,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip;
if (max_offset.x()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_x((scroll_offset.x() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) /
max_offset.x());
}
if (max_offset.y()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_y((scroll_offset.y() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) /
max_offset.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.x());
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.y());
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.x() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() ||
scroll_offset_dip.x() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.x() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.x();
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.y() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() ||
scroll_offset_dip.y() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.y() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.y();
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"x",
scroll_offset_dip.x(),
"y",
scroll_offset_dip.y());
if (compositor_) {
compositor_->DidChangeRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::ScrollOffset(scroll_offset_dip_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
Low
| 171,614
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
Rec2.RecordLength=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if (Rec.RecordLength > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp <= 16))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ReadWPGImage function in coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-9 does not properly validate the colormap index in a WPG palette, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use of uninitialized data or invalid memory allocation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a malformed WPG file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/85
|
Medium
| 167,674
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadImageReply(
SkBitmap bitmap, IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle image_handle = base::SharedMemory::NULLHandle();
uint32 image_size = 0;
std::string reply_data;
if (!bitmap.isNull()) {
std::vector<unsigned char> png_data;
SkAutoLockPixels lock(bitmap);
if (gfx::PNGCodec::EncodeWithCompressionLevel(
static_cast<const unsigned char*>(bitmap.getPixels()),
gfx::PNGCodec::FORMAT_BGRA,
gfx::Size(bitmap.width(), bitmap.height()),
bitmap.rowBytes(),
false,
std::vector<gfx::PNGCodec::Comment>(),
Z_BEST_SPEED,
&png_data)) {
base::SharedMemory buffer;
if (buffer.CreateAndMapAnonymous(png_data.size())) {
memcpy(buffer.memory(), vector_as_array(&png_data), png_data.size());
if (buffer.GiveToProcess(peer_handle(), &image_handle)) {
image_size = png_data.size();
}
}
}
}
ClipboardHostMsg_ReadImage::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, image_handle,
image_size);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle Khmer characters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
ssh_string sig_blob = NULL;
int rc;
(void)packet;
(void)user;
(void)type;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "Received SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS");
if(session->session_state!= SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH &&
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_newkeys called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
if(session->server){
/* server things are done in server.c */
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_FINISHED;
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
goto error;
}
/*
* Set the cryptographic functions for the next crypto
* (it is needed for generate_session_keys for key lengths)
*/
if (crypt_set_algorithms(session, SSH_3DES) /* knows nothing about DES*/ ) {
goto error;
}
if (generate_session_keys(session) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* Verify the host's signature. FIXME do it sooner */
sig_blob = session->next_crypto->dh_server_signature;
session->next_crypto->dh_server_signature = NULL;
/* get the server public key */
rc = ssh_pki_import_pubkey_blob(session->next_crypto->server_pubkey, &key);
if (rc < 0) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
/* check if public key from server matches user preferences */
if (session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]) {
if(!ssh_match_group(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
key->type_c)) {
ssh_set_error(session,
SSH_FATAL,
"Public key from server (%s) doesn't match user "
"preference (%s)",
key->type_c,
session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]);
ssh_key_free(key);
return -1;
}
}
rc = ssh_pki_signature_verify_blob(session,
sig_blob,
key,
session->next_crypto->secret_hash,
session->next_crypto->digest_len);
/* Set the server public key type for known host checking */
session->next_crypto->server_pubkey_type = key->type_c;
ssh_key_free(key);
ssh_string_burn(sig_blob);
ssh_string_free(sig_blob);
sig_blob = NULL;
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Signature verified and valid");
/*
* Once we got SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS we can switch next_crypto and
* current_crypto
*/
if (session->current_crypto) {
crypto_free(session->current_crypto);
session->current_crypto=NULL;
}
/* FIXME later, include a function to change keys */
session->current_crypto = session->next_crypto;
session->next_crypto = crypto_new();
if (session->next_crypto == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
goto error;
}
session->next_crypto->session_id = malloc(session->current_crypto->digest_len);
if (session->next_crypto->session_id == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
goto error;
}
memcpy(session->next_crypto->session_id, session->current_crypto->session_id,
session->current_crypto->digest_len);
}
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_FINISHED;
session->ssh_connection_callback(session);
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS and (2) SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY packet handlers in package_cb.c in libssh before 0.6.5 do not properly validate state, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted SSH packet.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void cmd_parse_status(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char *value = NULL;
struct Buffy *inc = NULL;
struct ImapMbox mx;
struct ImapStatus *status = NULL;
unsigned int olduv, oldun;
unsigned int litlen;
short new = 0;
short new_msg_count = 0;
char *mailbox = imap_next_word(s);
/* We need a real tokenizer. */
if (imap_get_literal_count(mailbox, &litlen) == 0)
{
if (imap_cmd_step(idata) != IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE)
{
idata->status = IMAP_FATAL;
return;
}
mailbox = idata->buf;
s = mailbox + litlen;
*s = '\0';
s++;
SKIPWS(s);
}
else
{
s = imap_next_word(mailbox);
*(s - 1) = '\0';
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mailbox);
}
status = imap_mboxcache_get(idata, mailbox, 1);
olduv = status->uidvalidity;
oldun = status->uidnext;
if (*s++ != '(')
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS\n");
return;
}
while (*s && *s != ')')
{
value = imap_next_word(s);
errno = 0;
const unsigned long ulcount = strtoul(value, &value, 10);
if (((errno == ERANGE) && (ulcount == ULONG_MAX)) || ((unsigned int) ulcount != ulcount))
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS number\n");
return;
}
const unsigned int count = (unsigned int) ulcount;
if (mutt_str_strncmp("MESSAGES", s, 8) == 0)
{
status->messages = count;
new_msg_count = 1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("RECENT", s, 6) == 0)
status->recent = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDNEXT", s, 7) == 0)
status->uidnext = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDVALIDITY", s, 11) == 0)
status->uidvalidity = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UNSEEN", s, 6) == 0)
status->unseen = count;
s = value;
if (*s && *s != ')')
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
mutt_debug(3, "%s (UIDVALIDITY: %u, UIDNEXT: %u) %d messages, %d recent, %d unseen\n",
status->name, status->uidvalidity, status->uidnext,
status->messages, status->recent, status->unseen);
/* caller is prepared to handle the result herself */
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_STATUS)
{
memcpy(idata->cmddata, status, sizeof(struct ImapStatus));
return;
}
mutt_debug(3, "Running default STATUS handler\n");
/* should perhaps move this code back to imap_buffy_check */
for (inc = Incoming; inc; inc = inc->next)
{
if (inc->magic != MUTT_IMAP)
continue;
if (imap_parse_path(inc->path, &mx) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing mailbox %s, skipping\n", inc->path);
continue;
}
if (imap_account_match(&idata->conn->account, &mx.account))
{
if (mx.mbox)
{
value = mutt_str_strdup(mx.mbox);
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, value, mutt_str_strlen(value) + 1);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
else
value = mutt_str_strdup("INBOX");
if (value && (imap_mxcmp(mailbox, value) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(3, "Found %s in buffy list (OV: %u ON: %u U: %d)\n", mailbox,
olduv, oldun, status->unseen);
if (MailCheckRecent)
{
if (olduv && olduv == status->uidvalidity)
{
if (oldun < status->uidnext)
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else if (!olduv && !oldun)
{
/* first check per session, use recent. might need a flag for this. */
new = (status->recent > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
#ifdef USE_SIDEBAR
if ((inc->new != new) || (inc->msg_count != status->messages) ||
(inc->msg_unread != status->unseen))
{
mutt_menu_set_current_redraw(REDRAW_SIDEBAR);
}
#endif
inc->new = new;
if (new_msg_count)
inc->msg_count = status->messages;
inc->msg_unread = status->unseen;
if (inc->new)
{
/* force back to keep detecting new mail until the mailbox is
opened */
status->uidnext = oldun;
}
FREE(&value);
return;
}
FREE(&value);
}
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. imap/command.c mishandles a long IMAP status mailbox literal count size.
Commit Message: Ensure litlen isn't larger than our mailbox
|
Low
| 169,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct sock *newsk;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (dst == NULL && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto exit_nonewsk;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
newinet->inet_id = jiffies;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
const void __user * __user *, pages,
const int __user *, nodes,
int __user *, status, int, flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
nodemask_t task_nodes;
/* Check flags */
if (flags & ~(MPOL_MF_MOVE|MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL))
return -EINVAL;
if ((flags & MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
return -EPERM;
/* Find the mm_struct */
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
if (!task) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -ESRCH;
}
get_task_struct(task);
/*
* Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
* process. The right exists if the process has administrative
* capabilities, superuser privileges or the same
* userid as the target process.
*/
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
!uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
err = security_task_movememory(task);
if (err)
goto out;
task_nodes = cpuset_mems_allowed(task);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!mm)
return -EINVAL;
if (nodes)
err = do_pages_move(mm, task_nodes, nr_pages, pages,
nodes, status, flags);
else
err = do_pages_stat(mm, nr_pages, pages, status);
mmput(mm);
return err;
out:
put_task_struct(task);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The move_pages system call in mm/migrate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.9 doesn't check the effective uid of the target process, enabling a local attacker to learn the memory layout of a setuid executable despite ASLR.
Commit Message: Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks
The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).
That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.
So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.
This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.
Famous last words.
Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,770
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string MakeMediaAccessRequest(int index) {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin;
MediaStreamManager::MediaAccessRequestCallback callback =
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManagerTest::ResponseCallback,
base::Unretained(this), index);
StreamControls controls(true, true);
return media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id, controls,
security_origin, std::move(callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,107
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
void *params = malloc(size);
data.read(params, size);
status_t err;
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
MetadataBufferType type;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index, &bufferProducer, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_PERSISTENT_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer;
status_t err = createPersistentInputSurface(
&bufferProducer, &bufferConsumer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferConsumer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer =
interface_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer>(data.readStrongBinder());
MetadataBufferType type;
status_t err = setInputSurface(node, port_index, bufferConsumer, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
MetadataBufferType type;
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length, flags, timestamp, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmedia/IOMX.cpp in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not initialize certain metadata buffer pointers, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via unspecified vectors, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26324358.
Commit Message: 3 uninitialized variables in IOMX.cpp
Uninitialized MetadataBufferType pointer in case:
SET_INPUT_SURFACE
STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS
CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE
Fix: initialize them to kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid
Bug: 26324358
Change-Id: Ib3bcac9bedc98bc65efa39f67cdbffbd90b374c9
|
Low
| 173,892
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->offset);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
/* set up the kvec */
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents->web_contents());
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents->web_contents(), NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents->web_contents());
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents->web_contents());
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ip_send_reply(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_reply_arg *arg,
unsigned int len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct {
struct ip_options opt;
char data[40];
} replyopts;
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
__be32 daddr;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (ip_options_echo(&replyopts.opt, skb))
return;
daddr = ipc.addr = rt->rt_src;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
if (replyopts.opt.optlen) {
ipc.opt = &replyopts.opt;
if (ipc.opt->srr)
daddr = replyopts.opt.faddr;
}
{
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, arg->bound_dev_if, 0,
RT_TOS(ip_hdr(skb)->tos),
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
ip_reply_arg_flowi_flags(arg),
daddr, rt->rt_spec_dst,
tcp_hdr(skb)->source, tcp_hdr(skb)->dest);
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return;
}
/* And let IP do all the hard work.
This chunk is not reenterable, hence spinlock.
Note that it uses the fact, that this function is called
with locally disabled BH and that sk cannot be already spinlocked.
*/
bh_lock_sock(sk);
inet->tos = ip_hdr(skb)->tos;
sk->sk_priority = skb->priority;
sk->sk_protocol = ip_hdr(skb)->protocol;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = arg->bound_dev_if;
ip_append_data(sk, ip_reply_glue_bits, arg->iov->iov_base, len, 0,
&ipc, &rt, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if ((skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue)) != NULL) {
if (arg->csumoffset >= 0)
*((__sum16 *)skb_transport_header(skb) +
arg->csumoffset) = csum_fold(csum_add(skb->csum,
arg->csum));
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
ip_push_pending_frames(sk);
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int wdm_post_reset(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = wdm_find_device(intf);
int rv;
clear_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags);
rv = recover_from_urb_loss(desc);
mutex_unlock(&desc->wlock);
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,104
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_list_int(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_attr_list_context *context)
{
struct attrlist_cursor_kern *cursor;
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
int retval;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_list_leaf(context);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
cursor = context->cursor;
cursor->initted = 1;
/*
* Re-find our place in the leaf block if this is a new syscall.
*/
if (context->resynch) {
entry = &entries[0];
for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == cursor->hashval) {
if (cursor->offset == context->dupcnt) {
context->dupcnt = 0;
break;
}
context->dupcnt++;
} else if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) >
cursor->hashval) {
context->dupcnt = 0;
break;
}
}
if (i == ichdr.count) {
trace_xfs_attr_list_notfound(context);
return 0;
}
} else {
entry = &entries[0];
i = 0;
}
context->resynch = 0;
/*
* We have found our place, start copying out the new attributes.
*/
retval = 0;
for (; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) != cursor->hashval) {
cursor->hashval = be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval);
cursor->offset = 0;
}
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)
continue; /* skip incomplete entries */
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc =
xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, i);
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_loc->nameval,
(int)name_loc->namelen,
be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen),
&name_loc->nameval[name_loc->namelen]);
if (retval)
return retval;
} else {
xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote_t *name_rmt =
xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
int valuelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
if (context->put_value) {
xfs_da_args_t args;
memset((char *)&args, 0, sizeof(args));
args.dp = context->dp;
args.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
args.valuelen = valuelen;
args.value = kmem_alloc(valuelen, KM_SLEEP | KM_NOFS);
args.rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args.rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(
args.dp->i_mount, valuelen);
retval = xfs_attr_rmtval_get(&args);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_rmt->name,
(int)name_rmt->namelen,
valuelen,
args.value);
kmem_free(args.value);
} else {
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_rmt->name,
(int)name_rmt->namelen,
valuelen,
NULL);
}
if (retval)
return retval;
}
if (context->seen_enough)
break;
cursor->offset++;
}
trace_xfs_attr_list_leaf_end(context);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
|
Low
| 166,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int read_request(int fd, debugger_request_t* out_request) {
ucred cr;
socklen_t len = sizeof(cr);
int status = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cr, &len);
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("cannot get credentials");
return -1;
}
ALOGV("reading tid");
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
pollfd pollfds[1];
pollfds[0].fd = fd;
pollfds[0].events = POLLIN;
pollfds[0].revents = 0;
status = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pollfds, 1, 3000));
if (status != 1) {
ALOGE("timed out reading tid (from pid=%d uid=%d)\n", cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
debugger_msg_t msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
status = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, &msg, sizeof(msg)));
if (status < 0) {
ALOGE("read failure? %s (pid=%d uid=%d)\n", strerror(errno), cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
if (status != sizeof(debugger_msg_t)) {
ALOGE("invalid crash request of size %d (from pid=%d uid=%d)\n", status, cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
out_request->action = static_cast<debugger_action_t>(msg.action);
out_request->tid = msg.tid;
out_request->pid = cr.pid;
out_request->uid = cr.uid;
out_request->gid = cr.gid;
out_request->abort_msg_address = msg.abort_msg_address;
out_request->original_si_code = msg.original_si_code;
if (msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) {
char buf[64];
struct stat s;
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/proc/%d/task/%d", out_request->pid, out_request->tid);
if (stat(buf, &s)) {
ALOGE("tid %d does not exist in pid %d. ignoring debug request\n",
out_request->tid, out_request->pid);
return -1;
}
} else if (cr.uid == 0
|| (cr.uid == AID_SYSTEM && msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_BACKTRACE)) {
status = get_process_info(out_request->tid, &out_request->pid,
&out_request->uid, &out_request->gid);
if (status < 0) {
ALOGE("tid %d does not exist. ignoring explicit dump request\n", out_request->tid);
return -1;
}
if (!selinux_action_allowed(fd, out_request))
return -1;
} else {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp in Debuggerd in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 mishandles the interaction between PTRACE_ATTACH operations and thread exits, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29555636.
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
|
Medium
| 173,407
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
Medium
| 172,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::setInnerHTML(const String& html, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = createFragmentFromSource(html, this, ec);
if (fragment)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,441
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: inline void update_rq_clock(struct rq *rq)
{
if (!rq->skip_clock_update) {
int cpu = cpu_of(rq);
u64 irq_time;
rq->clock = sched_clock_cpu(cpu);
irq_time = irq_time_cpu(cpu);
if (rq->clock - irq_time > rq->clock_task)
rq->clock_task = rq->clock - irq_time;
sched_irq_time_avg_update(rq, irq_time);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a certain clock-update optimization, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an application that executes code in a loop.
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,678
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
libxml_globals->stream_context = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_buffer.c = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_list = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The SOAP parser in PHP before 5.3.23 and 5.4.x before 5.4.13 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a SOAP WSDL file containing an XML external entity declaration in conjunction with an entity reference, related to an XML External Entity (XXE) issue in the soap_xmlParseFile and soap_xmlParseMemory functions. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-1824.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,744
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RejectPairing() {
RunPairingCallbacks(REJECTED);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,232
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void btif_av_event_free_data(btif_sm_event_t event, void* p_data) {
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT: {
tBTA_AV* av = (tBTA_AV*)p_data;
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&av->meta_msg.p_data);
if (av->meta_msg.p_msg) {
if (av->meta_msg.p_msg->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) {
osi_free(av->meta_msg.p_msg->vendor.p_vendor_data);
}
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&av->meta_msg.p_msg);
}
} break;
default:
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In avrc_pars_browsing_cmd of avrc_pars_tg.cc, there is a possible use-after-free due to improper locking. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege in the Bluetooth service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android ID: A-109699112
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
|
Low
| 174,101
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_Open(const char *midifile) {
uint8_t *mididata = NULL;
uint32_t midisize = 0;
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midifile == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL filename)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if ((mididata = (uint8_t *) _WM_BufferFile(midifile, &midisize)) == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(mididata,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(mididata, midisize);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(mididata, midisize);
}
free(mididata);
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WildMidi_Open function in WildMIDI since commit d8a466829c67cacbb1700beded25c448d99514e5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
|
Medium
| 169,369
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jas_stream_gobble(jas_stream_t *stream, int n)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_getc(stream) == EOF) {
return n - m;
}
}
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) jas_realloc function in base/jas_malloc.c and (2) mem_resize function in base/jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.22 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image, which triggers use after free vulnerabilities.
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
|
Medium
| 168,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view,
long signr, size_t *total)
{
unsigned int i;
/*
* NT_PRSTATUS is the one special case, because the regset data
* goes into the pr_reg field inside the note contents, rather
* than being the whole note contents. We fill the reset in here.
* We assume that regset 0 is NT_PRSTATUS.
*/
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, t->task, signr);
(void) view->regsets[0].get(t->task, &view->regsets[0],
0, sizeof(t->prstatus.pr_reg),
&t->prstatus.pr_reg, NULL);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(t->prstatus), &t->prstatus);
*total += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* Each other regset might generate a note too. For each regset
* that has no core_note_type or is inactive, we leave t->notes[i]
* all zero and we'll know to skip writing it later.
*/
for (i = 1; i < view->n; ++i) {
const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[i];
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, regset);
if (regset->core_note_type &&
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset))) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset->n * regset->size;
void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
0, size, data, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret))
kfree(data);
else {
if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRFPREG)
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "LINUX",
regset->core_note_type,
size, data);
else {
t->prstatus.pr_fpvalid = 1;
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "CORE",
NT_PRFPREG, size, data);
}
*total += notesize(&t->notes[i]);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The regset (aka register set) feature in the Linux kernel before 3.2.10 does not properly handle the absence of .get and .set methods, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a (1) PTRACE_GETREGSET or (2) PTRACE_SETREGSET ptrace call.
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitAgentHost() {
if (debuggee_.tab_id) {
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(*debuggee_.tab_id,
GetProfile(),
include_incognito(),
NULL,
NULL,
&web_contents,
NULL);
if (result && web_contents) {
if (content::HasWebUIScheme(web_contents->GetURL())) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kAttachToWebUIError,
web_contents->GetURL().scheme());
return false;
}
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(web_contents);
}
} else if (debuggee_.extension_id) {
ExtensionHost* extension_host =
ExtensionSystem::Get(GetProfile())
->process_manager()
->GetBackgroundHostForExtension(*debuggee_.extension_id);
if (extension_host) {
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(
extension_host->render_view_host());
}
} else if (debuggee_.target_id) {
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(*debuggee_.target_id);
} else {
error_ = keys::kInvalidTargetError;
return false;
}
if (!agent_host_.get()) {
FormatErrorMessage(keys::kNoTargetError);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Debugger extension API in browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger_api.cc in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not validate a tab's URL before an attach operation, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access limitations via an extension that uses a restricted URL, as demonstrated by a chrome:// URL.
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,653
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el) {
if (c->rbytes > 1024) {
/*
* We didn't have a '\n' in the first k. This _has_ to be a
* large multiget, if not we should just nuke the connection.
*/
char *ptr = c->rcurr;
while (*ptr == ' ') { /* ignore leading whitespaces */
++ptr;
}
if (strcmp(ptr, "get ") && strcmp(ptr, "gets ")) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: memcached.c in memcached before 1.4.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon hang or crash) via a long line that triggers excessive memory allocation. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
|
Low
| 165,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
krb5_data pname_data, tkt_data;
int sock = 0;
socklen_t l;
int retval;
struct sockaddr_in l_inaddr, f_inaddr; /* local, foreign address */
krb5_creds creds, *new_creds;
krb5_ccache cc;
krb5_data msgtext, msg;
krb5_context context;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
#ifndef DEBUG
freopen("/tmp/uu-server.log", "w", stderr);
#endif
retval = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (retval) {
com_err(argv[0], retval, "while initializing krb5");
exit(1);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
{
int one = 1;
int acc;
struct servent *sp;
socklen_t namelen = sizeof(f_inaddr);
if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "creating socket");
exit(3);
}
l_inaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
l_inaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;
if (argc == 2) {
l_inaddr.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[1]));
} else {
if (!(sp = getservbyname("uu-sample", "tcp"))) {
com_err("uu-server", 0, "can't find uu-sample/tcp service");
exit(3);
}
l_inaddr.sin_port = sp->s_port;
}
(void) setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof (one));
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, sizeof(l_inaddr))) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "binding socket");
exit(3);
}
if (listen(sock, 1) == -1) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "listening");
exit(3);
}
printf("Server started\n");
fflush(stdout);
if ((acc = accept(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &namelen)) == -1) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "accepting");
exit(3);
}
dup2(acc, 0);
close(sock);
sock = 0;
}
#endif
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &pname_data);
if (retval) {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading pname");
return 2;
}
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &tkt_data);
if (retval) {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading ticket data");
return 2;
}
retval = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting credentials cache");
return 4;
}
memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cc, &creds.client);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-client", retval, "getting principal name");
return 6;
}
/* client sends it already null-terminated. */
printf ("uu-server: client principal is \"%s\".\n", pname_data.data);
retval = krb5_parse_name(context, pname_data.data, &creds.server);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "parsing client name");
return 3;
}
creds.second_ticket = tkt_data;
printf ("uu-server: client ticket is %d bytes.\n",
creds.second_ticket.length);
retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, KRB5_GC_USER_USER, cc,
&creds, &new_creds);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting user-user ticket");
return 5;
}
#ifndef DEBUG
l = sizeof(f_inaddr);
if (getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &l) == -1)
{
com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting client address");
return 6;
}
#endif
l = sizeof(l_inaddr);
if (getsockname(0, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, &l) == -1)
{
com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting local address");
return 6;
}
/* send a ticket/authenticator to the other side, so it can get the key
we're using for the krb_safe below. */
retval = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "making auth_context");
return 8;
}
retval = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "initializing the auth_context flags");
return 8;
}
retval =
krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(context, auth_context, sock,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR |
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "generating addrs for auth_context");
return 9;
}
#if 1
retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, &auth_context,
AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY,
NULL, new_creds, &msg);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "making AP_REQ");
return 8;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg);
#else
retval = krb5_sendauth(context, &auth_context, (krb5_pointer)&sock, "???",
0, 0,
AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY,
NULL, &creds, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (retval)
goto cl_short_wrt;
free(msg.data);
msgtext.length = 32;
msgtext.data = "Hello, other end of connection.";
retval = krb5_mk_safe(context, auth_context, &msgtext, &msg, NULL);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "encoding message to client");
return 6;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg);
if (retval) {
cl_short_wrt:
com_err("uu-server", retval, "writing message to client");
return 7;
}
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &msg);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &pname_data);
/* tkt_data freed with creds */
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
krb5_free_creds(context, new_creds);
krb5_cc_close(context, cc);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_context(context);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.13.1 incorrectly expects that a krb5_read_message data field is represented as a string ending with a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a zero-byte version string or (2) cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by omitting the '0' character, related to appl/user_user/server.c and lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c.
Commit Message: Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355]
In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of
krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no
guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected
krb5_data value and use data_eq().
In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received
client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf
and krb5_parse_name.
CVE-2014-5355:
In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an
unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by
sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of
allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string.
The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly
vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name
string.
The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client
using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure
containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth
assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to
strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet
sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference
a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a
non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end
of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash.
uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal
name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without
verifying that it is a valid C string.
The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized
versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually
run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming
connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a
complete denial of service.
Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVSS score]
ticket: 8050 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
{
struct map_struct *buf;
OFF_T i, len = st_p->st_size;
md_context m;
int32 remainder;
int fd;
memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
return;
buf = map_file(fd, len, MAX_MAP_SIZE, CSUM_CHUNK);
switch (checksum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CSUM_CHUNK),
CSUM_CHUNK);
}
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
mdfour_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
}
/* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0 || checksum_type != CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid checksum-choice for the --checksum option (%d)\n", checksum_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
close(fd);
unmap_file(buf);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,643
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<vp9_subp_avg_variance_fn_t>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
sec_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1, sec_));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_avg_variance_ref(ref_, src_, sec_,
log2width_, log2height_,
x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,588
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg;
bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
dst_reg = ®s[dst];
if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from
* e.g. dead branches.
*/
__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
verbose(env,
"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
return -EACCES;
}
/* fall-through */
default:
break;
}
/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
* The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
*/
dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
!check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
return -EINVAL;
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
*/
if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
/* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
* == 0, since it's a scalar.
* dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
* integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
* if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
* this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
* added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
* from ptr_reg.
*/
if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
}
if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
dst_reg->raw = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
* test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
* be able to deal with it.
*/
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
/* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
* nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
*/
if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
}
if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
if (smin_val < 0)
dst_reg->raw = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
case BPF_OR:
case BPF_XOR:
/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */
verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
default:
/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
}
if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
return -EINVAL;
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
* in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
return -EACCES;
} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 170,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LocalSiteCharacteristicsWebContentsObserverTest() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kSiteCharacteristicsDatabase);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
Medium
| 172,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: videobuf_vm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct videobuf_mapping *map = vma->vm_private_data;
struct videobuf_queue *q = map->q;
int i;
dprintk(2,"vm_close %p [count=%d,vma=%08lx-%08lx]\n",map,
map->count,vma->vm_start,vma->vm_end);
map->count--;
if (0 == map->count) {
dprintk(1,"munmap %p q=%p\n",map,q);
mutex_lock(&q->lock);
for (i = 0; i < VIDEO_MAX_FRAME; i++) {
if (NULL == q->bufs[i])
continue;
if (q->bufs[i]->map != map)
continue;
q->ops->buf_release(q,q->bufs[i]);
q->bufs[i]->map = NULL;
q->bufs[i]->baddr = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
kfree(map);
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/video/videobuf-vmalloc.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.24 does not initialize videobuf_mapping data structures, which allows local users to trigger an incorrect count value and videobuf leak via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-5321.
Commit Message: V4L/DVB (6751): V4L: Memory leak! Fix count in videobuf-vmalloc mmap
This is pretty serious bug. map->count is never initialized after the
call to kmalloc making the count start at some random trash value. The
end result is leaking videobufs.
Also, fix up the debug statements to print unsigned values.
Pushed to http://ifup.org/hg/v4l-dvb too
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
|
Low
| 168,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: chdlc_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
register u_int length = h->len;
register u_int caplen = h->caplen;
if (caplen < CHDLC_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|chdlc]"));
return (caplen);
}
return (chdlc_print(ndo, p,length));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Cisco HDLC parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-chdlc.c:chdlc_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13687/CHDLC: Improve bounds and length checks.
Prevent a possible buffer overread in chdlc_print() and replace the
custom check in chdlc_if_print() with a standard check in chdlc_print()
so that the latter certainly does not over-read even when reached via
juniper_chdlc_print(). Add length checks.
|
Low
| 170,021
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: decode_multicast_vpn(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
uint8_t route_type, route_length, addr_length, sg_length;
u_int offset;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], 2);
route_type = *pptr++;
route_length = *pptr++;
snprintf(buf, buflen, "Route-Type: %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_multicast_vpn_route_type_values,
"Unknown", route_type),
route_type, route_length);
switch(route_type) {
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTRA_AS_I_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Originator %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
bgp_vpn_ip_print(ndo, pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,
(route_length - BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) << 3));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTER_AS_I_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 4);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Source-AS %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_S_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
sg_length = bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
addr_length = route_length - sg_length;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], addr_length);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", Originator %s",
bgp_vpn_ip_print(ndo, pptr, addr_length << 3));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SOURCE_ACTIVE:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SHARED_TREE_JOIN: /* fall through */
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SOURCE_TREE_JOIN:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Source-AS %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
break;
/*
* no per route-type printing yet.
*/
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTRA_AS_SEG_LEAF:
default:
break;
}
return route_length + 2;
trunc:
return -2;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:decode_multicast_vpn().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13043/BGP: fix decoding of MVPN route types 6 and 7
RFC 6514 Section 4.6 defines the structure for Shared Tree Join (6) and
Source Tree Join (7) multicast VPN route types. decode_multicast_vpn()
didn't implement the Source AS field of that structure properly, adjust
the offsets to put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,832
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(struct svc_req *rqst,
struct rpc_gss_init_res *gr)
{
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
struct rpc_gss_cred *gc;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, seqbuf;
gss_OID mech;
OM_uint32 maj_stat = 0, min_stat = 0, ret_flags, seq;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_accept_context()");
gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth);
gc = (struct rpc_gss_cred *)rqst->rq_clntcred;
memset(gr, 0, sizeof(*gr));
/* Deserialize arguments. */
memset(&recv_tok, 0, sizeof(recv_tok));
if (!svc_getargs(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_args,
(caddr_t)&recv_tok))
return (FALSE);
gr->gr_major = gss_accept_sec_context(&gr->gr_minor,
&gd->ctx,
svcauth_gss_creds,
&recv_tok,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&gd->client_name,
&mech,
&gr->gr_token,
&ret_flags,
NULL,
NULL);
svc_freeargs(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_args, (caddr_t)&recv_tok);
log_status("accept_sec_context", gr->gr_major, gr->gr_minor);
if (gr->gr_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
gr->gr_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
badauth(gr->gr_major, gr->gr_minor, rqst->rq_xprt);
gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
goto errout;
}
/*
* ANDROS: krb5 mechglue returns ctx of size 8 - two pointers,
* one to the mechanism oid, one to the internal_ctx_id
*/
if ((gr->gr_ctx.value = mem_alloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc))) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "svcauth_gss_accept_context: out of memory\n");
goto errout;
}
memcpy(gr->gr_ctx.value, gd->ctx, sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
gr->gr_ctx.length = sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc);
/* gr->gr_win = 0x00000005; ANDROS: for debugging linux kernel version... */
gr->gr_win = sizeof(gd->seqmask) * 8;
/* Save client info. */
gd->sec.mech = mech;
gd->sec.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
gd->sec.svc = gc->gc_svc;
gd->seq = gc->gc_seq;
gd->win = gr->gr_win;
if (gr->gr_major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
#ifdef SPKM
/* spkm3: no src_name (anonymous) */
if(!g_OID_equal(gss_mech_spkm3, mech)) {
#endif
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, gd->client_name,
&gd->cname, &gd->sec.mech);
#ifdef SPKM
}
#endif
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
log_status("display_name", maj_stat, min_stat);
goto errout;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL
log_debug("accepted context for %.*s with "
"<mech {}, qop %d, svc %d>",
gd->cname.length, (char *)gd->cname.value,
gd->sec.qop, gd->sec.svc);
#else
{
gss_buffer_desc mechname;
gss_oid_to_str(&min_stat, mech, &mechname);
log_debug("accepted context for %.*s with "
"<mech %.*s, qop %d, svc %d>",
gd->cname.length, (char *)gd->cname.value,
mechname.length, (char *)mechname.value,
gd->sec.qop, gd->sec.svc);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &mechname);
}
#endif
#endif /* DEBUG */
seq = htonl(gr->gr_win);
seqbuf.value = &seq;
seqbuf.length = sizeof(seq);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
maj_stat = gss_sign(&min_stat, gd->ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
&seqbuf, &gd->checksum);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
goto errout;
}
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_flavor = RPCSEC_GSS;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_base = gd->checksum.value;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_length = gd->checksum.length;
}
return (TRUE);
errout:
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr->gr_token);
return (FALSE);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context function in lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.11.x through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 transmits uninitialized interposer data to clients, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process heap memory by sniffing the network for data in a handle field.
Commit Message: Fix gssrpc data leakage [CVE-2014-9423]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(), do not copy
bytes from the union context into the handle field we send to the
client. We do not use this handle field, so just supply a fixed
string of "xxxx".
In gss_union_ctx_id_struct, remove the unused "interposer" field which
was causing part of the union context to remain uninitialized.
ticket: 8058 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::ScrollHitTest(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset) {
display_item_list_.AllocateAndConstruct<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest, std::move(scroll_offset));
return *this;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init sit_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
if (xfrm4_tunnel_register(&sit_handler, AF_INET6) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "sit init: Can't add protocol\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&sit_handler, AF_INET6);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void get_frame_stats(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
const vpx_image_t *img,
vpx_codec_pts_t pts,
unsigned int duration,
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags,
unsigned int deadline,
vpx_fixed_buf_t *stats) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(ctx, img, pts, duration, flags,
deadline);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to get frame stats.");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(ctx, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT) {
const uint8_t *const pkt_buf = pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf;
const size_t pkt_size = pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz;
stats->buf = realloc(stats->buf, stats->sz + pkt_size);
memcpy((uint8_t *)stats->buf + stats->sz, pkt_buf, pkt_size);
stats->sz += pkt_size;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,492
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DefragIPv4NoDataTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int id = 12;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* This packet has an offset > 0, more frags set to 0 and no data. */
p = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 0, 'A', 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should
* have been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static netdev_tx_t veth_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_device *rcv = NULL;
struct veth_priv *priv, *rcv_priv;
struct veth_net_stats *stats, *rcv_stats;
int length;
priv = netdev_priv(dev);
rcv = priv->peer;
rcv_priv = netdev_priv(rcv);
stats = this_cpu_ptr(priv->stats);
rcv_stats = this_cpu_ptr(rcv_priv->stats);
if (!(rcv->flags & IFF_UP))
goto tx_drop;
if (dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM)
skb->ip_summed = rcv_priv->ip_summed;
length = skb->len + ETH_HLEN;
if (dev_forward_skb(rcv, skb) != NET_RX_SUCCESS)
goto rx_drop;
stats->tx_bytes += length;
stats->tx_packets++;
rcv_stats->rx_bytes += length;
rcv_stats->rx_packets++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
tx_drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
stats->tx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
rx_drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
rcv_stats->rx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The veth (aka virtual Ethernet) driver in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly manage skbs during congestion, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging lack of skb consumption in conjunction with a double-free error.
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,088
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,633
|
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